Article I: On Negatively Doubtful Conscience

84. Thesis. Negative doubt, as being empty and founded upon no reason or only a slight reason, does not impede prudential certitude, but is ineffective for inducing a new obligation or for extinguishing it, and consequently is not to be attended to, but is to be held as nothing and despised; which is expressed by the axiom: The condition of the possessor is better.

It is proved: He would act imprudently who, on account of slight or no reasons, would think himself held to placing or omitting an act. Whence one must act as if the doubt had not arisen, which can be expressed by the axiom: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better, whether of law or of liberty; namely, one must stand for that part which before the doubt was practically certain.

Law, namely, and liberty can be considered as two possessors of right: law possesses the force of obliging, liberty the faculty of acting according to one's pleasure and of disposing of oneself and of one's acts, which is true dominion. But that possesses which is prior. Whence when a law or obligation is doubtful, the same liberty remains which man previously possesses; on the contrary, if a law or obligation is certain, while liberation from this law or obligation is altogether doubtful, the same law remains. Possession, namely, is the antecedent certain right of liberty or of law.¹

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, nn. 26 and 27.

85. Formation of certain conscience in negative doubt. - Negatively doubtful conscience can be laid aside by force of a reflex principle by which an indirectly certain conscience is formed (at least implicitly), for example in this way:

"That which, all things having been diligently considered, certainly appears prescribed, certainly must be done; that which in no way appears prescribed, certainly need not be done.

"But this action in no way appears prescribed, for no serious reason indicates that it must be done; on the contrary, that one appears prescribed, because no serious reason indicates that the law by which it is prescribed has been taken away.

"Therefore this action here and now certainly can be omitted, that other one certainly must be placed."

86. The axiom: "The condition of the possessor is better" is a general principle, so that it is valid for solving all negative doubts, and therefore it is more determined and expressed by more particular formulas according as it is applied to various doubts of law or fact. These particular forms are called subsidiary principles by which possession is more discerned. Hence:

1. In negative doubt of law: a) If slight or no reason proves that a law has been passed by legitimate authority, or has been edited or promulgated, liberty remains.

b) Similarly, if slight or no reason proves that the law extends to this case or to such subjects, commands under mortal sin, is strictly preceptive rather than merely penal, or establishes penalties to be incurred in fact. This is enunciated under the more particular form: In doubt favors are to be amplified, and odious things restricted; or: In obscure matters, the minimum is to be held.

c) On the contrary, if slight or no reason proves that a law has been revoked or abrogated, - or has ceased, - or that dispensation has been given in it, or that someone has been excused from it, the law remains.²

² Cf. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, n. 27.

2. In negative doubt of fact, since it is often difficult to understand which part possesses, the principle In doubt the condition of the possessor is better is enunciated under a more determined form:

a) In a general way: In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands; but presumption stands for the part which is not bound to prove the fact;³ - in other words: In doubt one must judge from things ordinarily occurring, for the exception must be proved. Thus a child of seven years is presumed to have the use of reason; a superior is presumed not to command illicit things, nor to exceed his power; a God-fearing man is presumed not to have consented to wicked delight.

³ Ibid., n. 26.

b) Under a more particular form the same principle is enunciated for the existence of an act or fact: A fact is not presumed, but must be proved. Hence in doubt of a fact founding an obligation, liberty remains, as if slight or no reason proves that I emitted a vow or oath or by it obligated myself to this, that I committed mortal sin, that harm was inflicted, that the time for an obligation to begin is present, for example that Friday has begun, that someone has reached the age of 7 or 21. On the contrary, in doubt of a fact supposing a law, and exempting from it, the law remains, as if slight or no reason proves that I recited the hours, was confessed, satisfied a vow or oath, paid a debt, that the time for the obligation to end is present, for example that Friday has passed, or that I have reached the age of 60.⁴

⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, n. 32.

c) Likewise for the condition or value of an act or fact: In doubt one must stand for the value of the act, or: What has been done is judged rightly done, for example, if slight or no reason proves that I did not have the intention and attention required in Mass or in the hours, that I possess this thing unjustly, that Baptism conferred was invalid, that the wine of the sacrifice is not genuine, that the confession was not integral, etc.⁵

⁵ Ibid., n. 26.

87. Observation. - Authors do not always agree for which side possession stands, for example, in doubt whether midnight has passed, whether liberty of eating before communion possesses, or the law prescribing the natural fast; - whether a debt must be paid if even the creditor doubts about payment; - whether a father can invalidate the vow of a son in doubt whether it was emitted before or after puberty or majority; etc.⁶ If their reasons are grave, the question is reduced to positive doubt, and is to be solved in the same way; of which we must now speak.

⁶ Ibid., nn. 38-39.