Thesis III. (Continued)

Objection 1. If St. Alphonsus, having left Probabilism behind, had embraced Equiprobabilism, he would have changed his Theologia Moralis, which he had composed according to the norm of Probabilism; but this was not done.

Response. St. Alphonsus composed and completed his Theologia Moralis according to the norm of Equiprobabilism; and this is clearly evident from the express testimonies of the holy Doctor. "I have decided to publish," he says in the Monitum to the reader which he prefixed to the second edition, "this new work, which would hold a middle place between opinions too benign and too severe... But in order that I might select, in each question, the opinions more conformable to truth, I spent no little labor." And in the dedicatory letters of the same edition to Benedict XIV he has these words: "I thought it suitable to select the more probable opinions, and those more useful for the salvation of souls" (Lettere, III, n. 5). Again: "In my moral work I reprobated many opinions, approved by many authors, as being certainly less probable" (Dell' uso moder., c. 3, n. 81). Again: "Some have thought that in the greater work I follow the system of the Jesuits, which is not true; for in the conflict of opinions I followed the more probable" (Lettere, II, n. 308).¹

Note. From what has been said it follows that, if St. Alphonsus again and again calls one opinion probable and the opposite one more probable, this is to be understood of one that is doubtfully more probable.

Objection 2. St. Alphonsus requires knowledge of the law, i.e., as he himself explains the word "knowledge," certain notice; indeed at times he requires that the law be manifest, evident, most certain.

Response. Those words cannot be taken in the strict sense, unless we wish to make St. Alphonsus a laxist of the first rank. In what sense the aforesaid expressions are to be taken, the holy Doctor himself explains, concluding the treatise in which statements of this kind chiefly occur with these words: "It is concluded that, unless the opinion which stands for the law is either certain or at least certainly more probable, as we said at the beginning, we are not held to follow it" (I, 83). It is clear, therefore, that the certainty of which the holy Doctor speaks in the texts objected is understood as certainty taken in the broadest sense.

Objection 3. St. Alphonsus admits the use of a probable opinion, even if the opposite is more probable.

Response. St. Alphonsus admits the use of a probable opinion even if the opposite is doubtfully more probable, I concede; even if the opposite is certainly more probable, I deny; for he expressly repeats hundreds of times that the certainly more probable opinion must be followed and the certainly less probable one must be abandoned (n. 232).

Objection 4. St. Alphonsus rejects the certainly less probable opinion only because, in his opinion, it ceases to be probable.

Response. I deny the assertion; for the holy Doctor especially rejects the certainly less probable opinion and imposes the certainly more probable one because the truth is to be followed. Hence he expressly calls that argument the principal argument (Dichiarazione del sistema, n. 2); hence, in the last editions of the Theologia Moralis, for the argument deduced from the slight or doubtful probability of the certainly less probable opinion, he substituted the argument deduced from the obligation of following truth. This argument entirely abstracts from the slight or doubtful probability of the more benign opinion, and proves that the certainly less probable opinion must be rejected, whether it is called probable or is not called probable.²

III. From the obligation of following truth in the moral order. One who forms an opinion, i.e., one who holds one opinion as certainly more probable and the contrary one as certainly less probable, is held sincerely to tend toward this: that he assume and follow as his norm of acting the true opinion, i.e., the opinion which is conformable to the objective Eternal Law or the supreme norm of actions, whether this imposes duties or grants rights.³ But he does this only when he assumes and follows as his norm of acting the opinion which he thinks to be true, i.e., consonant with the aforesaid Law, and not when he assumes and follows as his norm of acting the opinion which he thinks to be false, i.e., dissonant from the aforesaid Law; in other words, he does this only when he assumes and follows as his norm the opinion which, in his judgment, is certainly more probable, and not when he assumes and follows as his norm the opinion which, in his judgment, is certainly less probable. Therefore one who forms an opinion is held to follow the opinion certainly more probable to him in favor of the law.

