Hope

41. Definition. 1. Hope as a virtue, habitual hope, is defined: an infused supernatural habit by which man is disposed to expect with certainty, from the promise of God, eternal beatitude and the means necessary for it.

Theological hope as an act, actual hope, is defined: the certain expectation of future beatitude, to be obtained from the most faithful divine promise through the means ordained by God.

The name of hope is taken in various senses: for it signifies a. the expectation of a possible future good, whether sensible or suprasensible; b. the thing hoped for itself, as when it is said: awaiting the blessed hope,² or: hope, that is beatitude, comes to us from merits; c. the cause and reason of hope, whether primary or secondary, as when it is said: Thou hast become my hope, O Lord, or if the Blessed Virgin is called our hope; d. both the habit and the act of the theological virtue.

2. Hope is not an act of the intellect but of the will, consisting in a trustful expectation which is joined with certainty, or firmness and quiet, excluding inordinate fear lest we not obtain the hoped-for good.

a. The act of hope supposes and contains several acts: a. an act of love, love of concupiscence, by which God pleases us as our good and the object of our beatitude; for we cannot hope except for what pleases us as our good. b. An act of desire, by which the will is borne toward an absent good: for from love of a good by its nature there arises desire of it, if the beloved good is absent. c. From the divine promise we know that the attainment of the desired good is possible for us: for we cannot hope for a good which cannot be obtained by us, and at the same time we know that God, on account of His fidelity in preserving promises, cannot fail us; whence, toward that good, there arises an act of expectation and trust that we shall one day be made participants of it. Finally we understand that neither power nor will is lacking to God on His part for giving the promised goods, whence we are raised up to firm and certain expectation.

b. Therefore, because hope, looked at fully and adequately, contains several acts in itself, the formal object of hope so considered must also be called multiple: and indeed the formal object of love of concupiscence and of desire is God insofar as He is good to us, or the relative goodness of God; the motive of hope formally considered is the fidelity of God in fulfilling promises; the motive of the certainty and firmness which is inherent in trust is the omnipotence and mercy of God.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 17-22. St. Alphonsus, bk. 2, nn. 20-21. Suarez, De spe, disp. 1 and 2. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis decalogalis, tract. 2, nn. 107-125. Reuter, Theologia moralis, II, nn. 56-70. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale, II, nn. 109-133. Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis, I, nn. 305-313.

² Tit. 2:13.

42. Hope joined with fear. Theological hope ought to be firm and certain, excluding all diffidence and hesitation, and nevertheless it has fear joined to it: with fear and trembling work out your salvation.¹ Firmness is referred to the promise; fear to the attainment. The firmness and certainty of hope arises from the motive of hoping, which we have on the part of God, namely from certain knowledge that God can and wills to stand by all His promises, because He is omnipotent and merciful; and indeed the firmness of this knowledge is increased from the fact that God has already given such manifest arguments of His kindness and mercy toward us. The fear which is joined to hope has its origin on our part, because we know that the outcome of those things which we hope for can be frustrated because of our frailty. For God did not promise beatitude to us absolutely, but conditionally, namely dependently on our cooperation; now since with absolute certainty we cannot know whether the conditions are fulfilled on our part or not, there is always a reason for fear: for we cannot know with certainty whether we are worthy of love or hatred.² Yet since we can attain eternal beatitude, provided we ourselves seriously will it, this fear ought to exclude on the one hand rash security, and on the other also faint-hearted anxiety.

¹ Phil. 2:12. Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 9.

² Eccl. 9:1.

43. Object of hope. a. The material object of hope is constituted by all the goods promised to us by God; and since these are of two kinds, a primary object is distinguished, which is God Himself insofar as He is our highest good and our objective beatitude, and a secondary object, which is constituted by all the means which, from God's ordination, are necessary and useful for obtaining that beatitude, namely habitual gifts, helps of grace, remission of sins, goods both spiritual and also temporal, and the special providence of God, which may turn evils away from us and procure goods for us.

b. The formal object of hope is the supreme fidelity of God promising, who can perform what He has promised, because He is omnipotent, and wills to perform what He has promised, because He is most benign. And as faith supposes revelation, so hope supposes the divine promise of those things which we hope for as a necessary condition.¹

¹ Others present the reason of hope and its formal object otherwise. Cf. Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie XXII (1898), p. 63 ff.: "Das Formalobjekt der Hoffnung."

44. On the necessity itself of hope. 1. Actual hope is necessary for adults by necessity of means: for those not yet justified, unto justification; for those justified, unto salvation.

Arguments. a. An adult ought to dispose himself by his own acts for obtaining justification from God, which is impossible without hope, by which he trusts that he can obtain remission of sins. Besides this, he who intends to be justified ought to have at least the implicit purpose of keeping all the commandments for the whole time of his life; but since he cannot accomplish this by his own powers, he cannot conceive this purpose unless he trusts in the help of grace. Therefore the Council of Trent, among the dispositions which are required for the justification of adults, after faith also enumerates hope.¹ b. A justified man ought to attain his supernatural end of eternal beatitude by his own merits to be acquired through the help of grace; but he cannot tend to this end unless he hopes for eternal beatitude and for the helps of grace necessary for obtaining it. Besides this, prayer is necessary for salvation by necessity of means; but prayer is impossible without the exercise of hope;² therefore hope also is necessary by necessity of means.

The discussion here concerns the act of hope, which moral theology chiefly considers. The infused habit of hope is necessary for all, even infants, for salvation by absolute necessity of means: for since sanctifying grace is absolutely necessary, the habit of hope also, which is infused together with it, is absolutely necessary.

2. Actual hope is necessary for adults also by necessity of divine precept, both natural and positive.

a. For by natural precept man is bound to employ the means necessary for salvation; but the act of hope is a means necessary for salvation. b. In Sacred Scripture we are everywhere admonished and stirred up to hope;³ but by these texts of Sacred Scripture the act of hope is not only counseled, but truly prescribed. Besides this, Christ the Lord in the Lord's Prayer taught us the manner of hoping and asking, and prescribed it to us.⁴

The precept of hope is affirmative and negative: insofar as it is affirmative, it imposes the obligation of eliciting an act of hope; insofar as it is negative, it enjoins the obligation of not despairing and not presuming. But the affirmative precept obliges per se and accidentally; now it is asked when and how often the act of hope must be elicited.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 6.

² James 1:6-7.

³ 1 Tim. 6:17; Rom. 8:24; Col. 1:5; Ps. 4:6.

⁴ Proposition 1, condemned by Alexander VII: Man at no time whatever of his life is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, charity by force of the precepts pertaining to those virtues.

45. When the precept of hope obliges. 1. The precept of hope obliges per se, or by reason of the virtue itself of hope:

a. At the beginning of the use of reason or of spiritual life, that is, when first God and eternal beatitude, into which man ought to tend by the means ordained by God, have been sufficiently proposed to him.

a. For reverence owed to God requires that we immediately adhere to God with firm trust as soon as we know that God has promised eternal beatitude to us. b. Besides this, at the beginning of the use of reason man ought to tend into God, the ultimate end, through the means ordained for this; but he cannot tend into God and begin a spiritual life which is meritorious of eternal life unless he hopes for eternal retribution and the means necessary for salvation.

b. Several times in life, in order to conserve justice; but the time at which the act of hope ought to be elicited cannot be determined. Yet it must be elicited frequently, because it is so necessary for leading the Christian life; this is clear both from the fact that the desire of eternal beatitude is a most efficacious motive for observing the precepts, and from the fact that prayer is necessary, which cannot be exercised without hope.

Yet because, for satisfying the precept of hope, a formal act of hope is not required, but virtual hope suffices, practically it does not bring difficulty: for there is no sufficiently instructed Christian faithful person who does not in this way rather often elicit acts of hope, while he prays, receives the sacraments, observes the precepts, and purposes not to offend God lest he fall away from eternal salvation; but if he neglects the Christian life, he does not advert to this obligation.

c. When a temptation against hope urges which cannot be conquered except through an act of hope: for the precept of hope obliges one to repel temptations which arise against it; for if an act of hope is the means necessary for this, it must be employed from the precept of hope.

d. When man through the mortal sin of despair has lost the habit of hope: for he is bound to return to God by conversion from despair, which ought to happen through an act of hope.

2. Accidentally the precept of eliciting hope urges: a. in a temptation against another virtue, if this temptation cannot be overcome unless the soul is strengthened by an act of hope; b. when another precept must be fulfilled which cannot be fulfilled without at least a virtual and implicit act of hope, such as the precept of prayer, penance, etc.

46. On fear and hope insofar as they are motives of moral actions. Since non-Catholic writers reproach the moral doctrine of the Church, indeed even of the Gospel, for this reason, because Catholic doctrine says that moral actions performed from fear of punishment or from hope of reward are honorable and licit, although, they say, they are useless, indeed even vicious, it is helpful to explain briefly in what sense fear and hope are licit and honorable motives of moral actions. Namely, although according to the doctrine of the Church works done from charity are more perfect, nevertheless works performed with a view to eternal recompense do not lack moral honesty and spiritual usefulness.

Long ago Luther and Calvin had taught that works performed with a view to eternal recompense are useless and savor of vicious cupidity; afterwards Baius and the Jansenists had affirmed the same, whose doctrine the Council of Trent¹ and Alexander VIII² condemned. With these heretics today atheist philosophers agree, who agree in this affirmation: Actions from the motive of eternal life are opposed to pure morality. Die Motivierung der Handlungen durch die Hoffnung auf ewige Seligkeit ist eine Falschung der reinen Sittlichkeit.

1. On fear. a. Fear is an act of the will which turns away from an imminent evil; fear of God, or divine fear, turns away from the evil which God can inflict because of sin.

Servile fear fears punishment, damnation, to be inflicted by God because of sin, or sin as the cause of this punishment; it is called servile because servants are accustomed to obey because of fear of punishment. This fear is servilely servile if one fearing punishment, or sin because of punishment, has the will of sinning if there were no punishment, that is, hell.

Filial fear fears offense of God and the loss of divine friendship, or sin because it is an offense of God with loss of divine friendship. It is called filial because it belongs to sons to fear lest they offend their parents.

Initial fear fears offense of God and eternal punishment, or sin because it is an offense of God to be punished by eternal punishment. It is called initial because it belongs to beginners to fear sin, both because it is an offense of God and because it is a cause of punishment.

b. Just as servile fear is licit and honorable, so to serve God, to avoid sins, and to observe the precepts from fear of punishment is licit and honorable, provided the will of sinning is excluded; yet the motive of charity is far nobler and more perfect.

Servilely servile fear is morally evil and vicious, because it does not exclude the will of sinning; it prefers punishment to sin, the sinner to God the Creator, which cannot be said of servile fear. Therefore fear is commanded by God: Fear Him who ... has power to cast into gehenna;³ in Sacred Scripture it is said to be opposed to sin: The fear of the Lord drives out sin;⁴ it is sought from God as a gift: Pierce my flesh with Thy fear.⁵

2. On hope. a. From the motive of hope someone can serve God and observe the precepts in three different ways: a. in such a way that he would not serve the precepts unless eternal reward had been promised; b. in such a way that he observes them only because of eternal reward, thinking nothing of that condition; c. in such a way that he observes them both because of the reward and because of God.

b. To observe the precepts with a view to eternal recompense in such a way that they would not be observed if no recompense were given is vicious cupidity: for he who thus does good prefers himself to God; but to observe the precepts with a view to recompense is a morally good work and, under the due conditions, meritorious.

a. The motive of hope is most fitting to human nature, since it is especially consonant with the natural appetite by which man is borne toward his own happiness. Besides this, where great difficulties must be overcome in the service of God, man must be aided by the motive of hope and fear, lest he fall away from moral perfection.

b. Sacred Scripture praises and commends works which are done from the motive of hope with a view to recompense: Everyone who contends in a contest abstains from all things; and they indeed do this in order that they may receive a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible one.⁶

c. Although the motive of hope is lower than the motive of charity, nevertheless it does not exclude the motive of charity; indeed it necessarily leads to charity.

He who wills to attain eternal life also wills those things which are necessary for attaining eternal life; but for attaining eternal life charity is necessary.⁷

Note. The peculiar relation which exists between man's holiness, charity of God, and eternal beatitude must be considered. Eternal life, toward which we strive, is at the same time man's holiness and happiness. Therefore he who observes the precepts with a view to recompense implicitly at the same time intends his own holiness and the glory of God; and he who observes the precepts from charity of God or for acquiring holiness implicitly at the same time intends his own beatitude, since eternal beatitude is God.

¹ Sess. 6, can. 31: If anyone shall say that the justified man sins when he works well with a view to eternal recompense, let him be anathema.

² Prop. 13. Whoever serves God even with a view to eternal recompense, if he lacks charity, is not without vice whenever he works with a view, although to beatitude.

³ Luke 12:5.

⁴ Ecclus. 1:27.

⁵ Ps. 118:120.

⁶ 1 Cor. 9:25. Cf. Ps. 118:112; Col. 3:23 s.; Apoc. 2:10.

⁷ Cf. concerning this question: Kneib, Die "Lohnsucht" der christlichen Moral, Theologische Studien der Leo-Gesellschaft, Vienna: Meyer, 1904. Kneib, Die "Jenseitsmoral" im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen, Freiburg: Herder, 1907. Schneider, Die gottliche Weltordnung, Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1900: "Die 'Lohnsucht' der religiosen Moral," p. 496.

AN act of hope is an act of the will by which we desire the possession of God and of heaven, and firmly trust that we shall obtain them together with the necessary means through the goodness of God and God’s fidelity to his promises. The material object, then, of hope is God, heaven, and the supernatural helps necessary to attain thereto. ‘The formal object is God’s infinite goodness towards us, his omnipotence, and his faithfulness to his promises. God is infinitely good and wishes us to be happy with him for ever; he has promised that we shall be happy with him if only we persevere to the end. He will enable us to do this by his all-powerful grace.

Hope is necessary for salvation for all who have come to the use of reason. The sinner must hope in order to ask for pardon and to be able to rise from his sin. The just man must hope, otherwise he will not pray, and without prayer it is impossible to persevere in the grace of God. Hope is also matter of precept, which obliges sometimes per se, at other times per accidens, in much the same way as the precept of faith. Explicit acts of hope, however, are not necessary in order to fulfil this precept; what was said above about the acts of faith is applicable to acts of hope. Implicit acts contained in prayer, the reception of the sacraments, and other works of piety are sufficient to fulfil the obligation. Nobody, then, who is complying with the ordinary obligations of a Christian life need be anxious whether he is fulfilling the precept of eliciting acts of the theological virtues; but it is well, as a matter of counsel, to renew them frequently and explicitly.

The chief sins against hope are despair, presumption, and aversion for God and heavenly things.

Despair is a voluntary diffidence about obtaining heaven and the means necessary thereto. If it arises from mistrust of the goodness, power, and fidelity of God, it is gravely injurious to him, and is always mortally sinful. In an improper sense, despair sometimes springs from an overpowering idea of one’s own weakness and fickleness, and then it is frequently only venially sinful; it is not directly against hope, but rather a failure to make use of the motives to encouragement which hope furnishes.

Presumption here signifies a sin against hope by excess, and is an inordinate confidence in the attainment of heaven without using the necessary means. It is of itself a grave sin, but admits of parvity of matter, as when through such inordinate confidence one commits venial sin.

Aversion for God and heaven is distinguished from hatred of God, which is directly against charity, in that it does not wish evil to God, but prefers earth and earthly joys to God and heaven, It is, as is obvious, a mortal sin.

I. Notion of Hope. Hope is a theological virtue inclining man to expect, with certain confidence, through the help of God, eternal beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, n. 6). It is said:

1. With certain confidence. By these words is indicated the essential property of the virtue of hope; if this is lacking, the virtue of theological hope cannot exist.

2. Through the help of God. These words assign the formal object of the virtue of hope.

3. Eternal beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it. By these words is indicated the material object of this virtue, both primary, which is beatitude, and secondary, namely the means to attaining it.

Since the virtue of hope, as we have indicated, is not destroyed by just any mortal sin, but only by the sin of heresy and of despair, it is clear that, equally with faith, by reason of charity it is distinguished into formed and unformed hope, according as it exists in a subject which has charity or lacks it.

II. Object of Hope. 1. Material object. All agree that beatitude is the primary material object of theological hope. But beatitude is twofold: objective, which is God Himself, and subjective, which is the possession of God. Theologians dispute in which beatitude the primary material object is to be placed. Some admit both kinds of beatitude as such; others admit objective beatitude only. This latter, which is the opinion of the Thomists, seems to be admitted as more probable. For that is the primary material object of hope which beatifies man. Now it is not the very action by which we attain that object which beatifies us, but the object itself. There is added the fact that the primary material object of a theological virtue is immediately God; and this cannot be said of possession itself. It is indeed true that God is not the material object of theological hope except insofar as He is attained by means of subjective beatitude; but this merely makes subjective beatitude a condition without which not.

To the secondary material object of hope pertain all supernatural goods, and even natural goods, insofar as they conduce to beatitude. For the same virtue which primarily tends toward some end secondarily tends toward the means conducing to that end, since they stand under the same formal object.

2. Formal object. Omitting the opinions of the few who assign as the formal object of the virtue of hope either the arduousness of the good to be obtained, or only the goodness of God as desirable by us, with the far greater part of theologians we admit as certain that the formal object consists in divine help. But theologians dispute what divine attributes divine help involves by reason of the formal object. More commonly they teach that divine help, by reason of the formal object, involves at least omnipotence, by which in every case God can help us, and relative goodness, by which God wills to help us. With regard to the fidelity of God in His promises, authors disagree. But with St. Alphonsus (Theologia moralis, II, 21) and many others we admit that this fidelity is also a constitutive part of the formal object. For a formal object which regards the future moves to an act only insofar as that object is certain. But that object becomes certain for us through fidelity. For fidelity is that property by force of which the help of God is known as immutable; but help known as immutable is certain help; therefore help becomes formally certain for us through fidelity, and therefore fidelity is a constitutive part of the formal object of theological hope. Yet from this it does not follow that promise too enters into the essence of the formal object; for this is required only so that by divine faith we may be able to believe in divine help, and it is a condition without which there is no eliciting of an act of hope.

III. Subject of Hope. 1. The subject by which and partial of hope is the will. For the virtue of hope is occupied around the divine good, known by reason illumined by faith; but this is the good of the will.

2. The subject which and total of hope are:

a) All just wayfarers. For in the just there are all infused virtues compossible with their state. But the virtue of hope is compossible with all wayfarers, even with souls detained in purgatory, since beatitude is for them an arduous good, not yet possessed and possible to obtain.

b) All faithful wayfarers, although sinners, provided they are not guilty of the mortal sin of despair or of unbelieving presumption. This doctrine is founded on the analogy of faith and hope. For on the one hand it is established that divine faith is not always lost when charity is lost. On the other hand: a) while faith remains, the foundation of hope remains, and so hope is not destroyed indirectly;¹ b) hope, like faith, is in its essence independent of charity and of habitual grace, although this is the connatural principle of both habits; c) the act of hope, like the act of faith, is, as is clear from the Council of Trent, a remote disposition to justification.² Therefore, just as the merciful God leaves divine faith in the sinner as long as he does not directly destroy it by the sin of infidelity or heresy, it must be presumed that God similarly does not take away theological hope as long as the sinner does not despair or presume unbelievingly.

Corollary. From what has been said it follows that the subject which and total of the virtue of hope is in no way: 1. the Blessed, for they are possessors of the good to be hoped for; 2. the damned, for whom beatitude is simply impossible; 3. formal heretics as such, since by the sin of infidelity the foundation of hope is destroyed; 4. sinners guilty of the mortal sin of despair, by which the formal object of hope is directly destroyed, and sinners guilty of the sin of presumption joined with the sin of infidelity, by which the formal object is indirectly destroyed through the destruction of its foundation.

¹ A virtue is said to be destroyed directly, or per se, by an act contrary to it, by which the object is destroyed; but it is said to be destroyed indirectly, or per accidens, when the foundation is removed.

² Session 6, chapter 6.

IV. Properties of Hope. The properties of hope are enumerated as: certitude, moral goodness, utility, and necessity.

1. Certitude of hope consists in this, that it firmly expects its object insofar as the attainment of it depends on God's help; it is therefore founded on a complete persuasion that God on His part will furnish man all things necessary for salvation, so that, if man falls short of his end, he ought to ascribe this ruin to himself. From these points it follows of itself that most certain hope does not exclude fear. For man, in cooperating with the grace of God, which is required for salvation, is defectible of himself; and to this defectibility of nature there is added the arduousness of obtaining the good, which can turn man aside from his duty. Hence the certitude of hope and the fear of one hoping are very well joined together. For the one hoping is certain on the part of the motive on which hope rests, but he fears on the part of his own defectibility; this leaves the nature of hope intact.

That certitude belongs to hope is taught 1. by the Council of Trent,¹ saying: "All ought to place and repose a most firm hope in the help of God"; 2. by Sacred Scripture, which in various places praises it, for example, as "a sure and firm anchor of the soul";² 3. by theological reason, because the expectation of some thing participates in the state of mind in which it is founded. Now the expectation of beatitude is founded on certitude, namely that God on His part will furnish the things necessary for beatitude (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 18, a. 4).

2. The moral goodness of hope consists in this, that the virtue of hope inclines man to acts conformed to right reason; from this it follows that the habit itself and its acts, elicited with a view to reward, are morally good. That this property is truly present in the virtue of hope is established from the Council of Trent: "If anyone says that the justified man sins when he works well with a view to eternal reward, let him be anathema."³ It is further proved from Sacred Scripture, in which men are urged countless times to good works with a view to eternal happiness.⁴ It is confirmed by reason. For that habit and its acts are certainly morally good by which man is inclined to his salvation according to that order by which God Himself has set it before man, that is, by referring it, or at least leaving it referable, to God as the ultimate end. But man by the habit of hope and by its act tends toward himself as the end to whom he wills the good, yet without excluding the further relation, or at least referability, of this act to God as the ultimate end.

3. The utility of hope is derived both from its moral goodness just explained and from its necessity still to be explained.

4. Necessity of hope. a) The habit of hope, or habitual hope, is necessary for salvation for all men by necessity of means. For no one is saved without sanctifying grace. But sanctifying grace is not granted without the habit of hope. Therefore, just as sanctifying grace is necessary by necessity of means, so also is the habit of hope.

b) In what respect the act of hope, or actual hope, is necessary, we shall explain in Book II, where we shall speak of the exercise or cultivation of virtues.

¹ Session 6, chapter 13.

² Heb. 6:18.

³ Session 6, canon 31.

⁴ Cf. Gen. 15:1.

(St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 20-21; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, II, 20-21; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, nn. 6-8.)

Hope is a supernatural theological virtue inclining man to expect, with certain confidence, through the help of God, eternal beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, n. 6).

The primary material object is beatitude; the secondary material object is all the means which conduce to beatitude (De virtutibus, p. 402).

The formal object or motive of hope is divine help, or the assisting power of God.

