Equiprobabilism

Equiprobabilism consists of three propositions, of which the first is opposed to Probabiliorism, the later ones to Probabilism. Namely, against the Probabiliorists the Equiprobabilists teach: One who strictly doubts about the making of a law is not held to observe it. Against the Probabilists they contend: One who strictly doubts about the cessation or fulfillment of a law is held to fulfill it; likewise: One who opines, that is, who holds it as certainly more probable that a law exists, is bound by the law. Therefore let these be:

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. I, § IV, Point II, That Is, Equiprobabilism, Thesis I

n. 226.

One who strictly doubts about the making of a law, in other words, one who holds it as equally or almost equally probable that the law has not been made and that it has been made, is not held to observe it. It is proved:

I. From the authority of St. Alphonsus. For this authority is such that it seems to create a grave presumption in favor of the system which he himself defended. But the holy Doctor defended the proposed thesis.

The major is confirmed by these things: first, the Church recognized St. Alphonsus as an outstanding master of Moral Theology, and repeatedly declared that he was a most safe and divinely given guide of directors of souls (n. 215). Moreover, these things ought especially to hold for the principal question of Moral Theology, that is, for the moral system; indeed the aforesaid praises and commendations seem scarcely capable of being honorably explained if St. Alphonsus had erred in choosing the moral system which extends most widely throughout the whole of moral science and, as it were, pervades it, and by force of which the innumerable doubts that occur in the said science are solved for practice. These points are confirmed by what the Vindiciae Alfonsianae report from the Acts of the Cause of Beatification:¹ "Already a decree had been issued concerning 'Nothing worthy of censure,' and already the heroic virtues of Alphonsus had been discussed. But nevertheless, by command of the Pontiff, a new Positio on the Virtues was instituted, and indeed on Prudence, not with respect to the exercise of that virtue, but because of some rules of morals contained in his works. Hence besides other particular questions, the moral system in particular and the doctrine on habitual sinners and recidivists were called back to a more severe weighing." Once these things had been carried out, Pius VII solemnly declared that the heroic degree of the virtues was established. In addition, the Sacred Penitentiary on 19 Dec. 1855 wrote back to a certain professor of Moral Theology that he, notwithstanding his oath to defend Probabiliorism, could follow and publicly hand on the doctrine of St. Alphonsus (n. 215). Hence several, and those distinguished, theologians confess that the system which St. Alphonsus embraced seems worthy of commendation.²

The minor is admitted by all.

Objection. When it was asked of the Holy See whether by the words of the Decree of 11 March 1871, by which St. Alphonsus is said to have "paved a safe way amid the tangled opinions of theologians, whether laxer or stricter...," whether, I say, by those words Equiprobabilism had been designated and commended before Probabilism, the response was that by those words the Sacred Congregation "had wished to condemn no opinion or prefer one to another, but only to designate a fact admitted by all, namely, that St. Alphonsus by his system took care to avoid both laxer and stricter opinions."

Response. This response did not proceed from legitimate authority, as was learned after diligent examination instituted at Rome. It is also absent from the authentic edition of the Decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites. It was given by the substitute of the Secretariat of the Sacred Congregation of Rites alone, in the name of the Secretary alone.³

II. From the authority of theologians. Theologians today almost commonly defend the thesis stated. Concerning the opinion of St. Thomas, there will be discussion later.

III. From reason. Preceptive and prohibitive laws are in the likeness of a spiritual bond, and therefore, in order that they obtain their effect, they must reach a human being positively; this cannot happen except through at least some knowledge properly so called of the making of the law. "Just as a rope," says St. Alphonsus, "does not bind unless it is applied to the thing to be bound by contact, so a precept does not bind except through knowledge of it" (I, 76). But in strict doubt, all knowledge properly so called of the making of the law is lacking. "Then," says St. Alphonsus, "...we do not have knowledge of the law, but only knowledge of the doubt or question whether the law exists or not" (I, 74). It is indeed known that each part, namely both the making and the non-making of the law, is equally probable; but no knowledge is had about the conclusion or term of the inquiry.⁴

Then, in strict doubt about the making of a law, that is, in strict doubt whether a law prohibits or permits some act, all knowledge properly so called about the ordinance of the law concerning the said act, or about the objective morality of that act, is lacking. Once this has been posited, that act in second act, as it is said, is situated with respect to me outside the order of morality, or is regarded as a merely physical act. But nothing prevents an act of this sort from being placed, provided a good end is added. Therefore in strict doubt whether some act is objectively permitted or prohibited, it is right to place that act for a good end.

So that the argument just brought forward may be more fully clarified, I note these things: by force of our rational nature we are, as regards being, in the moral order, that is, in first act we are bound by law; but as regards acting, by force of our rational cognition, we are constituted in the moral order, that is, in second act we are bound by law. Hence, since in strict doubt there is no knowledge properly so called about the morality of an act, as regards acting we are not in the moral order except insofar as by a higher law the obligation of always acting for an honorable end is imposed on us.

Nor should you object that perhaps that act is prohibited by the legislator. This is true; but that prohibition, if it has place, binds only my rational being; in other words, it binds me because I have a rational nature, but my acting is bound only by rational cognition.

Hence in strict doubt the act, as regards my acting, is not in the moral order; but it is merely physical, and must receive morality from the end.

Finally, if the discussion concerns positive law, the principle proved in n. 229 has force: in strict doubt the condition of that which is prior is better than the condition of that which is posterior. But moral liberty is prior to a positive preceptive or prohibitive law.

¹ Dissertatio, Proemium, n. 46.

² Thus, for example, Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor., I, 165; Noldin, De Principiis theol. mor., n. 239; Sweens, Theol. mor. fund., n. 700 sq.; Beauduin-Gardeil, cited work, p. 79.

³ Cf. Ter Haar, Ven. Innoc. P. P. XI de Probabilismo Decreti Historia et Vindiciae, p. 107.

⁴ Therefore neither do we deny that contradictory parts considered in themselves, or even compared, can retain the probability which they have from good reasons. But this is not the matter at issue. The matter concerns the parts insofar as they are contradictorily opposed, or insofar as they are simultaneous affirmation and negation with respect to one question of truth.

n. 227.

Objection 1. In doubt, before all things the danger of sinning materially, or of transgressing the prohibitive ordinance of God, must be guarded against.

Response 1. I turn the argument back: namely, if in doubt the danger of sinning materially had to be guarded against before all things, it would also be illicit to follow the more probable opinion for liberty. But the adversaries reject this together with us.

Response 2. I deny the assertion, at least insofar as it is applied to strict doubt. For it cannot be admitted that in strict doubt a prohibitive ordinance is to be preferred to a permissive ordinance. But if in strict doubt material sin had to be guarded against before all things, in the said doubt a prohibitive ordinance would have to be preferred to a permissive ordinance, or the former would have to be assumed before the latter as the norm of acting.

The major is deduced from the fact that the permissive ordinance of God the legislator is equivalent to a prohibitive ordinance, or from the fact that the rights of a human being, as flowing from the eternal law equally with his duties, are equally holy as duties.

What the law is in strict doubt must be deduced from other principles.

And these things also involve a refutation of the System of Compensation, which teaches that in doubt the safer thing is to be followed unless a relatively grave inconvenience excuses. For that system rests on the supposition that of itself duty is to be preferred to right, even if it is conceded that by accident, because of a relatively grave inconvenience, duty can be postponed. But from what has been said it is clear that the aforesaid supposition must be rejected. There is added that this doctrine scarcely seems capable of being applied; since in individual cases not only the gravity of the law and the inconvenience which fulfillment of the law, considering the circumstances, would bring with it would have to be weighed against each other, but also the degree of certainty of the law would have to be compared with its inconvenience. To observe all these things rightly seems scarcely possible in practice. Moreover, no one would admit that a rule and norm of this sort for solving doubts is right.

Objection 2. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better, that is, of that which is prior by nature or time. But eternal law is prior to liberty, that is, to the moral faculty of placing an act. Therefore in doubt whether eternal law prohibits an act, the condition of eternal law is better.

Response. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: namely, eternal law which permits an act is prior to liberty, that is, to the moral faculty of placing that act, I concede; eternal law which prohibits an act is prior to liberty, that is, to the moral faculty of placing that act, I deny. Or rather, in our case it is doubtful whether eternal law prohibits some act or permits it, that is, whether it grants the moral faculty of placing that act. In this doubt, as we have explained, a human being uses his physical liberty at will, provided he places his act for an honorable end.

n. 228.

Corollary I. Law does not oblige in strict doubt: first, whether it has been established or promulgated; second, whether it comprehends some case or person, because there is strict doubt whether it has been made with respect to that case or person; third, whether the fact founding the law has had place, because there is strict doubt whether the law has now begun, or rather, whether it can now be applied. Hence, for example, it is licit to eat meats in doubt whether Friday has arrived; likewise to eat with the intention of celebrating, in doubt whether it is midnight; likewise to celebrate in doubt whether you have taken something after midnight (St. Alphonsus, I, 32, 97).

Likewise, in strict doubt whether a law is mixed or purely penal, practically it can be held as purely penal, because there is strict doubt whether a law has been made which commands the act. Finally, in strict doubt whether a law obliges under grave or under light sin, the obligation is light, because there is strict doubt whether a law has been established which commands under grave sin (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary II. Since a promissory oath and a vow are in the likeness of particular laws, obligation is lacking in strict doubt whether an oath or vow has been emitted (St. Alphonsus, I, 28).

Corollary III. If there is question of distinct things, it is licit in strict doubt to use now one opinion, now the other, or even both at the same time. Hence, for example, it is right, out of two testaments equally probably valid and invalid, to treat one as valid and the other as invalid, according as validity or nullity turns to your favor. I said "if there is question of different things," because it is impossible in one and the same individual thing to use two contrary opinions at the same time; in cases which are proposed by some authors, this has place only in appearance. Moreover, questions which are referred here by authors cannot be solved by a general principle, but rather each is treated separately in its own place.¹

Corollary IV. A parishioner and penitent ordinarily safely follow the judgment of a prudent pastor or confessor, because they prudently opine, or at least hold as equally probable, that no law prohibits what is declared licit by them. These words of St. Thomas pertain here: "Someone of little knowledge is made more certain about what he hears from someone scientific than about what seems to him according to his own reason" (II-II, q. 4, a. 8, ad 2).

¹ Yet for the reader's sake it is pleasing to touch upon some questions. They ask, for example, whether it is licit for someone, relying on a sufficiently probable opinion about the validity of an informal testament, to accept an inheritance against the heir ab intestato, and at the same time, relying on an equally probable opinion about the nullity of the same testament, to retain legacies. Moreover, in the proposed example the legacies cannot be retained, because it is certain, and therefore the case is entirely outside our matter, that they do not belong to the testamentary heir. For a testament in itself is either valid or invalid. If the former, the legacies belong to the legatee; if the latter, they fall to the heir ab intestato, or legal heir. They also ask what is licit for one who has before him two foods; one is certainly meat, but it is doubted which one is such. Moreover, it is sufficiently probably licit for him to eat both if the acts of eating are also morally speaking different; otherwise if morally speaking they constitute one act. The reason for the former is that each act is equally probably objectively, and therefore certainly subjectively, licit, and in the case there is no reason preventing the same solution from holding if there is question of two acts which morally speaking constitute one act. The reason for the latter is that it is not licit by acts which morally constitute one act certainly to violate the law. Objection: It is never licit certainly to violate the law. But this has place even if each act is also morally different. Response: It is never licit certainly to violate the law, that is, to place an act which you certainly know violates the law, I concede; that is, to place two morally different acts, one or the other of which will violate the law, although you do not know which of the two will violate the law, this seems to have to be denied, or at least is denied sufficiently probably.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. I, § IV, Point II, That Is, Equiprobabilism, Thesis II

n. 229.

One who strictly doubts about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, in other words, one who holds it as equally or almost equally probable that the law has not ceased or has not been fulfilled, is held to observe it.

It is said "one who strictly doubts," or "one who holds it as equally or almost equally probable"; since it is commonly admitted that the obligation of observing the law is absent in broad doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, in other words, where it is more probable that the law has ceased or has been fulfilled. Besides, in doubt about the fulfillment of a law several principles are at hand, in view of which the fact of fulfillment can commonly be held as more probable. Principles of this sort are: What regularly, what ordinarily happens, is judged to have happened; from things commonly occurring a prudent presumption is made.¹ Likewise: In doubt every fact is presumed to have been done rightly;² or: In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act³ (St. Alphonsus, I, 26). With these points noted, the thesis is proved:

I. From the authority of St. Alphonsus. Although I would not wish to deny that this thesis is not to be valued as much as the first and third theses are to be valued, nevertheless it cannot be denied that it extends very widely and pertains to the whole system, so that what we said above (nn. 214, 225) about the authority of St. Alphonsus is also to be applied to this thesis. But the holy Doctor, who had previously adhered to the more benign opinion, after considering the matter better, revoked it (I, 29) and defended the stricter opinion (I, 26-34); which in any case is now commonly admitted even by the adversaries themselves.⁴

II. From the authority of theologians. Our opinion was formerly commonly admitted, even by those authors who adhered to Probabilism. The witnesses of this assertion are Suarez⁵ and Laymann.⁶ The fact that afterward several withdrew from this opinion does not prevent the consensus of ancient theologians from supplying us some argument.

III. From reason. First, in strict doubt the condition of the possessor is better; or, to abstain from the ambiguous word "possessor," in strict doubt the condition of that which is prior seems to be better than the condition of that which is posterior.⁷ But the law itself is prior to its cessation and fulfillment. Therefore, in strict doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, the condition of the law seems to be better (St. Alphonsus, I, 29-34).

The major is established by these arguments: first, our principle of its own accord pleases reason more than the contrary principle, which would have to be admitted by the adversaries, namely: in strict doubt the condition of that which is prior seems to be worse than the condition of that which is posterior. This spontaneous inclination of reason indeed seems to supply an argument for our doctrine. Second, a principle which favors stability, or a stable manner of acting, seems to be preferred to a principle which fosters mutability, or a changeable manner of acting. But our principle favors stability, while the contrary favors mutability. Third, there is added that the principle stated by us has force for the external forum. Why, precisely, would the contrary principle have to be admitted for the internal forum?

Then our thesis is proved from the fact that the thesis of the Probabilists is at least doubtful: namely, a law which has doubtfully ceased or has doubtfully been fulfilled obliges unless it is demonstrated, or certain, that it does not oblige. But no one who hears prudently will contend that that is certain.

The major is evinced from a principle admitted by all: in a practical doubt not entirely solved, the safer part is to be followed.

To prove the minor, it will be enough to advert to these things: first, the arguments of the adversaries, as we shall soon see, either involve a begging of the question, or are such that they themselves require further proof. Second, add that always very many, and those grave and distinguished, theologians supported the contrary opinion. Third, finally, our arguments seem to be of such a kind that not even the adversaries will deny them all probability. Once all these things have been attended to and well weighed, no one will have affirmed that the opinion of the Probabilists has been placed beyond doubt.

¹ Suppose someone, while praying Sext, doubts whether he has said Terce. In the case he can commonly hold it as more probable that Terce has been said, since from things commonly occurring a prudent presumption is made. But it commonly happens that Sext is not begun before Terce has been said.

² Suppose someone doubts whether he has confessed with true sorrow. In the case he can commonly hold it as more probable that true sorrow was present.

³ Yet this principle, which canonists and moralists commonly use, is very ambiguous; namely, it has force only insofar as it rests on another principle of presumption. But this happens when there is doubt about the manner in which an act has been placed; in which case it can be held as more probable that all those things required for validity were done. It is otherwise if the manner in which the act was placed is known, but it is disputed whether the act so placed is valid.

⁴ Cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 133-139, where those things which some formerly objected are refuted.

⁵ Suarez, treating the question whether one who has doubtfully fulfilled an oath is still held to fulfill it, responds: "It is beyond controversy that he is held," because "in doubt the condition of the possessor is better" (De Relig., tr. 5, bk. 2, cap. 33, n. 7); this solution is a mere application of our thesis to a particular case.

⁶ Laymann speaks thus: "But the latter part of the assertion is common" (Theol. mor., bk. 1, tr. 1, c. 5, § 3, n. 31), namely, that one who doubts whether he has fulfilled a vow or promise, or satisfied any other debt whatsoever, is held by the obligation.

⁷ In this sense St. Alphonsus and others take the principle of possession, insofar as it regards matter distinct from the matter of justice; but since others explain it otherwise, we have abstained from that designation, mindful of this: "It belongs to the wise man not to care about names" (St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 1). With these points noted, those things which several theologians object concerning the nature of the principle of possession do not harm our argument.

n. 230.

Objection 1. A strictly doubtful law, by the consent of all, does not oblige. But a law which has equally probably ceased is here and now strictly doubtful.

Response. I distinguish the major: a law which in the present is strictly doubtful and did not previously certainly exist does not oblige, I concede; a law which in the present is strictly doubtful but did previously certainly exist does not oblige, I deny. That it does oblige has been proved above. With the same distinction I distinguish the minor.

You will insist: A law which in the present is strictly doubtful and did not previously certainly exist does not oblige precisely because it is doubtful. But if a law of this sort does not oblige precisely because it is doubtful, the same thing must be affirmed of every doubtful law. Now then, a law which has equally probably ceased is strictly doubtful. Therefore even a law of this sort does not oblige.

Response. The major is not very accurate, and is deficient on this head, that it neglects the principle of possession; since this precisely brings it about that a law which has equally probably ceased, although strictly doubtful, nevertheless obliges indirectly (n. 229).

Objection 2. It is repugnant that a doubtful law induce a certain obligation, because the effect cannot be more certain than the cause. But a law which has equally probably ceased has become doubtful.

Response. I distinguish the major: it is repugnant that a doubtful law induce a certain obligation directly, I concede; indirectly, that is, by force of the principle of possession or at least by force of the principle: in a practical doubt not solved the safer part is to be followed, I deny. Moreover, the adversaries themselves admit that a law which is not wholly certain, but only most probable or almost certain, induces an entirely certain obligation, certainly indirectly (n. 225).

Objection 3. Just as the beginning of obligation depends on certain or at least opinionative knowledge of the law, so also the continuation of obligation depends on the continuation of certain or at least opinionative knowledge. But knowledge of this sort is lacking in strict doubt whether the law has ceased or has been fulfilled.

Response. I deny the major, and this because of the dissimilarity which is had between the two cases; namely, possession does not favor a law equally probably beginning, but does favor a law which is equally probably continuing.

Objection 4. A doubtful obligation is no obligation. But the obligation of a law which has equally probably ceased becomes doubtful.

Response I. Let the major pass; I distinguish the minor: the obligation of a law which has equally probably ceased becomes doubtful, directly, I concede; with the principle of possession considered, I deny.

Response II. I deny the major unless a certain principle is alleged by which a doubtful obligation becomes certainly null. But a principle of this sort cannot be alleged; once this has been posited, the rule must be urged: in a practical doubt not solved, the safer part is to be followed.

Objection 5. When there is question of imposing an obligation, man must be regarded as the defendant, but the law as the petitioner. But in doubt the defendant defeats the petitioner.

Response. The parity of which the adversaries speak is invented without basis. Then, if we wish to set up a comparison, one who has doubtfully fulfilled the law must be regarded as a defendant who by force of a judicial sentence was bound by some obligation and has satisfied it only doubtfully. Whether or not the obligation should be urged in a case of this sort depends on the solution of the question now being treated by us. Moreover, let each person be persuaded that our controversy cannot be settled by comparisons of this sort.

n. 231.

Corollary I. Law obliges in strict doubt whether it has been explicitly or implicitly abrogated; whether there has been a dispensation in it; whether the time for which it was established has flowed past; or whether the fact founding the law has ceased; or whether the day to which it is affixed has passed. Hence, for example, it is not licit to eat meats in strict doubt whether Friday has passed (St. Alphonsus, I, 32).

Corollary II. Since a promissory oath, a vow, and an injunction of sacramental penance are in the likeness of particular laws, the obligation persists in strict doubt whether you have fulfilled an oath or vow, satisfied the penance, etc. (St. Alphonsus, I, 28, 29; Elenchus 2 Quaestionum reformatarum, q. 1).

Corollary III. Law indeed obliges in strict doubt whether the act by which it is fulfilled has been placed. But in strict doubt whether an act that has been placed suffices for fulfilling the law, further obligation is lacking, because in this hypothesis there is doubt whether the law commands another act than the one that has been placed.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. I, § IV, Point II, That Is, Equiprobabilism, Thesis III

n. 232.

One who forms the opinion, in other words, one who holds it as certainly more probable that a law exists, is held to observe it. It is proved:

I. From ecclesiastical documents. These, indeed, seem to be of such a kind that they create a presumption against the doctrine which teaches that it is licit to follow the certainly less probable opinion favoring liberty, or, what is the same thing, that there is no obligation of following the certainly more probable opinion favoring the law. It is useful to present the principal documents or edicts.

The Congregation of the Holy Office, by a decree issued on September 24, 1665, in the name of Alexander VII, not only condemned several laxer opinions, but also in the preface of the decree complains of "that extreme license of luxuriant minds... through which, in matters pertaining to conscience, a mode of opining has crept in which is wholly alien from Evangelical simplicity and from the doctrine of the holy Fathers, and which, if the faithful were to follow it in practice as a right rule, an immense corruption of Christian life would creep in." Now Stephen Gradius, who by command of the Congregation of the Index had drawn up a Votum concerning the decree that had been issued, expressly declares that by the mode and rule of opining disapproved by the Supreme Pontiff Probabilism is understood; and he adds that he had known this "on account of faithful knowledge of that time."¹
Benedict XIV, in the constitution De praeparatione ad annum Universalis Iubilaei (June 26, 1749), admonishes confessors that in doubtful matters they should diligently inquire into the truth "and then descend to that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms." But the less probable opinion is rather dissuaded by reason than persuaded by it. Therefore it is illicit to descend to it.²
Alexander VII, by his own exhortation, brought it about that the Dominican Order, from the year 1655, declared war on Probabilism and from that time waged it most strenuously.
The Congregation of the Holy Office, with the Supreme Pontiff Innocent XI presiding and present, on June 26, 1680, issued a decree by which "His Holiness... commanded that he himself (i.e., Thyrsus Gonzalez) freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable opinion thus known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable." Then it is enjoined upon the Superior General of the Society of Jesus that he permit the Fathers of the Society to attack the less probable opinion, and that he make known to all the universities of the Society that it is the mind of His Holiness that each one freely oppose the aforesaid system.³
Innocent XI, by his counsel and direction, brought it about that Thyrsus Gonzalez was elected Superior General of the Society, and this for the purpose of turning the members of the Society away from Probabilism. Then the same Pontiff wished that a decree be issued by the General Congregation which had elected Gonzalez as Superior, granting permission to all members of the Society to defend the stricter doctrine; and this was done. Moreover, Innocent XI indicated to Thyrsus Gonzalez that "he desired something more from the Jesuits against Probabilism than was prescribed by that decree."⁴
The Congregation of the Holy Office, at the end of the month of June 1693, by common vote took the counsel of asking the Supreme Pontiff Innocent XII to see to the publication of the work of Thyrsus Gonzalez, since in it the laxer doctrine was attacked; and the Supreme Pontiff satisfied this wish.⁵
Clement XI indicated to the Superior General of the Society that "the Superiors of the Society would do a thing most pleasing to His Holiness if they ensured that the Jesuits abstained from leading and defending the opinion which asserts that the use of the less probable and less safe opinion is licit."⁶
Finally, here must be referred all those things by which the Church has positively commended, and does not cease to commend, the doctrine of St. Alphonsus. And indeed: 1. The commendation of which we have spoken, as is evident to everyone, is opposed to the doctrine which the holy Doctor, whose doctrine is commended, finally rejected. But Probabilism, as we shall prove later, was rejected by St. Alphonsus. 2. There is added the fact that the Church at length declared that the heroic degree of the virtues of St. Alphonsus was established only when the Advocate of the cause had proved that, according to the opinion of St. Alphonsus, only a strictly doubtful law does not oblige, or that Probabilism was rejected by him;⁷ which certainly suggests that all those things by which the same Church afterward positively commended the doctrine of the holy Doctor favor Equiprobabilism and oppose Probabilism. But enough now concerning these matters, since from them, or from the authority of St. Alphonsus insofar as it rests upon them, we shall soon argue distinctly and specifically.

It is established, therefore, that the Church did not favor Probabilism, and inhibited it by edicts doctrinal, disciplinary, and mixed.

From what has been said there also follows, and I would like this noted in passing, how undeservedly several heterodox authors⁸ reproach the Catholic Church for having fostered and commended a doctrine more lax than is just: the Catholic Church, I say, which on repeated occasions disclosed a mind opposed to Probabilism, far from fostering and commending the aforesaid system.⁹

II. From the authority of St. Alphonsus. This authority, as we said above, seems to be such as to create a grave presumption for the system which he himself defended. But the holy Doctor also defended, to the best of his powers, the third thesis of Equiprobabilism.

The minor, which even now is denied by some, is established by these points:

First, there are at hand countless testimonies of the holy Doctor himself, several of which it is useful to present:¹⁰

a) Dell' uso moderato dell' opinione probabile (1765). There he teaches: "I have said so often that not only he who has evident knowledge of the law, but also he who, according to the light of reason, judges that the opinion standing for the law is notably or certainly more probable, is held to observe it, even if there is dispute among the doctors; just as in fact I myself have reprobated, in my moral work, several opinions formerly approved by many authors, as certainly less probable" (c. 3, n. 81).

b) Letter to Remondini (1769). "The Jesuits commonly defend that we can follow the less probable opinion; but I defend that, when it is known that the opinion favoring the law is more probable, we must follow this one, and that it is not licit for us to follow the less probable; concerning this matter the Jesuits have complained to me" (Lettere, II, n. 230).

c) Letter to Father Villani (1773). "In it (i.e., in the little work whose title is Dichiarazione del sistema) I shall make clear to all that I am the defender of the doctrine which asserts that the opinion favoring the law must be followed, if indeed this opinion is more probable, and that Probabilism is entirely reprobated by me. This one thing I say, namely, that a law does not oblige where the opinion supporting it is entirely doubtful" (Lettere, II, n. 284).

d) Theologia Moralis (7th ed., 1773). To this edition the holy Doctor added a Monitum,¹¹ in which he thus sets forth and proves his system: "I say that if the opinion which stands for the law seems certainly more probable, we are altogether held to follow it; nor can we then embrace the opposite opinion, which stands for liberty. The reason is that, in order to act licitly, we must in doubtful matters inquire into and follow the truth; but where the truth cannot be found clearly, we are held to embrace at least that opinion which comes nearer to the truth, such as the more probable opinion is."

e) Dichiarazione del sistema che tiene l'autore intorno alla regola delle azioni morali (1774). "Some reproach me, saying that I am a Probabilist. I again declare in this brief work that I am not a Probabilist, nor do I follow Probabilism; indeed I reprobate it... I say, first, that if the opinion which stands for the law appears certainly more probable, we are held to follow it for several reasons, the principal one of which is this, that in moral doubts we must follow the truth; wherefore, when we cannot clearly find the truth, we must at least follow that opinion which comes nearer to the truth, such as in this case is the very opinion which seems more probable to us. Therefore the truth itself, which obliges us to follow it, also obliges us to follow that opinion which stands for the law, when it comes nearer to that same truth" (n. 2).

f) Theologia Moralis (8th and 9th editions, 1779 and 1785). St. Alphonsus inserted in these editions the Monitum which he had added to the seventh edition, and so once again, from the obligation of following the truth, he deduces that the certainly more probable opinion must be followed (I, 54).¹² He repeats the same at I, 88: "For where we do not find certain truth, we must follow that opinion which approaches nearer to the truth."

Behold, then, certain testimonies which clearly show that St. Alphonsus rejected Probabilism.

Then our minor is confirmed by authority. For indeed almost all authors who are attached to no school testify that St. Alphonsus, at least from the year 1762 onward, supported Equiprobabilism.¹³
Lastly there is added the fact that the Church issued the "Decree concerning the doubt whether the virtues are established in a heroic degree" after it had ascertained that Probabilism had been rejected by St. Alphonsus (n. 225).

¹ Disp. de opin. probabili cum Honor. Fabri, c. 27; cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 19-21.

² The Supreme Pontiff indeed speaks about an opinion to be imposed on others; but these things hold a fortiori when there is question of the opinion which we ourselves must follow. Cf. Patuzzi, Regola prossima, t. II, pp. 91-94; Gonet, Clypeus, t. III, diss. De consc. prob., preface; Concina, Apparatus, t. II, p. 174 (ed. 1763).

³ That the aforesaid decree is opposed only to the less probable opinion or Probabilism, and by no means to the equally probable opinion or Equiprobabilism, is clear from the tenor of the decree itself, which speaks only of the more probable and less probable opinions, and in no way of the equally probable opinion. Besides, compare what we have disputed elsewhere concerning this matter (De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 24-35).

Forstmann, with Noldin, denies that "by the words with the more probable opinion thus known and judged the Supreme Pontiff intended the certainly more probable opinion" (Theol. Mor. Gen., n. 143). But it seems clear that the matters are being confused. The author adds: "Let us suppose that the Supreme Pontiff intended the certainly more probable opinion; then he did indeed attack Probabilism, but by this attack he did not yet condemn Probabilism." I grant these things freely; but a system attacked by the Supreme Pontiff, although not condemned, does not seem commendable. Forstmann indeed adds in the cited place: "For we can attack what we think good." But no one would admit that a moral system which the Supreme Pontiff held to be good or right was attacked by him.

⁴ De Minusprobabilismo, p. 35.

⁵ De Minusprobabilismo, p. 35.

⁶ De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 35-36.

⁷ Jansen, p. 34; Vindiciae Alf., I, n. 46; Berthe, Vie de S. Alf., II, p. 640.

⁸ Thus Dollinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten in der romischkatholischen Kirche seit dem sechzehnten Jahrhundert; Hermann, Romische und evangelische Sittlichkeit; Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte; Hoensbroech, Die Ultramontane Moral.

⁹ Cf. Ter Haar, Ven. Innoc.

¹⁰ Although St. Alphonsus at first supported Probabilism, and published two dissertations, anonymous however, which favored the aforesaid system, one in 1749 and the other in 1755, nevertheless he followed that system more from obedience than from inward conviction. This is so true that, when the holy Doctor was in the greatest danger of life in 1756, this one thing caused him fear: that he had supported Probabilism. "In the year 1756," Melchionna, who had seen and heard the matter in person, narrates, "our blessed Father had fallen mortally ill during Holy Week. When he had recovered somewhat from the illness, our whole Noceran family came to him rejoicing. Then Alphonsus spoke thus: 'Having been brought into this greatest danger of life, there was nothing that kept me disturbed and anxious. This alone caused me fear, namely, that I had followed a probable opinion; but the obedience that had to be given to my director required it.'" Moreover, in the cited dissertations he never explicitly defended the certainly less probable opinion, and in the second dissertation he expressly excludes notable excess. Indeed, already from the year 1759 he began to contradict Probabilism. Cf. Gaude, p. 17 sq.

¹¹ How highly the holy Doctor valued this Monitum is clear from these things which he wrote to his publisher Remondini: "This notice is certainly brief, since it is contained in a single folio; but I value this folio more than any other that might be desired in the book, both because I spent much labor in composing it, and because it embraces my whole system in moral matters" (Lettere, III, n. 308).

¹² In the last editions of the Theologia Moralis, the holy Doctor deleted these words: "I say certainly more probable; because when the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything but notably more probable. And in that case the safer opinion will no longer be doubtful (understand this of doubt strictly taken, as we shall say in the other question), but is morally or quasi-morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true. Hence then it comes about that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either slightly or at least doubtfully probable with respect to the safer one." These words, I say, which were found in the earlier editions, he deleted, and substituted for them the argument deduced from the obligation of following the truth. But he did this not because he held the things he had written to be false, but because they were less apt and less effective for his purpose than the argument from following the truth.

¹³ De Minusprobabilismo, p. 56.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. I, § IV, Point II, That Is, Equiprobabilism, Thesis III. (Continued)

Vol. I, Preliminary Notices · Vol. I, On Conscience, III. On Probable Conscience

Objection 1. If St. Alphonsus, having left Probabilism behind, had embraced Equiprobabilism, he would have changed his Theologia Moralis, which he had composed according to the norm of Probabilism; but this was not done.

Response. St. Alphonsus composed and completed his Theologia Moralis according to the norm of Equiprobabilism; and this is clearly evident from the express testimonies of the holy Doctor. "I have decided to publish," he says in the Monitum to the reader which he prefixed to the second edition, "this new work, which would hold a middle place between opinions too benign and too severe... But in order that I might select, in each question, the opinions more conformable to truth, I spent no little labor." And in the dedicatory letters of the same edition to Benedict XIV he has these words: "I thought it suitable to select the more probable opinions, and those more useful for the salvation of souls" (Lettere, III, n. 5). Again: "In my moral work I reprobated many opinions, approved by many authors, as being certainly less probable" (Dell' uso moder., c. 3, n. 81). Again: "Some have thought that in the greater work I follow the system of the Jesuits, which is not true; for in the conflict of opinions I followed the more probable" (Lettere, II, n. 308).¹

Note. From what has been said it follows that, if St. Alphonsus again and again calls one opinion probable and the opposite one more probable, this is to be understood of one that is doubtfully more probable.

Objection 2. St. Alphonsus requires knowledge of the law, i.e., as he himself explains the word "knowledge," certain notice; indeed at times he requires that the law be manifest, evident, most certain.

Response. Those words cannot be taken in the strict sense, unless we wish to make St. Alphonsus a laxist of the first rank. In what sense the aforesaid expressions are to be taken, the holy Doctor himself explains, concluding the treatise in which statements of this kind chiefly occur with these words: "It is concluded that, unless the opinion which stands for the law is either certain or at least certainly more probable, as we said at the beginning, we are not held to follow it" (I, 83). It is clear, therefore, that the certainty of which the holy Doctor speaks in the texts objected is understood as certainty taken in the broadest sense.

Objection 3. St. Alphonsus admits the use of a probable opinion, even if the opposite is more probable.

Response. St. Alphonsus admits the use of a probable opinion even if the opposite is doubtfully more probable, I concede; even if the opposite is certainly more probable, I deny; for he expressly repeats hundreds of times that the certainly more probable opinion must be followed and the certainly less probable one must be abandoned (n. 232).

Objection 4. St. Alphonsus rejects the certainly less probable opinion only because, in his opinion, it ceases to be probable.

Response. I deny the assertion; for the holy Doctor especially rejects the certainly less probable opinion and imposes the certainly more probable one because the truth is to be followed. Hence he expressly calls that argument the principal argument (Dichiarazione del sistema, n. 2); hence, in the last editions of the Theologia Moralis, for the argument deduced from the slight or doubtful probability of the certainly less probable opinion, he substituted the argument deduced from the obligation of following truth. This argument entirely abstracts from the slight or doubtful probability of the more benign opinion, and proves that the certainly less probable opinion must be rejected, whether it is called probable or is not called probable.²

III. From the obligation of following truth in the moral order. One who forms an opinion, i.e., one who holds one opinion as certainly more probable and the contrary one as certainly less probable, is held sincerely to tend toward this: that he assume and follow as his norm of acting the true opinion, i.e., the opinion which is conformable to the objective Eternal Law or the supreme norm of actions, whether this imposes duties or grants rights.³ But he does this only when he assumes and follows as his norm of acting the opinion which he thinks to be true, i.e., consonant with the aforesaid Law, and not when he assumes and follows as his norm of acting the opinion which he thinks to be false, i.e., dissonant from the aforesaid Law; in other words, he does this only when he assumes and follows as his norm the opinion which, in his judgment, is certainly more probable, and not when he assumes and follows as his norm the opinion which, in his judgment, is certainly less probable. Therefore one who forms an opinion is held to follow the opinion certainly more probable to him in favor of the law.

The major is clear from the fact that the Eternal Law is the supreme, primary, and independent norm of all moral goodness or rectitude, whereas reason is the inferior, secondary, and dependent rule, which borrows its whole force from the Eternal Law. Hence the Angelic Doctor excellently says: "In all ordered causes the effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause, because the second cause does not act except in virtue of the first cause. But that human reason is the rule of the human will, from which its goodness is measured, it has from the Eternal Law, which is divine reason. Hence it is said in Ps. 4: Many say: Who shows us good things? The light of your countenance, O Lord, has been signed upon us; as if he said: the light of reason, which is in us, can show us good things and regulate our will insofar as it is the light of your countenance, that is, derived from your countenance. Hence it is manifest that the goodness of the human will depends much more on the Eternal Law than on human reason" (I-II, q. 19, a. 4). Moreover, no one will deny that one must sincerely tend toward the agreement of the norm of acting with the supreme, primary, and independent norm of moral rectitude, unless he has proclaimed human reason independent of, and autonomous from, the Eternal Law.

The minor also seems clear and plain. For one does not sincerely tend toward an end if, of two means, he chooses the one which in his own judgment more probably leads away from the end than toward it. Suppose, for example, a sick person chooses a medicine which, in the judgment of that sick person himself, is more probably going to harm than to help him, while rejecting the medicine which is more probably going to help than to harm him: no one would contend that this sick person sincerely tends toward recovering health. By parity, one who would assume and follow as a norm the opinion which, in his own judgment, is more probably dissonant than consonant with the objective Eternal Law, while leaving aside the one which is more probably consonant than dissonant with the aforesaid Law, would in no way sincerely tend toward assuming as norm an opinion conformable with that Law.

And this argumentation is taken from those words by which St. Alphonsus, in the last editions of his Theologia Moralis, proves his system; because of the importance of the matter it is useful to cite them again: "I say that if the opinion which stands for the law seems certainly more probable, we are altogether held to follow it; nor can we then embrace the opposite opinion, which stands for liberty. The reason is that, in order to act licitly, we must in doubtful matters inquire into and follow truth;⁴ but where truth cannot be found clearly, we are held to embrace at least that opinion which comes nearer to truth,⁵ such as the more probable opinion is." And elsewhere: "The truth itself, which obliges us to follow it, also obliges us to follow that opinion which stands for the law, when it comes nearer to that same truth" (Dichiarazione del sistema, n. 2).