The major is clear from the fact that the Eternal Law is the supreme, primary, and independent norm of all moral goodness or rectitude, whereas reason is the inferior, secondary, and dependent rule, which borrows its whole force from the Eternal Law. Hence the Angelic Doctor excellently says: "In all ordered causes the effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause, because the second cause does not act except in virtue of the first cause. But that human reason is the rule of the human will, from which its goodness is measured, it has from the Eternal Law, which is divine reason. Hence it is said in Ps. 4: Many say: Who shows us good things? The light of your countenance, O Lord, has been signed upon us; as if he said: the light of reason, which is in us, can show us good things and regulate our will insofar as it is the light of your countenance, that is, derived from your countenance. Hence it is manifest that the goodness of the human will depends much more on the Eternal Law than on human reason" (I-II, q. 19, a. 4). Moreover, no one will deny that one must sincerely tend toward the agreement of the norm of acting with the supreme, primary, and independent norm of moral rectitude, unless he has proclaimed human reason independent of, and autonomous from, the Eternal Law.

The minor also seems clear and plain. For one does not sincerely tend toward an end if, of two means, he chooses the one which in his own judgment more probably leads away from the end than toward it. Suppose, for example, a sick person chooses a medicine which, in the judgment of that sick person himself, is more probably going to harm than to help him, while rejecting the medicine which is more probably going to help than to harm him: no one would contend that this sick person sincerely tends toward recovering health. By parity, one who would assume and follow as a norm the opinion which, in his own judgment, is more probably dissonant than consonant with the objective Eternal Law, while leaving aside the one which is more probably consonant than dissonant with the aforesaid Law, would in no way sincerely tend toward assuming as norm an opinion conformable with that Law.

And this argumentation is taken from those words by which St. Alphonsus, in the last editions of his Theologia Moralis, proves his system; because of the importance of the matter it is useful to cite them again: "I say that if the opinion which stands for the law seems certainly more probable, we are altogether held to follow it; nor can we then embrace the opposite opinion, which stands for liberty. The reason is that, in order to act licitly, we must in doubtful matters inquire into and follow truth;⁴ but where truth cannot be found clearly, we are held to embrace at least that opinion which comes nearer to truth,⁵ such as the more probable opinion is." And elsewhere: "The truth itself, which obliges us to follow it, also obliges us to follow that opinion which stands for the law, when it comes nearer to that same truth" (Dichiarazione del sistema, n. 2).

To forestall objections against the argumentation of St. Alphonsus, I would like you to notice what follows:

1. The argument is not deduced from the fact that I must sincerely tend toward the agreement of the norm to be assumed with truth, or with the Eternal Law certainly or certainly more probably known, but toward agreement with the Eternal Law as it is in itself. Therefore knowledge introduces a relation which must be absolutely excluded from the concept of the Law of which there is question in our argument, so that one who, in attacking our principle, makes mention of the aforesaid knowledge by that very fact departs from the meaning of the principle. In order that this may appear more clearly, I add these things: conformity with the norm certainly or certainly more probably known is to be actually attained, while one must tend toward the agreement of the norm with the Eternal Law as it is in itself.

2. The tendency of which we have spoken is nothing other than sincere love or an efficacious desire, appetite, and intention of assuming as norm of acting the true opinion, or the one conformable to the objective Eternal Law. This love and this intention ought to move each person in assuming the norm of acting, so that he may act honestly. One who is led and moved by this love alone or this intention as by a final cause can logically assume as norm only the more probable opinion, as being the means more probably leading to the end, and not the less probable opinion, as being the means more probably leading away from the end, i.e., away from the conformity of the norm of acting with the supreme norm.

3. I can intend the end, in this case truth or the conformity of the norm of acting with the objective Eternal Law, even if I do not know with certainty on which side the end is. Thus a sick person, by choosing the more probable remedy, intends health, even if he does not know with certainty on which side health is. Thus a traveler going to some city, by choosing the more probable of two opposite roads, truly intends the city, even if he knows only more probably, and not certainly, where the city is.

4. Tutiorism by no means follows from our argument; for, as we have said, the Eternal Law also wills very many licit things for us. Therefore, if, in equal probability about the licitness or illicitness of some action, I were to assume as norm, "This action is illicit for me," I would not certainly attain truth, or the agreement of the norm of acting with the Eternal Law or supreme norm.