These things recalled to memory, we shall speak first about the necessity of the act of hope, then about sins against hope.

I. Necessity of means. The act of hope, as was said about the act of faith, cannot be necessary except for adults. Besides, a distinction must again be made between adults not yet justified and adults justified. Now:

1. The act of hope is necessary for salvation by necessity of means for adults not justified. For the said act is necessary by necessity of means for justification. But justification itself is necessary for salvation by necessity of means. Therefore the same thing must be affirmed about the act of hope.

The major is clear: 1. from the Council of Trent, which enumerates the act of hope among the dispositions necessary for the justification of adults;¹ and elsewhere, speaking of the necessity of contrition for obtaining pardon of sins, teaches that in this contrition it is required that it be "with confidence in the divine mercy."² 2. It is confirmed by reason. For it is altogether fitting that, for the justification of an adult or for obtaining the right of possessing God, it be required that he have expected God as the supernatural end to be possessed.

But theologians dispute whether in every justification whatsoever of adults the act of theological hope is necessary, or only according to the common law. Perhaps it is more aptly said that according to the common law no justification of an adult takes place without an explicit act of theological hope, although absolutely it can happen that a sinner is justified while eliciting no act of hope except one which is implicitly contained in an act of perfect charity or contrition.

2. The act of hope is necessary for justified adults by necessity of means insofar as salvation cannot be obtained without prayer by which grace for fulfilling the precepts is obtained. But prayer without hope receives nothing from the Lord, as is clear from the Epistle of St. James.³

Corollary. From what has been said, it is clear how deservedly the doctrine of the Quietists,⁴ both carnal and spiritual, was proscribed by Innocent XI⁵ and XII.⁶

¹ Session 6, chapter 6.

² Session 14, chapter 4.

³ James 1:6.

⁴ The Quietists, pseudo-mystics of the seventeenth century, taught that an act of hope, although honorable, is nevertheless useless and even harmful to perfect Christians, and therefore should never be elicited by them. Among them, some, who are called carnal Quietists, with Michael Molinos as leader, under pretext of preserving the soul's highest quiet, said that all acts of the other virtues too, together with acts of hope, were useless for the perfect; and, declaring themselves impeccable, fell into most grave sins. Others, who are called spiritual Quietists, thought that a Christian can attain a stable disposition, or a certain state of perfection, in which he would no longer ever act in view of eternal reward, indeed would acquiesce in eternal damnation. The principal supporter of this erroneous opinion was the most pious Fenelon, who nevertheless immediately rejected it in a wholly most humble and sincere manner when it had been condemned by the Supreme Pontiff.

⁵ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1221 sq.

⁶ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1327 sq.

II. Necessity of precept follows from the necessity of means explained. Besides, it is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture;¹ 2. from these words of the Council of Trent: all must place and repose a most firm hope in the help of God;² 3. from proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII: "At no time in his life is a man bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues";³ 4. from the fact that each person is bound to expect the ultimate end for which he was created, that is, beatitude (St. Alphonsus, II, 20).

Now the act of hope obliges:

1. By reason of the precept of hope itself:

a) When someone first knows that eternal beatitude is his ultimate end (St. Alphonsus, II, 20).

b) Several times in life, and in the article of death, as was said of eliciting the act of faith several times in life and in the article of death (n. 489).

c) After an act of despair; in which case the injury done to the assisting power of God seems to carry with it the obligation of repairing it by an act of hope at least not long delayed.

d) When a grave temptation against hope presses, which someone judges he cannot conquer except by an elicited act of hope.

2. By reason of the precept of another virtue:

a) When an act of another virtue is prescribed, which cannot be placed without an act of hope (St. Alphonsus, II, 20).

b) When a temptation against another virtue presses, which someone seems to himself unable to conquer without an act of hope (St. Alphonsus, II, 20).

c) When an act of virtue is freely placed which cannot be placed in the due manner without an act of hope.

Corollaries I and II. Compare and apply the notes regarding faith (n. 489).

Corollary III. To the act of hoping there corresponds the act of fearing eternal damnation, which likewise obliges, as is clear both from Sacred Scripture,⁴ and from the fact that each person must fear that which involves frustration of the ultimate end and will not certainly be avoided.⁵

¹ Cf. Ps. 61:9; Col. 1:23.

² Session 6, chapter 13.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1101.

⁴ Luke 12:5.

⁵ Council of Trent, session 6, chapters 12 and 13.

The theological virtues are those that perfect the intellect and the will with reference to God, their ultimate, supernatural object. They are three: (a) faith, which is a virtue infused into the intellect, giving man supernatural truths that are perceived by a divine light; (b) hope, which is a virtue infused into the will, enabling man to tend towards the supernatural destiny disclosed by faith as towards an end possible of attainment; (c) charity, which is a virtue infused into the will, uniting man’s affections to the object of his hope and transforming him into its likeness.

The highest of the virtues within each group are the following:

(a) Charity is greater than faith and hope, since it implies union with its objects, while the other two imply a certain distance from their object;

(b) Justice is superior to fortitude and temperance, since it deals with actions by which man is rightly ordered, both as to himself and as to others, while the others deal with the passions and the right disposition of man as to himself. The order of the moral virtues is: prudence, which is the guide of the others; justice, which deals with man’s actions and orders him rightly, both as to himself and as to others; fortitude, which governs the passions, even when life and death are the issues; temperance, which governs the passions in affairs of less importance;

(c) The chief of the intellectual virtues is wisdom, which considers the supreme cause of things, and therefore judges the other virtues of the intellect.

In the blessed the virtues will remain, but changed in some respects. (a) Thus, the rectitude of soul contained in the moral virtues will endure, but there will be no rebellious passions to overcome, no dangers to oppose, no debts of justice to be discharged, as in this life; (b) the intellectual virtues acquired in this life will remain, but the soul separated from the body will not employ sense images as in its earthly existence; (c) faith and hope will give place to vision and realization, but charity will never fall away.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 17-22.)

Definition.—The word “hope” is variously used. (a) In a wide and improper sense, it signifies the expectation of some wished-for evil, or desire without expectation. Hence, colloquially one hopes for misfortune to another (hope of a future evil), or that another has succeeded or is in good health (hope of past or present good), or that some unlooked-for fortune will turn up (hope without expectation). (b) In its strict and proper sense, hope signifies the expectation of some desired good in the future. Thus, one hopes to pass an examination, or to recover from illness.

The virtue of hope is defined: “An infused habit, by which we confidently expect to obtain, through the help of God, the reward of everlasting life.”

(a) It is “an infused habit.” These words express the genus to which hope belongs, and they set it apart from the emotion and the affection of hope, as well as from any acquired habit of hoping for purely natural goods. A natural virtue of hope, strengthening the will with reference to natural happiness, is not necessary in any state of man, fallen or unfallen, for the will does not stand in need of a superadded virtue with respect to those things that fall within its proper sphere of action.

(b) Hope is a habit “by which we expect, etc.” These words express the specific subjective elements of hope, that is, the powers of the soul in which it resides and the kinds of acts it performs.

(c) “Through the help of God.” These words express the formal object or motive of hope.

(d) “The rewards of eternal life.” These words express the material object of hope, that is, the thing that is hoped for.

There is a general similarity between the virtue of hope and natural hope as regards their objects and acts.

(a) Natural hope is the result of a love of some good, and so differs from fear, which is the dread of some evil. Similarly, the virtue of hope springs from a love of heavenly goods (Rom., viii. 24, 25).

(b) Natural hope has to do with a good that is absent, and it is therefore desire, not enjoyment. Similarly, the virtue of hope looks forward to goods not as yet attained: “We hope for that which we see not, we wait for it with patience” (Rom, viii. 25).

(c) Natural hope, unlike mere desire, seeks a good whose attainment is not certain or easy, and hence it presupposes courage. Similarly, the virtue of hope demands strength of soul: “Do ye manfully and let your heart be strengthened, all ye that hope in the Lord” (Ps. xxx. 25).

(d) Natural hope tends towards an objective, which, while difficult, is not impossible; hence, it expects with confidence, for, when an object of desire is impossible, one does not hope for it, but despairs. The virtue of hope also is confident: “Hold fast the glory and confidence of hope unto the end” (Heb. iii. 6).

Just as faith is divided into living and dead faith, so hope is divided into animated and inanimated hope. (a) Animated hope is that to which is joined the state of grace and charity, and which is thereby perfect as a virtue and meritorious. This hope is stronger, because we hope more confidently from friends. An act of animated hope is more perfect when commanded by the virtue of charity, less perfect when not so commanded—that is, he who makes an act of hope out of love of God performs a better work than he who makes an act of hope out of some other motive (such as self-encouragement). (b) Inanimated hope is that to which the state of grace and charity is not joined, and which therefore is an imperfect virtue and not meritorious.

The following divisions of hope made by the Quietists are not admissible:

(a) The division of hope into natural hope (which seeks its own good, and which is permitted to the ordinary faithful) and supernatural hope (which is entirely disinterested, and which is necessary for the perfect) contains Rigorism; for since natural hope is of no avail towards justification or for merit, it would follow that without disinterested love of God one could not obtain forgiveness, nor could an act be meritorious.

(b) The division of hope into two supernatural species, the one disinterested (which desires heavenly goods for the glory of God alone) and the other interested (which desires heavenly goods for the advantage of self), is useless; for acts of disinterested love belong to charity, not to hope (Denz., 1327-1349).

The Object of Hope.—By the object of hope we mean three things: (a) the good that is hoped for (material object, the end which is intended); (b) the person for whom that good is hoped (the end for whom); (c) the ground or foundation of hope (formal object).

The material object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary object, which is desired for its own sake, and the secondary, which is desired on account of the primary object.

(a) The primary object of hope is God Himself, the infinite good, considered as our Last End and Beatitude (Ps. lxxii. 25). Connoted in this object is the beatific vision, the finite act by means of which the creature attains to the possession of God. The primary object of our hope is the imperishable crown (I Cor., ix. 25), glory (Col., i. 27), the glory of the children of God (Rom., v. 2), salvation (I Thess., v. 8), eternal life (Tit., i. 2), entrance into the holy of holies (Heli, x. 19, 23), the inheritance incorruptible and undefiled that cannot fade, reserved in heaven (I Pet., i. 4), the vision of God (I John, iii. 3). It is this object especially that distinguishes supernatural from natural hope (I Cor., xv. 19). “From God,” says St. Thomas (II-II, q. 17, a. 2), “we should expect nothing less than God Himself.”

(b) The secondary object of hope embraces all those created things that assist one to attain one’s Last End. We may hope for all those things for which we may pray, as St. Augustine remarks.

The primary object of hope includes: (a) essential beatitude, that is, the beatific vision; (b) accessory beatitude, that is, all resultant joys, such as glory of soul and body, the companionship of the Saints, security from harm, and the like.

The secondary object of hope includes: (a) spiritual goods, such as graces; (b) temporal goods, such as health and the means that will enable us, at least indirectly, to work for the life to come and acquire merit; (c) deliverance from evils that would hinder spiritual goods; (d) all that promotes one’s salvation, such as labors for God.

The person for whom eternal life is hoped may be either oneself or one’s neighbor. (a) Absolutely speaking (i.e., apart from the supposition of friendship towards a neighbor), a person can hope only for himself; for the salvation of others is not attained by him, but by them; and thus, if there is no bond of affection, it cannot arouse in him that feeling of courageous confidence which belongs to hope. (b) Accidentally (i.e., on the supposition of friendship or charity towards others), one can hope for them; for love makes a person regard the good of others as his own. Thus, St. Paul is hopeful for the perseverance of the Philippians (Phil., i. 6), and he labors for the Corinthians that his hope for them may be steadfast (II Cor., i. 7).

The formal object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary object, which is the principal cause that effects our salvation, and the secondary object, which is a secondary or instrumental cause of salvation. (a) The primary motive of hope is God Himself, the Author of salvation, and hence it is said: “Cursed be the man that trusteth in man” (Jer, xvii. 5). (b) The secondary motive of hope are creatures by whom one is assisted in obtaining the means for salvation (such as the Saints, who aid us by their intercessions). Thus, in the Salve Regina, our Lady is addressed as “our hope.” The merits of Christ and our own merits, since they are instruments used by God, are motives of hope.

On what divine attribute is the virtue of hope based?

(a) Essentially, hope is based on God’s character of omnipotent helper; for the specific and differentiating note of this virtue is its courageous confidence, and this, in view of the surpassing height one expects to attain and the feebleness of all created efforts, must rely on the assistance of One who is equal to the task: “The Lord is my rock and my strength. God is my strong One, in Him will I trust” (II Kings, xxii. 2, 3); “You have hoped in the Lord Mighty forever” (Is., xxvi. 4); “The name of the Lord is a strong tower; the just runneth to it and shall be exalted” (Prov. xviii. 10).

(b) Secondary (i.e., as regards acts that it presupposes, or that are connected with it), hope is concerned with other divine attributes. Thus, a person does not hope unless he first believes that God has promised beatitude and that He is true to His promises, unless he regards beatitude as something desirable; and so he who hopes has placed his dependence on the loyalty of God to His given word, and on the desirability of God as the prize of life’s efforts: “Let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering, for He is faithful that hath promised” (Heb., x. 23); “Unto the hope of life everlasting, which God, who lieth not, hath promised before the times of the world” (Tit., i. 2); “The Lord is my portion, therefore will I wait for Him” (Lam., iii. 24); “Fear not, I am thy reward, exceeding great” (Gen., xv. 1). Just as faith presupposes a beginning of belief and a pious inclination towards it, so does hope presuppose faith and the love of God, as He is our beatitude.

Omnipotent divine help as the foundation of hope can be understood in two senses:

(a) It may be taken for some created help, that is, for some gift of God possessed by us (such as habitual or actual grace, merits, virtues, etc). It is not in this sense that divine help is called the motive of hope; for even a sinner can and should hope, and the just man’s merits, while they are dispositions for beatitude, are not a principal cause that will conduct him to it.

(b) This divine help may be taken for uncreated help, that is, for the act by which God confers His gifts upon us. In this sense only is divine aid the basis of hope. For if a person is asked why he is confident of salvation, he will not answer, “Because I am in the state of grace and do good works,” but “Because I know that God will help me.”

The divine perfections included in the title of helper now given to God are:

(a) essentially, the almighty power of God; for this is the immediate and sufficient reason for the confident expectation that one will at last possess the same object of felicity as God Himself. The higher and more difficult the goal one sets before oneself, the greater must be the resources on which one counts for success;

(b) secondarily, these perfections include the infinite kindness of God; for it is the goodness of God that prompts Him to employ His omnipotence in assisting creatures to attain their Last End. Man has hope, therefore, of attaining supreme felicity, because he relies on supreme power to aid him, while this supreme power aids him, because it is directed by infinite goodness and mercy. Thus, the Psalmist says: “I have trusted in Thy mercy” (Ps. xii. 6). Just as faith rests proximately on the reliability of God and remotely on His perfection of being, so hope rests proximately on God’s almighty power and radically on His goodness and perfection.

The Excellence of Hope.—Hope is a theological virtue, and is therefore superior to the moral virtues.

(a) It is a theological virtue, inasmuch as it tends immediately to God Himself. As was said above (see 1019, 1023), we hope for God and we hope in God: “In God is my salvation and my glory. He is the God of my help, and my hope is in God” (Ps. lxi. 8); “What is my hope? Is it not the Lord?” (Ps. xxxviii. 8); “In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped” (Ps. xxx. 1). Hence, the Apostle numbers hope along with the other theological virtues (I Cor., xiii. 13). “By faith the house of God receives its foundations, by hope it is reared, by charity it is completed” (St. Augustine, Serm. xxvii., 1).

(b) The two moral virtues that most resemble hope are longsuffering and magnanimity, for the former is the expectation of good that is distant, while the latter is the readiness to encounter difficulties in the quest of high ideals. But these two virtues belong to courage, rather than to hope; for the goods they seek are finite, and the difficulty they encounter is external struggle, whereas the good which hope seeks is infinite, and the difficulty lies in the very greatness of that good.

There are various points of view from which virtues may be compared one with another.

(a) One virtue is prior to another in duration, when it precedes the latter in time. Thus, the natural virtues that pagans have before their conversion are prior in duration to the supernatural virtues that are received in Baptism.

(b) One virtue is prior to another by nature, or in the order of generation, when it is the necessary preparation or disposition for that other, which essentially presupposes it. Thus, the intellectual virtues are naturally prior to justice, for a man cannot will to give others their due, unless he first knows that this is his duty.

(c) One virtue is prior to another virtue in excellence as a habit, when it has an object that is more elevated and comprehensive, and when it is fitted to be the guide of the other virtue. For the standard of comparison of habits must be taken from the objects to which they tend, and from which they derive their specific character (see 134). Thus, the habit of philosophizing is in itself more noble than the habit of accumulating wealth, for truth is better than money.

(d) One virtue is prior to another in excellence according to the general concept of virtue, when it does more to set the will right. For the standard of comparison then is to be taken from the influence exercised on one’s acts (as the word “virtue” or “power” intimates), and the will is the motor power that sets the other faculties in motion. Thus, for one who has debts to pay, it is better that he give his time to earning money than to storing his mind with the lore of scientists; justice has more of a claim on him than knowledge.

Comparison of Hope with Faith.—(a) These virtues are not the same, for, while faith makes us cling to God as the giver of truth and assent to what is obscure to us, hope makes up turn to Him as the author of beatitude and strive for that which is difficult for us.

(b) Faith and hope are normally equal in duration, since as a rule they are infused at the same time (as in Baptism). Accidentally, however, faith may precede hope, as when one who preserves his faith loses hope on account of despair, and later recovers it.

(c) They are unequal as to natural precedence, faith being prior to hope, since both glory and grace—the objects of hope—must be known through faith (Heb., xi. 6).

(d) They are unequal in their excellence as habits, faith being superior to hope, as the intellectual habits are superior to the moral; for faith is regulative and directive of hope, and has an object more abstract and universal.

(e) They are unequal in their excellence according to the general concept of virtue, hope being superior to faith, as the moral virtues are superior to the intellectual (see 156). For hope includes a rightness of the will towards God that is not included in the concept of faith, which is chiefly intellectual, and it is the will that moves the other powers to action.

Comparison of Hope with Charity.—(a) These virtues are not the same, for, while faith and hope adhere to God as the principle from which one derives truth or goodness, charity adheres to God for His own sake. Hope tends towards God as our good, from whom beatitude and the means thereto are to be expected; but charity unites us to God so that we live for God rather than for self.

(b) Hope and charity are normally equal as to duration, but accidentally hope may precede charity, as when one commits a mortal sin, but retains his hope of salvation, and later recovers charity. There is question now only of the habits, because the acts of the sinner leading up to charity—faith, fear, hope, contrition, etc.—are for the most part successive, although in a sudden conversion hope may be virtually included in charity.

(c) They are unequal as to natural precedence, hope being prior to charity, for, just as fear naturally leads to interested love such as is contained in hope, so does this interested love prepare one for a higher love that is disinterested: “The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart” (I Tim., i. 5). We speak here of hope unanimated by charity; for animated or living hope trusts in God as a friend, and hence presupposes charity.

(d) They are unequal in excellence, for hope proceeds from imperfect love, which desires God for the sake of the one who loves, while charity is perfect love and desires God for His sake.

Hope, as said above (see 1015-1017), is good and virtuous even when separated from charity, or when exercised without the actual motive of charity. But imperfect or less perfect hope must not be confused with the following acts, which have only the appearance of hope: (a) acts that remove the material object of hope, which are such as look for all beatitude in something different from God (e.g., in secondary joys of heaven); (b) acts that do injury to the objects of hope, such as those that subordinate them to lesser goods (e.g., hope which puts self above God or delight above virtue).

Three types of the latter kind of pseudo-hope may be distinguished:

(a) Egotistical hope is that which places the end for which beatitude is hoped (i.e., self, as was said in 1022) above the end which is beatitude (i.e., God the Last End, as was said in 1019 sqq.), or which places subjective beatitude (i.e., the act of intuitive vision by which beatitude is attained) above objective beatitude (i.e., God as the object in which beatitude consists). Just as the intellect is in error when it mistakes the conclusion for the premise, so is the will in disorder when it takes a means for the end. Hence, while there is nothing inordinate in a man’s hoping for food on account of eating and in his eating on account of health (since in reality health is the purpose of eating, and eating the purpose of food), it is extremely inordinate to hope for God on account of the beatific vision or on account of self, since God is the End of all, and the beatific vision is only the condition for attaining to this Last End, and self merely the subject to whom God and the beatific vision are to be given for its perfection through them.

(b) Epicurean hope is that which places pleasure above the other elements that pertain to subjective beatitude. The subjective happiness of man consists essentially in the act that is highest and distinctly human—namely, in the act of the intellect seeing God intuitively; hence, pleasure—even the chief spiritual pleasures-should be esteemed as something secondary and consequent.

(c) Utilitarian hope is that which places reward above virtue, as if the latter were merely a means, as when one says: “If there were no heaven, I would practise no virtue.” There are three kinds of good: (i) useful good, or that which is desirable only because it serves as a means to something else (e.g., bitter medicine, which is wished, not for its own sake, but for the sake of health); (ii) moral good, or that which is desired for its own sake, as being agreeable to the rational nature of man (such as virtue); (iii) delightful good, that is, the repose or satisfaction of the will in possession of that which is desirable for its own sake. It is a mistake, therefore, to regard virtue as merely a useful good, something that is disagreeable in itself and cannot be practised on account of its inherent goodness. It is also a mistake to consider heaven as something above and apart from virtue; for eternal life is the perfect flowering and fruitage of the moral life that has been planted and developed here on earth. The things of this world are only means to virtue, and virtue reaches its climax in the beatific vision. The delights of heaven are results of that vision, not its end.

Hope, therefore, must seek God as the chief good; it must not prefer the lesser to the greater, and it must not hold virtue as good only in view of the reward. But, on the other hand, hope seeks God as its own good, and it need not be joined to disinterested love, in order to be a true virtue.

(a) Hence, it is not necessary that one hope with the proviso that, in the impossible hypothesis that God were unwilling to reward virtue, the reward would not be expected; for it is not necessary to consider chimerical cases.

(b) It is not necessary that hope be elicited by the act of charity (i.e., that one always direct one’s desire of salvation to the end that God may be glorified), for thus the motive of hope would cease to be active, and the lesser virtue would be absorbed in charity.

(c) It is not necessary that hope be commanded by the act of charity (i.e., that one hope for salvation as one’s own good, only when a previous act of charity has bidden that this be done as a mark of love towards God), for to desire that which God wishes one to desire is in itself good and laudable, and stands in need of no other act to justify it.

Discouragement and aridity occur even in the lives of great Saints, and at such times, when pure love of God seems almost impossible, hope comes to the rescue by offering encouragement and spurring on to activity. Hence, the importance of this virtue in the spiritual life; for (a) hope is an anchor of the soul in times of tempest, since it offers reasons for patience and good cheer (Heb, vi. 19; Ecclus., iii. 9; Rom., xii. 12, viii 25; I Thess., v. 8); (b) hope gives wings to the soul in times of weariness, since the motives it presents are inducements to courage and good works (Is., xl. 31, xxx. 15; Ps. cxviii. 32; Heb., X. xi).

