Article II: On Negatively Doubtful Conscience

— Statement of cases. This must be well held. Insofar as the doubt is negative, no reason is had, at least no serious reason, which would found a probable judgment and therefore could prudently direct the rational appetite. Wherefore, as we saw above, n. 362, a uniquely probable opinion approaches practically to one morally certain; and negative doubts of law, whether there is question of the first beginning or of the cessation of law or of its signification, are without moral use, or are contemned. Hence we said that he is safe who from his habitual diligence has a positive argument for confession having been made integrally, for the whole office having been recited, etc., which is attacked by a negative doubt alone.

— But not rarely it happens, when the doubt is of fact, not of law, that each part is negatively doubtful. Thus it is a doubt of law: whether such a law was revoked or not; and canon 23 wisely establishes: "in doubt, the revocation of an existing law is not presumed"; but, what must be accurately observed, we are found in a doubt of fact when it is asked: is today Friday, or not, on which the law of abstinence obliges?

But now, when no reason of affirming or denying is at hand, there are those who wish to solve cases of this sort from the principle of possession. Thus Sanchez ¹, several others, and also Noldin (2), who nevertheless admits that in a negative doubt of fact it is often difficult to understand what part possesses, so that other principles are rather employed. Wherefore, as they judge, if you negatively doubt whether a day of abstinence has begun or not, you will not be held by the law of abstinence; but you will be held if you doubt whether it has ceased or not, because in the former case liberty possesses, in the latter the law. Above, we showed that appeal to the principle of possession outside the matter of justice is vain. Some solve the proposed case in the same way, because, as they say, a fact is not presumed but must be proved. Therefore in doubt concerning the day begun the obligation of abstinence must be proved; on the contrary, the cessation of the obligation must be proved in doubt concerning the ended day of obligation. Thus Laymann, Theol. mor. l. 1, tr. 1, c. 5, n. 36; Noldin, Principia n. 249.

But the reason of the saying upon which they rely is lacking here. Why is a fact not presumed but must be proved? Because a fact of itself is accustomed to leave positive indications, so that if these are lacking, it now becomes like the truth that the fact has not arrived. But in the proposed case, while time passes in an equal manner, neither the beginning nor the end of the obligation leaves peculiar traces. But, even passing this over, if you consider the matter more accurately, the beginning and end of the obligation of abstinence are not so much facts as moral consequences which are connected with a certain hour. But the true doubt is this: is it the eleventh hour before midnight, or the first hour after midnight? But thus the fact appears uncertain on each side, so that the principle, a fact is not presumed, cannot truly be applied. Moreover, whether it is the night on which the day of abstinence begins or the night on which it ceases, the doubt is altogether the same; objectively the matters bear themselves in wholly the same way, so that common sense seems to repudiate two diverse solutions.

¹ De Matr. l. 2, d. 11, n. 32. - (2) Principia, n. 218.

— Solution from the mind of the legislator. More universally, therefore, we shall say what Laymann insinuates about the eucharistic fast alone, l. cit. n. 36: that cases or doubts of law to which doubts of fact, negative on each side, give occasion, must be solved according to the mind, prudently gathered, of the legislator. But from the mind of the legislator, we judge that this distinction must be employed.

1. Where there is question of a human law merely prohibiting, and no reason of justice or charity obliges one to forestall the danger of material error (v.g., concerning the law forbidding communion to one not fasting, or the eating of meat on such and such a day), the legislator can, without inconvenience, incline toward the more benign parts. And because rights are said to be more prompt for loosing than for binding, it can prudently be judged that he truly followed those parts. Wherefore:

a) In invincible doubt whether or not after midnight you ate or drank anything, you will judge yourself not prohibited from communion. This other reason accedes in the case of communion, that, especially today, this cause is most favorable. Cf. concerning this matter St. Alphonsus, l. 1, nn. 38.39; and l. 6, n. 282.

Nor is he to be condemned who, in that doubt, invited by thirst or hunger, eats or drinks. If he had the moral means of knowing the hour, he could not honestly neglect investigation unless communion were to be renounced. But after he has sincerely done this, i.e., has renounced communion, if then reason or a special devotion urges communion upon him, he does not seem to be prohibited from access to the sacred table;

b) We by no means praise, as is clear, him who intentionally or without reason chooses a time at which he negatively doubts concerning an ecclesiastical obligation, v.g., of abstinence, for example, to eat meat.

But he who, after he has investigated the matter according to the abundance of examination which is morally at hand, doubts whether or not the twelfth hour of the night has been heard, can reasonably choose for himself the more benign parts, whether there is question of abstinence, or of fasting, or of servile labor prohibited on feasts.

2. But where some precept must positively be fulfilled, or a positive condition is prescribed for a certain office or use, it is necessary that at least by probable reason the occasion of fulfilling the precept be had, or that satisfaction can be made to the required condition. This is demanded by the common good, to which the legislator adapts his mind. Wherefore:

a) The time which is defined by a commanding law as fit for fulfilling a positive office, v.g., for reciting the canonical hours, must be at least probably present. Therefore St. Alph., in order to defend his benign solution of doubts concerning the eucharistic fast preserved, argues from this, that there is question not so much of a positive law requiring the fast as of a prohibiting law, which forbids that you approach not fasting. Cf. l. 1, n. 38;

b) He who negatively doubts concerning his age, whether or not he has completed the years by which he can receive sacred order, obtain a benefice, or celebrate marriage, is forbidden either to receive sacred order, or obtain a benefice, or celebrate marriage. For the condition positively required for orders or for a benefice or for marriage must be demonstrated by at least probable reason. For the common good demands that only fit persons receive orders, obtain a benefice, contract marriage.

