§ 2. On the Lawful Use of Probability

The theologians, for whom there is morally one and the same sense concerning the use of probability where the matter concerns the danger of an evil absolutely to be avoided, by no means concur in the same opinion in the treatment of the present question; but different men devise different systems, which more or less favor either law or liberty. These systems must now be set forth briefly, so that afterward the system of St. Alphonsus may be better understood, and both the truth and the security of that system may become more clearly known.

85. STATE OF THE QUESTION. 1. By a moral system is understood a complex of rules by which moral controversies, arising from probable opinions, are settled in practice.

2. The end of a moral system is to indicate how, in practice, one arrives at a morally certain conscience, so that each one may act safely.

3. The matter of a moral system is only those doubts in which the matter concerns the honesty of an action, as we said above.

4. Five moral systems chiefly are numbered, devised by authors, namely: 1. rigorism (or tutiorism); 2. probabiliorism; 3. equiprobabilism; 4. probabilism; 5. laxism. To these in our times has been added the system of compensation.⁴

86. 1. Rigorists are called those who admit reflex principles in no way, or only in a merely secondary way. They are also called anti-probabilists, because they reject every use of probability properly so called in a moral matter; and tutiorists, because they teach that in doubt the safer part is always to be followed.⁵ But they are divided, according to the grades of direct certitude which they require in order to act lawfully, into strict rigorists and mild rigorists.

a) The stricter rigorists require direct absolute certitude in order to act lawfully. Their dictum is: safer or certain.

Thus Sinnichius, Wendrochius, etc. This system was condemned through the following proposition proscribed by Alexander VII (the 3rd): "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, or even the most probable among probable opinions." Therefore at least a most probable opinion in favor of liberty is lawful, even if, by its nature, it does not go out from the limits of probability. The reason is that the opposite opinion rests on only a slight moment, on account of which natural right forbids liberty to be despoiled of its own right (cf. n. 40, rule 3).

Add that rigorism is: 1. alien to the evangelical spirit: for how could the yoke of Christ be called sweet, and his burden light, if we were bound always to follow the safer things? 2. contrary to the doctrine of the holy Fathers, as is clear from their testimonies, which St. Alphonsus reports; 3. very pernicious in practice: for it imposes an intolerable burden, increases sins, ensnares consciences, generates desperation, and builds unto gehenna (I, 60, 66, 82 ff.).

b) The milder rigorists teach that direct certitude is required in order to act lawfully, not indeed absolute certitude, but broad or moral certitude. These indeed permit the use of the most probable opinion, not because it is lawful to use a probable opinion, but because, in moral matters, a most probable opinion furnishes some broad certitude (H. Ap., I, 33). Their dictum is: safer or most probable.

Thus Fagnanus, Habert, etc. This system indeed has not been condemned, but we do not admit it. Cf. below the first Thesis (n. 91).

2. Probabiliorists teach that the safer opinion must be held, unless the opinion for liberty is manifestly and solidly more probable. Their dictum is: Safer or more probable.

Thus Billuart, Wigandt, and, among more recent authors, Pegues and others from the Order of St. Dominic. And the reason is that it is not lawful, they say, to incur a grave and founded danger of transgressing the law; which danger, they say, always threatens unless the opinion which stands for liberty is at least more probable than the other. But if the opinion which stands for liberty is truly more probable, they contend that there is only a slight danger of acting against the law, which danger can prudently be disregarded (Billuart, de act. hum., Diss. VI). Against them likewise Thesis 1 will be established.

3. Equiprobabilists teach that in the concurrence of two opinions equally or almost equally probable (of which one favors liberty, the other law), while the doubt stands concerning the existence of the law, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty; but while the doubt stands concerning the cessation of the law, the opinion favoring the law must be followed. Outside the limits of this broad equiprobability, the uniquely probable or certainly more probable opinion prevails, whether this opinion supports the law or liberty. Their dictum is: The opinion for which possession stands, provided that it is equally or almost equally probable.

Thus, after several older authors, St. Alphonsus and his disciples, Aertnys, Konings, and others from diverse schools, such as Gousset, Scavini, Del Vecchio, Muller, Martin, Pruner, Simar, Berardi, Sweens, Farges, Beaudouin, Beijsens, Valensise, Koch, etc. Their reason is that in the concurrence of equiprobable opinions we are involved in strict doubt; but a strictly doubtful law does not oblige, and in an equal cause the condition of the possessor is better. More concerning this system at n. 88 ff.

4. Probabilists (in general) teach that in the concurrence of a probable or more probable opinion which stands for the law, it is permitted to follow a probable opinion favoring liberty, provided that this opinion is truly probable. The dictum of the probabilists is: The more benign, provided that it is truly probable. Their reason is that it is not lawful to impose an obligation concerning which there is no certain evidence; now, there is no certain evidence concerning the law where the opinion for liberty is truly probable; therefore.

Bartholomew Medina, O.P. (1.2, q. 19, a. 6, Commentary on St. Thomas), was the first who, in the year 1577, published this opinion: "If an opinion is probable, it is lawful to follow it, although the opposite is more probable."⁶

This system is not sufficiently defined, nor is it circumscribed by certain limits. For, as it is commonly circulated: 1. it does not define whether an opinion favoring liberty ought to be relatively probable, or whether it suffices that it be absolutely probable; 2. while it grants the use of a less probable opinion, with the safer and even more probable one left aside, it does not define whether this has force concerning one a little more probable, or concerning one notably more probable. And this obscurity indeed is the cause why probabilists have entered upon a diverse way.

Some, teaching that it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion which favors liberty, understand solidly probable relatively, and therefore with only a probable, or a little more probable, opinion which stands for the law left aside. These agree in substantial matters with the equiprobabilists, and can be called moderate probabilists. Such are Suarez,⁷ Vasquez, Lugo, Lessius, Laymann, Sylvius, Palaus, Viva, Abelly, Reuter, Voit, etc. We shall not act against these when we are about to attack probabilism. Yet we note that this moderate probabilism, since it carries before itself some ambiguity, by not determining sufficiently the less probable opinion, does not sufficiently guard against abuses, as St. Alphonsus has already complained.⁸

But there are others, probabilists, who hold as sufficiently probable every opinion absolutely and in itself probable, without caring at all about relative probability; they also deny that the use of a probable opinion is to be confined within the limits of equiprobabilism, and therefore that an opinion becomes unlawful to which another certainly or evidently more probable opinion is opposed. Thus expressly Lacroix,⁹ Illsung,¹⁰ etc., whose doctrine comes under the name of absolute or common or pure, broad probabilism.

Finally, among probabilists, some reject the principle of possession, or do not admit it in the same circumstances as St. Alphonsus.¹¹

Now, just as probabiliorism is more rigid than is just, so absolute probabilism seems to be more benign than is right. The disadvantages under which it labors will be indicated below, where its refutation is treated (Theses II and III).

Note. Ter Haar treats at length the various kinds of the older probabilists (op. cit., p. 20-85). If we consider the mind of more recent probabilists, some (for example, Lehmkuhl) are to be numbered with the moderate probabilists, others (for example, Raphael a St. Joseph, Meffert, Ballerini) rather with the broad probabilists. It is especially to be lamented that several recent authors sometimes use more general and even rather obscure words, by which they seem now to approach absolute probabilism, now to recede from it. See examples in Vind. Alph., I, p. 480 ff.

5. Laxists taught that it is permitted to follow any opinions whatever, even slightly probable ones. Their dictum is: The more benign, provided that it is probable in some way. Thus Caramuel, the prince of the laxists, Diana, and others.¹²

This other extreme was condemned by Innocent XI in the 3rd proposition, which said: "Generally, while relying on probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided that one does not go outside the limits of probability, we always act prudently when we do something." This proposition was excerpted to the letter from Tamburini (Dec., I, c. 3, § 3, n. 3). But deservedly was it condemned: for slight probability cannot be called true probability, just as slight fortitude or slight skill cannot be called true fortitude and true skill, but ought rather to be called weakness and lack of skill (H. Ap., I, 30).

To these things is added that "that lax manner of opining is alien to the evangelical simplicity and the doctrine of the holy Fathers; if the faithful were to follow it in practice as a right rule, an immense corruption of Christian life would creep in." Thus Pope Alexander VII, in the decree issued on September 24, 1665.

6. The system of compensation, which certain more recent authors defend (Manier, Lehu, Potton, Boisdron), states the general principle: Every law always obliges to some extent; but its force of obliging increases or decreases according to the degree of knowledge which we have concerning it. A law perfectly known obliges fully; wholly unknown, it does not bind; but imperfectly known, it binds imperfectly. But in order that, while a law imperfectly known stands, we may enjoy liberty, there is required on our part, as an excusing reason, a relatively grave inconvenience, by which the wound is compensated that we, by using our liberty, probably inflict on the law and on the moral order. The reason for this system is that the merely material transgression of a law is already a certain evil; for through this we inflict a wound on the law or moral order, because the law is frustrated in its end intended by the Legislator.

This system is not pleasing. The reasons are: a) because, as we shall say below (n. 91), it supposes that law obliges antecedently to promulgation: which smells of probabiliorism, indeed even of tutiorism. b) Moreover, the rule handed down by those theologians seems very difficult, and in practice there will scarcely be place for it. For the inconvenience attached to the observance of the law will often be different for individual persons, indeed also for individual cases. Thus, for example, the gravity of the inconvenience in confessing a doubtful sin will be different both according to the different character of each penitent, and according to the nature of the sin to be accused, and often also according to the different character of the confessor before whom the accusation must be made. Hence that rule, on the one hand, furnishes occasion for many anxieties; but on the other hand, frequently exposes one to the illusions of self-love; and therefore it cannot be a prudent practical norm in resolving doubts. c) Finally, the foundation of this system is also preserved in our system of equiprobabilism, insofar as the number of laws which are prescribed to be observed in practice is most closely equated with the number of materially existing laws, and therefore the end of all laws in the universe is attained in the best way in which it can be attained.

