§ 3. The True Moral System Is Established

— We shall proceed in this way: after the other systems have been briefly excluded, we shall show that the system of pure but moderate probabilism is true.

I. Neither Tutiorism, which no Catholic now admits, nor Probabiliorism, nor Equiprobabilism, nor the system called from compensation can be admitted speculatively or theoretically.

We say speculatively or theoretically; because, if by these various names they merely contend to obtain that, in the moral discipline of Catholics, that moderate probabilism alone should flourish which Suarez, Lugo, and other outstanding doctors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cultivated, then the things said concerning the practical concord of most Catholic writers of our age return. Therefore:

1. Tutiorism labors under this fundamental defect: since it does not distinguish between facts of the physical order and facts of the moral and juridical order, it wholly passes over this, that it can happen that because of the doubt itself the condition necessary for the law to exist or to be applied to the subject ceases. But then there remains no danger of violation of law whence the Tutiorists were taking their argument, while the danger of a physical fact is by no means removed by my doubt concerning the event. Cf. the positive demonstration of probabilism.

2. Probabiliorism needs this principle: probable reasons which incline toward contradictory parts mutually destroy one another, so that, if they are equal, no probability remains; if they are unequal, the excess of the greater probability remains as the only motive for assenting, so that only one prudent conclusion remains: that which is founded upon that excess ¹.

But it is so far from being the case that that mutual destruction is necessary, that you will scarcely find a case where it is demonstrated to occur ². The reason is that most often motives are drawn from diverse sources. Since they are disparate, they can very well stand together. Thus, v.g., is there, from natural law, an obligation of restoring to the poor what, having been unjustly acquired, you cannot return to the owner? Those who deny argue from this, that natural law commands this one thing, that the owner unjustly harmed be restored from the damages; those who affirm contend that that unjust possession cannot be sanctioned by natural law. Does he sin who omits a more perfect action to which he is clearly invited? Those who deny rely upon the distinction between works of counsel and precepts; those who affirm call upon man's charity toward himself and the necessity of acting reasonably. How, they say, can the choice of the less good part be reasonable? But who does not see that to both reasons their own proper force is preserved, and that motives of this sort can by no means be compared with weights placed in the two pans of one balance? Indeed, if five witnesses, otherwise approved, do not agree concerning some matter, but two narrate the fact in one way and three in another way, it will indeed be doubted in what way the matter truly happened, but a positive reason for each narration will remain.

But when the distinguished Marc, Institutiones, I, n. 74, conceding that it rarely happens that the motives themselves destroy one another, nevertheless contends that their force is relatively and practically destroyed, insofar as, because of the equality of the motives, the intellect can now be moved to assent by neither, so that, moved by the will alone, it adheres to one part, he offends against sound philosophy. For this teaches us that it is repugnant to the nature of the intellect to adhere to some part by the will alone, without any reason; then, that the intellect by itself is not determined to assent except by the evidence of the thing, so that even if there is only one probable motive, it needs the command of the will in order to arrive at opining. Finally, as will soon appear better, it is not even necessary, for the right use of probabilism, that the intellect adhere to either part as true.

But if, besides, the probabiliorists contend that this is the law of our reason, that, when evidence is lacking, we adhere to the part more like the truth, this cannot be admitted, at least universally, either speculatively or practically. Not speculatively: for it is enough for the intellect to testify to that which it truly sees, i.e., that the matter is doubtful but more like the truth; indeed of itself it does not receive except what it sees. Not practically. Even in the external forum a defendant is absolved who is more likely to be culpable. In a civil judgment, if discretion is left to the judge, in the sentence he will have regard to the probability of the opposite side, at least in computing expenses. Only then, when there is a necessity of awarding the whole matter to one or the other litigant, will the judge pronounce right according to the things more like the truth. But in our private action, sometimes we shall prudently have to abstain from an action whose happy outcome is much more like the truth; it also happens, if from the less probable part a far greater profit is hoped, that a merchant prudently tries his fortune by this less safe way. Therefore we are never moved by what is like the truth as by what is certain, far less can it be said that, when certainty is lacking, likeness to truth is perpetually present to us as guide.

Why therefore, in the internal forum, where, when certainty is lacking, the very condition of obligation can be lacking, do you impose the rule of following parts certainly more like the truth, a rule which cannot even be called constant in the external forum and in exterior matters?