To forestall objections against the argumentation of St. Alphonsus, I would like you to notice what follows:

The argument is not deduced from the fact that I must sincerely tend toward the agreement of the norm to be assumed with truth, or with the Eternal Law certainly or certainly more probably known, but toward agreement with the Eternal Law as it is in itself. Therefore knowledge introduces a relation which must be absolutely excluded from the concept of the Law of which there is question in our argument, so that one who, in attacking our principle, makes mention of the aforesaid knowledge by that very fact departs from the meaning of the principle. In order that this may appear more clearly, I add these things: conformity with the norm certainly or certainly more probably known is to be actually attained, while one must tend toward the agreement of the norm with the Eternal Law as it is in itself.
The tendency of which we have spoken is nothing other than sincere love or an efficacious desire, appetite, and intention of assuming as norm of acting the true opinion, or the one conformable to the objective Eternal Law. This love and this intention ought to move each person in assuming the norm of acting, so that he may act honestly. One who is led and moved by this love alone or this intention as by a final cause can logically assume as norm only the more probable opinion, as being the means more probably leading to the end, and not the less probable opinion, as being the means more probably leading away from the end, i.e., away from the conformity of the norm of acting with the supreme norm.
I can intend the end, in this case truth or the conformity of the norm of acting with the objective Eternal Law, even if I do not know with certainty on which side the end is. Thus a sick person, by choosing the more probable remedy, intends health, even if he does not know with certainty on which side health is. Thus a traveler going to some city, by choosing the more probable of two opposite roads, truly intends the city, even if he knows only more probably, and not certainly, where the city is.
Tutiorism by no means follows from our argument; for, as we have said, the Eternal Law also wills very many licit things for us. Therefore, if, in equal probability about the licitness or illicitness of some action, I were to assume as norm, "This action is illicit for me," I would not certainly attain truth, or the agreement of the norm of acting with the Eternal Law or supreme norm.
Nor does our argument involve a begging of the question. For from the certain obligation of sincerely and efficaciously intending truth alone, which is an obligation of natural law, there is logically deduced by reasoning the certain obligation of following an opinion not only certainly or almost certainly true, but also more probably true and known as such; hence this too obliges by force of natural law.

IV. From the fact that an act, with respect to the agent, has the morality which the agent thinks objectively inheres in the act. An act, with respect to the one acting here and now, is of that morality which the one acting thinks objectively inheres in the act, rather than of that morality which the one acting thinks does not objectively inhere in the act. Hence, if the agent thinks that some act is objectively prohibited and therefore not permitted, that act, with respect to the one forming the opinion here and now, is prohibited and not permitted.

Sweens says excellently: "Since a human act derives its morality from the object as that object is in the apprehension of the one acting, it is clear that the principal norm of acting rightly must be taken by us from the knowledge which we have concerning that object. But a solidly probable opinion⁶ for the law begets in our mind knowledge concerning its object as commanded or prohibited; knowledge, I say, not indeed strictly certain and without fear concerning the opposite, but nevertheless positive and suitable for drawing the assent of a prudent man; in other words, as St. Alphonsus says, although such an opinion is not certainly true, it has a certain foundation that it is true. Therefore he would act unreasonably who would employ the reflex principle: A doubtful law does not oblige, in order to attribute to his action a goodness contrary to that which shines upon the action from its proper object. For this principle is wholly extrinsic to the action, and therefore it does not come into use except when, after prudent inquiry, no positive knowledge concerning the object of the action is available to us, or, what is the same thing, when concerning the direct goodness of the action we are in strict doubt, whether positive or negative; for such doubt is equivalent to invincible ignorance, as we have seen above."⁷

V. From the fact that Probabilism is at least doubtful. A doubtful system lacks practical value. But Probabilism, insofar as it permits us to follow the less probable opinion, is at least doubtful.

The major is made out from the fact that a moral system is itself the reflex principle which must serve for solving moral doubts for practice. But a reflex principle which is itself doubtful cannot solve doubts or induce a certain conclusion.

The minor is proved by these considerations: 1. As we shall soon note, all the arguments brought forward by the principal adversaries seem to involve a begging of the question. 2. Then, even if we grant that the arguments of the adversaries do not rest on a begging of the question, they nevertheless are not such as to settle the question, and they themselves need further proof. 3. Next, no one who is free from party zeal will deny that the arguments brought forward by us are at least such as to obtain true probability for our opinion. 4. Add that the highest men from every nation under the theological heaven have stood for anti-Probabilism, and even now not a few theologians support it; indeed Dr. Sawicki does not hesitate to assert that anti-Probabilism is becoming stronger day by day.⁸

Now who is there who, after all these things have been weighed in the scales of the sanctuary, would assert that Probabilism is indubitable?

Behold, then, the arguments by which our third thesis is proved sufficiently and more than sufficiently. It remains for us to present the arguments by which the Probabilists try to prove the contrary thesis.

¹ Nor should this seem strange to anyone, because St. Alphonsus, as we have said, defended Probabilism in the years 1749 and 1755, driven more by obedience than by conviction. These things are gathered both from those matters which we narrated above (p. 167), and from the fact that the holy Doctor, at the same times at which he composed the probabilistic and anonymous dissertations, publicly and non-anonymously, i.e., in the first four editions of the Theologia Moralis, expressly declares that he prescinds from the question whether or not it is permitted to follow the less probable opinion. Hence Dubois, with all the circumstances considered, rightly concludes that "the first dissertations of St. Alphonsus on the use of probable opinion were nothing except his preliminary inquiries and a certain exaggerated reaction against simple Probabiliorism, which he had previously defended. For he gathered all the arguments in favor of simple Probabilism, in order to persuade himself of its truth and of the licitness of its use" (De Exemplarismo divino, t. III, n. 1167). But the aforesaid persuasion was never such that a sincere lover of truth would have dared publicly and in his Theologia Moralis to approve for practice opinions which he himself held as more probably false than true. See this proved more fully in De Minusprobabilismo, p. 62.

² See other objections refuted in De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 58-59.

³ Therefore the Eternal Law, as it is taken here, is the reason of divine wisdom insofar as it is directive of all human acts. Moreover, this Law either commands, prohibits, permits, or counsels, as has been explained more fully in n. 81.

⁴ The truth which the holy Doctor here wishes to be inquired into and followed is certainly objective truth, not subjective truth, lest we fall into Kantism.

⁵ That is, it appears nearer to truth or bears before itself a greater appearance of truth; with this noted, the things which some have criticized in the doctrine of St. Alphonsus fall away.

⁶ A solidly probable opinion, as Sweens understands it, coincides with the more probable opinion.

⁷ Theol. mor. fund., n. 129.

⁸ Katholische Kirche und sittliche Personlichkeit, p. 82. Even in this century distinguished authors have cast their vote for Equiprobabilism, such as Vinati, in Divus Thomas, 1905, p. 340; Berardi, Theol. mor. fund., n. 514; Sweens, Theol. mor. fund., n. 700 sq.; Koch, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, p. 97 sq.; Van Tuil, in De Katholiek, 1900, p. 145; Beysens, Ethiek of Natuurlijke Zedenleer, I, n. 234 sq.; Seysener, in De Katholiek, 1916, II, p. 83; Beauduin-Gardeil, Tract. de Conscientia; Valensise, Super systema Theol. Mor... brevis disquisitio, etc.

n. 233.

Objection 1. The Church cannot positively approve a doctrine pertaining to daily practice which is against good morals and promotes illicit actions. But in St. Alphonsus the Church positively approved the doctrine of Probabilism.

Response. A twofold approval can and must be distinguished, one negative, the other positive. Negative approval is that by which the Church declared that the works of St. Alphonsus contain "nothing worthy of censure"; this approval imports only this one thing, that a doctrine has not been reprobated. Positive approval is understood as that by which the writings of the holy Doctor were adorned with the highest praises, and the Author himself was proclaimed by the Church as an illustrious master of Moral Theology and a safe guide of theologians.

Moreover, I freely admit that negative approval belongs to all the works of St. Alphonsus, even the earlier ones which are probabilistic; but the commendation which is called positive favors only Equiprobabilism, as was shown above (n. 232).

Objection 2. The Church cannot tolerate a doctrine pertaining to daily practice which is against good morals and promotes illicit actions. But the Church tolerates Probabilism; she could not do this if it were false, because she cannot tolerate a false doctrine which is against good morals and promotes illicit actions.

Response. The Church also tolerates Equiprobabilism and Probabiliorism; she could not do this if they were false, because even those doctrines which aggravate the yoke of the Lord more than is fitting must be said both to be dishonorable in themselves, or contrary to the divine ordination, and indirectly to harm good morals. Hence from tolerance as such nothing can be deduced in this case. But the tolerance of Probabilism does not prevent the Church from being opposed to Probabilism and from inhibiting it (n. 232); this, as it seems, continues to introduce some presumption against that system. Add what we have just said concerning the positive approval of the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, which favors only Equiprobabilism.

Objection 3. The supreme tribunal of the Church, i.e., the Sacred Penitentiary, in its solemn decrees admitted Probabilism as the practical norm for interpreting law. For in that decree given on February 11, 1661, by which it gave responses to a great number of questions concerning the obligation of denouncing a soliciting confessor, it gives this reason why in one question it affirms the obligation and in another it does not: that the opinion which denies the obligation "is not probable," or "is probable." This is nothing other than to acknowledge Probabilism, or solid probability, as the legitimate norm from which judgment is made concerning the licitness of acting.

Response 1. I deny the consequence; for this supposes that the word "probable" is taken in a logical sense, and in such a sense as also includes the certainly less probable. But neither point is proved, so that this word can be understood either of ethical probability (n. 215), or of logical probability, and indeed of such a kind as excludes the certainly less probable, according to what was said in the cited number.

Response 2. Even if we granted that the word "probable" is taken in the sense of the adversaries, nevertheless the consequence would have to be denied. For there is question of an odious law, namely of denouncing a confessor. Now, with the nature of a law of this kind considered, it was rightly answered that, according to the mind of the Church, a case which theoretically is probably not included under the law is practically not included under the law.

Objection 4. Probabilism was defended by countless and very grave theologians,¹ and is defended even now. But one who follows a doctrine which many and very grave theologians teach acts prudently; and one who acts prudently acts honestly.

Response. One who follows a doctrine which many and very grave theologians teach acts prudently if, after having seen the arguments of the adversaries, he holds it as certain that the system of the theologians whom he follows is true, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Let the reader see, therefore, whether, after considering the arguments brought forward against Probabilism, he can prudently judge that that system is certain and indubitable.

Objection 5. St. Thomas seems to favor Probabilism, since he requires knowledge in order that a precept oblige. But merely certain probabiliority does not import knowledge. "No one," says the holy Doctor, "is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept; and therefore he who is not capable of notice is not bound by a precept; nor is anyone ignorant of a precept of God bound to do the precept, except insofar as he is held to know the precept" (De Verit., q. 17, a. 3).

Response 1. From the fact that someone, especially formerly, i.e., before the controversy about the moral system arose, declares that no one is bound by any precept except through knowledge or notice of that precept, it cannot be deduced with certainty to which moral system, or even whether to any system, he adhered. For all will easily assert this, without attending precisely to this or that determinate sense of those words. Besides, this response being passed over:

Response 2. The holy Doctor, as is clear from the text brought forward, uses the words "knowledge" and "notice" interchangeably. Now even the state of one forming an opinion involves some notice, although imperfect (n. 215). This, moreover, the Angelic Doctor himself expressly affirms. "The more efficacious," he says, "the action of the agent is, the more quickly it induces the form; and therefore in intellectual matters we see that by one demonstration, which is efficacious, knowledge is caused in us; but opinion, although it is less than knowledge, is not caused in us by one dialectical syllogism, but several are required because of their weakness" (De Virt., q. un., a. 9, ad 11). Elsewhere (I-II, q. 67, a. 3) he distinguishes perfect and imperfect cognition, of which the former is obtained through a demonstrative means or argument, and the latter through a probable means. "It must be considered that cognition can be imperfect in three ways: in one way on the part of the knowable object; in another way on the part of the means; in a third way on the part of the subject... But on the part of the means, the cognition which is of some conclusion through a demonstrative means and through a probable means differ according to perfect and imperfect."²

Response 3. For the sake of completeness it is useful to report what St. Thomas notes in the treatment of a particular question, and what seems to favor us. The holy Doctor, asking "whether consent in delectation is a mortal sin," responds that "concerning this some have held different opinions: for some have said that consent in delectation is not a mortal sin, but only venial; but others have said that it is a mortal sin; and this opinion is more common and more likely" (I-II, q. 74, a. 8). Now, after reading the whole article (cf. also I-II, q. 88, a. 5, ad 2), no one will easily deny that, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, only the latter opinion, although he calls it merely more likely, is safe in practice. This being posited, the more likely or more probable opinion, for that is the same thing, seems to St. Thomas to be the one to be followed. The principal places to which different supporters of different opinions refer are these: Quodlibet VIII, q. 6, a. 13; II-II, q. 70, a. 3.

Objection 6. A doubtful law does not oblige. But a law which exists only certainly more probably is doubtful.

Response. A law doubtful with strict doubt does not oblige, I concede; a law doubtful with broad doubt, such as a certainly more probable law is, does not oblige, I deny, for the reasons brought forward.

You will insist: An unknown, unrecognized law does not oblige. But a law which is known only certainly more probably is truly unknown.

Response. A law entirely unknown or entirely unrecognized does not oblige, I concede; a law which is known by opinionative notice does not oblige, I deny, for the reasons brought forward.

You will urge: A law does not oblige unless it is known in the strict sense, as St. Thomas teaches. But the state of one forming an opinion does not import knowledge strictly so called, for this is strictly certain.

Response. I deny the major, and for the reasons brought forward I contend that even knowledge taken in the broad sense, i.e., opinionative cognition, suffices in order that a law oblige. Concerning the opinion of St. Thomas, enough has been said above.

Objection 7. It is repugnant that a certain obligation be induced by an uncertain law, because the effect cannot be more certain than the cause itself. But a law which exists only more probably remains uncertain.

Response 1. I turn back the argument: It is repugnant that a certain obligation be induced by an uncertain law. But a law which exists most probably or almost certainly is not altogether certain. Therefore not even most probable and almost certain laws oblige altogether certainly.

Response 2. I distinguish the assertion: It is repugnant that a certain obligation be induced by an uncertain law directly, I concede; indirectly, as happens if, for example, a law exists only most probably or almost certainly, i.e., by force of the principle explained in n. 232, or at least by force of the principle: In a practical doubt not solved, the safer part is to be followed, I deny.

Objection 8. An uncertain law cannot take away the certain right of liberty of determining oneself at will.

Response. The right of liberty, through the more probable law, directly becomes less probable. But the less probable right of liberty must yield to the more probable right of law, as follows from the arguments brought forward by us.

Objection 9. If the certainly more probable opinion had to be followed, each person would be held to institute a comparison between the various degrees of probability of each opinion; but this morally cannot be done by most people.

Response. This difficulty rests on the error which is called ignoratio elenchi. We require nothing else, nor by force of the system ought we to require anything else, except what is required by the Probabilists themselves, namely, that each person, before acting, inquire into the truth according to his powers or with proportionate diligence (n. 222). But if, after the truth has been inquired into with due diligence, it does not appear that the probability of one opinion surpasses the probability of the other, no obligation arises.³

Corollary. A law obliges if someone thinks or holds as more probable: 1. that the law exists; 2. that some person or case is comprehended by the law; 3. that the fact which founds the law has taken place. It obliges, moreover, in the cases set forth even if one who thinks that the law exists knows that extrinsic authority favors the more benign opinion more, provided, of course, that notwithstanding the extrinsic authority he holds the existence of the law as more probable (St. Alphonsus, Dell' uso moderato dell' opinione probabile, 1765; Lettere, III, 217).

¹ As regards the history of moral systems, it is useful to note these things:

With respect to the holy Fathers, I sincerely confess that, after looking over all their testimonies with an attentive eye, it remained doubtful to me whether they adhered to any moral system, and to which one, of course only implicitly. This one thing I observe: in view of the decree issued by Alexander VII in 1665, the doctrine of Probabilism is "wholly alien from Evangelical simplicity and from the doctrine of the holy Fathers" (n. 231). Let these things be said against those who have gathered certain things from the holy Fathers, otherwise few and ambiguous, of which several do not even deal directly with moral matters. Nor does any one of them state, and this is the state of the question, that the one acting can perform what he himself holds as more probably objectively illicit.
Then it must be noted that before Bartholomew de Medina, who in 1577 first stated this thesis: "If an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite is more probable" (Expos. in I-II D. Thom., q. 19, a. 6, concl. 3), Probabilism was commonly repudiated. The ancient Probabilists themselves expressly testify to this (cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 102-103).
After the year 1577, at which time Medina proposed the thesis cited above, very many theologians adhered to the new doctrine, and it gradually gained such strength that from the year 1620 up to the year 1665 it was received quite commonly. Yet it must not be judged that almost all after Medina, or from the year 1620 up to the year 1665, favored the new system; this is clear from very many testimonies of authors flourishing at that time (cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 105-113).
After Alexander VII in 1665 had overthrown many laxer opinions, and had called Probabilism itself "a mode of opining wholly alien from Evangelical simplicity and the doctrine of the holy Fathers," the system more benign than is just vanished more and more, and, chiefly through the work of the Supreme Pontiffs (n. 232), for a long time was quite commonly reprobated (cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 113-116).

From these things, which we have set forth more fully and confirmed with very many testimonies in our cited little work, from these things, I say, it is made out that the historical notice presented by several authors seems defective and not very accurate.

² By "probable means" the equally probable cannot be understood, since this introduces strict doubt and therefore excludes all notice. It remains that the more probable is understood, which therefore according to the mind of St. Thomas produces some cognition or knowledge, although imperfect.

³ Please see the remaining arguments and objections of the adversaries refuted in De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 95-132.

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 13 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. IV, Art. 3. A Certain Conscience, Equiprobabilism

n. 688.

Equiprobabilism

Equiprobabilism.—The doctrine of Equiprobabilism is a middle way between Probabiliorism and Probabilism. Thus: (a) it agrees with Probabiliorism in holding that it is not lawful to follow the less safe, if the safer is more probable, or if the safer is equally probable, and the question is about the cessation of the law; (b) it agrees with Probabilism in holding that it is lawful to follow the less safe, if the safer is only equally probable, and the question is about the existence of the law.

n. 689.

The principle that “it is not lawful to follow the less safe, if the safer is equally probable and the question is about the cessation of the law,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In real doubt we should decide in favor of that side which is possession. But, when doubt is about the cessation of a law, the law is in possession; for there is no question that it was made. Therefore, in such a doubt we should decide for the safer side, that is, that the law has not ceased.

(b) A certain obligation is not complied with by a doubtful fulfillment. But doubts about the cessation of the obligation of law usually arise from a probability that one has already fulfilled the law. Therefore in such cases we should decide that the law has not been fulfilled—that is, that its obligation has not ceased.

n. 690.

The Probabilists reply that: (a) it is not true that, in equiprobability about the cessation of law, the law is in possession; for liberty is naturally prior to law, and hence has possession in doubt; (b) nor is it true that an obligation that has probably been complied with or removed is certain.

n. 691.

The Equiprobabilists answer: (a) liberty was in possession, until it was dispossessed by the making of the law; (b) an obligation that certainly existed must be held as certainly in existence, until the contrary is proved; whereas a fact, such as dispensation, abrogation, or fulfillment, is not proved if it is only probable.

n. 692.

The principle that “it is lawful to follow the less safe side, if the safer is only equally probable and the question is about the existence of the law,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In real doubt we should favor the side that is in possession. But when doubt is about the existence of a law, liberty is in possession; for liberty is prior to law. Therefore, in such doubt we may decide that there is no obligation.

(b) An uncertain law does not oblige, if one is invincibly ignorant of its existence. But, when there are equiprobable reasons against the existence of a law, one is invincibly ignorant of its existence. Therefore, in such cases one is not obliged.

n. 693.

The principle that “it is not lawful to follow the less safe side if the safer side is more probable,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In doubt improperly so called—that is, in that condition of mind in which there is no fluctuation between equal arguments, but only some indecision between the more and the less probable—we should decide in favor of the more probable, as being morally certain. Hence, it is not lawful to follow what is less safe and less probable.

(b) A law sufficiently promulgated obliges. But, when it is more probable that a law was made or is in force, such law is sufficiently promulgated to the conscience. Hence, the safer side must be followed, if it is more probable.

n. 694.

Probabilist Criticism of the Foregoing Arguments.

(a) If the excess of the more probable over the less probable is so great that the latter is only slightly or doubtfully probable, the more probable is equivalent to certitude; for certitude is assent without fear of the opposite, and the fear of the opposite in such a case would be so slight that it may be considered as non-existent. If the excess is not so great, the less probable remains solidly and certainly probable, and the more probable is not certitude, but opinion (that is, assent with fear of the opposite). The Equiprobabilists are speaking of greater probability in the second sense, and hence they are wrong when they identify it with certitude (see above, 654).

(b) A law must be so promulgated to the conscience that one knows the law or could know it with sufficient diligence; it does not suffice that one can get no further than opinion. It would be unreasonable to oblige one to observe not only what is the law, but also what seems to be the law. Now, he who has only more probable opinion that he is bound by some law, does not know that such obligation exists; he only knows that it seems to exist.

n. 695.

Reply of the Equiprobabilists.-(a) The more probable always removes the appearance of truth from the less probable. Hence, he who recognizes an opinion as more probable can assent to it without any fear of error.

(b) One who holds it as more probable that he is obliged by a certain law, does not know for certain that he is obliged by reason of that law; but he does know for certain that he is obliged by reason of a higher law. Superior to every particular law is the general law that nothing may be done that will deprive law of its efficacy. But law loses its efficacy if each one is free to decide that he is not bound even when the greater weight of probability is to the contrary.

n. 696.

General Arguments in Favor of Equiprobabilism

General Arguments in Favor of Equiprobabilism.—(a) From Authority.—St. Alphonsus Liguori, who holds a unique place in the Church as a moralist, preferred Equiprobabilism to every other moral system; and his views are followed not only by his own Congregation, the Redemptorists, but by many others.

(b) From Comparison with Other Systems.—Truth lies midway between extremes; for truth is lost either by exaggeration or by defect. But Equiprobabilism is a happy medium between Probabiliorism inclining to Rigorism, and Probabilism inclining towards Laxism. Hence, the relation of Equiprobabilism to other systems is in its favor.

(c) From the Character of Its Teaching.—According to principles of justice universally admitted as true, a judge should pronounce sentence in favor of the more probable when there is evidence of unequal weight and in favor of that which is in possession when there is evidence of equal weight. But these principles ought to be of universal application. Therefore, Equiprobabilism does right in making these the guiding principles for the court of conscience.

n. 697.

Probabilist Criticism of these Arguments

Probabilist Criticism of these Arguments.—(a) St. Alphonsus is one of the greatest moral theologians of the Church. Whether in his later years (1762-1787) he taught Equiprobabilism, is a matter of dispute among those who are familiar with his writings. But there is no doubt that in his mature age (1749-1762), when he wrote his Moral Theology, he was a Probabilist.

(b) Probabilism can likewise claim that it stands midway between the extremes of Rigorism (represented by Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism), on the one side, and of Laxism, on the other side.

(c) The principle of possession invoked by Equiprobabilism applies to matters of justice, because there is a presumption that he who holds property has a right to it, and also because human laws must favor him who is in possession, lest property rights be left uncertain and disputes be multiplied. The principle of possession does not apply, however, to other matters; if the law obliged one yesterday, how can that create a presumption that it obliges one today, if one has good reasons for thinking the obligation has ceased? And as for human ordinances, while they have jurisdiction over external goods and may award them in case of doubt to the possessor, they have not, and have never claimed, the right to make the principle of possession a rule for solving all difficulties about duty.

The principle of Probabiliorism for which the Equiprobabilists claim the authority of judicial practice certainly does not apply to criminal cases, for in these preponderance of evidence against an accused is not to be followed if there is a reasonable doubt. In civil cases judges apply the principle of probabiliorism, but it does not follow that conscience should do the same, for the circumstances are different. The judge is seeking to decide which of two litigants has the more likely claim, and hence he is bound to declare for the side that has stronger evidence. Conscience is seeking to decide whether an obligation is certain or uncertain, and hence it is not obliged to decide for obligation when this is more probable, but still not certain.

n. 698.

Answer of Equiprobabilists to this Criticism

Answer of Equiprobabilists to this Criticism.—(a) Granted that St. Alphonsus once held Probabilism, he rejected it later emphatically, and when dying declared that his former defense of Probabilism was the only thing that gave him anxiety.

(b) Equiprobabilism is further removed from Rigorism than Probabilism is from Laxism. It hears both sides of the question—that for liberty and that for law—before it decides. Probabilism is satisfied to hear one side, that for liberty; or at least it does not compare the two sides.

(c) The principle of possession is applied more strictly in cases of justice; for, since justice implies a more exact equality and a more rigorous right than other virtues (see 154), disputes in matters of justice demand stronger proofs. But every virtue renders to someone his due, and hence there is no reason why principles applicable to justice should not be applicable to other virtues also. The principle of Probabiliorism, likewise, is just as applicable to the court of conscience as to the civil court, since in both courts the aim is to get the truth as nearly as possible.

n. 699.

General Arguments Against Equiprobabilism

General Arguments Against Equiprobabilism.—(a) Theoretical Objection.—If we judge Equiprobabilism by its arguments, we find it unconvincing, for that which is old in it does not agree with that which is new, and that which is new argues equally well for Probabilism. Thus, the old arguments for Probabiliorism mean in the last analysis that the greater probability deprives the opposite side of all solid probability; logically, then, one should conclude that equal probability deprives both sides of all solid probability, since one neutralizes the other. The new arguments are drawn from the principles that in doubt one should decide in favor of the side in possession, that a doubtful law does not oblige, etc.—all of which principles, as we shall see, favor Probabilism.

(b) Practical Objection.—If we judge Equiprobabilism by its adaptibility for use, we find it wanting. A moral system should be one that can be easily understood and applied, otherwise it is unworkable and useless. But Equiprobabilism is so complicated and abstruse that even the professional theologians who hold it are often at a loss how to apply it, and are found to give inconsistent decisions. How can it be expected, then, that anyone else will be able to decide whether the law or liberty is possession, whether the degree of probability on one side is greater than or equal to that on the other, whether the question has to do with the existence of the law or its cessation, etc.?

n. 700.

Replies of the Equiprobabilists

Replies of the Equiprobabilists.—(a) The old (i.e., probabilioristic) principles of Equiprobabilism are not contrary to the new. A more probable opinion not only balances the opposition by its equal arguments, and thus puts away doubt, but it also wins assent by the surplus in its favor, and thus certitude is had. When the two opposites are equally probable, there is a state of true doubt, but certitude is had by recourse to the principles of possession and doubtful law. These principles proper to Equiprobabilism do not favor Probabilism, if one is impartial in one’s use of them, and willing to use them against as well as for liberty.

(b) Equiprobabilism is not more difficult in its application than Probabilism. It does not require that one determine minutely and exactly the greater or equal probability of the arguments for law and for liberty, or that one devote extraordinary diligence to the solution of the problem. All it requires is that one consider the matter seriously, weigh the arguments on both sides impartially, and decide to the best of one’s ability which side appears to be more probable or to have the presumption in its favor.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 3 passages

Vol. I, Preliminary Notices

n. 2.

What have been the vicissitudes of Moral Theology? - There have been various vicissitudes of Moral Theology, both as regards its didactic development and as regards the development of the general rule of morals in doubtful cases.

As regards its methodical form, various ages can be distinguished in it, and they are the following six.

The first age, from the beginning, in the time of the Apostles, was when moral doubts were resolved by the decisions of the Supreme Pontiffs, by the decrees of Councils, and by the opinions of the Fathers, who especially in their homilies and sermons to the people explained those things which are necessary for rightly informing morals and for salvation.

The second age succeeds a little later, when in the first centuries of the Church the use of canonical penance became established, and Penitential Books were employed. Special treatises on moral matters were gradually multiplied in this age, either together with speculative doctrines or separately, up to the twelfth century, when, after St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, who died in the year 1033, and after St. Bernard, first Abbot of Clairvaux, who died in 1153, Peter Lombard, called the Master by antonomasia, wrote the books of the Sentences, in the third of which he treats of the virtues and of vices; he died in 1164. Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 11, c. 11; Decree of Gratian, at the end.

The third age extends from the thirteenth century to the fourteenth. In this age sacred practical doctrine made great progress, especially through the work of William of Paris, who died in 1249, St. Bonaventure, O. Min., who died in the year 1274, St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P., who died in the year 1274, called the Angelic Doctor, St. Raymond of Pennafort, of the Order of Preachers, who died in the year 1275, and Peter Paludanus, O.P., who died in the year 1342, who for St. Alphonsus is a doctor of perfect knowledge.

The fourth age embraces the two following centuries, the fifteenth and the sixteenth; and it is distinguished by the notable saints who flourished in this age. Among others are celebrated St. John of Capistrano, O. Min., who died in the year 1440, St. Bernardine of Siena, O.S. Fr., who died in the year 1444, St. Lawrence Justinian, who died in the year 1455, St. Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, who died in the year 1459, Thomas Cardinal Cajetan, O.P., who died in the year 1534, a man of most subtle genius, Francis de Vitoria, O.P., who died in the year 1546, Dominic Soto, O.P., who died in the year 1560, Peter Soto, O.P., who died in the year 1563, Bartholomew Medina, O.P., who died in the year 1581, St. Charles Borromeo, who died in the year 1584, Martin Azpilcueta, called Navarrus, who died in the year 1590, Cardinal Francis Toletus, S.J., who died in the year 1596, and Louis Molina, S.J., who died in the year 1600.

The fifth age embraces the seventeenth and eighteenth century up to St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, and it is distinguished by many learned scholastic theologians who expressly expounded and illustrated moral questions in copious treatises. Among many others there excel Thomas Sanchez, S.J., who died in the year 1610, Francis Suarez, S.J., who died in the year 1617, Leonard Lessius, S.J., who died in the year 1623, Basil Pontius, O.S. Aug., who died in the year 1629, the Salmanticenses, O. Carm. Disc., from 1631 to 1722, Martin Bonacina, who died in the year 1631, Giles Coninck, S.J., who died in the year 1633, Ferdinand De Castro Palao, S.J., who died in the year 1633, Paul Laymann, S.J., who died in the year 1635, Francis Sylvius, who died in the year 1649, Augustine Barbosa, who died in the year 1649, Cardinal John De Lugo, who died in the year 1660, Peter Marchant, O. Min., who died in the year 1661, Antoninus Diana, Cleric Regular Theatine, who died in the year 1663, Zacharias Pasqualigo, Cler. Reg., who died in the year 1664, Hermann Busembaum, S.J., who died in the year 1668, Henry Pirhing, S.J., who died in the year 1670, Thomas Tamburinus, S.J., who died in the year 1675, Anacletus Reiffenstuel, O.S. Franc., who died in the year 1703, Claude La-Croix, S.J., who died in the year 1714, Patrick Sporer, O. Min., who died in the year 1714, Prosper Lambertini, Benedict XIV, who died in the year 1758, and Lucius Ferraris, Ord. Min., who died in the year 1760.

The sixth age takes its beginning from St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, who died in the year 1787, and extends down to our own times. St. Alphonsus, most outstanding in genius and doctrine as well as in sanctity of life, and divinely given for exterminating Jansenist errors and severities, wrote a Moral Theology in which he treats all questions learnedly, eruditely, and with the highest prudence, recounting almost all that had been handed down before him; hence he was deservedly adorned by the Church with the title of Doctor. Hence it happened that in more recent times Moral Theologians followed St. Alphonsus as leader and master. In our age very many compendia of Moral Theology have been published.

The name indeed is modest, but the works are certainly of notable merit. For in these compendia the whole doctrine of Moral Theology is handed down briefly and in order, and in them is contained, accurately set forth, not only the doctrine of the old theologians accumulated in the course of time, but also that which has been acquired for Moral Theology either from the more recent Acts of the Holy See and of the Sacred Roman Congregations, or also from the progress of the natural sciences. Nor indeed have more expansive treatments been lacking in this age, as can be seen in the treatises On Justice and Law and On Contracts of D. Carriere, and in the scholia, annotations, and dissertations of Fr. Anthony Ballerini, S.J. Zitelli, Enchirid.;

Hurter, Nomenclat.; D'Annibale, Summ., 4th ed., p. 1, n. 2 ff.; Bouquillon, Inst. Theol. Mor. Fundam., Introduction V.

As regards the development of the general rule of morals in doubtful cases, for several centuries each one defended his own opinion, according to the varying weight of the reasons, as seemed better to him. In the year 1572 Antonius Cordubensis first began to contend on behalf of law, because of the authoritative and obligatory prerogative of law, and accordingly he established that in doubt the safer part must always be held. But in the year 1577 Bartholomew Medina, professor at Salamanca, began, on the contrary, to contend on behalf of liberty because of the prerogative of its natural right, and accordingly he established that in doubtful matters he acts prudently and licitly who follows an opinion truly probable and favoring liberty, even after leaving aside the more probable opinion in favor of law. He was the first who reduced the doctrine concerning probable opinions into a system. From this Tutiorism and Probabilism arose.

In the following seventeenth century Synnichius, who died in the year 1666, brought Tutiorism down into Rigorism, while Caramuel brought Probabilism into Laxism: for the former denied that we can follow an opinion favoring liberty, even if it is most probable, which was condemned by Alexander VIII in the year 1690; the latter, on the opposite side, affirmed that we can follow an opinion even slightly probable, which was proscribed by Innocent XI in the year 1679. Hence in that same century Probabilism was widely diffused, and became a very common and very received doctrine in every school: of almost all the disciples of St. Thomas, of almost all the disciples of Scotus, of almost all the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, and of other theologians, with few exceptions.

But since many of these probabilists favored liberty too much, asserting that it was lawful to follow even an opinion that was probably and doubtfully probable, the Probabilists were divided among themselves, and there arose moderate Probabilism, standing in an opinion truly and gravely probable, and broad Probabilism, proceeding even to doubtful probability. Hence, while the Fathers of the Society of Jesus commonly remained in Probabilism, the Thomists passed over to Probabiliorism, requiring for liberty an opinion more probable than the opinion favoring law. Zitelli, in his Enchiridion, mentions as the head of the probabiliorists Francis Genet, who died in the year 1702.

In the eighteenth century, to overthrow broad Probabilism and Probabiliorism at the same time, St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori undertook to defend moderate Probabilism, establishing that it is lawful to use a probable opinion even in competition with one more probable for law, whenever the former has a certain and grave foundation. And for that reason the Holy Doctor called his system moderate Probabilism, against rigid Probabiliorists and lax Probabilists, Equiprobabilism, with aeque taken according to the nature of true probability, not according to equality of degree.

But since the word nevertheless was not free from ambiguity in itself, hence after St. Alphonsus another system arose, which the Redemptorist Fathers defend, namely the system of Equiprobabilism, by which it is established that it is lawful to follow an opinion favoring liberty when it is equally or a little less probable than the opinion favoring law; but that it is not lawful when the latter is much more probable than the former, which in truth falls back into Probabiliorism. La-Croix, vol. 1, prodromal book, Franc. Ant. Zachariae and Quaest. facti of Stephen De Champs; Zitelli, Enchir.; D'Annibale, p. 1, n. 8 ff.; Bouquillon, Inst. Theol. Mor. Fundam., Introduction II; E. E. M. n. 114, 119.

Vol. I, On Conscience, III. On Probable Conscience

n. 112.

Note: 1. "That diverse species of probabilities are given.... A tenuously probable opinion is one which rests on some foundation, but not such as avails to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man.... Probable is that which rests on a grave moment, either of intrinsic reason or extrinsic authority, which avails to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite. More probable is that which rests on a graver foundation, but still with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary is also judged probable. Most probable is that which rests on a most grave foundation, and for this reason the opposite is judged either tenuously or doubtfully probable.... An opinion or sentence morally certain is one which excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite is reputed altogether improbable. Finally a safe opinion is one which withdraws from every danger of sinning; but the safer is one which withdraws more from such danger, although it may not rest on stronger reasons." L. l. c. But S. D. speaks more exactly about a most probable opinion, H. A. tr. 1. n. 65: "Unless we wish to confuse a most probable opinion with an absolutely certain opinion, it is necessary to say that the opinion contrary to the most probable is not tenuously probable, but doubtfully probable." The reason is that a most probable opinion "is within the limits of probability," and therefore "does not exclude every prudent fear." "But tenuous probability is not true probability, and therefore does not bring with it a prudent reason. But doubtful probability brings some prudent reason, although not altogether certain and stable." Cf. also Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 85. But lest there be quibbling about words, as far as concerns us, we recognize no opinions, as regards doctrine, within the limits of true probability except the probable opinion, the more probable, and the most probable. Below the probable there is only the non-probable, the improbable, of which there can indeed be various grades; above the most probable there is only the certain. The probable is immediately opposed, by an opposition of comparison, to the more probable; but mediately to the most probable; and likewise the most probable is immediately opposed to the more probable, but mediately to the probable, unless someone wishes really to confuse the most probable with the certain.

Various moral systems: Tutiorism: A moral system which establishes that in doubt the safer part is to be followed practically. One kind is absolute, and is Rigorism, which establishes that the safer part must always be followed. Another is mitigated, which establishes that the safer part must be followed unless the other part favoring liberty is most probable. Probabiliorism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow an opinion favoring liberty only when it is more probable than the opposite favoring the law. Therefore according to this system a doubtful law obliges, against the most common opinion and against reason. Equiprobabilism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is not licit to follow the less safe opinion unless it is equally or almost equally probable as the opposite. It is indeed a right norm of acting, but not to the exclusion of probabilism, which is a moral system containing an altogether right norm of acting, embracing all the cases of a true probable opinion favoring liberty, when the question concerns merely the subjective honorableness of an action. Probabilism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion favoring liberty, although the opposite in favor of the law is more probable, whether a little or much more probable, where nevertheless the question concerns only the liceity of a human action. The reason is that when there is a truly probable opinion against a law, the law is doubtful, and a doubtful law does not oblige. Laxism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow an opinion even doubtfully and tenuously probable against the law. It was condemned by Innocent XI, proposition 3, condemned March 2, 1679.

n. 119.

It is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, the safer being left aside, whether equally probable or even truly more probable, where the question concerns only the honorableness of the action, by forming for oneself a conscience not directly, but from reflex principles.

The proposition is against probabiliorists and equiprobabilists. The first part is proved. Probabiliorism and equiprobabilism are refuted.

Proof 1. The system of the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists is not practical. For it is very difficult even for the doctors themselves to establish which opinion is more probable, which notably more probable. What appears to one more probable or notably more probable appears to another less probable and notably less probable. Indeed, what to one and the same person previously appeared more probable, far more probable, afterwards, the matter having been weighed better, seems less probable and much less probable.