Note. Cardinal D'Annibale (Summ., I, 270) judged that the rule for the solution of doubts was to be drawn solely from possession. If this system is well understood and accommodated to practice, it rather approaches the system of St. Alphonsus. For the Holy Doctor (cf. Gaude's Dissertation de mor. syst. S. Alph., n. 26) calls the principle of possession supreme, most universal.

87. Therefore, with the stricter rigorism and laxism excepted, the remaining systems can be sustained without the condemnation of the Church. Among these, equiprobabilism holds the middle way, of which St. Alphonsus is the distinguished defender (Vind. Alph., P. I, c. 3, Apologetic Dissertation, 143).

Historical question. That equiprobabilism is the genuine system of St. Alphonsus, which he definitively embraced at least from the year 1762, the Vindiciae Alphonsianae (I, p. 1-150), Gaude (de mor. syst. S. Alph.), Wouters (de Minusprobab., ed. 2, p. 49), and many others clearly prove.

1. Before the year 1762, in two dissertations which he inscribed FOR THE MODERATE USE OF PROBABLE OPINION IN THE CONCURRENCE OF A MORE PROBABLE ONE, and of which he published one in the year 1749 and the other in 1755, he supported simple probabilism. But truly, as is evident from his various writings, these dissertations, published without the name of the Holy Author, were nothing except certain trials, certain preludes, or preliminary contests concerning a most grave question. For before the year 1762 (let this be well noted), in all and each of the editions of his Moral Theology, indeed also in other works of lesser moment which he brought into the light under his own name, he constantly asserted that he was prescinding from that thesis: Whether it is lawful to follow the less probable, with the more probable left aside. Indeed, in various works of this time there appears so much the constant inquiry of the Holy Doctor into the safe way, that it is not difficult (so the Collationes Brugenses) to find support in them for various systems.

2. After the year 1762, once the brief Dissertation, in the Italian language, de usu moderato opin. probab., had been published, St. Alphonsus cast away his former hesitation, and constantly held those opinions which we shall set forth below. Much erudition and usefulness are brought, in relation to this question, by a comparison of the propositions of each edition of the Moral Work. Cf., on this matter, the preface of Father Gaude (I, p. xix), and especially the cited little work of the same author.

3. Although the system established by the Holy Doctor was received everywhere with great praise (cf. Berthe, Vita di S. Alfonso, II, p. 165), nevertheless the Saint himself never had an end of perfecting his work, so that he receded ever more from absolute probabilism, and found the middle way between probabilism and probabiliorism. Thence it came about that he made public his celebrated Monitum (1773) and the golden little work, Dichiarazione del sistema (1774). When these had been added to the eighth edition of the Moral Work, and the probabilistic dissertation of Father Zacharia, S.J. (cf. n. 6), had also been expunged, St. Alphonsus could exclaim: "Joyful now I shall die, because this last edition, the work complete in all respects, has come into the light" (cf. Gaude, de mor. syst., p. 38).

All these things, after the letters of the Holy Doctor were published and the excellent works of Father Gaude, lie open so clearly to theologians (even if, by reason of the controversy occasioned by Father Ballerini's dissertation on the moral system of St. Alphonsus, held in the Roman College in 1863, they remained doubtful for a while), that now "they think it must be acknowledged, nor can it be denied, that St. Alphonsus, at least from the year 1762, was an equiprobabilist and rejected common probabilism." "In vain," they say, "do the very writers of the Collationes Brugenses (1906, p. 400) assert that the older St. Alphonsus taught equiprobabilism... whence the genuine and definitive opinion of the Holy Doctor is not to be sought in writings from 1762 and earlier, as the new probabilists did and do. Thus Lehmkuhl is not free from this error in the little work Probabilismus vindicatus." To these sayings consent, besides the alumni of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, very many distinguished theologians, such as Bellesheim (Katholik, 1891, II, p. 245), who thus speaks: "The texts are thus clearer than the midday light, so weighty, that an opponent must be silent: St. Alphonsus truly taught equiprobabilism." The same testify Schneider (Liter. Rundschau, 1895, col. 202), Koch (Tubing. Quart. Schr., 1897, p. 70-126), Mausbach (Die kath. Moral, p. 181), Berardi (Theol. fund., 1905, I, n. 55), Tanquerey (I, n. 405), Sweens (Theol. mor., 688).

Finally let Genicot-Salsmans be heard, who in the last edition of Theol. mor. (1912) has these things: "In reality St. Alphonsus seems in his last works to have openly taught equiprobabilism, at least if we attribute to the words which he uses their native sense" (de Consc., n. 81-72). Cf. Wouters, de Minusprobab., p. 56.

Since these things are so, with the Collationes Brugenses we note that several probabilists do not always act critically when they at once recur to the probabilistic dissertations of the years 1749 and 1755. For in his letters the Holy Doctor clearly acknowledges that he made a retraction concerning common probabilism, which he previously professed, and this indeed, as he says, not for the sake of avoiding difficulty or persecution, but for the sake of conviction and conscience. Corresp. gen., n. 818 and Corresp. spec., n. 315.

Hence the defender of St. Alphonsus for the Concession of the title Doctor asserts without hesitation: "The Holy Author, from the year 1762, defended the system of EQUIPROBABILISM so openly, clearly, and constantly, that every reasonable doubt about this matter is excluded: which also the most ample Censor (that is, the Promoter of the Faith) concedes" (Act. Doct. animad., § 25, Resp. n. 239).

But this is not the place to dwell longer on the question of fact. It is better to approach the question of right, and to demonstrate that the rules handed down by St. Alphonsus concerning the manner of resolving practical doubt are true.

St. Thomas, Quodl. VIII, q. 6, a. 13; St. Alphonsus, I, n. 54; ed. G., I, p. 25; Monitum from ed. 7; little work Dichiaraz., etc.; Vind. Alph. (ed. 2); Gaude, de mor. system. S. Alph.; De Caigny, Apologetic Dissertation; Wouters, de Minusprobab. (ed. 2); Ter Haar, de syst. mor. antiq. Probab.; the history of Innocent XI's decree on Probabilism; Ballerini, op. mor., ed. 2; Arendt, Crisis; Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund., ed. 3; Sweens, Theol. mor. fund.; Beaudouin, de Consc.; Lehmkuhl, Probab. vindicatus. Besides these, the authors of moral theology, treatise on Conscience.

So that the system may be better understood, three things will be explained:

1. The exposition of the system;
2. The demonstration of the system;
3. The excellent merit of the system.

Two things are essential to this system: the method and the principles which it employs (Vind. Alph., Apologetic Dissertation, n. 68).

88. A. The METHOD is expressed by the following rules:

1. Truth is to be sought with moral diligence, which is proportioned to the matter and to the gravity of the doubt (n. 40, rule 2).

2. Where truth cannot be found, a comparison of opinions must necessarily be instituted, and their value must be estimated not only absolutely, but also relatively (n. 67).

3. From the comparison and opposition of opinions one must see what sort of doubt arises, whether strict or broad. When opinions occur equally or almost equally probable, we are involved in strict doubt (n. 74). When one opinion is certainly more probable, or most probable, or uniquely probable, we are involved in broad doubt, with moral certitude broadly taken (n. 75, 77).

4. Once the nature of the doubt has been defined, the principles are immediately applied.

89. B. The PRINCIPLES on which St. Alphonsus's system rests are of a twofold kind, according to the twofold kind of doubt, strict or broad.

I. In STRICT doubt these two principles have force: A doubtful law does not oblige, and In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. From these principles flows this DOUBLE RULE: 1. In doubt concerning the existence (or extension) of a law or right, when there concur two opinions equally or almost equally probable, of which one stands for law, the other for liberty, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty; because in strict doubt concerning the existence of a law, liberty certainly possesses (n. 44, 55). 2. In doubt concerning the cessation of a law or right certainly previously existing, when there concur two equiprobable opinions or assertions of fact, the opinion or assertion which favors the law is to be held, because in strict doubt concerning the cessation of a law, the previously certain law possesses (ibid.).

II. In BROAD doubt the following principle comes in: In obscure things the more verisimilar is to be chosen. "Where truth cannot be clearly found," says St. Alphonsus (I, 54, 88), "we are bound to embrace at least that opinion which comes nearer to the truth." From this general principle flow two COROLLARIES: 1. A law that is only broadly doubtful, regularly speaking, obliges, because concerning it there is moral, and therefore sufficient, evidence. 2. Liberty or liberation that is only broadly doubtful, regularly speaking, truly de-obliges, because concerning it there is moral, and therefore sufficient, evidence.

90. It is also useful to note here that it is unlawful to use two probable opinions, or both parts of a doubt, at the same time in the same act, if one law is thereby certainly violated: for example, in a testament which, lacking legal form, is probably valid. Therefore it is not lawful, by following the former opinion, to enter upon the inheritance, and at the same time, by following the latter, not to pay the legacies contained in the same testament. For by such a manner of acting, the observance of one or the other law would necessarily be eluded, and the agent would contradict himself in the same act or business, which would be contrary to right reason (Reuter, n. 110).

Concerning Rigorism and Laxism, as being condemned by the Church, it would be futile to dispute here. Therefore it remains to prove the system of St. Alphonsus against probabiliorists and absolute probabilists at the same time. In establishing the theses by which the Alphonsian system is constituted, we shall indicate all things according to the norm of those things which are reported in the Acts of the Doctorate.

