Thesis III

One who forms the opinion, in other words, one who holds it as certainly more probable that a law exists, is held to observe it. It is proved:

I. From ecclesiastical documents. These, indeed, seem to be of such a kind that they create a presumption against the doctrine which teaches that it is licit to follow the certainly less probable opinion favoring liberty, or, what is the same thing, that there is no obligation of following the certainly more probable opinion favoring the law. It is useful to present the principal documents or edicts.

1. The Congregation of the Holy Office, by a decree issued on September 24, 1665, in the name of Alexander VII, not only condemned several laxer opinions, but also in the preface of the decree complains of "that extreme license of luxuriant minds... through which, in matters pertaining to conscience, a mode of opining has crept in which is wholly alien from Evangelical simplicity and from the doctrine of the holy Fathers, and which, if the faithful were to follow it in practice as a right rule, an immense corruption of Christian life would creep in." Now Stephen Gradius, who by command of the Congregation of the Index had drawn up a Votum concerning the decree that had been issued, expressly declares that by the mode and rule of opining disapproved by the Supreme Pontiff Probabilism is understood; and he adds that he had known this "on account of faithful knowledge of that time."¹

2. Benedict XIV, in the constitution De praeparatione ad annum Universalis Iubilaei (June 26, 1749), admonishes confessors that in doubtful matters they should diligently inquire into the truth "and then descend to that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms." But the less probable opinion is rather dissuaded by reason than persuaded by it. Therefore it is illicit to descend to it.²

3. Alexander VII, by his own exhortation, brought it about that the Dominican Order, from the year 1655, declared war on Probabilism and from that time waged it most strenuously.

4. The Congregation of the Holy Office, with the Supreme Pontiff Innocent XI presiding and present, on June 26, 1680, issued a decree by which "His Holiness... commanded that he himself (i.e., Thyrsus Gonzalez) freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable opinion thus known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable." Then it is enjoined upon the Superior General of the Society of Jesus that he permit the Fathers of the Society to attack the less probable opinion, and that he make known to all the universities of the Society that it is the mind of His Holiness that each one freely oppose the aforesaid system.³

5. Innocent XI, by his counsel and direction, brought it about that Thyrsus Gonzalez was elected Superior General of the Society, and this for the purpose of turning the members of the Society away from Probabilism. Then the same Pontiff wished that a decree be issued by the General Congregation which had elected Gonzalez as Superior, granting permission to all members of the Society to defend the stricter doctrine; and this was done. Moreover, Innocent XI indicated to Thyrsus Gonzalez that "he desired something more from the Jesuits against Probabilism than was prescribed by that decree."⁴

6. The Congregation of the Holy Office, at the end of the month of June 1693, by common vote took the counsel of asking the Supreme Pontiff Innocent XII to see to the publication of the work of Thyrsus Gonzalez, since in it the laxer doctrine was attacked; and the Supreme Pontiff satisfied this wish.⁵

7. Clement XI indicated to the Superior General of the Society that "the Superiors of the Society would do a thing most pleasing to His Holiness if they ensured that the Jesuits abstained from leading and defending the opinion which asserts that the use of the less probable and less safe opinion is licit."⁶

8. Finally, here must be referred all those things by which the Church has positively commended, and does not cease to commend, the doctrine of St. Alphonsus. And indeed: 1. The commendation of which we have spoken, as is evident to everyone, is opposed to the doctrine which the holy Doctor, whose doctrine is commended, finally rejected. But Probabilism, as we shall prove later, was rejected by St. Alphonsus. 2. There is added the fact that the Church at length declared that the heroic degree of the virtues of St. Alphonsus was established only when the Advocate of the cause had proved that, according to the opinion of St. Alphonsus, only a strictly doubtful law does not oblige, or that Probabilism was rejected by him;⁷ which certainly suggests that all those things by which the same Church afterward positively commended the doctrine of the holy Doctor favor Equiprobabilism and oppose Probabilism. But enough now concerning these matters, since from them, or from the authority of St. Alphonsus insofar as it rests upon them, we shall soon argue distinctly and specifically.