Proof 2. For either the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists say that it is licit to act from the immediate judgment of the more probable or notably more probable opinion; or they say that it is licit to act from a mediate judgment, namely by force of the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; an uncertain law does not produce a certain obligation; the will without knowledge of the law cannot be bound by its obligation. The first cannot be said, for although the opinion is more probable or notably more probable, nevertheless it is not certain; and without a certain conscience it is not licit to act. But the other, as is clear, leads not into probabiliorism or into equiprobabilism, but into simple probabilism. For where there is true probability against the law, the law is already doubtful and uncertain, and knowledge of the law cannot be had.

Proof 3. For we would be bound to follow the more probable or notably more probable opinion insofar as these approach more closely to truth. But this is false; for an opinion simply probable can approach more closely to truth, and a sentence can be false which bore before itself a certain greater appearance of truth. Moreover, here the question does not concern speculative truth but practical truth; the question does not concern adhesion of the intellect simply to truth, but the obligation of the will, which is not bound by the obligation of the law unless the law is certain and knowledge of the law is had.

The second part is proved. Simple probabilism is proved.

Proof 1. The proposition established is clear from the authority of very many and very grave theologians, who not only hand it down, but also affirm it as common doctrine, such as Suarez, Lugo, Struggl, La-Croix, Pignatelli, Vasquez, Elbel, Castropalaus, Sporer, etc. Cf. these Instit. Mor. ed. 4. Hence S. Alph. in Dissert. de usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris, 2nd ed., Naples 1755: "We undertake to prove the last, more benign, and most common opinion, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one in favor of the law, whenever that opinion has a certain and grave foundation." And certainly, although many after the Jansenists defended probabiliorism, nevertheless by far the greater part of theologians embraced probabilism. But he who in practice follows a doctrine which very many and very grave theologians teach, and which the doctors commonly hand down, acts prudently; but he who acts prudently acts honorably. For this reason, in the Dissertation just cited, S. D. immediately adds: "Add to these especially the argument, namely that if the benign opinion had been false, it certainly would by no means have been commonly received everywhere by doctors as it truly was received; or at least the Church would not have tolerated it, permitting souls commonly to walk by this way of perdition, as the adversaries cry out, deceived by such blind guides." And, as the same S. Alph. has it l. 6. n. 460, par. Haec autem, "nor is it an obstacle that several opinions which are circulated are not condemned by the Church, and yet by others more commonly are reputed lax; for the Church does not condemn all opinions which regard particular cases, although it does not approve them; but opinions which regard the universality of consciences, the Church does not approve nor keep silent about, as S. Aug. said, Epist. 119: The Church of God tolerates many things, and yet those things which concern faith or good life, it neither approves nor keeps silent about." Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 669 toward the end, Hoc unum, etc.; Bouquillon Theol. Fund. de Consc. c. 2. a. 1. § 2.

Proof 2. He who in practice follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence acts prudently, and consequently honorably. But he who in practice follows a truly probable opinion, the more probable and safer being left aside, follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence. Therefore. - The major is clear of itself. For what is more honorable than to follow right reason and prudence, which is right reason concerning things to be done? And Benedict XIV, C. Apostolica Constitutio § 21, indeed hands down this rule of acting, namely that we should follow the opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Moreover, it is by no means consonant with right reason, and especially with divine goodness, to wish to oblige man to perform somehow that which remains prudently uncertain to man himself after diligent inquiry, whether it is required by the order or not; especially since doubts of this kind are very frequent because of the weakness of the human intellect itself. This would be to impose unbearable burdens. L. 58. 86; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 10 ad 1. But the minor is clear from the very nature and definition of a truly probable opinion, which is not changed by the concurrence of another opinion, although more probable and safer. And this S. Alph. himself openly affirms in the definition of the more probable opinion; for he says that its contrary is judged probable. Cf. 112. Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1807, p. 30 seq.; L. 1. 1. n. 79.

Proof 3. S. Alph. says this in his Op. Mor. Theol., 6th ed., Rome 1767: "There are two principles on which, relying, I defend the licit use of a probable opinion. The first, that a doubtful law, in the conflict of two equally probable opinions, does not oblige, because a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. The other, that an uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation, because the obligation of law is posterior to liberty, with which man has been endowed by God." Each of these principles is explained and proved at length by S. D. l. 1. n. 66 seq., H. A. tr. 1. n. 37 seq. But when a truly probable opinion is present, although it is in concurrence with another more probable and safer one, each principle is still verified, namely that the law is uncertain if the question concerns its existence, or that it is doubtful if the question concerns its interpretation, because it is obscure; and therefore neither does the law have the power of actually obliging, since it has not been sufficiently or certainly promulgated; "for then the doubt whether the law exists is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated," L. 1. 1. n. 70, Turin ed. 1846; nor is man, having certain possession of his liberty, bound to reckon himself despoiled of it because of an uncertain law: for antecedently to every law, each possesses his own liberty, since man must first be conceived as free, and then the law which is imposed on man. Therefore. L. 54 seq.

Now, that the law in that hypothesis is really doubtful or uncertain, so that it may prudently be regarded as such, whence that twofold axiom flows, is clear from the very nature of probability. For where true probability is present, greater probability does not of itself destroy the lesser; and this philosophers and theologians commonly affirm, and S. Alph. expressly hands down, H. A. tr. 1. n. 29 and l. 1. n. 40, where he says that the contrary of the more probable is also judged probable. The same S. D. explains this in this way in the Dissertation ed. 1755, n. 13: Greater probability does not destroy the lesser, "unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has in its favor so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. But otherwise it must be said if the excess is not notable, and the opposed probability receives force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means deprived of its grave probability." Indeed the probability or improbability of some opinion is not the same as its truth or falsity, so that one excludes the other; but it is a worthiness of meriting prudent assent, arising from grave motives, which, although greater or lesser, do not contradict one another if they are taken from diverse principles. But if they exhibit an argument so convincing that the opposite is judged improbable, we are already outside the case of greater or lesser probability, since then one opinion will be certain or probable, the other false or improbable.

Hence S. D. l. 6. n. 604, raising the question: "Whether a penitent can be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion contrary to that which the confessor holds," responds: "The common and to-be-followed opinion teaches that the confessor not only can, but is also bound under grave sin (where the question concerns grave matter, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118), to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion, although the opposite seems more probable to the confessor.... This common opinion standing, strengthened by so many authorities and reasons, I do not see how a confessor can with a safe conscience deny absolution to one wishing to follow an opinion which appears probable to the penitent himself, indeed perhaps more probable, if not directly at least reflexively, as probabilist authors commonly think, who by following a probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one judge that they embrace an opinion reflexively more probable, as being confirmed by graver foundations and by the most common authority of doctors." S. D. has the same doctrine in his last work, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118; and to this opinion he adds no limits except the following: namely that "the opinion of the penitent have some probability, so that the confessor, although he does not hold it as solidly probable, nevertheless does not repute it altogether false... evidently erroneous." Cf. also l. 1. n. 87, where S. D. after Gerson says: "Theological doctors ought not to be quick to assert that some things are mortal sins where they are not most certain about the matter: Note, WHERE THEY ARE NOT MOST CERTAIN." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 1. d. 26. n. 3; Pignatelli Cons. Can. tom. 8. cons. 15.

Proof 4. In order that law certainly oblige, it must be sufficiently promulgated, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 90. a. 4. But sufficient promulgation of law is not had if the law is not certain and manifest. Hence in canon law it is generally established: "In these things, concerning which the law is not found expressed, proceed, equity being preserved, always inclining toward the more humane part, according as you will see persons and causes, places and times, to require." C. Ex parte tua 11 de Transact. And in civil law it is decreed: "Whenever the interpretation of liberty is doubtful, response must be made according to liberty." L. 20 de R. I. "In a doubtful matter, to follow the more benign interpretation is no less just than safe." L. 192 de R. I. But the reason is that law imposes moral necessity, and therefore must necessarily bind the will. But it cannot necessarily bind the will except through knowledge. Therefore, knowledge of the law being excluded, the will remains morally free. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Now if a most probable opinion is present against the law, it is evidently clear that knowledge of the law is lacking. For certainty and evidence cannot be had with the greatest opposite probability; indeed not even with simple probability. Hence S. Alph. says: "To constitute a doubtful law, true probability to the contrary suffices." L. 1. n. 57, ed. 1762. 1763.

Confirmation 5. By the authority of S. Thomas. Law is a certain rule and measure. In order that a rule direct and a measure measure, it must be applied to the thing which must be directed and measured. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30. a. 4. Therefore law must reach the subjects whom it directs; but it reaches them through knowledge. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Accordingly law must be certain and evident. Therefore, if the law is uncertain, namely if its existence is not established, if the law is doubtful, namely if the meaning of the law is obscure, the obligation of the law ceases; a precept does not bind except through knowledge. S. Th. l. c. Hence those axioms: An uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation; A doubtful law does not oblige. For the effect cannot surpass the cause. These things S. Thomas says altogether generally, nor does he distinguish between a law having against it a less probable, or equally probable, or more probable opinion. Therefore the whole question from the Angelic Doctor is this: whether a law having against it a more probable, equally probable, or less probable opinion can be said to reach man through knowledge, to bind him by means of knowledge, through knowledge, through the power of knowledge. But knowledge is not given if true probability is against it. Hence every question about mortal sin is determined dangerously unless the truth is had expressly. S. Th. Quodl. 9. a. 15. And S. Alph. l. 3 after n. 139, Epist. Resp.: "But in order that some action be affirmed absolutely to be a mortal sin, a probable opinion is not enough, nor even a more probable one; for the more probable does not exclude rational fear of erring; whence it does not bring about that the law does not remain doubtful, and that the opposite cannot be true, if it is truly probable."

Confirmation 6. Innocent III allowed a spouse suffering from impotence a three-year trial, C. Laudabilem 5 de Frig., and did not prescribe that it must first be seen whether potency was more probable, or at least equally probable. In the eighteenth century, when certain Indians in the Kingdom of Paraguay who had been converted to the faith had several wives, and questions arose concerning the validity of their marriages, Urban VIII responded to John de Lugo, afterwards Cardinal: "Where the opinions of doctors concur as probable on each side, those opinions are to be followed which, for the condition of places and barbarian men, are more favorable." Urban did not say that the more probable opinions were to be followed, nor did he say where equally probable opinions concur, but absolutely where probable opinions concur. Carden. Cris. Theol. Diss. 2. § 553. E. M. 119.

Nor indeed is it of any force, in order to overturn all the aforesaid things in almost one word, to object against them that probabilism has already been condemned by Innocent XI. For Innocent XI only commanded that liberty be given to the Fathers of the Society to defend probabiliorism and to refute probabilism, if they wished. Cf. E. M.; Wirceburg. De Actib. hum. c. 4.

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 31 passages

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Second Commentary: On Cons…, IV. Objections Against Probabilism · Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Second Commentary: On Cons…, V. On the Doctrine of St. Alphonsus Concerning Probabilism · Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Second Commentary: On Cons…, VI. On Doubtful Conscience

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Second Commentary: On Cons…, IV. Objections Against Probabilism

n. 97.

And by approving the Moral Works of St. Alphonsus, the Church implicitly approved probabilism also. For the Holy Doctor, apart from his own system itself expounded in his various Dissertations, follows only opinions simply probable, and approves them for practice although the opposite seems to him more probable. If St. Alphonsus had never written Dissertations about his moral system, surely no one could deduce probabiliorism or equiprobabilism from his moral works, as is demonstrated even from the very exquisite diligence by which he weighs the probability of each sentence.

n. 98.

Moreover St. Alphonsus in fact speculatively proposes the moral system of simple probabilism. For his system rests upon the aforesaid principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; and upon the aforesaid proposition, that when against the law there is a truly probable proposition, although for the law there is a truly and equally probable proposition, the law becomes doubtful and consequently does not oblige.

n. 99.

Nor indeed is the probabilism of St. Alphonsus converted into another moral system by another proposition which the Holy Doctor adds for completing his system, namely that when for the law there is a sentence certainly notably, or certainly evidently much more probable, we must follow it. For then there would be a different moral system of the Holy Doctor, as equiprobabilists pretend, if from the Holy Doctor the contrary sentence for liberty remained itself probable, although in an inferior and notably inferior degree. But the Holy Doctor does not hold some sentence for the law as certainly and much, or notably, more probable unless when through it the law already appears at least morally sufficiently promulgated, and therefore by no means doubtful; and consequently the opposite sentence for liberty cannot be called certainly probable. This the Holy Doctor wished explicitly to note in order to remove from his system slight and doubtful and uncertain probability. And this whole thing is certainly not against probabilism, but against laxism.

n. 103.

Nor indeed is it of force to object that St. Alphonsus limited common probabilism, and that the whole hinge of the question turns on this limitation. For he says: "that if an opinion which stands for the law seems certainly more probable, we are altogether bound to follow it, nor can we then embrace the opposite opinion which stands for liberty." Loc. cit., n. 54, p. 25. Certainly more probable, as Rev. Father Gaude notes in the Preface, p. XX, is the same for St. Alphonsus as notably more probable. But this certainly or notably more probable opinion, for the Holy Doctor, is the same as a morally certain sentence, so that the opposite is only doubtfully or slightly probable; and therefore that former one is called by the Holy Doctor certainly or notably more probable. Behold how, says the same Rev. Father Gaude, "the Holy Doctor in the sixth and seventh edition, n. 55, expounded that principle," p. 25. But this exposition the Holy Doctor, with the same Rev. Father Gaude as witness, p. XIX, did not afterwards change substantially. This exposition is: "I say... certainly, because when the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything except notably more probable. And in that case, the safer opinion will no longer be now doubtful (understanding doubt strictly so called), but is morally or quasi-morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has for itself a certain foundation that it is true. Hence then it comes about that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either slightly or at least doubtfully probable in respect to the safer one." But it is said by the Holy Doctor, "which lacks a certain foundation"; because if in truth, notwithstanding that greater probability of the sentence for the law, the opposite for liberty rests upon a sufficient foundation, the Holy Doctor himself will say that this is probable or sufficiently probable, and that we can follow it.

n. 108.

It is insisted: St. Alphonsus reproved probabilism as a lax doctrine, for he asserts that the doctrine which Theologians of the seventeenth century commonly held on this matter was lax. Likewise he asserts that he does not follow the system of the Jesuits. - The Holy Doctor holds as lax not probabilism simply, but broad and lax probabilism, which is extended even to doubtful and slight probability. Let the Moral System of St. Alphonsus be read, as it is expounded in the very edition of the Moral Theology of Father Gaude. In that whole Dissertation the Holy Doctor does not attack a truly probable opinion, but an opinion which, although it is called probable, in reality is not probable, since it is only slightly, or at least doubtfully, probable; as Rev. Father Gaude himself, p. 25, interprets St. Alphonsus, with the note added from St. Alphonsus himself in the sixth and seventh edition. And indeed St. Alphonsus, on the contrary, in that whole Dissertation does nothing else except defend ex professo and diffusely probable opinion against probabiliorists, from the fact that knowledge, or certain notice of the law, is required for affirming obligation; whence a doubtful law does not oblige, an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation. - Nor indeed does the Holy Doctor say that the doctors of the seventeenth century commonly held that lax sentence which he reproves; but that those authors held it as if commonly, therefore not commonly. As if commonly, not because all or almost all, or the greatest or greater part held it, but only because many held it. The Holy Doctor himself declares his assertion in the Dissertation of the year 1765, in which he says: "I did not pretend, nor do I pretend, to establish a new system; I also know well that no probabilist of solid doctrine declares licit the use of an opinion only slightly or doubtfully probable. But because many probabilists without distinction say that it is lawful to follow an opinion less probable if it is founded in reason or authority, I wished to distinguish, etc." And from these things it is openly clear that the Holy Doctor holds and defends only probabilism of solid doctrine, which excludes sentences slightly and doubtfully probable. Besides, it is clear that the Holy Doctor does not disapprove probabilism, but only its abuse. For this reason, H. A., tr. 1, n. 73, he says: "And in truth, in the past century very many abused matters in opining, in approving as probable many lax opinions; and therefore the Church proscribed several opinions, because they were undeservedly called probable." But how could the Holy Doctor have disapproved probabilism, when he defends it against its detractors who assert that it had already been condemned by the Church? Cf. l. 1, n. 85, 70, pp. 66, 70, ed. P. Gaude. Finally, if in truth the Holy Doctor had held the authors of the seventeenth century as lax, at least in the greatest or greater part of them, how would he not have contradicted words by deed? For the greatest part of the authors whom St. Alphonsus praises and follows belong to the seventeenth century. To this century, among other probabilist doctors, belong Gregory of Valencia, S.J.; John Azor, S.J.; Gabriel Vasquez, S.J.; Dominic Bannez, O.P.; Peter Lorca, O. Cist.; Thomas Sanchez, S.J.; Francis Suarez, S.J.; Vincentius Fillucius, S.J.; Leonard Lessius, S.J.; Martin Becanus, S.J.; Basil Pontius, O.S.A.; the Salmanticenses, Discalced Carmelites; Martin Bonacina, doctor of Milan; Aegidius Coninck, S.J.; Ferdinand de Castropalao, S.J.; Didacus Alvarez, O.P.; Paul Laymann, S.J.; Augustine Barbosa, Bishop of Ugento; Francis Amicus, S.J.; Cardinal De Lugo, S.J.; Peter Marchant, O.S.F.; Hermann Busembaum, S.J.; Anthony de Escobar and Mendoza, S.J.; Christian Lupus, O.S.A.

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Second Commentary: On Cons…, V. On the Doctrine of St. Alphonsus Concerning Probabilism

n. 114.

Since in moral matters the authority of St. Alphonsus is very great, and several more recent authors deny that the Holy Doctor stands for probabilism simply such, but affirm that he teaches equiprobabilism, and indeed rejects probabilism as a lax doctrine; hence here especially we raise the question concerning the mind of the holy Doctor, although in the preceding article we have almost constantly used his sentences and even words for establishing the doctrine of probabilism. But it will be very useful, as it were under one view, to set forth his doctrine, in order to understand it fully.

n. 115.

Lest there be doubt in this matter, and that we may faithfully expound the mind of the Holy Doctor, we take his doctrine from the tract On Conscience in his work Homo Apostolicus, which he himself declares in the same place, n. 79, that he wrote when near death. Now these things are had in nn. 33, 77: "The third sentence, which is ours, says that when the opinion which favors liberty is equally probable as the opinion which favors the law, it can without doubt and licitly be followed... Here it is necessary that I warn about something concerning my system, which is altogether to be warned, and it is this: that when it is doubted whether the opinion favoring the law is equally probable or a little more probable, then the same principle has place, that a doubtful law does not oblige; for in such a case the law itself does not cease to be strictly doubtful; for then, although some greater probability should be present for the law, since it is doubted whether this greater probability is present or not, the preponderance will be so light and minimal that it is to be considered as nothing, before that saying commonly admitted by the adversaries themselves, that a little is reckoned as nothing. But it would be otherwise when the excess were evident and certain; because then the opinion favoring the law will be certainly and much more probable; and therefore then, as was said at the beginning, the law is now morally promulgated, and therefore obliges, and is without doubt to be observed."

n. 116.

Two things are to be investigated here. The first is what St. Alphonsus understands by an opinion evidently and certainly much more probable. For if he understands an opinion truly and properly probable, he is against us; but if he understands an opinion which passes beyond the limits of probability and reaches certainty, he will be for us. The other is what again the Holy Doctor understands by an opinion equally probable or a little more probable; for if that little more probable denotes a slight excess of probability, as it is distinguished from a greater excess of true probability, again the Holy Doctor is against us; but if it denotes simply an excess of probability, the Holy Doctor will be for us.

n. 117.

As regards the first, the Holy Doctor refers himself to those things which were said at the beginning. These things are had at the beginning, n. 31: "Whether it is lawful to operate with a probable opinion, three sentences are present. The first of these is that someone can licitly follow an opinion even less probable for liberty, although the opinion for the law is certainly more probable. The authors of the past century held this sentence as if commonly, but we say that it is lax and cannot licitly be embraced. The reason is that when the opinion for the law is certainly more probable, then the law is no longer doubtful by a strict doubt, as happens, as we explain afterwards, when the opinions both for the law and for liberty are equally probable; but it is morally certain, since it has for itself a certain foundation that it is true, while, on the contrary, the less probable opinion which favors liberty has such a foundation that it is not true, so that it remains slightly or at least doubtfully probable before the safer opinion; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence, to wish to follow it. For since it appears certainly to the intellect that truth stands more for the law than for liberty, then the will cannot prudently and without fault follow the less safe part; for then he would not operate from his own judgment, or his own belief, but by a certain effort which by his will he would make upon the intellect, removing it from that part which seems truer to it, and bending it toward that part which not only seems to it not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true."

n. 118.

Now from these things it is openly clear that the Holy Doctor, by an opinion certainly more probable, understands in fact an opinion morally certain. For he says that then the law: 1. is not doubtful by a strict doubt, but is morally certain; 2. that the same law then has for itself a certain foundation that it is true; 3. again, that the said law has against itself only an opinion which has such a foundation that it is not true; 4. that the less probable opinion opposed to the law is slightly or doubtfully probable, so that it would be imprudence to wish to follow it, and it not only seems not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true. - But a slightly probable opinion is not an opinion truly probable, and the same St. Alphonsus hands this down in n. 65: "slight probability is not true probability, but is only a certain false or vain appearance of probability." Likewise a doubtfully probable opinion is not truly and properly probable, which we contend that it is licit to follow even in the concurrence of a more probable one. For if it is doubtfully probable, it participates doubtfully in the nature of probability, and therefore, properly speaking, is not probable. And indeed an opinion truly and properly probable is defined by the same St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 21, as "that which rests upon some grave foundation, apt for inclining the assent of a prudent man." Therefore a doubtfully probable opinion will be an opinion which has a doubtfully grave foundation, and therefore does not merit the assent of a prudent man, who would be exposed to the danger of acting imprudently. "Doubtfully probable," says St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 65, "which no one can follow, but if it is not probable, has only some prudent reason that it may be true... the doubtfully probable has some prudent reason, although not wholly stable, that it is probable." - And hence it is clear that that opinion, which it is imprudence to wish to follow, and which not only seems not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true, is not an opinion truly and properly probable. Therefore, if the less probable opinion, opposed to the certainly more probable, is not truly and properly probable, the certainly more probable opinion by no means subsists within the limits of probability, but now reaches certainty.

n. 119.

The same is confirmed from the Dissertation inserted in Op. Mor., l. 1, n. 55 of the sixth and seventh edition, and reported in the edition of Father Gaude, p. 25, as a commentary on the doctrine of St. Alphonsus in the text. The Holy Doctor explains that certainly more probable. "I say," he says, "certainly, because when the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything except notably more probable. And in that case the safer opinion will not now be doubtful (understanding doubt strictly so called...) but is morally or quasi-morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has for itself a certain foundation that it is true. Hence then it comes about that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either slightly or at least doubtfully probable in respect to the safer one; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence, to wish to embrace it," etc. - Note first that from the Holy Doctor, if an opinion is certainly more probable, it is notably more probable, because a small excess is either not perceived by the intellect, or is not perceived without fear of erring. Hence, if an opinion is certainly more probable, it is also notably more probable. - Note then, as regards that quasi-morally certain, that for the Holy Doctor in this matter, where there is question of a certain moral estimation, a little is reckoned as nothing. - Besides, the Holy Doctor does not speak of any probability whatsoever, but of that which appears certainly to the intellect; and he speaks of the one who, if he withdrew from this probability, would withdraw from his own judgment by a certain effort of the will, and would act against his conscience. To such a one, accordingly, he applies that saying of the Apostle to the Romans 14:23, what is not from faith is sin, ibid. and H. A., tr. 1, n. 31, "from which it is deduced that we, in order to operate rightly, ought to be morally certain concerning the honesty of the action."

n. 120.

Finally, the Holy Doctor calls that sentence lax which defends even the less probable opinion for liberty without any distinction, which namely has only some foundation of reason and authority, and therefore he distinguished by saying that one cannot follow this less safe opinion when there is a great and certain preponderance for the safer. Apology against Father Patuzzi, year 1765. But the true doctrine of probabilism, which we follow, does not defend indiscriminately just any probable sentence, but a certainly and gravely probable one, which alone is truly probable. Likewise the Holy Doctor calls that doctrine lax which the authors of the past century handed down as if commonly, namely in the latter part of that century, in which several lax opinions of probabilists were condemned by the Holy See; but certainly not Sanchez, Suarez, Lessius, Palaus, Laymann, Lugo, Pallavicini, and very many others, whom St. Alphonsus himself approves and praises for his own opinion not only in his Moral Works, but in that very Dissertation on his Moral system. This he himself defends, and repeatedly champions, not against probabilists, but against rigid tutiorists, and affirms that it was without doubt common among all for a series of many years. Breve Dissertaz. dell'uso moderato dell'Opin. Probab., Naples, 1762, p. 48; Op. Mor., l. 1, n. 59, 68, 73, 84.

n. 121.

As regards the other point, it is an evident matter that, if the Holy Doctor by a much more probable opinion understands an opinion morally certain, or quasi-morally certain, against slight or doubtful probability, by a little more probable opinion he understands simply an excess of mere probability. Otherwise the Holy Doctor himself certainly could not admit that a probable opinion can at least sometimes retain its probability, and that someone can follow it, although the opposite is notably more probable, as he himself in fact admits several times. Cf. here n. 104 seqq. Otherwise again it would have to be said from the Holy Doctor that there is not in fact given a probable, more probable, most probable opinion, and a more probable opinion in various degrees, but only a probable opinion; which is both false in itself and altogether foreign to the doctrine of the Holy Doctor. Cf. here n. 33 seqq. - But if it is asked why the Holy Doctor then designates that excess by saying, a little more probable, and not simply by saying, more probable, the reason is that the Holy Doctor considers the matter more practically than speculatively, with attention to the nature of the thing and of the principles, and also to the rigor of the words; and thus he distinguishes between a small and a notable excess of probability. A notable excess truly such is had when it is evident and certain, and then, from the Holy Doctor, probability in fact ceases and reaches certainty. And so indeed it is, at least practically and regularly speaking; for such probability, at least practically, is confused with moral certainty, which is certainty in a certain broader sense.

n. 122.

And in very truth, the Holy Doctor speaks of a much greater probability certainly and evidently such. Certainly and evidently to whom? Certainly not to the opiner alone, since all know well that one and the same opinion appears less probable to one, more probable to another, indeed even to the same person in diverse circumstances; but to all, or by the common judgment of the wise. And in fact if a proposition is certainly and evidently much more probable to all, or by the common judgment of the wise, it is now, practically speaking, morally certain. For in things to be done we often use both most probable and more probable opinions as if true, and as if morally certain, when greater certainty cannot be had. - Every other excess, although perhaps it may be notable, if nevertheless it is not so evident and certain, cannot in fact properly be called notable, since then there is doubt about such a notable excess, and the proposition which seems much more probable to one perhaps, indeed perhaps even to the same person, the matter having been weighed better, as St. Alphonsus himself confesses about himself, l. 1, n. 86; H. A. 1, n. 78, appears much less probable. - Therefore, if that notable excess of probability is so evident and certain, then it now reaches certainty, and by right and deservedly the opposite can only be slightly or doubtfully probable. But if, although notable, it is nevertheless not so evident and certain, that excess in fact, as regards us, cannot be held as notable, but remains within the limits of equal probability or of a little greater probability. And indeed, if to the opiner himself alone a sentence seems notably more probable, or if regarding it doctors fall into various opinions, can that sentence prudently be held as certainly and evidently more probable? Certainly not. - Hence again it is established that by that a little greater excess the Holy Doctor in fact understands simply an excess of probability.

n. 123.

For this reason the Holy Doctor openly confesses that he does not dissent from the probabilists. "These authors, our probabilists, say that the opinion for the law is to be followed when this is notably and with excess more probable, because in that case the law is morally sufficiently promulgated." Letter of May 25, 1767. And thus Suarez, De Leg., l. 8, c. 3, n. 9: "Greater probability," he says, "is a certain moral certainty, if the excess of probability is certain." Therefore St. Alphonsus did not found a new system, as he himself confesses, but only in the sixth edition and following handed down a practical rule for discerning true and real probability from false and only apparent probability, openly rejecting doubtful and slight probability, and deciding that the certainly more probable is then to be followed. And this in fact is that singular thing which, as the Holy Doctor wrote to Remondini, "is not found in other books." Theol. Mor., ed. P. Gaude, p. XIX.

n. 124.

But Rev. Father Wouters objects, p. 67, that the Holy Doctor speaks of an opinion certainly notably more probable to the opiner. - To the opiner alone: this is not true, and cannot be affirmed. For a sentence certainly and without any hesitation more probable is well understood if there is question of a certain and notable preponderance of probability as regards all. But if it is restricted to a notable preponderance of probability as regards the opiner himself alone, who is so ignorant of notions that, from the fact that he himself holds some sentence as notably more probable, he is persuaded that it is now certainly more probable, so that the opposite sentence is to be held as slightly and doubtfully probable? That one certainly is not St. Alphonsus, with whom we are dealing at present. St. Alphonsus establishes generally that for this reason we can follow a most probable opinion against the law, because the law is doubtful. Therefore a most probable opinion, which remains within the limits of probability, and much more an opinion only certainly notably more probable to the opiner, remaining within the limits of probability from the Holy Doctor, cannot make the law certain to the opiner. And consequently, speculatively and doctrinally, the axiom of the Holy Doctor has force: A doubtful law does not oblige. Op. Mor., ed. P. Gaude, vol. 1, l. 1, n. 78, p. 58; n. 81, pp. 60-61. - Besides, St. Alphonsus himself, as has already been demonstrated, in several particular cases, although he judged one opinion much more probable, did not for that reason reject the other opposite opinion, and on the contrary held it as sufficiently probable and useful for practice. Behold, we have an opinion much more probable to the opiner, St. Alphonsus, who nevertheless holds the opposite as probable. Cf. n. 104 seqq.

n. 125.

Moreover what kind of rule indeed would this be, by which someone, after a question has been raised about the value of sentences, could not be ruled except by his own individual judgment? Is this a true rule? It is not a true rule, nor certainly is it the rule of St. Alphonsus: "Such an appearance (of greater probability) cannot constitute a certain rule of operating, since it can deceive in many ways. For not rarely some opinion which will appear more probable to one will appear less probable to another; indeed, to himself an opinion which yesterday was less probable will today appear more probable." Therefore that opinion which appears more probable to someone cannot be a true rule of acting, because "the law would be particular only for him to whom that opinion appeared more probable. But this certainly would be against the nature of law, which for the common good must necessarily be universal and universally proposed, lest the people who are bound to observe it be more often divided and perplexed about the truth to be embraced, while each preacher or confessor from the diversity of opinions would often instruct the faithful according to his own sense." Nor is it of force to say that in following the benign sentence (namely the probable one even in concurrence with the more probable for the law) deformity can also intervene, since the same opinion can seem probable to one, improbable to another. It is not denied that this can happen; but it will always be true that when some opinion is strong with solid probability and rests upon a certainly grave foundation, it will be judged probable among the greatest part of the wise. And this will already be enough for preserving the universal uniformity of observance of the law, notwithstanding that among some particular person that opinion is not probable; for that which rarely happens does not remove universal conformity. However, this does not happen concerning the estimation of more probable opinions; because since greater or lesser probability depends upon moral motives, namely upon judgment and the weighing of reasons, which some draw from one principle, others from another, it happens not rarely, but commonly, that what is stronger to one appears weaker to another... "But that we should become certain that some opinion... is truly more probable or has the required preponderance, this is morally impossible. For either that preponderance is small, and who will be secure that the opinion is truly more probable? For since the excess is modest, it can with difficulty be perceived certainly. Or the preponderance is great; and who will be able to judge that it reaches a sufficient measure, so that the opposite is judged false or slightly probable? And thus we would always have to act with a practical doubt. - Either I am bound to follow opinions more probable in themselves, and then when shall I know which opinion is truly more probable in so many cases where grave reasons and authorities occur opposed on both sides? Or opinions more probable to me, and anxieties would be increased, for often I would have to judge my opinion to be more probable against another sentence of many wise men; and then who will render me safe that my opinion is certainly more probable, and more notable with that notable preponderance which some of the adversaries require? How shall I become certain that I have understood the opposing reasons well and solved them well? That the dictate of conscience which I formed for myself is sufficiently certain and safe? That I was not deluded by my own sense, so that if I err, my error is truly invincible and inculpable?" St. Alphonsus, Dissertation, year 1755, n. 3, 17, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52.

n. 126.

St. Alphonsus himself tells us "that several opinions which he at some time held as probable, he was afterwards not ashamed to retract." Op. Mor., l. 1, n. 82, p. 62, ed. P. Gaude. - The sentence of Lessius, that it is not illicit to advise a lesser evil to one prepared to inflict a graver one, seemed to the same St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 57, p. 353, ed. P. Gaude, more probable; l. 5, n. 77, p. 763, ed. P. Gaude, sufficiently probable; and H. A., tr. 8, n. 7, not improbable. And on the contrary the sentence of St. Thomas, that that thing frees from the obligation of a vow which, if it had been known from the beginning, would have impeded the vow from being made, seemed to St. Alphonsus probable, l. 3, n. 187, 198, pp. 488, 498, ed. P. Gaude; soon perhaps more probable, the same l. 3, n. 226, p. 518, ed. P. Gaude; finally as certain, the same also l. 3, n. 720, p. 186, ed. P. Gaude. - Can even learned men fully confident in their own knowledge and free from every prejudice rightly weigh the aforesaid excess? St. Alphonsus speaks of a most probable opinion for liberty, note well, against which from the same Holy Doctor there is only the doubtfully probable; and nevertheless against those who say that it is not lawful to follow any except the most probable, behold what he says: "Where will they find so exact a balance which will render them secure that the opinion standing for the law lacks indeed so much weight of probability as would make it probable, and thus they themselves may operate safely and free from danger?" L. 1, n. 81, p. 61, ed. P. Gaude.

n. 127.

Nevertheless, a sentence will sometimes be certainly and evidently more probable to the opiner himself, with sufficient foundation, "when namely he himself finds a convincing reason which is opposed to liberty, and judges that to such a reason an adequate response cannot morally be given." St. Alphonsus, Dell'Uso moderato dell'Opinione Probabile, cap. 5, n. 26. But when this case occurs, that opiner is now again not found in the case of a probable opinion, but of moral certainty, although perhaps only subjective.

n. 128.

And if it is asked why the Holy Doctor made this distinction between a little more probable, and notably, much, evidently, certainly more probable, the reason is this: because the Holy Doctor, as is clear from loc. cit., H. A., n. 31, and from the Apology against Patuzzi, 1762, wished to oppose himself to those probabilists who extended probabilism even to slight and doubtful probability, and therefore contended that it is licit to act when there is present any apparent, but not firm, reason or authority. Hence, from the opposite side, the Holy Doctor established that then one must follow the opinion certainly, evidently, notably, much more probable, which, as is clear, in comparison with the slightly or doubtfully probable, is rightly and deservedly called morally certain by the Holy Doctor. Therefore, since St. Alphonsus designated such an opinion, in comparison with the doubtful and slightly probable, by notably more probable, it remained that he should designate any other more probable opinion, in comparison with the truly probable, by a little more probable. Cf. Breve Dissertaz., etc., cited above, at the end of n. 133, p. 51; Op. Mor., Roman ed., year 1757, l. 1, n. 33.

n. 129.

Behold the very words of the Holy Doctor in the Apology of the year 1765: "I never contended, nor do I now contend, to found new systems; I well know that no probabilist of solid doctrine holds as licit the use of an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable. But because many probabilists indiscriminately say that it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion when it has some foundation from reason or from authority, therefore I wished to distinguish, saying that it is illicit to follow the less safe opinion when there is much and certain preponderance on the part of the safer opinion; because then the less safe opinion cannot be called certainly probable."

n. 130.

And Joseph Aertnys, C.Ss.R., in his Moral Theology, Tournai, 1890, On Conscience, n. 69, says that according to the mind of St. Alphonsus "to the probable, very probable, more probable, there is opposed the probable or sufficiently probable; to the notably more probable, the most probable, there is opposed the slightly or doubtfully probable." This once established, who can any longer understand equiprobabilism according to the Holy Doctor? The same Rev. Father Aertnys, explaining the sentence of the Holy Doctor, says that the notably more probable opinion, about which the whole question is, and which one is bound to follow from the Holy Doctor, is in reality an opinion morally certain; "wherefore an opinion is not truly probable when the opposite is notably more probable, n. 80." But probabilists do not say that it is lawful to follow an opinion not truly probable, but an opinion truly probable. Equiprobabilism is thus reduced to a mere abuse of words, by still calling an opinion morally certain probable. The question would no longer be a question of a moral system, but at most would be a logical question of the nature of probability: namely, whether it is always true that an opinion notably more probable renders the opposite not truly probable. This, as has already been said, regularly and practically speaking, is true only when that opinion is certainly notably more probable to all. Cf. here n. 122 seqq. But if the question is made speculatively and doctrinally, this is altogether false, and will not be proved for all eternity. For probability of itself does not exclude opposite probability; probability is not excluded except by opposite certainty.

n. 131.

From the tract On Conscience in Homo Apostolicus and in the Moral Theology, according to St. Alphonsus it is lawful to follow an equally or nearly probable opinion for liberty, "because a doubtful law does not oblige... Hence all agree in asserting that law, in order that it oblige, must be certain and manifest, and must as certain be manifested or become known to the man to whom it is promulgated... whence no one is bound by any precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept," l. 1, n. 57, p. 26; n. 58, p. 27; n. 59, p. 29, ed. P. Gaude. But this is the very principle of simple probabilism itself. And from it, in fact, not equiprobabilism but simple probabilism is deduced: "because opinion denotes doubtful or probable cognition of some truth, but science signifies certain and evident cognition," l. 1, n. 53, p. 28, ed. P. Gaude. Therefore, with an opinion standing for the law, even certainly and notably more probable, the law does not become known as certain; nor is knowledge of the law had; and therefore it is doubtful, and even practically does not oblige, if against the law there stands, as well can stand, a truly probable opinion.

n. 132.