In doubt concerning the existence of a law, when there concur opinions equally or almost equally probable, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty.

The sense of the proposition is evident. Cf. what we said n. 70 ff.

The thesis is against tutiorists and probabiliorists. It can also be stated thus: It is lawful to follow an opinion equally or almost equally probable for liberty, with the opposite opinion for the law left aside. In strict doubt concerning the existence of a law, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty. It is lawful to follow the opinion for liberty, with the opinion for the law a little or doubtfully more probable left aside.

91. I. THE THESIS IS PROVED FROM THE AUTHORITY OF DOCTORS AND OF THE CHURCH.

1. Although the holy Fathers did not treat this question expressly, nevertheless they teach not obscurely that the safer part is not always to be followed in doubts.

Behold, for example, with what words St. Gregory Nazianzen (Or. 39, n. 18, 19) addresses a heretic who condemned second marriages: "By what argument do you confirm this? Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot, do not condemn. But if the law is doubtful, let humanity and facility prevail." And St. Augustine (Ep. 54, c. 2, n. 2): "For what is not proved to be contrary either to faith or to good morals is to be held indifferently." Similarly St. Bernard (Ep. 77, c. 5, n. 18): "Certainly, there each one securely abounds in his own sense, where what is thought is opposed neither to certain reason nor to authority not to be despised."

The testimonies of other Fathers can be read in St. Alphonsus (I, 60, 66; ed. G., I, p. 30, 36).

2. Disputations concerning probabilism began to be made toward the end of the sixteenth century; and from this time there were almost innumerable authors, and these most excellent, who pleaded the cause of this doctrine, at least in general, against anti-probabilists and probabiliorists.

Among these authors, as leaders, are to be reckoned Suarez, Vasquez, Lugo, Lessius, Sanchez, Palaus, Toletus, Laymann, the Salmanticenses, Amort, Bonacina, Sylvius, Croix, Roncaglia, Elbel (Diss. 1757, n. III).

3. The same is evident both from the practice of the Supreme Pontiffs, for example concerning certain doubtful impediments of matrimony (cf. I, n. 78; Diss. 1755, n. II), and from diverse responses of the Holy Office and of the Sacred Penitentiary, approved by Pius VIII and Gregory XVI, concerning loans.

For while it was being sharply disputed among theologians whether an increase could lawfully be received by force of the title of civil law, the Church, while this invincible doubt stood, handed down this practically safe rule, namely: "that penitents receiving profit from a loan according to the legal rate are not to be disturbed, provided they are ready to obey the Holy See when it shall have definitively defined."

4. There is added the approval of the works of St. Alphonsus issued by the Holy See, by which it is especially evident that a professor of sacred Theology can lawfully follow in all things and publicly hand down the doctrine of the Blessed Doctor, notwithstanding an oath which he may have emitted of retaining the doctrine of a University which would follow probabiliorism and the opinions of probabiliorists (see the text at the end of the Preface).

92. II. THE THESIS IS PROVED FROM REASON, namely: 1. from the nature of law, 2. from the nature of liberty.

PROOF 1. From the nature of LAW, because from the right notion of law there is drawn this first fundamental principle: A doubtful law does not oblige.

ARGUMENTATION. A law insufficiently promulgated does not oblige. But a doubtful law is insufficiently promulgated. Therefore it does not oblige.

The MAJOR is evident both from the unanimous consent of theologians and from reason, because law is the measure according to which our life ought to be regulated, and it is the bond of our liberty, from which it follows that it must be applied to liberty through sufficient knowledge.

1. Law is a measure, which the prince of theologians, St. Thomas, thus teaches: "Law is a certain rule and measure of acts, according to which someone is induced to acting or is withdrawn from acting" (1.2, q. 90, a. 1). "But a rule and measure is imposed by the fact that it is applied to those things which are ruled and measured. Hence, in order that law obtain the power of obliging (which is proper to law), it must be applied to men, who ought to be ruled according to it. But such application is made by the fact that it is brought to their knowledge by promulgation itself. Hence promulgation itself is necessary in order that law have its power" (I, 57). Therefore law before promulgation does not have the force of obliging. And the same must be said if the matter concerns natural law: for God promulgates this through the light of reason implanted in each man, as St. Thomas asserts (1.2, q. 90, a. 4, ad 1).

2. Law is a bond. "For law is said from binding, because it obliges to acting" (1.2, q. 90, a. 1). Now, law touches and binds man only through knowledge. "For just as for binding some thing it is necessary that a cord actually be applied; so, for binding the will of man, so that he may exercise some action, or be bound to omit it, it is necessary that he himself have knowledge of the precept; otherwise that man remains in his liberty" (I, 59). St. Thomas teaches the same (de Verit., q. 17, a. 3), saying: "No one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept."¹ Therefore the major is clearly evident: A law insufficiently promulgated does not oblige (I, 57-59).

PROOF OF THE MINOR. But a doubtful law is insufficiently promulgated. A strictly doubtful law (with which alone we are here concerned) is invincibly unknown. Therefore it is insufficiently promulgated.

Proof of the antecedent. Those things are invincibly unknown concerning which there is not a sufficient foundation, so that they can be affirmed rather than denied. But this obtains in the case where the matter concerns a strictly doubtful law, since only this is known, that a question is being agitated concerning the existence of the law; but concerning the solution of the question itself, there is no greater reason for affirming than for denying. Therefore. Hence all agree in asserting that law, in order that it oblige, ought to be certain and manifest, and ought to be manifested or become known as certain to the man to whom it is promulgated (I, 58, 63, 71, 72, 76). "Law, therefore, in order that it oblige, whether it be human or divine, must always be sufficiently promulgated or known, or proposed, or implanted (say it as you prefer), as certain" (Diss. 1757, n. 26). Recall what was said n. 46.

The same proof, in few words, in another place St. Alphonsus completes thus: "A law not sufficiently promulgated does not oblige. A doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated (because while the law is doubtful, the doubt or question is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated); therefore a doubtful law does not oblige. He who would wish to deny this argument would have to prove either that a law not even promulgated obliges, or that a doubtful law is truly promulgated, contrary to that which St. Thomas expressly teaches, and others commonly, as we have seen; but he will never prove either of these propositions forever" (I, 58).

93. PROOF 2. From the nature of LIBERTY. There is the fundamental principle: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better, or: In doubt the possessor prevails. But here we are involved in doubt, and liberty possesses. Therefore liberty prevails.

Proof of the major. The principle itself states the universal principle of equity, which the most learned Suarez expresses thus (Vot., l. 4, c. 5, n. 8): "On account of doubt alone, things are not to be changed from the ancient state in which they existed in good faith; because, since in doubt there is a certain equality on each side, there is no reason why it should oblige toward one part rather than toward the other." Therefore until certain reasons persuade this, no one is to be despoiled of the certain right which he enjoyed.

This principle of possession (as we said n. 44) was always admitted, in the matter of justice, in all tribunals, both civil and ecclesiastical.

Its extension to the matter of the other virtues was indeed attacked by some (cf. Vind. Alph., Apologetic Dissertation, n. 114 ff.); but "the most common opinion is," says our Holy Doctor, "that not only in the matter of justice, but also in every other matter, the right of possession prevails. The reason is: 1. Because the same motive of reason which runs for the matter of justice also runs for the other virtues; for just as in the matter of justice the condition of the possessor is better, because this condition of possession furnishes to the possessor a special right to retain the thing until it is evident to him that it is another's, so it must be said in other matters. For when someone, after diligence has been applied, could not find the truth, he now perseveres in possession of his liberty, and therefore has a certain right to it, by which he is judged deprived by no doubtful right. 2. Because, as Sanchez says, possession is a universal title for all virtues. For since the essence of justice is to render to each his right, this belongs to every virtue, according as religion renders his right to God, charity to the neighbor, temperance to oneself, and so concerning the others; and therefore it is rightly said that the notion of justice is the potential or generic part of all the virtues, in which the other virtues agree among themselves" (Diss. 1757, in ed. 3 and 4 of the Theol. mor., n. 19, 20).

Proof of the minor. Here we are involved in doubt, and liberty possesses. The first part, here we are involved in doubt, is evident from what was said n. 74. Proof of the other part: liberty possesses. This is clear from the very concept of law, which, since it is the bond of liberty, cannot even logically be conceived unless liberty is first posited. "Certainly man is born subject to God, and universally dependent on his will; but truly, just as a servant is not bound to carry out the wishes of his master unless they are made known to him, so man is not bound to carry out the particular wishes of God unless they are manifested to him by precept or prohibition" (Dichiar., 1774, n. 42)... "Hence Scripture says (Ecclus. 15:14): God from the beginning constituted man, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commandments and precepts: if you will to keep the commandments, they will preserve you. Therefore first the Lord created man free, giving him liberty from his good pleasure, according to that which the Apostle writes (1 Cor. 7:37): Having power over his own will; and afterward he added and imposed the commandments which man was bound to keep; and therefore man's liberty, since it is certain and possesses before the obligation of law, is bound only by a certain law" (I, 75).¹ This is confirmed by St. Thomas, who says with the common opinion: That is called lawful which is prohibited by no law (on 4, D. 15, q. 2, a. 4, ad 2).

Let us conclude this universal thesis with these words of St. Alphonsus (I, 68): "1. Considering the equal weight of each opinion, man would remain doubtful, and could not act; 2. but considering the force of the law, since in that case it has not been sufficiently promulgated, it does not oblige nor bind: and therefore 3. man, as not bound by a doubtful law of this kind, is rendered certain of his (moral) liberty, and thus he can act."

94. OBJ. 1. In doubts the condition of the possessor is better. But according to the probabiliorists, the eternal law possesses before liberty. Therefore in the concurrence of two opinions which generate doubt, the opinion which stands for law must always be preferred.

