§ 2. On Equiprobabilism

347. Arguments for Equiprobabilism. a) From the authority of St. Alphonsus. Without any prudent doubt St. Alphonsus de Ligorio, Doctor of the Church, defended this system, and before him already certain other theologians, and after him several theologians, and those most noble, both Redemptorists and outsiders, as was said above. But those modern theologians who by right and wrong contend that St. Alphonsus was a pure Probabilist waste oil and labor.¹⁴¹ For the Holy Doctor himself in express words affirms not once but several times that he is not a Probabilist, but reproves Probabilism.¹⁴² But whether St. Alphonsus was always an Equiprobabilist, or only from the year 1762, theologians are not agreed.¹⁴³ In moral matters, however, the authority of St. Alphonsus is very great, as is clear from what was said above in n. 7.

b) From reason. Equiprobabilism differs little from Probabiliorism. The only difference consists in this: that it admits liberty of acting and excuse from the observance of law when a strict doubt is present concerning the existence of a law, against which equally probable reasons militate. Probabiliorism indeed does not admit this. But since this difference is of little moment, almost all the arguments which are brought from reason for Probabiliorism are valid also for Equiprobabilism. In addition, the following argument is added: If there is question of equally or almost equally probable opinions, a doubt strictly so called is present, in which the mind remains uncertain and properly assents to neither contradictory part. But the law in that case is so doubtful that it merits no assent and produces no obligation. The same argument is proposed in this way by Wouters:¹⁴⁴ "Since an opinion which favors liberty is equally probable as the opinion which favors law, directly there is given no reason on account of which one rather than the other ought to be assumed as the norm of acting, nor can an indirect reason be assigned on account of which the preceptive ordering, or duty, should be favored rather than the permissive ordering, or right. But where the matter stands thus, it is licit, with attention given to the benignity of God Almighty, to suppose that the more benign opinion, that is, the one which favors liberty, is to be held as the norm."

¹⁴¹ Almost all authors who are attached to no school candidly testify that St. Alphonsus taught Equiprobabilism at least from the year 1762. Hence Bellesheim deservedly says: "Since the letters of the Saint have been available, it should no longer be disputed that from 1762 until his death he continuously presented and steadfastly defended Equiprobabilism as his doctrine, and indeed not out of mere caution, but from conviction and impulse of conscience." Ant. Koch says: "Liguori was generally regarded as an Equiprobabilist until in the year 1863 A. Ballerini, S.J., first attempted to prove that the Saint had been a simple Probabilist. The fact ... can be misunderstood and denied only by one who works in the interest of a party" (apud Wouters, De Minusprobabilismo 56). - Francois de Paul Blachere says: "The probabilists have taken the habit of placing themselves under his patronage, but how wrongly!" (Revue Augustinienne 1905, 484.)

¹⁴² Thus St. Alphonsus writes in the letter to Remondini on 30 June 1768: "I reject the opinion that it is licit to follow a known less probable opinion, as Busembaum, Lacroix, and almost all the Jesuits say, who admit the less probable opinion." And in the letter of 9 December 1759 he writes: "The Jesuits commonly defend that we can follow a less probable opinion; but I defend that when the opinion favoring the law is known to be more probable, we ought to follow this and it is not licit for us to follow the less probable; concerning which matter the Jesuits have complained to me." (See several other similar places apud Wouters l. c. 53 sqq.)

¹⁴³ "St. Alphonsus never firmly adhered to Probabilism, and he followed that system from obedience rather than from his soul; and this is so true that, when the Holy Doctor was in the greatest danger of life in the year 1756, that one thing cast fear into him, that he had patronized Probabilism. In the year 1756 - so Melchionna narrates, who had seen and heard the matter in person - our Blessed Father had fallen mortally ill within Holy Week. When he had recovered a little from the illness, our whole Nocera family came to him rejoicing. Then Alphonsus spoke thus: In this supreme danger of life into which I was brought there was nothing that held me disturbed and anxious. This alone cast fear into me, namely that I followed the probable opinion; but the obedience which had to be given to the director required that" (apud Wouters l. c. 49-50).

¹⁴⁴ L. c. 147.

348. Difficulties against Equiprobabilism. Since, as appears from what was said above, there is so small a difference between Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism, all the difficulties by which the former labors press upon the latter. Besides, the fundamental principle of Equiprobabilism, "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better," is indeed true in the matter of justice, and perhaps can also be applied in other matters, as is clear from what was said above; but the application which Equiprobabilism makes of it does not seem always to be right. For if a law is strictly doubtful, that is, if equally grave reasons persuade its obligation or disobligation, liberty always possesses, which by nature and reason seems to precede law. Hence in that case to distinguish between the cessation and the existence of the law is superfluous. For in strict doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands. But the presumption stands for liberty until the obligation of the law has at least been made probable. - Finally, he seems to commit an inconsistency who teaches that the confessor ought to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow an opinion less probable and less safe, and yet on the other hand establishes that it is not licit to follow a less probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one. But thus teach St. Alphonsus¹⁴⁵ and all the Equiprobabilists after him.¹⁴⁶ Hence the Probabiliorists, such as Billuart, proceed more logically, who reprove this mode of acting on the part of the confessor.

¹⁴⁵ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 604.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. above n. 346.