The same is wholly evinced from the general rule which the Holy Doctor hands down for the choice of opinions. "For the rest, I protest that just as I do not approve those confessors who, adhering to excessive austerity, easily condemn the use of several opinions which rest upon a grave foundation; so, on the contrary, neither can I approve those who easily acclaim opinions without certain foundation as probable," l. 1, n. 82, p. 62, ed. P. Gaude. - "For the rest, in discussing doubtful matters I had equal scruple both about admitting as probable sentences favoring liberty and foreign to reason, and about condemning as improbable those which seemed to me to rest upon some valid foundation," l. 3, n. 547, ed. P. Gaude, p. 33. - This rule of acting practically is certainly the rule of simple probabilism.

n. 133.

The system of equiprobabilism also cannot be understood from the Admonition prefixed by the Holy Doctor to his work, at the end of the preface, ed. P. Gaude, p. LVI, so that the reader may be able to understand which opinions the Holy Doctor approves in his work and which he reproves. It was certainly the place for affirming the system of equiprobabilism, and yet not even a word is had favoring equiprobabilism. - Finally, both in the Homo Apostolicus and in the Moral Theology, the Holy Doctor pursues with the greatest diligence not only the more common and more probable opinions, but also the less and much less probable and common. For this reason the Holy Doctor does not consider whether a sentence is notably or certainly more probable, but whether it is probable; and if he judges it probable, he exhibits it as a norm of acting.

n. 134.

If therefore someone still wishes to contend that St. Alphonsus speculatively champions another system, different from true probabilism, he must certainly confess that practically St. Alphonsus is a true probabilist. And indeed, if, in order that we be bound to follow the more probable opinion according to the system of St. Alphonsus, that excess of greater probability must be commonly evident and certain, cf. here n. 124 seqq., you will scarcely perhaps find one or another such opinion in moral matters, since, as we have already observed, where there is question of probability, even the judgments of very grave theologians are very diverse, and therefore that excess cannot prudently be held as evident and certain. Indeed, as Ithur. observes, Cas. 44, n. 5: "scarcely any question is discussed among doctors in which there are not both probabilists who embrace the stricter sentence against other probabilists, and probabiliorists who embrace the more benign sentence against other probabiliorists." - L. l. 3, n. 930, dub. 1.

n. 135.

Therefore the doctrine which St. Alphonsus holds as lax is not true probabilism, which remains within the limits of true and proper probability; but it is that probabilism which goes beyond these limits and extends itself even to slight and doubtful probability. Hence the Holy Doctor does not absolutely say that this doctrine is commonly held, but as if commonly by the authors of the past century; for at that time it was in fact held by many. But it would be wholly and wrongly confused with the doctrine of true probabilism, which was truly commonly, indeed most commonly, handed down. Hence the same St. Alphonsus called this most common and most probable, Dissert. de Usu moder. opin. probab., 1755, which through almost two centuries exhausted the labors of so many wise men, and which, if it had been false, the Church would not have tolerated.

n. 136.

And if indeed the matter is not so, where is that moral system which in the Catholic Church could be defended in Catholic fashion, as Clement XIII replied to St. Alphonsus himself in the year 1761? l. 1, n. 84, 85, p. 66, ed. P. Gaude. For before St. Alphonsus there was nothing intermediate between true probabilism and tutiorism or probabiliorism; nor then was equiprobabilism even counted among the moral systems. But the Holy Doctor perpetually refuted tutiorism or probabiliorism. But the Holy Doctor asserts that he hands down only the common doctrine, l. 1, n. 59, 84. But the Holy Doctor perpetually taught: In order that there not be grave sin, it suffices that true probability be had, I understand that which rests upon a foundation NOT SLIGHT, etc., l. 3, after n. 139, Epist. Resp. Wherefore it is immediately to be noted that the Holy Doctor very rarely uses this note, certainly, notably, more probable, etc., which the Vindic. Alph., Appendix 1, Clavis operum, etc., themselves noted; and this indeed would be very strange if his system had been so little practical for the Holy Doctor himself. Nothing, on the contrary, would have had to be expressed more frequently and clearly in individual questions. The Holy Doctor did not reject true and proper Probabilism, but broad Probabilism, extended namely even to slight probability, which the Church certainly did not tolerate. Cf. following n. 138.

n. 137.

But it is objected: From the Holy Doctor, "for acting licitly we ought in doubtful matters to inquire into and follow the truth; but where the truth cannot clearly be found, we are bound to embrace at least that opinion which approaches nearer to truth, such as the more probable opinion." L. 1, n. 54, p. 25, ed. P. Gaude. - The Holy Doctor himself solves this objection in advance, by simply denying that we are practically bound to follow the opinion approaching nearer to truth: "When truth appears for the law, we are certainly bound to follow it, because then the law manifestly appears, whence no one can form for himself a right conscience (concerning the non-existence of the law). Otherwise, if the thing only appears more likely; for then, since truth likely stands also for the other part, the law is doubtful, and therefore in that case either the law is not present or it does not oblige." Dissertation, year 1755, n. 35. "When the opinion for the law appears more likely, such an appearance cannot constitute a certain rule of operating, since it can deceive in many ways." Loc. cit., n. 17. "Certainly we are bound to follow what appears more likely concerning the truth of the honesty of the use of an opinion, but not always what appears more likely concerning the truth of an opinion... because often, granted, the law more probably seems to be present, nevertheless it will be more probable that it does not oblige; and from this we form a practical judgment morally certain concerning the licit... the law in that case, since it is doubtful, does not oblige." Loc. cit. 54, 17.

n. 138.

Are all opinions which St. Alphonsus reports and does not expressly reject, although neither does he expressly approve them, to be held as probable according to St. Alphonsus? - On this matter St. Alphonsus himself thus declares his mind: "I judged that the Medulla of Hermann Busembaum should be placed before my work, not now so that I might approve all the opinions of that author himself, but only so that I might follow his method, which among the methods of other doctors for expounding moral matters seemed to me very suitable... For the rest, kindly reader, I wish you to be warned, lest you think that I approve those opinions from the fact that I do not reprove them; for sometimes I shall faithfully set them forth with their reasons and patrons, so that others, according to their prudence, may judge of what weight they are. Then note that when I call some opinion truer, then I do not hold the contrary as probable, even if I do not expressly condemn it as improbable. Moreover, when I call one of the sentences more probable, without giving any judgment about the probability of the other, or use this phrase, I do not dare to condemn, I do not for that reason understand myself to call it probable, but to refer it to the judgment of the more prudent." Author's Admonition to the reader, at the beginning of the work. And again, l. 5, n. 76: "And here again I repeat what I protested at the beginning, namely that when I call some opinion only more probable, I do not therefore understand myself to call the contrary probable. Likewise, when I say concerning some opinion, I do not dare to condemn it, or to call it improbable, I do not therefore admit it as probable; but I doubt concerning its probability. Likewise, when I call some sentence truer, I understand the opposite not to have solid probability for me, although I do not altogether reprove it." - Nevertheless it can in no way be denied that in fact certain opinions are held by the Holy Doctor, at least implicitly, as sufficiently probable, which he not only reports, but also weighs their reasons, and to which he himself seems to add strength, if, in enumerating grave theologians, he says, for example, the Salmanticenses judge it probable, etc., or adds at the end, indeed Palaus says, Lugo adds, notes, etc. St. Alphonsus also holds as sufficiently probable the opinions which he says are not improbable, l. 3, n. 1012. - Acta S. Sed. vol. 1, p. 467 seqq.

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Second Commentary: On Cons…, VI. On Doubtful Conscience

n. 162.

Since this question is held by equiprobabilists as a certain capital question, it will not be beside the point to linger somewhat over the doctrine of St. Alphonsus concerning it. - When the question has been proposed: "If someone probably judges that he has already satisfied a vow, is he bound, notwithstanding this, to fulfill the vow?" St. Alphonsus responds, l. 1, n. 29, p. 14, ed. P. Gaude: "Several Authors deny it, namely Roncaglia, the Salmanticenses with Leander, Lugo and others; because, as they say, since the obligation of the law in that case is doubtful, so also is the possession of the law. - Formerly I thought this opinion probable, being led more by extrinsic probability than intrinsic; but after the matter was better weighed, now I by no means judge it probable. Hence I say that the opposite is to be held with Concina, Filliuccio, Leander and others. The reason is that... when the vow is certain, liberty remains bound by the obligation of the vow, until the vow certainly has not been fulfilled." Indeed in Elenchus 2 of Reformed Questions, q. 1, the Holy Doctor writes these things: "If someone probably judges that he has fulfilled a vow, the canonical hours, or penance, is he bound to satisfy it, if it is still probable or doubtful that he has not fulfilled it? Several Authors deny it... But the opposite is to be held, because the obligation already contracted possesses, until certainly it has not been fulfilled."

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 3 passages

Vol. II, Fundamental Moral Theology…, On Conscience

n. 405.

II. Present-Day Systems Are Weighed Critically. — 1. Concerning Equiprobabilism.

(A) Its origin. Equiprobabilism, which does not differ substantially from moderate probabilism as set forth above, had as its principal defender St. Alphonsus de Liguori, who was numbered among the Doctors of the Church on 23 March 1871. He at first had adhered to the Probabiliorists, but, in hearing confessions, understanding well that their system could be applied only with difficulty, he embraced moderate probabilism, and defended it against the probabiliorists in a dissertation, published in the years 1749 and 1755, whose title was: Dissertatio scholastico-moralis pro usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris; but already at that time he reproved the opinion of the laxists no less severely. In the first edition (1749), he had made the system of the probabilists his own in these words: "It is licit to follow a probable opinion in the concurrence of a more probable one, provided that it rests on a grave motive, whether intrinsic, namely from reason, or extrinsic, from the authority of doctors"; but in the second edition he added this restriction: "unless the excess of probability is notable." Afterward, however, fearing lest by this formula certain persons might abuse it for favoring too benign opinions, in the year 1762 he published a new dissertation, in which he established these two things: "When the less safe opinion is equally probable, one can licitly follow it"; - "It is not licit to follow a less probable opinion when the opinion which stands for the law is notably and certainly more probable"; in these words the sum of equiprobabilism is contained. He polished this system more and more, and in the year 1767, in the sixth edition of Theologia Moralis, he explained it thus: "Therefore I say that it is not licit to follow the less probable opinion when the opinion which stands for the law is notably¹ or certainly more probable; I say or certainly, because when the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything but notably more probable"; - from another side: "When the less safe opinion is equally, or almost equally, probable, one can licitly follow it."² Toward the end of his life, attacked by tutiorists with accusations of laxism, and fearing lest his system be confused with simple probabilism, he openly declared that he was not a probabilist: "I again declare in this brief little Work that I am not a probabilist, nor do I follow probabilism; indeed I reprove it."¹ - It is helpful to observe that the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus was specially praised by the Roman Pontiffs, because "amid the tangled opinions of theologians, whether laxer or stricter, he paved a safe way, by which the directors of the souls of the Christian faithful could walk with unoffending foot."²

¹ This word is omitted in the seventh edition, because it adds nothing to the word certainly; cf. Theologia moralis, cura Gaude, 1905, t. I, p. xx.

² These and other texts of the Holy Doctor you will find in the work Vindiciae Alphonsianae, Rome, 1873, P. I, p. 1-125, - more briefly apud Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. I, p. 911-915. Moreover, concerning the mind of St. Alphonsus there has been much dispute, and there is still dispute today, between equiprobabilists and probabilists; besides the works cited, cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, Appendix I, Diss. de genuina S. Alphonsi sententia circa usum opinionis probabilis, p. 632-706; Bouquillon, n. 315-317; Wittmann, S. Alphonse et le pur probabilisme, Gien, s.d.; Ter Haar, op. cit. p. 99-107; Gaude, De Morali systemate S. Alphonsi; De Caigny, Apologetica de aequiprobabilismo alphonsiano, 1894.

¹ Apud Bouquillon, n. 317; cf. Vindiciae, p. 70-72.

² Decree of 22 March 1871, concerning the concession of the title Doctor; this testimony and very many others are reported by Vindiciae, preliminary dissertation, and more briefly by Marc, Instit. Mor. Alphonsianae, t. I, at the beginning.

The system of St. Alphonsus is defended by Redemptorists, among whom are Konings, Marc, Aertnys, Ter Haar, Wouters, etc.; and by not a few others, Gousset, Del Vecchio, Savini, Pruner, Muller, Simar, C. Martin, and also many Dominicans, who, setting aside probabiliorism, adhere to equiprobabilism.

"Wednesday, 26 June 1680. After a report had been made by Father Laurea concerning the contents of the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzales, S.J., directed to Our Most Holy Lord, the Most Eminent Lords said that it should be written through the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of the Spains, so that he might signify to the said Father Thyrsus, that His Holiness, having kindly received and not without praise read through his letters, commanded that he freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; and that he should make him certain that whatever he shall have done and written in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

"Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness, that he not only permit Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those asserting that in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; but also that he write to all Universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that each one, as it pleases him, freely write for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary opinion; and command them that they wholly submit themselves to the mandate of His Holiness." F. Ter Haar, C.SS.R., gives the history and commentary of this decree in the little work Ven. Innocentii PP. XI de Probabilismo Decreti historia et vindiciae, Tournai and Paris, 1904; Arendt, S.J., explains the same decree in a plainly different sense apud Analecta ecclesiastica, 1902, p. 306 sq. and p. 353 sq. Cf. Revue thomiste, Jan. 1903, May-Oct. 1903, May-June and Sept.-Oct. 1904, where you will find diverse disputations concerning the same decree; Etudes, t. 86, p. 778 and t. 91, p. 831.

n. 406.

(B) Equiprobabilism is set forth.³ It can be contracted into these three propositions, according to C. Marc (n. 91-103):

³ Besides St. Alphonsus, Systema morale, cf. Marc, op. cit., n. 88-108; Konings, n. 63-96; Aertnys, n. 80-121; Gousset, Theol. Morale, n. 79-88; Wouters, De minusprobabilismo, 1905.

(a) When opinions equally or almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the existence of a law, it is licit to follow the opinion favoring liberty; thus against the Probabiliorists. For 1. a law truly and strictly doubtful does not oblige; for it is insufficiently promulgated, and can be called invincibly unknown: since on each side there are reasons equally or almost equally probable, morally speaking there is no greater reason for affirming than for denying, and therefore in this case the existence of the law, or obligation, is invincibly unknown. 2. From another side, in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; a principle of this kind, which in the matter of justice is admitted by all, can be extended to the other virtues: for when someone, after diligence has been applied, could not find the truth, he perseveres in possession of his liberty, and therefore cannot be deprived of his right by a strictly doubtful law.

(b) When arguments equally or almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, the opinion which favors the law is to be followed; thus against the Probabilists. It is gathered from the principle: in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; for, just as liberty possesses when the law is not certain, so the law possesses when this is certain and it is doubted whether it has been revoked; therefore the law is to be observed until its revocation is established. - This is confirmed from received principles of law, such as, for example: in doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated; now the revocation of a law, or desuetude, or dispensation is a fact which is not sufficiently demonstrated by equiprobable reasons. - Yet these authors note that liberty possesses much more frequently than the law.

(c) In the concurrence of an opinion certainly more probable on behalf of the law, it is not licit to follow the less probable on behalf of liberty; against the probabilists. - For, in this case, the law is not strictly doubtful: for only then does the intellect fluctuate between two opposed parts, when the motives on each side are either none or appear nearly equal; but in the case, the motives on behalf of the law appear certainly stronger than those on behalf of liberty, and thus the force and efficacy of the reasons on which the less probable opinion rests is certainly overcome and broken by the stronger arguments of the contrary opinion; for that reason man does not act prudently by following the less probable opinion, since by his own will he forces the intellect to leave behind what seems more verisimilar, and to adhere to an opinion which appears less verisimilar. - Nor is it licit to have recourse to the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; for this is valid only when the law is strictly doubtful, namely when the mind fluctuates because of arguments nearly equal on each side, but not when it certainly sees stronger arguments favoring the law.

n. 407.

(C) The arguments brought against equiprobabilism are set forth. Against the equiprobabilists the probabilists, especially Noldin, n. 219-222, argue thus: (a) Equiprobabilists, in order to establish their system, use these principles: a doubtful law does not oblige, and an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; but from these not equiprobabilism, but probabilism follows by necessary inference; for even a law which more probably exists remains truly doubtful and uncertain, provided that against its existence or force a probable argument is brought forward. Nor can it be said that the lesser probability is broken by the greater probability of the other opinion; for often the lesser probability rests on an entirely independent foundation, and therefore subsists, even if the contrary opinion is truly more probable. - Nevertheless the equiprobabilists respond that, even in this case, the less probable opinion, which considered apart appears probable, when compared with the opposed notably more probable one, is no longer solidly probable.

(b) A moral system which for its use necessarily requires that the moments of reasons be weighed on each side, and that it be established whether adverse opinions are equally or almost equally probable, is less apt for solving difficulties practically: for often it is impossible to determine when probability is equal or almost equal, and those who think that they can furnish this without difficulty deceive themselves and others. - This impossibility by no means exists, say the adversaries, for with ordinary diligence it can be recognized whether such or such an opinion is notably more probable or not, all the more because St. Alphonsus and modern theologians determine this accurately enough.

(c) From another side, the principle: in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, is falsely applied: for it is false that in doubt concerning the cessation of a law, the law previously certainly existing possesses. And indeed in doubt concerning the cessation of a law, liberty is certain and the law is doubtful, since it is truly probable that the law has ceased. - Besides, the right of liberty is in itself prior to the right of law, because liberty, if not in time, at least in nature and reason, precedes law, and therefore in doubt the presumption stands for liberty. - Yet equiprobabilists say that liberty is no longer in possession when it is certainly established that some law has been promulgated; for liberty was morally bound by the very promulgation of the law, and therefore cannot be called immune from obligation until the revocation is sufficiently established.

(D) Conclusion. Equiprobabilism assuredly is supported by solid arguments, and, although it does not perfectly solve some difficulties, it lays down a safe way between the laxer and stricter opinions.¹ Wherefore the Sacred Penitentiary, being asked "whether a professor of sacred theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which Blessed Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology," on 5 July 1831 judged that it should be answered: "Affirmatively, without, however, those being judged reprehensible who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors." - Yet let these last words be noted, from which it is clear that other systems, not reproved by the Church, can freely be defended.

¹ Yet to us it seems that the principle "in doubt, the condition of the possessor is better" is not rightly applied in the case in which the law, as they say, possesses; for whether the matter concerns the existence or the cessation of the law, we do not think that it obliges when the reasons brought forward on each side are equally or almost equally probable: for then there is truly and strictly a doubt, and the Liguorian principle is deservedly applied: a law truly and strictly doubtful does not oblige.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 31 passages

Vol. I, Its Subject, Norm, and Object, Morality, Its Subject, Norm, and Object, Ch. IV, Section 3: Probabilism and Other Systems of Morals

We now come to a consideration of the systems that have been devised for the purpose of insuring practical certainty in cases of speculative doubt, or, if we may express the same thought somewhat differently, to satisfy oneself whether an act, the morality of which is speculatively uncertain, is practically allowed or forbidden. 1. STATE OF THE QUESTION. —In all cases where a definite decision has to be made under conditions which do not admit of full certainty regarding the existence of a law or obligation, a man may act safely with what is called a probable conscience (conscientia probabilis ). Such doubtful cases owe their existence to the fact that law cannot regulate the actions of men in every detail, nor adequately express the will of the lawgiver, and hence a sphere is left open in which man may use his own judgment.

In every "case of conscience" there are two opposing opinions: one in favor of the law (opinio pro lege), the other in favor of liberty (opinio pro libertate). Neither is certain, but both are more or less probable (probabiles). Note that the discussion of such cases by Catholic moralists never turns on the question, which is the more perfect course to pursue? but merely, what is licit or not? In other words, in trying to solve so-called cases of conscience, theologians do not ask: "Which of the two actions is the more perfect?" but "Which of the two is one obliged to perform under pain of sin?" For example: I am uncertain whether or not to-day is a day of fasting. I have reasons for thinking that it is. But these reasons are merely probable. What am I to do if I cannot obtain reliable information? Am I obliged to fast? Or may I, on the strength of the reasons I have for thinking it is not a fast-day, absolve myself from the duty of keeping the fast? The question at issue is plainly one of licitness, not of greater perfection, for no one disputes that to fast would be the more perfect act.

GENERAL PRINCIPLE. —Aside from Laxism, it is a general principle that in case of doubt the pars tutior must be chosen, i. e., that course of action must be followed which most effectively excludes the danger of sin. Abstractly and objectively considered, the opinion in favor of the law (opinio pro lege) is the safer (opinio tutior scil. a periculo peccandi) for the reason that by following it one can best avoid the risk of sin. That the pars tutior must be followed in all cases is the teaching of Rigorism. The so-called Probabilistic systems, on the contrary, contend that the opinio pro lege does not always furnish moral certainty, that such certainty may also be afforded by the opinio pro libertate, and that in case of doubt one may, for good reasons (probabilitas), safely follow the latter.

The controversy thus narrows itself down to the question which of the two opposing opinions, —that favoring the law or that favoring liberty, —is safer to follow in case of doubt.

3. the Fundamental Supposition. —Man

is not permitted to act upon a mere opinion, but when direct certitude is unattainable, should try to reach reflex certitude by earnest consideration and careful comparison. The conscience or dictate of conscience based upon such an opinion is called probabilis. The relation of the different conflicting opinions is determined according to the degrees of intrinsic or extrinsic probability which each can claim.

The difference between intrinsic and extrinsic probability is that intrinsic probability rests upon reasons contained within the opinion itself, whereas extrinsic probability is based on authority.

A probable opinion (opinio probabilis) may be based either on intrinsic or extrinsic grounds, provided these are good and solid.

If two contrary opinions have the same degree of probability they are called aequiprobabiles.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. I, Ch. III, Article II: On the Use of Probability · Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. II, § 1. On the Unlawful Use of Probability Where There Intervenes the Danger of Some Evil Absolutely to Be Avoided · Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. II, § 2. On the Lawful Use of Probability

A more probable opinion (opinio probabilior) is one that rests on weightier reasons than its opposite, which in that case is still probable, but less so (minus probabilis, or simply probabilis).

n. ¶10.

When a probable opinion rests on such solid grounds that it is almost a certainty, it is called most probable (probabilissima). Its opposite can not, of course, be solidly probable, but, in the language of the schools, may be parum vel tenuiter probabilis.

n. ¶11.

From what we have said it follows that the probability of an opinion is measured by the weight of the intrinsic and extrinsic arguments on which it rests. The authority which creates extrinsic probability is that of theological experts or confessors.

n. ¶12.

THE SCOPE OF PROBABILISM. —Though, as we have seen, the claims of liberty may in all cases be asserted against those of the law, the sphere of liberty in Moral Theology is nevertheless greatly restricted, for the reason that the safer side (pars tutior) must always be chosen where it is absolutely necessary to attain a definite end, and where following an opinio probabilis or even probabilior would involve danger of frustration.¹ This is the case whenever faith or religion are involved, especially in the administration of the Sacraments,² in medical and surgical prescriptions, and when there is an obligation to protect the interests of one's fellowmen.³

¹ Cfr. J. P. Gury, Compendium Theologiae Moralis, Lyons and Paris, 1850, Vol. I, n. 55-56: saria "It is not lawful to follow a probable, or even a more probable, opinion after abandoning the safer one whenever there is an absolute obligation to attain some determinate end which the use of a probably unsuitable means would place in danger; therefore the safer course must then be followed."

² Cfr. Gury, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 57, 1 and 4: "In those things which are necessary for salvation by necessity of means, you are compelled to act more safely; for so great an end must be attained absolutely before all others, entirely by necessity, and therefore safe and certain means must be employed. Accordingly, in matters pertaining to that end or to religion, probability being rejected, the safer opinion must necessarily be followed. Hence the following proposition, under no. 4, was condemned by Innocent XI: 'An unbeliever who does not believe will be excused from unbelief when led by a less probable opinion.' [See Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1154]. Indeed, in such a case it would not be lawful to use even a more probable opinion after setting aside the safer one. A minister of a sacrament, where its validity is at issue, unless a defect is supplied or a case of necessity presses, is bound to follow the safer course insofar as he morally can, abandoning the less safe course, whether probable or even more probable, because otherwise he would expose the sacrament to the danger of nullity and his neighbor to the danger of spiritual harm. Hence the following proposition was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI under no. 1: 'It is not unlawful in conferring sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, abandoning the safer opinion.' " (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1151).

³ Gury, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 57, 2-3: "A hunter who fears that by firing a bullet at a wild animal he may perhaps injure some man cannot fire it, even if he judges it more probable that the danger is absent; for if the danger is perhaps present, it cannot be removed by the contrary probability, even though greater. A physician and a surgeon are bound to employ the safer medicines and means which can be had here and now, because by an implicit contract they have bound themselves to attain the end insofar as this can be done. The same must likewise be said of all others who have contracted an obligation toward their neighbor." —Cfr. the Propositiones Damnat. sub Innocentio XI., n. 2: "I judge it probable that a judge can render judgment according to an opinion that is even less probable." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1152).

n. ¶13.

Hence Probabilism may be applied only when there is question of the mere morality, i. e., the licitness or illicitness, of an act or omission (sola actionis honestas). In all other cases the pars tutior must be chosen. This is no argument in favor of Tutiorism, however, nor an exception to the general rule of Probabilism, because in such cases there is always present a direct speculative certitude, whereas Probabilism was expressly devised for cases in which no speculative certitude can be attained.

n. ¶14.

5. Absolute Tutiorism or Rigorism.—

Absolute Tutiorism or Rigorism (tutiorismus absolutus sive rigidus) is based on the principle that the opinion which favors the law must be followed always, and that it is never lawful to follow a probable opinion, even though it be probabilissima, in favor of liberty.⁴ This system is untenable because it misconceives the problem at issue, ⁵ and has been formally condemned by the Church.⁶

⁴ Tutiorism was adopted by the Jansenists. Its foremost defender was the Irish theologian Joan Sinnichius (+ 1666).

⁵ Cfr. 1 Macc. II, 31 sqq.; IX, 44; 2 Mace. V, 25; VI, 11; Matth. XXIV, 20.

⁶ See the Prop. damn, ab Alexandro VIII. (Dec. 7, 1690), n. 3: "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1293).

n. ¶15.

In order to escape ecclesiastical condemnation a certain school of Rigorist theologians modified the fundamental tenet of Tutiorism by saying that one may decide in favor of liberty only if the opinion favoring that side is most probable (probabilissima). This system does not differ substantially from absolute Tutiorism and is useless for the solution of difficult cases of conscience. Its principal representatives are the Jansenists M. Steyaert († 1701) and J. Obstraet († 1720), Henry a Sancto Ignatio († 1719), and Cardinal H. S. Gerdil († 1802). ⁷ 6. LAX PROBABILISM OR LAXISM (probabilismus absolutus sive excessivus). —This system maintains that the opinion which favors liberty may be followed always, even when it enjoys but a slight or doubtful degree of probability (tenuiter vel dubie). The Church rejects Laxism for the reason that this system is incompatible with the dignity of the moral law.⁸

⁷ A sketch of Card. Gerdil's life will be found in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. 471.

⁸ Cfr. the Prop. Damnat. sub Innocentio XI, n. 3: "Generally, whenever, relying upon either intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided the bounds of probability are not exceeded, we do something, we always act prudently." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1153).

n. ¶16.

Excessively lax propositions were taught by J. Sanchez († about 1620), ⁹ F. Amicus, S.J. (+ 165 1),¹⁰ St. Bauny, SJ. († 1649),¹¹ Thos. Tamburini, S.J. († 1675),¹² J. Caramuel, Ord. Cist. († 1682),¹³ J. Cardenas, SJ. († 1684),¹⁴ A. Diana, Ord. Theat. († 1663),¹⁵ Z. Pasqualigo, Ord. Theat. († 1664), ¹⁶ A. Escobar y Mendoza, S.J. († 1669), ¹⁷ M. de Moya, S.J. († 1684), ¹⁸ and others.

⁹ John Sanchez must not be confounded with Thomas Sanchez, S.J. (+ 1610). Cfr. Hurter, Nomenclator Lit. Theol. Cath., Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 592, 893.

¹⁰ See the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I, p. 429.

¹¹ V. supra, p. 63.

¹² On Tamburini see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, p. 441.

¹³ Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 329 sq.

¹⁴ Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 332 sq.

¹⁵ Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 773.

¹⁶ Hurter, Nomenclator Lit. Theol. Cath., Vol. IV, 3rd ed., col. 298 sqq.

¹⁷ V. supra, p. 62.

¹⁸ Father Matthew de Moya was professor of Moral Theology in Murcia, Alcala, and Madrid. Under the nom de plume "Amadaeus Guimenius" he wrote a book entitled Adversus Quorundam Expostulationes contra Nonnullas Jesuitarum Opiniones Morales (Palermo 1657), in which he showed that the lax doctrines attributed to the Jesuits in a libelous pamphlet, Teatro Jesuitico, Apologetico Discurso con Saludables y Seguras Doctrinas Necessarias a los Principes y Senores de la Tierra, by Francisco de la Piedad (also a pseudonym), were taught long before by other writers. Both the Teatro and Moya's reply were put on the Index, where they remain even after the Leonine revision.

n. ¶17.

PROBABILIORISM. —This theory contends that if a man is in doubt regarding the existence of a law, he must nevertheless obey the same and may follow the opinion in favor of liberty only if that opinion is certainly more probable (certe probabilior) than its opposite. Hence the axiom, "In dubio stricto seu aequali pars tutior sequenda est," i. e., as long as the conscience is strictly in doubt, that is to say, while it suspends judgment without inclining either way, the law must be obeyed.

n. ¶18.

This principle is theoretically incontrovertible but useless for practical purposes, and therefore no longer has any followers. While all Catholic moralists admit that a man may safely follow Probabiliorism, most of them maintain that this system is of no value in the solving of doubtful cases precisely for the reason that in such cases no opinio probabilior is attainable. In practice Probabiliorism leads to Tutiorism, and "solves" only those cases of conscience which in reality are no "cases" at all, because the greater probability in favor of one side or the other can be easily perceived.

n. ¶19.

The most eminent defenders of this system are: Cardinal Cajetan († 1534),¹⁹ Alexander Natalis († 1724), ²⁰ Vincent Baronius († 1674),²¹ C. R. Billuart († 1757),²² D. Concina († 1756),²³ V. Contenson († 1674),²⁴ P. M. Gazzaniga († 1799),²⁵ J. B. Gonet († 1681),²⁶ J. V. Patuzzi († 1769), ²⁷ —all Dominicans —and the Jesuits Thyrsus Gonzalez de Santalla († 1705),²⁸ M. de Elizalde († 1678),²⁹ P. G. Antoine († 1743),³⁰ and P. Collet († 1770).³¹

¹⁹ On Cardinal Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio Gaetani) see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. III, pp. 145 sqq.

²⁰ On Alexander Natalis (Noel Alexandre), ibid., Vol. I, pp. 296 sq.

²¹ Not to be confounded with the famous Jesuit Cardinal Cesare Baronius. Brief sketches of both in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. II, pp. 304 sq.

²² V. supra, p. 57.

²³ V. supra, p. 60.

²⁴ V. Cath. Encyc., IV, 330.

²⁵ V. Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. 401.

²⁶ V. supra, p. 60.

²⁷ V. supra, p. 60.

²⁸ Gonzales was the thirteenth general of the Society of Jesus, and while holding that office, published his famous Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis, i. e. Tractatus Theologicus de Recto Usu Opinionum (Rome 1694). It is reproduced in Migne's Cursus Theologiae, Vol. XI. —Cfr. J. Salsmans, S.J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, pp. 635 sq.; Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten in der römisch-kath. Kirche, Nördlingen 1889, Vol. I, pp. 120 sqq. —For an account of the controversies that raged about the decree of Innocent XI on Probabilism see J. Brucker S.J., in the Paris Études Religieuses, 1901-02, and F. Ter Haar, Das Decret Innocenz XI. über den Probabilismus, Paderborn 1904. —Latin text of the decree given by the latter, pp. 29 sqq. and by Lehmkuhl, Prob. Vind., pp. 81 sqq. For an English translation see p. 230, note 40, infra.

²⁹ V. Hurter, Nomenclator Lit. Theol. Cath., Vol. IV, 3rd ed., col. 286 sq.

³⁰ V. supra, p. 58.

³¹ Cfr. Buchberger, Kirchl. Handlexikon, I, 964.

n. ¶20.

SIMPLE OR COMMON PROBABILISM (probabilismus simplex sive benignus, communis sive latus). —This system teaches that whenever there is doubt concerning the mere lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act, it is permissible to follow a solidly probable opinion in favor of liberty, even though the opposing view be more probable (probabilior). But why may a more probable opinion be relinquished in favor of a less probable one? To this Probabilism answers as follows: If the opinion favoring liberty is truly and solidly probable (vere et solide probabilis), it must be because the law is doubtful or insufficiently promulgated (lex dubia aut non sufficienter pr omul gat a). Now a doubtful law is not binding (lex dubia non obligat), and therefore one is at liberty.

n. ¶21.

But this statement of the Probabilist position does not remove the logical and moral objection that Probabilism permits men to follow a less probable opinion (sententia minus probabilis sic cognita et iudicata) even though its opposite is perceived to be more probable.

n. ¶22.

"The wise practicians who established the moral system of the Jesuits," says a Protestant ethicist, "correctly perceived that probability plays a part in moral conduct, and that to reject Probabilism absolutely, would betray a hasty judgment. Were man permitted to follow the axiom, 'Quod dubitas, ne feceris' and to act only when he knows for certain and without doubt that he is right, he would frequently be unable to act at all; nor would abstention from action help him out of the difficulty, for the mere omission of an act also entails consequences and is equivalent to a definite decision of the will, which may be either right or wrong That a certain mode of procedure is absolutely right in all circumstances, and its opposite absolutely wrong, can be asserted only from the standpoint of an omniscient intelligence. Man is a short-sighted creature and can act only if he has the courage to make a false move and to do something which may prove objectively wrong, and which he would not do were he better informed. Nevertheless, his conscience absolves him from guilt if he has acted to the best of his knowledge and understanding in accordance with the most probable opinion. The only thing we reject in the teaching of the Jesuits is that they base probability preferably on authority and allow a man to follow an opinion which he himself must admit to be less probable." ³²

³² Ch. Sigwart, Vorfragen der Ethik, 2nd ed., Tübingen 1907, pp. 40 sq. —Cfr. Mandonnet, Le Decret d'Innocent XI. contre le Probabilisme, Paris 1903, pp. 79 sqq., 99 sqq.

n. ¶23.

"There can be no doubt," says St. Alphonsus, "that the Tutiorists in their excessive rigorism do much damage; but on the other hand the Probabilists, who follow an opinion which they recognize as less probable (but which I no longer regard as probable because the law in its moral sense is sufficiently promulgated), are also to blame for the loss of many souls." ³³ Neither the Fathers nor the early Schoolmen give any general rule for determining moral obligation in doubtful cases. But from the way in which they decided controversies it is evident that they were guided by the principle that a doubtful law does not bind. Thus St. Gregory of Nazianzus addressed the following challenge to a Novatian writer who had denounced second marriage as illicit: "Either prove that you are right, or if you are unable to bring proof, do not pass judgment. If the matter is in doubt, let humanity and convenience prevail." ³⁴ The first theologian who reduced Probabilism to a formula and attempted to demonstrate it systematically was Bartholomew de Medina, O. P. († 1581). In his commentaries on the Second and Third Parts of the Summa of St. Thomas, this learned writer, who is usually called "the Father of Probabilism," defends the proposition: "We are permitted to follow a probable opinion even if its opposite is more probable." ³⁵ This thesis was favorably received by the majority of Catholic moralists and met with no ex professo opposition until Father Andrew Bianchi, S.J., attacked it in his treatise De Opinionum Praxi Disputatio, published at Genoa in 1642.³⁶ The bitterest opponents of simple Probabilism were the Jansenists, especially Blaise Pascal, who, in his famous Lettres a un Provincial (1656), attacked Probabilism with vigor and grace of style. The result was that many theologians adopted Probabiliorism. In the ensuing conflict, which lasted nearly two centuries, Probabilism received its hardest blows from the Dominicans. Alexander VII (1665), Innocent XI (1679), and Alexander VIII (1690) censured a series of propositions which were mostly taken from the writings of Probabilistic authors.³⁷ At the instance of the last-mentioned Pope, a general chapter of the Dominicans, held at Rome in 1656, advised all members of that Order to espouse Probabiliorism.³⁸ Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, General of the Jesuits, tried to banish Probabilism from the Society by publishing an anti-Probabilistic work, Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis.³⁹ The so-called decree of Innocent XI, of June 26, 1680 (which in reality was merely a protocol of the Holy Office), strongly approved of his action.⁴⁰

³³ Letters, III, 355.

³⁴ Orat., 39, n. 19 (Migne, P.G., XXXVI, 358): "Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot do this, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and mildness prevail." —Cfr. Chr. Lupus, Dissertatio de Antiquitate, Auctoritate et Legitimo Usu Sententiae Probabilis (Opera Omnia, Venice 1729, Vol. XI, pp. 1 sqq.).

³⁵ "If an opinion is probable, it is lawful to follow it, even though the opposite opinion is more probable." (Expositio s. Scholastica Commentaria in D. Thomae S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 19, art. 6, Salamanca 1577. For a sketch of B. de Medina's life see D. J. Kennedy, O. P., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X, pp. 143 sq. Modern writers are divided as to Medina's teaching on Probabilism. Echard (followed by Billuart) maintains that Medina's system differed greatly from Probabilism as expounded by its later defenders. H. Hurter, S.J., says of him: "He was numbered among the leading cultivators of Scholastic and moral theology of his age, and from this also gained a certain renown; he is said to have anticipated the system of Probabilism." (Nomenclator Literarius Theologiae Catholicae, Vol. III, 3rd ed., Innsbruck 1907, col. 144). Cfr. Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 28 sqq.; Ter Haar, De Systemate Mor., pp. 17 sqq.; A. Schmitt, Zur Geschichte des Probabilismus, Innsbruck 1904, pp. 43 sqq.

³⁶ Andrea Bianchi, S.J., is perhaps better known by his Latin name, Blancus. He died at Genoa, March 29, 1657. His treatise De Opinionum Praxi Disputatio was published under the pseudonym "Candidus Philalethes." It is Tutioristic in tendency. —Cfr. Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 31 sqq., 51 sqq.; Ter Haar, De Syst. Mor., pp. 18 sqq.

³⁷ For a list of these condemned propositions see Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1101, 1151, 1289, 1291; A. Rohling, Medulla Theol. Mor., pp. 479 sqq., St. Louis 1875.