Resp. Distinguish the minor. The eternal law precedes liberty by priority of time or duration, I concede; by priority of order, whether ontological or logical, I deny. In the ontological order there is simultaneity, as between two correlatives; in the logical order, liberty is prior, "by priority of reason or nature," as St. Alphonsus says. For how could man be bound before he exists, or before he knows the bond of the law? Therefore the eternal law, although in itself it has always had and has the force of obliging in first act, nevertheless actually and in second act it does not bind man except when it is actually promulgated to him through the light of reason (I, n. 70, 75; ed. G., I, p. 50).

INST. The rule is prior to the thing ruled. But law is as it were the rule, and liberty as it were the thing ruled. Therefore law is prior to liberty.

Resp. Distinguish the major. If the matter concerns rule insofar as it is an exemplary cause in relation to the effect, I concede; if the matter concerns rule insofar as it is a norm to be applied in the use of some thing, I deny. The use of a thing to be moderated according to rule cannot even be conceived unless the thing itself is presupposed.

OBJ. 2. No law is doubtful: for all laws, whether divine or human, certainly exist and are certainly promulgated; the only doubt is whether such a particular case is comprehended in the general law, for example in the Decalogue; therefore law always possesses against liberty.

Resp. St. Alphonsus: "In the case of two opinions of equal weight, although the general law is certain as to existence and is sufficiently promulgated, nevertheless with respect to that case it is doubtful both as to existence and as to promulgation; and therefore then, because it is doubtful whether the law is extended to that case, it is certain that it is not extended as to obligation. This indeed St. Thomas recognized when he said that law is like a bond, which, until it is applied to someone through contact, allows him the power of turning wherever he wishes" (I, 62, 72; H. Ap., I, 67, 68).

OBJ. 3. In canon law this rule is handed down: "In doubt the safer way is to be chosen." Therefore it is not lawful to embrace the less safe part.

Resp. 1. The aforesaid rule has force in practical doubt (cf. n. 54), which someone does not wish or cannot lay aside; it has force especially in doubts of fact, where there is danger of an evil absolutely to be avoided. And our Holy Doctor clearly proves that the doubts to which the Supreme Pontiffs applied the aforesaid rule were of this kind (I, 77, 78).

2. If the matter is to be judged from the rules of law, neither is this support lacking to our opinion, since these things are had in law: "In doubt, favors are to be enlarged, odious things restricted. In obscure things the minimum is to be followed." And: "Unless you shall have been certain concerning the mandate, you will not be compelled to execute what is commanded."

OBJ. 4. He who exposes himself to the danger of sinning sins, as Sacred Scripture testifies: He who loves danger will perish in it (Ecclus. 3:27). But probabilists, or equiprobabilists, by following a probable, less safe opinion, expose themselves to such danger. Therefore.

Resp. 1. Retort the argument. If, on account of any danger whatever of sinning, it were unlawful to use a probable opinion, it would also be unlawful to use a more probable one, indeed even a most probable one; for, since neither opinion goes out from the limits of probability, neither excludes fear of erring. Therefore absolute tutiorism, condemned by the Church, would necessarily have to be embraced (Dich. del sist., 1774, n. 51).

2. Distinguish the major. He sins who exposes himself to the danger of sinning formally, I concede; he sins who exposes himself to the danger of sinning materially only, I deny.

To the minor: Probabilists expose themselves to the danger of sinning materially only, let it pass; to the danger of sinning formally, I deny. The danger of sinning formally cannot arise except from a certain law: For where there is no law, neither is there transgression (Rom. 4:15). But a probable opinion, to which another also probable opinion is opposed, does not constitute a certain law. Therefore the danger of sinning formally exists only in the mind of those who, contrary to the dictate of reason, affirm that a doubtful law is equivalent to a certain law.

OBJ. 5. The thesis admits the danger of transgressing, at least materially, the divine law, since that danger cannot be separated from the probable existence of the law. But it is unlawful to undergo such danger; because it brings into jeopardy the conformity of the human will with the divine will, and the end intended by God the supreme Legislator; each of which must absolutely be procured. Therefore the thesis is to be rejected.

Resp. I concede the major; distinguish the minor. The danger of material transgression cannot be admitted when the danger arises from the temerity of the one acting, who contemns practical doubt and does not apply due or proportionate diligence for obtaining the truth, I concede; when the danger arises from invincible ignorance, namely from the fact that, after diligence has been applied, the truth could not be found, I deny. In circumstances of this kind God permits such danger to be incurred, for universal reasons, as will soon be seen. Hence "it is certain that material sin invincibly unknown is not imputed to fault" (Diss. 1757, n. 37).

To the reason alleged, distinguish. The conformity of the human will with the divine will is brought into jeopardy as to those things in which man is not bound to conform himself to the divine will, I concede; as to those things in which he is bound, I deny (I, 76; Istr. e Prat., I, n. 46). For man is not always bound to will what God wills, as St. Thomas teaches, saying (1.2, q. 19, a. 10, ad 1): "In particular, we do not know what God wills, and as to this we are not bound to conform our will to the divine will." Therefore, unless the divine precepts are manifest, man is not bound to conform himself to the divine will. Gonet also declares this in these words: "Man is not bound to conform himself to the divine will in the material thing willed, except when the divine will is manifested to us by precept or prohibition" (Clyp., disp. 6, a. 2, n. 37).

Nor is the end intended by God the supreme legislator frustrated. That end, which is the glory of God and the salvation of souls, is had in the perfect obedience which men render to God. But the danger of material transgression by no means removes this perfect obedience. Thus man, not even in this case (as we just said), omits to will that which God wills him to will; in which thing his full obedience toward God is contained.

For the rest, what prudent man can deny that it is too onerous to be bound by laws even doubtful, and that an obligation of that sort is unequal to human powers, and therefore redounds to the detriment of the glory of God himself? "I hold as certain," says St. Alphonsus (dell'Uso moder., 1765, c. 4, n. 35), "that in so great a variety of innumerable doubts which can arise in the human mind, on account of the darkness with which nature has been enveloped from original sin, God did not will to oblige man to observe even uncertain laws, of which there would exist as many as there are doubts which can occur concerning laws."

95. Note. This last reason, by way of a universal epikeia, and therefore of itself and in a uniform manner, excuses man from the transgression of doubtful laws, and removes a priori their obligation, as long as there shall not have been evidence concerning the will of the legislator. Nor therefore, in a particular case, are we bound to seek a special excuse. But this has force especially with respect to laws which by the common judgment of doctors are reputed doubtful. For St. Alphonsus observes, saying (Diss. 1757, n. 24): "A law which is disputed among the wise cannot even be said to have been intimated to the community, since the community itself, split into diverse parts, still seeks, and does not find, that a law has been given." Concerning a law of this kind, commonly and as it were juridically unknown, the axiom certainly has force: A doubtful law is no law (at least in second act), and therefore its transgression can scarcely retain the name of material sin. Quite otherwise must be said if a law intimated to the community of men is unknown, or reputed doubtful, by someone in particular; for this is per accidens, and the agent then is excused only individually, on account of his conscience invincibly erroneous (cf. I, 173).

In doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, when there concur arguments equally or almost equally probable, the opinion which favors the law is to be followed.

The thesis is against certain probabilists who contend that, in every doubt, whether negative or positive on both sides, it is lawful to follow the parts of liberty, whether the matter concerns the beginning of the law or the cessation of the law.

The thesis can also be stated thus: In strict doubt concerning the cessation or fulfillment of a law, the law is to be observed. The law continues to oblige whenever it is equally or almost equally probable that it has ceased or has been fulfilled.²

96. The thesis is proved 1. From the part of LAW. The rights of liberty and of law ought, when their cause is equal, to be held equal. Therefore just as liberty possesses when the law is not certain, so on the contrary law ought to possess until there is evidence of revocation (cessation). Cf. n. 44 and 91; D'Annibale, I, n. 264, 266.

Proof 2. From the part of LIBERTY. For following the parts of liberty there is not given, in the case, sufficient certitude concerning the honesty of the action. Therefore. For the only foundation on which conscience could rest would be the principle: A doubtful law does not oblige, applied also to a law doubtfully ceasing. Now, as Berardi (I, 56) and the editor of the Ratisbon Compendium of Gury (n. 80) well note, "the aforesaid principle, even for the probabilists themselves, as to this sense, that is, in such a universal acceptance, is very doubtful, nor is it held as morally certain" (recall what was said above, n. 46).

97. It is confirmed from other most received PRINCIPLES OF LAW: 1. In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated (cf. n. 48). But the revocation of a law, desuetude, dispensation, an excusing or exempting cause, the fulfillment of a precept, etc., are facts, which are by no means proved by merely equiprobable reasons (IV, 174). Therefore. 2. Proof lies on the plaintiff, or: Proof lies on him who affirms, not on him who denies (cf. n. 49). Now, where law, through certain promulgation, is found in possession of its right, if afterward, circumstances having changed, doubt arises, and liberty asks to be loosed by this law, liberty certainly assumes the place of plaintiff and affirmant. Therefore the burden lies on it to prove, by reasons sufficiently convincing, that there truly has intervened that cessation of the law and change of right which it contends. 3. In doubts one must stand for that part for which presumption stands (n. 47). Now, in doubt whether a law certainly established and certainly promulgated has ceased, presumption stands for law, not for liberty. For presumption stands for that part which is not bound to prove. But in the aforesaid doubt, proof certainly lies not on the law, which was proved, but on liberty, which demands for itself liberation from the bond of law. Therefore (cf. n. 129, 173).