It is established, therefore, that the Church did not favor Probabilism, and inhibited it by edicts doctrinal, disciplinary, and mixed.

From what has been said there also follows, and I would like this noted in passing, how undeservedly several heterodox authors⁸ reproach the Catholic Church for having fostered and commended a doctrine more lax than is just: the Catholic Church, I say, which on repeated occasions disclosed a mind opposed to Probabilism, far from fostering and commending the aforesaid system.⁹

II. From the authority of St. Alphonsus. This authority, as we said above, seems to be such as to create a grave presumption for the system which he himself defended. But the holy Doctor also defended, to the best of his powers, the third thesis of Equiprobabilism.

The minor, which even now is denied by some, is established by these points:

1. First, there are at hand countless testimonies of the holy Doctor himself, several of which it is useful to present:¹⁰

a) Dell' uso moderato dell' opinione probabile (1765). There he teaches: "I have said so often that not only he who has evident knowledge of the law, but also he who, according to the light of reason, judges that the opinion standing for the law is notably or certainly more probable, is held to observe it, even if there is dispute among the doctors; just as in fact I myself have reprobated, in my moral work, several opinions formerly approved by many authors, as certainly less probable" (c. 3, n. 81).

b) Letter to Remondini (1769). "The Jesuits commonly defend that we can follow the less probable opinion; but I defend that, when it is known that the opinion favoring the law is more probable, we must follow this one, and that it is not licit for us to follow the less probable; concerning this matter the Jesuits have complained to me" (Lettere, II, n. 230).

c) Letter to Father Villani (1773). "In it (i.e., in the little work whose title is Dichiarazione del sistema) I shall make clear to all that I am the defender of the doctrine which asserts that the opinion favoring the law must be followed, if indeed this opinion is more probable, and that Probabilism is entirely reprobated by me. This one thing I say, namely, that a law does not oblige where the opinion supporting it is entirely doubtful" (Lettere, II, n. 284).

d) Theologia Moralis (7th ed., 1773). To this edition the holy Doctor added a Monitum,¹¹ in which he thus sets forth and proves his system: "I say that if the opinion which stands for the law seems certainly more probable, we are altogether held to follow it; nor can we then embrace the opposite opinion, which stands for liberty. The reason is that, in order to act licitly, we must in doubtful matters inquire into and follow the truth; but where the truth cannot be found clearly, we are held to embrace at least that opinion which comes nearer to the truth, such as the more probable opinion is."

e) Dichiarazione del sistema che tiene l'autore intorno alla regola delle azioni morali (1774). "Some reproach me, saying that I am a Probabilist. I again declare in this brief work that I am not a Probabilist, nor do I follow Probabilism; indeed I reprobate it... I say, first, that if the opinion which stands for the law appears certainly more probable, we are held to follow it for several reasons, the principal one of which is this, that in moral doubts we must follow the truth; wherefore, when we cannot clearly find the truth, we must at least follow that opinion which comes nearer to the truth, such as in this case is the very opinion which seems more probable to us. Therefore the truth itself, which obliges us to follow it, also obliges us to follow that opinion which stands for the law, when it comes nearer to that same truth" (n. 2).

f) Theologia Moralis (8th and 9th editions, 1779 and 1785). St. Alphonsus inserted in these editions the Monitum which he had added to the seventh edition, and so once again, from the obligation of following the truth, he deduces that the certainly more probable opinion must be followed (I, 54).¹² He repeats the same at I, 88: "For where we do not find certain truth, we must follow that opinion which approaches nearer to the truth."

Behold, then, certain testimonies which clearly show that St. Alphonsus rejected Probabilism.

2. Then our minor is confirmed by authority. For indeed almost all authors who are attached to no school testify that St. Alphonsus, at least from the year 1762 onward, supported Equiprobabilism.¹³

3. Lastly there is added the fact that the Church issued the "Decree concerning the doubt whether the virtues are established in a heroic degree" after it had ascertained that Probabilism had been rejected by St. Alphonsus (n. 225).