Add that, in this distinction of degrees, much must be attributed to subjective inclination, so that what one will call more probable another will hold as equally or less probable. And, as R. P. Prummer, O. Pr., says, Manuale Theol. mor. I, n. 346, probabiliorism is almost impossible in practice. For the common opinion holds that a penitent must be absolved who, having left aside the more probable opinion, wishes to follow the probable opinion, so that a probabiliorist confessor is sometimes compelled to act against his own system. "Whence today perhaps I think there is no confessor who applies all the logical consequences of Probabiliorism in the practice of the tribunal of penance" (Prummer, l.c.).

3. Equiprobabilism, in the part in which it agrees with that system, sins by the common error of Probabiliorism. Besides, it employs that fictitious possession of law or liberty which we demonstrated in the introduction itself to pertain least of all to the matter. R. P. Prummer, op. c. I, n. 348, can say thus ad hominem: "If the law is strictly doubtful, that is, if equally grave reasons urge its obligation or deobligation, liberty always possesses, which by nature and reason seems to precede law. Whence, in that case, to distinguish between the cessation of law and the existence of law is superfluous. For in strict doubt one must stand for that for which the presumption stands. But the presumption stands for liberty until the obligation of the law has at least been made probable."

4. As to the system of compensations: 1. Since the conscious violation of an obliging law is a sin not only material but truly formal, while the "compensators" merely object to the probabilists the permission of material sin, they freely admit that no obligation arises from the merely probable law itself, but tacitly appeal to a higher law which would forbid the permission of material sin made without proportionate cause: which law remains to be demonstrated by them. 2. Nor must material sin always be apprehended. For since an objectively obscure law has not been promulgated, often the very foundation of material sin will be lacking: a law which is unconsciously violated. 3. Even when material sin can be present, either the matter concerns positive law, and then, scandal being excluded, its non-culpable violation is harmful to no one; or the matter concerns natural law, and then a grave reason of answering in favor of the least obligation will always be present as excusing. For questions of this sort are not raised except when some serious utility of the present order, at least temporal, renders the observance of the doubtful law difficult. 4. Nor ever, if we speak strictly, is material sin properly permitted. For that effect is properly permitted which is foreseen as going to follow. Here it is not foreseen except perhaps as going to follow. Therefore rather the danger of material sin is permitted. How will they ever demonstrate that permission of this sort is forbidden under grave sin without proportionate cause, if of itself there is only a light obligation of warning him who materially but certainly violates natural law? 5. Finally, the system does not have universal use. For what if the proportionate cause itself is present only probably?

Concerning that system d'Annibale, I, n. 263, note 1, has these words: "The foundation (entirely new) upon which this whole edifice has been built surely totters."

But, as Bouquillon observes ¹, this can be true in fact, that we give place to some compensation. Since broad moral certainty, which is required and suffices for acting prudently, is sufficiently undefined, and sometimes scarcely exists in the lowest degree, the consideration of the importance of the law will be able to avail for affirming practically an obligation which is scarcely morally certain; and, on the contrary, the consideration of the difficulty, whether extrinsic or even intrinsic, will be able to avail for denying practically an obligation which is almost morally certain." And also, as we shall see, the dissolution of a particular law by no means absolves a man from the common duty of observing the general rules of honest action, whether they regard the object, or the motive, or the mode of honesty.

¹ Cf. Billuart, diss. 6, and Sertillanges himself, La philosophie morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin, pp. 552. 553.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, Op. Theol., T. I, Tr. 2, n. 188.

¹ Theol. mor. fundament. n. 297.

— II. The true moral system is established. 1. In order to forestall the fallacies of arguments, these things must be well noticed:

a) The distinction between a manifest thing and a thing like the truth. When a certain thing is manifest, it can equally be said: the thing is seen, its evidence is perceived; but when a thing is only like the truth, the likeness to truth indeed, but by no means the thing itself, is known. Wherefore it cannot at all be said: he approaches nearer to the thing who seeks it where it is more like the truth that it will be found, since, on the contrary, it can happen that he is farther from that place than from the place where the seeker now stands;

b) We free man from no divine service. Him whom we free from some definite obligation we least of all make immune from the general divine service by which man, in every action of his, is commanded to procure the glory of God. For man is capable of constituting a certain order in things both his own and another's by his rational appetite ². And while thus, as a subordinate orderer, he disposes certain things fitly, he praises the divine Majesty, whose perfections he manifests and to whom he can also refer the free actions of his own. Therefore he serves God even who does what he is commanded to do by no divine precept. For the rest, in the end or mode of any action, some precept to be observed necessarily occurs;