Nor should it be said that these axioms of law have force indeed in doubt, but not in probable opinion. For this distinction could be admitted if the probable opinion, or probability of fact, were unique and expedient, as we have said several times with St. Alphonsus. But it is otherwise if, on each side, as the thesis bears, equal opinions or probabilities concur; for it is not lawful to adhere to one opinion or probability, with the other spurned or not considered; and therefore then we are involved not in opinion or probability, but in strict and true doubt, in which the aforesaid axioms have their whole force (cf. n. 74).

Note. The principle of possession, far from proceeding in negative doubts alone, as many probabilists teach, has force especially for positive doubts, as is evident from its own terms: In an equal cause, etc. Equality of cause denotes equal probability, rather than an equal defect of motives. But the primary principle of the probabilists, he who acts probably acts prudently, stood in the way of their applying the principle of possession to positive doubts, as can be seen everywhere among them.

98. For the rest, concerning the extension of the present thesis, the following things are to be noted:

1. In doubt, or in equiprobability, liberty possesses much more frequently than law, so that the principle of possession favors liberty much more than law.

And indeed, as is evident to all: 1. neither natural laws once known (which must be well noted), nor positive divine laws, after the promulgation of the Gospel, whether by abrogation, or derogation, or dispensation properly so called, will ever cease. 2. As regards human laws, which can cease by the aforesaid ways from the will of the legislator, even these do not remain doubtful for much time. For by law it has been provided that after a certain interval of time, the cessation of the law, or desuetude, be held as prescribed (cf. n. 265). Therefore the principle of possession, in practice, rarely binds one doubting, if particular cases are excepted: for example, whether someone has satisfied the law; whether there is a sufficient cause so that someone may be exempted from a law by which he certainly was bound. But these cases, however frequent, manifestly become rarer if they are compared with those in which liberty possesses.

2. If the matter concerns probable satisfaction of the law, there are several principles by which the doubt of fact is indirectly solved and liberty can often be helped (Linz. Q. Schr., 1883, p. 573).

The first is: That which regularly, that which ordinarily happens, is judged to have been done (see what was said n. 50). The other: In doubt one must stand for the value of the act (n. 51). The third: A positive precept does not oblige with grave inconvenience. Here it is useful to note: if sometimes by force of this principle you are freed from fulfilling the precept itself, a fortiori you will be able to be freed from repeating an action which you have already probably placed for fulfilling the law; otherwise the way would be opened to scruples. The fourth: In a conflict of laws, the higher law is to be preferred to the lower. Hence, in invincible doubt whether the recitation of the Office, or the hearing of Mass, is going to harm health, you are held to nothing, because the law or right of preserving health prevails (III, 335, 1036; IV, 154).

99. OBJ. 1. From that principle, An obligation is not to be imposed unless there is certain evidence concerning it, a twofold conclusion is deduced: 1. Whenever law has not proved its existence, it is nothing for the human will, and thus every doubtful law is a null law. 2. Whenever law ceases to prove its existence, it too ceases for the human will, and thus every law which, once certain, has become doubtful by the lapse of time, loses the force of obliging and is to be held as nothing. Thus Gury, I, n. 79 (ed. 16).

Resp. 1. Retort the conclusion. Therefore similarly liberty, whenever it ceases to prove its existence, ceases to exist; therefore a Superior, whenever he ceases to prove his right, ceases to possess his right; therefore whenever someone ceases to prove his innocence, his innocence ceases to exist. These consequences are certainly false; therefore the antecedent also is false.

2. I deny the parity. For positive law (concerning which alone the matter is here), once promulgated and known, obliges, and continues to oblige as long as its cessation has not been proved: for it is of the nature of law that it remain (H. Ap., app. 3, n. 74; IV, 174). Hence the argument is to be made thus. Whenever the existence of law is not proved, it is nothing for conscience. Therefore, by parity, whenever the cessation of a certain law is not proved, there is no cessation for conscience. For just as obligation depends on certain knowledge of the law, so de-obligation depends on certain knowledge of de-obligation.

INST. No one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept. But concerning a law doubtfully ceasing there is no knowledge. Therefore.

Resp. Distinguish the major. That is, no one is bound by any precept unless he knows himself to be held, whether directly or indirectly, I concede; unless there is evidence of a direct obligation, I deny. All theologians teach that an indirect obligation must be admitted. But truly, in the case, there is very good evidence of an indirect obligation, as is clear from the proof of the thesis. Therefore there is present the knowledge required for the obligation of the law.

OBJ. 2. An obligation which has probably been satisfied is no longer a certain obligation; therefore it is doubtful; therefore null.

Resp. Distinguish the major. If the law has been probably satisfied in such a way that it is quasi morally certain (either because all conjectures are in favor of liberty, and none to the contrary, or because the reasons for liberty are notably more probable), I concede; if conjectures are had in each part so that it is probable that you have satisfied, and equally probable that you have not satisfied, I subdistinguish: it is no longer a certain obligation directly, I concede; indirectly, I deny.

Hence St. Alphonsus (2 El. qq. ref., n. 1): "If someone probably judges that he has fulfilled a vow, the Canonical Hours, or a penance, whether he is now bound to satisfy if it is still probable or doubtful that he has not fulfilled? Several authors deny; but the opposite must be held, because the obligation already contracted possesses, until it shall certainly have been fulfilled." Cf. Conf. dir., I, 12; V, 9; XV, 17.

N. B. St. Alphonsus sometimes distinguishes doubt from probability, and says that in doubt concerning the cessation of a law the law is to be observed; but otherwise, if a probable opinion is present. Book III, 112, q. 3, Second opinion; ibid., 290, word Notandum.

This ambiguity vanishes if one attends to the fact that the Holy Doctor understands in the former case strict doubt, namely when there are two opinions almost equally probable; but in the latter case a uniquely probable opinion, as is plain from the context, and from book I, 67 at the end, and 71, likewise book III, 562.

OBJ. 3. No small difficulty arises from the application of the principle which is commonly called the principle of possession. For in many questions it does not immediately appear whether law possesses or liberty.

Resp. This difficulty can by no means bring it about that the principle itself is not legitimate. For it is proper to a moral matter that it involve many obscurities and difficulties. Nevertheless, in the present case the difficulty is not so great as is proclaimed. St. Alphonsus establishes on this matter the following general rule: "Presumption or possession stands for that part which is not bound itself to prove the fact, but transfers the burden of proving it to the other" (cf. n. 47). Now, the application of this rule, in most cases, is easy, since it is enough to ask whether my liberty, as to this case, has already been bound or not. If it has not yet been certainly bound, liberty itself possesses, and it belongs to the law (that is, to reason acting the part of the law) to prove its existence, or promulgation. But if liberty has certainly been bound, the law (or legislator) possesses, in which case the burden lies on me of proving my liberation. But if finally the matter, all things having been weighed, remains obscure, let benignity and charity prevail; for where law doubtfully possesses, liberty certainly possesses.

In the concurrence of an opinion certainly more probable for the law, it is not lawful to follow a less probable one for liberty.

The thesis is against those probabilists who patronize liberty too much. It can also be stated thus: It is not lawful to follow an opinion for liberty if the opposite for the law is certainly or notably more probable. In the state of one opining concerning the existence of a law, the law is to be observed. It is not lawful to follow an opinion known certainly to be less probable.

The SENSE OF THE THESIS, after those things which we have said (n. 70; 73, note; 75), is sufficiently clear. Therefore an opinion certainly more probable is that which, without any hesitation, we recognize as more probable. For this a notable excess is required, that is, a grave one, but a most grave excess is not required. Finally, in order that an opinion be certainly more probable, it is not necessary that it be held so commonly by doctors, but it suffices that someone, after a proportionate weighing of the arguments, holds it, by subjective judgment, to be certainly more probable.¹ Ballerini, Arendt, Bucceroni, and others err, who twist the words of the Holy Doctor into another sense.

100. I. THE THESIS IS PROVED FROM AUTHORITY.

1. From undoubted documents it is evident that the Holy See, from the seventeenth century onward, gave the favor of its authority to the more probable opinion for the law.

a) Alexander VII by his exhortation brought it about that the Order of Dominicans, in the year 1656, declared war against the less probable opinion.

b) Innocent XI, as prefect of the Holy Office, by a decree of June 26, 1680, "commanded the Most Reverend Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., that he freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend by the pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully impugn the opinion of those who assert that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable."

c) Clement XI, in the year 1702, signified to the Superior General of the Society of Jesus that "the Superiors of the Society would do a thing most pleasing to His Holiness if they see to it that the Jesuits abstain from teaching and defending the opinion which asserts that the use of a less probable and less safe opinion is lawful." Cf. as to these and other very useful documents: Ter Haar, Innocentii XI de Probabilismi decreti Historia et Vindiciae; Wouters, de Minusprobabilismo (2nd ed., p. 21 ff.); Mandonnet, Revue Thomiste, 1902; Jansen, Geschichte u. Kritik in Dienste der Minusprobab.; Patuzzi, Lett., VI, p. 21.

d) Finally, the Holy See always praised with great encomia the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus. Cf. above, beginning. Who does not see that those encomia support the whole moral system of the Holy Doctor?

2. Our thesis agrees with the rule most received in Canon Law: We look in obscure things to what is more verisimilar (Rule 45, in 6). Now what is more verisimilar is the same as what is more probable. Each forum ought to agree, insofar as this can be done, says D'Annibale (I, 264), after De Lugo and others. As Father Schmitt (Gesch. des Probab.) concedes, this rule was commonly used before Medina.

3. St. Thomas favors our thesis. For from the fact that he affirms these two things: a) that probable certitude directs what is right in human acts (cf. n. 37); b) that doubt then occurs when equal reasons are given on each side, as we also noted above (n. 74), the Angelic Doctor laid the foundations of our opinion.