³⁸ Cfr. Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 42 sqq.

³⁹ V '. supra, p. 225, n. 10. —Cfr. A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Prob. Vind., pp. 83 sqq.; A. Koch, "Neue Dokumente zu dem Thyrsus Gonsalez'- Streit," in the Theol. Quartalschrift of Tübingen, 1905, pp. 95 sqq.

⁴⁰ Cfr. Mandonnet, Decret d' Innocent XL, pp. 73 sqq.; T er Haar, Das Dekret Innozenz' XI, pp. 29 sqq.; G. Arendt, S.J., De Conciliationis Tentamine nuper Iterate Aequiprobabilistas inter et Probabilistas, Rome 1902 (cfr. the Civiltà Cattolica, 1902, quad. 1253, pp. 574 sqq.). The "decree," the authentic text of which was published Apr. 19, 1902, by the Secretary of the Holy Office, reads: "A report having been made by Father Laurea of a letter directed by Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., to Our Most Holy Lord; the Most Eminent Lords said that the Secretary of State must write to the Apostolic nuncio of the Spains [directing him] to signify to the said Father Thyrsus that His Holiness, having received his letter favorably, and having read it with approval, has commanded that he [Thyrsus] shall freely and fearlessly preach, teach, and defend with his pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that in a conflict of a less probable opinion with a more probable, known and estimated as such, it is allowed to follow the less probable; and to inform him that whatever he does and writes on behalf of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness. Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus, as by order (de ordine) of His Holiness, not only to permit the Fathers of the Society to write in favor of the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those who assert that in a conflict of a less probable opinion with a more probable, known and estimated as such, it is allowed to follow the less probable; but also to write to all the universities of the Society, [informing them] that it is the mind of His Holiness that whosoever chooses may freely write in favor of the more probable opinion, and may attack the aforesaid contrary [opinion]; and to order them to submit entirely to the command of His Holiness." (Cfr. J. M. Harty in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, p. 445).

n. ¶24.

The present status of Probabilism may be described as It has never been either officially approved or officially censured by the Church, but was and is tolerated ⁴¹ and upheld by the majority of Jesuit theologians, though it is not the official teaching of the Society.⁴²

⁴¹ Cfr. Ter Haar, Das Decret Innocenz XL, pp. 177 sqq.

⁴² For some of the leading arguments for and against Probabilism see J. M. Harty in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 444 sq.

n. ¶25.

Lately J. de Caigny, C.SS.R., published several books ⁴³ for the purpose of reconciling Probabilism with Æquiprobabilism. His arguments were met by G. Arendt, S.J.⁴⁴ 9. ÆQUIPROBABILISM (probabilismus moderatus). —Æquiprobabilism takes middle ground between Probabiliorism and simple Probabilism. It teaches that unless the opinions for and against the existence of a law have equal or nearly equal probability, it is not permissible to choose in favor of liberty. The leading principle of this system, which it shares with Probabiliorism, is this:

⁴³ Apologetica, etc. (see p. 235, infra); De Gemino Probabilismo Licito Dissertatio Exarata Conciliationis Gratia; De Genuino Morali Systemate S. Alphonsi Dissertatio Irenico-Critica.

⁴⁴ Apologeticae de Aequiprobabilismo Alphonsiano Historico-Philosophicae Dissertationis a R. P. J. Caigny, C.SS.R., Exaratae Crisis iuxta Principia Angelici Doctoris Instituta. Freiburg i. B. (Herder). —Fr. Lehmkuhl says towards the conclusion of his little book, Probabilismus Vindicatus (p. 126): "What I have said more often I now repeat: I recognize only a slight theoretical difference, and either no practical difference or scarcely any, between moderate or equiprobabilism and probabilism."

n. ¶26.

"In obscure matters the certainly more likely side, or the more probable side known and judged as such, is to be followed in favor of the law." However, if the opinions for and against the existence of a law have equal or nearly equal probability, and there is consequently a state of real doubt, it is permissible to follow the less safe opinion. Hence the axiom, "Lex stricte dubia non obligat. In other words, when there is doubt as to the existence of a law, liberty is in possession. When there is doubt in regard to the cessation of a law, the law remains in possession. Consequently, whereas simple Probabilism teaches that a man may always follow the opinion favoring liberty, if that opinion is based on good and solid grounds (opinio vere ac solide probabilis), even though he knows that the opposite opinion is more probable, Æquiprobabilism maintains that the less safe opinion may be followed only when it is quite or nearly as probable (aeque aut fere aeque probabilis) as its opposite, and only when there is question of an obligation arising, not ceasing.

n. ¶27.

/Equiprobabilism is regarded by some as an advance over simple Probabilism, in so far as it sets up a practical instead of a purely logical probability. ⁴⁵ The extrinsic reasons in favor of Æquiprobabilism are summed up by Archbishop Simar as follows: "This theory is the fruit of long scientific debates and has in its favor the presumption that, by dint of logical development, it is the golden mean between the two conflicting extremes of absolute Probabilism and Tutiorism. The followers of St. Alphonsus may point to the official declaration of the Church that, unlike Tutiorism and several forms of Probabilism, his teaching has never been censured. To these advantages must be added the great personal authority of the Saint, which deserves to be the more highly regarded because the problem in question was for him a vital one, which he investigated with the utmost conscientiousness and zeal, and also for the further reason that the conviction at which he finally arrived has stood the test of pastoral experience and triumphantly resisted innumerable attacks." ⁴⁶ The most prominent representatives of Æquiprobabilism are the Jesuits Christopher Rassler (+ about 1730) and Antony Mayr († 1749), Eusebius Amort of the Canons Regular of St. Augustine († 1775),⁴⁷ St. Alphonsus de' Liguori, founder of the Redemptorist Order,⁴⁸ Bishop Martin of Paderborn, Archbishop Simar of Cologne, and the moral theologians of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer.48a

It is unjust to charge that Probabilism and the allied systems permit man to act on the strength of a mere opinion and thus dispense him from the duty of regulating his life in accordance with the dictates of conscience, which must be the highest rule and measure of all morality. Probabilism, Probabiliorism, and Æquiprobabilism were all devised for the express purpose of enabling man to follow the voice of conscience in doubtful cases.⁴⁹ So far from undermining morality, these systems, as a whole, deserve great credit for having safeguarded the important principle of liberty against the attacks and snares of the Jansenists, Rigorists, and Talmudists.

⁴⁵ Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., I, n. 58: "For acting lawfully probability alone does not suffice, but moral certainty concerning the uprightness of the action is required." —Cfr. op. cit., I, 54: "If the opinion which stands for the law appears certainly more probable, we are bound altogether to follow it and cannot then embrace the opposite opinion which stands for liberty. The reason is that, in order to act lawfully, we must seek and follow the truth in doubtful matters; but where the truth cannot be clearly found, we are bound to embrace at least that opinion which approaches nearer to the truth, such as the more probable opinion." (Ed. Gaude, I, 25). —Cfr. Ter Haar, Das Decret Innocenz' XI, pp. 8 sqq.

⁴⁶ Th. H. Simar, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, 3rd ed., p. 143. — The translator of this work thinks it but fair to note, however, that Lehmkuhl and others hold that St. Alphonsus never held Aequiprobabilistic principles. Lehmkuhl (Theol. Mor., ed. 11a, Vol. I, p. 118) illustrates the difference between the Saint's teaching and that of the Aequiprobabilists as follows: EQUIPROBABILISM says: With probability alone that a law exists, an obligation does not exist. With probability alone that a law has ceased, the obligation has not ceased. ST. ALPHONSUS says: With probability alone that a law exists, an obligation does not exist; with probability alone that a law has ceased, the obligation has ceased. —For an able defense of the Probabilist position see the same author's Probabilismus Vindicatus, Freiburg 1906.

⁴⁷ Cfr. Ter Haar, De Systemate Mor., pp. 20 sqq., 52 sqq. —On Amort, see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. I, pp. 434 sq. He was one of the foremost theologians of the 18th century. (Thos. J. Shahan, Cath. Encycl., Vol. I, p. 434). 48a See L. Wouters, C.SS.R., De Systemate Morali Dissertatio, new edition, "ad novum ius accommodata," Wittem (Holland), 1918.

⁴⁸ Æquiprobabilism "gained vigor and persistence from the teaching of St. Alphonsus, who began his theological career as a Probabiliorist, subsequently defended Probabilism, ... and finally, about 1762, embraced Æquiprobabilism. In a new dissertation he laid down the two propositions that it is lawful to act on the less safe opinion, when it is equally probable with the safe opinion, and that it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion when the safe opinion is notably and certainly more probable. In the sixth edition (1767) of his 'Moral Theology' he again expressed these views, and indeed towards the end of his life frequently declared that he was not a Probabilist." (Cath. Encyc., Vol. XII, pp. 442 sq.; cfr. Irish Theol. Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 24). —On the systema compensationis seu rationis sufficientis, which d'Annibale ascribes to Potton, O. P., and which has been latterly espoused by Prummer and some French moralists, see Vermeersch, Theol. Mor., I, pp. 306 and 313; K. Neuner, O. Cap., in the Kath. Kirchenstg. of Salzburg, 1924, No. 26.

⁴⁹ Cfr. Joseph Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, pp. 69 sqq.; A. Meyenberg, Die kath. Moral, 2nd ed., pp. 161 sqq.; Ter Haar, Vcn. Innoc. XL de Probabilismo Decrcti Histona, Rome 1904, pp. 126 sqq.

n. ¶28.

READINGS. —On the moral systems in general: K. Werner, System der Ethik, Vol. I, pp. 430 sqq. —W. Wilmers, S.J., Lehrbuch der Religion (ed. Lehmkuhl), 6th ed., pp. 537 sqq. —F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 114 sqq. —F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., pp. 168 sqq. —Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 68 sqq. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 441 sqq. —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 478 sq. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, Tournai 1905, pp. 213 sqq. —C. Gaudé, C.SS.R., De Morali Systemate S. Alphonsi, Rome 1894.

n. ¶29.

On Probabilism: F. Ter Haar, De Systemate Morali Antiquerum Probabilistarum Dissertatio Historic o-Critica, Paderborn 1894, pp. 77 sqq. —P. F. Mandonnet, O.P., Le Décret d' Innocent XI contre le Probabilisme, Paris 1903, pp. 99 sqq. —A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Probabilismus Vindicatus, Freiburg 1906, pp. 16 sqq. —L. Wouters, C.SS.R., De Minus probabilismo, Amsterdam, 2nd ed., 1908, pp. 17 sqq. —J. L. Jansen, Geschichte und Kritik im Dienste der "Minus probabilis," Paderborn 1906, pp. 14 sqq. —F. Mentré, Courot et la Renaissance du Probabilisme au XIXe Siècle, Paris 1908. —Chr. Lupus, Dissertatio de Antiquitate, Auctoritate et Legitimo Usu Sententiae Probabilis (Opera Omnia, XI, Venice 1729). —Dinneen, De Probabilismo Dissertatio, Dublin 1898. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 443 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, Moral Philosophy, pp. 152 sqq. —W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 215 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 303 sqq.

n. ¶30.

On Probabiliorism: Thyrsus Gonzalez, Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis, i. e. Tractatus Theologicus de Recto Usu Opinionum, Rome 1694. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 442 sq. —J. Biederlack, S.J., in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1890, pp. 186 sqq. —L. Wedff, "S. Alphonse est-il Probabilioriste?" in the Revue Thomiste, Paris 1904, pp. 129 sqq., 477 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, pp. 220 sqq.

n. ¶31.

On Æquiprobabilism: Vindiciae Alphonsianae seu Doctoris Ecclesiae S. Alphonsi de Ligorio Doctrina Moralis Vindicata a Plurimis Oppugnatoribus A. P. Ballerini cura et studio quorundam Theologorum e Congregatione SS. Redemptoris, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Bruxelles 1874. —J. De Caigny, C.SS.R., Apologetica de Æquiprobabilismo Alphonsiano, Tournai 1894. —G. Arendt, S.J., Apologeticae de Æquiprobabilismo Alphonsiano Historico-Philosophicae Dissertationis a R. P. J. de Caigny Exaratae Crisis iuxta Principia Angelici Doctoris, Freiburg 1897, pp. 65 sqq. —IDEM, Æquiprobabilismus ab Ultimo Fundamento Discussus, Rome 1909. —Vindiciae Ballerinianae seu Gustus Recognitionis Vindiciarum Alphonsianarum. Insunt Dissertationes Ballerini de Systemate S. Alphonsi et Altera Dissertatio de Probabilismo et Æquiprobabilismo eiusdem, Bruges 1873. —A. Ballerini, S.J., Opus Theologiae Moralis (ed. Palmieri), Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 606 sqq. —Le Bachelet, La Question Ligorienne, Paris 1899, pp. 25 sqq. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, p. 445. —Berthe-Castle, C.SS.R., Life of St. Alphonsus de' Liguori, Dublin 1905. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, pp. 223 sqq. —Sabetti-Barrett, S.J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 27th ed., New York 1919, pp. 163 sqq.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 44 passages

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. I, Ch. III, Article II: On the Use of Probability

n. ¶79.

The argument of great moment, whose treatment we undertake, can be stated in these words:

How a certain dictate of conscience can be formed when, on account of diverse opinions, one of which stands for the law and the other for liberty, direct certitude cannot be had. Here a solution concerning the particular case is not sought, but a certain and universal norm by which it may safely be discerned both when it is lawful to follow an opinion favoring liberty and when we are bound to follow an opinion favoring the law.

To solve this question a twofold case must be distinguished: according as the question is moved concerning only the honesty of the action, or there intervenes the danger of some evil absolutely to be avoided, which does not depend on the dictate of conscience. In the latter case, the use of probability is entirely unlawful; but in the former case, it can be lawful.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. II, § 1. On the Unlawful Use of Probability Where There Intervenes the Danger of Some Evil Absolutely to Be Avoided

n. ¶80.

All theologians, at least the more recent, teach that the use of probability is not lawful in any matter whatever; for there are circumstances in which, antecedently to every doubt, the law of choosing safer things possesses (cf. n. 42 and 54).

For easier understanding of the question, a threefold danger in the use of a probable opinion must be distinguished, namely danger of error, of sin, and of an evil effect (Vind. Alph., P. I, c. 1, § 1, a. 1, n. 3).

The danger or fear of error, with which the danger of materially violating the law is necessarily connected, is always present in the use of a probable opinion, as is clear from the very notion of probability. But such a danger, when moral diligence for finding the truth has been made, we neither can nor are bound to avoid, because the error, if it is present, is invincible (cf. n. 95).
The danger of sinning formally is wholly removed in doubt of mere law by reflex principles. For conscience, relying on these principles, drives away practical fear and forms for itself a certain and prudent dictate concerning the honesty of its action, as was shown above (n. 38-39) and will be confirmed below.
Another danger, diverse from formal transgression of the law, can intervene in doubts of fact, namely the danger of some damage or evil, temporal or spiritual, on the part of the thing. Thus, for example, homicide embraces both moral evil, or sin, and physical evil, or grave damage, which is inflicted on the neighbor by deprivation of life. Here the matter concerns this last danger.

n. ¶81.

Principle. Whenever in doubts of fact there intervenes danger of damage or evil which does not depend on conscience and which we are certainly bound to avoid, the use of any probability whatever is unlawful, and the safer part is to be followed. So commonly, against certain laxists.

Proof. It is not lawful to expose an end absolutely to be pursued (such as that concerning which the matter here is) to the danger of frustration. But, the safer part being left aside, a danger of that sort (in the case) is not avoided; for, whatever may be true concerning the probability of the opinion, that danger perseveres in the thing itself; nor can it be removed by reflex principles, since it does not depend on the conscience or persuasion of the agent, but on the fact itself.

Thus an opinion, however probable, cannot make what is not a sacrament be a sacrament, or make what is rather poison be medicine.⁸ Namely, in cases of this kind, the matter is not about a doubtful law, but about a certain law, which forbids us to incur the danger of disturbing another from the certain possession of his right. Wherefore St. Alphonsus: "If," he says, "an arrow is shot in probable doubt whether that object is a man or a beast, one does not act against a doubtful law, but against a certain law: for in such a case the law is certain, that the life of one's neighbor, who has a certain right not to be injured, not be cast into probable danger" (H. Ap., I, 68).

We said: Danger of evil which we are bound to avoid; for sometimes there are just causes of permitting evil, indeed of creating the danger itself from which evil may arise: either because between two evils the lesser must be chosen, or because the safer part is judged morally impossible, or because the neighbor is not in certain possession of his right. In cases of this kind, it is lawful, the safer opinion being left aside, to choose the less safe (cf. n. 315).

n. ¶82.

But the necessity of an end absolutely to be pursued can arise from the law, whether of religion, justice, or charity, either toward oneself or toward one's neighbor. Whence the following flow:

Corollaries. I. In the conferral of the sacraments the minister cannot, concerning their value, use an opinion either probable or even more probable; but he is bound to follow a safe opinion, such as one which is either safer or morally certain. This is clear from the first proposition proscribed by Innocent XI: "It is not unlawful in conferring sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the value of the sacrament, the safer being left aside."⁹ The reason for the condemnation is that to confer a sacrament with only a probable opinion is contrary not only to charity, on account of the danger of grave harm, but also to religion and the reverence owed to the Author of the sacraments.

Except 1. If necessity urges, and by the use of an opinion even slightly probable concerning the value of the sacrament, the salvation of the neighbor is better consulted. For since men are not for the sacraments, but the sacraments for men, it is lawful to expose them to the danger of frustration, so that in this way, in the best way possible, help may be given to the salvation of a man certainly in danger. Hence, when certain matter is lacking, an infant who is in danger of death must be baptized with doubtful matter. Yet he is to be baptized under condition, lest injury be inflicted on the sacrament if perhaps it is made invalidly.¹⁰

Unless the Church can and is reasonably presumed to supply: which indeed can be done either in the sacrament of penance, if from a just cause it is administered with jurisdiction probable by probability of law; or in the sacrament of marriage, if there is present an impediment introduced by ecclesiastical discipline, also probable by probability of law.¹¹ But when the Church supplies, there is practically moral certitude, and therefore the sacrament is to be conferred not under condition, but absolutely. See more in the Treatise on Penance and on Matrimony.

Note. The question is whether in the reception of the sacraments it is lawful to use a probable opinion. Some affirm; but others not undeservedly deny, both because it is against the reverence due to the sacraments to expose them to danger of frustration, and because the opposite opinion can almost never be brought into practice without detriment to one's own soul (I, 51).

n. ¶83.

II. It is not lawful to use a probable opinion in danger of one's own damage, whether spiritual or temporal, necessarily to be avoided.

Hence: 1. In things necessary for salvation by necessity of means, for example in the matter of faith, the safer religion must be followed, which, without doubt, is our Catholic religion. The reason is that in things absolutely necessary for salvation, persuasion of conscience does not remove the danger of damnation. Therefore in these things the axiom has force: No security is too great where eternity is in danger. And the following fourth proposition was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI: "An infidel not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from infidelity."¹²

In a proximate occasion of sin, and generally in every probable danger of sinning formally, the safer thing must similarly be chosen, as will be explained more fully in its place (n. 373 ff.). Hence it is unlawful to follow several opinions which are indeed speculatively probable, but which, with attention to the common or special fragility of the one acting, are in practice certainly joined with probable danger of a fall into formal sin. Opinions of this kind are concerned with reading prohibited books, with kisses, touches, dances, comedies, the matter of simony, etc.
In danger of life it is not lawful, without necessity, to expose oneself to probable death, for example, by taking food probably harmless and probably poisonous.¹³

n. ¶84.

III. It is not lawful to follow a probable opinion in danger of spiritual or temporal harm to the neighbor, whenever the neighbor is in certain possession of his right.

Wherefore: 1. on account of the scandal of the neighbor, we are sometimes bound to observe a law which probably or even certainly does not exist.¹ Hence St. Paul (1 Cor. 8:13): "Wherefore," he says, "if food scandalizes my brother, I will not eat flesh forever, lest I scandalize my brother."

In healing, the physician is bound to apply the safer remedies. But if the case were desperate, it is sufficiently probable that it is lawful to use a doubtful remedy, that is, one probably going to help and probably going to harm; because, in a case of this kind, some hope of life is to be preferred to the danger of hastening death. But for the sake of experiment alone it is not lawful to apply wholly uncertain and untried remedies to the sick, even to the desperate, with danger of gravely harming them (I, 44 ff.).
In the direction and care of souls, the confessor is bound, regularly, to follow benign opinions, which commonly remove penitents more from the danger of formal sin. "But where benign opinions render proximate the danger of formal sin, as are some opinions of authors, for example, as to avoiding proximate occasions, and others of that kind; then it is always expedient that the confessor use, indeed I say that he himself, as a physician of souls, is bound to use the safer opinions, which conduce to preserving penitents in the state of grace" (I, 83; VI, 456).
In civil judgment, if neither party possesses, the judge is bound to render sentence in favor of that party for whom the more probable opinion stands. The reason is that the judge, by divine and human precept, must render to each his right, according to the greater weight of reasons which favor each one. Hence proposition 2 was condemned by Innocent XI: "I think it probable that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable."² But if the cause of each litigant seems equally probable, he must divide the contested thing, or its price, equally. The reason is that he himself is not the master of the things, but the distributor according to the rights of the parties. Hence proposition 26 was condemned by Alexander VII: "When litigants have for themselves equally probable opinions, the judge can accept money for rendering sentence in favor of one rather than the other"³ (I, 47).

Note. It was said: a) In civil judgment; because in criminal cases, where the matter concerns inflicting a penalty, especially a capital one, among opposed probable sentences the sentence favoring the accused must always be followed, even if it is less probable; otherwise the judge would expose himself to the danger of condemning an innocent man, which is intrinsically evil. b) If neither party possesses; because if one of the litigants possesses the thing in good faith, and has for himself a probable reason, he cannot be despoiled, even if the other adduces more probable reasons for himself. For legitimate possession gives the possessor a certain right of retaining the thing, until the right of the other is evident (I, l. c.; IV, 210). Cf. above n. 45.

In hunting, the hunter who doubts whether that which he sees in the forest is a wild beast or a man cannot strike it, even if he thinks it more probable that it is a wild beast.

The same must be said in similar cases (I, 52).

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. II, § 2. On the Lawful Use of Probability

Where the Matter Concerns Only the Honesty of the Action

The theologians, for whom there is morally one and the same sense concerning the use of probability where the matter concerns the danger of an evil absolutely to be avoided, by no means concur in the same opinion in the treatment of the present question; but different men devise different systems, which more or less favor either law or liberty. These systems must now be set forth briefly, so that afterward the system of St. Alphonsus may be better understood, and both the truth and the security of that system may become more clearly known.

Various Systems for the Selection of Opinions

n. ¶85.

STATE OF THE QUESTION. 1. By a moral system is understood a complex of rules by which moral controversies, arising from probable opinions, are settled in practice.

The end of a moral system is to indicate how, in practice, one arrives at a morally certain conscience, so that each one may act safely.
The matter of a moral system is only those doubts in which the matter concerns the honesty of an action, as we said above.
Five moral systems chiefly are numbered, devised by authors, namely: 1. rigorism (or tutiorism); 2. probabiliorism; 3. equiprobabilism; 4. probabilism; 5. laxism. To these in our times has been added the system of compensation.⁴

n. ¶86.

1. Rigorists are called those who admit reflex principles in no way, or only in a merely secondary way. They are also called anti-probabilists, because they reject every use of probability properly so called in a moral matter; and tutiorists, because they teach that in doubt the safer part is always to be followed.⁵ But they are divided, according to the grades of direct certitude which they require in order to act lawfully, into strict rigorists and mild rigorists.

a) The stricter rigorists require direct absolute certitude in order to act lawfully. Their dictum is: safer or certain.

Thus Sinnichius, Wendrochius, etc. This system was condemned through the following proposition proscribed by Alexander VII (the 3rd): "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, or even the most probable among probable opinions." Therefore at least a most probable opinion in favor of liberty is lawful, even if, by its nature, it does not go out from the limits of probability. The reason is that the opposite opinion rests on only a slight moment, on account of which natural right forbids liberty to be despoiled of its own right (cf. n. 40, rule 3).

Add that rigorism is: 1. alien to the evangelical spirit: for how could the yoke of Christ be called sweet, and his burden light, if we were bound always to follow the safer things? 2. contrary to the doctrine of the holy Fathers, as is clear from their testimonies, which St. Alphonsus reports; 3. very pernicious in practice: for it imposes an intolerable burden, increases sins, ensnares consciences, generates desperation, and builds unto gehenna (I, 60, 66, 82 ff.).

b) The milder rigorists teach that direct certitude is required in order to act lawfully, not indeed absolute certitude, but broad or moral certitude. These indeed permit the use of the most probable opinion, not because it is lawful to use a probable opinion, but because, in moral matters, a most probable opinion furnishes some broad certitude (H. Ap., I, 33). Their dictum is: safer or most probable.

Thus Fagnanus, Habert, etc. This system indeed has not been condemned, but we do not admit it. Cf. below the first Thesis (n. 91).

Probabiliorists teach that the safer opinion must be held, unless the opinion for liberty is manifestly and solidly more probable. Their dictum is: Safer or more probable.

Thus Billuart, Wigandt, and, among more recent authors, Pegues and others from the Order of St. Dominic. And the reason is that it is not lawful, they say, to incur a grave and founded danger of transgressing the law; which danger, they say, always threatens unless the opinion which stands for liberty is at least more probable than the other. But if the opinion which stands for liberty is truly more probable, they contend that there is only a slight danger of acting against the law, which danger can prudently be disregarded (Billuart, de act. hum., Diss. VI). Against them likewise Thesis 1 will be established.

Equiprobabilists teach that in the concurrence of two opinions equally or almost equally probable (of which one favors liberty, the other law), while the doubt stands concerning the existence of the law, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty; but while the doubt stands concerning the cessation of the law, the opinion favoring the law must be followed. Outside the limits of this broad equiprobability, the uniquely probable or certainly more probable opinion prevails, whether this opinion supports the law or liberty. Their dictum is: The opinion for which possession stands, provided that it is equally or almost equally probable.

Thus, after several older authors, St. Alphonsus and his disciples, Aertnys, Konings, and others from diverse schools, such as Gousset, Scavini, Del Vecchio, Muller, Martin, Pruner, Simar, Berardi, Sweens, Farges, Beaudouin, Beijsens, Valensise, Koch, etc. Their reason is that in the concurrence of equiprobable opinions we are involved in strict doubt; but a strictly doubtful law does not oblige, and in an equal cause the condition of the possessor is better. More concerning this system at n. 88 ff.

Probabilists (in general) teach that in the concurrence of a probable or more probable opinion which stands for the law, it is permitted to follow a probable opinion favoring liberty, provided that this opinion is truly probable. The dictum of the probabilists is: The more benign, provided that it is truly probable. Their reason is that it is not lawful to impose an obligation concerning which there is no certain evidence; now, there is no certain evidence concerning the law where the opinion for liberty is truly probable; therefore.

Bartholomew Medina, O.P. (1.2, q. 19, a. 6, Commentary on St. Thomas), was the first who, in the year 1577, published this opinion: "If an opinion is probable, it is lawful to follow it, although the opposite is more probable."⁶

This system is not sufficiently defined, nor is it circumscribed by certain limits. For, as it is commonly circulated: 1. it does not define whether an opinion favoring liberty ought to be relatively probable, or whether it suffices that it be absolutely probable; 2. while it grants the use of a less probable opinion, with the safer and even more probable one left aside, it does not define whether this has force concerning one a little more probable, or concerning one notably more probable. And this obscurity indeed is the cause why probabilists have entered upon a diverse way.

Some, teaching that it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion which favors liberty, understand solidly probable relatively, and therefore with only a probable, or a little more probable, opinion which stands for the law left aside. These agree in substantial matters with the equiprobabilists, and can be called moderate probabilists. Such are Suarez,⁷ Vasquez, Lugo, Lessius, Laymann, Sylvius, Palaus, Viva, Abelly, Reuter, Voit, etc. We shall not act against these when we are about to attack probabilism. Yet we note that this moderate probabilism, since it carries before itself some ambiguity, by not determining sufficiently the less probable opinion, does not sufficiently guard against abuses, as St. Alphonsus has already complained.⁸

But there are others, probabilists, who hold as sufficiently probable every opinion absolutely and in itself probable, without caring at all about relative probability; they also deny that the use of a probable opinion is to be confined within the limits of equiprobabilism, and therefore that an opinion becomes unlawful to which another certainly or evidently more probable opinion is opposed. Thus expressly Lacroix,⁹ Illsung,¹⁰ etc., whose doctrine comes under the name of absolute or common or pure, broad probabilism.

Finally, among probabilists, some reject the principle of possession, or do not admit it in the same circumstances as St. Alphonsus.¹¹

Now, just as probabiliorism is more rigid than is just, so absolute probabilism seems to be more benign than is right. The disadvantages under which it labors will be indicated below, where its refutation is treated (Theses II and III).

Note. Ter Haar treats at length the various kinds of the older probabilists (op. cit., p. 20-85). If we consider the mind of more recent probabilists, some (for example, Lehmkuhl) are to be numbered with the moderate probabilists, others (for example, Raphael a St. Joseph, Meffert, Ballerini) rather with the broad probabilists. It is especially to be lamented that several recent authors sometimes use more general and even rather obscure words, by which they seem now to approach absolute probabilism, now to recede from it. See examples in Vind. Alph., I, p. 480 ff.

Laxists taught that it is permitted to follow any opinions whatever, even slightly probable ones. Their dictum is: The more benign, provided that it is probable in some way. Thus Caramuel, the prince of the laxists, Diana, and others.¹²

This other extreme was condemned by Innocent XI in the 3rd proposition, which said: "Generally, while relying on probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided that one does not go outside the limits of probability, we always act prudently when we do something." This proposition was excerpted to the letter from Tamburini (Dec., I, c. 3, § 3, n. 3). But deservedly was it condemned: for slight probability cannot be called true probability, just as slight fortitude or slight skill cannot be called true fortitude and true skill, but ought rather to be called weakness and lack of skill (H. Ap., I, 30).

To these things is added that "that lax manner of opining is alien to the evangelical simplicity and the doctrine of the holy Fathers; if the faithful were to follow it in practice as a right rule, an immense corruption of Christian life would creep in." Thus Pope Alexander VII, in the decree issued on September 24, 1665.

The system of compensation, which certain more recent authors defend (Manier, Lehu, Potton, Boisdron), states the general principle: Every law always obliges to some extent; but its force of obliging increases or decreases according to the degree of knowledge which we have concerning it. A law perfectly known obliges fully; wholly unknown, it does not bind; but imperfectly known, it binds imperfectly. But in order that, while a law imperfectly known stands, we may enjoy liberty, there is required on our part, as an excusing reason, a relatively grave inconvenience, by which the wound is compensated that we, by using our liberty, probably inflict on the law and on the moral order. The reason for this system is that the merely material transgression of a law is already a certain evil; for through this we inflict a wound on the law or moral order, because the law is frustrated in its end intended by the Legislator.

This system is not pleasing. The reasons are: a) because, as we shall say below (n. 91), it supposes that law obliges antecedently to promulgation: which smells of probabiliorism, indeed even of tutiorism. b) Moreover, the rule handed down by those theologians seems very difficult, and in practice there will scarcely be place for it. For the inconvenience attached to the observance of the law will often be different for individual persons, indeed also for individual cases. Thus, for example, the gravity of the inconvenience in confessing a doubtful sin will be different both according to the different character of each penitent, and according to the nature of the sin to be accused, and often also according to the different character of the confessor before whom the accusation must be made. Hence that rule, on the one hand, furnishes occasion for many anxieties; but on the other hand, frequently exposes one to the illusions of self-love; and therefore it cannot be a prudent practical norm in resolving doubts. c) Finally, the foundation of this system is also preserved in our system of equiprobabilism, insofar as the number of laws which are prescribed to be observed in practice is most closely equated with the number of materially existing laws, and therefore the end of all laws in the universe is attained in the best way in which it can be attained.

Note. Cardinal D'Annibale (Summ., I, 270) judged that the rule for the solution of doubts was to be drawn solely from possession. If this system is well understood and accommodated to practice, it rather approaches the system of St. Alphonsus. For the Holy Doctor (cf. Gaude's Dissertation de mor. syst. S. Alph., n. 26) calls the principle of possession supreme, most universal.

n. ¶87.

Therefore, with the stricter rigorism and laxism excepted, the remaining systems can be sustained without the condemnation of the Church. Among these, equiprobabilism holds the middle way, of which St. Alphonsus is the distinguished defender (Vind. Alph., P. I, c. 3, Apologetic Dissertation, 143).

Historical question. That equiprobabilism is the genuine system of St. Alphonsus, which he definitively embraced at least from the year 1762, the Vindiciae Alphonsianae (I, p. 1-150), Gaude (de mor. syst. S. Alph.), Wouters (de Minusprobab., ed. 2, p. 49), and many others clearly prove.

Before the year 1762, in two dissertations which he inscribed FOR THE MODERATE USE OF PROBABLE OPINION IN THE CONCURRENCE OF A MORE PROBABLE ONE, and of which he published one in the year 1749 and the other in 1755, he supported simple probabilism. But truly, as is evident from his various writings, these dissertations, published without the name of the Holy Author, were nothing except certain trials, certain preludes, or preliminary contests concerning a most grave question. For before the year 1762 (let this be well noted), in all and each of the editions of his Moral Theology, indeed also in other works of lesser moment which he brought into the light under his own name, he constantly asserted that he was prescinding from that thesis: Whether it is lawful to follow the less probable, with the more probable left aside. Indeed, in various works of this time there appears so much the constant inquiry of the Holy Doctor into the safe way, that it is not difficult (so the Collationes Brugenses) to find support in them for various systems.
After the year 1762, once the brief Dissertation, in the Italian language, de usu moderato opin. probab., had been published, St. Alphonsus cast away his former hesitation, and constantly held those opinions which we shall set forth below. Much erudition and usefulness are brought, in relation to this question, by a comparison of the propositions of each edition of the Moral Work. Cf., on this matter, the preface of Father Gaude (I, p. xix), and especially the cited little work of the same author.
Although the system established by the Holy Doctor was received everywhere with great praise (cf. Berthe, Vita di S. Alfonso, II, p. 165), nevertheless the Saint himself never had an end of perfecting his work, so that he receded ever more from absolute probabilism, and found the middle way between probabilism and probabiliorism. Thence it came about that he made public his celebrated Monitum (1773) and the golden little work, Dichiarazione del sistema (1774). When these had been added to the eighth edition of the Moral Work, and the probabilistic dissertation of Father Zacharia, S.J. (cf. n. 6), had also been expunged, St. Alphonsus could exclaim: "Joyful now I shall die, because this last edition, the work complete in all respects, has come into the light" (cf. Gaude, de mor. syst., p. 38).

All these things, after the letters of the Holy Doctor were published and the excellent works of Father Gaude, lie open so clearly to theologians (even if, by reason of the controversy occasioned by Father Ballerini's dissertation on the moral system of St. Alphonsus, held in the Roman College in 1863, they remained doubtful for a while), that now "they think it must be acknowledged, nor can it be denied, that St. Alphonsus, at least from the year 1762, was an equiprobabilist and rejected common probabilism." "In vain," they say, "do the very writers of the Collationes Brugenses (1906, p. 400) assert that the older St. Alphonsus taught equiprobabilism... whence the genuine and definitive opinion of the Holy Doctor is not to be sought in writings from 1762 and earlier, as the new probabilists did and do. Thus Lehmkuhl is not free from this error in the little work Probabilismus vindicatus." To these sayings consent, besides the alumni of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, very many distinguished theologians, such as Bellesheim (Katholik, 1891, II, p. 245), who thus speaks: "The texts are thus clearer than the midday light, so weighty, that an opponent must be silent: St. Alphonsus truly taught equiprobabilism." The same testify Schneider (Liter. Rundschau, 1895, col. 202), Koch (Tubing. Quart. Schr., 1897, p. 70-126), Mausbach (Die kath. Moral, p. 181), Berardi (Theol. fund., 1905, I, n. 55), Tanquerey (I, n. 405), Sweens (Theol. mor., 688).

Finally let Genicot-Salsmans be heard, who in the last edition of Theol. mor. (1912) has these things: "In reality St. Alphonsus seems in his last works to have openly taught equiprobabilism, at least if we attribute to the words which he uses their native sense" (de Consc., n. 81-72). Cf. Wouters, de Minusprobab., p. 56.

Since these things are so, with the Collationes Brugenses we note that several probabilists do not always act critically when they at once recur to the probabilistic dissertations of the years 1749 and 1755. For in his letters the Holy Doctor clearly acknowledges that he made a retraction concerning common probabilism, which he previously professed, and this indeed, as he says, not for the sake of avoiding difficulty or persecution, but for the sake of conviction and conscience. Corresp. gen., n. 818 and Corresp. spec., n. 315.

Hence the defender of St. Alphonsus for the Concession of the title Doctor asserts without hesitation: "The Holy Author, from the year 1762, defended the system of EQUIPROBABILISM so openly, clearly, and constantly, that every reasonable doubt about this matter is excluded: which also the most ample Censor (that is, the Promoter of the Faith) concedes" (Act. Doct. animad., § 25, Resp. n. 239).

But this is not the place to dwell longer on the question of fact. It is better to approach the question of right, and to demonstrate that the rules handed down by St. Alphonsus concerning the manner of resolving practical doubt are true.

The Moral System of the Holy Doctor Alphonsus

St. Thomas, Quodl. VIII, q. 6, a. 13; St. Alphonsus, I, n. 54; ed. G., I, p. 25; Monitum from ed. 7; little work Dichiaraz., etc.; Vind. Alph. (ed. 2); Gaude, de mor. system. S. Alph.; De Caigny, Apologetic Dissertation; Wouters, de Minusprobab. (ed. 2); Ter Haar, de syst. mor. antiq. Probab.; the history of Innocent XI's decree on Probabilism; Ballerini, op. mor., ed. 2; Arendt, Crisis; Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund., ed. 3; Sweens, Theol. mor. fund.; Beaudouin, de Consc.; Lehmkuhl, Probab. vindicatus. Besides these, the authors of moral theology, treatise on Conscience.

So that the system may be better understood, three things will be explained:

The exposition of the system;
The demonstration of the system;
The excellent merit of the system.

I. Exposition of the System

Two things are essential to this system: the method and the principles which it employs (Vind. Alph., Apologetic Dissertation, n. 68).

n. ¶88.