c) Perfect concord between intellect and will is impossible. Concord between intellect and will must indeed be procured. But while direct conscience can affirm an obligation, deny it, or doubt concerning it, the will can only do or omit, nor can it have an act perfectly congruent with doubt. Hence, if, as often as conscience reports an uncertain obligation, you pronounce the will bound so often, you will seem to demand too much; but too little, if so often you absolve it from every bond. This discrepancy of intellect and appetite at length gives place to the question concerning a moral system ¹: that knot of it must be untied;

d) How one arrives at opinion. The intellect is compelled by the evidence of the thing alone. Wherefore opinative assent is always determined by the will ². But the will is moved by reason of good ³. Therefore, if no other good than truth offers itself as to be sought, man will incline toward the parts more like the truth. But there are other goods, other utilities also of the human order, on account of which we prudently determine that something else is to be done than the parts which are more like the truth would urge. Consider that practical distinction.

If certain ruin, certain shipwreck, certain invasion of robbers is foreseen, no prudent man would commit money to business or to a ship, or, unarmed, make a journey through ways which robbers hold occupied. But if these things are not morally established, for the sake of great utility, for the sake of attaining a great good, fortune will prudently be tried, although the hope of success is less than the hope of disaster or misfortune. The mind of the agent will turn itself to considering the contrary probability. Certainly he will not say to himself: I judge that it will happen that the ship perish, that robbers oppress me; but rather he will reason in this other way: there is a serious probability of escaping shipwreck or the hands of robbers, and the danger is redeemed by the utility;

e) No force is brought upon the intellect. He who embraces the less probable parts ought not to bring any force upon himself so that he falsely estimates them more like the truth; but it is enough that he judge them practically safe because probable.

² "Man," as Leo XIII writes most wisely, enc. Rerum novarum, 15 May 1891, "... under the eternal law, under the power of God governing all things most providently, governs himself by the providence of his counsel."

¹ We borrow this observation, which we think pertains to the hinge of the matter, from a certain professor of dogmatic theology.

² Cf. 2, 2, q. 1, art. 4, c.; q. 2, art. 9, c. and ad 2.

³ Therefore to the element which the will adds it must be attributed that contradictory opinions exist. And thus it happens that probabilities do not mutually exclude one another, as the contradictory opinions themselves do. And because no opinion necessarily infers the falsity of the opposite opinion, it also happens that no properly contradictory opinions are given, although opinions of contradictories are given. Cf. R. P. Munzi, Logica, n. 294.

— 2. These things having been premised, let this be the simple demonstration of probabilism. Every divine precept either is certainly established or is uncertain. We are bound by a certain precept, even if it is such only morally: this is undoubted. Are we also bound by an uncertain one?

If we are bound, the various degrees of doubting are distinguished in vain; but until it is morally established that a precept is absent, the parts of the precept, or the safer parts, must be embraced by us. But if we are not bound by an uncertain precept, again, every other distinction being omitted, we shall preserve free option until it is morally established that a precept is truly had.

But the reason for doubting concerning the honesty of free option is drawn from the danger alone of violating, if you act otherwise than the probable precept shall have indicated, either the divine precept which perhaps exists, or the moral order which is sanctioned by divine precepts.

But if you consider the matter more closely, no violation of precept is to be feared. For a divine precept means a will divinely intimated to a subject man and therefore of itself known. But an uncertain precept of itself is unknown. For only by efficacious proof is the thing itself, which is called true, known; but he who has learned a thing as like the truth knows not the thing itself, but merely its appearance, sometimes fallacious. Wherefore an uncertain precept must be held as none.

But, the divine precept being excluded, we ought not to be solicitous about the danger of acting against the moral order. For by the same limits by which the divine precept is contained, by the same limits the care of avoiding its material transgression is contained ¹. Whence will you demonstrate that a general law which demands more has been promulgated? Besides, we can positively add this: right order demands that, when a precept ceases, man preserve free options, by which he may make actions at least formally good. Therefore material transgression is permitted by God on account of the goodness of that human liberty ². Finally, if greater care were necessary for us, not even when an action seems certainly honest to us would we be permitted to put away anxious solicitude: for to err is human. Much less would that be permitted when the opinion of honesty is only more probable or most probable; for then positive apprehensions of material violation remain.

Hence it is also clear what must be answered to one objecting that, in the proposed case, not less than the obligation, the very permission of acting is at least directly unknown. We readily admit it. But permission of acting ought not to be demonstrated, on account of the commonly admitted principle: whatever is not prohibited is permitted. For the physical faculty of choosing, the various solicitations by which we are impelled to acting, the goodness which of itself is present in action as such ³, the very formal object (good) under which we seek all things, prove moral liberty of acting, unless there stand in the way a divine prohibition known by human reason.