See above, n. 92, in what sense the words of St. Thomas are to be understood: "No one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept."

4. Many theologians from the last six centuries support our thesis. Hence it, just like the first (n. 91), does not lack that excellence which comes to some opinion from the weight and multitude of testimonies.

a) It escapes no one that from the thirteenth century up to the end of the sixteenth century authors almost commonly taught: the more probable opinion is practically to be followed. Corduba is witness (Quaest. mor., l. 2, q. 3), who wrote a little before Medina; the old probabilists are also witnesses.

Then, when the controversy concerning probabilism had arisen, there were not lacking doctors, and those very grave, indeed also theologians of entire Universities (for example, of Paris and Louvain), who proscribed the use of an opinion less probable and known as such.

They certainly erred by rejecting the use even of an equiprobable opinion; but they did not err wholly. Cf. Ter Haar, Innocentii XI de Probab. decr. Hist., p. 35.

b) Among theologians who opposed probabiliorism, very many teach that, in a conflict of opinions, the certainly or notably more probable one is to be followed. Before the rest let Suarez be heard (de Leg., l. 8, c. 3, n. 19): "Greater probability is a certain moral certitude, if the excess of probability is certain." Muzzarelli says the same (Reg. mor. op., in Migne, Curs. theol., XI, 1309), whom it is pleasing to cite as being especially alien to party zeal: "Some excess of reasons for one part against the other, unless it is notable, does not remove doubt. But when it has been notable, the gravity now preponderates for one part, it is now determined to one, and in that we stand." The same teach Ferdinand Rebellus, S.J.; Antonius Perez, O.S.B.; Martinus a Prado, O.P.; Franciscus de Arauxo, O.P.; Antonius Cotonius, O.M.; Passerini de Sextula, O.P.; Esparza, S.J.; Terillus, S.J.; Gabriel Daniel, S.J.; Christ. Rassler, S.J.; Benedict Schmier, O.S.B.; Ant. Mayr, S.J.; Eusebius Amort; Jos. Biner, S.J.; and several others. Cf. Ter Haar, de syst. mor. antiq. Probab., where there are more things.

c) To these finally acceded St. Alphonsus, who in the nineteenth century drew not a few theologians to his system. Cf. n. 86, 3. In the year 1878, the distinguished Ernest Muller wrote: "Equiprobabilism is today taught almost everywhere in the schools" (Theol. mor., I, 278, 3).

101. II. IT IS PROVED FROM REASON.

1. From the part of LAW, which is sufficiently promulgated.

For: law is sufficiently promulgated when concerning it there is had that moral certitude which is called broad certitude. But the law which an opinion certainly more probable favors is certain by broad moral certitude. Therefore.

Proof of the major. 1. That certitude which suffices so that it is lawful for man to follow the parts of liberty (see n. 37), certainly also suffices so that he is bound to follow the parts of law: for the same reason applies to contraries; and both natural equity and common sense itself demand that the rights of law and liberty, in an equal cause, be held equal: for each right is of itself equally holy, as being most wisely ordered and willed by the eternal law. Cf. Ami du Cl., 1900, p. 484. 2. Certitude of this kind corresponds to the nature of a moral thing, since in many cases a greater cannot be had. But if it were not sufficient for imposing an obligation, very many laws would be ineffective with respect to very many persons, and the discipline of morals would be excessively loosened (Muller, P. I, § 81, n. 10; cf. Bonacina, de Leg., D. I, q. 1, p. 7, n. 11).

Proof of the minor. "The law which an opinion certainly more probable favors," etc. This certitude indeed is had when the reasons favoring one opinion so draw to themselves the assent of the intellect that the reasons favoring the other opinion are able to introduce no longer strict doubt, but only some prudent hesitation, or broad doubt. But this obtains for an opinion certainly more probable. Therefore.

For the force and efficacy of the reasons on which the less probable opinion rests is certainly overcome, and in order to prudent assent elided, by the stronger reasons of the opposite opinion, which alone for that reason perseveres as expeditely probable for practice; and although there remains a certain fear of the other part, the intellect can no longer deny assent to it, unless it dismisses at the same time the rules of prudence and logic (I, 67, 88). To the point Laymann says thus (Consc., c. 5, n. 5): "When, I say, one part of a contradiction appears more verisimilar than the opposite part, the intellect cannot dissent from that and assent to this; because this would be done without reason, indeed against reason." The same teach Esparza, Vasquez, Suarez, Lessius (in Ter Haar, de syst. mor. antiq. Probab., p. 89), Beaudouin (p. 97, 127), Farges, Storchenau, and others. See also what was said n. 75. In this controversy concerning probabilism, whatever Noldin may teach (I, n. 244, 2), attention must be paid not only to the rules of Logic but also, and first of all, to the norms which Ethics hands down. Cf. Koch, Moralth., § 36, 4, 5.

Those things which we said (n. 30 and 31) show more than sufficiently that our argument expresses the mind of St. Thomas. For in moral matter (I Eth., lect. 3) our norm is coarse certitude (that is, rude and imperfect), namely that which arises from verisimilitude, from those things which occur more frequently.

Moreover, that law is sufficiently promulgated and certain if unique probability stands for it is handed down everywhere by the gravest theologians with St. Alphonsus (cf. n. 76) and with Suarez, who teaches: "When a man probably judges one part and concerning the other does not have a probable judgment, ... then there is no doubt that the man can or must follow such a judgment" (de Poenit., disp. 22, s. 9, n. 5; likewise de Voto, l. 4, c. 5, n. 5; de Legibus, l. 5, c. 18, n. 19). But the state of mind is the same if an opinion is uniquely probable as if it is certainly more probable; for on account of this certain and notable excess above the reasons equal on each side, there is present for the law a simply grave motive, which is able to draw the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite; whence the mind is no longer involved in the state of strict doubt or suspicion, but in the state of one opining or of certitude broadly so called.

2. From the part of LIBERTY, which cannot prudently choose the certainly less probable opinion.

For acting prudently, moral certitude, at least broad, concerning the honesty of the action is required (cf. n. 36, 37, 40). But such certitude, for liberty, cannot be had with an opinion certainly less probable. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. "It cannot be had" either as direct or indirect certitude.

a) Not direct. For an opinion certainly less probable cannot, as certainly less probable, move the mind to prudent assent. For it is against right reason, with rectitude in the will supposed, to adhere to an opinion which is judged to approach nearer to error than to truth.

1. In the year 1765 he teaches these things: "It is certain that it is unlawful to follow a slightly probable opinion... The same must be said of a doubtfully probable opinion... Thus not even (according to our system) can we follow a much or certainly less probable opinion. The whole question is whether it is lawful to follow an equally or almost equally probable one." And he responds: affirmatively. Cf. Vind. Alph., I, p. 65 ff. Cf. ibid., I, p. 55.

2. In the same year he writes: "We do not defend the probable opinion in concurrence with the more probable, but we say that it is lawful to follow an equally probable one." In the same little work the same words return three times. Vind. Alph., I, p. 70.

3. In the same year (dell'Uso moder., c. 3, n. 81) he says: "So many times I have said that not only he who has evident knowledge of the law, but also he who, according to the light of reason, judges that the opinion standing for the law is notably or certainly more probable, is bound to observe it, even if there is dispute among doctors." Cf. Wouters, p. 50.

4. To Father Blasucci (1768): "When I know that the stricter opinion is more probable, I say that it must be followed; and in this I am opposed to the system of the Jesuits. When the strict opinion is certainly more probable to me (presso me), I must follow it." Lettere, III, n. 217.

5. In the year 1777 he writes: "I am not a rigorist, nor a probabilist. My opinion... is this: It is unlawful to follow an opinion favoring liberty, if an opinion of this kind rests on the sole foundation of probability. But the opinion for the law must necessarily be followed whenever it is more probable than the opposite. And hence it is why I again affirm that I am neither a rigorist nor a probabilist; but my system is such that I truly deserve to be called a probabiliorist." Lettere, III, 315.

b) Not indirect. Indirect certitude is obtained from undoubted reflex principles. But, in the present case, such principles are lacking. For the principles which are commonly invoked in favor of liberty: A doubtful law does not oblige; in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, obtain certain and firm value in strict doubt alone (cf. n. 32), as is evident from the preceding argument. Therefore.

On these things the following must be noted:

1. According to St. Thomas, "the whole matter of the moral virtues falls under one notion of prudence" (2.2, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3). The essential act of prudence is counsel (2.2, q. 47, a. 1; VI Eth.), through which prudence directs the election of the will (I Eth., lect. 1). The matter about which prudence is concerned is practical truth, for it is "right reason concerning things to be done"; whence its norm is that certitude which judges concerning those things which happen for the most part; for prudence is in the opinative part of the soul (1.2, q. 57, a. 4, ad 2; 2.2, q. 49, a. 1; 2.2, q. 47, a. 3, ad 2; a. 9, ad 2). See what was said above n. 31.

2. Since the object of prudence is practical truth, the counsel of prudence necessarily supposes and seeks conformity to right appetite. "For in those things which are toward the end," says St. Thomas (1.2, q. 19, a. 3, ad 2), "the rectitude of (practical) reason consists in conformity to the appetite of the due end." Cf. 1.2, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3. From which it follows that he acts imprudently who, given an opinion certainly less probable against the law, nevertheless chooses it, because in his counsel and in his election he has not acted conformably to the appetite of the due end. The will, by liberty of exercise and specification, can indeed choose the less probable. But in the case, this election cannot be called that of a prudent man. Cf. Beaudouin, p. 128; Ami du Cl., 1900, p. 483, where there are many useful and learned things.

