§ 2. On Doubtful Conscience.

220. Notion. Doubtful conscience is that by which the mind suspends judgment concerning the honesty of an action, or indeed forms it, but with fear of erring.

a. Doubt accepted in general is a state of the mind concerning some proposition, by which the mind lacks certitude: for one is called doubtful who is not certain, whether he suspends judgment, or inclines to one side, or assents to one side with fear concerning the opposite. Therefore doubt accepted in this sense is opposed to certitude alone.

b. A twofold doubt must be distinguished, strict and broad: for the mind which does not possess a firm judgment concerning the honesty of an action can have itself in two ways; for either it assents to neither side, neither for liceity nor against liceity, but suspends assent (strict doubt), or it assents to one side rather than the other, but with fear of erring (broad doubt).

c. Doubt properly and strictly so called, since it is suspension of judgment or suspension of assent concerning some proposition, is opposed to all states of the mind by which the mind in some way assents to a proposition: suspicion, opinion, and certitude. For in suspicion the mind inclines to one side without nevertheless assenting to it; in opinion the mind assents to one side, but with fear; finally, in certitude it assents without fear.

d. Doubt properly and strictly taken can happen from a twofold reason: either because on each side there are either no reasons or only slight reasons, or because on each side equal or almost equal reasons militate. Therefore in doubt strictly accepted the mind is as the tongue of a balance which, placed in equilibrium, bends neither to one side nor to the other. But where on each side probable reasons are present, the will can move the mind to assent to one or the other.

221. Division. 1. By reason of the motive, doubt is called negative if either no reasons or only slight reasons of assenting occur; and it is called positive if a grave reason of assenting is present, which nevertheless does not exclude prudent fear of erring.

Positive doubt can happen in two ways: for either on each side there is a grave reason of assenting, or on one side only, while on the other no reason of assenting appears. The same must be said of negative doubt: for either on each side a reason of assenting is lacking, or on one side only, while on the other a reason of more or less firmly assenting is present, as if a priest doubts whether he consecrated duly, because reflexively he does not remember the consecration having been made.

2. By reason of the object, one doubt is speculative, which is concerned with the truth of a matter or proposition, e.g. whether painting is a servile work, or with the liceity of an action in general, e.g. whether it is lawful to paint on a feast day; another is practical, which is concerned with the liceity of an action now to be placed, e.g. whether it is lawful for me to paint today.

Therefore that doubt which is concerned with the liceity of an action in general is not customarily called practical doubt, but that which is concerned with the liceity of an action to be placed here and now.

3. Speculative doubt is either doubt of fact, which is concerned with a particular matter, e.g. whether I recited the hours, whether the child has been baptized, whether this food is meat; or doubt of law, which is immediately concerned with the law, or with a faculty of doing something, or with the value of an act, e.g. whether it is prohibited to hunt on a feast day, whether a parish priest can dispense from fasting, whether such a baptism is valid.

Practical doubt always supposes speculative doubt, whether of law or of fact, and arises from speculative doubt: for I would not doubt whether it is lawful for me to paint today unless I doubted whether painting is a servile work, nor would I doubt that I can baptize this child unless I doubted whether he has already been baptized. It is clear that it can happen that, while speculative doubt remains, a practically certain conscience can be had, namely indirectly.

222. Principles. 1. It is never lawful to operate with a practically doubtful conscience: for he who operates in this way, willing the action even if it were evil, consents to evil and therefore sins: for everything which is not from faith, i.e. from certain persuasion of liceity, is sin.¹

a. The sin which one acting with practical doubt commits is of the same species and gravity as a sin committed with certain conscience. Therefore he who doubts whether that which he is about to do is a grave sin and nevertheless acts, sins gravely; and he who in doubt whether today one must abstain from meat nevertheless eats, sins against the precept of abstinence. Wherefore in confession it suffices to say: on a prohibited day I ate meat.

b. Nevertheless they are foolish who after the fact begin to be distressed and to inquire in books or from a confessor whether they have sinned; likewise those who act in doubt and afterward, knowing that the action placed was not evil, are no longer distressed: for the whole morality of the action depends upon the dictate of conscience antecedent to and concomitant with the action itself; subsequent doubt or knowledge cannot change the morality of the action placed.

2. He who doubts concerning the liceity of an action to be placed, before he acts, must lay aside the doubt and form for himself a practically certain conscience. But there exists a twofold way and method of laying aside doubt and forming for oneself a practically certain conscience, direct and indirect.

a. He attempts to lay aside practical doubt directly who inquires into the truth of the matter or the liceity of the action concerning which speculative doubt is concerned, by investigating internal reasons, consulting books or doctors, etc. Practical doubt is laid aside indirectly or reflexively by means of some reflex principle: for by means of these one can arrive at a practically certain conclusion that this or that is licit, while speculative doubt remains (n. 218).

b. If the doubt is concerned with a law or precept which obliges here and now, the direct mode of laying aside a doubtful conscience must be employed in the first place, namely by inquiring with moral diligence into the truth of the matter or the liceity of the action: for every law first obliges to knowledge of itself. Wherefore he who from negligence in the inquiry of truth exposes himself to the danger of transgressing the law, by this very fact sins. But in this investigation of truth the highest diligence must not be employed, namely by using all means which can be employed: for this would be an intolerable burden; rather, it suffices that moral diligence be employed, which alone is accommodated to human nature (n. 49). He who, after employing moral diligence, cannot arrive at knowledge of the matter is situated in invincible ignorance of that matter (n. 209).

3. But if a doubtful conscience can be laid aside neither directly nor indirectly, the action must be deferred, or, if the necessity of acting urges, the safer part must be chosen: for unless in this case the safer part were chosen, the action would be made with a practically doubtful conscience, which is always sin; but he who embraces the safer part certainly observes the law, even if perhaps he would not be bound.

The safer part is that which stands for the observation of the law and which therefore excludes every danger of sinning by one's action. Therefore in doubt whether it is lawful to place an action which can licitly be omitted, the action must be omitted; in doubt whether it is lawful to omit an action which can licitly be placed, the action must be placed.

¹ Rom. 14, 23.