The following means are recommended for growth in hope: (a) to ask this from God: “Grant us, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and charity” (Missal, 13th Sunday after Pentecost); (b) to meditate on the rewards of heaven and the motives of hope, and to make corresponding acts (II Cor., iv. 18; Ecclus., ii. 11-13); (c) to have recourse to God in all our needs, casting all our care on Him (I Pet., v. 7); (d) to work courageously for salvation and to preserve purity of conscience (Ps. xxvi. 14; I John, iii. 21, 22).

The Subject of Hope.—By the subject of hope we mean the power of the soul to which this virtue belongs and also the persons who are capable of hope. (a) The faculty of the soul in which hope resides is the will, for this virtue seeks the good, not the true. (b) The persons capable of hope are all those who have not yet received their final reward or punishment.

The virtue of hope does not remain in the blessed. (a) They cannot hope for the principal object of bliss, since they already enjoy it: “Hope that is seen is not hope. For what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?” (Rom., viii. 24). (b) The blessed can desire secondary objects, such as the continuance of their state, the glorification of their bodies, the salvation of those who are still on earth, etc.; but this desire belongs to the virtue of charity, since with the blessed there is no longer the struggle and expectation of the future that is contained in the desire of hope. Moreover, the desire of objects other than God does not constitute the theological virtue of hope, which tends directly to God.

As to the departed who are not in heaven, we must distinguish between those in hell and those in purgatory.

(a) Those who are in hell, whether demons or men, cannot hope; for it is part of their punishment that they know their loss is eternal (Matt., xxv. 41; Prov., xi. 7). Dante expresses this truth when he says that on the gates of hell it is written: “Hope abandon ye that enter here.” Only in an improper sense can the lost be said to hope, inasmuch as they desire evils, or things other than heaven. Unbaptized infants either do not know their loss, or else are not tormented by the thought that heaven is for them unattainable, realizing that its privation has resulted from no personal fault of their own.

(b) Those who are in purgatory have hope; for, although they are certain of their salvation, it still remains true that they must ascend through difficulties to their reward. Hence, in the Mass the Church prays for the departed “who sleep the sleep of peace”—that is, who are secure about their salvation. The Fathers in limbo also had hope before their introduction into heaven: “All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off and saluting them, and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on the earth.... They desire a better, that is to say a heavenly country” ( Heb., xi. 13, 16).

As to those who have not yet passed from this mortal life, some have hope, others have it not.

(a) Those who have no hope are unbelievers and those believers who have rejected hope. Unbelievers have no theological hope, since faith is “the substance (i.e., basis) of things to be hoped for” (Heb., xi. 1). Hence, even though one accepts the Article of the Creed, “I look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come,” one’s hope is not real, if one culpably rejects some other Article; for then one expects the end without the necessary means (Heb. xi. 6). Believers who despair of salvation, or who do not look to God for it, have not the virtue of hope; for, just as faith is lost if its object or motive is not accepted, so also hope perishes if its object is not expected or its motive is not relied on.

(b) Those who have hope are all believers not guilty of a sin contrary to hope. Sinners cannot expect to be saved if they continue in sin, but they can expect through the grace of God to be freed from sin and to merit eternal life; indeed, they are bound to believe that God wishes their salvation and to hope for it.

The certainty of hope does not exclude the uncertainty of fear; on the contrary, man must both hope and fear, as regards his salvation.

(a) If a person looks to the motives of hope (i.e., God’s power and mercy), he has the assurance of faith that God can and will help him to attain salvation; and thus there arises in him a firm and unshaken hope: “I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him, against that day” (II Tim., i. 12; cfr. Heb., vi. 18; Ps. xxiv. 2; Ps. xxx. 2.; Rom., xiv. 4)

(b) But, if a person looks to his own frailty and remembers that others have hoped and yet have been lost, he is not certain that he will cooperate with God and be saved, and hence he must fear (Eccles., ix. 1 sqq.; I Cor., iv. 4, ix. 27). The Council of Trent declares that no one can promise himself with absolute certainty that he will persevere (Sess. VI, Cap. 13). Therefore, it is written: “He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall” (I Cor., x. 12); “With fear and trembling, work out your salvation” (Phil., ii. 12).

The Gift of Fear of the Lord.—The Gift of the Holy Ghost that perfects the virtue of hope is Fear of the Lord (see 159 sqq.); for (a) hope is the root from which the Gift of Fear is derived, since hope joins the affections to God, and fear acts upon the soul that is thus tending towards its beatitude—we fear to lose what we hope for; (b) fear assists hope, since it makes us dread, not the loss of beatitude or of divine help, but the lack of cooperation on our own part with the assistance given by God.

The Sins Against Hope.—There are two sins contrary to hope: (a) despair, which is the opposite of hope by defect; (b) presumption, which is the opposite of hope by excess.

Definition of Despair.—Leaving out of consideration negative despair and despair improperly so-called, the sin we are now considering may be defined as follows: “Despair is an act of the will by which one turns away from the beatitude one desires, not under the aspect in which it appears as good, but because one apprehends it as impossible, or too difficult, or never to be realized, and under this aspect as evil.”

(a) Despair is an “act of the will,” and as such it differs from the intellectual sin of unbelief. The Novatians, who rejected the forgiveness of sins, and a heretic who denies the future life, are guilty by these acts of sin against faith, though of course one who disbelieves must also despair (see 1029, 751).

(b) Despair is a positive “turning away from beatitude.” It differs, therefore, from the mere omission of the act of hope or from an act of feeble hope, as well as from the sins against the moral virtues, which consist primarily in a turning towards some created good.

(c) Despair turns away “from God,” and thus it differs from despondency about other things.

(d) Despair turns away from God “apprehended as good and desired as the beatitude of man,” for no one is said to despair of what he considers evil or undesirable. Hence, despair differs from aversions and fears; such as hatred of God (which regards Him as evil) or fear of God (which thinks of Him, not as a rewarder, but as the author of chastisement).

(e) Despair, however, does not reject God, because He is good and desirable, but because He is apprehended as a “beatitude that is impossible,” or too difficult for one, or as a good that one will never attain to. For a person does not turn away from that which he regards as the object of his happiness, unless he considers that there is some inconvenience in seeking after it.

Certain acts of fear or sadness must not be mistaken for despair: (a) acts that are praiseworthy, like servile and filial fear spoken of above (see 1048 sqq.), grief over sin, etc.; (b) acts that are a trial from God, such as spiritual desolations in holy persons, scruples about forgiveness of sins, anxieties about predestination, perseverance, or the Judgment; (c) acts that are sinful, such as worldly fear, fear of God that is purely servile, timidity (i.e., an excessive dread of death or other evils). Those who fear that, on account of their frailty, they may not acquire a good habit or overcome an evil one, are guilty of pusillanimity. Those who, on account of sadness, neglect prayer are guilty of spiritual sloth.

Presumption is the name given to certain acts of the intellect. (a) Sometimes it signifies an arrogant self-esteem, as when an ignorant person thinks he is able to dispute with a learned scholar. (b) Sometimes it is a judgment about the affairs of others made rashly or out of fear: “A troubled conscience always presumeth grievous things” (Wis., xvii. 10). (c) Sometimes it is a conclusion based on probable evidence, and which by jurists is called violent, strong, or weak presumption according to the evidence (see 658).

The Commandments of Hope and of Fear.—Since hope is a necessary preparation for justification, and since man should tend towards the supernatural beatitude prepared for him by God, we cannot be surprised that scripture in many places inculcates the duty of hope.

(a) In the first legislation, given in the Decalogue, neither faith nor hope are enjoined by distinct Commandments, for, unless man already believed and hoped in God, it would be useless to give him commandments from God. Hence, in the Decalogue faith and hope are presupposed, faith being enjoined only in so far as it is taught, as when the law begins with the words: “I am the Lord thy God” (Exod., xx. 2), and hope being prescribed only in so far as promises are added to the precepts, as in the First and Fourth Commandments.

(b) In the later laws there are given distinct commandments about hope, in order to remind man that he must observe not only the law, but also that which the law presupposes. Thus, we read: “Hope in Him, all ye congregation of people” (Ps. lxi. 9); “Charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God” (I Tim., vi. 17).

Since acts of hope are obligatory for all adults in this life, the Quietists were in error when they defended disinterested love and absolute holy indifference (Denzinger, 1221 ff., 1327-1349). (a) Hence, man can at times make acts of pure love of God, in which self is not thought about, or even acts of renunciation of beatitude on condition that that were possible and necessary; but the habitual state of pure love, in which self-interest is entirely lost sight of, cannot be admitted (Philip., iii. 14; II Tim., iv, 8). (b) Indifference to the happenings of life, sin excluded, is good; but it is not lawful to be indifferent about one’s own salvation, or the means thereto. Indifference about salvation is not holy, but unholy.

Is it lawful to desire to surrender beatitude for the sake of another’s spiritual good? (a) If there is question of beatitude itself, this is not lawful. The prayer of Moses that he be stricken from God’s book (Exod., xxxiii. 31, 32), and of St. Paul that he suffer loss of Messianic benefits (Rom., ix. 3), were only velleities or hyperbolical expressions of their great love for their race. (b) If there is question, not of beatitude itself, but of something that refers to it (such as the time of receiving it, present certainty about its possession), one may be willing to sacrifice this good for the benefit of his neighbor. Thus, St. Martin of Tours was willing to have his entrance into heaven delayed for the sake of his flock (cfr. Philip., i. 22 sqq.), and St. Ignatius Loyola would have preferred to remain uncertain of salvation and labor for souls, rather than to be certain of salvation and die at once.

At what times does the commandment of hope oblige? (a) In its negative, or prohibitory aspect, this commandment obliges for all times and at all times (see 371). Hence, it is not lawful to despair, even when things are darkest, nor to presume, even when they are brightest. (b) In its affirmative, or preceptive aspect, this commandment obliges for all times, but not at all times. Hence, the law of hope remains always in force, but one is not obliged at every instant to make acts of hope.

Note: "Christian Princes can permit to Jews, pagans, or heretics liberty of conscience only because of the good of Religion and because of hope of conversion, but not because of temporal advantage.... But the Church, and any supreme Prince, can rightly compel Jews and pagan subjects to hear our faith." L. 18. Likewise infidels can be compelled "not to impede the faith of Christ." But "in no way are they to be compelled to the faith so that they themselves believe, because to believe belongs to the will." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, aa. 8, 10, 11; q. 11, aa. 3, 4; q. 12, a. 2; E. M. 369.

What is hope? - Hope is an act of the will by which, with a love of concupiscence, we desire God and divine things for ourselves before all other desirable things, and by which from the helping power of God and fidelity in promises we certainly and most firmly expect future blessedness and the means for attaining it. Hence the primary material object of hope is God and eternal blessedness, but the secondary is the divine help of grace and our good works. The formal object of hope, according to its various acts or formalities, of love and desire, of elevation of soul and effort of the will toward overcoming difficulties, and finally of confidence, is the respective goodness of God, the helping power of God, the fidelity of God in promises. "Hope," says S. Th. 2. 2. q. 17, a. 6 ad 3 and ad 8, "makes one tend toward God as toward a certain final good to be attained, and as toward a certain efficacious help for assisting." - Heb. 6:18, 19; Trid. s. 6, c. 31; Struggl, q. 3, nn. 1, 2, 3; q. 4, n. 2; Theol. Wirceb., n. 233 seqq.; Laymann, l. 2, tr. 2, c. 1, n. 6; S. Th. 3, D. 26, q. 1, 2; de Virtut., q. 7 un., de Spe, aa. 1, 3; 1. 2. q. 40; 2. 2. q. 18, aa. 1, 4; L. 20, 21; E. M. 370.

What are the sins opposed to hope? - By reason of love, the first act of hope, there is opposed to it the hatred of abomination of God, by which someone abominates God as hostile to himself because of vengeance for sins, or by which someone is turned away from God, eternal blessedness, and wishes to place his happiness in some other thing than in God. Hence it is also a mortal sin opposed to hope, to love earthly things more with a love of concupiscence than heavenly things; e.g., if someone is so disposed that he desires to remain perpetually in this life, and to leave heaven to God, if God leaves earth to him.

By reason of hope, the other act of the virtue of hope, there is opposed to it flight from God because of the labor and difficulty of attaining him, and despair and presumption. The former is voluntary diffidence of obtaining blessedness and the means necessary for attaining it. But the latter is an inordinate confidence of obtaining blessedness without the means ordained by God. Presumption is chiefly committed if you presume to obtain eternal life by the proper powers of nature without the help of grace; if you expect it without penance, without labor, from the mercy of God alone; if you expect it above your proper disposition, according to the order of divine providence, e.g., if you should wish to surpass the Blessed Virgin Mary in holiness and glory. Struggl, q. 3, nn. 11, 14-16; Suarez, d. 1, ss. 2, 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20; q. 21; L. 20, 21.

Is there smallness of matter in sins against hope? - R. Negatively as to hatred of God and love of creatures, if the act is perfect, as is clear of itself. R. Negatively as to despair, if it is perfect and properly such; for it is most greatly injurious to the divine Mercy. Eph. 4:19. Otherwise, however, if it is imperfect and improperly such, as often happens in sadness and impatience. But here it must be noted that even devout souls are sometimes troubled by almost continuous temptations of despair. It is certainly not easily to be believed that they have sinned gravely, although they think they have given consent to them; just as excessive fear about the danger of salvation must not be confused with despair properly so called. - R. Affirmatively as to presumption, although it is grave from its genus. Bonacina, cited by La-Croix 128, teaches that he sins only venially who from presumption concerning the goodness of God would sin venially, or would defer doing penance concerning a mortal sin until the following day. - Suarez, d. 2, s. 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20, aa. 1, 3; L. 20.

Is it a sin against hope, from weariness, to wish for death?

R. Negatively per se, because it is not to recede from God as from the last end; nor generally is it a grave sin, but only venial, unless there is express rebellion against the order of divine Providence. Cf. 386.

Is it presumption to sin under hope of pardon, or to persevere in sin from the same hope of pardon? - "It must be said that to sin with the purpose of persevering in sin under hope of pardon pertains to presumption, and this does not diminish but increases the sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 21, a. 2 ad 3. Say the same of him who sins or increases sins, or perseveres in sin from hope of pardon, as from the motive or reason of sinning; namely because God forgives sins, or as easily forgives ten sins as five, now or at the end of life. But it is not presumption to sin from passion and frailty with hope of pardon to be received sometime, and with the purpose of repenting, and in this way obtaining remission of sins; even if this act of hope, whether it is preceding or concomitant, removes a greater fear of sin, and is per accidens an occasion of sinning more freely. Indeed, this "diminishes the sin, because through this he seems to have a will less firmly fixed on sinning." S. Th. l. c. And indeed "while someone actually wills to sin or actually sins, it is good to hope for pardon of the sin and to propose afterward to repent." Struggl, q., n. 17; La-Croix 126; L. 21.

Is it presumption to commit the same sin several times, because committed several times it is as easily accused as once? R. Negatively. The reason is that then someone does not sin from the facility of obtaining pardon, but from the facility of confessing, although this is an altogether depraved disposition. La-Croix 127.

Is hope necessary? Is fear also necessary? R. To the first. Hope in adults is required by necessity of means for salvation. For man cannot arrive at obtaining God, his last end, unless by his own acts and merits he tends toward him; but this cannot happen without hope. The just need hope so that they can ask for grace for persevering. Sinners need hope so that they may be disposed to justification. If faith is necessary by necessity of means, hope also is necessary by necessity of means. The Apostle derives the necessity of faith from the things to be hoped for. Heb. 11:1, 6; Col. 1:23. It is also established from Trid. s. 6, C. 1, 13.

Hope is necessary also by necessity of precept. For there is given a true precept of eliciting acts of hope some times in life. This is established from proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII. When and in what way the precept of hope urges must be determined by the same rules which we established above concerning faith. Cf. 354. Moreover, as for the precept of faith, so for the precept of hope no anxiety is to be had practically. For virtual hope suffices for fulfilling it, by praying, receiving the sacraments, exercising other pious works. But those who are lacking in it, since this is ordinarily done without advertence, ought to have no disturbance concerning the past. Yet sin because of omission of acts of faith, hope, charity is easily understood in a man, for example, who confesses that he has lived forgetful of God and Religion, or who confesses that he has prayed nothing, and for a notable time has not approached the sacrament of penance. Suarez, d. 2, s. 1, n. 3; Struggl, q. 3, n. 7 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 22, a. 1; L. 20; E. M. 376.

211. • Hope is a supernatural virtue through which, with certain confidence from the promise of God, we expect future beatitude, and the means for attaining it.

The primary material object of Hope is God to be possessed, according to that saying, Gen. 15.1: I will be your reward exceedingly great. But the secondary object is all the means necessary for attaining beatitude, such as the remission of sins, the grace of God through the merits of Christ, etc... ¹.

¹ ** Other benefits, even temporal ones, which we expect from the goodness of God, are not to be excluded from this; since these also were promised by the Lord (Luke 12.31): And all these things shall be added to you.

But the formal object of Hope is the goodness and fidelity of God joined with his omnipotence ².

² Hope... rests upon... divine omnipotence and mercy, through which even he who does not have grace can obtain it, so that thus he may arrive at eternal life. But whoever has faith is certain of the omnipotence of God and of his mercy. St. Thom. (2. 2. q. 18. art. 4. ad 2.). And again the same Holy Doctor (De Virt. q. 4. art. 1.): The formal object of hope is the help of divine power and piety, on account of which the motion of hope tends toward hoped-for goods, which are the material object of hope.

But the acts included in Hope are the desire of eternal beatitude, firm confidence of arriving at it, and a raised-up spirit against occurring difficulties ³.

³ Hope, as St. Thomas says (2. 2. q. 17. art. 5. ad 4.), according as it is a theological virtue, regards something arduous to be attained by the help of another. But (3. Dist. 26. q. 2. art. 1. ad 2.) this arduous thing, which is eternal life, exceeds the faculty of nature. Therefore (ibid. art. 2. o) it is necessary that from some gift superadded to nature there be made an inclination into that arduous thing; and that gift is the habit of hope. Therefore insofar as (2. 2. q. 17. art. 1. o) we hope for something as possible for us through divine help, our hope reaches to God himself, upon whose help it rests.

But the sins opposed to Hope are despair and presumption. The former is voluntary distrust of obtaining beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it. - But the latter is an inordinate confidence of obtaining beatitude without the means ordained by God.

212. Principles. - I. Hope in adults is required by necessity of means for justification. For man cannot arrive at attaining God, his ultimate end, unless by his own acts he tends toward him: but this cannot be done without hope. This is also clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 6. c. 6.

II. Hope is also necessary by necessity of precept; since there is a true precept of eliciting acts of Hope at some times in life. This is clear from the 1st proposition condemned by Alexander VII, which sounds thus: At no time whatever of his life is a man bound to elicit an act of Faith, Hope, and Charity, by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues ⁴.

⁴ Since the precept itself does not expressly determine a time, it seems one must recur to an article of necessity, which scarcely can be designated in the matter proposed. But it must be noted that this necessity can be either per se, or from an extrinsic reason: in this second way this precept will oblige when it shall be necessary to hope either for duly praying, or for overcoming a temptation, or for something similar: nevertheless in these occasions it will often not be necessary to elicit a formal act of hope, but it will be enough in the very effect duly to do that in which hope is virtually included, such as to petition efficaciously, or to grieve over sin, or something similar.... Concerning necessity per se..... I say, as concerning charity and penance, that this time cannot be designated positively and altogether determinately, but as it were negatively and confusedly: for a man is bound sometime in life to exercise hope; but whether that is now, or later, is left to the man's judgment. Suarez, De Spe Disp. 2. Sect. 1. n. 2. 3.

Moreover the Doctors commonly warn that no place is to be given to anxieties concerning the sufficient execution of this precept. Since, to fulfill it, just as was said concerning faith, virtual hope suffices, and this is commonly exercised; hence there can scarcely be a suspicion that the faithful are lacking in this obligation. But if any are lacking in it, since they do this almost without advertence, the matter falls back to the same point.

213. Questions. - Q. 1º In how many ways is the sin of presumption committed?

Resp. Chiefly 1º if you presume to obtain eternal life by your own powers; 2º if you expect it without labor, from the mercy of God alone. - St. Lig. n. 24.

Q. 2º Can there be smallness of matter in sins against Hope?

Resp. 1º Affirm., with regard to presumption, although it is grave from its genus.

Resp. 2º Dist., with regard to despair: Neg., if it is perfect and properly so called; otherwise, if it is imperfect, as often happens in sadness and impatience.

214. • Q. 3º Is it a sin against Hope to desire to live perpetually in this world, or on the contrary from weariness to wish for death?

Resp. to the first: Affirm., because he who desires that stops in temporal life, as in the ultimate end. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig. n. 20.

Resp. to the second: 1º It is not against Hope per se, because it is not to withdraw from the ultimate end; 2º nor generally does it exceed venial sin, unless there is express rebellion against the order of divine Providence.

Q. 4º Is it presumption to commit the same sin several times, because when committed several times it is accused as easily as when committed once?

Resp. Neg., because the penitent sins more easily not from the facility of obtaining pardon, but from the lesser difficulty of confessing; although this is a depraved disposition, most injurious to God. But it would be a sin of presumption, if someone therefore sinned more easily because several sins are remitted as easily as a single one ⁵. - St. Lig. n. 21.

⁵ It must be noted here that an opinion not rarely sits in the mind of the faithful, that a sin becomes graver which is committed on account of the hope of pardon: whereas the doctors, on the contrary, think that by this circumstance a sin is sometimes rather diminished. Thus Suarez, rightly distinguishing this from the sin of presumption (de Spe Disp. 2. sect. 3. n. 2.): Although sometimes to offend from frailty on account of the hope of pardon can fail to be presumption, indeed can somewhat diminish sin; nevertheless to take thence an occasion of persevering in sin is a certain kind of presumption. Yet he adds (ibid. n. 3.) that a light fault can be found in presumption of this sort.

And this is the doctrine of St. Thomas (2. 2. q. 21. art. 2. ad 3.): It must be said that to sin with the purpose of persevering in sin under the hope of pardon pertains to presumption. And this does not diminish, but increases sin. But to sin under the hope of pardon to be received at some time, with the purpose of abstaining from sin and repenting of sin, this is not of presumption, but this diminishes the sin; because through this he seems to have a will less firmly fixed on sinning. Hence Marcus Struggl well says (Theol. Moral. Tr. IV. q. 3. n. 17.): Even while someone wishes to sin or actually sins, it is good to hope for pardon of sin and to propose afterward to repent. Moreover, that in the proposed case there is not a sin of presumption, Sanchez (In Dec. Lib. 2. Cap. 35. n. 7.), alleging Bannez and Medina, the Salmanticenses (Tr. 21. Cap. 5. n. 56.), Palaus (De Spe Tract. V. Disp. unic. punct. 6.), Bonacina (De I. Praecept. q. 3. punct. I. n. 6.), etc., commonly teach.