Wherefore those also are mistaken who, like C. d'Annibale, think that favor must be shown equally to law and liberty, and therefore defend equiprobabilism. For if the law exists, it always prevails over the liberty which it takes away; but if it is doubtful, common sense with every law says, not that sometimes answer must be made for law and sometimes for liberty, but simply: in doubt one must answer for liberty, or: a doubtful law does not oblige ⁴.

Finally, cause yourself to advert that the order which man constitutes by his free election can be better or more sublime in itself than that whose observance would undeservedly be imposed upon him from a more severe system. For an election contrary to a probable or more probable obligation can be directed by our will to the best ends of charity, of the salvation of neighbor.

Thus far the simple exposition of the matter and yet an adequate consideration. For in reality speculative judgments concerning the honesty of an action belong to two kinds, not to more: they are either certain or uncertain.

3. But what if you wish to discern the various degrees? - Yet to those who wish to observe the various degrees by which a thing not demonstrated, if it is compared with the opposite, can be more or less or even equally like the truth, an answer can be made thus.

Certainly, at first sight, this kind of reasoning offers itself. A man studious of truth, to whom full arguments are lacking, will opine according to the things more like the truth. But if contrary arguments seem to be of almost equal weight, then he will remain doubtful, wavering, and as it were suspended in mind between each part.

But, as we have already noted, the pursuit of truth is not the only good by which we are moved to acting. And in every use of life, practical judgments indeed are directed according to properly so-called speculative persuasions; but when there is question of uncertain conclusions, often, on account of a just cause, one prudently recedes from the parts which are more like the truth. We saw examples above, nn. 358, 3; 359 d.

But in a moral matter these questions at once arise in the mind: prudent fear of error is not excluded by an opinion; therefore the obligation is uncertain, and also the honesty which are predicated as more like the truth are uncertain. Why therefore must I act in the same way whether the obligation was certain or uncertain; why will I be permitted to act in the same way whether the honesty is certain or uncertain? For only then, when the affirmation or negation of obligation is certain, does the action truly agree with the mind; but when the affirmation or negation of obligation is uncertain, the obligation seems to be imposed too severely, or relaxed too benignly.

If the state of the mind opining alone is considered, these questions cannot be satisfied; a certain argument is desired, by which it may be effected that a speculative opinion suffices so that we must or can act according to it. And thus the principles called reflex above are recalled: that no one is held by a non-promulgated law; that no one is bound by a precept of which he does not have knowledge. But the diverse principles concerning the destruction of probabilities or concerning possession have already been exploded. Moreover the former principles permit no distinction between various degrees of probability ¹. Therefore one must return to the simple and logical division by which a certain speculative judgment is separated from an uncertain one.

4. We can also use this brief reasoning. An action which practically is prohibited by no law is certainly honest and therefore practically safe. But an action whose liceity is speculatively probable is prohibited by no law. Therefore it is certainly honest and practically safe.

The major is proved. As we said above: since our liberty does not remove order, since to act is good of itself, since we seek all things under the species of good, since we are freely borne to seeking our own good, it must be held with common sense: those things are permitted which are not prohibited.

The minor is proved. An action is not forbidden by a particular law to which the action is only probably conformed: for knowledge of this law, or imputable ignorance of it, is not had; but the law itself cannot reach us except by means of certain cognition of it.

Nor is it forbidden by a general law by which whatever is only probably not against a particular law would be prohibited. For that general law is not demonstrated, and therefore has not been promulgated. R. D. De Bock reasons similarly, Tract. fundam. theol. mor. 2, n. 223.

The thesis is confirmed, a) by considering human nature and its fragility. It seems little human that fragile man should morally have to fulfill also uncertain obligations, or obligations probably null. Wherefore, concerning human law, already ancient wisdom pronounced that rights are more prompt to loosen than to bind, and that in doubts one must answer for liberty. Cf. St. Alph., diss. 1765, c. 4, n. 35.

It is also confirmed, b) by the logical necessity of choosing for probabilism or for tutiorism, which is repudiated by all. For either the principle stands: A law which after diligent investigation appears truly doubtful does not oblige; or the principle, A doubtful law does not oblige, is rejected. If it is true, it demonstrates probabilism. If it is rejected, logically neither probabiliorism nor equiprobabilism can be admitted. For both systems permit that answer be made for liberty to which a less probable law, therefore a simply doubtful law, is opposed. Nor let them say: liberty is morally certain when a less probable law is opposed to it. For this is affirmed gratuitously, unless you recur to the principle: A doubtful law does not oblige. R. P. Prummer, Manuale, I, n. 346, 1, almost concedes that this is a logical conclusion.

