§ III. On Fear

15. Definition. - Fear is a trepidation of mind on account of some danger present or future to oneself or to those closely joined to oneself.

Division. - Fear is commonly divided as follows, namely:

1° By reason of itself, into grave and light, according as a grave evil is feared (hard imprisonment, notable detriment to reputation, great loss of goods), certain or probable, inevitable; - or an evil either light, or improbable, or avoidable. Thus, if you take fear objectively. - Subjectively it is most grave, grave, or light according as it disturbs reason entirely, notably, or lightly.

But grave fear is such absolutely or relatively. Fear is called absolutely grave when evils truly grave in themselves are feared; but relatively grave when, although light in itself, nevertheless it is grave with respect to certain persons. Thus boys, women, and old men are wont to be affected by greater fear in the same danger than men of mature age.

2° Fear, by reason of the cause, is from within or from without, according as the thing itself produces fear, as disease, shipwreck, etc., or an extrinsic cause, namely a man bringing fear upon someone.

3° Fear, by reason of the manner in which it is struck in, is struck in justly or unjustly, according as it is inflicted from a cause either just, for example deserved penalties, or unjust; and this fear is unjust as to substance. It is called unjust as to manner when it is inflicted indeed from a just cause, but without the order of law being observed. See n. 1599. II.

4° By reason of the end, fear from without can be struck in either for extorting some act, or for another end.

Reverential fear must also be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have offended his parents, or other Superiors. It is referred to just or unjust fear according as its cause is just or unjust. But it can be grave if there is prudent fear lest those who strike in the fear be held offended for a long time and gravely.

16. Principles. - I. An act placed from fear, however grave, is simply and absolutely voluntary and free. The reason is that through fear neither is cognition taken away on the part of the intellect, unless the mind is entirely disturbed, - nor election on the part of the will, which always enjoys the faculty of determining itself to the opposite. Hence those have always been regarded as apostates who, conquered by fear of torments, denied the Faith.

II. Those things which are done from fear, although simply voluntary, nevertheless regularly are also involuntary in a qualified respect; whence also the gravity of fault is diminished. The reason is that, by hypothesis, when someone is impelled to acting by fear alone, he acts in such a way that, with fear absent, he would recoil from acting; and therefore a work done from fear alone has joined with it a certain sadness and repugnance of the will, although inefficacious. It is said regularly, because sorrow for sins which is elicited from fear of divine vengeance excludes every true notion of the involuntary, or every deliberate affection toward sin. Understand this of fear or attrition that is simply servile, not of servilely servile fear; for the latter does not exclude the will of sinning absolutely, as the former does. Namely, just as in a merchant who casts his wares into the sea from fear of shipwreck there remains an affection simply voluntary toward the wares, so in a sinner detesting his sins from servilely servile fear there remains an affection simply voluntary toward sins; and neither this detestation nor that casting overboard is involuntary except in a qualified respect.

III. If fear takes away the use of reason, the act, as is clear, can in no way be voluntary. But if it does not indeed take away the use of reason, but notably impedes it, the act will be imperfectly voluntary because of imperfect cognition of the thing.

17. Note. - 1° What has been said holds concerning those things which are done from fear, not concerning those things which are done only with fear; for the latter can in no way be called involuntary, and are wont to belong to a man acting manfully or overcoming fear, for instance to a soldier fighting bravely. Bouq. n. 59.

2° It happens that together with fear other causes impel one to acting, and then the action can be pleasing rather than troublesome. For example, someone eats meat on a forbidden day from fear indeed of the mockery of companions, but at the same time from affection for meat. In this case it is not always evident what the act has from fear and what from elsewhere, nor therefore in what degree it is involuntary in a qualified respect. Ib. n. 61.

3° Theologians treat of fear under a threefold respect: 1. as an impediment of the voluntary; 2. as a cause excusing from law; 3. as a cause of invalidity of acts. Here we have spoken of it under the first respect.