5. Nor does our argument involve a begging of the question. For from the certain obligation of sincerely and efficaciously intending truth alone, which is an obligation of natural law, there is logically deduced by reasoning the certain obligation of following an opinion not only certainly or almost certainly true, but also more probably true and known as such; hence this too obliges by force of natural law.

IV. From the fact that an act, with respect to the agent, has the morality which the agent thinks objectively inheres in the act. An act, with respect to the one acting here and now, is of that morality which the one acting thinks objectively inheres in the act, rather than of that morality which the one acting thinks does not objectively inhere in the act. Hence, if the agent thinks that some act is objectively prohibited and therefore not permitted, that act, with respect to the one forming the opinion here and now, is prohibited and not permitted.

Sweens says excellently: "Since a human act derives its morality from the object as that object is in the apprehension of the one acting, it is clear that the principal norm of acting rightly must be taken by us from the knowledge which we have concerning that object. But a solidly probable opinion⁶ for the law begets in our mind knowledge concerning its object as commanded or prohibited; knowledge, I say, not indeed strictly certain and without fear concerning the opposite, but nevertheless positive and suitable for drawing the assent of a prudent man; in other words, as St. Alphonsus says, although such an opinion is not certainly true, it has a certain foundation that it is true. Therefore he would act unreasonably who would employ the reflex principle: A doubtful law does not oblige, in order to attribute to his action a goodness contrary to that which shines upon the action from its proper object. For this principle is wholly extrinsic to the action, and therefore it does not come into use except when, after prudent inquiry, no positive knowledge concerning the object of the action is available to us, or, what is the same thing, when concerning the direct goodness of the action we are in strict doubt, whether positive or negative; for such doubt is equivalent to invincible ignorance, as we have seen above."⁷

V. From the fact that Probabilism is at least doubtful. A doubtful system lacks practical value. But Probabilism, insofar as it permits us to follow the less probable opinion, is at least doubtful.

The major is made out from the fact that a moral system is itself the reflex principle which must serve for solving moral doubts for practice. But a reflex principle which is itself doubtful cannot solve doubts or induce a certain conclusion.

The minor is proved by these considerations: 1. As we shall soon note, all the arguments brought forward by the principal adversaries seem to involve a begging of the question. 2. Then, even if we grant that the arguments of the adversaries do not rest on a begging of the question, they nevertheless are not such as to settle the question, and they themselves need further proof. 3. Next, no one who is free from party zeal will deny that the arguments brought forward by us are at least such as to obtain true probability for our opinion. 4. Add that the highest men from every nation under the theological heaven have stood for anti-Probabilism, and even now not a few theologians support it; indeed Dr. Sawicki does not hesitate to assert that anti-Probabilism is becoming stronger day by day.⁸

Now who is there who, after all these things have been weighed in the scales of the sanctuary, would assert that Probabilism is indubitable?

Behold, then, the arguments by which our third thesis is proved sufficiently and more than sufficiently. It remains for us to present the arguments by which the Probabilists try to prove the contrary thesis.

¹ Nor should this seem strange to anyone, because St. Alphonsus, as we have said, defended Probabilism in the years 1749 and 1755, driven more by obedience than by conviction. These things are gathered both from those matters which we narrated above (p. 167), and from the fact that the holy Doctor, at the same times at which he composed the probabilistic and anonymous dissertations, publicly and non-anonymously, i.e., in the first four editions of the Theologia Moralis, expressly declares that he prescinds from the question whether or not it is permitted to follow the less probable opinion. Hence Dubois, with all the circumstances considered, rightly concludes that "the first dissertations of St. Alphonsus on the use of probable opinion were nothing except his preliminary inquiries and a certain exaggerated reaction against simple Probabiliorism, which he had previously defended. For he gathered all the arguments in favor of simple Probabilism, in order to persuade himself of its truth and of the licitness of its use" (De Exemplarismo divino, t. III, n. 1167). But the aforesaid persuasion was never such that a sincere lover of truth would have dared publicly and in his Theologia Moralis to approve for practice opinions which he himself held as more probably false than true. See this proved more fully in De Minusprobabilismo, p. 62.

