§ I. On the Voluntary in General

4. Definition. - The voluntary, properly so called, is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end, or of the object willed: from an intrinsic principle, which is common to every act proceeding from any potency of the soul whatever, for example from the vegetative potency, and is not proper to the voluntary alone; with cognition of the end, which belongs to the voluntary alone. Therefore an act is voluntary insofar as it is done with cognition of the end. Hence if some circumstance of the action is altogether unknown by the agent, the action in relation to that circumstance will not be voluntary, by that very fact that it is unknown. Thus, if someone strikes a man while ignorant that he is a priest, he will indeed be guilty of injustice, but not of sacrilege, since he was ignorant of that sacred quality of priest in the man struck.

From this definition it is clear that the voluntary differs from the coerced, from the spontaneous, from the willed, from the free, and from a human act: 1° from the coerced or violent, because that proceeds only from an extrinsic principle; 2° from the spontaneous, because although it proceeds from an intrinsic principle, nevertheless it does not proceed from that principle with cognition of the end. For a spontaneous act is of those who apprehend only the end (object), but not the reason of the end and its proportion to the act. Thus a dog, seeing bread, begins to move toward it, and an infant smiles upon its mother caressing it;¹ 3° from the willed; for willed is not said of an act of the will, but of the object into which the will tends, and this can happen although the object does not depend on the will as an effect from its own cause. Thus rain poured out upon dry land, with respect to the farmer, is called willed, but not voluntary. 4° from the free, because that proceeds from the will determining itself to acting, with the power of not acting. Therefore everything free is voluntary, but not conversely. Thus the Blessed in heaven love God voluntarily indeed, but not freely; say the same of man as wayfarer, who voluntarily indeed, yet necessarily,

pursues happiness. Nevertheless in the schools voluntary is regularly taken for free, since in the acts by which man as wayfarer tends to his end they are in fact not distinguished. The reason is from St. Thomas,¹ because the will "has determination in this alone," "that it naturally desires happiness, but not determinately in this or that"; 5° from a human act, which, although it agrees with the voluntary insofar as it proceeds from the same principle, namely from deliberate will, nevertheless differs from it, both because a human act, since it is an act, comprises only action or omission, while the voluntary also extends to their effects (n. 6); and because a human act, since it is human, is effected by man alone, but the voluntary by any being endowed with intellect and will; and because the human act (of the 2nd and 3rd kind, p. 1, note 1 at the bottom of the page), which is considered by Moralists, is free, while there is also necessary voluntary (n. 4 under 4°).²

5. Division. - The voluntary is manifold, namely:

1° Necessary or free, of which the one differs from the other as voluntary and free (n. 4 under 4°).

2° Perfect, which supposes that full cognition of the intellect by which the character of good and evil becomes known, and the full consent of the will, such as is in him who perfectly knowing and willing eats flesh on a forbidden day; or imperfect, or semi-voluntary, which proceeds from the will with that imperfect cognition by which the character of good and evil becomes known only somewhat obscurely, and in which there can be a manifold degree. But an imperfect or semi-voluntary act, even in the violation of a grave precept, does not exceed venial sin, as happens in those half-asleep or distracted by other things.

3° Voluntary simply, which proceeds from the full inclination of the will without any repugnance, as, for example, in a youth who, for the comfort of his mind, wishes a game, when he could choose for himself another kind of recreation, for example walking; or voluntary according to something, which indeed comes from the consent of the will, but with some repugnance, or with some inclination of the will toward the opposite. Therefore, if someone, induced by human fear or by threats of companions, violates a precept which obliges gravely and notwithstanding fear of any evil whatever, he places an act truly voluntary (unless the fear is of such a kind that it wholly disturbs reason), and indeed gravely sinful; for he acts with full determination of the will, although he acts reluctantly and would prefer not to act. Yet an act of this kind is also involuntary according to something, and therefore becomes less culpable.

4° Actual, virtual, habitual, interpretative. It is called actual if the will here and now, and immediately and directly, is borne toward the thing willed. Thus actually voluntary to me is, for example, this my response to the question proposed, or contrition while here and now I elicit an act of penance. Virtual is an act of the will physically indeed now past, but which morally perseveres in some thing which is done in a human manner, as in its effect, and therefore is its cause. Thus, for example, in a traveler who "desires to reach the wished-for goal of his course," the individual steps which he places toward it are themselves virtually voluntary, although he does not attend to the individual steps, indeed, while making the journey, he thinks about things altogether diverse. The reason is that those steps proceed from the act of the will by which the traveler at the beginning wished to undertake the journey to that goal. Resolve the same concerning absolution imparted by a distracted confessor. Habitual is an act of the will not retracted, but not persevering either in itself or in its effect, as the application of the fruit of a Mass to be celebrated long afterward, not revoked. Interpretative is that which has been had neither physically nor morally, but which can prudently be presumed would be had, if thought were taken of it, or could be taken. Thus the consent of an absent Superior, reasonably presumed by a religious, is interpretatively voluntary. Sometimes it gives honesty to an act, when there is question of lawfulness alone, as in the proposed example; often it does not give honesty, especially when there is question of the validity of an act, because then it is required that another's will either truly exist, or have existed and not been revoked. Thus you cannot absolve someone sacramentally if you trust that the Superior would consent to the jurisdiction if you asked, because jurisdiction actually had is required (Haine, Th. Mor. Elem., p. 4, q. 7).

The interpretative voluntary is sometimes taken in the sense of the indirect voluntary, and by St. Alphonsus (L. I. 170) is called virtual or interpretative advertence; improperly, however, as is clear from the Holy Doctor himself, L. V, 177, § Ratio 2 and § Dictum est; L. VI, 14; L. III, 313.

By the ancient scholastics under the name of the habitual voluntary there is sometimes understood that voluntary which is now called virtual; for example, by St. Thomas, p. 3, q. 64, a. 8 ad 3.

5° Express, which is manifested externally (by words or signs), for example if a Bishop, asked to grant jurisdiction to someone for hearing confessions, responds: I grant it, or assents by a nod of the head; or tacit, which is not declared externally, but is sufficiently gathered to be present from some fact, or from the omission of some fact. Thus the sins of subjects are voluntary and imputable to a superior if he omits to oppose himself to them when otherwise he can and ought to do this. Hence rule of law 43 in the Sixth: "He who is silent is seen to consent." Tacit is also called presumed, namely concerning the present.

6° Explicit or implicit, according as something is intended in terms, or in a proper and distinct concept - as if one about to baptize should say: I wish to baptize - or in a confused concept, or in some general thing willed, as if one about to baptize should say: I wish to do what Christ instituted or what the Church here does or intends.¹

7° Absolute or efficacious, and relative or inefficacious. This division supposes two volitions which cannot stand together. From this twofold contrary volition, that is called absolute and efficacious which explicitly or implicitly contains the revocation of the other; but that which is thus explicitly or implicitly revoked is called relative or inefficacious.² See n. 1219, Note, under 2°; n. 1319, q. 2°, and St. Alph., L. IV, 210; L. VI, 24.

8° Direct and indirect, concerning which in the following §.

9° Some add the voluntary by one's own will, which proceeds from the operator's own will, and the voluntary by another's will, which indeed proceeds from the will of another, yet is imputed to us on account of subordination or subjection, or the pact of a legitimate Superior or of the parties among themselves. Thus the sin of Adam was voluntary for us; thus, at least in the external forum, the will of the father is sometimes judged the will of the son who is under puberty, or even of a minor. See, for example, n. 1525, It is said, 3°.