Thesis II

One who strictly doubts about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, in other words, one who holds it as equally or almost equally probable that the law has not ceased or has not been fulfilled, is held to observe it.

It is said "one who strictly doubts," or "one who holds it as equally or almost equally probable"; since it is commonly admitted that the obligation of observing the law is absent in broad doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, in other words, where it is more probable that the law has ceased or has been fulfilled. Besides, in doubt about the fulfillment of a law several principles are at hand, in view of which the fact of fulfillment can commonly be held as more probable. Principles of this sort are: What regularly, what ordinarily happens, is judged to have happened; from things commonly occurring a prudent presumption is made.¹ Likewise: In doubt every fact is presumed to have been done rightly;² or: In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act³ (St. Alphonsus, I, 26). With these points noted, the thesis is proved:

I. From the authority of St. Alphonsus. Although I would not wish to deny that this thesis is not to be valued as much as the first and third theses are to be valued, nevertheless it cannot be denied that it extends very widely and pertains to the whole system, so that what we said above (nn. 214, 225) about the authority of St. Alphonsus is also to be applied to this thesis. But the holy Doctor, who had previously adhered to the more benign opinion, after considering the matter better, revoked it (I, 29) and defended the stricter opinion (I, 26-34); which in any case is now commonly admitted even by the adversaries themselves.⁴

II. From the authority of theologians. Our opinion was formerly commonly admitted, even by those authors who adhered to Probabilism. The witnesses of this assertion are Suarez⁵ and Laymann.⁶ The fact that afterward several withdrew from this opinion does not prevent the consensus of ancient theologians from supplying us some argument.

III. From reason. First, in strict doubt the condition of the possessor is better; or, to abstain from the ambiguous word "possessor," in strict doubt the condition of that which is prior seems to be better than the condition of that which is posterior.⁷ But the law itself is prior to its cessation and fulfillment. Therefore, in strict doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, the condition of the law seems to be better (St. Alphonsus, I, 29-34).

The major is established by these arguments: first, our principle of its own accord pleases reason more than the contrary principle, which would have to be admitted by the adversaries, namely: in strict doubt the condition of that which is prior seems to be worse than the condition of that which is posterior. This spontaneous inclination of reason indeed seems to supply an argument for our doctrine. Second, a principle which favors stability, or a stable manner of acting, seems to be preferred to a principle which fosters mutability, or a changeable manner of acting. But our principle favors stability, while the contrary favors mutability. Third, there is added that the principle stated by us has force for the external forum. Why, precisely, would the contrary principle have to be admitted for the internal forum?

Then our thesis is proved from the fact that the thesis of the Probabilists is at least doubtful: namely, a law which has doubtfully ceased or has doubtfully been fulfilled obliges unless it is demonstrated, or certain, that it does not oblige. But no one who hears prudently will contend that that is certain.

The major is evinced from a principle admitted by all: in a practical doubt not entirely solved, the safer part is to be followed.

To prove the minor, it will be enough to advert to these things: first, the arguments of the adversaries, as we shall soon see, either involve a begging of the question, or are such that they themselves require further proof. Second, add that always very many, and those grave and distinguished, theologians supported the contrary opinion. Third, finally, our arguments seem to be of such a kind that not even the adversaries will deny them all probability. Once all these things have been attended to and well weighed, no one will have affirmed that the opinion of the Probabilists has been placed beyond doubt.

¹ Suppose someone, while praying Sext, doubts whether he has said Terce. In the case he can commonly hold it as more probable that Terce has been said, since from things commonly occurring a prudent presumption is made. But it commonly happens that Sext is not begun before Terce has been said.

² Suppose someone doubts whether he has confessed with true sorrow. In the case he can commonly hold it as more probable that true sorrow was present.

³ Yet this principle, which canonists and moralists commonly use, is very ambiguous; namely, it has force only insofar as it rests on another principle of presumption. But this happens when there is doubt about the manner in which an act has been placed; in which case it can be held as more probable that all those things required for validity were done. It is otherwise if the manner in which the act was placed is known, but it is disputed whether the act so placed is valid.

⁴ Cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 133-139, where those things which some formerly objected are refuted.

⁵ Suarez, treating the question whether one who has doubtfully fulfilled an oath is still held to fulfill it, responds: "It is beyond controversy that he is held," because "in doubt the condition of the possessor is better" (De Relig., tr. 5, bk. 2, cap. 33, n. 7); this solution is a mere application of our thesis to a particular case.