215. • Q. 5º What are the remedies of despair?

Resp. The principal ones are the following: 1º consideration of the infinite goodness and mercy of God; - 2º frequent remembrance of those men who after many and most grave sins obtained pardon; 3º meditation on the parables of the holy Gospel, especially of the lost sheep; - 4º special devotion toward the Blessed Virgin, refuge of sinners; - 5º confidence in Christ affixed to the cross for us, etc.

216. Practical Rules. - First. Let the Confessor examine from what root especially despair arises in the penitent, so that he can apply suitable remedies according to the different cause. - But it is usually accustomed to be born proximately from the apprehension of certain damnation. Remotely, however, 1º from sloth, by which someone thinks the means of salvation too burdensome, and therefore is deterred from employing them; 2º from lust or other inveterate sins, which turn the mind away from heavenly things, and on account of the difficulty of amendment lead to despair; 3º from melancholy, which inclines to sadness and turns away from confidence, which is accustomed to generate joy of soul; 4º from scruples, by which the soul is cast down and oppressed.

Second. Penitents given to despair are to be governed by the Confessor with great circumspection, prudence, and patience, according to the diversity of dispositions and the varied kind of despair. For those are to be directed in one way who have been driven into despair from malice, or from the weight of sins and a scandalous life; in another way those who are impelled to it from pusillanimity, or from diabolical temptation.

Third. Penitents who exhibit themselves as such, especially if they live in a Christian manner, are not immediately at first glance to be judged as carried away by despair. For souls are found, even devout ones, which are agitated by almost continual temptations of despair; nor is it easily to be believed that they have sinned, especially gravely, although they think that they have given consent to them; just as excessive fear concerning the danger of salvation is not to be confused with despair properly so called. - Elbel, etc.

1. Argyrophilus clings so ruinously to riches and to the present life that he thinks neither of paradise nor of hell, but only of hoarding treasure. Hence he desires to live on earth for thousands of years, indeed perpetually, lest he be drawn away from riches.

2. Melania, afflicted by a long-lasting illness, begged health from God and from the Blessed Virgin Mary for several years. Since she did not obtain it, she resolved to pour out no more prayers to God and the Saints, saying: God does not wish to hear me.

3. Marinus, after a long life of sins, hears a preacher exhorting sinners to penitence. But he himself, considering the long series of his sins, says within himself: I am already lost; it is now useless to renounce sin.

4. Leonardus, a recidivist, was often admonished by his confessor, but with almost no amendment. The confessor insists, admonishing him again, but he says: Father, indeed I fear the future judgment on account of the multitude of my sins, and scarcely perhaps shall I obtain divine mercy; for I can no longer abstain from sins, both on account of inveterate custom and on account of my excessive frailty.

Q. 1. What are the sins opposed to hope? - 3. What as to the cases?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 371. To the second: Argyrophilus sins gravely against the virtue of hope. The reason is that he truly places creatures before God; content to be without God, he establishes his happiness and his last end in creatures. G. 203.

Melania sins gravely against hope, if therefore she truly ceases to pray because she is persuaded that God is unwilling to furnish her his aids. But if from a certain inordinate sadness she loses heart and ceases from prayer, she sins only venially. If, finally, she ceases to ask health because she believes that God, by the secret judgment of his wisdom, does not will to restore health to her, she does not on account of this sin. G. 204.

Marinus sins gravely from desperation. This is a most grave sin, and most dangerous. The confessor ought not to desert him; but with all solicitude he ought to try to raise him up, and to stir him to hoping firmly, to sorrowing, and to proposing. If the sick man should despair of recovering bodily health, the prudent physician does not desert him, but then labors especially, so that by salutary counsels and suitable medicines he may restore him to his former health. Elbel 184; G. 203.

Leonardus does not seem to sin gravely from desperation. For he does not seem truly to distrust divine mercy, but only fears too much lest he fall into sin, as one who is well conscious of his own frailty. Wherefore the confessor ought to console and strengthen a pusillanimous man of this sort, so that he may place all his hope and confidence not in his own powers, but in the assisting grace of God, to whom nothing is impossible. G. 203; Elbel 184.

“7. The soul ought not to think either of punishment, or of paradise, or of hell, or of death, or of eternity. — 12. He who has given his free will to God ought to take care for nothing, neither for hell nor for paradise; nor ought he to have a desire for his own perfection, or for virtues, or for his own sanctity, or for his own salvation, the hope of which he ought to purge away.” Propositions of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI. Cf. n. 79.

695. From faith hope is born: for by faith we know that the miseries and temptations of this life are not perpetual, but are as it were a transitory stage for obtaining immortal life. Therefore the faithful firmly expect eternal beatitude and the means necessary for obtaining it.

Hope in general designates three different things: (a) one of the passions, namely a movement of the appetite by which we tend toward a future, arduous, and possible good: future, because hope does not rest in a good already possessed, but tends toward an absent good which we wish to possess; arduous, because things very easy to obtain, which can be obtained immediately, without effort, are not properly hoped for, but are already had in our power; yet possible, because what can in no way be obtained excites despair rather than hope.¹

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 40, a. 1.

(b) A movement of the will, by which we desire some good with confidence of obtaining it; for as the appetite is borne toward sensible good, so the will tends toward the intellectual good of the natural order through hope, which includes two things: desire and confidence of obtaining it.

(c) The supernatural virtue of hope, by which we confidently await heavenly goods. It differs indeed from natural hope, because it tends toward supernatural things; but it agrees with it in this, that it pursues a future, arduous, and possible good, and indeed by a twofold act, namely by desire and confident expectation. Desire supposes and involves love of the hoped-for good, namely a love of concupiscence,² by which we tend toward the object as toward our proper and beatifying good; but confidence supposes a certain elevation of soul, and an effort of the will toward obtaining the arduous good which is hoped for.

² The love of concupiscence, which among moderns often sounds bad, among the ancients is nothing else than the love by which we desire something insofar as it is our good.

We shall speak: 1. concerning the nature of hope; 2. concerning its honesty and necessity; 3. concerning sins against hope; adding a few things, by way of corollary, concerning the means of progressing in hope.

696. Hope, as a habit, is a theological virtue disposing the will to desire God as our supreme good, and firmly to expect from Him supernatural beatitude and the means for obtaining it, on account of the infinite goodness of God toward us, and His power and fidelity in promises.

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 17-18 and Quaest. disp., de Spe; Suarez, De Spe, disp. I; Perrone, op. cit., de Spe, nn. 1-70; Bouquillon, op. cit., nn. 309-344; Pesch, op. cit., nn. 467-513; Billot, th. 25-26; M. d'Hulst, Confer. 1892, 5th.

For the understanding of this definition, we shall explain: 1. the object; 2. the motive; 3. the properties; 4. the subject of hope.

697. The primary and principal object of hope is God Himself, insofar as He is the supreme good beatifying man; but the secondary object is all the goods which are ordered to the possession of God.

1. God Himself, to be possessed by man and about to beatify him, is the primary object of hope. (A) Scripture teaches this many times; for when the parents and relatives of Tobias insulted the pious servant of God, saying: Where is your hope? he answered: "Do not speak so, because we are children of the saints, and we await that life which God is about to give to those who never change their faith from Him."⁴ But in what this life consists is taught more clearly in the New Testament: "Now this is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent";⁵ - "Dearly beloved, we are now the sons of God; and it has not yet appeared what we shall be; we know that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is."⁶

⁴ Tob. 2:17-18.

⁵ John 17:3.

⁶ 1 John 3:2.

(B) The Fathers often inculcate this doctrine, among whom Augustine, namely explaining these words "God is my portion forever," says: "He who asks another reward from God, and therefore wishes to serve God, makes dearer what he wishes to receive than Him from whom he wishes to receive it. What then? no reward of God? None besides Himself. The reward of God is God Himself."⁷

⁷ In Ps. 72, n. 32, P. L., XXXVI, 928; the same holy Doctor expounds this philosophically in the little work De Beata Vita, P. L., XXXII, 959-976.

(C) Reason suggests the same thing. For that must be the primary object of our hope which is the supreme good, the cause of our beatitude, and to which all our works are ordered; but, from what was said above, nn. 13-20, our supreme beatitude consists not in created goods, but in the perfect knowledge and love of God.

698. 2. But the secondary object of hope is all the helps which are ordered to the possession of God: (a) first of all the supernatural helps of grace, by which we are daily assisted for knowing the truth, conquering desires, overcoming temptations, avoiding sins, and also exercising Christian virtues, according to that saying:⁸ "Having therefore a great high priest who has passed into the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God, let us hold fast our confession... Let us therefore go with confidence to the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace in seasonable aid." (b) Afterward, however, even temporal goods, insofar as they are referred to eternal beatitude; for merely natural goods, which in no way pertain to the supernatural end, cannot be called the object of Christian hope. On the contrary, however, the evils of this life, tribulations, anxieties, persecutions, and other things of this kind, insofar as they contribute to our salvation, increase our hope, according to that saying:⁹ "And we know that to those who love God all things work together unto good, to those who, according to His purpose, are called to be saints."

⁸ Heb. 4:14-16.

⁹ Rom. 8:28.

699. 1. Various opinions. Since hope can be considered under different respects, there are different opinions concerning the motive upon which it rests, according to the different way in which this virtue is regarded.

(a) The Scotists, considering hope chiefly as an appetite of the supreme good insofar as it beatifies us, say that the sole motive of hope is God, as He is our supreme good;¹⁰ for what seems principal in this virtue is the love of God, insofar as He is the supreme good of man: the rest, namely desire and expectation of grace, is something accessory.

¹⁰ Suarez, De Spe, disp. I, sect. 3.

(b) The Thomists, considering hope as the pursuit of an arduous good, think that its motive is the helping omnipotence of God; for the reason on account of which we tend toward an arduous good is divine power insofar as it can help us.

(c) But some place the motive of hope in the fidelity of God; for since there is question of supernatural beatitude and the means proportioned to this end, which exceed the powers and merits of man, we cannot hope for these unless God has promised to bestow the same upon us.

(d) Finally, there are many today who, observing that the act of hope is virtually threefold, or can be regarded under a threefold respect, contend that the three aforesaid motives concur together for the production of this act; this opinion indeed seems to us more probable.

700. 2. The more probable opinion: The adequate motive of hope is the goodness of God toward us, and at the same time His helping power, and also fidelity in keeping promises.

(A) The motive of hope, insofar as it includes love of the supreme good, is the goodness of God toward us. For hope tends toward divine good through love; for we do not hope except for that which we love. But the motive of this love is not divine goodness absolute, or regarded in itself, which is the motive of charity, but the relative goodness of God, or His goodness toward us; for as in the natural order we hope for those things which seem good to us, so in the supernatural order we hope for the supreme good insofar as it is ours and makes us blessed.

Thus Christ proposes the kingdom of God to the elect as the reward prepared for them and hoped for by them:¹¹ "Come, blessed of My Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." Wherefore the Apostle, after many labors bravely endured for Christ, expects the crown of justice which will beatify him:¹² "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day."

¹¹ Matt. 25:34.

¹² 2 Tim. 4:7-8.

701. (B) The motive of hope, insofar as it includes elevation of soul, is the helping power of God. For since the supreme good which we hope for is truly arduous, and cannot be attained without divine help, there accedes another motive of hope, namely the helping power of God: this comprises not only omnipotence, by which God can help us, but also mercy, by which He is kindly prepared to furnish His help in our weakness.

This indeed is gathered from innumerable texts of Scripture in which we are commanded to hope in the Lord, because He is powerful and merciful, and therefore our helper: "In God is my salvation and my glory; He is the God of my help, and my hope is in God. Hope in Him... God is our helper forever."¹³ - "But I, as a fruitful olive tree in the house of God; I have hoped in the mercy of God forever and ever."¹⁴ - "And God is able to make all grace abound in you, that in all things, always having all sufficiency, you may abound unto every good work."¹⁵ - "But God, who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, quickened us together in Christ, by whose grace you are saved, and raised us up together and made us sit together in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus, that He might show in the ages to come the abundant riches of His grace in His goodness toward us in Christ Jesus."¹⁶

¹³ Ps. 61:8-9. This is often repeated in the Psalms.

¹⁴ Ps. 51:10.

¹⁵ 2 Cor. 9:8.

¹⁶ Eph. 2:4-7.

The same can be gathered from Trent, where it declares that the gift of perseverance is not had "except from Him who is powerful to establish him who stands, that he may stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falls; let no one promise himself anything certain with absolute certitude, although all ought to place and repose the firmest hope in the help of God."¹

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 13, Denzing., n. 689.

In truth, in order that amid the multiple temptations and miseries of life by which we are surrounded we may be able to raise the soul to the supernatural good which is not only arduous but also surpasses our powers, it is necessary that we expect help from Him who, on account of His power, is able, and, on account of His mercy, wills to help us.

702. (C) The motive of hope, insofar as this includes confidence, or a firm and certain expectation of heavenly goods, is the fidelity of God in promises. For since God is by no means bound to bestow upon us supernatural goods, we cannot hope for these with firm certitude unless He has promised to grant the same to men; moreover, since He is faithful, we can rely upon His promises with all confidence.

Therefore Scripture not rarely derives the certitude of our hope from the promises or fidelity of God: "Let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering, for He is faithful who has promised";² - "unto the hope of eternal life, which God, who does not lie, has promised."³ - In the same sense must be understood the words of Paul cited above (n. 700); for eternal life is not a crown of justice unless the promise of God accedes.

² Heb. 10:23; cf. 6:13-20.

³ Titus 1:2.

703. Corollary. Although properly the motive of our hope is God, good, helping, and faithful, yet it is certain that our confidence is much increased from the merits and satisfactions of Christ: for He, as the moral head of the whole human race, satisfied for our sins, and merited for us all spiritual helps which we need for obtaining eternal life, as was proved in the Treatise on the Incarnate Word, nn. 179-214.

Therefore He is truly the meritorious cause of our justification and salvation, according to that saying of Trent:⁴ "Who, when we were enemies, on account of the exceeding charity with which He loved us, merited justification for us by His most holy passion on the wood of the cross, and satisfied God the Father for us." Therefore when we act and pray through Christ and in Christ, relying upon His merits, we are certainly able to conceive greater confidence.

⁴ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, Denzing., n. 681.

Besides, by force of the communion of saints, the intercession of the Blessed Mary and of the elect reigning in heaven, and also the prayers of the just on earth, can increase our confidence secondarily; for these can obtain for us opportune helps, by which we are assisted not a little toward obtaining eternal beatitude. (De Verbo Incarnato, nn. 292-294 and nn. 304-306.)

704. 1. State of the question. That the act of hope is supernatural and free is easily understood from what has already been said; but it will not be useless to consider whether and in what sense it can be called certain and firm.

Certitude is directly and properly predicated of cognition, but indirectly of those acts of the will which depend upon prior cognition; yet with this difference, that certitude of the intellect excludes doubt, while certitude or firmness of the will excludes fluctuation or fear. Therefore the act of hope is called certain insofar as it cannot be frustrated, and firm insofar as it excludes fear. But in order that the matter may be understood better, hope can be considered both on the part of God and on the part of ourselves.

705. 2. Thesis: Theological hope, as much as is on the part of God, is supremely certain and firm; but as much as is on the part of ourselves, it admits a certain uncertainty and fear.

(A) On the part of God it is supremely certain and firm.

(a) This indeed is inculcated very often in the Psalms: "My God, in Thee I trust; let me not be ashamed. Neither let my enemies laugh at me; for none of those who wait on Thee shall be confounded... In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped, let me not be confounded forever... Our God is our refuge and strength, a helper in troubles which have found us exceedingly; therefore we will not fear when the earth shall be troubled... He who dwells in the help of the Most High shall abide in the protection of the God of heaven."⁵ (b) The same is taught in the sapiential books: "Know that no one has hoped in the Lord and has been confounded. For who has continued in His commandments, and has been forsaken, or who has called upon Him, and He has despised him? For God is pious and merciful, and will forgive sins in the day of tribulation."⁶ (c) Nor does Paul speak otherwise: "Tribulation works patience, and patience trial, and trial hope; but hope does not confound."⁷ Wherefore elsewhere he teaches that hope is like a sure and firm anchor of the soul;⁸ and, near the end of life, he writes confidently:⁹ "For I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep my deposit unto that day." - (d) This is confirmed by Trent:¹⁰ "All ought to place and repose the firmest hope in the help of God."

⁵ Ps. 24:2-3; Ps. 30:2; Ps. 45:2-3; Ps. 90:1; let the whole Psalm be read with the Commentary of St. Bernard.

⁶ Ecclus. 2:11-13.

⁷ Rom. 5:3-5.

⁸ Heb. 6:19.

⁹ 2 Tim. 1:12.

¹⁰ Sess. VI, cap. 13, Denzing., n. 689.

In truth this is gathered from what was said concerning the motive of hope. For that act is certain and firm which rests upon an infallible motive; but the motive upon which hope rests is altogether infallible, since the goodness, omnipotence, mercy, and fidelity of God can never be frustrated; therefore the act of hope must be altogether firm: otherwise injury is inflicted upon the divine attributes.

706. (B) On the part of ourselves, insofar as hope supposes our cooperation, it admits a certain uncertainty, from which there arises fear lest by our own fault we lose the heavenly kingdom.¹⁰ For the divine promise of eternal beatitude to be given to each is conditioned, namely on this supposition, that we cooperate with the grace of God and persevere unto the end; but, on account of weakness or malice, we can fail and fall away from the state of grace; therefore from this head hope is not absolutely certain, but can be frustrated.

¹⁰ Thus against the Protestants, who think that each one must trustingly hope and believe that he is inscribed among the number of the predestined. This is refuted in the Treatise on Grace, n. 164-167.

This indeed Scripture teaches; thus Paul wrote to the faithful: "Therefore he who thinks himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall... With fear and trembling work out your salvation";¹¹ indeed concerning himself he said: "For I am conscious of nothing to myself, yet I am not hereby justified; but He who judges me is the Lord... I chastise my body and bring it into servitude, lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become reprobate."¹²

¹¹ 1 Cor. 10:12; Phil. 2:12.

¹² 1 Cor. 4:4; 9:27.

Trent declared the same against the Protestants:¹³ "For as no pious person ought to doubt concerning the mercy of God, concerning the merit of Christ, and concerning the efficacy of the sacraments: so each person, while he looks upon himself and his own proper weakness and indisposition, can fear and be afraid concerning his grace; since no one can know with the certitude of faith, to which falsehood cannot be subject, that he has obtained the grace of God... Nevertheless those who think themselves to stand, let them take heed lest they fall; and let them work out their salvation with fear and trembling, in labors, in watchings, in alms, in prayers and oblations, in fastings and chastity. For they ought to fear, knowing that they have been reborn unto the hope of glory and not yet unto glory."

¹³ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 9 and 13, Denzing., nn. 684 and 689; cf. n. 688.

707. Corollary. Therefore no one, unless from a special revelation, can be certain concerning his own justification and salvation. Therefore with fear and trembling we must work out our salvation.

But this fear does not diminish our hope, but rather sharpens and raises it, because it impels us to flee to God: for while we fear, on account of our weakness, lest we fall into sin, we are rendered more watchful, and place all our confidence in God; and at the same time we devote ourselves more perseveringly to good works, so that our salvation may become more certain, according to that saying:¹⁴ "Labor the more, that by good works you may make your vocation and election sure: for doing these things, you shall not sin at any time."

¹⁴ 2 Pet. 1:10.

708. From what has been said, it is easily understood that the proximate subject of hope is the will: for hope cannot be placed in the intellect, which regards the true, since it tends directly toward the good; nor in the sensitive appetite, which is concerned with sensible good; therefore it is in the will, since it inclines toward spiritual good.

But the question arises what persons are capable of eliciting an act of hope. (A) With regard to the dead: (a) the blessed in heaven no longer hope, at least for essential beatitude,¹⁵ since they already enjoy the same, according to that saying:¹⁶ "But hope which is seen is not hope; for what a man sees, why does he hope for?" (b) The damned likewise cannot hope, since they know that they cannot escape damnation and arrive at beatitude. (c) But hope can be elicited by souls detained in purgatory, according to the common opinion, because, although they are already certain of their salvation, nevertheless they cannot arrive at it except by enduring the sufferings and anxieties to which they are subjected; and thus the future possession of heaven appears to them as something certain but arduous.

¹⁵ Some indeed assert that they hope for the accidental beatitude of the body; yet St. Thomas denies this, II-II, q. 18, a. 2 ad 4, because the glory of the body does not have the character of an arduous good with respect to one having the glory of the soul.

¹⁶ Rom. 8:24.

709. (B) If the question is of the living: (a) hope does not remain in those who are formally heretics (above, n. 604), because the foundation of hope is faith itself, which is lacking in these; nor in those who have fallen into despair or heretical presumption, because by these sins hope is lost, from what is to be said below. (b) Yet it can remain in other sinners, who must prepare themselves for justification by hope, according to Trent:¹⁷ "While sinners, understanding that they are sinners, by the fear of divine justice, by which they are usefully shaken, turning themselves to consider the mercy of God, are raised into hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ."

¹⁷ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6, Denzing., n. 680.

710. Once the nature of hope has been explained, it is easy enough to understand its excellence. (a) Nevertheless, some contended that hope, considered separately from charity, or the desire of some reward, is of itself infected by some stain of baseness, and cannot be made honest unless it is converted into an affection of benevolence and charity; and therefore they said that a work exercised with a view to eternal reward, without charity, is not truly honest: thus the Calvinists, Baius, and the Jansenists.² Besides, not a few modern philosophers, especially Kantians, and (what is astonishing) evolutionists, turn it into a fault of the Christian religion that it proposes a reward to those doing good; for thus, they say, virtue is mercenary (above, nn. 30 and 56).

¹ Suarez, De spe, disp. I, sect. 5; Perrone, op. cit., nn. 82-124; Bouquillon, nn. 346-371; Billot, th. 27-28; Pesch, nn. 514-530.

² Calvin, Instit., lib. III, c. 16, § 3, and c. 18, § 2; Baius, lib. de Caritate, c. 6; de virtutibus impiorum, c. 5-6; with regard to the Jansenists, see propositions 44-45 of Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI, Sept. 8, 1713, apud Denzing., nn. 1259-1278.