¹ Disp. de opin. probabili cum Honor. Fabri, c. 27; cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 19-21.

² The Supreme Pontiff indeed speaks about an opinion to be imposed on others; but these things hold a fortiori when there is question of the opinion which we ourselves must follow. Cf. Patuzzi, Regola prossima, t. II, pp. 91-94; Gonet, Clypeus, t. III, diss. De consc. prob., preface; Concina, Apparatus, t. II, p. 174 (ed. 1763).

³ That the aforesaid decree is opposed only to the less probable opinion or Probabilism, and by no means to the equally probable opinion or Equiprobabilism, is clear from the tenor of the decree itself, which speaks only of the more probable and less probable opinions, and in no way of the equally probable opinion. Besides, compare what we have disputed elsewhere concerning this matter (De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 24-35).

Forstmann, with Noldin, denies that "by the words with the more probable opinion thus known and judged the Supreme Pontiff intended the certainly more probable opinion" (Theol. Mor. Gen., n. 143). But it seems clear that the matters are being confused. The author adds: "Let us suppose that the Supreme Pontiff intended the certainly more probable opinion; then he did indeed attack Probabilism, but by this attack he did not yet condemn Probabilism." I grant these things freely; but a system attacked by the Supreme Pontiff, although not condemned, does not seem commendable. Forstmann indeed adds in the cited place: "For we can attack what we think good." But no one would admit that a moral system which the Supreme Pontiff held to be good or right was attacked by him.

⁴ De Minusprobabilismo, p. 35.

⁵ De Minusprobabilismo, p. 35.

⁶ De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 35-36.

⁷ Jansen, p. 34; Vindiciae Alf., I, n. 46; Berthe, Vie de S. Alf., II, p. 640.

⁸ Thus Dollinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten in der romischkatholischen Kirche seit dem sechzehnten Jahrhundert; Hermann, Romische und evangelische Sittlichkeit; Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte; Hoensbroech, Die Ultramontane Moral.

⁹ Cf. Ter Haar, Ven. Innoc.

¹⁰ Although St. Alphonsus at first supported Probabilism, and published two dissertations, anonymous however, which favored the aforesaid system, one in 1749 and the other in 1755, nevertheless he followed that system more from obedience than from inward conviction. This is so true that, when the holy Doctor was in the greatest danger of life in 1756, this one thing caused him fear: that he had supported Probabilism. "In the year 1756," Melchionna, who had seen and heard the matter in person, narrates, "our blessed Father had fallen mortally ill during Holy Week. When he had recovered somewhat from the illness, our whole Noceran family came to him rejoicing. Then Alphonsus spoke thus: 'Having been brought into this greatest danger of life, there was nothing that kept me disturbed and anxious. This alone caused me fear, namely, that I had followed a probable opinion; but the obedience that had to be given to my director required it.'" Moreover, in the cited dissertations he never explicitly defended the certainly less probable opinion, and in the second dissertation he expressly excludes notable excess. Indeed, already from the year 1759 he began to contradict Probabilism. Cf. Gaude, p. 17 sq.

¹¹ How highly the holy Doctor valued this Monitum is clear from these things which he wrote to his publisher Remondini: "This notice is certainly brief, since it is contained in a single folio; but I value this folio more than any other that might be desired in the book, both because I spent much labor in composing it, and because it embraces my whole system in moral matters" (Lettere, III, n. 308).

¹² In the last editions of the Theologia Moralis, the holy Doctor deleted these words: "I say certainly more probable; because when the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything but notably more probable. And in that case the safer opinion will no longer be doubtful (understand this of doubt strictly taken, as we shall say in the other question), but is morally or quasi-morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true. Hence then it comes about that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either slightly or at least doubtfully probable with respect to the safer one." These words, I say, which were found in the earlier editions, he deleted, and substituted for them the argument deduced from the obligation of following the truth. But he did this not because he held the things he had written to be false, but because they were less apt and less effective for his purpose than the argument from following the truth.

¹³ De Minusprobabilismo, p. 56.