² See other objections refuted in De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 58-59.

³ Therefore the Eternal Law, as it is taken here, is the reason of divine wisdom insofar as it is directive of all human acts. Moreover, this Law either commands, prohibits, permits, or counsels, as has been explained more fully in n. 81.

⁴ The truth which the holy Doctor here wishes to be inquired into and followed is certainly objective truth, not subjective truth, lest we fall into Kantism.

⁵ That is, it appears nearer to truth or bears before itself a greater appearance of truth; with this noted, the things which some have criticized in the doctrine of St. Alphonsus fall away.

⁶ A solidly probable opinion, as Sweens understands it, coincides with the more probable opinion.

⁷ Theol. mor. fund., n. 129.

⁸ Katholische Kirche und sittliche Personlichkeit, p. 82. Even in this century distinguished authors have cast their vote for Equiprobabilism, such as Vinati, in Divus Thomas, 1905, p. 340; Berardi, Theol. mor. fund., n. 514; Sweens, Theol. mor. fund., n. 700 sq.; Koch, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, p. 97 sq.; Van Tuil, in De Katholiek, 1900, p. 145; Beysens, Ethiek of Natuurlijke Zedenleer, I, n. 234 sq.; Seysener, in De Katholiek, 1916, II, p. 83; Beauduin-Gardeil, Tract. de Conscientia; Valensise, Super systema Theol. Mor... brevis disquisitio, etc.

Objection 1. The Church cannot positively approve a doctrine pertaining to daily practice which is against good morals and promotes illicit actions. But in St. Alphonsus the Church positively approved the doctrine of Probabilism.

Response. A twofold approval can and must be distinguished, one negative, the other positive. Negative approval is that by which the Church declared that the works of St. Alphonsus contain "nothing worthy of censure"; this approval imports only this one thing, that a doctrine has not been reprobated. Positive approval is understood as that by which the writings of the holy Doctor were adorned with the highest praises, and the Author himself was proclaimed by the Church as an illustrious master of Moral Theology and a safe guide of theologians.

Moreover, I freely admit that negative approval belongs to all the works of St. Alphonsus, even the earlier ones which are probabilistic; but the commendation which is called positive favors only Equiprobabilism, as was shown above (n. 232).

Objection 2. The Church cannot tolerate a doctrine pertaining to daily practice which is against good morals and promotes illicit actions. But the Church tolerates Probabilism; she could not do this if it were false, because she cannot tolerate a false doctrine which is against good morals and promotes illicit actions.

Response. The Church also tolerates Equiprobabilism and Probabiliorism; she could not do this if they were false, because even those doctrines which aggravate the yoke of the Lord more than is fitting must be said both to be dishonorable in themselves, or contrary to the divine ordination, and indirectly to harm good morals. Hence from tolerance as such nothing can be deduced in this case. But the tolerance of Probabilism does not prevent the Church from being opposed to Probabilism and from inhibiting it (n. 232); this, as it seems, continues to introduce some presumption against that system. Add what we have just said concerning the positive approval of the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, which favors only Equiprobabilism.

Objection 3. The supreme tribunal of the Church, i.e., the Sacred Penitentiary, in its solemn decrees admitted Probabilism as the practical norm for interpreting law. For in that decree given on February 11, 1661, by which it gave responses to a great number of questions concerning the obligation of denouncing a soliciting confessor, it gives this reason why in one question it affirms the obligation and in another it does not: that the opinion which denies the obligation "is not probable," or "is probable." This is nothing other than to acknowledge Probabilism, or solid probability, as the legitimate norm from which judgment is made concerning the licitness of acting.

Response 1. I deny the consequence; for this supposes that the word "probable" is taken in a logical sense, and in such a sense as also includes the certainly less probable. But neither point is proved, so that this word can be understood either of ethical probability (n. 215), or of logical probability, and indeed of such a kind as excludes the certainly less probable, according to what was said in the cited number.

Response 2. Even if we granted that the word "probable" is taken in the sense of the adversaries, nevertheless the consequence would have to be denied. For there is question of an odious law, namely of denouncing a confessor. Now, with the nature of a law of this kind considered, it was rightly answered that, according to the mind of the Church, a case which theoretically is probably not included under the law is practically not included under the law.