(b) The Quietists, under the leadership of Michael Molinos, did not proceed so far, but, thinking that perfection consists in a continuous act of contemplation and love, asserted that hope, which regards one's own good, is imperfect, and therefore cannot be composed with the pure love of God and the highest perfection. From this they also inferred that all desires, even pious ones, all petitions, all acts except the pure love of God, as imperfect, are to be omitted; and that temptations are not to be resisted actively, but only passively.³ The will, they said, ought to remain altogether quiet, and not act except when divine grace impels, which alone works good in us. From this error the pious widow Guyon did not withdraw far enough; her defense was undertaken by the Archbishop of Cambrai, Fenelon, in the work Explication des Maximes des Saints, where he taught that there is given a habitual state of pure love which excludes hope.⁴

³ Yet the greatest difference must be established between the errors of M. Molinos and of Fenelon. The former indeed proceeded much farther both speculatively and practically, by deducing immoral conclusions from his principles. Theoretically he taught: "The soul must not think either of reward, or of punishment, or of paradise, or of hell, or of death, or of eternity." Practically: "The free will having been handed over to God, and the care and thought of our soul having been left to Him, there is no longer to be any account of temptations; nor should any resistance be made to them except negative resistance, with no effort being used: and if nature is moved, it is necessary to allow it to be moved, because it is nature... When violences of this kind (diabolical temptations) occur, it is necessary to allow Satan to work, by applying no effort and no proper endeavor, but man ought to remain in his nothingness: and even if pollutions and obscene acts by one's own hands, and even worse things, follow, there is no need to disturb oneself..." (Ap. Denzing., nn. 1094, 1104, 1134.)

⁴ Fenelon said: "There is given a habitual state of the love of God, which is pure charity and without any admixture of the motive of one's own interest. Neither fear of punishments nor desire of rewards any longer has a part in it. God is no longer loved on account of merit, nor on account of perfection, nor on account of the happiness to be found in Him... In this state the soul loses every hope of its own proper interest; but never loses in the higher part, that is, in its direct and intimate acts, perfect hope, which is the disinterested desire of the promises." (Ap. Denzing., nn. 1193 and 1203.) It is known to all with how great humility Fenelon retracted his errors, condemned by Innocent XII. - The history of quietism has been sketched among others by Gosselin, Analyse de la controverse du Quietisme (Oeuvres de Fenelon, Versailles, t. IV); L. Crouste, Fenelon et Bossuet, Paris, 1894-1895, t. I, pp. 375-564, t. II in entirety. - You will find the doctrine of Bossuet especially in the work Instruction sur les etats d'oraison, where the articles called Issy are set forth, concerning quietism.

Against these errors we shall prove the honesty and necessity of hope.

711. Thesis. Theological hope, by which we work good with a view to eternal beatitude, not only bears before itself nothing disordered, but truly has the character of virtue.

(A) This indeed is clear from the texts of Scripture cited above, nn. 700-702, in which hope in God is commended; but besides, from many others in which works done with a view to eternal reward are explicitly praised as good: "Seek therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."⁵ - "Make unto yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity, that, when you shall fail, they may receive you into eternal dwellings."⁶ Therefore the Apostle exhorts the Corinthians that, like athletes, they abstain from all things and thus receive an incorruptible crown,⁷ and elsewhere adds:⁸ "Whatever you do, work from the soul, as to the Lord, and not to men; knowing that from the Lord you shall receive the retribution of the inheritance." Now God cannot so earnestly and frequently exhort us to hope unless it is honest and praiseworthy. Indeed St. John explicitly declares that this hope is sanctifying:⁹ "And everyone who has this hope in Him sanctifies himself, as He also is holy."

⁵ Matt. 6:33.

⁶ Luke 16:9.

⁷ 1 Cor. 9:25.

⁸ Col. 3:23-24.

⁹ 1 John 3:3.

(B) Therefore deservedly Trent reproved those "who establish that in all works the just sin, if in those works, by arousing their own sluggishness and exhorting themselves to run in the stadium, with this, that God first of all be glorified, they also look to eternal reward"; and afterward declared: "And therefore to those working well unto the end and hoping in God, eternal life is to be proposed, both as grace mercifully promised through Christ Jesus to the sons of God, and as a reward faithfully to be rendered, from the promise of God Himself, to their good works and merits."¹⁰

¹⁰ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 11 and 16, Denzing., nn. 687 and 692.

712. (C) It is consonant with reason to hope in God, to love Him as our good, and to expect from Him eternal life and the means for obtaining it. (a) Certainly good and honest is the act by which we tend toward God as our end and the fountain of supreme beatitude; for thus our faculties are rightly developed, while they are ordered to infinite good; moreover, by loving God as good for us, we easily love Him as lovable in Himself.

Some say that thus the order is perverted, because we refer God to ourselves as to an end. But undeservedly; for when we seek our beatitude in the knowledge and love of God, by that very fact we recognize God to be our ultimate end; wherefore we refer ourselves to God as to the ultimate end.

(b) Moreover, when we confidently expect divine help, by that very fact we adhere to God helping; now the perfection of man consists in this, that he is united to God. Besides, to hope in the Lord is honorable to Him: for thus we recognize His power, goodness, and fidelity: "Because he has hoped in Me, I will deliver him; I will protect him because he has known My name."¹¹

¹¹ Ps. 90:14.

713. Therefore they err, as we showed above, n. 30, who say that a work done with a view to eternal life is mercenary: for hope of a merely spiritual and future reward does not exclude an honest motive, but, given human weakness, powerfully incites us to the good.¹² - And indeed those who boast that they act well on account of duty, and not on account of reward, deceive themselves or others: for experience establishes that men are only gradually drawn to the good of a higher order, to pure love, elicited without any hope of gratitude or reward. - The Catholic doctrine seems much more adapted to the weakness of human nature, which draws men to spiritual good by hope of future reward, and gradually raises them from hope to the supreme good loved for its own sake. We confess besides that our acts are more perfect the less they regard our own advantage.¹³

¹² This Seailles himself admits, although otherwise hostile to Catholic doctrine: "It is not my intention to diminish or calumniate Christian morality; what it has obtained from men, what it has given them suffices to defend it from voluntary injustices and unintelligent bias. It has deepened souls, it has made them more delicate and more pure, it has restrained the impatient and brutal beast, it has opposed to its immediate desires the dream of paradise and the nightmares of hell: by binding beatitude to sacrifice, it has made disinterestedness come forth from egoism itself. Some are scandalized by this: instinct is found again, fear, desire, hope, trembling or appetite of the beast in this expectation of reward; but, to what is seen, to what is touched, victoriously to oppose an image, a dream of happiness, what one does not verify by the senses, what exists only to the extent that one believes it, is this not already idealism, proof that the idea can conquer?" (Les affirmat. de la conscience, pp. 49-50.)

¹³ Which M. d'Hulst splendidly explains, Careme 1891, pp. 200 and 412: "It is not because the virtuous man will have made a calculation that he will be beatified, it is because he will have done his duty. The more he has forgotten himself in the virtuous effort, the greater will be his reward. To mediocre souls, enamored of themselves even in the practice of good, the lesser happiness; to heroic souls, unoccupied with themselves even in the care of their salvation, the highest felicity."

714. That the infused habit of hope is necessary by necessity of means for salvation is gathered from the fact that justification is not infused except with the virtues of faith, hope, and charity (above, n. 597). But the question is moved concerning the act of hope, namely whether this is at times necessary for obtaining or preserving justification. The Quietists denied this, asserting that there is given a perfect state in which every act of hope is excluded (above, n. 710).

715. 1. Some act of theological hope, according to the ordinary law, is necessary for adults by necessity of means for obtaining justification.

(A) For Trent, describing the dispositions necessary by necessity of means for justification, places hope among them:¹⁴ "They are raised into hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ." In truth the first movement which follows faith and fear of God in sinners is confidence of obtaining remission of sins, which they conceive by turning themselves to the mercy of God; for unless they trust in God, they fall into despair, they do not think of doing penance,¹⁵ and therefore they cannot be justified.

¹⁴ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6; Denzing., n. 680.

¹⁵ "For no one," says St. Ambrose, "can do penance well unless he has hoped for pardon." (De Paenitent., c. I, n. 4, P. L., XVI, 466.)

Absolutely speaking, it can indeed happen that they pass immediately to eliciting an act of perfect charity or contrition, by which they are justified, and therefore we said "according to the ordinary law." But this act of charity virtually includes hope: for by loving God as a friend, we hope that He will be propitious to us.

(B) Scripture does not openly declare the matter, since it inculcates the utility rather than the necessity of hope. Yet this necessity is logically inferred from it. For the Apostle, when he preaches the absolute necessity of faith, defines it as the substance of things to be hoped for,¹⁶ and therefore supposes that hope is required for justification just as faith itself is; for the sinner who believes and does not hope easily falls into despair, and thus cannot be saved.¹⁷

¹⁶ Heb. 11:1, 6.

¹⁷ Below, n. 720.

716. 2. He who is already justified is bound at times to elicit acts of hope for persevering and obtaining salvation.

(A) Scripture indeed insinuates this in many places, in which hope is so commended that it seems to fall under precept: "Command the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God."¹ - "But Christ as a son in His house: which house we are, if we hold fast confidence and the glory of hope firm unto the end."² Hence the Apostle often exhorts the faithful to Christian hope: "So run that you may obtain. And everyone who strives for the mastery abstains from all things; and they indeed that they may receive a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible one";³ - "Let us live piously in this world, awaiting the blessed hope."⁴ All these things indeed suppose that acts of hope are to be elicited at least at times.

¹ 1 Tim. 6:17.

² Heb. 3:6.

³ 1 Cor. 9:24-25.

⁴ Titus 2:13.

(B) This likewise is gathered from the necessity of prayer. That this is necessary for salvation was proved in the Treatise on Grace, nn. 42 and 58, and below will be demonstrated in the Treatise on the Virtue of Religion. But prayer to God supposes hope: for we ask graces from Him for this reason, because we hope in Him; wherefore James says:⁵ "But let him ask in faith (confidence), nothing wavering." Therefore acts of hope are to be elicited at times.

⁵ James 1:6.

717. 3. Corollary. Therefore quietism must be rejected, nor can there be admitted a habitual state of the love of God which altogether excludes hope. Man can indeed at times elicit an act of perfect charity, by which, without any admixture of a motive of his own interest, he loves God solely as supremely lovable in Himself; he can arrive at that excess of charity that, with Paul, conditionally (that is, if it were possible, without loss of divine love), he would renounce eternal happiness: "I wished myself to be anathema from Christ for my brethren";⁶ but soon with the same Apostle he must return to hope: "I press toward the mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation of God in Christ Jesus... As to the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day."⁷ Therefore in the present life, while we are pilgrims away from God, we must not only love Him, but hope in Him.

⁶ Rom. 9:3.

⁷ Phil. 3:14; 2 Tim. 4:8.

This is also clear from the condemnation of 68 propositions of Michael de Molinos by Innocent XI, Nov. 20, 1687, - and of 23 propositions excerpted from the work of Msgr. Fenelon by Innocent XII, Mar. 12, 1699. For from this condemnation it is certainly gathered that there is not given a habitual state of the love of God without any admixture of proper interest.⁸

⁸ You will find these propositions apud Denzing., nn. 1088-1155 and 1193-1215. - Here it is also worthwhile to refer to some of the Issy articles, concerning which Bossuet, Noailles, bishop of Chalons, Fenelon, and Tronson, S.S., agreed: "1) Every Christian in every state is bound to preserve the exercise of faith, hope, and charity, and to elicit their acts, as acts of distinct virtues. 2) It is not permitted for a Christian to be indifferent to salvation and to the things which are referred to it: holy indifference regards the outcome of this life (sin excepted), and the dispensation of spiritual consolations and aridities."

718. 4. Concerning the time at which the precept of hope obliges. Almost the same must be said as concerning faith, nn. 644-647; namely this precept:

(A) Obliges of itself: (a) when someone has attained the use of reason, and at the same time eternal beatitude toward which he must tend has been sufficiently proposed to him; (b) in danger of death, at least more probably, so that the mind, the terrors of judgment having been overcome, may confidently tend toward God the ultimate end; (c) often in life, although the times cannot be determined more particularly; besides, he who lives as a Christian, prays, and worthily receives the sacraments, by that very fact satisfies the precept; (d) when a temptation against hope urges which can be conquered only by an act of hope; (e) when the habit of hope has been lost through the mortal sin of despair.

(B) By accident: (a) when a precept must be fulfilled which cannot be fulfilled without an act of hope, for example, prayer, penance; (b) if a temptation urges which cannot be overcome unless the soul is raised by an act of hope.

719. One can sin against hope in a twofold way: by omission, when the prescribed act of hope is not elicited; by commission, when hope is cast away through despair or perverted through presumption. From what has been said it is sufficiently understood when one sins against hope by omission. Yet it may be observed that the principal cause of these sins is disordered adhesion to earthly goods, by which temporal goods are preferred to eternal goods, so that not a few desire to remain perpetually in this life. This happens especially to those who abound in riches and pleasures: for these sometimes contemn heavenly goods and place their happiness in earthly things;¹⁰ and this sin is grave when it turns us away from the love of God and from other duties of the Christian life which oblige under mortal sin. - Therefore it remains to speak concerning despair and presumption.

⁹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20-21; Suarez, disp. II, sect. 2-3; Billuart, De spe, art. 5; St. Alphonsus, lib. III, nn. 20-21; Perrone, nn. 145-158; Bouquillon, nn. 372-383; Lehmkuhl, nn. 310-313; Ballerini-Palmieri, nn. 124-132.

¹⁰ This M. d'Hulst thus explains, Careme, 1892, p. 201: "Hope is therefore a duty, and this duty, so sweet, is costly at its hours. Yes, gentlemen, when life seems to smile upon our earthly hopes, it is hard to disdain those flattering promises which take us by the sensible side of ourselves; it is hard to withdraw from the embrace of pleasure, to say to the happiness which offers itself to us: you could not suffice for me... The Christian needs something of this heroism (of the martyrs) to disengage himself from the caressing embraces of pleasure and to entrust to the distant promises of a mysterious beyond all the hope of his happiness."

720. 1. Notion and causes. (A) Despair is a voluntary diffidence of obtaining beatitude, or the means necessary for it.

In order that it be a sin, it must be voluntary; it is therefore distinguished from involuntary disturbance, which frequently arises in those who fear God, or in the scrupulous: for these, from an empty motive, often fear lest they are in the state of mortal sin, or lest, on account of their malice, they fall into danger of damnation. It likewise differs from that sense of spiritual dereliction which sometimes the most perfect suffer: for these, with God permitting it thus, are deprived of spiritual consolation, and are pressed by various temptations, so that they seem to themselves to have been forsaken by the Lord Himself, and become altogether despondent.¹¹

¹¹ Christ wished to suffer this spiritual dereliction on the cross, namely when He cried out: "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" (Matt. 27:46). Bona describes this state thus (De discretione spirituum, c. 13): "But in the higher part the mind is darkened by the densest darkness, the will languishes, finding consolation nowhere, neither in God nor in creatures: every ardor of love grows cold; and, what is most grave, it is pressed by so many temptations that it often seems to itself to have given assent to diffidence, blasphemies, and despair. Those who have experienced it liken this horrible torment to the pains of hell." Cf. Schram, Instit. mysticae, § 226-237.

In order to know whether a penitent has truly consented to the sin of despair, the confessor will opportunely ask him whether or not he has omitted the accustomed exercises of religion and piety: if, notwithstanding fears and anxieties, he has not ceased to pray, he can be judged free from the sin of despair; but if he has ceased from praying, thinking that God is unwilling to come to his aid, of itself he sins gravely; but if, desponding in soul from a certain disordered sadness, he becomes tepid and remiss, he sins venially.

721. (B) Among the principal causes of despair are numbered:

(a) Defect of faith, because faith is the foundation of hope; such was the despair of Cain when he said:¹² "My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon"; for he seemed to suppose that God does not remit sins even to those truly penitent. (b) Disordered adhesion to pleasures, especially lust; for from affection for these delights a man grows disgusted with spiritual goods; and when he wishes to come to his senses, it is so arduous to restrain lust and to leave the enticements of the flesh,¹³ that not a few despair concerning victory and eternal salvation. (c) Spiritual sloth (above, n. 562), that is, languor and weariness in the exercise of virtue, horror of difficulty, labor of combat, by force of which we consider the good to be done as too difficult and impossible, and therefore abstain from it.¹⁴ (d) Presumption, insofar as it leads us into temptation, but afterward into multiple sins and despair; namely, the Seducer deceitfully leads the incautious into sin, by persuading them of the lightness of sin and the ease of pardon; but, once sin has been committed, he deters them from penance, by magnifying its enormity, the inescapable weight of depraved custom, and the implacable justice of God. (e) Among natural causes is numbered a certain melancholic disposition, which begets sadness and dejection of soul.

¹² Gen. 4:13.

¹³ Augustine graphically describes this (Confess., lib. VIII, c. 11, n. 26, P. L., XXXII, 761): "Trifles of trifles and vanities of vanities, my old friends, held me back, and they muttered softly: Do you send us away? and from this moment shall we not be with you any more forever? and from this moment will this and that not be permitted to you any more forever? And what things did they suggest?... what filth did they suggest! what disgraces!... Yet they delayed me, hesitating to tear myself away and shake myself free from them and leap across whither I was called, while violent custom said to me: Do you think you will be able to live without these?"

¹⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, a. 4.

722. 2. The malice of despair. (A) Despair properly so called, which is concerned with salvation or the means necessary for obtaining it, is a mortal sin of its whole kind, less indeed than infidelity and hatred of God, but graver than the sins which are committed against the moral virtues; for it is directly opposed to the very motive of faith, since it at least implicitly denies the mercy or power of God; and therefore it utterly destroys hope itself, without which salvation becomes impossible. Besides, "hope being removed, men slide unrestrained into vices, and are drawn back from good labors."¹⁵ Sometimes it is also joined with heresy, insofar as someone believes that God cannot or does not will to save him: then it contracts the special malice of heresy.

¹⁵ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 20, a. 3.

(B) But diffidence concerning those things which are not necessary for salvation, for example, concerning avoiding some venial sin or attaining such a degree of perfection, is not despair properly so called, and of itself is a light sin. The same must be said concerning a certain pusillanimity, by force of which we in some way despair concerning our cooperation with grace, but not concerning divine mercy.

723. 1. Notion and causes. (A) Presumption, insofar as it is opposed to hope, is a rash expectation of beatitude and of the means for obtaining it, contrary to the order of Providence. For God, in the conferring of His gifts, has established certain laws conformable to wisdom; and the sin of presumption is situated in this, that spiritual goods are desired without conformity with these laws. This happens in various ways.

(a) Presumption is heretical, namely when it imports some error against faith; such is Pelagian presumption, situated in this, that someone hopes to obtain the remission of sins, or some other grace, and heavenly beatitude by his own powers; or Lutheran presumption, by which someone trusts that he will obtain remission of sins and eternal beatitude from the merits of Christ alone, without penance properly so called and the observance of the commandments;¹ or Calvinist presumption, by which someone hopes for divine help in carrying out something evil, for example, in taking vengeance upon an enemy, as if God could positively cooperate with sin.

¹ From this error they do not sufficiently withdraw who hope, on account of some offices of piety toward the Blessed Virgin, that they will obtain salvation, even if they live carnally and sin more freely. Cf. Tyrrell, External Religion (French, La religion exterieure, Paris, 1902), lect. V.

(b) Presumption is simple, or non-heretical, when someone, without error in faith, presumes too much concerning divine mercy or his own powers, for example, if he trusts that he will obtain extraordinary graces, such as are granted only to the greatest saints, - or assumes divine mercy as a motive for sinning more freely, multiplying sins because, he says, God remits many just as easily as one, and is always ready to spare penitents even when they return late to virtue.

But if someone sins or perseveres in sin from passion or frailty, with hope of obtaining pardon, or because of the ease of accusing sins, this is not properly presumption, but an abuse of grace to be diligently avoided.

724. (B) The principal causes of presumption, besides the errors in faith recounted above, are pride and vainglory.

From pride especially arises that presumption by which someone trusts that he will obtain glory without merits, or pardon without penance; for he esteems himself so highly that he hopes that even while sinning he will not be excluded from glory. From vainglory proceeds especially the presumption by which we attempt something above our powers, expecting thereby to be esteemed by others.² Yet sometimes it also arises from levity of mind, by force of which, forgetful of our own infirmity, we presume too much upon our own strength: then the sin is lighter.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 21, a. 4.

725. 2. Concerning the malice of presumption. (A) Heretical presumption is of itself a most grave sin, since it is opposed both to faith and to hope, and inflicts injury upon the divine attributes; when it is voluntary, it destroys the habit of hope, since it overturns faith, which is deservedly held to be the foundation of hope. - Yet I said of itself, because there can be, among Lutherans, those who in good faith think that salvation can be obtained from the merits of Christ alone, without observance of the commandments.

(B) Simple presumption is of itself a grave sin, but can admit smallness of matter;³ nor of itself does it destroy the habit of hope, because it preserves its motive: for although someone presumes too much upon himself, he does not for that reason altogether reject divine help.

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 21, a. 2.

In practice, in order to judge whether a penitent has sinned against hope, and at the same time against faith, he must be asked why and how he despaired or presumed, and from his answers the nature and gravity of this sin will be able to be recognized.

726. First of all it must be noted that hope is increased by the same means by which faith grows (above, nn. 689-694), since faith is the foundation of hope. But besides this, like the other virtues, it is strengthened by exercise and becomes more prompt.

⁴ Scaramelli, op. cit., art. II, concerning Hope, ch. 7-8; Schram, Instit. theol. mysticae, § 119-123; M. d'Hulst, Careme 1892, conf. 4-5.

(A) But in order that hope may be rightly exercised, there is required first a good conscience, that is, the state of grace and the practice of good works, or at least a sincere and efficacious desire of recovering grace; for he who remains in the state of mortal sin rightly fears damnation; while the just man, who knows that he is a son of God, easily trusts in his heavenly Father: "If our heart does not reprehend us, we have confidence toward God, and whatsoever we shall ask, we shall receive from Him, because we keep His commandments and do those things which are pleasing before Him."⁵

⁵ 1 John 3:21-22.

Augustine explains the reason for this thus:⁶ "A good conscience bears hope: as an evil conscience is wholly in despair, so a good conscience is wholly in hope... For he hopes who bears a good conscience. But he whom an evil conscience stings withdraws himself from hope, and hopes for nothing for himself except damnation. Therefore, in order that he may hope for the kingdom, let him have a good conscience; and in order that he may have a good conscience, let him believe and work."

⁶ In Ps. XXXI, n. 5, P. L., XXXVI, 261.

727. (B) When someone enjoys a good conscience, he ought now no longer to trust in man or in other creatures, but in God; wherefore, in all events, he should ask and expect from God alone counsel, strength, and grace, recalling to memory the motives of hope set forth above, nn. 700-703, namely the infinite power, mercy, and fidelity of God. For then, relying on divine help, he can overcome all adverse things: "The Lord is my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear? The Lord is the protector of my life; of whom shall I be afraid?... If armies in camp should stand together against me, my heart shall not fear."⁷

⁷ Ps. 26:1-3.

The reason is that nothing can separate us from the charity of God, which is plainly sufficient for rendering us blessed: "I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come... nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the charity of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."⁸

⁸ Rom. 8:38-39.