N.B. C. d'Annibale demonstrates by many examples the principle: A doubtful law does not oblige, I, § 162, note 21. But he well sets forth, § 261, that liberty precedes law. "The contrary opinion," he says, "is most alien from the nature of law... we understand that to be licit which the law does not forbid, that to be illicit which the law prohibits."

¹ He who would deny this must impute to God a moral order not sufficiently sanctioned.

² This is the direct refutation of tutiorism and of the system of compensations.

³ Cf. Sertillanges, op. c., p. 43, n. 1; p. 45, n. 4.

⁴ "In obscure matters, the minimum is to be followed." R.I. 30 in 6°. Cf. d'Annibale, Summula, I, 162.

¹ In order that we could distinguish various degrees, it would be necessary to have reflex principles by which they are distinguished; but we have only two, which do not bear that further distinction.

— Scholia. I. What St. Thomas thought. In the age of St. Thomas, those questions concerning probabilism were not being posed. Wherefore we do not wish to call upon him as a formal patron of our opinion. It has sufficiently profited us, since he formally taught our reflex principles.

For he has these things: "Promulgation itself is necessary for this, that a law have its force" ¹. "No one is bound by any precept except by means of knowledge of that precept. And therefore he who is not capable of knowledge is not bound by a precept, nor is anyone ignorant of the precept of God bound to doing the precept, except insofar as he is bound to know the precept. But if he is not bound to know and does not know, in no way is he bound by the precept" (2). "When I say conscience, I do not say or imply knowledge only strictly accepted, insofar as it is only of truths, but knowledge accepted in a broad way, for any knowledge whatsoever, according as whatever we know, by common use of speaking, we are said to know" (3). "That is called licit which is prohibited by no law" (4).

¹ Summa 1, 2, q. 90, art. 4. - (2) De veritate, q. 17, art. 3. - (3) Ibid. art. 2 ad 2. - (4) In 1. 4, d. 15, q. 2, art. 4, solution 2.

— II. On the uniquely probable opinion. An opinion can also be uniquely probable, which is impugned by no grave reason, and yet is not truly demonstrated. It is not permitted to follow the less safe parts against that opinion; for their election would not be prudent or rational. Wherefore an opinion of this sort is practically assimilated to what is morally certain. Cf. Noldin, Principia n. 224, 5. But, as we said in handing down the notions, moral certainty is here taken broadly.

— III. An opinion probably probable. Here it is customary to ask whether, from an opinion probably probable, a practically certain judgment concerning the honesty of an action can be gathered.

With Ballerini-Palmieri ¹ and Noldin (2), we judge that the answer depends upon the signification of the words. If, with that moral certainty broadly so called, concerning which n. 351, or because of a grave reason impugned by no contrary grave reason, you affirm that an opinion is probable, certainly the same must be estimated by you as truly probable.

But if the probability itself comes into serious controversy, and you discern serious motives on each side, the probability itself seems to us uncertain, just as a law is uncertain which is affirmed and denied by serious motives. But uncertain probability is probability not seen, which therefore is only doubtful and does not suffice.

¹ Opus Theol., I, tr. 2, n. 190. - (2) Princip. n. 235, 2.

— IV. The force of presumptions. Presumption, taken from the customary way of acting, in not a few cases produces sufficient probability why, unless a grave reason positively stands in the way, you may solve the case according to that presumption. This rule is founded in human necessity, lest we be compelled to live a life full of anxieties, and is contained in various sayings: "From things commonly occurring, a prudent presumption is made." "In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act."

Wherefore he who is accustomed to be diligent in accusing sins, - in fulfilling penance, - in reciting the office, - in repelling temptations, can disregard a doubt concerning a sin accused, etc.

Likewise disregard negative doubts whether you had contrition in confession, whether you gave absolution, indeed whether you baptized well. Let the Ritual itself be heard, concerning consecration: "If the celebrant does not remember that he said the things which are commonly said in the consecration, he ought not therefore to be disturbed... But if he very probably doubts that he omitted something essential, let him repeat the form, at least under condition. But if they are not of the necessity of the Sacrament, let him not resume, but proceed further."

By a similar reason, a mandate given to you by a Superior is presumed legitimate; the wine which is offered to you in church for sacrificing, pure; an altar-stone, portable, well placed, so that, unless a special cause persuades otherwise, you can abstain from positive investigation.