Article II. On Doubtful Conscience, i.e., On Moral Doubt

⁶⁸

For the sake of clarity the present article is divided into two paragraphs: 1. concerning the notion and division of doubtful conscience or moral doubt; 2. concerning the means for solving practical doubt.

⁶⁸ Strictly and accurately speaking, doubtful conscience is a contradiction in the adjective, as was already said above in n. 304. For conscience is judgment or dictate; but doubt is suspension of judgment, as St. Thomas clearly teaches: "When a man has no reason toward the other part, either because he has none toward either part, which belongs to one not knowing, or because he has reason toward each part, but equal reason, which belongs to one doubting, then he assents in no way, since his judgment is in no way determined, but bears itself equally toward diverse things" (3, dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 3, sol. 1). Hence the question would be placed more accurately in this way: How ought the dictate of conscience be formed if in the mind there exists doubt concerning the licitness of an act? - Nevertheless, since, St. Alphonsus leading the way, authors commonly employ the expression "doubtful conscience," and since conscience in the vernacular language not rarely signifies a state of mind, we also speak of doubtful conscience (cf. Beaudouin, Tract. de conscientia p. 47).