728. (C) But especially in adverse things all hope must be placed in God, who alone can rescue us from dangers, and at the same time give grace that we may use tribulations for increasing eternal beatitude.

Thus indeed Paul says: "Not only so, but we glory also in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience, and patience trial, and trial hope; and hope confounds not..."⁹ The reason is that if we suffer with Christ and for Christ, with Him we shall be glorified; and our glory will be proportioned to the tribulations patiently endured, and every arduous work done for God works in us an eternal weight of glory: "Yet so if we suffer with Him, that we may also be glorified with Him. For I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come that shall be revealed in us."¹⁰ - "For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation works for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory."¹¹

⁹ Rom. 5:3-5.

¹⁰ Rom. 8:17-18.

¹¹ 2 Cor. 4:17.

729. (D) But also in prosperous things we must raise the mind to eternal goods; otherwise we shall adhere to creatures and to pleasure, with the greatest detriment to the soul. Namely, when all things proceed prosperously, we are prone to pass God by, and to place our hope in creatures, riches, and friends; whence it happens that we become earthly, gaping after pleasure and contemning heavenly goods.

Wherefore it is necessary to look upon heaven, "while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal."¹² It is also necessary to pray, that, despising temporal and earthly things, we may learn to love heavenly things: "Grant to Thy peoples to love that which Thou commandest, to desire that which Thou dost promise; that, amid worldly changes, our hearts may there be fixed where true joys are."¹³

¹² 2 Cor. 4:18.

¹³ Missal, prayer for the 4th Sunday after Easter.

Concerning the exercise of hope, or confidence, in prayer we shall speak below.

By these and other means of this kind hope is strengthened and raised up, and the way is prepared for charity, concerning which it remains to speak.

1. NATURE OF HOPE.—Hope is an act of the will by which we desire to possess God, and firmly trust that through His goodness and fidelity we shall obtain Him, together with the necessary means, both natural and supernatural, of reaching Heaven.¹

¹ Rom. VIII, 24 sq.; Heb. XI, 1.—Cfr. Peter Lombard, Sent., III, dist. 26, n. 1: “It is hope by which spiritual and eternal things are hoped for, that is, awaited with confidence. For hope is the certain expectation of future beatitude, proceeding from the grace of God and preceding merits, either charity which precedes hope by nature, or the thing hoped for, that is, eternal beatitude. For to hope for something without merits can be called not hope but presumption.” (Migne, P. L., CXCII, 811).—IDEM, Comm. in Epist. ad Rom., c. 5, 2–5: “Hope is the certain expectation of future glory, which seems vain to human reason, but is confirmed by the testimony of power, that is, by patience or miracles.” (P. L., CXCI, 1380).

Hope, therefore, may be either a transient act or a permanent habit (habitus). Both as an act and as a habit it has two essential constituents, namely, the effective desire of salvation and a firm trust in the promises and the providence of God. This twofold note distinguishes the Christian virtue of hope from resignation or apathy on the one hand, and, on the other, from presumption, which is an inordinate confidence of attaining Heaven without using the prescribed means.²

² 1 Pet. V, 6–10.

a) Through these two constituents of desire and trust, hope, though essentially distinct from faith and charity, is intimately united with both—with faith, because it is based on belief in God and shares its motives and object; with charity, because hope without the love of God would be fruitless and ineffective.³ “Charity flows from faith,” says St. Ambrose, “and hope from charity, and together they flow back and forth as in a sort of holy intercourse.”⁴ And St. Augustine: “Hope is impossible without charity. . . . Hence charity cannot exist without hope, nor hope without charity, nor either of the two without faith.”⁵ And in another place: “He who does not love, believes in vain, even though his belief is true, and hopes in vain, even though the things he hopes for appertain to real happiness. . . .”⁶

³ Luke VIII, 47–50; Rom. V, 1–5; XV, 13; 1 Cor. XIII, 13; Eph. III, 12; Col. I, 4 sq.; Heb. VI, 19 sq.; XI, 1.—Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 7, can. 12.

⁴ Expos. Evang. sec. Luc., l. VIII, n. 30: “From faith comes charity, from charity hope, and in turn they flow back into one another in a certain holy circle.” (Migne, P. L., XV, 1774).

⁵ Enchiridion, c. 8: “What can be hoped for that is not believed? Moreover, something that is not hoped for can also be believed. For which of the faithful does not believe in the punishments of the impious? Yet he does not hope for them. . . . Now what shall I say about love, without which faith profits nothing? Hope, however, cannot exist without love (Jas. ii, 19). . . . Therefore neither is love without hope, nor hope without love, nor either without faith.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 234).

⁶ IDEM, ibid., c. 117: “When it is asked whether anyone is a good man, it is not asked what he believes or hopes, but what he loves. He who loves rightly without doubt believes and hopes rightly; but he who does not love believes in vain, even if the things he believes are true, and hopes in vain, even if the things he hopes for are taught to pertain to true happiness, unless he also believes and hopes that it can be granted to him when he asks, so that he may love.” (P. L., XL, 286).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 17, art. 6: “A virtue is called theological because it has God as the object to which it adheres. A person can adhere to another in two ways: in one way for his own sake, and in another way insofar as one comes through him to something else. Charity, therefore, makes man adhere to God for His own sake, uniting the mind of man to God through the affection of love. Hope and faith, however, make man adhere to God as to a principle from which certain things come to us. From God there come to us both the knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness. Faith, therefore, makes man adhere to God insofar as He is for us the principle of knowing truth; for we believe those things to be true which are said to us by God. Hope makes man adhere to God insofar as He is for us the principle of perfect goodness, namely, insofar as through hope we rely upon divine assistance to obtain beatitude.”

b) Hope, being on the one hand an indestructible natural tendency and, on the other, a virtue supernaturally infused by God, may by practice become an acquired virtue and thereby truly moral. Its de facto object lies in the future, since eternal beatitude cannot be fully realized in the present life. Patient resignation to the will of God here on earth, with a view to eternal happiness in Heaven, demands a moral effort and entails sacrifices which not infrequently assume heroic proportions.

St. Paul calls Christ “the hope of glory”⁷ and says that God glorified us in Him; but he adds: “Your life is hid with Christ in God. When Christ shall appear, who is your life, then you shall also appear with him in glory.”⁸ The higher life of the Christian believer, therefore, whilst he sojourns in this vale of tears, is subject to manifold hindrances, which will not disappear entirely until Christ reveals to us His hidden glory in Heaven.

⁷ Col. I, 27.

⁸ Rom. VIII, 30; Col. III, 3 sq.

To this consideration may be added another. No man is certain that he will reach Heaven. God has created us, but He will not save us, without our coöperation. No one is crowned unless he has fought the good fight, and only those obtain eternal life who have kept the commandments, abstained from mortal sin, or purged themselves from it if they had the misfortune to fall. Hence our ultimate fate depends upon how we wage war against the enemies of our soul, and we must “work out our salvation with fear and trembling.”⁹ This explains why Sacred Scripture warns men against inordinate confidence and exhorts them to strive unceasingly for sanctification by performing good works. In this terrific struggle Christian hope proves itself a moral virtue, supernatural both in origin and substance, founded solely upon “the word of the truth of the gospel.”¹⁰

⁹ Matt. VII, 21 sq.; 1 Cor. VI, 9; Phil. II, 12; 1 Pet. I, 17; 1 John II, 3–6; Apoc. XXI, 27.—Peter Lombard, Comm. in Ep. ad Rom., c. 5: “It is no great thing to glory in prosperity; the upright of heart glory even in tribulations, knowing the greatness of the reward, and that when tribulation has ended they will acquire an infinite reward.” (Migne, P. L., CXCI, 1379).

¹⁰ Col. I, 5; cfr. 1 Cor. X, 13; 2 Pet. I, 10.—Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 13, can. 15, 16.

2. THE OBJECT OF HOPE.—The material object (obiectum materiale) of hope is Heaven, i. e., the beatific vision of God, and the means that are necessary to obtain it. Some writers distinguish a primary and a secondary object. The primary object is God,¹¹ whereas the secondary object are the graces,—natural and supernatural, spiritual and physical,—which He grants for the purposes of salvation.¹²

¹¹ Gen. XV, 1; Tob. II, 16–18; John XIV, 1–3; Tit. III, 7; 1 John II, 25.—St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, l. XXII, c. 30, n. 1: “The reward of virtue will be He Himself [God], who gave the virtue and promised Himself to it, than whom nothing can be better or greater.” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 801).—IDEM, Tr. in Ioa., III, n. 21: “Do not love God for the sake of a reward; let Him Himself be your reward.” (P. L., XXXV, 1405).—IDEM, Enarr. in Ps., LXXIX, n. 14: “You [God] will be the whole reward of the justified.” (P. L., XXXVI, 1028).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 17, art. 2: “The hope of which we now speak attains God by relying on His help to obtain the good hoped for. An effect must be proportionate to its cause. And therefore the good which we ought primarily and principally to hope for from God is the infinite good proportionate to the power of God who assists us, for it belongs to infinite power to lead to an infinite good. This good is eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For nothing less is to be hoped for from Him than He Himself, since His goodness, by which He communicates good things to creatures, is not less than His essence. And therefore the proper and principal object of hope is eternal beatitude.”

¹² Matt. VI, 9–13, 33; 1 Tim. IV, 8.—St. Augustine, Enchirid., c. 114: “Of all the things that are to be faithfully believed, only those pertain to hope which are contained in the Lord’s Prayer.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 285).—IDEM, ibid., c. 115: “In the Evangelist Matthew the Lord’s Prayer appears to contain seven petitions, in three of which eternal things are asked, and in the remaining four temporal things, which nevertheless are necessary for obtaining eternal things.” (P. L., XL, 285).—Chr. Pesch, S.J., Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. VIII, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1900, pp. 205 sqq.—Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, 4th ed., St. Louis 1921, pp. 3 sqq.

The primary formal object of hope is God, in so far as He is the Sovereign Good and, as such, capable of satisfying the human heart, and be- cause He has promised us eternal salvation for the sake of Jesus Christ; in other words, God’s infinite goodness towards us, His omnipotence, and His fidelity to His promises.¹³ Secondary motives are the merits acquired through His grace, which are not fruits of human righteousness, but free gifts of God,¹⁴ and the intercession of the Saints or of our fellowmen; for in all these things the hope of the Christian is directed medi- ately to God Himself, or to Christ, who is “the one mediator between God and men.”¹⁵

¹³ Acts IV, 12; Rom. IX, 32; Eph. I, 19 sq.; II, 4–7; Phil. I, 6; 2 Tim. I, 12; Heb. VI, 17 sq.; X, 23; 1 Pet. I, 3; V, 7.—St. Augustine, De Trinit., l. XIII, c. 10, n. 13: “What was so necessary for raising up our hope as that it should be shown to us how highly God values us and how greatly He loves us? And what more manifest and splendid indication of this could there be than that the Son of God deigned to enter into fellowship with our nature?” (Migne, P. L., XLII, 1024).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 18, art. 4, ad 2: “Hope does not rest principally upon grace already possessed, but upon divine omnipotence and mercy, through which even one who does not have grace can obtain it and thus arrive at eternal life. Everyone who has faith is certain of the omnipotence and mercy of God.”—Cfr. Ph. Kneib, Die “Lohnsucht” in der christlichen Moral, Vienna 1904, pp. 7 sqq.

¹⁴ Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 16: “Far be it that a Christian man should trust or glory in himself and not in the Lord, whose goodness toward all men is so great that He wills His own gifts to be their merits.”—St. Augustine, Epist., 194 (al. 105), c. 5, n. 19: “What merit does man have before grace, by which merit he might receive grace, since nothing but grace produces every good merit of ours in us, and when God crowns our merits, He crowns nothing other than His own gifts?” (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 880).—IDEM, Serm., 170 (al. 49, De Temp.), n. 10: “When you depart from here, you will receive according to the merits and deeds which you have performed. Then God will crown not so much your merits as His gifts to you.” (P. L., XXXVIII, 932).—IDEM, Serm., 333, n. 5 (P. L., XXXVIII, 1466); Confess., l. IX, c. 13, n. 34 (P. L., XXXII, 778); Enarr. in Ps., 98, n. 8 (P. L., XXXVII, 1246); ibid., 144, n. 11 (P. L., XXXVIII, 1876); ibid., 126, n. 4: “No one has anything good unless he has received it from Him who alone is good.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1670).—On the Catholic doctrine of supernatural merit see Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, pp. 397 sqq.; P. O’Neill, Divine Charity, Dublin 1918, pp. 47 sqq.; G. H. Joyce, S.J., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, London and New York 1920, pp. 158 sqq.

¹⁵ 1 Tim. II, 5; cfr. Heb. XII, 24; Jas. V, 16 sqq.—H. Denifle, O.P., Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 400 sqq.—K. Krogh-Tonning, Der letzte Scholastiker, Freiburg 1904, p. 209.—On Christ as the Mediator of mankind see Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, 3rd ed., St. Louis 1919, pp. 5 sqq.; on the intercession of the Saints, Pohle-Preuss, Mariology, 3rd ed., St. Louis 1919, pp. 142 sqq.

3. NECESSITY OF HOPE.—a) Hope is a necessary means of salvation for all who have attained the use of reason. Hope corresponds to an elemental need of human nature. “We are saved by hope,” says St. Paul,¹⁶ and Christ Himself demands trust and confidence in God as an indispensable condition for the forgiveness of sins.¹⁷ The sinner must hope (actualiter) in order to prepare himself for justification, and after he has been justified, he must hope (habitualiter) in order to obtain the grace of prayer and to persevere and grow in the favor of God.

¹⁶ Rom. VIII, 24.

¹⁷ Matt. IX, 22, 28–30; Luke XVIII, 42.—Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 6 and 7.

The Church has condemned the opinion that perfect charity excludes hope.¹⁸ This condemnation is in entire harmony with Holy Scripture, which admonishes us again and again to have unlimited confidence in the omnipotence, the goodness, and the mercy of God.¹⁹ b) In proportion to the necessity of hope is the duty of cultivating this virtue, keeping it alive and nourishing it in the soul. Innumerable are the passages in which the Bible exhorts us to hope in God and confide in His mercy.²⁰ However, it is not necessary to make explicit acts of hope, except in times of special temptation against this virtue.²¹ The most effective means of preserving and increasing hope are prayer, meditating on the divine goodness and fidelity, eliciting frequent acts of this virtue, and thanking God for the favors He confers upon us.²² The Church specially recommends the frequent and confident invocation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is the refuge of sinners and the help of Christians.²³

¹⁸ Prop. Damnat. sub Innoc. XI., n. 1 and 23 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1327, 1349).

¹⁹ Ps. IV, 6; Matt. XI, 12; Heb. X, 23.

²⁰ Ps. XXVI, 14; Luke XII, 32; John XIV, 1; 1 Tim. VI, 17; Heb. X, 35.—Cfr. Prop. Damnat. ab Alex. VII., n. 1 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1101).

²¹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 186.

²² Ps. XXIV, 2 sqq.; Matt. VI, 25 sqq.; Luke XV, 11 sqq.; Rom. V, 1 sqq.; VIII, 23 sqq.; Phil. I, 6.

²³ “Refugium peccatorum,” “Auxilium Christianorum” (Litany of Loreto).—Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 188: “The principal remedies opposed to despair are: 1. consideration of the infinite goodness and mercy of God; 2. frequent recollection of the greatest sinners who obtained pardon; 3. meditation on the parables of the holy Gospel, especially of the lost sheep; 4. special devotion to the Blessed Virgin, the refuge of sinners; 5. confidence in Christ affixed to the cross for us, etc.”

READINGS.—Peter Lombard, Sent., III, dist. 16.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 17 sq.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, Paris 1905, pp. 396–400.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 47–54.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 240–247.—E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 55–64.—F. Abert, S. Thom. Aqu. Compend. Theol., pp. 457 sq., 461 sqq., 472 sqq.—G. Mayer, System der christl. Hoffnung, Leipsic 1900.—J. B. Ferreres, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., Barcelona 1918, pp. 192 sqq.—Thos. Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 177 sq.—G. H. Joyce, S.J., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, London and New York 1920, pp. 80 sqq.—P. O’Neill, Divine Charity, Dublin 1918, pp. 28 sqq.

1. THE QUALITIES OF HOPE.—The qualities of hope flow from the twofold nature of this virtue as a desire and as a firm trust or confidence in the mercy of God.

a) The desire must (α) correspond in a measure to the desirability of its object, which is God, and consequently must exceed the desire for every earthly good. (β) It must be effective, i. e., combined with the firm purpose of fulfilling the conditions necessary to attain eternal salvation. (γ) It must be well-ordered, i. e., aim at nothing but what is in accord with the will of God, and extend to temporal goods only in so far as they are necessary, or at least useful, for the attainment of Heaven.¹

¹ Cfr. Matt. V, 6; VI, 33; Col. III, 1; 1 Tim. IV, 10; Heb. VI, 11 sq.

b) The confidence or trust that is an essential constituent of hope, is founded on faith in Jesus Christ, and must consequently be (α) firm and steady,² and (β) illumined by the truths of religion, especially the wisdom, goodness, and justice of God, and therefore expecting no temporal blessing except in connection with, and in relation to, the “one necessary thing,” i. e., eternal salvation.³ Finally, (γ) the hope that is founded in Christ will be “an anchor of the soul, sure and firm”⁴ only if confident trust in God is united with humility and diffidence in one’s own powers.⁵ “He who hopes and does not fear,” says Pseudo-Augustine, “is careless, but he who fears and does not hope is weighed down and descends into the depths like a stone.”⁶

² Ps. XXIV, 2; 1 Cor. XV, 58; Eph. III, 12; Heb. VI, 19 sq.; 1 Pet. I, 13.

³ Matt. VI, 33; Col. III, 1; 1 Tim. VI, 17.

⁴ Heb. VI, 19.

⁵ Ps. CXLVII, 11; 1 Cor. X, 12; Phil. II, 12.

⁶ Pseudo-Augustine, Append. Serm. X ad Fratres in Eremo: “Therefore, my brethren, love this [hope], hold it, yet not without fear; because he who hopes and does not fear is careless, but he who fears and does not hope is weighed down and descends into the depths like a stone.” (P. L., XL, 1253).

2. THE FRUITS OF HOPE.—The fruits of hope as a theological virtue are the following:

a) In regard to the desire which it contains, (α) the conception of Heaven as our true home, and of life on earth as an exile which we must always be ready to leave;⁷ (β) moderation in the use of earthly goods, which, compared with the one thing necessary, i. e., the kingdom of God and its justice, must appear to the Christian merely as something superadded;⁸ and (γ) the salutary fear of losing Heaven, which gains strength in proportion to the ardor with which we desire to be united to God.

⁷ 2 Cor. V, 6–8; Phil. I, 23; III, 20; Col. III, 1 sq.; Heb. XIII, 14; cfr. John XIV, 2.—St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., CXLVIII, n. 4: “As pilgrims we sigh, still held captive under the weight and burden of the mortal body; hence we still groan in pilgrimage, but we shall exult in our fatherland. He who does not groan as a pilgrim will not rejoice as a citizen, because there is no desire in him.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1940).

⁸ Matt. VI, 36; Phil. IV, 11 sqq.; 1 Tim. VI, 6–8.

b) In regard to the confidence which it inspires, hope produces (α) true contentment and that heavenly joy which comforts man in all temptations, tribulations, and difficulties;⁹ (β) patience, which, though it does not exclude complaints and other manifestations of natural pain,¹⁰ consists in a readiness to bear the adversities of life with resignation to the will of God, nay to delight in suffering and thank God for it in the firm conviction that “to them that love God all things work together unto good.”¹¹ This persevering patience, when it has developed into absolute resignation to, or conformity with, the will of God, is a sure sign of election. “He that shall persevere to the end shall be saved.”¹² “Blessed is the man that endureth temptation, for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him.”¹³

⁹ Deut. X, 19; Rom. XV, 13; 1 Cor. I, 3 sqq.; Phil. II, 1; 1 Thess. IV, 12; Heb. VI, 18.—St. Augustine, Serm., 158, n. 8: “Hope will no longer exist when the reality exists. For hope itself will be necessary in pilgrimage. For when the traveler labors in walking, he therefore endures the labor because he hopes to arrive. Take away from him the hope of arriving, and at once his strength for walking is broken. Therefore the hope which exists here also pertains to the justice of our pilgrimage.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 866).—St. Bernard, Serm. in Cant., 61, n. 3: “I have sinned a great sin; my conscience will be troubled, but it will not be disturbed, because I shall remember the wounds of the Lord.” (P. L., CLXXXIII, 1072).

¹⁰ “There is a certain pleasure in weeping.”—Cfr. Matt. XXVI, 38 sq.; XXVII, 46; John XI, 35.—Ovid, Trist., IV, 3, 37.

¹¹ Rom. VIII, 28; cfr. Matt. V, 11 sq.; XXVI, 39; Acts V, 41; Rom. V, 3 sqq.

¹² Matt. X, 22.

¹³ Jas. I, 12.

Three things, in the terse phrase of a famous Italian writer, lead us blind mortals to misjudge the ways of God: corta vita, corta vista, corta pazienza—i. e., the shortness of life, our limited vision, and impatience.¹⁴

¹⁴ Antonio Rosmini.—Cfr. Gregory the Great, Hom. in Evang., l. I, 3, n. 4: “And if we do this [conquer ourselves], we shall not only escape the punishments that threaten us, but shall be rewarded together with the martyrs. For although an occasion of persecution is lacking, our peace also has its martyrdom; and although we do not place the neck of the flesh beneath the sword, nevertheless with the spiritual sword we slay carnal desires in the mind.” (Migne, P. L., LXXVI, 1089).—IDEM, ibid., l. II, 35, n. 7: “But because we celebrate the birthday of a martyr today, my brethren, we must by no means consider ourselves strangers to the virtue of his patience. For if, with the Lord assisting us, we strive perfectly to preserve the virtue of patience, we both live in the peace of the Church and nevertheless hold the palm of martyrdom. There are indeed two kinds of martyrdom, one in the mind, the other in the mind and in action together. And so we can be martyrs even if we are slain by no sword of persecutors. For to die at the hand of a persecutor is martyrdom in outward deed; but to endure insults and to love one who hates us is martyrdom in hidden thought.” (Migne, P. L., LXXVI, 1263).

READINGS.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 400–403.—G. H. Joyce, S.J., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, p. 81 sq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 49 sqq.

Man sins against the theological virtue of hope either by wilfully entertaining an aversion for God and heavenly things or by confiding in Him either too much or too little.

1. Aversion for God is not the same as hatred of God. The latter is a sin against charity rather than against hope. To have an aversion for God means not to wish Him evil, but simply to prefer the earth and its attractions to Him and to the happiness He has prepared for His rational creatures. To do this is obviously a mortal sin.