St. Alphonsus sets forth our arguments in these words:

"When the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything except notably more probable. And in that case, the safer opinion will no longer be doubtful (understand this of doubt strictly taken...), but is morally or quasi morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has for itself a certain foundation that it is true. Whence then it happens that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either slightly or at least doubtfully probable with respect to the safer; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence (grave imprudence, as is read in the Dissertation of 1762), to will to follow it. For whenever it expressly appears to the intellect that truth stands much more for law than for liberty, then the will cannot prudently and without fault adhere to the less safe part; since, in that case, the man would operate not leaning on his own judgment or his own credulity, but rather through a certain effort which by his will he would inflict upon the intellect, so that it would be removed from the part which appears to him much more verisimilar, and would be bent to the part which does not appear true to him, indeed which seems not even to have a certain foundation by which it could be true." These things the Holy Doctor says in editions 6 and 7. There he unfolds more clearly and more fully what already in the year 1762, in the brief Dissertation, he had written (cf. Vind. Alph., I, p. 51).

In the little work Dichiaraz. del sist., n. 2 (1774), he argues more briefly:

"I again declare in this little work that I am not a probabilist, nor do I follow probabilism; indeed I reprove it... I say that if the opinion for the law appears certainly more probable, we are bound to follow it, for several reasons, of which the chief is this: In doubtful matters we ought to seek and follow truth. But where truth cannot be clearly found, we are bound at least to embrace that opinion which comes nearer to the truth; and so the truth itself, which obliges us to follow it, also obliges us to follow that opinion which stands for the law, when it comes nearer to that same truth." Thus also in the Monitum (1773) attached to the seventh edition, and in the last editions of the Moral Theology, n. 54 and 88. Cf. Muller, l. I, § 81, n. 9; Farges, La liberte et le devoir, VIII, p. 215 ff.

102. III. IT IS PROVED FROM THE DISADVANTAGES OF ABSOLUTE PROBABILISM.

Although Innocent XI by an authentic act gave favor to our thesis (cf. n. 100), nevertheless he never wished to mark with censure this proposition: "It is lawful to follow a less probable opinion which is truly probable" (in D'Annibale, I, n. 263, note 2). And indeed this proposition is very well explained in an equiprobabilistic sense, if the matter concerns an opinion a little less probable, and if a truly probable opinion is understood as it is defined by St. Alphonsus (cf. n. 75). Nevertheless, if it is explained in the sense of absolute probabilism, concerning an opinion certainly and notably less probable, this system of itself furnishes occasion to laxism. This can be proved both from the method which it uses in judging probability, and from the very principles on which it rests.

1. From the method. Those who follow absolute probabilism attend only to the probability of the benign opinion, and this absolute, and suspend judgment concerning the safer opinion. Very many probabilists teach this in set words; and what they teach is a consequence of the very doctrine which they defend. And indeed, if even the certain preponderance of the adverse opinion matters nothing, judgment concerning it can now be passed over, nor is there any reason why this opinion should be weighed. But "such a voluntary suspension of judgment" (these are the words of St. Alphonsus) "has annexed to itself a certain vincible, indeed affected, ignorance" (I, 65). Hence, not from a prudent weighing of opinions, but from voluntary ignorance of the opinion which favors the law, the probability of liberty is affirmed. Cf. Istr. e prat., I, 53; Vind. Alph., Apologetic Dissertation, n. 105, 106.

2. From the principles. The first principle of the probabilists, which implicitly underlies the diverse reflex principles which they bring forward, is this: He who acts probably acts prudently. Now this principle does not provide, by itself alone, a sufficient foundation for forming a certain conscience, since the probability alone of an opinion renders us in no way certain concerning the honesty of the action (cf. n. 36, 37). Indeed, he who relies on an equilibrated probability does not even act probably, but doubtingly and rashly, since amid equality of motives and arguments there is room only for doubt (I, 65, 97).

The other principle is: A law against which grave probability stands does not oblige, because it is uncertain. But this principle too labors under a defect. For not every probability fighting against the law, even if, from reasons considered in themselves, it seems grave, therefore renders the law doubtful; but only an opinion equally or almost equally probable, as was shown sufficiently and more than sufficiently (cf. above n. 67 and 75, end). "That opinion," says St. Alphonsus, "which stands for liberty, when it enjoys equal probability with the opposite which stands for the law, introduces a grave doubt whether the law exists which prohibits the action" (I, 56).

But that the aforesaid method and the aforesaid principles of themselves furnish occasion to laxism will become not obscurely known to one seriously weighing the matter. For, since the method denies that the probability of the adverse opinion must necessarily be weighed, it can easily happen that solid probability is undeservedly adjudged to an opinion which favors liberty; and since, on the other hand, the principles of the system permit the use of a less probable opinion, who does not see that very many opinions, in themselves or at least with respect to their opposites only slightly or doubtfully probable, will be judged by many as truly probable and lawful in practice? That this can happen is to be judged all the more certain because each one easily assents to those things which please him. Therefore.

Hence the solicitude and complaints of Alexander VII, after that broad probabilism had especially prevailed; cf. n. 86, 5.

Nor less decisive is the judgment of St. Alphonsus: "The authors of the past century held this opinion (of absolute probabilism) almost commonly, but we say that it is lax, and cannot be lawfully embraced" (H. Ap., I, 31; Apolog., 1769, n. 2).

Elsewhere the Holy Doctor has these things: "Deservedly many opinions of some ancient casuists have been condemned; I add, in my judgment, many still remain to be condemned" (dell'Uso moderato, c. 6, n. 16).

Note. Moderate probabilists (cf. n. 85, 4) have long since labored (and indeed not without fruit) so that they might meet these disadvantages. Yet there still remains, in our judgment, a hidden danger in their manner of proceeding, insofar as the principles which they use can of themselves lead the incautious to this conclusion: only a (truly) certain law binds the will. Cf. the words of the distinguished Noldin, I, n. 236, at the end. How much more securely do those act who follow to the exact rule those norms which St. Alphonsus finally established! For these norms (notwithstanding the decree concerning "nothing worthy of censure") in the year 1807 were subjected to a new examination, when the Positio concerning the Prudence of our Saint was instituted: cf. Wouters, p. 49. See below, n. 107.

103. OBJ. 1. There is no obligation unless there is certain evidence concerning it. But there is no evidence concerning an obligation against which true and solid probability fights. Therefore.

Resp. Distinguish the major. There is no obligation unless there is certain evidence concerning it, by certitude at least broad, I concede; unless there is certain evidence concerning it by strict certitude, I deny. Otherwise not even the most probable opinion fighting for the law would have the force of obliging, and consequently whenever some broad doubt concerning the law remained, the nullity of the law would always have to be pronounced: which would be intolerable laxism.

Likewise I distinguish the minor. If there is not given an opinion certainly more probable for the law, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Because from the natural precept of choosing the part which evidently comes nearer to the truth, the law certainly more probable already obliges, as being sufficiently promulgated.

OBJ. 2. He who follows a truly probable opinion acts with grave reason. Therefore he does not sin.

Resp. In the hypothesis, he acts with a grave reason, which is certainly overcome by a graver one. Hence he acts against right reason, as has been proved. For, as St. Thomas says: "Those morals are called good which agree with reason; but evil, which disagree from reason" (1.2, q. 100, a. 1).

INST. It is false that the lesser probability is elided by the greater, namely when both receive their force from diverse principles. But this almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions, as St. Alphonsus himself concedes (Diss. 1755, n. 13). Therefore.

Resp. Distinguish the major: if the discourse is concerning speculative elision, let it pass; if concerning practical elision, I subdistinguish with the same Holy Doctor (ibid., note): If the excess is not notable, I concede; otherwise, I deny. For even if the motives and principles of each opinion are disparate, and can, as such, preserve their intrinsic force, nevertheless the conclusions, that is, the opinions themselves, are not only disparate, but for the most part contradictory to each other, since one affirms the very thing which the other denies, that is, the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the act. Therefore when one certainly surpasses the other, this latter is practically elided, that is, at least in order to forming conscience; in other words, it no longer provides a sufficient foundation so that we may act prudently (cf. n. 75 and 101).

OBJ. 3. The arguments of equiprobabilism for the use of the less safe opinion are the same as the arguments of simple probabilism, and logically lead to permitting a truly probable opinion, even if it is certainly less probable; because, namely, even then the law is doubtful.

Resp. The same objection was made to St. Alphonsus, who responds thus: "To this opposition I have already forestalled an answer in my book, establishing that, where there is a more probable opinion for the law, then the law is morally promulgated, and therefore obliges, notwithstanding that broad doubt for the more benign opinion. For where we do not find certain truth, we must follow that opinion which approaches more closely to truth; but, on the contrary, where opinions are equally probable, the law is truly doubtful with a strict doubt, so that in no way can the law then be said to be sufficiently promulgated" (I, 88; ed. G., p. 69). Certainly only in strict doubt is the existence of the law invincibly unknown, but not in broad doubt, or in the state of one opining.

OBJ. 4. He who proves too much proves nothing. But from the thesis, all probabilists would have to be held as laxists, many of whom indeed were of the best note, and existed as distinguished theologians. Therefore the thesis is false.

Resp. I concede the major; I deny the minor. The thesis is not directed against all probabilists. For there are those who professed probabilism not closely determined, and to be benignly interpreted in a good sense. These permitted the use of the less probable opinion, understanding beneath this a little less probable; indeed, several expressly taught this, as is evident from what was said (n. 100). Moreover, many, even if they profess too benign a system, nevertheless in the solution of individual questions and cases are grave theologians, by no means laxists.

OBJ. 5. It is better to err in mercy than in severity. Therefore probabilism, as being more benign, is to be preferred.