A. The METHOD is expressed by the following rules:

Truth is to be sought with moral diligence, which is proportioned to the matter and to the gravity of the doubt (n. 40, rule 2).
Where truth cannot be found, a comparison of opinions must necessarily be instituted, and their value must be estimated not only absolutely, but also relatively (n. 67).
From the comparison and opposition of opinions one must see what sort of doubt arises, whether strict or broad. When opinions occur equally or almost equally probable, we are involved in strict doubt (n. 74). When one opinion is certainly more probable, or most probable, or uniquely probable, we are involved in broad doubt, with moral certitude broadly taken (n. 75, 77).
Once the nature of the doubt has been defined, the principles are immediately applied.

n. ¶89.

B. The PRINCIPLES on which St. Alphonsus's system rests are of a twofold kind, according to the twofold kind of doubt, strict or broad.

I. In STRICT doubt these two principles have force: A doubtful law does not oblige, and In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. From these principles flows this DOUBLE RULE: 1. In doubt concerning the existence (or extension) of a law or right, when there concur two opinions equally or almost equally probable, of which one stands for law, the other for liberty, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty; because in strict doubt concerning the existence of a law, liberty certainly possesses (n. 44, 55). 2. In doubt concerning the cessation of a law or right certainly previously existing, when there concur two equiprobable opinions or assertions of fact, the opinion or assertion which favors the law is to be held, because in strict doubt concerning the cessation of a law, the previously certain law possesses (ibid.).

II. In BROAD doubt the following principle comes in: In obscure things the more verisimilar is to be chosen. "Where truth cannot be clearly found," says St. Alphonsus (I, 54, 88), "we are bound to embrace at least that opinion which comes nearer to the truth." From this general principle flow two COROLLARIES: 1. A law that is only broadly doubtful, regularly speaking, obliges, because concerning it there is moral, and therefore sufficient, evidence. 2. Liberty or liberation that is only broadly doubtful, regularly speaking, truly de-obliges, because concerning it there is moral, and therefore sufficient, evidence.

n. ¶90.

It is also useful to note here that it is unlawful to use two probable opinions, or both parts of a doubt, at the same time in the same act, if one law is thereby certainly violated: for example, in a testament which, lacking legal form, is probably valid. Therefore it is not lawful, by following the former opinion, to enter upon the inheritance, and at the same time, by following the latter, not to pay the legacies contained in the same testament. For by such a manner of acting, the observance of one or the other law would necessarily be eluded, and the agent would contradict himself in the same act or business, which would be contrary to right reason (Reuter, n. 110).

II. Demonstration of the System

Concerning Rigorism and Laxism, as being condemned by the Church, it would be futile to dispute here. Therefore it remains to prove the system of St. Alphonsus against probabiliorists and absolute probabilists at the same time. In establishing the theses by which the Alphonsian system is constituted, we shall indicate all things according to the norm of those things which are reported in the Acts of the Doctorate.

Thesis I

In doubt concerning the existence of a law, when there concur opinions equally or almost equally probable, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty.

The sense of the proposition is evident. Cf. what we said n. 70 ff.

The thesis is against tutiorists and probabiliorists. It can also be stated thus: It is lawful to follow an opinion equally or almost equally probable for liberty, with the opposite opinion for the law left aside. In strict doubt concerning the existence of a law, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty. It is lawful to follow the opinion for liberty, with the opinion for the law a little or doubtfully more probable left aside.

n. ¶91.

I. THE THESIS IS PROVED FROM THE AUTHORITY OF DOCTORS AND OF THE CHURCH.

Although the holy Fathers did not treat this question expressly, nevertheless they teach not obscurely that the safer part is not always to be followed in doubts.

Behold, for example, with what words St. Gregory Nazianzen (Or. 39, n. 18, 19) addresses a heretic who condemned second marriages: "By what argument do you confirm this? Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot, do not condemn. But if the law is doubtful, let humanity and facility prevail." And St. Augustine (Ep. 54, c. 2, n. 2): "For what is not proved to be contrary either to faith or to good morals is to be held indifferently." Similarly St. Bernard (Ep. 77, c. 5, n. 18): "Certainly, there each one securely abounds in his own sense, where what is thought is opposed neither to certain reason nor to authority not to be despised."

The testimonies of other Fathers can be read in St. Alphonsus (I, 60, 66; ed. G., I, p. 30, 36).

Disputations concerning probabilism began to be made toward the end of the sixteenth century; and from this time there were almost innumerable authors, and these most excellent, who pleaded the cause of this doctrine, at least in general, against anti-probabilists and probabiliorists.

Among these authors, as leaders, are to be reckoned Suarez, Vasquez, Lugo, Lessius, Sanchez, Palaus, Toletus, Laymann, the Salmanticenses, Amort, Bonacina, Sylvius, Croix, Roncaglia, Elbel (Diss. 1757, n. III).

The same is evident both from the practice of the Supreme Pontiffs, for example concerning certain doubtful impediments of matrimony (cf. I, n. 78; Diss. 1755, n. II), and from diverse responses of the Holy Office and of the Sacred Penitentiary, approved by Pius VIII and Gregory XVI, concerning loans.

For while it was being sharply disputed among theologians whether an increase could lawfully be received by force of the title of civil law, the Church, while this invincible doubt stood, handed down this practically safe rule, namely: "that penitents receiving profit from a loan according to the legal rate are not to be disturbed, provided they are ready to obey the Holy See when it shall have definitively defined."

There is added the approval of the works of St. Alphonsus issued by the Holy See, by which it is especially evident that a professor of sacred Theology can lawfully follow in all things and publicly hand down the doctrine of the Blessed Doctor, notwithstanding an oath which he may have emitted of retaining the doctrine of a University which would follow probabiliorism and the opinions of probabiliorists (see the text at the end of the Preface).

n. ¶92.

II. THE THESIS IS PROVED FROM REASON, namely: 1. from the nature of law, 2. from the nature of liberty.

PROOF 1. From the nature of LAW, because from the right notion of law there is drawn this first fundamental principle: A doubtful law does not oblige.

ARGUMENTATION. A law insufficiently promulgated does not oblige. But a doubtful law is insufficiently promulgated. Therefore it does not oblige.

The MAJOR is evident both from the unanimous consent of theologians and from reason, because law is the measure according to which our life ought to be regulated, and it is the bond of our liberty, from which it follows that it must be applied to liberty through sufficient knowledge.

Law is a measure, which the prince of theologians, St. Thomas, thus teaches: "Law is a certain rule and measure of acts, according to which someone is induced to acting or is withdrawn from acting" (1.2, q. 90, a. 1). "But a rule and measure is imposed by the fact that it is applied to those things which are ruled and measured. Hence, in order that law obtain the power of obliging (which is proper to law), it must be applied to men, who ought to be ruled according to it. But such application is made by the fact that it is brought to their knowledge by promulgation itself. Hence promulgation itself is necessary in order that law have its power" (I, 57). Therefore law before promulgation does not have the force of obliging. And the same must be said if the matter concerns natural law: for God promulgates this through the light of reason implanted in each man, as St. Thomas asserts (1.2, q. 90, a. 4, ad 1).
Law is a bond. "For law is said from binding, because it obliges to acting" (1.2, q. 90, a. 1). Now, law touches and binds man only through knowledge. "For just as for binding some thing it is necessary that a cord actually be applied; so, for binding the will of man, so that he may exercise some action, or be bound to omit it, it is necessary that he himself have knowledge of the precept; otherwise that man remains in his liberty" (I, 59). St. Thomas teaches the same (de Verit., q. 17, a. 3), saying: "No one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept."¹ Therefore the major is clearly evident: A law insufficiently promulgated does not oblige (I, 57-59).

PROOF OF THE MINOR. But a doubtful law is insufficiently promulgated. A strictly doubtful law (with which alone we are here concerned) is invincibly unknown. Therefore it is insufficiently promulgated.

Proof of the antecedent. Those things are invincibly unknown concerning which there is not a sufficient foundation, so that they can be affirmed rather than denied. But this obtains in the case where the matter concerns a strictly doubtful law, since only this is known, that a question is being agitated concerning the existence of the law; but concerning the solution of the question itself, there is no greater reason for affirming than for denying. Therefore. Hence all agree in asserting that law, in order that it oblige, ought to be certain and manifest, and ought to be manifested or become known as certain to the man to whom it is promulgated (I, 58, 63, 71, 72, 76). "Law, therefore, in order that it oblige, whether it be human or divine, must always be sufficiently promulgated or known, or proposed, or implanted (say it as you prefer), as certain" (Diss. 1757, n. 26). Recall what was said n. 46.

The same proof, in few words, in another place St. Alphonsus completes thus: "A law not sufficiently promulgated does not oblige. A doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated (because while the law is doubtful, the doubt or question is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated); therefore a doubtful law does not oblige. He who would wish to deny this argument would have to prove either that a law not even promulgated obliges, or that a doubtful law is truly promulgated, contrary to that which St. Thomas expressly teaches, and others commonly, as we have seen; but he will never prove either of these propositions forever" (I, 58).

n. ¶93.

PROOF 2. From the nature of LIBERTY. There is the fundamental principle: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better, or: In doubt the possessor prevails. But here we are involved in doubt, and liberty possesses. Therefore liberty prevails.

Proof of the major. The principle itself states the universal principle of equity, which the most learned Suarez expresses thus (Vot., l. 4, c. 5, n. 8): "On account of doubt alone, things are not to be changed from the ancient state in which they existed in good faith; because, since in doubt there is a certain equality on each side, there is no reason why it should oblige toward one part rather than toward the other." Therefore until certain reasons persuade this, no one is to be despoiled of the certain right which he enjoyed.

This principle of possession (as we said n. 44) was always admitted, in the matter of justice, in all tribunals, both civil and ecclesiastical.

Its extension to the matter of the other virtues was indeed attacked by some (cf. Vind. Alph., Apologetic Dissertation, n. 114 ff.); but "the most common opinion is," says our Holy Doctor, "that not only in the matter of justice, but also in every other matter, the right of possession prevails. The reason is: 1. Because the same motive of reason which runs for the matter of justice also runs for the other virtues; for just as in the matter of justice the condition of the possessor is better, because this condition of possession furnishes to the possessor a special right to retain the thing until it is evident to him that it is another's, so it must be said in other matters. For when someone, after diligence has been applied, could not find the truth, he now perseveres in possession of his liberty, and therefore has a certain right to it, by which he is judged deprived by no doubtful right. 2. Because, as Sanchez says, possession is a universal title for all virtues. For since the essence of justice is to render to each his right, this belongs to every virtue, according as religion renders his right to God, charity to the neighbor, temperance to oneself, and so concerning the others; and therefore it is rightly said that the notion of justice is the potential or generic part of all the virtues, in which the other virtues agree among themselves" (Diss. 1757, in ed. 3 and 4 of the Theol. mor., n. 19, 20).

Proof of the minor. Here we are involved in doubt, and liberty possesses. The first part, here we are involved in doubt, is evident from what was said n. 74. Proof of the other part: liberty possesses. This is clear from the very concept of law, which, since it is the bond of liberty, cannot even logically be conceived unless liberty is first posited. "Certainly man is born subject to God, and universally dependent on his will; but truly, just as a servant is not bound to carry out the wishes of his master unless they are made known to him, so man is not bound to carry out the particular wishes of God unless they are manifested to him by precept or prohibition" (Dichiar., 1774, n. 42)... "Hence Scripture says (Ecclus. 15:14): God from the beginning constituted man, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commandments and precepts: if you will to keep the commandments, they will preserve you. Therefore first the Lord created man free, giving him liberty from his good pleasure, according to that which the Apostle writes (1 Cor. 7:37): Having power over his own will; and afterward he added and imposed the commandments which man was bound to keep; and therefore man's liberty, since it is certain and possesses before the obligation of law, is bound only by a certain law" (I, 75).¹ This is confirmed by St. Thomas, who says with the common opinion: That is called lawful which is prohibited by no law (on 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 4, ad 2).

Let us conclude this universal thesis with these words of St. Alphonsus (I, 68): "1. Considering the equal weight of each opinion, man would remain doubtful, and could not act; 2. but considering the force of the law, since in that case it has not been sufficiently promulgated, it does not oblige nor bind: and therefore 3. man, as not bound by a doubtful law of this kind, is rendered certain of his (moral) liberty, and thus he can act."

Objections Are Solved

n. ¶94.

OBJ. 1. In doubts the condition of the possessor is better. But according to the probabiliorists, the eternal law possesses before liberty. Therefore in the concurrence of two opinions which generate doubt, the opinion which stands for law must always be preferred.

Resp. Distinguish the minor. The eternal law precedes liberty by priority of time or duration, I concede; by priority of order, whether ontological or logical, I deny. In the ontological order there is simultaneity, as between two correlatives; in the logical order, liberty is prior, "by priority of reason or nature," as St. Alphonsus says. For how could man be bound before he exists, or before he knows the bond of the law? Therefore the eternal law, although in itself it has always had and has the force of obliging in first act, nevertheless actually and in second act it does not bind man except when it is actually promulgated to him through the light of reason (I, n. 70, 75; ed. G., I, p. 50).

INST. The rule is prior to the thing ruled. But law is as it were the rule, and liberty as it were the thing ruled. Therefore law is prior to liberty.

Resp. Distinguish the major. If the matter concerns rule insofar as it is an exemplary cause in relation to the effect, I concede; if the matter concerns rule insofar as it is a norm to be applied in the use of some thing, I deny. The use of a thing to be moderated according to rule cannot even be conceived unless the thing itself is presupposed.

OBJ. 2. No law is doubtful: for all laws, whether divine or human, certainly exist and are certainly promulgated; the only doubt is whether such a particular case is comprehended in the general law, for example in the Decalogue; therefore law always possesses against liberty.

Resp. St. Alphonsus: "In the case of two opinions of equal weight, although the general law is certain as to existence and is sufficiently promulgated, nevertheless with respect to that case it is doubtful both as to existence and as to promulgation; and therefore then, because it is doubtful whether the law is extended to that case, it is certain that it is not extended as to obligation. This indeed St. Thomas recognized when he said that law is like a bond, which, until it is applied to someone through contact, allows him the power of turning wherever he wishes" (I, 62, 72; H. Ap., I, 67, 68).

OBJ. 3. In canon law this rule is handed down: "In doubt the safer way is to be chosen." Therefore it is not lawful to embrace the less safe part.

Resp. 1. The aforesaid rule has force in practical doubt (cf. n. 54), which someone does not wish or cannot lay aside; it has force especially in doubts of fact, where there is danger of an evil absolutely to be avoided. And our Holy Doctor clearly proves that the doubts to which the Supreme Pontiffs applied the aforesaid rule were of this kind (I, 77, 78).

If the matter is to be judged from the rules of law, neither is this support lacking to our opinion, since these things are had in law: "In doubt, favors are to be enlarged, odious things restricted. In obscure things the minimum is to be followed." And: "Unless you shall have been certain concerning the mandate, you will not be compelled to execute what is commanded."

OBJ. 4. He who exposes himself to the danger of sinning sins, as Sacred Scripture testifies: He who loves danger will perish in it (Ecclus. 3:27). But probabilists, or equiprobabilists, by following a probable, less safe opinion, expose themselves to such danger. Therefore.

Resp. 1. Retort the argument. If, on account of any danger whatever of sinning, it were unlawful to use a probable opinion, it would also be unlawful to use a more probable one, indeed even a most probable one; for, since neither opinion goes out from the limits of probability, neither excludes fear of erring. Therefore absolute tutiorism, condemned by the Church, would necessarily have to be embraced (Dich. del sist., 1774, n. 51).

Distinguish the major. He sins who exposes himself to the danger of sinning formally, I concede; he sins who exposes himself to the danger of sinning materially only, I deny.

To the minor: Probabilists expose themselves to the danger of sinning materially only, let it pass; to the danger of sinning formally, I deny. The danger of sinning formally cannot arise except from a certain law: For where there is no law, neither is there transgression (Rom. 4:15). But a probable opinion, to which another also probable opinion is opposed, does not constitute a certain law. Therefore the danger of sinning formally exists only in the mind of those who, contrary to the dictate of reason, affirm that a doubtful law is equivalent to a certain law.

OBJ. 5. The thesis admits the danger of transgressing, at least materially, the divine law, since that danger cannot be separated from the probable existence of the law. But it is unlawful to undergo such danger; because it brings into jeopardy the conformity of the human will with the divine will, and the end intended by God the supreme Legislator; each of which must absolutely be procured. Therefore the thesis is to be rejected.

Resp. I concede the major; distinguish the minor. The danger of material transgression cannot be admitted when the danger arises from the temerity of the one acting, who contemns practical doubt and does not apply due or proportionate diligence for obtaining the truth, I concede; when the danger arises from invincible ignorance, namely from the fact that, after diligence has been applied, the truth could not be found, I deny. In circumstances of this kind God permits such danger to be incurred, for universal reasons, as will soon be seen. Hence "it is certain that material sin invincibly unknown is not imputed to fault" (Diss. 1757, n. 37).

To the reason alleged, distinguish. The conformity of the human will with the divine will is brought into jeopardy as to those things in which man is not bound to conform himself to the divine will, I concede; as to those things in which he is bound, I deny (I, 76; Istr. e Prat., I, n. 46). For man is not always bound to will what God wills, as St. Thomas teaches, saying (1.2, q. 19, a. 10, ad 1): "In particular, we do not know what God wills, and as to this we are not bound to conform our will to the divine will." Therefore, unless the divine precepts are manifest, man is not bound to conform himself to the divine will. Gonet also declares this in these words: "Man is not bound to conform himself to the divine will in the material thing willed, except when the divine will is manifested to us by precept or prohibition" (Clyp., disp. 6, a. 2, n. 37).

Nor is the end intended by God the supreme legislator frustrated. That end, which is the glory of God and the salvation of souls, is had in the perfect obedience which men render to God. But the danger of material transgression by no means removes this perfect obedience. Thus man, not even in this case (as we just said), omits to will that which God wills him to will; in which thing his full obedience toward God is contained.

For the rest, what prudent man can deny that it is too onerous to be bound by laws even doubtful, and that an obligation of that sort is unequal to human powers, and therefore redounds to the detriment of the glory of God himself? "I hold as certain," says St. Alphonsus (dell'Uso moder., 1765, c. 4, n. 35), "that in so great a variety of innumerable doubts which can arise in the human mind, on account of the darkness with which nature has been enveloped from original sin, God did not will to oblige man to observe even uncertain laws, of which there would exist as many as there are doubts which can occur concerning laws."

n. ¶95.

Note. This last reason, by way of a universal epikeia, and therefore of itself and in a uniform manner, excuses man from the transgression of doubtful laws, and removes a priori their obligation, as long as there shall not have been evidence concerning the will of the legislator. Nor therefore, in a particular case, are we bound to seek a special excuse. But this has force especially with respect to laws which by the common judgment of doctors are reputed doubtful. For St. Alphonsus observes, saying (Diss. 1757, n. 24): "A law which is disputed among the wise cannot even be said to have been intimated to the community, since the community itself, split into diverse parts, still seeks, and does not find, that a law has been given." Concerning a law of this kind, commonly and as it were juridically unknown, the axiom certainly has force: A doubtful law is no law (at least in second act), and therefore its transgression can scarcely retain the name of material sin. Quite otherwise must be said if a law intimated to the community of men is unknown, or reputed doubtful, by someone in particular; for this is per accidens, and the agent then is excused only individually, on account of his conscience invincibly erroneous (cf. I, 173).

Thesis II

In doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, when there concur arguments equally or almost equally probable, the opinion which favors the law is to be followed.

The thesis is against certain probabilists who contend that, in every doubt, whether negative or positive on both sides, it is lawful to follow the parts of liberty, whether the matter concerns the beginning of the law or the cessation of the law.

The thesis can also be stated thus: In strict doubt concerning the cessation or fulfillment of a law, the law is to be observed. The law continues to oblige whenever it is equally or almost equally probable that it has ceased or has been fulfilled.²

n. ¶96.

The thesis is proved 1. From the part of LAW. The rights of liberty and of law ought, when their cause is equal, to be held equal. Therefore just as liberty possesses when the law is not certain, so on the contrary law ought to possess until there is evidence of revocation (cessation). Cf. n. 44 and 91; D'Annibale, I, n. 264, 266.

Proof 2. From the part of LIBERTY. For following the parts of liberty there is not given, in the case, sufficient certitude concerning the honesty of the action. Therefore. For the only foundation on which conscience could rest would be the principle: A doubtful law does not oblige, applied also to a law doubtfully ceasing. Now, as Berardi (I, 56) and the editor of the Ratisbon Compendium of Gury (n. 80) well note, "the aforesaid principle, even for the probabilists themselves, as to this sense, that is, in such a universal acceptance, is very doubtful, nor is it held as morally certain" (recall what was said above, n. 46).

n. ¶97.

It is confirmed from other most received PRINCIPLES OF LAW: 1. In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated (cf. n. 48). But the revocation of a law, desuetude, dispensation, an excusing or exempting cause, the fulfillment of a precept, etc., are facts, which are by no means proved by merely equiprobable reasons (IV, 174). Therefore. 2. Proof lies on the plaintiff, or: Proof lies on him who affirms, not on him who denies (cf. n. 49). Now, where law, through certain promulgation, is found in possession of its right, if afterward, circumstances having changed, doubt arises, and liberty asks to be loosed by this law, liberty certainly assumes the place of plaintiff and affirmant. Therefore the burden lies on it to prove, by reasons sufficiently convincing, that there truly has intervened that cessation of the law and change of right which it contends. 3. In doubts one must stand for that part for which presumption stands (n. 47). Now, in doubt whether a law certainly established and certainly promulgated has ceased, presumption stands for law, not for liberty. For presumption stands for that part which is not bound to prove. But in the aforesaid doubt, proof certainly lies not on the law, which was proved, but on liberty, which demands for itself liberation from the bond of law. Therefore (cf. n. 129, 173).

Nor should it be said that these axioms of law have force indeed in doubt, but not in probable opinion. For this distinction could be admitted if the probable opinion, or probability of fact, were unique and expedient, as we have said several times with St. Alphonsus. But it is otherwise if, on each side, as the thesis bears, equal opinions or probabilities concur; for it is not lawful to adhere to one opinion or probability, with the other spurned or not considered; and therefore then we are involved not in opinion or probability, but in strict and true doubt, in which the aforesaid axioms have their whole force (cf. n. 74).

Note. The principle of possession, far from proceeding in negative doubts alone, as many probabilists teach, has force especially for positive doubts, as is evident from its own terms: In an equal cause, etc. Equality of cause denotes equal probability, rather than an equal defect of motives. But the primary principle of the probabilists, he who acts probably acts prudently, stood in the way of their applying the principle of possession to positive doubts, as can be seen everywhere among them.

n. ¶98.

For the rest, concerning the extension of the present thesis, the following things are to be noted:

In doubt, or in equiprobability, liberty possesses much more frequently than law, so that the principle of possession favors liberty much more than law.

And indeed, as is evident to all: 1. neither natural laws once known (which must be well noted), nor positive divine laws, after the promulgation of the Gospel, whether by abrogation, or derogation, or dispensation properly so called, will ever cease. 2. As regards human laws, which can cease by the aforesaid ways from the will of the legislator, even these do not remain doubtful for much time. For by law it has been provided that after a certain interval of time, the cessation of the law, or desuetude, be held as prescribed (cf. n. 265). Therefore the principle of possession, in practice, rarely binds one doubting, if particular cases are excepted: for example, whether someone has satisfied the law; whether there is a sufficient cause so that someone may be exempted from a law by which he certainly was bound. But these cases, however frequent, manifestly become rarer if they are compared with those in which liberty possesses.

If the matter concerns probable satisfaction of the law, there are several principles by which the doubt of fact is indirectly solved and liberty can often be helped (Linz. Q. Schr., 1883, p. 573).

The first is: That which regularly, that which ordinarily happens, is judged to have been done (see what was said n. 50). The other: In doubt one must stand for the value of the act (n. 51). The third: A positive precept does not oblige with grave inconvenience. Here it is useful to note: if sometimes by force of this principle you are freed from fulfilling the precept itself, a fortiori you will be able to be freed from repeating an action which you have already probably placed for fulfilling the law; otherwise the way would be opened to scruples. The fourth: In a conflict of laws, the higher law is to be preferred to the lower. Hence, in invincible doubt whether the recitation of the Office, or the hearing of Mass, is going to harm health, you are held to nothing, because the law or right of preserving health prevails (III, 335, 1036; IV, 154).

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract IV. On Conscience, Ch. VI, Article I. On The Notion Of The Individual Systems · Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract IV. On Conscience, Ch. VI, Art. II, § 2. On Equiprobabilism

Objections Are Solved

n. ¶99.

OBJ. 1. From that principle, An obligation is not to be imposed unless there is certain evidence concerning it, a twofold conclusion is deduced: 1. Whenever law has not proved its existence, it is nothing for the human will, and thus every doubtful law is a null law. 2. Whenever law ceases to prove its existence, it too ceases for the human will, and thus every law which, once certain, has become doubtful by the lapse of time, loses the force of obliging and is to be held as nothing. Thus Gury, I, n. 79 (ed. 16).

Resp. 1. Retort the conclusion. Therefore similarly liberty, whenever it ceases to prove its existence, ceases to exist; therefore a Superior, whenever he ceases to prove his right, ceases to possess his right; therefore whenever someone ceases to prove his innocence, his innocence ceases to exist. These consequences are certainly false; therefore the antecedent also is false.

I deny the parity. For positive law (concerning which alone the matter is here), once promulgated and known, obliges, and continues to oblige as long as its cessation has not been proved: for it is of the nature of law that it remain (H. Ap., app. 3, n. 74; IV, 174). Hence the argument is to be made thus. Whenever the existence of law is not proved, it is nothing for conscience. Therefore, by parity, whenever the cessation of a certain law is not proved, there is no cessation for conscience. For just as obligation depends on certain knowledge of the law, so de-obligation depends on certain knowledge of de-obligation.

INST. No one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept. But concerning a law doubtfully ceasing there is no knowledge. Therefore.

Resp. Distinguish the major. That is, no one is bound by any precept unless he knows himself to be held, whether directly or indirectly, I concede; unless there is evidence of a direct obligation, I deny. All theologians teach that an indirect obligation must be admitted. But truly, in the case, there is very good evidence of an indirect obligation, as is clear from the proof of the thesis. Therefore there is present the knowledge required for the obligation of the law.

OBJ. 2. An obligation which has probably been satisfied is no longer a certain obligation; therefore it is doubtful; therefore null.

Resp. Distinguish the major. If the law has been probably satisfied in such a way that it is quasi morally certain (either because all conjectures are in favor of liberty, and none to the contrary, or because the reasons for liberty are notably more probable), I concede; if conjectures are had in each part so that it is probable that you have satisfied, and equally probable that you have not satisfied, I subdistinguish: it is no longer a certain obligation directly, I concede; indirectly, I deny.

Hence St. Alphonsus (2 El. qq. ref., n. 1): "If someone probably judges that he has fulfilled a vow, the Canonical Hours, or a penance, whether he is now bound to satisfy if it is still probable or doubtful that he has not fulfilled? Several authors deny; but the opposite must be held, because the obligation already contracted possesses, until it shall certainly have been fulfilled." Cf. Conf. dir., I, 12; V, 9; XV, 17.

N. B. St. Alphonsus sometimes distinguishes doubt from probability, and says that in doubt concerning the cessation of a law the law is to be observed; but otherwise, if a probable opinion is present. Book III, 112, q. 3, Second opinion; ibid., 290, word Notandum.

This ambiguity vanishes if one attends to the fact that the Holy Doctor understands in the former case strict doubt, namely when there are two opinions almost equally probable; but in the latter case a uniquely probable opinion, as is plain from the context, and from book I, 67 at the end, and 71, likewise book III, 562.

OBJ. 3. No small difficulty arises from the application of the principle which is commonly called the principle of possession. For in many questions it does not immediately appear whether law possesses or liberty.

Resp. This difficulty can by no means bring it about that the principle itself is not legitimate. For it is proper to a moral matter that it involve many obscurities and difficulties. Nevertheless, in the present case the difficulty is not so great as is proclaimed. St. Alphonsus establishes on this matter the following general rule: "Presumption or possession stands for that part which is not bound itself to prove the fact, but transfers the burden of proving it to the other" (cf. n. 47). Now, the application of this rule, in most cases, is easy, since it is enough to ask whether my liberty, as to this case, has already been bound or not. If it has not yet been certainly bound, liberty itself possesses, and it belongs to the law (that is, to reason acting the part of the law) to prove its existence, or promulgation. But if liberty has certainly been bound, the law (or legislator) possesses, in which case the burden lies on me of proving my liberation. But if finally the matter, all things having been weighed, remains obscure, let benignity and charity prevail; for where law doubtfully possesses, liberty certainly possesses.

n. ¶10.

Thesis III

In the concurrence of an opinion certainly more probable for the law, it is not lawful to follow a less probable one for liberty.

The thesis is against those probabilists who patronize liberty too much. It can also be stated thus: It is not lawful to follow an opinion for liberty if the opposite for the law is certainly or notably more probable. In the state of one opining concerning the existence of a law, the law is to be observed. It is not lawful to follow an opinion known certainly to be less probable.

The SENSE OF THE THESIS, after those things which we have said (n. 70; 73, note; 75), is sufficiently clear. Therefore an opinion certainly more probable is that which, without any hesitation, we recognize as more probable. For this a notable excess is required, that is, a grave one, but a most grave excess is not required. Finally, in order that an opinion be certainly more probable, it is not necessary that it be held so commonly by doctors, but it suffices that someone, after a proportionate weighing of the arguments, holds it, by subjective judgment, to be certainly more probable.¹ Ballerini, Arendt, Bucceroni, and others err, who twist the words of the Holy Doctor into another sense.

n. ¶100.

I. THE THESIS IS PROVED FROM AUTHORITY.

From undoubted documents it is evident that the Holy See, from the seventeenth century onward, gave the favor of its authority to the more probable opinion for the law.

a) Alexander VII by his exhortation brought it about that the Order of Dominicans, in the year 1656, declared war against the less probable opinion.

b) Innocent XI, as prefect of the Holy Office, by a decree of June 26, 1680, "commanded the Most Reverend Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., that he freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend by the pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully impugn the opinion of those who assert that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable."

c) Clement XI, in the year 1702, signified to the Superior General of the Society of Jesus that "the Superiors of the Society would do a thing most pleasing to His Holiness if they see to it that the Jesuits abstain from teaching and defending the opinion which asserts that the use of a less probable and less safe opinion is lawful." Cf. as to these and other very useful documents: Ter Haar, Innocentii XI de Probabilismi decreti Historia et Vindiciae; Wouters, de Minusprobabilismo (2nd ed., p. 21 ff.); Mandonnet, Revue Thomiste, 1902; Jansen, Geschichte u. Kritik in Dienste der Minusprobab.; Patuzzi, Lett., VI, p. 21.

d) Finally, the Holy See always praised with great encomia the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus. Cf. above, beginning. Who does not see that those encomia support the whole moral system of the Holy Doctor?

Our thesis agrees with the rule most received in Canon Law: We look in obscure things to what is more verisimilar (Rule 45, in 6). Now what is more verisimilar is the same as what is more probable. Each forum ought to agree, insofar as this can be done, says D'Annibale (I, 264), after De Lugo and others. As Father Schmitt (Gesch. des Probab.) concedes, this rule was commonly used before Medina.
St. Thomas favors our thesis. For from the fact that he affirms these two things: a) that probable certitude directs what is right in human acts (cf. n. 37); b) that doubt then occurs when equal reasons are given on each side, as we also noted above (n. 74), the Angelic Doctor laid the foundations of our opinion.

See above, n. 92, in what sense the words of St. Thomas are to be understood: "No one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept."

Many theologians from the last six centuries support our thesis. Hence it, just like the first (n. 91), does not lack that excellence which comes to some opinion from the weight and multitude of testimonies.

a) It escapes no one that from the thirteenth century up to the end of the sixteenth century authors almost commonly taught: the more probable opinion is practically to be followed. Corduba is witness (Quaest. mor., l. 2, q. 3), who wrote a little before Medina; the old probabilists are also witnesses.

Then, when the controversy concerning probabilism had arisen, there were not lacking doctors, and those very grave, indeed also theologians of entire Universities (for example, of Paris and Louvain), who proscribed the use of an opinion less probable and known as such.

They certainly erred by rejecting the use even of an equiprobable opinion; but they did not err wholly. Cf. Ter Haar, Innocentii XI de Probab. decr. Hist., p. 35.

b) Among theologians who opposed probabiliorism, very many teach that, in a conflict of opinions, the certainly or notably more probable one is to be followed. Before the rest let Suarez be heard (de Leg., l. 8, c. 3, n. 19): "Greater probability is a certain moral certitude, if the excess of probability is certain." Muzzarelli says the same (Reg. mor. op., in Migne, Curs. theol., XI, 1309), whom it is pleasing to cite as being especially alien to party zeal: "Some excess of reasons for one part against the other, unless it is notable, does not remove doubt. But when it has been notable, the gravity now preponderates for one part, it is now determined to one, and in that we stand." The same teach Ferdinand Rebellus, S.J.; Antonius Perez, O.S.B.; Martinus a Prado, O.P.; Franciscus de Arauxo, O.P.; Antonius Cotonius, O.M.; Passerini de Sextula, O.P.; Esparza, S.J.; Terillus, S.J.; Gabriel Daniel, S.J.; Christ. Rassler, S.J.; Benedict Schmier, O.S.B.; Ant. Mayr, S.J.; Eusebius Amort; Jos. Biner, S.J.; and several others. Cf. Ter Haar, de syst. mor. antiq. Probab., where there are more things.

c) To these finally acceded St. Alphonsus, who in the nineteenth century drew not a few theologians to his system. Cf. n. 86, 3. In the year 1878, the distinguished Ernest Muller wrote: "Equiprobabilism is today taught almost everywhere in the schools" (Theol. mor., I, 278, 3).

n. ¶101.

II. IT IS PROVED FROM REASON.

From the part of LAW, which is sufficiently promulgated.

For: law is sufficiently promulgated when concerning it there is had that moral certitude which is called broad certitude. But the law which an opinion certainly more probable favors is certain by broad moral certitude. Therefore.

Proof of the major. 1. That certitude which suffices so that it is lawful for man to follow the parts of liberty (see n. 37), certainly also suffices so that he is bound to follow the parts of law: for the same reason applies to contraries; and both natural equity and common sense itself demand that the rights of law and liberty, in an equal cause, be held equal: for each right is of itself equally holy, as being most wisely ordered and willed by the eternal law. Cf. Ami du Cl., 1900, p. 484. 2. Certitude of this kind corresponds to the nature of a moral thing, since in many cases a greater cannot be had. But if it were not sufficient for imposing an obligation, very many laws would be ineffective with respect to very many persons, and the discipline of morals would be excessively loosened (Muller, P. I, § 81, n. 10; cf. Bonacina, de Leg., D. I, q. 1, p. 7, n. 11).

Proof of the minor. "The law which an opinion certainly more probable favors," etc. This certitude indeed is had when the reasons favoring one opinion so draw to themselves the assent of the intellect that the reasons favoring the other opinion are able to introduce no longer strict doubt, but only some prudent hesitation, or broad doubt. But this obtains for an opinion certainly more probable. Therefore.

For the force and efficacy of the reasons on which the less probable opinion rests is certainly overcome, and in order to prudent assent elided, by the stronger reasons of the opposite opinion, which alone for that reason perseveres as expeditely probable for practice; and although there remains a certain fear of the other part, the intellect can no longer deny assent to it, unless it dismisses at the same time the rules of prudence and logic (I, 67, 88). To the point Laymann says thus (Consc., c. 5, n. 5): "When, I say, one part of a contradiction appears more verisimilar than the opposite part, the intellect cannot dissent from that and assent to this; because this would be done without reason, indeed against reason." The same teach Esparza, Vasquez, Suarez, Lessius (in Ter Haar, de syst. mor. antiq. Probab., p. 89), Beaudouin (p. 97, 127), Farges, Storchenau, and others. See also what was said n. 75. In this controversy concerning probabilism, whatever Noldin may teach (I, n. 244, 2), attention must be paid not only to the rules of Logic but also, and first of all, to the norms which Ethics hands down. Cf. Koch, Moralth., § 36, 4, 5.

Those things which we said (n. 30 and 31) show more than sufficiently that our argument expresses the mind of St. Thomas. For in moral matter (I Eth., lect. 3) our norm is coarse certitude (that is, rude and imperfect), namely that which arises from verisimilitude, from those things which occur more frequently.

Moreover, that law is sufficiently promulgated and certain if unique probability stands for it is handed down everywhere by the gravest theologians with St. Alphonsus (cf. n. 76) and with Suarez, who teaches: "When a man probably judges one part and concerning the other does not have a probable judgment, ... then there is no doubt that the man can or must follow such a judgment" (de Poenit., disp. 22, s. 9, n. 5; likewise de Voto, l. 4, c. 5, n. 5; de Legibus, l. 5, c. 18, n. 19). But the state of mind is the same if an opinion is uniquely probable as if it is certainly more probable; for on account of this certain and notable excess above the reasons equal on each side, there is present for the law a simply grave motive, which is able to draw the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite; whence the mind is no longer involved in the state of strict doubt or suspicion, but in the state of one opining or of certitude broadly so called.

From the part of LIBERTY, which cannot prudently choose the certainly less probable opinion.

For acting prudently, moral certitude, at least broad, concerning the honesty of the action is required (cf. n. 36, 37, 40). But such certitude, for liberty, cannot be had with an opinion certainly less probable. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. "It cannot be had" either as direct or indirect certitude.

a) Not direct. For an opinion certainly less probable cannot, as certainly less probable, move the mind to prudent assent. For it is against right reason, with rectitude in the will supposed, to adhere to an opinion which is judged to approach nearer to error than to truth.