In this connection theologians discuss the question whether it is a mortal sin to wish that this terrestrial life might last forever. Noldin says that if this wish is accompanied by a disposition to leave Heaven to God, provided He will give us the earth, it is a mortal sin against hope because by entertaining such a desire the creature turns away from the Creator and seeks its happiness in created things. If, however, it is merely a sign of excessive absorption in earthly pleasures, or of fear of death on account of the uncertainty of reaching Heaven, it is not necessarily a mortal sin against hope because such a disposition of mind does not per se exclude the desire of beatitude. Married people who say that they would like to live together forever, as often as not merely mean to give utterance to the ardor of their mutual affection.¹

¹ Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., p. 55.

2. Against the confidence that forms an essential constituent of hope we may sin either by excess (per excessum) or by defect (per defectum).

We sin by excess of hope, a) If we entertain presumption, which is an inordinate confidence of being able to attain Heaven without employing the necessary means. This may manifest itself in a twofold manner:

α) By tempting God. “Tentatio Dei” is a Biblical term² which denotes the expectation of extraordinary divine help or miraculous intervention when there is no legitimate reason for it. The term may also be applied to anything that is done with the purpose of eliciting such help, as, for example by ordeals (ordalia) or so-called divine judgments (iudicia divina),³ which are based on the belief that God, being just and all-powerful, will, if solemnly invoked by public authority, rather work a miracle than allow his rational creatures to be unjustly punished or to escape punishment when guilty of a serious crime. This belief is contrary to the revealed truth that God’s distributive justice does not work itself out fully in this world.⁴

² Ex. XVII, 7; Deut. VI, 16; Ps. LXXVII, 18; Is. VII, 12; Matt. IV, 7; Acts XV, 10.

³ See, however, A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th ed., p. 250, n. 1: “Nevertheless, if a miraculous intervention of God is expected in the matter of eternal salvation, there is indeed in this expectation or request a certain disorder contrary to theological hope; but this must not be confused with the temptation of God itself. The latter also extends more broadly, since it is committed in any matter whatsoever if such an intervention of God is requested without a just cause and is of itself constitutes a graver malice.”—Gury (I, n. 273) says: “The temptation of God is a request for and expectation from God of some unusual effect placed outside the order of things. It is certain that a formal and express temptation of God is always a mortal sin against religion. . . . If, however, it is only implicit, it can often be merely a venial sin because of ignorance, inadvertence, or smallness of matter. . . . 1. He sins gravely against religion who demands to prove his innocence by duel, red-hot iron, etc., or who offers himself voluntarily for martyrdom, unless he is excused by good faith or divine inspiration. 2. Likewise one who exposes himself to great danger of death without a just cause, relying on divine aid. But if he acts merely from rashness without trusting in divine providence, he does not sin against religion, but only against the fifth commandment of the Decalogue. 3. He sins only lightly who, in a slight illness, rejects remedies and hopes for health from God, because there is no grave disorder there. Indeed, he is excused from every fault if he hopes that, with God’s aid, he will be freed naturally from such a slight illness. 4. Likewise, he sins venially in itself who through negligence approaches unprepared to preach the word of God, hoping for special aid from God.”—On ordeals, etc., see A. Franz, Das Rituale von St. Florian, Freiburg 1904, pp. 180 sqq.; IDEM, Die kirchlichen Benediktionen im Mittelalter, Vol. II, pp. 307 sqq.; E. Vacandard, Études de Critique et d’Histoire Religieuses, 2nd ed., Paris 1906, pp. 204 sqq.; J. P. Kirsch in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, pp. 276 sqq.

⁴ John III, 17.

β) We further sin by presumption if we harbor the inordinate confidence that, no matter what we do, we shall get to Heaven, because it lies entirely with God not only to call men to eternal beatitude but to enable them to obey the call.⁵ This is what theologians call praesumptio salutis.

⁵ Phil. II, 12 sq.—Gury (I, n. 185): “Presumption is a disordered confidence of obtaining beatitude by means not ordained by God.”

Its wrongness lies in seeking certainty of salvation in conditions other than those prescribed by the Christian religion.⁶

⁶ St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., III, n. 21.—Gury, I, 187: “In how many ways is the sin of presumption committed? Principally: 1. by presuming to obtain eternal life by one’s own powers; 2. by expecting it without labor, from the mercy of God alone; 3. by sinning because of the hope of easily obtaining pardon from God; 4. by persevering in sin because of the hope of conversion at death.”—St. Augustine, Serm., 13 (al. 94, De Temp.), n. 2: “This is the sum of instruction: Serve the Lord in fear and rejoice in Him with trembling (Ps. II). Rejoice in Him, not in yourself: for from Him you have what you are, both that you are a man and that you are just, if nevertheless you are already just. But if you think that you are a man from Him but are just from yourself, you do not serve the Lord in fear and rejoice with trembling, but in presumption toward yourself. . . . For now you seem just to yourself by not taking another’s property, not committing adultery, not committing murder, not bearing false witness against your neighbor, honoring father and mother, worshipping the one God, and not serving idols and demons; but you will perish from this way if you presume that these things come from yourself, if you think that you have them from yourself. . . . What, then, must be done so that we do not perish from the just way? ‘Blessed are all who trust in Him’ (Ps. II, 13). If those who trust in Him are blessed, those who trust in themselves are wretched. For ‘cursed is every man who places his hope in man’ (Jer. XVII, 5). Therefore do not place it in yourself either, because you too are a man. For if you place your hope in another man, you will be inordinately humble; but if you place your hope in yourself, you will be dangerously proud. What difference does it make? Both are ruinous; neither is to be chosen. The inordinately humble man is not raised up; the dangerously proud man is cast down.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 107).

This sin assumes different forms according to the character of the sects that encourage it. Thus theologians speak of a praesumptio lutherana, a praesumptio calviniana, a praesumptio pelagiana, and a praesumptio pia, or, more correctly, pietistica. The Lutherans base their presumption upon the theory that salvation depends solely on the confidence a man has (fides fiducialis) in the grace of God and the merits of Jesus Christ, i. e., on faith alone (sola fides) without good works.⁷ The Calvinists believe in absolute predestination.⁸ The Pelagians held that man can work out his eternal salvation without the aid of supernatural grace.⁹ A certain class of Pietists make salvation depend on mere “ortho- doxy.”¹⁰ All these theories are false and pernicious.

⁷ Rom. III, 28; Jas. II, 14 sqq.— Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 9–15.—B. Bartmann, St. Paulus und St. Jakobus über die Rechtfertigung, Freiburg 1897, pp. 140 sqq.—Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, pp. 274 sqq.

⁸ Cfr. Conc. Arausic. II., c. 25 (epilog.): “We not only do not believe that any persons are predestined to evil by divine power, but if there are any who wish to believe so great an evil, we say anathema to them with all detestation.”—A. Zahn, Über den biblischen und kirchlichen Begriff der Anrechnung, Amsterdam 1899.—Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, pp. 152 sqq.

⁹ Rom. X, 3; 1 Cor. X, 12.—St. Augustine, Epist., 196 (al. 200), c. 2, n. 7: “Similar to these [Rom. X, 3] are those who, although they profess themselves Christians, oppose the grace of Christ in such a way that they think they fulfill the divine commandments by human powers; as though they too, ignorant of the justice of God and wishing to establish their own, are not subject to the justice of God, and Judaize not indeed in name but nevertheless in error. This kind of men had found for itself as leaders Pelagius and Coelestius, the most vigorous defenders of this impiety.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 893).—IDEM, Confess., IV, c. 16, n. 31: “Our firmness is firmness when You [God] are it; but when it is our own, it is weakness.” (P. L., XXXII, 706).—On the Pelagian heresy see Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, pp. 82 sqq. On the prevalence of the same error at the present day see G. H. Joyce, S.J., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, London 1920, pp. 65 sqq. Father Joyce says: “The idea that a man’s soul is disabled, and that in order to resist temptation he needs a new force infused into him, is, outside the Catholic Church, almost forgotten. Religion is reduced to the recognition of God’s sovereignty and the observance of a certain standard of morality; but it is not supposed that there is anything in this beyond the scope of our natural powers. The idea that man comes into the world spiritually crippled, and that the religion of Jesus Christ can remedy his ills simply because it communicates to him a new principle of life, has disappeared. What, for instance, is the view taken of Baptism by the vast majority of our fellow-countrymen? It is probably true to say that by most non-Catholics it is at most held to secure to the recipient a certain external favor on God’s part. Many, certainly, regard it as strictly obligatory by reason of Christ’s command. Yet even they do not consider that the rite confers any internal gift, and would very likely dismiss as absurd the idea that the child who dies unbaptized must remain for ever deprived of the beatitude conferred on those who have received that sacrament. There is no mystery as to the source of these errors. They have their origin in a reaction against the false teaching of the Protestant Reformers. Luther and Calvin grossly exaggerated the effects of original sin. They declared that it had so vitiated and corrupted human nature, that fallen man is incapable of the smallest good. Indeed, according to Luther, even after justification, every act that man performs is stained with sin. The justified are saved, not because they are delivered from sin, but solely by the imputation to them of Christ’s merits. A teaching so manifestly false could not but provoke a reaction. Experience teaches us plainly enough that fallen man is not wholly destitute of virtue: that even bad men are capable, from time to time, of good and generous actions. Hence it is no matter of surprise that those who have been brought up to believe that this travesty of Christian teaching is the teaching of Scripture as to human nature, should in preference accept the solution of Rationalism and deny original sin altogether. But when sanctifying grace and original sin are both gone, what remains of Christianity is hardly distinguishable from pure and simple Pelagianism. One of the most marked features of this modern view of religion is the almost universal acceptance of the principle that one religion is as good as another. This is not looked upon as a matter admitting of argument or discussion. It is assumed as one of those self-evident truths which are beyond dispute: and the fact that Catholics deny it is regarded as a standing proof of their wrongheadedness. It is accepted equally by the sincerely pious and by those who are wholly indifferent to religious motives. The pious appeal to it as justifying their charitable hopes for the salvation of all. There are, they say, many roads to heaven: we must not condemn those who are not travelling along the same road as ourselves. The indifferent find in it an adequate excuse for the neglect of all religion. So indubitable does the principle appear to the modern Protestant, that nothing is commoner than to hear the opinion expressed that foreign missions are the most futile of enterprises. Why, it is asked, can we not leave the Mohammedan to serve his God in his own way? A sincere Mohammedan is just as likely to be saved as any Christian: to start a religious propaganda in a Moslem or pagan country may cause much political trouble, and can do no good to anyone. It is, of course, manifest that if the Christian religion has nothing more to offer to its adherents than a somewhat clearer knowledge of the moral law than is to be found in other creeds, there is much to be said for the objection. It might reasonably be doubted in that case, whether it is worth while to disturb the rooted beliefs of a nation in order to confer on it the problematic benefit of Christianity. Far better, it would seem, to try to induce them to observe the law which they already acknowledge as divine. The preaching of a new faith, even though it propose a higher ideal, may well cause more harm by the unsettlement to which it must give rise, than it will do good. But in fact this new form of belief, is, as we have urged, not Christianity at all. It may be said without irreverence that it would not have been worth while for God to become incarnate and die upon the Cross, to give man a gift such as that. The true religion of Jesus Christ does not consist simply in an example of the perfect fulfilment of the law. It is a stupendous gift to our race—the transformation of our nature by grace, the elevation of man to the high dignity of a child of God. It alone comes from God, and it alone can bring man to eternal beatitude. All other religions are the work of human imagination, and are powerless to save us. The Catholic missionary goes out to heathen countries knowing that he brings with him a boon that is beyond all price. Were the result of his life’s work but to make a single convert, his labors would have been well spent. Without him that soul would never have obtained grace, but would have passed out of this life still in the bondage of sin: through him it has been delivered from Satan and raised to be a partaker of the divine nature. He has achieved a result of inestimable value.”

¹⁰ Gen. XVII, 10–14; Deut. X, 16 sqq.; Matt. III, 8–10; XII, 50; Luke III, 8 sq.; John I, 12 sq.; VIII, 33, 39 sq.; Acts III, 25 sq.; X, 28; Rom. II, 28 sq.; VIII, 14; 1 Cor. VII, 19; 2 Cor. XI, 22; Gal. III, 2–29; V, 5 sqq.; VI, 15; Eph. II, 11–22; Phil. III, 2–9; Apoc. II, 9; III, 9.

What is ordinarily called presumption has its origin in a sinful life inspired by the confident expectation that God will not punish sin, or at least will grant the sinner an opportunity to repent before death. This is a crime against the Holy Ghost, because, as St. Thomas says, “by presuming thus a man removes or despises the assistance of the Holy Spirit, whereby he is withdrawn from sin.”¹¹ Presumption is not, however, always the inspiring motive of such seemingly presumptuous conduct. Father Noldin says:

¹¹ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 21, art. 1: “Concerning hope, through which someone adheres to divine power, presumption can arise through excess when someone tends toward some good as possible through divine power and mercy although it is not possible, as when someone hopes to obtain pardon without repentance or glory without merits. This presumption is properly a species of sin against the Holy Spirit, because through presumption of this kind the assistance of the Holy Spirit, by which man is recalled from sin, is removed or despised.”—IDEM, ibid., art. 2, ad 3: “To sin with the intention of persevering in sin under the hope of pardon pertains to presumption, and this does not diminish but increases the sin. But to sin under the hope of obtaining pardon at some time, with the intention of abstaining from sin and repenting of it, is not presumption; rather, this diminishes the sin, because through it the person appears to have a will less firmly fixed upon sinning.”

(1) To sin, or to persevere in sin, through passion or weakness, with the hope of eventually obtaining forgiveness (cum spe), is not presumption, because in that case the hope of forgiveness is not the motive of sin, but merely a sentiment accompanying it; as when a soldier who is leading a sinful life defers confession until his time of service expires.

(2) To sin because it is so easy to accuse oneself of repeated sins of the same species, or because the confessional is open at all times, or because it is no harder to confess many sins than one or two, is not presumption, because the real motive in such cases is not the ease with which it is possible to obtain forgiveness, but the facility of confession.

(3) To sin or persevere in sin because of the hope of forgiveness (propter spem veniae), i. e., because God forgives many sins as readily as one, or because He will forgive sins as easily later as now, is presumptuous because the hope of forgiveness in that case is the direct motive of sin and therefore an inordinate confidence in divine mercy. However, this sin is committed but rarely because in most instances the hope of obtaining forgiveness is an occasion rather than a motive.¹²

¹² H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, p. 57.

Presumption is of itself grave (ex toto genere suo grave) and therefore always a mortal sin if it involves heresy or blasphemy; otherwise it admits of smallness of matter.¹³

¹³ Ibid., p. 58.

Certain deep-seated prejudices have recently been corrected by a non-Catholic savant as follows:

“It is a Protestant prejudice . . . that the Evangelical Church alone knows what it is to struggle for certainty in regard to, and to be personally conscious of, salvation. Current opinion [among Protestants] entirely ignores Monasticism, which for two important branches of the Christian Church represents the ideal Christian life. In judging the Catholicism of the western world we must never forget that to St. Thomas (who advanced in this matter beyond Augustine) belongs the merit of having first discussed the question,¹⁴ ‘whether man can know that he has grace,’ and of having laid down certain rules by which it is possible to arrive at an empiric, though not absolute, assurance on this point.”¹⁵

¹⁴ Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 112, art. 5: “Utrum homo possit scire se habere gratiam?”

¹⁵ K. Holl, Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt beim griechischen Mönchtum, Leipsic 1898, p. 85.—Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 16.—H. Schell, Kath. Dogmatik, Vol. III, P. 1, pp. 346 sq.

It has been pointed out that St. Bernard of Clairvaux speaks of “certitude” in connection with hope and charity. But the certitude he means has as little in common with the Lutheran brand as St. Bernard’s theory of justification has with that of the Protestant reformers, for according to the Abbot of Clairvaux confidence in God has no justifying power, but justification flows from charity and is never absolutely certain until man has reached Heaven.¹⁶

¹⁶ St. Augustine, Serm., 130, n. 5: “When the doors are closed and the bolts shot, no friend departs, no enemy enters. There we have true and certain security, if here we have not abandoned the truth.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 728).—Cfr. Ps. CXLVII, 12–14.—Cfr. P. O’Neill, Divine Charity, Dublin 1918, pp. 45 sq.

We sin against hope per defectum if we have too little confidence or none at all in God and His mercy. This want of confidence may manifest itself in the form of a) Pusillanimity (pusillanimitas), which, however, is not always an act of the will, but often a mere sentiment or mood, or a temptation arising from timidity, scrupulousness, disease, lack of instruction, or momentary weakness. In such cases, though there have perhaps been manifestations of a violent grief bordering on despair, there may be little or no real guilt; nay, if these periods of mental depression are borne with Christian fortitude, they may lead to a closer union with God.

b) Want of confidence in God may manifest itself also in a feeling of hopelessness, owing to an overpowering realization of one’s own weakness and the consciousness of being unworthy of further graces from above. This is despair in an improper sense, and is frequently only a venial sin.

Despair in the proper sense of the word (desperatio positiva) is a voluntary diffidence in regard to reaching Heaven and the means necessary thereto; a complete and formal surrender of trust in the promises of God and of the hope of ever breaking with sin and leading a better life.¹⁷ This utter loss of confidence in one’s own strength and in the power of divine grace may spring from unbelief or from the positive con- viction that one cannot escape God’s punitive justice. The disposition which leads to despair frequently arises from spiritual or mental indolence, or from excessive indulgence in sensual pleasures, which may so completely ruin a man in body and mind that he loses confidence in himself.¹⁸ Thus despair, by its very nature, excludes the possibility of amendment or conversion, and is a grievous sin against the Holy Ghost,—more grievous even than presumption, first, because divine Revelation is primarily a manifestation of charity and mercy;¹⁹ second, because it is a greater injustice against God to reject His loving mercy than to disregard His justice,²⁰ and, third, because despair entails many other sins and is the proximate cause of eternal damnation.²¹

¹⁷ Gen. IV, 13 sq.; 2 Kings XVII, 23; Matt. XXVII, 3–5.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 40, art. 4, ad 3: “Despair imports not only the privation of hope, but also a certain withdrawal from the desired thing because of the estimated impossibility of attaining it.”—Cfr. 2a 2ae, qu. 20, art. 1.—P. O’Neill, Divine Charity, p. 46.—Vol. II of this Handbook, pp. 94 sq.

¹⁸ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 20, art. 4: “The object of hope is an arduous good possible to attain either by oneself or through another. Therefore hope of obtaining beatitude can fail in someone in two ways: in one way, because he does not regard it as an arduous good; in another way, because he does not regard it as possible to attain either by himself or through another. That spiritual goods do not taste good to us, as it were, or do not appear to us as great goods, is chiefly brought about by the fact that our affection is infected with the love of bodily pleasures, among which the chief are venereal pleasures; for from affection for these pleasures it happens that man disdains spiritual goods and does not hope for them as arduous goods. And in this way despair is caused by lust. But that someone should not judge an arduous good possible for him to attain either by himself or through another is brought about by excessive dejection; when this dominates a man’s affection, it seems to him that he can never be raised up to any good. And because sloth is a sorrow that casts down the spirit, despair is generated from sloth in this way. Now this belongs properly to the object of hope, namely, that it be possible; for the good and the arduous also pertain to other passions. Hence despair arises especially from sloth. It can nevertheless arise from lust for the reason already stated.”

¹⁹ Ez. XVIII, 23, 32; XXXIII, 11–16; John III, 16; XII, 47; 1 Tim. II, 4; 2 Pet. III, 9.

²⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 21, art. 2: “Presumption is a sin, yet less than despair, because it is more proper to God to have mercy and to pardon than to punish, because of His infinite goodness; the former belongs to God in Himself, but the latter according to our sins.”—Cfr. Ps. CXXIX, 7 sq.—Missale Roman., Dom. X post Pentec.: “O God, who chiefly manifestest Thy omnipotence by sparing and having mercy, multiply Thy mercy upon us. . . .”—Brev. Rom., Litaniae Sanct. Omnium: “O God, whose property it is always to have mercy and to spare, receive our supplication. . . .”

²¹ St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., L, n. 5: “Sin with certain despair is death.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 588).—St. Isidore, Sent., l. II, c. 14: “To commit some disgraceful act is the death of the soul; to despise repentance and to remain in guilt is to descend into hell after death. Therefore to sin pertains to death, but to despair pertains to descending into hell.” (Migne, P. L., LXXXIII, 617).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 20, art. 3: “If despair is compared with the other two sins [infidelity and hatred of God] on our part, despair is more dangerous, because through hope we are recalled from evils and induced to pursue good things; and therefore, once hope is removed, men fall without restraint into vices and are withdrawn from good works.”

Sometimes what is called despair is a mere motus desperationis, essentially a temptation, and therefore not in itself a sin, and it may be made a means of exercising the soul in virtue.

Utility. - From this treatise the moral theologian chiefly has to gather arguments for raising and increasing the souls of the faithful by perpetual hope and confidence, and criteria by which true despair and presumption contrary to the theological virtue are distinguished from other sins of the same name.

The order of speaking will be this: first we shall explain the notion, necessity, and use of hope; then briefly the sins against hope.

I. Notion. — Hope is a theological virtue by which, relying on the goodness, omnipotence, and fidelity of God in His promises, we are raised in soul to a certain expectation of beatitude and consequently of the means which are necessary for obtaining it. Hope formally consists in that elevation of soul and firm expectation. But we do not hope except for what we have known as desirable and possible of attainment, although difficult. Wherefore hope is said to be of a future, arduous, possible good (St. Thomas, Q. De Spe, art. 1). The infinite perfection of God, by which He Himself supremely befits the creature, declares that He is supremely concupiscible. At the same time, however, He is in Himself altogether inaccessible to us, so that hope of possessing God must rest in no way upon our own powers or actions, but wholly upon divine assistance. Therefore the formal object of hope, or the motive on which it rests, is the Omnipotence of God, His Supreme relative Goodness, and His fidelity in promises. But our merits, if we are adults, are a condition appended to the attainment of the thing hoped for. Moreover, he hopes more perfectly who, in the state of grace, actually has merits than he who only proposes to acquire future ones (St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 65, art. 4). Eternal beatitude, or God beatifying, is the primary material object of hope; the means or necessary aids are its secondary material object. That beatitude directly terminates hope as it is objective, or God to be possessed in Himself; yet at the same time, in oblique, the subjective happiness of His possession is intended.

But God is not desired by the one hoping as a means of enjoying another good, but as the very good which the one hoping desires to enjoy; and love of God as relatively good by no means excludes the love by which we love God for His own sake; just as the divine amiability as to us by no means removes, but presupposes, the infinite amiability of God in Himself and for His own sake.

Hope presupposes faith: what we hope and why we hope must suitably be apprehended; theologically I cannot expect what theologically I do not know. It is begun in a theological affection or love of its primary object, or of God, insofar as He is discerned by the light of faith and is believed to be our supreme good, infinitely to be sought. Hope formally gives us a true ambition, proportioned to the thing, for this good. Insofar as we raise ourselves to attaining so arduous a good, hope is an outstanding magnanimity of the Christian; insofar as we dare this, relying on the divine promise and trusting in God, hope is glorious to God; insofar as by free will we cooperate with the inviting grace of God, hope is of the greatest merit for us.