Objection 4. Probabilism was defended by countless and very grave theologians,¹ and is defended even now. But one who follows a doctrine which many and very grave theologians teach acts prudently; and one who acts prudently acts honestly.

Response. One who follows a doctrine which many and very grave theologians teach acts prudently if, after having seen the arguments of the adversaries, he holds it as certain that the system of the theologians whom he follows is true, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Let the reader see, therefore, whether, after considering the arguments brought forward against Probabilism, he can prudently judge that that system is certain and indubitable.

Objection 5. St. Thomas seems to favor Probabilism, since he requires knowledge in order that a precept oblige. But merely certain probabiliority does not import knowledge. "No one," says the holy Doctor, "is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept; and therefore he who is not capable of notice is not bound by a precept; nor is anyone ignorant of a precept of God bound to do the precept, except insofar as he is held to know the precept" (De Verit., q. 17, a. 3).

Response 1. From the fact that someone, especially formerly, i.e., before the controversy about the moral system arose, declares that no one is bound by any precept except through knowledge or notice of that precept, it cannot be deduced with certainty to which moral system, or even whether to any system, he adhered. For all will easily assert this, without attending precisely to this or that determinate sense of those words. Besides, this response being passed over:

Response 2. The holy Doctor, as is clear from the text brought forward, uses the words "knowledge" and "notice" interchangeably. Now even the state of one forming an opinion involves some notice, although imperfect (n. 215). This, moreover, the Angelic Doctor himself expressly affirms. "The more efficacious," he says, "the action of the agent is, the more quickly it induces the form; and therefore in intellectual matters we see that by one demonstration, which is efficacious, knowledge is caused in us; but opinion, although it is less than knowledge, is not caused in us by one dialectical syllogism, but several are required because of their weakness" (De Virt., q. un., a. 9, ad 11). Elsewhere (I-II, q. 67, a. 3) he distinguishes perfect and imperfect cognition, of which the former is obtained through a demonstrative means or argument, and the latter through a probable means. "It must be considered that cognition can be imperfect in three ways: in one way on the part of the knowable object; in another way on the part of the means; in a third way on the part of the subject... But on the part of the means, the cognition which is of some conclusion through a demonstrative means and through a probable means differ according to perfect and imperfect."²

Response 3. For the sake of completeness it is useful to report what St. Thomas notes in the treatment of a particular question, and what seems to favor us. The holy Doctor, asking "whether consent in delectation is a mortal sin," responds that "concerning this some have held different opinions: for some have said that consent in delectation is not a mortal sin, but only venial; but others have said that it is a mortal sin; and this opinion is more common and more likely" (I-II, q. 74, a. 8). Now, after reading the whole article (cf. also I-II, q. 88, a. 5, ad 2), no one will easily deny that, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, only the latter opinion, although he calls it merely more likely, is safe in practice. This being posited, the more likely or more probable opinion, for that is the same thing, seems to St. Thomas to be the one to be followed. The principal places to which different supporters of different opinions refer are these: Quodlibet VIII, q. 6, a. 13; II-II, q. 70, a. 3.

Objection 6. A doubtful law does not oblige. But a law which exists only certainly more probably is doubtful.

Response. A law doubtful with strict doubt does not oblige, I concede; a law doubtful with broad doubt, such as a certainly more probable law is, does not oblige, I deny, for the reasons brought forward.

You will insist: An unknown, unrecognized law does not oblige. But a law which is known only certainly more probably is truly unknown.

Response. A law entirely unknown or entirely unrecognized does not oblige, I concede; a law which is known by opinionative notice does not oblige, I deny, for the reasons brought forward.

You will urge: A law does not oblige unless it is known in the strict sense, as St. Thomas teaches. But the state of one forming an opinion does not import knowledge strictly so called, for this is strictly certain.

Response. I deny the major, and for the reasons brought forward I contend that even knowledge taken in the broad sense, i.e., opinionative cognition, suffices in order that a law oblige. Concerning the opinion of St. Thomas, enough has been said above.