Resp. Since our ways will always remain uncertain, the principle is pleasing; but I deny the consequence. Rather, it is better to err neither in mercy nor in severity, but to preserve what is just and consonant with God's providence.

OBJ. 6. The comparative method is useless. For the probability of an opinion depends on the reasons by which it is supported. But the reasons for some opinion can very well be known in themselves without comparison being made with opposites. Therefore comparison is useless.

Resp. I concede the major, distinguish the minor. Reasons can be known in themselves without comparison as to their proper nature, I concede; as to their efficacy in order to solid and expeditious or practical probability, I deny. For by reason it is clear, and by daily experience it is evident, that it often happens that an opinion which previously was judged solid and supported by certain foundations, afterward, once the reasons of the adverse part have been weighed, appears little solid, indeed relying on slight probability. And the same occurs in every controversial matter. Therefore from defect of the comparative method, a certain danger is incurred of acting from an opinion which practically is only slightly probable.

OBJ. 7. The obligation of following the opinion certainly more probable would impose an intolerable yoke. Therefore it is not given. Proof of the antecedent. That obligation carries with it the necessity of knowing the more probable opinions. But all acknowledge that more probable opinions are not easily discerned from less probable ones. Therefore.

Resp. I deny the antecedent and the consequence. To the proof, distinguish the major: that obligation carries with it the necessity of knowing the more probable opinions: an absolute necessity, which would require the greatest diligence, I deny; an ordinary necessity, which requires common and proportionate diligence in investigating truth, I concede. For all approved authors admit this diligence (n. 40, 2); and when, after moral diligence has been applied, the opinion for the law is not recognized as certainly more probable, it is lawful at once to embrace the opinion for liberty. To the minor: It is difficult to discern more probable opinions from less probable ones, if even the smallest excess must be weighed, I concede; if a small and doubtful excess can be neglected, I deny. But that this latter obtains in the Alphonsian system we have already said. Therefore no burden is imposed which goes beyond moral possibility and the rules of prudence. Add that that labor, already in most cases, has been supplied either by approved authors, or first of all by St. Alphonsus.

Note. See other objections refuted in Wouters, p. 95-132.

104. St. Alphonsus everywhere in his moral works commemorates this distinguished dictum of the Seraphic Doctor: "Conscience too broad and too strict is to be avoided; for the first generates presumption, the second desperation; thus the first often calls evil good, the second on the contrary calls good evil; likewise, the first often saves one to be damned, the second on the contrary condemns one to be saved" (Compend. theol. ver., l. 2, c. 52).

That the rule of equiprobabilism handed down by St. Alphonsus accurately holds that middle way is already clear from what has been said (cf. n. 88 ff.).

But that it moreover surpasses the other systems in prudence, and in facility, and in authority, will be evident from what is now to be said.¹

105. I. The rule of equiprobabilism of St. Alphonsus is the most PRUDENT of all. For the Blessed Doctor proposes such a norm as guards against every illusion of self-love, and entirely closes the way to scruples.

1. It guards against the illusion of self-love. This danger threatens if someone weighs only the moments which fight for liberty, without attending to the reasons of the other part (cf. n. 67). But equiprobabilism (as the very word indicates) does not follow such a manner of acting, indeed rather it expressly rejects it.

2. It closes the way to scruples. For it does not impose strict equiprobabilism, but teaches that almost equal probability of opinions suffices, and that attention is not to be given to an excess of probability unless it appears certain and notable. Certainly proportionate diligence is required; but as often as

the intellect, with reasonable diligence applied according to its powers, does not clearly perceive the certain preponderance of the safer opinion, liberty remains in full possession of its right. What more accommodated to even moderate minds can be desired?

Let us hear the theologian who drew up the Votum for the concession of the title Doctor. "But I would not wish anyone to think," he says, "that Alphonsus supplied only this one thing, namely that he collected dissenting opinions and estimated them very acutely; since besides this it is certain that the solid foundations of the whole moral discipline were established through him. For all know that the question concerning the nature and use of probability is fundamental in Moral Theology.... Now, before Alphonsus, a question of this kind was so entangled that probabilists and probabiliorists, contending among themselves, very easily struck either upon the rock of laxism or upon that of rigorism. But that now in this question extremes are avoided is owed TO ALPHONSUS ALONE, who introduced that golden system of EQUIPROBABILISM, which he constantly retained and adopted in explaining moral discipline."

106. II. The rule of equiprobabilism of St. Alphonsus is the EASIEST of all. For two things, in every controversy concerning the lawfulness of actions, suffice:

1. To see whether law or liberty possesses, according to the things set forth above (n. 55). 2. To adjudge the palm to the part which possesses, unless the opinion which favors the other is evidently more probable.

YOU WILL OBJECT. It is easier to judge concerning solid and grave probability than concerning the excess of the opposite probability. Therefore the rule of probabilism is easier, which teaches that an opinion can lawfully be admitted, provided it is truly and solidly probable.

Resp. The objection is vain. For before you embrace an opinion, either you consider it alone, or you compare it with its contradictory. If the first, you sin by acting imprudently; for it is proper to imprudence, St. Thomas testifying, to judge or act while sufficient deliberation is neglected. Would you not then have to be called similar to a judge who, after hearing only one part of the litigants, and indeed the part friendly to himself, adjudged the case to that same part? (cf. n. 40, rule 2).

If the second, there is no reason why you should glory in a simpler rule; since, in order to judge your probability as theologically and relatively or comparatively grave, you must institute the same weighing of reasons standing on each side. Therefore they deceive themselves who think that the rule of absolute probabilism is simpler; for this either is not a right rule of morals, or it demands for itself the same labor as ours.

107. III. The rule of equiprobabilism of St. Alphonsus is the most APPROVED of all. Those things which, from the testimonies of authors and of the Prelates of the whole world, and from the approval of the Holy See, are reported in favor of the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus in general (cf. Acts of the Doctorate), have force not only with equal but with stronger right concerning his moral system. For this system sustains and moderates the whole moral doctrine, since almost all doubts are resolved according to its norm.

The Sacred Congregation of Rites understood this very well; and hence it was why it subjected the system of the holy man to the most rigorous investigation, not once, but a second time; with this result, that the system, from that time, received for itself the assent of all and almost unanimous applause in the Catholic world.¹ The defender of the cause of Beatification had already gravely testified this before the assembly of the Most Eminent Cardinals, saying: "But if the wise system of Ligorio did not please certain private writers, nevertheless it pleased others infinite in multitude and most excellent in doctrine, who judged that he had carried every point in this question: therefore throughout all Italy, Spain, Germany, and other parts of the world, they received his Moral Theology with the highest applause."²

But there is not given another system of Moral Theology which equally authentic testimonies adorn, and which so many and so splendid suffrages commend. Nor is it true, as certain authors wrongly affirm, that the aforesaid approval belongs also to simple or absolute probabilism; since it has been proved sufficiently and more than sufficiently that the system of St. Alphonsus is and always was alien from that more benign probabilism which he himself calls a lax opinion (n. 102).

Note. As to the manner of acting, if a penitent follows the more benign opinion, see n. 1789.

108. For the more perfect understanding of St. Alphonsus's Moral Theology, it seems useful to propose some rules by which the genuine judgment of the holy man concerning the value of opinions may be known. For when the Blessed Doctor commemorates diverse opinions of authors, he does not always state in set words which one out of all is to be held in practice. The disciple of so great a master will detect this by an easy task, if he knows his system well, and at the same time knows the manner in which he himself is accustomed to declare his opinions. On this matter, attention must be given to the following RULES:

1. Generally that opinion alone which St. Alphonsus calls probable is truly probable for him. Hence, when he uses this formula: The authors probably say, in this case he judges their opinion probable. But when he uses this other formula: The authors say that it is probably lawful, from this it is not clear that that opinion is regarded by him as probable; for his words indicate only that he is setting forth the judgment of the authors whom he cites.

2. If, speaking of some opinion, he says: it does not seem improbable; or: it is not improbably said; in this case, regularly, he holds the opinion as sufficiently probable, unless perhaps he opposes to the opinion something certainly or notably more probable.

3. An opinion which he calls neither probable nor improbable, he generally leaves to the judgment of others. Yet one must see what he says either before or afterward: for, if he opposes nothing at all, and the author whom he cites is grave, that opinion is generally to be held as sufficiently probable: as, for example, when at the end of a question he adds: Lugo... adds... notes.

4. If he expressly says of some opinion: I do not dare to condemn it, or I do not dare to call it improbable, by that very fact he declares that, in his judgment, it is doubtfully probable, or that it is referred by him to the judgment of the more prudent.

5. When he calls some opinion truer, or much or absolutely more probable, or more probable and at the same time common or most common, in this case he no longer judges the opposite, with respect to the other, as solidly probable, even if he does not expressly reject it as improbable.

6. The same must be said when he calls one of the opinions more probable or more common, and does not set forth a judgment concerning the opposite; for by this manner of speaking he intends to signify that that opinion seems to him so much more probable that he does not acknowledge the opposite as truly probable.

7. An opinion to which nothing is opposed, and which he simply calls probable (a case which nevertheless rarely happens), ordinarily founds moral certitude for practice (cf. n. 72).

8. An opinion which he simply calls common, with no judgment given concerning the opposite, must certainly be called his own.

Warning. In this work we shall for the most part pass over opinions which are destitute of the force of obliging, or which have little bearing on the matter, and we shall report only those which St. Alphonsus supports for practice, referring the reader to the work of the Holy Doctor himself for richer study and understanding. Nevertheless, in appraising opinions we shall use the same word as he does, and in questions truly controversial we shall always set forth each opinion in a few words.