In the year 1765 he teaches these things: "It is certain that it is unlawful to follow a slightly probable opinion... The same must be said of a doubtfully probable opinion... Thus not even (according to our system) can we follow a much or certainly less probable opinion. The whole question is whether it is lawful to follow an equally or almost equally probable one." And he responds: affirmatively. Cf. Vind. Alph., I, p. 65 ff. Cf. ibid., I, p. 55.
In the same year he writes: "We do not defend the probable opinion in concurrence with the more probable, but we say that it is lawful to follow an equally probable one." In the same little work the same words return three times. Vind. Alph., I, p. 70.
In the same year (dell'Uso moder., c. 3, n. 81) he says: "So many times I have said that not only he who has evident knowledge of the law, but also he who, according to the light of reason, judges that the opinion standing for the law is notably or certainly more probable, is bound to observe it, even if there is dispute among doctors." Cf. Wouters, p. 50.
To Father Blasucci (1768): "When I know that the stricter opinion is more probable, I say that it must be followed; and in this I am opposed to the system of the Jesuits. When the strict opinion is certainly more probable to me (presso me), I must follow it." Lettere, III, n. 217.
In the year 1777 he writes: "I am not a rigorist, nor a probabilist. My opinion... is this: It is unlawful to follow an opinion favoring liberty, if an opinion of this kind rests on the sole foundation of probability. But the opinion for the law must necessarily be followed whenever it is more probable than the opposite. And hence it is why I again affirm that I am neither a rigorist nor a probabilist; but my system is such that I truly deserve to be called a probabiliorist." Lettere, III, 315.

b) Not indirect. Indirect certitude is obtained from undoubted reflex principles. But, in the present case, such principles are lacking. For the principles which are commonly invoked in favor of liberty: A doubtful law does not oblige; in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, obtain certain and firm value in strict doubt alone (cf. n. 32), as is evident from the preceding argument. Therefore.

On these things the following must be noted:

According to St. Thomas, "the whole matter of the moral virtues falls under one notion of prudence" (2.2, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3). The essential act of prudence is counsel (2.2, q. 47, a. 1; VI Eth.), through which prudence directs the election of the will (I Eth., lect. 1). The matter about which prudence is concerned is practical truth, for it is "right reason concerning things to be done"; whence its norm is that certitude which judges concerning those things which happen for the most part; for prudence is in the opinative part of the soul (1.2, q. 57, a. 4, ad 2; 2.2, q. 49, a. 1; 2.2, q. 47, a. 3, ad 2; a. 9, ad 2). See what was said above n. 31.
Since the object of prudence is practical truth, the counsel of prudence necessarily supposes and seeks conformity to right appetite. "For in those things which are toward the end," says St. Thomas (1.2, q. 19, a. 3, ad 2), "the rectitude of (practical) reason consists in conformity to the appetite of the due end." Cf. 1.2, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3. From which it follows that he acts imprudently who, given an opinion certainly less probable against the law, nevertheless chooses it, because in his counsel and in his election he has not acted conformably to the appetite of the due end. The will, by liberty of exercise and specification, can indeed choose the less probable. But in the case, this election cannot be called that of a prudent man. Cf. Beaudouin, p. 128; Ami du Cl., 1900, p. 483, where there are many useful and learned things.

St. Alphonsus sets forth our arguments in these words:

"When the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything except notably more probable. And in that case, the safer opinion will no longer be doubtful (understand this of doubt strictly taken...), but is morally or quasi morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has for itself a certain foundation that it is true. Whence then it happens that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either slightly or at least doubtfully probable with respect to the safer; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence (grave imprudence, as is read in the Dissertation of 1762), to will to follow it. For whenever it expressly appears to the intellect that truth stands much more for law than for liberty, then the will cannot prudently and without fault adhere to the less safe part; since, in that case, the man would operate not leaning on his own judgment or his own credulity, but rather through a certain effort which by his will he would inflict upon the intellect, so that it would be removed from the part which appears to him much more verisimilar, and would be bent to the part which does not appear true to him, indeed which seems not even to have a certain foundation by which it could be true." These things the Holy Doctor says in editions 6 and 7. There he unfolds more clearly and more fully what already in the year 1762, in the brief Dissertation, he had written (cf. Vind. Alph., I, p. 51).

In the little work Dichiaraz. del sist., n. 2 (1774), he argues more briefly:

"I again declare in this little work that I am not a probabilist, nor do I follow probabilism; indeed I reprove it... I say that if the opinion for the law appears certainly more probable, we are bound to follow it, for several reasons, of which the chief is this: In doubtful matters we ought to seek and follow truth. But where truth cannot be clearly found, we are bound at least to embrace that opinion which comes nearer to the truth; and so the truth itself, which obliges us to follow it, also obliges us to follow that opinion which stands for the law, when it comes nearer to that same truth." Thus also in the Monitum (1773) attached to the seventh edition, and in the last editions of the Moral Theology, n. 54 and 88. Cf. Muller, l. I, § 81, n. 9; Farges, La liberte et le devoir, VIII, p. 215 ff.

n. ¶102.

III. IT IS PROVED FROM THE DISADVANTAGES OF ABSOLUTE PROBABILISM.

Although Innocent XI by an authentic act gave favor to our thesis (cf. n. 100), nevertheless he never wished to mark with censure this proposition: "It is lawful to follow a less probable opinion which is truly probable" (in D'Annibale, I, n. 263, note 2). And indeed this proposition is very well explained in an equiprobabilistic sense, if the matter concerns an opinion a little less probable, and if a truly probable opinion is understood as it is defined by St. Alphonsus (cf. n. 75). Nevertheless, if it is explained in the sense of absolute probabilism, concerning an opinion certainly and notably less probable, this system of itself furnishes occasion to laxism. This can be proved both from the method which it uses in judging probability, and from the very principles on which it rests.

From the method. Those who follow absolute probabilism attend only to the probability of the benign opinion, and this absolute, and suspend judgment concerning the safer opinion. Very many probabilists teach this in set words; and what they teach is a consequence of the very doctrine which they defend. And indeed, if even the certain preponderance of the adverse opinion matters nothing, judgment concerning it can now be passed over, nor is there any reason why this opinion should be weighed. But "such a voluntary suspension of judgment" (these are the words of St. Alphonsus) "has annexed to itself a certain vincible, indeed affected, ignorance" (I, 65). Hence, not from a prudent weighing of opinions, but from voluntary ignorance of the opinion which favors the law, the probability of liberty is affirmed. Cf. Istr. e prat., I, 53; Vind. Alph., Apologetic Dissertation, n. 105, 106.
From the principles. The first principle of the probabilists, which implicitly underlies the diverse reflex principles which they bring forward, is this: He who acts probably acts prudently. Now this principle does not provide, by itself alone, a sufficient foundation for forming a certain conscience, since the probability alone of an opinion renders us in no way certain concerning the honesty of the action (cf. n. 36, 37). Indeed, he who relies on an equilibrated probability does not even act probably, but doubtingly and rashly, since amid equality of motives and arguments there is room only for doubt (I, 65, 97).

The other principle is: A law against which grave probability stands does not oblige, because it is uncertain. But this principle too labors under a defect. For not every probability fighting against the law, even if, from reasons considered in themselves, it seems grave, therefore renders the law doubtful; but only an opinion equally or almost equally probable, as was shown sufficiently and more than sufficiently (cf. above n. 67 and 75, end). "That opinion," says St. Alphonsus, "which stands for liberty, when it enjoys equal probability with the opposite which stands for the law, introduces a grave doubt whether the law exists which prohibits the action" (I, 56).

But that the aforesaid method and the aforesaid principles of themselves furnish occasion to laxism will become not obscurely known to one seriously weighing the matter. For, since the method denies that the probability of the adverse opinion must necessarily be weighed, it can easily happen that solid probability is undeservedly adjudged to an opinion which favors liberty; and since, on the other hand, the principles of the system permit the use of a less probable opinion, who does not see that very many opinions, in themselves or at least with respect to their opposites only slightly or doubtfully probable, will be judged by many as truly probable and lawful in practice? That this can happen is to be judged all the more certain because each one easily assents to those things which please him. Therefore.

Hence the solicitude and complaints of Alexander VII, after that broad probabilism had especially prevailed; cf. n. 86, 5.

Nor less decisive is the judgment of St. Alphonsus: "The authors of the past century held this opinion (of absolute probabilism) almost commonly, but we say that it is lax, and cannot be lawfully embraced" (H. Ap., I, 31; Apolog., 1769, n. 2).

Elsewhere the Holy Doctor has these things: "Deservedly many opinions of some ancient casuists have been condemned; I add, in my judgment, many still remain to be condemned" (dell'Uso moderato, c. 6, n. 16).

Note. Moderate probabilists (cf. n. 85, 4) have long since labored (and indeed not without fruit) so that they might meet these disadvantages. Yet there still remains, in our judgment, a hidden danger in their manner of proceeding, insofar as the principles which they use can of themselves lead the incautious to this conclusion: only a (truly) certain law binds the will. Cf. the words of the distinguished Noldin, I, n. 236, at the end. How much more securely do those act who follow to the exact rule those norms which St. Alphonsus finally established! For these norms (notwithstanding the decree concerning "nothing worthy of censure") in the year 1807 were subjected to a new examination, when the Positio concerning the Prudence of our Saint was instituted: cf. Wouters, p. 49. See below, n. 107.

n. ¶11.

Objections Are Solved

n. ¶103.

OBJ. 1. There is no obligation unless there is certain evidence concerning it. But there is no evidence concerning an obligation against which true and solid probability fights. Therefore.

Resp. Distinguish the major. There is no obligation unless there is certain evidence concerning it, by certitude at least broad, I concede; unless there is certain evidence concerning it by strict certitude, I deny. Otherwise not even the most probable opinion fighting for the law would have the force of obliging, and consequently whenever some broad doubt concerning the law remained, the nullity of the law would always have to be pronounced: which would be intolerable laxism.

Likewise I distinguish the minor. If there is not given an opinion certainly more probable for the law, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Because from the natural precept of choosing the part which evidently comes nearer to the truth, the law certainly more probable already obliges, as being sufficiently promulgated.

OBJ. 2. He who follows a truly probable opinion acts with grave reason. Therefore he does not sin.

Resp. In the hypothesis, he acts with a grave reason, which is certainly overcome by a graver one. Hence he acts against right reason, as has been proved. For, as St. Thomas says: "Those morals are called good which agree with reason; but evil, which disagree from reason" (1.2, q. 100, a. 1).

INST. It is false that the lesser probability is elided by the greater, namely when both receive their force from diverse principles. But this almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions, as St. Alphonsus himself concedes (Diss. 1755, n. 13). Therefore.

Resp. Distinguish the major: if the discourse is concerning speculative elision, let it pass; if concerning practical elision, I subdistinguish with the same Holy Doctor (ibid., note): If the excess is not notable, I concede; otherwise, I deny. For even if the motives and principles of each opinion are disparate, and can, as such, preserve their intrinsic force, nevertheless the conclusions, that is, the opinions themselves, are not only disparate, but for the most part contradictory to each other, since one affirms the very thing which the other denies, that is, the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the act. Therefore when one certainly surpasses the other, this latter is practically elided, that is, at least in order to forming conscience; in other words, it no longer provides a sufficient foundation so that we may act prudently (cf. n. 75 and 101).

OBJ. 3. The arguments of equiprobabilism for the use of the less safe opinion are the same as the arguments of simple probabilism, and logically lead to permitting a truly probable opinion, even if it is certainly less probable; because, namely, even then the law is doubtful.

Resp. The same objection was made to St. Alphonsus, who responds thus: "To this opposition I have already forestalled an answer in my book, establishing that, where there is a more probable opinion for the law, then the law is morally promulgated, and therefore obliges, notwithstanding that broad doubt for the more benign opinion. For where we do not find certain truth, we must follow that opinion which approaches more closely to truth; but, on the contrary, where opinions are equally probable, the law is truly doubtful with a strict doubt, so that in no way can the law then be said to be sufficiently promulgated" (I, 88; ed. G., p. 69). Certainly only in strict doubt is the existence of the law invincibly unknown, but not in broad doubt, or in the state of one opining.

OBJ. 4. He who proves too much proves nothing. But from the thesis, all probabilists would have to be held as laxists, many of whom indeed were of the best note, and existed as distinguished theologians. Therefore the thesis is false.

Resp. I concede the major; I deny the minor. The thesis is not directed against all probabilists. For there are those who professed probabilism not closely determined, and to be benignly interpreted in a good sense. These permitted the use of the less probable opinion, understanding beneath this a little less probable; indeed, several expressly taught this, as is evident from what was said (n. 100). Moreover, many, even if they profess too benign a system, nevertheless in the solution of individual questions and cases are grave theologians, by no means laxists.

OBJ. 5. It is better to err in mercy than in severity. Therefore probabilism, as being more benign, is to be preferred.

Resp. Since our ways will always remain uncertain, the principle is pleasing; but I deny the consequence. Rather, it is better to err neither in mercy nor in severity, but to preserve what is just and consonant with God's providence.

OBJ. 6. The comparative method is useless. For the probability of an opinion depends on the reasons by which it is supported. But the reasons for some opinion can very well be known in themselves without comparison being made with opposites. Therefore comparison is useless.

Resp. I concede the major, distinguish the minor. Reasons can be known in themselves without comparison as to their proper nature, I concede; as to their efficacy in order to solid and expeditious or practical probability, I deny. For by reason it is clear, and by daily experience it is evident, that it often happens that an opinion which previously was judged solid and supported by certain foundations, afterward, once the reasons of the adverse part have been weighed, appears little solid, indeed relying on slight probability. And the same occurs in every controversial matter. Therefore from defect of the comparative method, a certain danger is incurred of acting from an opinion which practically is only slightly probable.

OBJ. 7. The obligation of following the opinion certainly more probable would impose an intolerable yoke. Therefore it is not given. Proof of the antecedent. That obligation carries with it the necessity of knowing the more probable opinions. But all acknowledge that more probable opinions are not easily discerned from less probable ones. Therefore.

Resp. I deny the antecedent and the consequence. To the proof, distinguish the major: that obligation carries with it the necessity of knowing the more probable opinions: an absolute necessity, which would require the greatest diligence, I deny; an ordinary necessity, which requires common and proportionate diligence in investigating truth, I concede. For all approved authors admit this diligence (n. 40, 2); and when, after moral diligence has been applied, the opinion for the law is not recognized as certainly more probable, it is lawful at once to embrace the opinion for liberty. To the minor: It is difficult to discern more probable opinions from less probable ones, if even the smallest excess must be weighed, I concede; if a small and doubtful excess can be neglected, I deny. But that this latter obtains in the Alphonsian system we have already said. Therefore no burden is imposed which goes beyond moral possibility and the rules of prudence. Add that that labor, already in most cases, has been supplied either by approved authors, or first of all by St. Alphonsus.

Note. See other objections refuted in Wouters, p. 95-132.

n. ¶12.

III. The Excellent Merit of the System of St. Alphonsus

n. ¶104.

St. Alphonsus everywhere in his moral works commemorates this distinguished dictum of the Seraphic Doctor: "Conscience too broad and too strict is to be avoided; for the first generates presumption, the second desperation; thus the first often calls evil good, the second on the contrary calls good evil; likewise, the first often saves one to be damned, the second on the contrary condemns one to be saved" (Compend. theol. ver., l. 2, c. 52).

That the rule of equiprobabilism handed down by St. Alphonsus accurately holds that middle way is already clear from what has been said (cf. n. 88 ff.).

But that it moreover surpasses the other systems in prudence, and in facility, and in authority, will be evident from what is now to be said.¹

n. ¶105.

I. The rule of equiprobabilism of St. Alphonsus is the most PRUDENT of all. For the Blessed Doctor proposes such a norm as guards against every illusion of self-love, and entirely closes the way to scruples.

It guards against the illusion of self-love. This danger threatens if someone weighs only the moments which fight for liberty, without attending to the reasons of the other part (cf. n. 67). But equiprobabilism (as the very word indicates) does not follow such a manner of acting, indeed rather it expressly rejects it.
It closes the way to scruples. For it does not impose strict equiprobabilism, but teaches that almost equal probability of opinions suffices, and that attention is not to be given to an excess of probability unless it appears certain and notable. Certainly proportionate diligence is required; but as often as

the intellect, with reasonable diligence applied according to its powers, does not clearly perceive the certain preponderance of the safer opinion, liberty remains in full possession of its right. What more accommodated to even moderate minds can be desired?

Let us hear the theologian who drew up the Votum for the concession of the title Doctor. "But I would not wish anyone to think," he says, "that Alphonsus supplied only this one thing, namely that he collected dissenting opinions and estimated them very acutely; since besides this it is certain that the solid foundations of the whole moral discipline were established through him. For all know that the question concerning the nature and use of probability is fundamental in Moral Theology.... Now, before Alphonsus, a question of this kind was so entangled that probabilists and probabiliorists, contending among themselves, very easily struck either upon the rock of laxism or upon that of rigorism. But that now in this question extremes are avoided is owed TO ALPHONSUS ALONE, who introduced that golden system of EQUIPROBABILISM, which he constantly retained and adopted in explaining moral discipline."

n. ¶106.

II. The rule of equiprobabilism of St. Alphonsus is the EASIEST of all. For two things, in every controversy concerning the lawfulness of actions, suffice:

To see whether law or liberty possesses, according to the things set forth above (n. 55). 2. To adjudge the palm to the part which possesses, unless the opinion which favors the other is evidently more probable.

YOU WILL OBJECT. It is easier to judge concerning solid and grave probability than concerning the excess of the opposite probability. Therefore the rule of probabilism is easier, which teaches that an opinion can lawfully be admitted, provided it is truly and solidly probable.

Resp. The objection is vain. For before you embrace an opinion, either you consider it alone, or you compare it with its contradictory. If the first, you sin by acting imprudently; for it is proper to imprudence, St. Thomas testifying, to judge or act while sufficient deliberation is neglected. Would you not then have to be called similar to a judge who, after hearing only one part of the litigants, and indeed the part friendly to himself, adjudged the case to that same part? (cf. n. 40, rule 2).

If the second, there is no reason why you should glory in a simpler rule; since, in order to judge your probability as theologically and relatively or comparatively grave, you must institute the same weighing of reasons standing on each side. Therefore they deceive themselves who think that the rule of absolute probabilism is simpler; for this either is not a right rule of morals, or it demands for itself the same labor as ours.

…and 4 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 3 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract IV. On Conscience, Ch. VI, Article I. On The Notion Of The Individual Systems

n. 341.

341. 4. Equiprobabilism is contained in this proposition: "In the concurrence of opposed opinions equally or almost equally probable, it is licit to follow the opinion favoring liberty whenever the doubt is about the existence of the law; but in a doubt of fact about the cessation of the law, the law continues to oblige."⁹⁹ The principal defender of this system is St. Alphonsus, who adopted it after the year 1761, although previously he taught pure Probabilism. Before St. Alphonsus this system was held by Eusebius Amort,¹⁰⁰ Rassler, Antonius Mayr, and certain others;¹⁰¹ Billuart, O. Pr. (+ 1757), already attempts to solve the arguments of the Equiprobabilists. - Besides the Redemptorists, Konings, Marc, Ter Haar, Aertnys, Wouters, and also several others adopted this system, for example Scavini, Gousset, Pruner, Muller, Simar, etc., and from the Order of Preachers Moran,¹⁰² Saralegui,¹⁰³ Beaudouin, etc.¹⁰⁴ It agrees with Probabiliorism in this, that 1. a man ought to follow an opinion certainly more probable and favoring law, and that 2. he can follow an opinion certainly more probable and favoring liberty. But it differs from Probabiliorism with respect to opinions equally or almost equally probable, in which according to Probabiliorism the law must be observed; but according to Equiprobabilism a distinction is necessary by applying the principle of possession: if there is question of a doubt about the cessation of law, the law possesses, and therefore is to be observed (so also Probabiliorism teaches); but if there is question of the existence of law, then liberty possesses, and a man is not bound to observe such a law (Probabiliorism does not admit this). The matter becomes clearer by examples: On the night of Friday someone doubts what hour it is. It is equally probable that midnight has already passed and that it has not yet arrived. According to Equiprobabilism, then it is not licit to eat meats, because the doubt is about the cessation of law and therefore the law possesses. If entirely the same case with the same circumstances occurred on the night of Thursday, it would be licit to eat meats, because then liberty possesses. Another example: He who thinks that he has probably fulfilled the obligation of a vow he has made is not freed from the obligation. The reason is that a vow certainly made is not fulfilled by a doubtful fulfillment; therefore the vow possesses. Other examples: He who probably recited the Breviary, or paid the sacramental penance, or confessed his mortal sins, is again bound to perform those acts. The reason is the same: the law possesses, and a certain law is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment. Especially with respect to the confession of sins, Equiprobabilism differs from Probabilism, which does not oblige to confession if sins are: a) doubtfully grave; b) doubtfully committed; c) doubtfully confessed. Equiprobabilism, however, demands confession if mortal sins were doubtfully confessed, because then the law of confession possesses. On the contrary, he who with equal probability thinks that he made or did not make a vow is bound to nothing; he who with equal probability thinks that he did not commit some sin, or that the sin committed was not grave, according to the strict principle of Equiprobabilism is not bound to confession, because liberty possesses. In the two last cases, however, confession is counseled.

⁹⁹ Cf. Aertnys-Damen, Theol. mor. I, n. 85.

¹⁰⁰ St. Alphonsus himself cites Eusebius Amort for his system (Breve dissertazione dell' uso moderato dell' opinione probabile 1762, apud Wouters, de Minusprobabilismo p. 50). But that St. Alphonsus taught Equiprobabilism and not pure Probabilism, at least from the year 1762, is historically certain and is manifestly drawn from the letters of the Holy Doctor; cf. below n. 347.

¹⁰¹ Cf. E. Muller, Theol. mor. l. 1, § 81; Ter Haar, De systemate morali antiquorum Probabilistarum p. 21 sqq. (Paderborn 1894).

¹⁰² Theol. mor. I, n. 128 sqq.

¹⁰³ Comm. al P. Laraga n. 96.

¹⁰⁴ Tract. de consc. (1911) p. 99, 138.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract IV. On Conscience, Ch. VI, Art. II, § 2. On Equiprobabilism

n. 347.

347. Arguments for Equiprobabilism. a) From the authority of St. Alphonsus. Without any prudent doubt St. Alphonsus de Ligorio, Doctor of the Church, defended this system, and before him already certain other theologians, and after him several theologians, and those most noble, both Redemptorists and outsiders, as was said above. But those modern theologians who by right and wrong contend that St. Alphonsus was a pure Probabilist waste oil and labor.¹⁴¹ For the Holy Doctor himself in express words affirms not once but several times that he is not a Probabilist, but reproves Probabilism.¹⁴² But whether St. Alphonsus was always an Equiprobabilist, or only from the year 1762, theologians are not agreed.¹⁴³ In moral matters, however, the authority of St. Alphonsus is very great, as is clear from what was said above in n. 7.

b) From reason. Equiprobabilism differs little from Probabiliorism. The only difference consists in this: that it admits liberty of acting and excuse from the observance of law when a strict doubt is present concerning the existence of a law, against which equally probable reasons militate. Probabiliorism indeed does not admit this. But since this difference is of little moment, almost all the arguments which are brought from reason for Probabiliorism are valid also for Equiprobabilism. In addition, the following argument is added: If there is question of equally or almost equally probable opinions, a doubt strictly so called is present, in which the mind remains uncertain and properly assents to neither contradictory part. But the law in that case is so doubtful that it merits no assent and produces no obligation. The same argument is proposed in this way by Wouters:¹⁴⁴ "Since an opinion which favors liberty is equally probable as the opinion which favors law, directly there is given no reason on account of which one rather than the other ought to be assumed as the norm of acting, nor can an indirect reason be assigned on account of which the preceptive ordering, or duty, should be favored rather than the permissive ordering, or right. But where the matter stands thus, it is licit, with attention given to the benignity of God Almighty, to suppose that the more benign opinion, that is, the one which favors liberty, is to be held as the norm."

¹⁴¹ Almost all authors who are attached to no school candidly testify that St. Alphonsus taught Equiprobabilism at least from the year 1762. Hence Bellesheim deservedly says: "Since the letters of the Saint have been available, it should no longer be disputed that from 1762 until his death he continuously presented and steadfastly defended Equiprobabilism as his doctrine, and indeed not out of mere caution, but from conviction and impulse of conscience." Ant. Koch says: "Liguori was generally regarded as an Equiprobabilist until in the year 1863 A. Ballerini, S.J., first attempted to prove that the Saint had been a simple Probabilist. The fact ... can be misunderstood and denied only by one who works in the interest of a party" (apud Wouters, De Minusprobabilismo 56). - Francois de Paul Blachere says: "The probabilists have taken the habit of placing themselves under his patronage, but how wrongly!" (Revue Augustinienne 1905, 484.)

¹⁴² Thus St. Alphonsus writes in the letter to Remondini on 30 June 1768: "I reject the opinion that it is licit to follow a known less probable opinion, as Busembaum, Lacroix, and almost all the Jesuits say, who admit the less probable opinion." And in the letter of 9 December 1759 he writes: "The Jesuits commonly defend that we can follow a less probable opinion; but I defend that when the opinion favoring the law is known to be more probable, we ought to follow this and it is not licit for us to follow the less probable; concerning which matter the Jesuits have complained to me." (See several other similar places apud Wouters l. c. 53 sqq.)

¹⁴³ "St. Alphonsus never firmly adhered to Probabilism, and he followed that system from obedience rather than from his soul; and this is so true that, when the Holy Doctor was in the greatest danger of life in the year 1756, that one thing cast fear into him, that he had patronized Probabilism. In the year 1756 - so Melchionna narrates, who had seen and heard the matter in person - our Blessed Father had fallen mortally ill within Holy Week. When he had recovered a little from the illness, our whole Nocera family came to him rejoicing. Then Alphonsus spoke thus: In this supreme danger of life into which I was brought there was nothing that held me disturbed and anxious. This alone cast fear into me, namely that I followed the probable opinion; but the obedience which had to be given to the director required that" (apud Wouters l. c. 49-50).

¹⁴⁴ L. c. 147.

n. 348.

348. Difficulties against Equiprobabilism. Since, as appears from what was said above, there is so small a difference between Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism, all the difficulties by which the former labors press upon the latter. Besides, the fundamental principle of Equiprobabilism, "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better," is indeed true in the matter of justice, and perhaps can also be applied in other matters, as is clear from what was said above; but the application which Equiprobabilism makes of it does not seem always to be right. For if a law is strictly doubtful, that is, if equally grave reasons persuade its obligation or disobligation, liberty always possesses, which by nature and reason seems to precede law. Hence in that case to distinguish between the cessation and the existence of the law is superfluous. For in strict doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands. But the presumption stands for liberty until the obligation of the law has at least been made probable. - Finally, he seems to commit an inconsistency who teaches that the confessor ought to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow an opinion less probable and less safe, and yet on the other hand establishes that it is not licit to follow a less probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one. But thus teach St. Alphonsus¹⁴⁵ and all the Equiprobabilists after him.¹⁴⁶ Hence the Probabiliorists, such as Billuart, proceed more logically, who reprove this mode of acting on the part of the confessor.

¹⁴⁵ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 604.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. above n. 346.

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 44 passages

Vol. I, Treatise on Conscience, Ch. IV, AND ON THE EQUI-PROBABILIS…, Art. V, § I. Previous Notions · Vol. I, Treatise on Conscience, Ch. IV, AND ON THE EQUI-PROBABILIS…, Art. V, § II. Exposition of the System · Vol. I, Treatise on Conscience, Ch. IV, AND ON THE EQUI-PROBABILIS…, Art. V, § III. Proof of the System

Vol. I, Treatise on Conscience, Ch. IV, AND ON THE EQUI-PROBABILIS…, Art. V, § I. Previous Notions

n. ¶63.

- For a clearer understanding of the matters to be treated in this article, it will help to premise certain notions. And indeed:

I. Concerning liberty and law.

1° A twofold liberty is distinguished: one physical, and it is the force of choosing one's actions, concerning which we treated in nn. 4, 8, and 9; the other moral, involving the right and power of licitly doing or omitting something. Hence physical liberty, or liberty of choice, is also called liberty from necessity; but moral liberty is called liberty from law. In this place, as is clear, the dispute is about moral liberty.

2° Law is the bond of liberty, obliging it to certain acts and prohibiting it from certain others.

n. ¶64.

- II. Concerning doubtful law.

Law can be doubtful in two ways: 1° Simply, that is, with respect to existence, namely when it is doubted whether it has been enacted; whether promulgated; whether the time of obligation has already begun; whether it comprehends such a case or such a burden; whether it extends itself to such persons; whether it commands something or only counsels it.

2° In a qualified sense, that is, with respect to cessation, when the existence of the law is certain, and a doubt only supervenes whether its obligation has ceased; whether someone has an excusing cause; whether he has been dispensed; whether he has fulfilled the law, and so forth.¹

n. ¶65.

- III. Concerning the possession of law and of liberty.

Since St. Alphonsus applies to liberty and to law the known principle of law: "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better," we must explain what that possession of liberty and of law means for itself.

This possession signifies here, the due proportion being observed, exactly the same thing as in the matter of justice; for by analogy it is extended from the matter of this virtue to the matter of the other virtues. For the understanding of this matter, the principle of presumption must be explained by us: "In doubt one must stand for that part for which presumption stands," as that from which the principle of possession draws its force. Presumption is defined by jurists: an anticipated proof of a doubtful thing, drawn from valid arguments and indications. It is called anticipated because presumption, before every legitimate proof (that is, a proof held by law as sufficient), takes something as true; namely, as long as the contrary is not proved, that which is presumed is held as true.

These indications are distinguished in various ways according to the diverse nature of things. One of them, which pertains to the present matter, it helps to unfold in this way: as often as something is known to exist which of its own nature perseveres until it is removed by some contrary fact, it is judged to persevere in its own condition as long as the contrary is not established, so that this judgment yields only to sufficient proof, the burden of which rests upon the other part which impugns it. But it does not yield to an arising doubt; indeed, neither does the doubt effect that even the presumed certainty itself be brought into doubt. Wherefore that which was known to exist, even while the doubt has arisen, is judged to continue and to remain entire. Thus, for example, boundary markers are presumed to be where they were before, unless they are proved to have been changed. Finally, the principle of presumption is plainly general and is accommodated to very many particular cases, the chief of which it helps to enumerate:

1° When suspicion is had concerning someone's crime, his antecedent probity, while the doubt stands, is judged to persevere as long as wickedness is not established; whence the adage: "Everyone is presumed good until he is proved evil."

2° If someone possesses an estate which another contends to be his by doubtful right, the possessor remains in possession until the competitor proves his right; because possession gives birth to a presumption of dominion; whence the axiom: "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better."

3° A law or precept concerning which it is doubted whether it is just is held as just until injustice is proved; whence the principle: "In doubt one must obey the Superior."

These things having been premised, it is permitted to hand down the following notion of possession. Just as in the matter of justice possession is called - a pre-existing exercise of dominion in a certain thing on the part of someone, with respect to another contending concerning dominion, from which possession the thing is presumed to be the possessor's until the contrary is demonstrated - so in like manner, in the matter of honesty, possession of liberty is nothing other than its antecedent certain right with respect to a doubtful law; but possession of law is its antecedent certain obligation with respect to doubtful liberation. This priority effects that, when a doubt supervenes, that which was certain first has for itself a presumption of law, and therefore transfers the burden of proving to the other part. Therefore possession in this matter is taken analogically for any certain right preceding a doubt; whence it follows that the force and sense of the principle of possession can be rendered in this way: "A preceding certain right is not taken away by a supervening doubt, but perseveres until the cessation of the same is proved."

From the given notion we conclude in the following way: just as in the matter of justice, where two dispute about the property of some thing, he who, when the doubt has arisen, possesses the thing is presumed to be its owner, and therefore preserves the right in the thing until the contrary is proved; so in the matter of honesty, as often as there is a doubt between man's liberty and the obligation of law, that which was certain first is said to remain in possession until the contrary is proved.¹

n. ¶66.

- IV. Concerning reflex principles.

Some are for doubts of law, others for doubts of fact. The chief ones are those which follow.

For doubts of law. 1° In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. Moreover, that which was first certain possesses and is presumed. Hence, where liberty was first certain, but an obligation arises as doubtful, there liberty possesses; where, on the contrary, obligation was first certain, but liberation is doubtful, there the law possesses, according to the things just said. To this pertains that other principle of law: "In doubt one must stand for that part for which presumption stands"; for presumption begets moral certainty, at least broad or imperfect certainty. Cf. n. 47.

2° A doubtful law does not oblige. This is understood of a law simply doubtful, that is, with respect to existence, not however doubtful with respect to the cessation of a law certainly existing; for then the law continues to oblige, because, just as certain liberty is not taken away by a supervening doubt, so neither is a certain law. Therefore in this case the principle must be converted, and one must say: "Doubtful liberty does not liberate."¹

Hence, for example, in doubt whether sins doubtfully mortal, or mortal sins doubtfully committed, must be confessed; whether notably aggravating circumstances must be explained, there is no obligation. On the contrary, he who, certain that a mortal sin was committed, doubts whether he has already confessed it, must confess it. In like manner, one who doubts whether he has a sufficient excuse from the observance of the fast, when he cannot conveniently approach the Superior for a dispensation, is bound to observe the law, unless he prudently judges that in the case an excusing cause is probably present, while no probability stands to the contrary; for then there is imperfect moral certainty.²

As to the principle: "In doubt the safer part is to be chosen," applied to a speculative doubt concerning only the honesty of the action, it is proper to the rigorists and altogether false, as will be proved clearly below. It is true in this case alone, when practical doubt is not laid aside or cannot be laid aside, as we showed above in Article III.

n. ¶67.

- For doubts of fact. 1° In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. That principle proceeds when doubt concerns the principal fact, for example whether you emitted a vow, whether you confessed, etc.

Hence a doubt of law resulting from a doubt of fact must be resolved according to the diversity of the fact to be proved, according to the following rules.

a) In doubt of a fact founding the law, that is, upon which being posited the law or obligation is born, liberty possesses. Hence, for example, in doubt whether the time is present at which the law begins to oblige, you are not held by the law; whether someone is fasting, he can receive Communion; whether or not he sinned mortally, he can receive Communion without having confessed (practically [n. 60, I] contrite). Likewise, in doubt whether counsel given was directed to harm, or, if indeed this is established, whether it is doubted whether harm followed from it, no restitution is to be made after the due inquiry, of course.¹

b) In doubt of a fact supposing the law, that is, upon which being posited the law ceases or has been fulfilled, the law possesses. Hence, for example, in doubt whether the time during which the law obliges has elapsed, you are held by the law.² Likewise, if you doubt whether you have fulfilled the law, for instance whether you have recited the Hours or fulfilled penance, you are obliged, unless from a prudent reason, to which another is not opposed, you can probably judge that you have fulfilled it; for then there arises probable certainty, which, where a legal debt is concerned, suffices so that you are excused. In this way those things must be understood which St. Alphonsus says in L. I, 29-99 at the end, L. IV, 112, q. 3, Second sentence.² It is confirmed from Question I recently reformed, from which it is clear that the reformed doctrine must be restricted to the case in which probability is present for and against. As to L. I, n. 99 at the end, the passage according to the mind of St. Alphonsus seems to have to be reformed according to the cited Question I recently reformed, inasmuch as it was not corrected by the Holy Doctor through forgetfulness.

Likewise, when the debt is certain, but the fact of payment is doubtful, the debtor is bound to pay, or a composition must be made between the parties according to the proportion of the doubt.³

c) In doubt of a fact inducing a conflict of laws or rights, the stronger law prevails. By this reason, for example, a sexagenarian is excused from fasting, because the natural right of preserving life preponderates over an ecclesiastical precept. Likewise, he who prudently doubts whether the hearing of Mass in church on a feast day, or the recitation of the Office, or fasting, is not perhaps going to harm his health gravely, if he cannot conveniently seek counsel or a dispensation, is excused.⁴

2° In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act, or: In doubt every fact is presumed to have been rightly done. This principle holds when the principal fact is established and only some accessory fact is doubted, for instance concerning some circumstance or necessary condition, or concerning the due manner, whether it was present. Then, namely, this kind of accessory fact, due by law or customarily done, is presumed to have been present; its defect, on the contrary, must be demonstrated. This is customarily enunciated by the following axioms: In doubt the fact is presumed which had to be done by law, or which ordinarily is customarily done; and this other one: Delict or defect is not presumed, but must be demonstrated.¹

It is useful to clarify these axioms by some examples, so that it may appear to which cases they can be accommodated, and to which they cannot.

If, for example, someone truly vowed, but doubts whether in vowing he knew or adverted to the obligation of the vow, or whether full deliberation was not lacking, whether he did not vow compelled by fear, whether that fear was grave - one must stand for the validity of the act. But it is otherwise if doubt concerns the very emission of the vow, or whether that which someone vowed is matter capable of a vow, or whether it was not a simple proposal. Likewise in doubt whether a sacramental confession was valid: if it is doubted whether some one of the conditions required for validity was lacking, one must stand for the validity of the act, because then the fact is presumed which by law had to be done. On the contrary, if it is certain that something was lacking, even if required only probably for the validity of the sacrament, for instance knowledge of the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Redemption, or an explicit purpose, one must not stand for the validity of the act, but the confession must be repeated. For then it is certain that the fact was not done which by law had to be done; namely, the sacrament had to be received with all things required for validity, even only probably required. Hence from the reflex principles themselves it is clear that St. Alphonsus by no means fights with himself in Theol. Mor. L. III, 2 at the end, L. VI, 450 compared with n. 505.²

3° From things commonly occurring a prudent presumption is made. Hence in doubt whether boys, who before the seventh year certainly arrived at the use of reason, are held by merely ecclesiastical laws, they are not held; because the Church is presumed not to oblige except according to things commonly occurring. But after the seventh year, in doubt whether reason has been attained, they are held; because then from things commonly occurring the obligation is presumed. - In doubt concerning voluntary adherence in venereal delight, if a pious and timorous person who is not accustomed to consent doubts, he must be presumed not to have consented, at least not fully; but if he doubts who is accustomed easily to fall into mortal sins, he is presumed to have consented. - In doubt concerning the validity of the confessions of recidivists, if the recidivist after his confessions has for the most part relapsed quickly and without any resistance, he must be presumed to have had no sorrow or a too slight sorrow and purpose. But it must be said otherwise if he persevered for some time, or before the fall offered at least some resistance.¹

Vol. I, Treatise on Conscience, Ch. IV, AND ON THE EQUI-PROBABILIS…, Art. V, § II. Exposition of the System

n. ¶68.

- In the concurrence of two opinions equally or almost equally probable, of which one favors liberty and the other the law, while the doubt stands concerning the existence of the law, it is permitted to follow the opinion favoring liberty; but in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, the opinion favoring the law must be followed.²

Conditions to be observed. The use of a probable opinion favoring liberty must be moderated by the following conditions.

1° At least ordinary diligence must be employed so that the truth may be discovered; for this investigation is necessary so that ignorance may be invincible and possession of liberty may be preserved in good faith.