Objection 7. It is repugnant that a certain obligation be induced by an uncertain law, because the effect cannot be more certain than the cause itself. But a law which exists only more probably remains uncertain.

Response 1. I turn back the argument: It is repugnant that a certain obligation be induced by an uncertain law. But a law which exists most probably or almost certainly is not altogether certain. Therefore not even most probable and almost certain laws oblige altogether certainly.

Response 2. I distinguish the assertion: It is repugnant that a certain obligation be induced by an uncertain law directly, I concede; indirectly, as happens if, for example, a law exists only most probably or almost certainly, i.e., by force of the principle explained in n. 232, or at least by force of the principle: In a practical doubt not solved, the safer part is to be followed, I deny.

Objection 8. An uncertain law cannot take away the certain right of liberty of determining oneself at will.

Response. The right of liberty, through the more probable law, directly becomes less probable. But the less probable right of liberty must yield to the more probable right of law, as follows from the arguments brought forward by us.

Objection 9. If the certainly more probable opinion had to be followed, each person would be held to institute a comparison between the various degrees of probability of each opinion; but this morally cannot be done by most people.

Response. This difficulty rests on the error which is called ignoratio elenchi. We require nothing else, nor by force of the system ought we to require anything else, except what is required by the Probabilists themselves, namely, that each person, before acting, inquire into the truth according to his powers or with proportionate diligence (n. 222). But if, after the truth has been inquired into with due diligence, it does not appear that the probability of one opinion surpasses the probability of the other, no obligation arises.³

Corollary. A law obliges if someone thinks or holds as more probable: 1. that the law exists; 2. that some person or case is comprehended by the law; 3. that the fact which founds the law has taken place. It obliges, moreover, in the cases set forth even if one who thinks that the law exists knows that extrinsic authority favors the more benign opinion more, provided, of course, that notwithstanding the extrinsic authority he holds the existence of the law as more probable (St. Alphonsus, Dell' uso moderato dell' opinione probabile, 1765; Lettere, III, 217).

¹ As regards the history of moral systems, it is useful to note these things:

1. With respect to the holy Fathers, I sincerely confess that, after looking over all their testimonies with an attentive eye, it remained doubtful to me whether they adhered to any moral system, and to which one, of course only implicitly. This one thing I observe: in view of the decree issued by Alexander VII in 1665, the doctrine of Probabilism is "wholly alien from Evangelical simplicity and from the doctrine of the holy Fathers" (n. 231). Let these things be said against those who have gathered certain things from the holy Fathers, otherwise few and ambiguous, of which several do not even deal directly with moral matters. Nor does any one of them state, and this is the state of the question, that the one acting can perform what he himself holds as more probably objectively illicit.

2. Then it must be noted that before Bartholomew de Medina, who in 1577 first stated this thesis: "If an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite is more probable" (Expos. in I-II D. Thom., q. 19, a. 6, concl. 3), Probabilism was commonly repudiated. The ancient Probabilists themselves expressly testify to this (cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 102-103).

3. After the year 1577, at which time Medina proposed the thesis cited above, very many theologians adhered to the new doctrine, and it gradually gained such strength that from the year 1620 up to the year 1665 it was received quite commonly. Yet it must not be judged that almost all after Medina, or from the year 1620 up to the year 1665, favored the new system; this is clear from very many testimonies of authors flourishing at that time (cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 105-113).

4. After Alexander VII in 1665 had overthrown many laxer opinions, and had called Probabilism itself "a mode of opining wholly alien from Evangelical simplicity and the doctrine of the holy Fathers," the system more benign than is just vanished more and more, and, chiefly through the work of the Supreme Pontiffs (n. 232), for a long time was quite commonly reprobated (cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 113-116).

From these things, which we have set forth more fully and confirmed with very many testimonies in our cited little work, from these things, I say, it is made out that the historical notice presented by several authors seems defective and not very accurate.

² By "probable means" the equally probable cannot be understood, since this introduces strict doubt and therefore excludes all notice. It remains that the more probable is understood, which therefore according to the mind of St. Thomas produces some cognition or knowledge, although imperfect.

³ Please see the remaining arguments and objections of the adversaries refuted in De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 95-132.