⁶ Laymann speaks thus: "But the latter part of the assertion is common" (Theol. mor., bk. 1, tr. 1, c. 5, § 3, n. 31), namely, that one who doubts whether he has fulfilled a vow or promise, or satisfied any other debt whatsoever, is held by the obligation.

⁷ In this sense St. Alphonsus and others take the principle of possession, insofar as it regards matter distinct from the matter of justice; but since others explain it otherwise, we have abstained from that designation, mindful of this: "It belongs to the wise man not to care about names" (St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 1). With these points noted, those things which several theologians object concerning the nature of the principle of possession do not harm our argument.

Objection 1. A strictly doubtful law, by the consent of all, does not oblige. But a law which has equally probably ceased is here and now strictly doubtful.

Response. I distinguish the major: a law which in the present is strictly doubtful and did not previously certainly exist does not oblige, I concede; a law which in the present is strictly doubtful but did previously certainly exist does not oblige, I deny. That it does oblige has been proved above. With the same distinction I distinguish the minor.

You will insist: A law which in the present is strictly doubtful and did not previously certainly exist does not oblige precisely because it is doubtful. But if a law of this sort does not oblige precisely because it is doubtful, the same thing must be affirmed of every doubtful law. Now then, a law which has equally probably ceased is strictly doubtful. Therefore even a law of this sort does not oblige.

Response. The major is not very accurate, and is deficient on this head, that it neglects the principle of possession; since this precisely brings it about that a law which has equally probably ceased, although strictly doubtful, nevertheless obliges indirectly (n. 229).

Objection 2. It is repugnant that a doubtful law induce a certain obligation, because the effect cannot be more certain than the cause. But a law which has equally probably ceased has become doubtful.

Response. I distinguish the major: it is repugnant that a doubtful law induce a certain obligation directly, I concede; indirectly, that is, by force of the principle of possession or at least by force of the principle: in a practical doubt not solved the safer part is to be followed, I deny. Moreover, the adversaries themselves admit that a law which is not wholly certain, but only most probable or almost certain, induces an entirely certain obligation, certainly indirectly (n. 225).

Objection 3. Just as the beginning of obligation depends on certain or at least opinionative knowledge of the law, so also the continuation of obligation depends on the continuation of certain or at least opinionative knowledge. But knowledge of this sort is lacking in strict doubt whether the law has ceased or has been fulfilled.

Response. I deny the major, and this because of the dissimilarity which is had between the two cases; namely, possession does not favor a law equally probably beginning, but does favor a law which is equally probably continuing.

Objection 4. A doubtful obligation is no obligation. But the obligation of a law which has equally probably ceased becomes doubtful.

Response I. Let the major pass; I distinguish the minor: the obligation of a law which has equally probably ceased becomes doubtful, directly, I concede; with the principle of possession considered, I deny.

Response II. I deny the major unless a certain principle is alleged by which a doubtful obligation becomes certainly null. But a principle of this sort cannot be alleged; once this has been posited, the rule must be urged: in a practical doubt not solved, the safer part is to be followed.

Objection 5. When there is question of imposing an obligation, man must be regarded as the defendant, but the law as the petitioner. But in doubt the defendant defeats the petitioner.

Response. The parity of which the adversaries speak is invented without basis. Then, if we wish to set up a comparison, one who has doubtfully fulfilled the law must be regarded as a defendant who by force of a judicial sentence was bound by some obligation and has satisfied it only doubtfully. Whether or not the obligation should be urged in a case of this sort depends on the solution of the question now being treated by us. Moreover, let each person be persuaded that our controversy cannot be settled by comparisons of this sort.

Corollary I. Law obliges in strict doubt whether it has been explicitly or implicitly abrogated; whether there has been a dispensation in it; whether the time for which it was established has flowed past; or whether the fact founding the law has ceased; or whether the day to which it is affixed has passed. Hence, for example, it is not licit to eat meats in strict doubt whether Friday has passed (St. Alphonsus, I, 32).

Corollary II. Since a promissory oath, a vow, and an injunction of sacramental penance are in the likeness of particular laws, the obligation persists in strict doubt whether you have fulfilled an oath or vow, satisfied the penance, etc. (St. Alphonsus, I, 28, 29; Elenchus 2 Quaestionum reformatarum, q. 1).

Corollary III. Law indeed obliges in strict doubt whether the act by which it is fulfilled has been placed. But in strict doubt whether an act that has been placed suffices for fulfilling the law, further obligation is lacking, because in this hypothesis there is doubt whether the law commands another act than the one that has been placed.