Chapter II: On the Force of Practically Doubtful Conscience

— He who practically doubts concerning the honesty of his action, by acting sins with a sin of the gravity and species concerning which he had prudent suspicion. For he hypothetically consents to the violation of law, and consequently has an affection inclined toward the violation of the law obliging him: which is forbidden by divine natural law, which urges the fulfillment of individual laws. Therefore he acts against a certain conscience, although a confused one, by which even an unlearned man detects that an action of suspected honesty is not permitted to him ¹.

And although he doubts concerning a merely human law, he makes the action intrinsically dishonest: for he sins against the natural law.

¹ Insofar as he doubts, conscience does not judge concerning the matter. Wherefore a doubting conscience is not the rule of action.

— Obligation of one practically doubting. He who practically doubts concerning the honesty of his action must, if he can, embrace the safer parts or put away the doubt by sufficient inquiry, according to the rules to be handed down later.

Moreover that investigation will be sufficient which is accommodated to the moment of the matter and to the capacity of the agent. Thus the more learned man, in a grave matter, will not be able to trust a simple priest, but must examine the matter by himself, while the unlearned man will not be able to trust himself, but, v.g., will have to ask his priest or someone whom he judges fit. Yet the very narrowness of time will be able to dispense from a fuller investigation which otherwise would have to be made, when proportionate harm is to be feared from the delay itself. For since then there is not the moral opportunity of greater diligence, the ignorance which remains will be able to be held as invincible. Wherefore even an unlearned man will then be able prudently, according to his measure, to solve the case by himself.

— Sin of one neglecting. Does he who acts by neglecting a founded but confused suspicion of malice sin gravely or lightly?

The matter seems to be judged from the concrete circumstances. If the man has been of a timorous conscience, or the object of itself has appeared light, it can be presumed that there was no doubt concerning grave sin, except perhaps an empty fancy. On the contrary, you will pronounce more severely if the matter at first appearance spontaneously seems grave, and the agent does not seem alien from grave sin. The matter will often have to be committed to divine judgment. Cf. Laymann, l. I, tr. 2, c. 4, n. 7.

— On a perplexed case. A perplexed case is said to be one where sin is practically feared on every side, whether by acting or by not acting. Of itself, indeed, then the lesser evil must be chosen; wherefore a natural precept must of itself be preferred to a positive one, and a divine precept to a human one. But if the gravity has appeared morally the same on each side, the very supply of free option is not had. For which reason, however you bear yourself, you will not actually sin, even if the perplexity has arisen from culpable negligence. And they observe that there will be only a light sin of him who, since he does not discern a notable excess, has made the choice of the part which is feared to be worse.

— Practically doubtful conscience, as such, judges nothing, and consequently cannot be a rule. One practically doubting concerning the honesty of his action makes the matter intrinsically evil. Nevertheless a human duty of inquiring is imposed upon us; and, in a perplexed case, one does not sin by choosing for either part which seems to him to be of almost equal danger, or for the part which he estimates to be of lesser danger or moral evil.