3. Finally, if the legislator has bound subjects by a law once a condition has been posited, as long as that condition has not been positively established, the subjects are not held by the law. For the common good also demands that a burden not be imposed unless certain. Wherefore he who doubts whether or not he was born twenty-one years ago will not have to fast.

— I. On notions. Properly, that is called morally certain which is established from the character and morals of men; and more strictly, if an exception in a particular case is excluded; less properly, concerning a thing which is so like the truth that only a positive reason for doubting is absent. Wherefore a uniquely probable positive opinion, which is impugned by no grave reason, is assimilated to what is morally certain. By a different use, moral certainty is called adhesion, even most firm, which is commanded by the will, as is the very adhesion of supernatural faith.

But the probable is that which rests upon such a motive by which, although it is fallible, a grave man is inclined to assent. The motive can be intrinsic to the thing, or extrinsic: the authority of doctors. This founds a presumption of an intrinsic motive, and can be the cause why a human legislator tempers his own law according to received opinions.

Positive doubt can be converted into opinion or assent with fear of the opposite. That assent is made at the command of the will, nor does it contain more perceived truth than the doubt itself.

According to the degree of probability, two opinions can be of morally equal probability; or one can be more probable than another. But the more probable can be false, and the true one less probable, so that to one following the more probable it cannot be said: you approach more to the truth.

Only experts in theology or in the science upon which the solution depends can judge concerning the intrinsic probability of an opinion; concerning the extrinsic, by reading approved authors, even the moderately learned can pronounce. Extrinsically probable is what several expert men, who have examined the matter, say is probable; indeed what one prudent man says, if he has investigated the matter more deeply and adds a reason not to be despised. But doubtful probability cannot found a prudent opinion.

The unlearned will usually obtain for themselves a probable judgment concerning the honesty of their action from another's authority; and no one ought to examine all things intrinsically by himself, but all can trust approved authors.

Safe is said of the part which one can embrace without formal sin; safer, or less safe, of an opinion according as it stands for obligation or for liberty.

II. Various systems. A moral system is said to be a proposed way of arriving from speculative doubt to a practically safe way of acting.

Because it necessarily happens that direct certainty concerning the honesty or malice of an action is inaccessible to us, and because there is not a threefold practical conclusion of the will as there is a threefold state of mind, which can affirm, deny, and doubt, therefore it is necessary to have recourse to certain principles (reflex) which offer the will a certain practical norm.

Rigorists condemned every action whose honesty was not demonstrated at least as most probable.

Probabiliorists (several Friars Preachers) deny that an action is honest unless its honesty is at least certainly more probable.

Equiprobabilists (Fathers of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer and several others), besides, permit that, when the probabilities are morally equal, answer be made for liberty when there is question of a new law or the beginning of an obligation.

Probabilists (Friars Minor, Fathers of the Society of Jesus, and very many others), when the question immediately turns upon the liceity of the action, always permit the use of a solidly probable opinion.

No one is theoretically a laxist: practically he was and can be one who is content with slender probability, or too easily pronounces an opinion to be solidly probable.

St. Alphonsus defended simple probabilism through the greater part of his life, which afterward he tempered by his sayings so that he might exclude every laxism more. By circumstances he was also compelled to open his opinion less clearly; and by his humility he was moved to abstain from professing absolutely an opinion then greatly attacked.

The system of compensation does not admit the use of a probable opinion except when a proportionate cause excuses the permission of material sin.

Today the controversy survives more theoretically than practically.

III. Refutation and proof. Rigorism, excluded by authority, sins by denying the principle concerning the conditions necessary that a law truly oblige.

Probabiliorism is also deceived by the error of the destruction of contrary probabilities.

Equiprobabilism besides wrongly applies the principle of possession.

The system of compensation sins because there is not always place for fearing material sin; and there is always a sufficient reason present for permitting the danger of material sin. And when compensation seems merely probable, it must necessarily use another system.

Simple probabilism rests upon these certain principles: that there is no law not promulgated; and that the application of law is not had without knowledge of the law, or cognition certain in a human way.

Logically one must be either a probabilist or a tutiorist.

IV. Use of probability. He who is truly persuaded of the error of a common opinion cannot follow it, with saving of the benign mind of the human legislator, which may permit the use of the interpretation of approved authors. Yet it is always permitted to a confessor to accommodate his answers according to an opinion which is held as probable. In acts at least formally diverse, nothing of itself hinders the simultaneous use of opposite probabilities, unless by the prior election the other is virtually demonstrated to be excluded.

But the law itself, for fulfilling various positive obligations, has introduced a time almost common to two days, which can be attributed to either day or part of a day.

Doubtful probability does not provide practical security.

V. On probability of fact. Probabilism cannot be applied immediately to probability of fact. On the contrary, here the principle holds: in morals, to do and to expose oneself to the danger of doing are equivalent. Hence we are obliged to embrace the safer parts. Except if the legislator, because of doubt of fact, relaxes his obligation, or if probability of fact can be converted into probability of law, either because there is no obligation of forestalling the danger of error, even material error, or because approved authors affirm the probability of the liceity of the action in these circumstances.

VI. Negative doubts of law or fact are of themselves to be contemned. When each part is negatively doubtful, the solution must be sought from the prudently estimated mind of the legislator. Wherefore a merely prohibiting law does not seem to have to be urged; but a positively required condition must be satisfied at least probably. If subjects are bound conditionally by some law, they are not held by the law until it is morally established that the condition has been fulfilled.