2° The opinion must be truly probable, that is, founded in a reason grave in itself and comparatively, even if it is a little less probable than its opposite. Wherefore an opinion is not solidly probable whenever the opposite is notably or certainly more probable. For a certain excess of probability takes away the suspension of the intellect, and consequently begets probable certainty, as we shall prove below. But in moral matters, since they must be estimated morally, strict certainty and evidence cannot be demanded, but probable certainty (that is, broad or imperfect) must suffice, as St. Thomas teaches. Therefore notable greater probability elides the comparative probability of the opposite sentence, so that this is only slightly or doubtfully probable; consequently an opinion much more probable is now not strictly doubtful, but morally or almost morally certain.³

Therefore the System of St. Alphonsus must always be kept before the eyes as proceeding only in a case of true doubt, or in the conflict of equal or almost equal probability; for an equilibrium of this kind produces a true suspension of the intellect between both parts, and therefore a true doubt, to be resolved only through reflex principles, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas:¹ "Our intellect . . . sometimes is not inclined more to one thing than to another, either because of a defect of things moving it, as in those problems concerning which we do not have reasons, or because of the apparent equality of those things which move it to each part: and this is the disposition of one doubting, who fluctuates between the two parts of a contradiction." But the System does not proceed when either one opinion is notably more probable than the other, or there is a single probable opinion. For in that case there is not strict doubt, but a sufficient motive, in moral matters determining the intellect to give assent to such an opinion and to follow it as sufficiently certain.

Then, when one opinion is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, it can only be notably more probable.² Therefore no one is bound to embrace an opinion as long as he does not in the least doubt concerning its greater probability.

3° Liberty must be in possession against the law, that is, according to what was said above in n. 65, the certain right of liberty must precede the doubtful law.

n. ¶69.

- It helps in this place to clarify two locutions of St. Alphonsus.

1° The Holy Doctor sometimes says that a law, in order to oblige, must be certain and manifest;³ but sometimes he says that it obliges, although it is not altogether certain, provided it is notably more probable.⁴ Yet in no way does he contradict himself. For a twofold moral certainty, of which the Holy Doctor speaks here, must be distinguished, namely one strictly so called, or perfect, which is evidently deduced from certain principles of morals; and one broadly so called, or imperfect, whose arguments, even if they do not beget evidence, nevertheless so convince that the opposite remains only doubtfully or slightly probable. The former is not required in moral matters, but the latter suffices. Hence the sense of his words is that the law, in order to oblige, must indeed be certain and manifest, but that broad certainty suffices, without need of strict certainty. In the same way we say that an opinion notably more probable is morally certain.

2° Sometimes he distinguishes doubt from probability, and says that in doubt concerning the cessation of the law the law must be observed, but otherwise if probability is present. This ambiguity vanishes if it is attended to that the Holy Doctor understands in the former case strict doubt, namely when there are two opinions almost equally probable according to the doctrine of St. Thomas already related in n. 68; but in the latter case an opinion which alone is probable, or whose opposite rests on no reason.

That the system expounded is the genuine system of St. Alphonsus is luminously proved by Vind. p. 1-125. 2nd ed., T. I, p. 453 sq.

Vol. I, Treatise on Conscience, Ch. IV, AND ON THE EQUI-PROBABILIS…, Art. V, § III. Proof of the System

For the sake of clarity and order, we divide the subject matter into three parts, demonstrating the System 1° by parts, by intrinsic and extrinsic arguments; 2° as a whole at once, from the approbation of the Church; 3° by refuting the opposite systems.

I. Proof of the System by Parts.

n. ¶70.

- The Equi-probabilism of St. Alphonsus, as is clear from its explanation, is opposed on one side to Probabiliorism, insofar as it teaches that, in the concurrence of opinions equally or almost equally probable, it is lawful to follow the less safe one, as often as the doubt is turned, as most often happens, to the existence of the law. On the other side, however, and indeed by the twin part of itself, it excludes simple and common Probabilism, insofar as it teaches that it is illicit to follow the less safe opinion in the concurrence of the safer, when 1° the latter is notably more probable, or 2° the doubt concerns the cessation of a certain law. We complete the whole matter in three propositions.

PROPOSITION I.

n. ¶71.

- It is not permitted to follow the less probable opinion for liberty in concurrence with a notably more probable one for the law.

Proof I. From reason. - For in the case posited, on one side the opinion for liberty does not appear truly probable; and on the other side the law is not truly doubtful. Hence it follows that the reflex principles of Probabilism cannot be applied here, since they proceed only in doubt; for they are: "A doubtful law does not oblige. - In doubt the condition of the possessor is better."

I say: 1° The opinion for liberty does not appear truly probable. - That opinion is truly and readily, that is, notwithstanding the opposite, probable, whose motives are such that they suffice to obtain the assent of a prudent man. But the motives of the less probable sentence in concurrence with one much more probable do not suffice to obtain the assent of a prudent man, but only to introduce some fear of the opposite. Therefore a sentence of this kind is not truly and readily probable.

Proof of the minor. For 1° the force and efficacy of those motives is weakened and elided by much stronger motives, since, as St. Alphonsus says,¹ the certainly or notably more probable sentence has for itself a certain foundation that it is true, which foundation the opposite lacks.

2° No prudent person can assent to an opinion which he judges to be much more probably false than true. For assent is an act of the mind by which we judge something true or likely to be true; but the more one opinion is much more likely to be true, the more we necessarily judge this one much more probably true, but the opposite not only not probably true, but on the contrary much more probably false. Therefore we cannot prudently assent to the latter.

Therefore, although a less probable opinion considered apart can appear probable, nevertheless, compared with the opposite much more probable opinion, it certainly ceases to be probable. Wherefore St. Alphonsus writes suitably:² "A truly probable opinion is only that which has intrinsic and extrinsic foundations equally or almost equally valid as the opposite for the law, so that the law appears certainly and strictly doubtful."

I say: 2° The law is not truly doubtful. - For doubt is a suspension of assent between opposites. But in the case of the proposition assent for the law cannot be suspended. Therefore the law is not truly doubtful.

Proof of the minor. Then alone does the intellect fluctuate between two opposed parts, when motives for each part are either absent or appear equal. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas, which we related in n. 68. But in the case the motives are by no means equal, but appear much stronger for the law than for liberty. Therefore the intellect cannot deny assent to the law, though with some fear of the opposite part.¹

n. ¶72.

- Proof II. From the authority of St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor altogether favors the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, since on one side he teaches that doubt then occurs when reasons move equally or almost equally to each part, as we noted in n. 68, 2°; whence it follows spontaneously that, if reasons move much more strongly to one part, we are outside the state of doubting; and on the other side he affirms that in human acts strict certainty is not demanded, but probable certainty suffices, as we showed in n. 68 under 2. These two things agree perfectly with the thesis of St. Alphonsus.

n. ¶73.

- From the things said above we conclude: if, notwithstanding these things, the will should choose the part favoring liberty, it will choose from affection alone toward that part, not from the dictate of reason; therefore it will choose rashly and imprudently, because an election which is not led by reason cannot be free from imprudence and temerity.²

Deservedly, therefore, the Holy Doctor affirms: "This sentence" (that someone can licitly follow an opinion even less probable for liberty, although the opinion for the law is certainly more probable) "the authors of the past century almost commonly held; but we say that it is lax and cannot licitly be embraced."³

PROPOSITION II.

n. ¶74.

- When opinions almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the existence of the law, it is permitted to follow the opinion favoring liberty.

I. It is proved from reason.

The obligation of pursuing the safer part, if any were present, would come either from the part of liberty destitute of its right, or from the part of the law endowed with the force of obliging. But from neither of the aforesaid parts can the obligation arise. Therefore no obligation of pursuing the safer part is given.

Proof of the minor by parts. I. Not from the part of liberty as though destitute of its right.

This is drawn from the principle of possession: "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better," which in other words signifies: A certain right cannot be taken away by a supervening uncertain opposed right. Hence I reason thus: in doubt the possessor conquers; but liberty is in possession against every doubtful law (understand: doubtful as to existence); therefore in doubt concerning the existence of the law, liberty conquers. - The same reasoning can be proposed thus: in doubt no one is to be deprived of his own thing or his own right, which he legitimately possesses; but liberty is a legitimately possessed right; therefore on account of a doubtful law a man is not deprived of his liberty.

Proof of the major assumption. In doubt the possessor conquers. - Natural reason proclaims the truth of this axiom. For whoever certainly and in good faith possesses some thing cannot be deprived of that thing except on account of certain reasons which prove that there is no longer a right of possessing for him, since everyone who possesses is presumed to possess by right until the contrary is shown, just as no one is presumed evil unless he is proved so. Therefore until this has been proved by certain reasons, the presumption arising from possession gives a certain right to the possessor according to the principle of law: "In doubt one must stand for that part for which presumption stands." Besides, that principle has always been admitted by all in the matter of justice before all tribunals, both civil and ecclesiastical.

Proof of the minor assumption. Liberty is in possession against every doubtfully existing law. The minor assumption will stand if we have proved the following two things: 1° that the principle of possession also holds in the matter of simple honesty; 2° that man possesses liberty against a doubtful law.

As to the 1st. Both the principle of presumption, "In doubt one must stand for that part for which presumption stands," and that one, "Against a preceding certain right a doubt which has arisen cannot prevail," are plainly universal principles and of natural right. But the principle of possession taken analogically is exactly the same, as we explained above in n. 65. Therefore the principle of possession holds in any matter of simple honesty.

Besides, St. Alphonsus suitably notes: "Possession," says Sanchez,¹ "is a universal title for all the virtues, in that way in which another potential part of justice, such as obedience to God, transcends all virtues. For since the essence of justice is to render to each one his own right, this belongs to every virtue; insofar as religion renders his right to God, charity to the neighbor, temperance to oneself, and so of the others; and therefore it is deservedly said that the notion of justice is a potential, or generic, part of all the virtues, in which the other virtues agree among themselves. Wherefore, if it were against justice to deprive a possessor in doubt of his own right, it is likewise against justice in doubt of law to despoil man of his possessed liberty."¹

Notes to preceding text - note sequence 1.

1 Dec. L. I, c. 10, n. 11.

Add that the force of this principle in the matter of simple honesty is commonly admitted by Probabilists, chief among whom besides St. Alphonsus are Suarez,² Lugo,³ Sanchez,⁴ Croix, Salmanticenses,⁶ Roncaglia,⁷ Bonacina,⁸ Sporer,⁹ etc.

It will help to have noted in this place that the principle of possession admits a stricter application in the matter of justice than in the matter of the other virtues, because justice is more rigid than the other virtues. For unlike the other virtues, the mean of justice is the mean of the thing, that is, of equality of thing to thing; and the right which justice regards is a strict or rigorous right. Hence it happens that disputes concerning justice demand stricter proofs.¹⁰

As to the 2nd. God from his good pleasure created man free and afterwards imposed precepts upon him by which his liberty is restricted, according to that of Eccli.¹¹ "God from the beginning established man and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commandments and precepts."

Notes to preceding text - note sequence 2.

1 Dissert. a. 1763, n. 19. 2 In 1. 2. D. Thom. tr. 3, de bonit. et malit. act. human. Disput. 12, Sect. 5, n. 7, 8. - De Relig. tr. 6, l. 4, c. 5, n. 7 et seqq. - De Censur. Disp. 40, Sect. 5, n. 14, 15. 3 De Justit. Disp. 17, n. 87. Disp. 23, n. 110. | 4 Decal. L. I, c. 10, n. 10, 11. | 5 Lib. I, n. 502. | 6 Tr. 20, c. 6, n. 7. | 7 Tr. 1, q. 1, c. 3, q. 3. 8 De Peccat. q. 4, p. 7, n. 13. | 9 Tr. 1, n. 75. | 10 Cf. S. Alph. L. I, 36. L. VI, 905. | 11 15, v. 14, 15.

From this, in doubt concerning the existence of some law, the following argumentation can be used. The certain divine will must be preferred to the uncertain; but that God endowed man with liberty and does not will that he be deprived of his liberty insofar as some precept does not require its restriction (for that is called licit, from St. Thomas, which is prohibited by no law), is a certain divine disposition. But whether God wills that in the case of a doubtful law man renounce his own liberty is uncertain. Therefore with a safe conscience he persists in possession of the liberty with which God endowed him, until his contrary will becomes known to him.¹

Conclusion. - From the things proved there follows: 1° Since liberty is certain and prior to the law, man is presumed free in every case where the law is not established. Hence this rule flows spontaneously: "What is not certainly prohibited is licit."

2° The rule of the Anti-Probabilists is false: "Nothing is licit unless it is morally established that it was permitted by God." For if this were true, God should not have had to promulgate a law, but those things which he permits us to do.²

n. ¶75.

- II. No obligation is given from the part of the law, as though endowed with the force of obliging. - In order that the assertion may appear, the principle must be established: "A doubtful law does not oblige."

But it must be warned beforehand that the enunciated principle, taken in a too general sense, is false. For from the things proved and still to be proved in Proposition III, it is established that it must be understood of a law simply doubtful, that is, doubtfully existing. In the same way St. Alphonsus understands the principle; for he always uses it to prove that a doubtful law, as insufficiently promulgated, and therefore doubtfully existing, does not oblige.

That principle is proved: 1° From defect of promulgation and invincible ignorance. The promulgation of law in subjects is required essentially, so that the law may have the force of obliging. But where the law is doubtful, true promulgation of it is lacking. Therefore a doubtful law does not oblige.

Proof of the major. Law cannot be a rule of acting for a free being unless it becomes known to him; but it is brought to his notice through promulgation; therefore promulgation is of the essence of law.³

Proof of the minor. A law invincibly unknown to subjects is not sufficiently promulgated; but doubt of law, invincible by human study, is invincible ignorance; therefore a doubtful law is a non-promulgated law.

Proof of the minor assumption. We are said invincibly to be ignorant of those things concerning which we do not have sufficient foundation for affirming rather than denying. But such a sufficient foundation is equally lacking where the reasons for law and liberty are almost equal on each side, and where there are none, since in either case the intellect remains equally suspended. Therefore.

Note. - 1° In the argument brought forward, the Holy Doctor does not expressly distinguish the promulgation of the law made to the community from the knowledge of it in the subject. He considers the matter practically; for practically a law not becoming sufficiently known to the subject returns to the same point as a law not sufficiently promulgated.

2° You would wrongly turn back upon him the argument which he seeks from invincible ignorance, by inferring from it that even a certainly more probable law, as not certainly known, is invincibly unknown. For he holds that this law, as sufficiently known, that is, from the rules of prudence, which is a virtue of the practical intellect,¹ obliges.

2° From the principle of causality. A doubtful law obliges either certainly, or doubtfully, or in no way. But the first is impossible, because an effect cannot be greater than its cause. The second is absurd; for the will follows the intellect, and therefore unless the intellect is convinced, the will is not bound. But no doubtful knowledge necessitates the intellect to assent; therefore no doubtful law binds the will to obey. Therefore the third remains.

3° From the presumed will of the Divine Legislator. God is legitimately presumed not to will to oblige by a doubtful law when the end of creation is obtained equally. But thus the matter stands. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. The end of creation is the glory of God and the salvation of men. But each is obtained even when doubtful laws are not observed. Therefore.

Proof of the minor assumption. The glory of God as well as the salvation of men exists from the perfect obedience of men given to the divine laws. But while certain laws are observed, doubtful laws, which are believed not to oblige, even not being observed, an equally perfect submission is given to God by men. Therefore, without the observance of those laws, the end of creation is obtained equally.

Proof of this minor. Although the law exists objectively, nevertheless God does not will it to oblige proximately and subjectively unless it also exists subjectively in conscience, sufficiently known by moral diligence. But when doubtful laws are believed by the conscience of men not to oblige, men perfectly obey God from the observance of certain laws alone.¹

n. ¶76.

- It pleases us to note in this place that it is illicit to use two probable opinions at the same time in the same act, if from this one law is certainly violated. For example, a testament lacking legal form is probably valid; it also more probably is not valid. Therefore it is not permitted, by following the former sentence, to enter upon the inheritance, and at the same time, by following the latter, not to pay the legacies contained in the same testament. By this deed the observance of one or the other law is necessarily evaded, and the agent contradicts himself in the same act.²

II. It Is Proved from Authority.

n. ¶77.

- Historical notice. Disputations about the choice of opinions in practice arose after the middle of the sixteenth century. Then first came forth the System of Probabilism, whose author is reputed to be Bartholomaeus Medina, of the Order of Preachers; this System was immediately received very commonly, as the adversaries themselves confess. (Therefore if, St. Alphonsus observes, the rigid sentence, as its followers assert gratuitously, had from the beginning of the Church up to that time been in possession, how could it have happened that so quickly it was commonly rejected by the Doctors, and the benign sentence received?) In the time of Cornelius Jansenius various Systems of Anti-Probabilism came forth, among which Probabiliorism, from the influence of Jansenistic fraud, was more commonly received up to our century. But, as usually happens in controversies of this kind, extremes were avoided by neither part. For just as certain Probabilists slipped into too lax doctrines, which the Supreme Pontiffs proscribed, so also their adversaries struck upon extreme rigor, which was likewise reproved by the Holy See. For the rest, that the use of probable opinion in the matter of honesty alone has always flourished in the Church can be proved against the Anti-Probabilists by many testimonies, some of which we shall bring forward, and by no certain testimony can it be refuted. Besides, Probabilism numbers among its patrons theologians of great name. Finally, today it is received everywhere in the Church.

n. ¶78.

- I. From the testimony of the Holy Fathers. From them it is evidently shown that in doubt the safer part is not always to be followed. Thus St. Augustine: "For what is proved to be neither against faith nor against good morals must be held indifferently."¹ St. Gregory Nazianzen: "Either prove that the matter is thus, or if you cannot do that, do not condemn; but if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and ease conquer."² St. Leo the Great: "In those things which are doubtful or obscure, let us know that this must be followed which is found neither contrary to the evangelical precepts nor opposed to the decrees of the Holy Fathers."³ St. Bernard: "Indeed there each one abounds safely in his own sense, where that which is thought by him does not stand opposed either to certain reason or to an authority not to be despised."⁴

That the force of the argument sought from the Fathers may be clearer to you, go, if you please, to the cited passages of the Fathers, where, from the occasion on which the words adduced were written, you will discover that cases really probabilistic are dealt with in them. The cited words of St. Leo the Great and Bernard are general. The praised epistle of St. Augustine is wholly occupied in admonishing Januarius that he should not condemn customs observed in various regions or churches, unless they are certainly opposed to the Faith or good morals. The passage from St. Gregory Nazianzen regards the question whether it is lawful for widows after Baptism to proceed to second marriages.

n. ¶79.

- II. From the consent of the Doctors. The prince of theologians, St. Thomas, speaks thus: "The command of one governing is related to binding in voluntary matters by that mode of binding which can happen to the will, as bodily action is related to binding bodily things by the necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never introduces necessity into another thing except through the contact of the coercion itself with the thing in which it acts; hence neither is anyone bound from the command of any lord unless the command reaches him to whom it is commanded. But it reaches him through knowledge. Hence no one is bound by some precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept. . . . As in bodily things a bodily agent does not act except through contact, so in spiritual things a precept does not bind except through knowledge."¹ St. Isidore: "But the law will be manifest."² To these are added most excellent theologians who are Probabilists, as Suarez, Lugo, Sanchez, Sylvius, Toletus, Lessius, Laymann, Bonacina, the Salmanticenses, Amort, and many others.³

n. ¶80.

- From the approbation of the Works of St. Alphonsus. Recall what was said on p. lxxix, and notice that by the judgment of the Holy See itself the System of St. Alphonsus is safe, and that any other system, for example that of simple and common Probabilism, lacks a testimony of this kind.

PROPOSITION III.

n. ¶81.

- When opinions almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, the opinion favoring the law must be followed.

It is a logical corollary of the preceding proposition. For: 1° If a doubtful law, supervening upon certain liberty, does not bind the latter, by the same reason, conversely, doubtful liberty, supervening upon a certain law, does not dissolve the latter. 2° As invincible ignorance concerning the existence of a law excludes obligation, so the same ignorance concerning the cessation of the law excludes disobligation. 3° If in invincible doubt concerning the existence of a law liberty is presumed, likewise in invincible doubt concerning the cessation of a law obligation is presumed; for the rights of law and of liberty, in an equal cause, must be equal. On these causes especially the Probabilism of St. Alphonsus merits the name of Equi-probabilism, namely because it not only indicates most rightly the limits of true probability, but also favors law and liberty with an equal balance, attributing equal rights to each in the same circumstances, not using weight and weight.⁴

II. The Opposite Systems Are Refuted.

n. ¶82.

- I. Strict Rigorism. This System was condemned, proposition 3 having been condemned by Alexander VIII: "It is not permitted to follow an opinion, either among probable opinions the most probable, or among probable opinions the most probable of all." This proposition is openly false; for if the opinion for liberty is most probable of all, the opinion for the law will be only slightly or doubtfully probable; but on account of a weak motive to despoil liberty of its own certain right is openly against natural right. Therefore the System is false.

n. ¶83.

- II. Laxism. It was condemned, proposition 3 having been condemned by Innocent XI: "Generally, when relying on probability either intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability, we do something, we always act prudently"; and proposition 27, condemned by Alexander VII: "If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion must be judged probable, as long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable." Deservedly also was this doctrine condemned; for a law cannot be judged truly doubtful which is founded on so grave a reason that against it no solid reason can be brought forward, but only a slight reason or authority.

n. ¶84.

- III. Mitigated Tutiorism. As such it did not live long. It is refuted by this argumentation. If the less safe opinion is notably more probable, the opposite for the law becomes slightly or doubtfully probable; but on account of a motive only slightly or doubtfully probable to despoil liberty of its own right is certainly against natural right; therefore . . . Besides, notable greater probability for some opinion founds probable certainty of it; but in human acts probable certainty must suffice; therefore . . . Recall what was said in n. 68 under 2.

n. ¶85.

- IV. Probabiliorism. This System adds uncertain obligations to certain obligations, and thus, with the number of obligations increased, it increases the number of sins. But from the principles of Equi-probabilism it has been demonstrated that uncertain obligations are repugnant to the natural right of liberty. Therefore Probabiliorism denies to liberty the justice owed to it.

n. ¶86.

- V. Simple Probabilism. This system labors under a twofold vice. First indeed, it extends the limits of probability more than is just, by contending that an opinion can enjoy solid probability even though the opposite is much more probable, which we sufficiently showed cannot be admitted in nn. 71-73. Then Probabilism does not temper the principle by the principle of possession; hence it violates the right of possession of the law and indulges liberty more than is just. For the patrons of this System, by always defending the parts of liberty wherever the opinion is probable, use weight and weight; indeed, the arguments by which they prove that liberty is not bound by a doubtful law do not convert against liberty, where precisely the same reason has force for a certainly existing law. For if the following reasoning has force in favor of liberty where the law is doubtful - a doubtful law does not oblige, because he is not obliged who invincibly does not know himself to be obliged - the conversion of the same must necessarily be made in favor of the law when a doubt concerning liberty follows.

Finally it must be noted here that most Probabilists sustained a false principle, namely: "He who acts probably acts prudently." The vice of this principle is in this, that in order to make a certain judgment concerning the honesty of an action it relies on probability, and therefore on doubt as on a motive, but not as on a mere condition, which being posited, a certain reflex principle is employed to form a certain conscience. For when two opposite opinions are about equally probable, the motives of each elide each other's strength for determining the assent of the intellect to one rather than the other. For as much as the motives of one strive to obtain assent, so much do the motives of the other strive in the opposite direction; hence the intellect can prudently adhere to neither before the other, but necessarily remains unmoved and suspended, just as a balance remains suspended in equilibrium when equal weights are in each pan, or just as a stone, drawn in opposite parts by a double equal force, rests unmoved. Therefore he who in such a case commands assent to the opinion favoring liberty, and from it forms the ultimate dictate of conscience, acts imprudently and culpably.¹

Conclusion concerning the Practice of Probabilism.

n. ¶87.

- Up to this point we have proved that the moderate use of a probable opinion is licit. Further, now it is asked here whether it is also expedient for the salvation of souls to follow benign opinions rather than rigid ones. Concerning this the following rules are handed down.

I. In general: 1° "Where it is a question of removing a penitent from the danger of formal sin, the confessor must, generally speaking, and insofar as Christian prudence suggests" (elsewhere¹ he says more expressly: "insofar as Christian prudence concedes"), "use benign opinions." 2° "But where benign opinions render nearer the danger of formal sin, . . . then it is always expedient that the confessor use, indeed I say that he himself, as a physician of souls, is bound to use, the safer opinions, which lead penitents to be preserved in the state of grace."² Yet as to the manner let him observe this distinction: where the probable danger of sin is present only doubtfully, he is bound altogether to persuade safer opinions; but where such danger is certainly present, he is bound altogether to oblige them to be followed. Moreover, of this kind are some opinions, probable but dangerous in practice, in the matter of the Sixth Precept, concerning touches, kisses, dances, comedies, the repression of sensual motions, the avoiding of proximate occasions, readings dangerous with respect to faith or morals, and similar matters.³

II. As to perfection. Certainly it is more perfect to follow the safer opinions wherever they contain acts of greater virtue and do not give occasion to anxieties and scruples. Hence, generally speaking, we ought to counsel the use of opinions of this kind, as of counsels, when penitents show themselves prepared to follow safer things and prudence dictates that this will profit them.⁴

Objections Are Solved.

n. ¶88.

- Objections against Probabilism in general. - Some of these attack the application of the principle: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better, namely, of liberty; and you will easily refute these if you always have properly before your eyes the proper thesis of the Probabilists. For they do not ask whether liberty precedes the law insofar as it is existing in first act, but this one thing: whether it precedes the law insofar as it is actually obliging, or apprehended by conscience.⁵ The Anti-probabilists, by denying this, fall into that absurdity which we noted in n. 74, Conclusion, under 2°. - Notice besides that Probabilists do not affirm that doubtful liberty is certain in itself (which would imply a contradiction in terms), but that in doubt concerning the law liberty certainly possesses, and therefore preserves its right.

n. ¶89.

- Others attack the principle itself: A doubtful law does not oblige, and deny that it has force; either because a) in very many cases it is not doubted whether the law exists, but whether a certainly existing law comprehends this or that case; or because b) the Probabilist, by following a probable less safe sentence, is exposed to the danger of sin; or because c), according to the principle of Canon Law, in doubt the safer part must be chosen.

You will easily remove the objection under a), if you notice that a law, although certainly existing, becomes doubtful with respect to that case about which there is really doubt whether it is comprehended under the law, and therefore with respect to that case does not oblige.¹

To the objection under b):

Resp. 1° I retort the argument against the Probabiliorists: for by following the more probable opinion favoring liberty, which itself can be false, the same danger is given; therefore one would have to flee to condemned Rigorism.

2° I distinguish. It is not permitted to expose oneself to the danger of formal sin: I concede; of material sin: I deny; because merely material sin is not imputable, nor does it offend God, since it is nothing other than the matter of sin, separated from every malice of the will; but where no depraved will intervenes, no sin is present. For this reason proposition 46 of Baius was condemned: "To the reason and definition of sin the voluntary does not pertain."² But Probabilists are in danger of material sin, not of formal sin; for from the reflex principles of Probabilism we are plainly certain that a doubtful law, even if objectively perhaps it were present, is not present subjectively, or does not oblige, that is, is not a law as to us, and therefore its material transgression cannot be imputed to fault.

3° The objection of the adversaries either proves that the principle of possession cannot be applied even in the matter of justice, or it proves nothing. For in the matter of justice, if someone, after a doubt has arisen, perseveres in the use of the right which he possesses, he exposes himself to the danger of violating the natural law; but, as the adversaries confess, this danger of violating the natural law in the matter of justice does not prevent the possessor from conquering in doubt. Therefore the same has force for liberty in any other matter. - Proof of the major. For as soon as a doubt has arisen concerning the property of a thing which someone possesses, there is danger of exercising a right which perhaps belongs not to the possessor but to another, and of receiving fruits which perhaps are not the possessor's, but belong to another despoiled of his right; these two things are manifestly contrary to the natural law.

n. ¶90.

- To the objection under c):

Resp. 1° The aforesaid rule has force a) in practical doubt concerning the formal honesty of the action; b) in doubt of fact with which there is joined the danger of an evil which does not depend on conscience and which we are bound to avoid, about which we spoke in nn. 58-60. For such were the doubts to which the Canons apply that rule; for in those cases it was always a question of practical doubt, or of some evil to be avoided, independent of conscience, as St. Alphonsus clearly proves,¹ by discussing each of those cases. Besides, theologians almost commonly teach that the aforesaid rule of the Canons, as to speculative doubts, is of counsel, not of precept.

2° To the cited rule we oppose Rule 15 in the Sixth: "It is fitting that odious things be restricted and favors amplified"; the 30th: "In obscure things the minimum must be followed"; and this Canon: "Unless you have been certain of the mandate of the Apostolic See, you will not be compelled to execute what is commanded."²

n. ¶91.

- There are those who also object this: that Probabilists are not consistent with themselves, since they except from the principle, A doubtful law does not oblige, those cases which we said in nn. 58-60 must be excepted. But this is objected absurdly, since those cases are improperly called excepted, and in reality must be called cases foreign to Probabilism or not pertaining to Probabilism. For what is the case? Probabilism is occupied with doubtful law, not with certain law. But in those exceptions there is a question of cases in which some law is known certainly to exist, and the doubt is whether by those means which are employed for executing the law the end of the law, and that necessarily to be obtained, is in reality obtained, and therefore whether the law itself is really fulfilled; in which case the safer thing must always be chosen. And the reason is ready to hand: for, since the law is certain, and its execution altogether urges, those means must be used by which the end of the law is certainly, or at least more safely, obtained, and in this way satisfaction is made to the law. For he who wished to employ only doubtful means, where certain means are supplied, would deliberately commit himself to the danger of violating a known law, and therefore would sin. Therefore, where there is a certain obligation of obtaining the end, safer means for attaining this end must be used.

n. ¶92.

- Objections against Equi-probabilism.

These are reduced to three classes.

The first is of those who contend that the distinguished authority of St. Alphonsus, and one sanctioned by the Church, is invoked undeservedly for the patronage of Equi-probabilism, since, as they say, the Holy Doctor of the Church in his Dissertations for the moderate use of probable opinion openly adheres to simple Probabilism. - But how falsely this is objected, and how much this betrays either sloth in reading the works of the Saint or obstinacy in an opinion once undertaken, the things which follow show more clearly than light.

For to one looking through the writings of the Holy Doctor, and indeed the very Dissertations objected, these two things will easily become clear: first, that the Holy Doctor never adhered to simple Probabilism even in his earlier writings, but already taught Equi-probabilism implicitly; second, that in the later writings Equi-probabilism is handed down by him explicitly and systematically. Since even the adversaries themselves do not deny this second point, we dispense all the more from proving it, because the nature of our Compendium does not allow useless discourse (see, for the rest, what was said in n. 73, § Deservedly, and, if you wish, the Vindiciae¹). Therefore it remains that we prove the first. Let the following arguments suffice.

The 1st is sought from the very inscription of the Dissertations, even the two earlier ones, which especially are objected. Namely, the inscription is this: "Dissertation . . . for the moderate use of probable opinion." But the epithet moderate, which the Holy Doctor was the first to use, and certainly not without some reason, sufficiently intimates that Probabilism circumscribed by certain limits is defended by him, and that not only by those by which it is distinguished from condemned Probabilism, but by those by which it is discerned from simple Probabilism. For you see the same epithet placed in the title of the later Dissertations, in which Equi-probabilism is explicitly defended.¹ This argument, although by itself it would not seem to complete the matter, receives force from the following.

The 2nd argument is sought from the little work published by the Holy Doctor in the year 1765, whose title is: "Appendice all' Apologia" (1764), "in risposta all' autore della Regola de' costumi."² In this little work the Holy Doctor writes these things pertaining to our matter: "Speaking of our controversy, in which the question is of two equally probable opinions," etc. Then a little below he adds: "My sentence," namely that very one which he embraces concerning two opinions equally probable, "I examined and recalled to the balance for thirty years and more, . . . often conferring concerning the reasons both of one part and of the other, with Probabilists and Probabiliorists." . . . Therefore, unless you should wish to charge the most holy man with a lie (which God forbid!), it will be necessary to admit that he, at least from the year 1735, and even throughout the very 14 years which preceded the first Dissertation (1749), had already adhered to Equi-probabilism. For in the cited little work, or in the year 1765, the Saint affirms two things: one, that he is an Equi-probabilist; the other, that he had been an Equi-probabilist for 30 years and more. Therefore already long before the first Dissertation, and certainly at that time at which he wrote this first Dissertation, namely in the year 1749.³

The 3rd argument is drawn from the Dissertations of the years 1749⁴ and 1755,⁵ or from those very ones which especially are opposed.

For in these, to the axiom objected to him, "greater probability elides the lesser," the Holy Doctor responds, "that it is false that greater probability elides the lesser, unless when that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has for itself so convincing an argument that the contrary opinion seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. Yet otherwise it must be said, if the excess is not notable, and the opposite probability receives force from diverse principles (as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions)." Therefore St. Alphonsus clearly and distinctly teaches that the use of a probable opinion for liberty is licit in concurrence with a more probable one; but only in that case in which the excess is not notable, such as also is the evident excess of only one degree, as the Saint teaches elsewhere.¹²

That we not be longer, we send the reader to the Vindiciae,³ where difficulties are dissolved which are opposed against these three arguments from the writings of the Saint, admonishing our readers of this one thing: that, mindful of the rules of sound criticism, they seek the sense of the Holy Doctor, where his earlier writings seem to fight with his later ones, from these later writings and not from the earlier; and that in the earlier writings, in which he attacks the Probabiliorists, they attend to the purpose of the writing.

n. ¶93.

- The second class of objections comprehends those difficulties which are opposed to Equi-probabilism insofar as it favors the law when the latter is notably or certainly more probable. Namely, the adversaries say that nothing prevents the opinion for liberty from remaining truly and solidly probable even in the case in which the opposite opinion for the law is notably or certainly more probable, provided the more probable reasons which fight for the law are not taken from the same motives from which the reasons for liberty are taken.

But those who argue thus do not attend to the following things.

1° They do not attend to the nature of probability. For a probable opinion is that which rests upon a foundation which has force to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, or is consistent with the prudence of the agent (n. 52). But prudence requires that, where the truth cannot be clearly found, we embrace that opinion which is undoubtedly known to approach nearer to truth.⁴

2° They do not attend to the inclination implanted in the human mind itself. For where truth cannot be known certainly, the intellect spontaneously embraces what it clearly perceives to approach nearer to the truth; so that he who preferred the less probable opinion to another certainly more probable one would satisfy the will, wherefore he would not act consistently with reason, nor prudently, nor therefore well. See the words of St. Alphonsus cited in n. 73, § From the things said above.

3° They do not attend to the true sense of the reflex principles: "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better," and "A doubtful law does not oblige." For those principles have force only in a true or strict doubt (n. 48, 1 and 68, 2°), or in a perfect suspension of the intellect between each part of a contradiction. This perfect suspension is lacking where the intellect without any hesitation knows one opinion to approach nearer to certainty than the other. Hence St. Alphonsus¹ says: "when an opinion is certainly more probable, in that case, . . . although the law is not altogether certain, nevertheless because of that greater probability, the opinion for the law seems morally truer, and consequently the law also seems morally or sufficiently promulgated; and therefore the law cannot then be called altogether doubtful, with strict doubt; in that case there remains only some broad doubt, which does not permit one to depart from the safer opinion." - You have almost the same in Scotus² in these words: "Since to many the negative part is more probable, someone exposes himself to doubt not without sin, by following the less probable affirmative." Likewise in Suarez³ in these other words: "Greater probability is a certain certainty, if the excess of probability is certain."

4° They do not attend to the twofold mode by which greater probability can elide lesser probability. For one is absolute, by which namely the probability of one proposition is so destroyed by the probability of another that it no longer exists either in itself or relatively; this happens when the probability of contradictory propositions is sought from the same motives. The other, however, is relative or moral, consisting in this, that one probability by reason of the manifest preponderance of reasons takes away from another the force of moving the intellect to a prudent assent.⁴

…and 4 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 45 passages

Vol. II, Appendix. Excursus: On the Systems of Moralists concerning Solving Doubt of Conscience

Since the right formation of conscience is made by varied application of principles, it is not strange if the doctrine on this matter did not exist from the beginning perfect and complete, but was slowly elaborated.

I. Among the Fathers no definite system is found; nevertheless there are traces of principles which can serve for forming conscience.

Frequently they rather favored the safer part. Namely the safer is to be taken in choosing religion (Lact., De Div. Inst. III, 13), in avoiding danger of nullity in the administration of the sacraments (Aug., De B. c. Don. I, c. 3, n. 5), in admitting the whole truth of faith without regard to the empty opinions of heterodox persons (Greg. Naz., or. XXXVI, 7; Chrys., In II Cor., hom. XIII, 4; Aug., De util. cred. XI), in conforming oneself through all things to the divine law (Tertul., De spect. XX-XXI), in striving to inquire into truth (Aug., De Civ. Dei, l. XXII, 23), in certainly establishing necessary penance for sins and avoiding the uncertainty of penance at the end: "hold the certain and dismiss the uncertain," Augustine cries, serm. 393. He also inveighs against the Academics (l. III, n. 35-36) who say: "when each one does what seems probable to him, he neither sins nor errs," who understood probability as merely subjective and empty, which each one fashioned for himself.

Even outside these cases, they quite generally favored the safer part, both because of the rigorous penitential discipline of those times and because ignorance of law was regularly held by many as culpable (cf. Aug., ep. 194).

On the opposite side, however, certain more benign solutions are found, for sometimes they did not urge an uncertain obligation in practice.

Lactantius says that one must not care about the precepts of the philosophers, as being mere conjectures without solid foundation; on which occasion he writes: "It belongs to a most foolish man to wish to obey their precepts, concerning which it is doubted whether they are true or false; and therefore no one obeys, because no one wishes to labor toward what is uncertain" (De Div. Inst. III, 27).

Gregory Nazianzen, or. XXXIX, 19, replies to the rigorists who did not wish the baptized to be admitted to penance: "Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity prevail."

Thus Jerome, in the question concerning bigamists to be ordained, permits an uncertain and less safe opinion to be embraced, "prejudging no one from following what he wishes" (Adv. Ruf. I, 32). And Theodoret repeats the same (P. G. LXXXIII, 136 B C).