Through hope we participate in the immutable will by which God loves and wills His beatitude; indeed it confers upon us a certain anticipated possession of so great a beatitude; in which sense Paul called us "rejoicing in hope" (Rom. 12, 12). On the part of God, the attainment of the hoped-for good is certain: hence the firmness of hope; on our part, it can fail per accidens: hence the fear and trembling with which, from the Apostle (Phil. 2, 12), our salvation is to be worked out by us.

Confidence itself is "hope strengthened from some firm opinion"; it is a certain mode and perfection of hope (2, 2, q. 129, art. 6, ad 3).

The various things which are controverted concerning the material and formal object of hope we leave to dogmatic lectures.

II. Necessity of Hope. — Without hope there can be no charity, since it is repugnant to our nature that we love what in no way is our good. Therefore both the habit of hope is an essential part of justification for every man, and the act of hope has, in an adult, necessity both of means and of precept.

This precept obliges per se, or from the virtue of hope: 1. At the beginning of moral life, as a part of voluntary conversion to God, our end (thus St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 89, art. 6; but cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 122); - 2. For recovering the habit of hope which has been lost through an act of despair or one repugnant to hope; - 3. For overcoming a temptation of despair, if it is a necessary means; - 4. As many wish, around the end of life, when a conscious man, by an almost necessary inclination, will aspire to heaven, unless he contemns heaven; - 5. Sometimes in life. How often? This cannot be defined. But in fulfilling the duties of Christian life, acts sufficient in number will not be lacking. Cf. the things said concerning faith.

The same precept of hope obliges by accident: 1. As often as acts are imposed which contain a virtual use of hope: prayer, penance, charity; - 2. When a tempted man is in proximate danger of consent, unless he raises his soul by hope: if, however, he is conscious of this connection.

— Detractors of the Catholic faith preach a gratuitous love of virtue, and deny the true moral honesty of an action which is commanded by fear of hell or hope of eternal reward. In this attack of theirs, first, they are shamefully deceived concerning the true nature of hope and fear. They entirely pass over the theological essence of hope; they hold as vulgar cupidity the sublime participation of anticipated divine beatitude; the desired good or reward they thrust down to a certain supreme but vulgar delight, while there is question of the very intrinsic and supernatural perfection of man; they suppose the affection to be human, while it is a communication of that most holy love by which God loves His own beatitude. Then they are ignorant, or pretend to be ignorant, that in Catholic doctrine fear servilely servile is not made honorable, but only that fear which excludes affection for sin; nor is hope praised, or indeed able to subsist, with the exclusion of the superior motive which is love. But by their preaching of gratuitous virtue, they sin against human nature, which by an invincible tendency can love nothing unless it is in some way its own good; logically they would have to condemn all social institutions which, in order to restrain the wicked and stimulate the good, promise penalties for delicts and a just reward for good deeds. Wherefore their preaching is shown to be perfectly sterile.

How much more happily that outstanding exhorter of most perfect charity, St. Paul, keeps the eyes of the Christian athlete intent on the heavenly prize, while he inculcates to him faith which works through charity. Hence R. P. Bover, S.I. (La ascetica de S. Pablo, p. 90), commends this formula of action as Pauline: "Faith works through charity on account of hope."

— I. Hope is a theological virtue by which, relying on the goodness, omnipotence, and fidelity of God in His promises, we are raised in soul to a certain expectation of beatitude, and consequently of the means which are required for obtaining it. In that elevation of soul and firm expectation, hope formally consists. The relative assisting Goodness of God, His Omnipotence and Fidelity in promises, constitute its formal object. God beatifying, connoting the beatific vision, is its primary material object, while the secondary consists in the necessary means or aids. Hope presupposes faith and is begun in the theological affection or love of God (imperfect charity). It is at the same time glorious to God, magnanimous and meritorious for us. On the part of God, the attainment of the hoped-for good is certain; on our part, per accidens, it can fail.

Confidence is a certain mode and perfection of hope, insofar as it is hope strengthened from some firm opinion.

II. Since without hope there can be no charity, its habit is an essential part of justification; and its act has, in the adult, necessity of means and of precept.

III. The precept obliges per se and by accident, almost as was said concerning faith, except that the obligation of an act of hope immediately from the use of reason is controverted. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 122.

IV. Since we wish to enjoy God Himself, and the love of God as good to us by no means excludes, but indeed prepares, love of God for His own sake, hope can fall under no reproach. The preachers of gratuitous love of virtue are deceived by ignorance, and sin against human nature.

I. — Hope is violated by despair, by which the will deliberately ceases from the pursuit of beatitude, which it judges to be morally inaccessible to itself or to be neglected: whether it obstinately at least doubts concerning the divine assistance necessary for overcoming difficulties, or concerning divine mercy because of its sins, or whether it esteems too highly the labor to be endured and fastidiously contemns the reward.

Despair is directly opposed to confidence in God, is injurious to Him, and consequently is mortal from its whole genus. Yet often, for example in grave sadness, imperfection of the act will excuse from grave sin.

II. — Not by defect, as despair does, but by evil excess, man sins against hope by presumption.

Presumption, in general, says a certain confidence concerning a matter before it happens or is known to have happened. In a "pejorative" and more recent sense, it is confidence not founded. But insofar as by vain confidence we in some way sustain or inform our moral life, we act inordinately; we sin by imprudence and rashness of various gravity and species according to the quantity and specific quality of the evil to which we are exposed.

Hence presumption against theological hope is to be distinguished from presumption besides that hope: which presumption can also be called vulgar.

By presumption against hope, man strives to obtain supernatural beatitude by his own powers; or he attributes to the assistance of God what does not befit it, when he dares to hope for pardon without penitence, or glory with final perseverance in sin.

The first genus of presumption removes the formal object of hope; the other changes its material object, as if one wished to believe a non-revealed object. Both these genera are mortal from their whole genus. And St. Thomas judges it graver to wish to exercise hope in false objects than to trust in one's own powers rather than in divine assistance.

Beautifully St. Thomas says that despair is graver than presumption, because it befits God according to Himself to give heaven, but to punish only according to our sins (2, 2, q. 21, art. 2, c.).

Sins of presumption properly so called are scarcely ever committed.

— Practically, by the name of presumptions, men accuse evil confidences by which they expect too much from themselves, even with divine graces, and thus approach dangers rashly, or, abusing divine long-suffering, defer penitence, or add sin to sin, because three sins are accused as easily as one, or because God is no less ready to pardon several sins than one sin, etc.

In acts of this kind they in no way think of relying on the divine promise or of exercising theological hope. Wherefore these presumptions are not against hope but besides hope: these men sin by rashness against charity toward themselves, and by ingratitude toward God. According to the nature and gravity of the danger to which they commit themselves, they will sin gravely or venially. The proposition: God pardons three sins just as easily as one sin, certainly of itself is blasphemous, as if God does not care about the number of sins: but little attention is paid to that blasphemy. Observe also that the divine goodness or mercy is not assumed as a motive of sinning, but rather does not then prohibit from sin (Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 436).

A certain genus of presumption is committed, to be estimated from the gravity of the danger or evil, when someone, esteeming his own powers too highly, casts himself into danger of sinning; or when certain things are expected apart from divine ordination: for example, health without the use of medicine. According to the gravity of the danger or evil, the sin will be grave or light (Cf. the things just said).

III. — Despair is contained in the highest degree in a certain hatred of God, which is called hatred of abomination, by which God is displeasing to us as hostile because of the vengeance of sins, so that man no longer places his happiness in God.

But that sin, rather than being formally opposed to hope itself, is opposed to the love of God which some call the love of hope. That love itself is presupposed to the very elevation of soul which is formal hope, and is better referred to charity (certainly imperfect charity).

— It is mortal to hope for or to love more, with love of concupiscence, these earthly things than heavenly things: suppose someone so disposed that he desires to live perpetually in this life, and would leave heaven to God if He would leave earth to him. Yet for the most part these words do not contain that mortal repudiation of heavenly good before earthly good, but express a mere velleity, which signifies a great affection for the present life, or fear of death because of uncertain salvation, or even a defect of living faith and a certain natural hesitation concerning the future life.

— By every sin by which faith itself perishes, hope is concomitantly taken away. Besides, it is lost by despair: whether you contemn the divine good as not desirable, or you no longer trust that that good is accessible to you; and by the two reasons of presumption properly so called (cf. n. 62): these are directly opposed to theological hope.

— You ask in what way he sins who applies his hope to objects which God can in no way give: moral evil, indifferent things as such. If he wishes to appeal to the very motive of theological hope for obtaining these things, by attributing to the divine promise what in no way befits it, he will have sinned against hope itself, as we said, n. 62, by a sin which can in no way be composed with the habit of hope. Cf. 2, 2, q. 21, art. 1, ad 3. But if he merely prayed to God for that thing, appealing to no divine promise, then an object morally evil is to be distinguished from an indifferent one: he will have sinned gravely, not against hope but against religion, who prays God to assist him in moral evil. That sin is to be ascribed to the genus of superstition. Add that it is objectively blasphemous that you suppose God as favoring moral evil. But those do not sin who merely pray that after the evil has been perpetrated they may escape physically unharmed; nor he who in the very act of sin implores the mercy of God. Although it is also inordinate to ask for indifferent things, as such, since God wills and gives all things insofar as they bear an order to our salvation, nevertheless we do not judge this to be grave.

— I. Sin is committed against hope: 1. by despair, by which someone ceases from pursuing beatitude, whether he at least doubts concerning divine assistance, for example, after sins have been committed, or whether he fastidiously rejects the heavenly reward itself: this is despair less properly so called; - 2. by presumption, by which someone would attempt to obtain eternal life either by his own powers, or would attribute to the assistance of God what does not befit it: pardon without penitence, glory with final perseverance in sin. By both despair and presumption, the formal object of hope is removed and hope itself is lost. But this presumption is scarcely committed; despair not rarely is excused from grave sin by the very imperfection of the act.

But by the name of presumptions there usually come several evil confidences which, according to the various degree, conscience, and created danger, can be a grave or light sin.

It would be grave against hope itself deliberately to rely on the motives of hope for asking from God things which God cannot give because of His infinite holiness: moral evil, indifferent things as such; and it is also grave against religion simply to ask God for assistance toward moral evil (it would be another thing toward escaping unharmed).

II. They are accustomed to oppose to hope a certain hatred of God, conceived from the occasion of the justice by which God punishes sins. Yet this sin rather is opposed to imperfect charity which is presupposed to hope itself.

III. Grave would be the repudiation of heavenly good before earthly good; but words by which someone seems to wish that he always spend life in this life rather contain a venial inordination of too great affection for the present life, or too great fear of death, or not sufficiently living faith.

Cf. St. Thom., S. theol. 2, 2, q. 17-22; Quaest. disp. de spe; Billuart, Tract. de spe; Gopfert, Moraltheol. I, § 49 sq.; Schiffini, De virtut. infusis (1904); Th. Bouquillon, De virtut. theol. (1890); Tanquerey, Synops. Theol. mor. de virtute spei; O. Schilling, Lehrbuch der Moraltheol. II, § 72 sqq.

Connection of the matter. The virtue of hope is intimately connected with theological faith. For according to St. Paul,¹ faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, i.e. the foundation of our hope; for by faith man knows the heavenly goods stored up for all those who keep the commandments of God; likewise from faith we know that those goods are possible for us to obtain, although they are very arduous. From this knowledge there arises a vehement desire of obtaining those goods; and this desire arisen from theological faith is hope. Wherefore faith necessarily precedes hope (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 17, a. 7), and not unfittingly faith is called the mother of hope.

¹ Hebr. 11, 1.

533. Preliminary notes on the name and notion of hope. The name of hope is taken in diverse ways, namely according as it is:

1. A passion of the irascible appetite, which is defined by St. Thomas:² "A movement of the appetitive power, following upon the apprehension of a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, namely an extension of the appetite into an object of this kind." But this passion of hope is in no way to be confused with the virtue of hope; for the virtue of hope is something wholly spiritual, while on the contrary the passion of hope is something material. Nevertheless there is some analogy between the passion and the virtue of hope, namely the object of both is a good a) absent, because hope does not hold itself by way of rest in a possessed good, but by way of tending toward a good to be possessed; b) arduous and difficult, because just as that is not feared which can easily be avoided or driven away, so neither is someone said to hope for lesser and very easy things which, as soon as he wills, he can obtain. Hence to be arduous pertains to the object of hope in a similar way as to be obscure regards the object of faith; c) possible of attainment, because what someone knows that he cannot obtain either in any way or at least scarcely, he cannot prudently hope for. From all these things it appears that to hope is nothing other than to desire for oneself some arduous good, and to trust that he will obtain it. Hence hope expresses two acts: an efficacious desire (as something presupposed),³ and confidence or an elevation of soul, as it were promising itself that it will obtain that good.

2. The thing hoped for itself; thus St. Paul says: "Awaiting the blessed hope."⁴

3. The cause of our confidence. Thus it is said: "Because Thou hast been made my hope, a tower of strength";⁵ and the Blessed Virgin is called: "Our life, sweetness, and hope."

4. The theological virtue, according as it is distinguished from faith and charity.

In the following we speak only about the theological virtue of hope, and we divide the whole treatise into three chapters, namely: 1. on the nature of theological hope; 2. on the necessity of hope; 3. on the vices and sins against hope.

² S. theol. 1, 2, q. 40, a. 2.

³ Ib. a. 1.

⁴ Tit. 2, 13.

⁵ Ps. 60, 4.

In this treatise one must treat: 1. of the nature of hope; 2. of its necessity; 3. of the sins opposed to it.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 20, 21; 3 Sent., D. 26, q. 1, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, II, n. 20; ed. G., I, p. 313; H. Ap., IV, n. 6; Laymann, 2, tr. 2, c. 1; Mazzella, de Virt., p. 622; Lahousse, de Virt. theol., disp. III; Billot, Thes. 25-26.

456. DEFINITION. Hope, taken generally, is a movement of the soul tending toward a future, arduous, and possible good (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 17, a. 1). - Theological hope is a divinely infused virtue by which, with certain confidence, we expect eternal beatitude and the means of attaining it, through the help of God (H. Ap., IV, 6). This last, that is, certain and firm expectation, is proper to hope.

I. The primary MATERIAL OBJECT of hope is eternal beatitude, which is God himself to be possessed; but the secondary object is divine graces and our good works, to be carried out by divine help (II, n. 20).

II. Some say the FORMAL object is the mercy of God; others divine omnipotence, as the Thomists commonly hold; others the divine promise. Wherefore St. Alphonsus says: "I think one must conclude that the three aforesaid motives constitute the formal object of hope, namely divine MERCY and OMNIPOTENCE, by which God imparts helps to us for overcoming the enemies of salvation: and St. Thomas expressly teaches these two motives.... I judge besides that a third motive must altogether be added to these two: namely the divine promise, ... or divine FIDELITY concerning the promise which he displayed, of saving us on account of the merits of Christ; otherwise, without this promise, we would not be able to hope for salvation with certain confidence" (II, 21; H. Ap., IV, 6, 7).

And indeed in reality: the formal object ought to be fitted to the proper act of hope, that is, of firm expectation, which tends into God as good, as helper willing to supply our misery, impotence, and hesitation. Moreover, so that all these things may be gathered into one, it can be said: the formal object of hope is the BENEVOLENCE OF GOD, considered as presupposing omnipotence, and as bound to us by fidelity, through the promise of saving us in view of the merits of Jesus Christ (St. Francis de Sales, Theotim., II, c. 15).

III. The SUBJECT of the virtue of hope is the will, not the intellect. All the faithful can elicit an act of hope, not only the just, but also sinners, as is established from Trent (Sess. 6, c. 6). Likewise souls being purified, from the common opinion. Cf. n. 417.

IV. The acts comprehended in hope are: 1. the explicit act of expectation of eternal beatitude, and of those things which conduce to it; 2. love of concupiscence toward God, simple desire, effort or efficacious raising of the soul against occurring difficulties; these acts are virtually included in the proper act of hope; 3. firm confidence of obtaining, and fear of losing, the things which we expect; these acts inseparably accompany the proper act of hope (II, 20; Reuter, n. 61).

457. On fear. Fear is distinguished as fourfold, namely: human, servile, initial, and filial (2.2, q. 19, a. 2, 4, and 8).

1. Human, or worldly, fear is flight from temporal evil through offense of God. It is mortally or venially evil, according as it induces into mortal or venial sin. Hence that saying (Matt. 10:28): Fear ye not them that kill the body.... And (Luke 9:26): He that shall be ashamed of me, and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, etc. Yet it does not constitute a peculiar species of vice (Perrone, n. 135, annot.).

2. Servile fear of God (formally, called by others servilely servile) is that by which the soul fears punishment to be inflicted by God, without pursuing fault with hatred; so that it would wish to sin if punishment did not threaten. This fear is evil and vicious (VI, 442).

3. Initial fear (or materially, called simply servile by others) is fear by which the soul truly turns away from fault, although on account of punishment, abstracting from what it would do if punishment were absent. This fear corresponds to the virtue of hope, and is good: for it arises from love of oneself well ordered. Whence Christ the Lord (Luke 12:5): I will show you whom you shall fear: fear HIM who, after he has killed, has power to cast into hell: yea, I say to you, FEAR HIM. And Trent (Sess. 6, can. 8): "If anyone shall say that fear of hell, through which, by grieving over sins, we flee to the mercy of God or abstain from sinning, is a sin, or makes sinners worse: let him be anathema." - It is called initial, because it belongs to those beginning to walk the way of the commandments of the Lord; whence it is said (Ps. 110:10): The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom (Polman, 2.2, n. 174).

4. Filial (or chaste) fear is fear of sinning, for avoiding offense of God. It belongs to sons to fear the offense of a father (2.2, q. 19, a. 2). This fear is best and arises from charity; indeed it grows as charity grows. This fear besides wonderfully assists hope; for we have a greater reason for hoping the more we avoid the offense of God (Pratica d'amar G. C., c. 16).

458. Corollaries. I. It is not licit to hope in some creature as in the first cause moving toward beatitude. But it is licit to hope in that creature as in a secondary and instrumental cause. And in this way we turn to the saints (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 17, a. 4), and we call the Blessed Virgin Mary OUR HOPE, indeed "the whole reason of our hope" (St. Alph., Glorie di Maria, c. 3 and 5).

II. On the part of God, our hope is certain and firm. For it rests upon his mercy, omnipotence, and fidelity in the promise of saving us on account of the merits of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Cf. St. Alph., Storia delle eresie, conf. XIV, n. 19-21.

III. On our part, hope is uncertain. For unless we faithfully cooperate with divine grace, we cannot attain salvation, according to that saying of St. Augustine: "He who created you without you will not save you without you." Hence we must always fear, as the Apostle writes (Phil. 2:12): With fear and trembling work out your salvation.

Note. There are two things which are uncertain in us: a) Our justification is uncertain; for man does not know whether he is worthy of love or of hatred (Eccli. 9:1). Yet this uncertainty is morally taken away through the exercise of charity. b) Our perseverance even unto death is also uncertain. For perseverance is a special gift of God, which is strictly owed to no one, which no one can merit for himself de condigno. But this uncertainty also can be taken away in great part, if we implore that great gift of perseverance by DAILY PRAYER, and are true worshipers of the Virgin Mother of God, who is called Mother of perseverance (Op. dogm. in Trid., Sess. 6, n. 48; Appar. alla morte, cons. 9).

St. Alphonsus, l. c.; Perrone, de Virt., n. 82; Lahousse, op. cit., c. 2, a. 2; Billot, Thes. 27-28; Lehmkuhl, 1, n. 430; Aertnys, l. II, n. 21.

Necessity, as we have already said, is either of means or of precept; but it regards hope, both habitual and actual.

459. PRINCIPLES. I. Habitual hope is necessary for all men, by necessity of means, for salvation. It is established from Trent (Sess. 6, c. 7): "Faith, unless hope and charity accede to it, neither unites perfectly with Christ, nor makes a living member of his body."

460. II. Actual hope, at least implicit, is necessary for all adults endowed with reason, by necessity both of means and of precept.

1. By necessity OF MEANS; for if it is a question of the just, they need hope so that they can rightly ask for the graces necessary for persevering. Whence St. Paul (Rom. 8:24): By hope we are saved. If it is a question of sinners, they need hope so that they may dispose themselves for justification (Trent, Sess. 6).

2. By necessity OF PRECEPT; both because the natural law prescribes that the means necessary for obtaining the end be applied; and because the divine letters positively inculcate hope. Wherefore the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:17): Command them not to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God. See n. 470.

IT IS ASKED. When does the precept of hope oblige?

Resp. 1. It obliges by reason of the virtue, that is, PER SE: a) at the beginning of the use of reason, or, more rightly, of spiritual life, when namely eternal beatitude has been sufficiently proposed as the end; b) in danger of death, so that man may be strengthened against temptations, and be borne into God, the ultimate end soon to be attained; c) more often in life (at least once in any year), because without an act of hope we can neither persist in divine justice nor operate meritoriously.

For the rest, there is no reason why the faithful person should be anxious about this obligation, for virtual hope suffices, which is everywhere exercised by the faithful, for example when he prays or receives the sacraments.

2. It obliges by reason of a peculiar circumstance, therefore PER ACCIDENS: a) when someone is in danger of desperation; b) when from precept an act of other virtues must be elicited, for example of prayer or penance, which cannot be exercised without at least an implicit act of hope; c) in every temptation, when there is danger of consenting unless hope raises up the soul (II, 20; H. Ap., IV, 13).

461. From these things you will gather: 1. It is not dishonorable, as Calvinists, Baianists, and Jansenists affirm, but most pleasing to God, to be moved by theological hope to operating well. This is confirmed by the words of Trent: "If anyone shall say that the justified man sins while he operates well in view of eternal reward: let him be anathema" (Sess. VI, c. 31).

2. There is not given, in this present life, a state of love so perfect that the mind is never moved either by fear of punishments or by desire of remuneration, as the Quietists dreamed, especially since hope and fear, in time of temptation, often seem necessarily required against a fall (cf. St. Alph., Pratica d'amar G. C., c. 16). - Wherefore that 7th proposition of Michael Molinos was condemned by Innocent XI: "The soul ought not think either of reward or of punishment; nor of paradise, nor of hell; nor of death, nor of eternity" (cf. Storia delle eresie, c. 12, a. 5).

3. The notion of reward, which is had in hope, does not include any imperfection in the Christian religion, as the Kantians and Evolutionists said. Nor are we bound directly, from a special precept, to exercising explicit acts of fear, insofar as fear is distinguished from hope or from other acts of virtues. Thus commonly Valentia, Sanchez, etc.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 20 seqq.; St. Alphonsus, II, n. 21; Suarez, disp. II, sect. 2-3; Perrone, op. cit., n. 145; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 433; Gopfert, 1, 250.

Things to be noted beforehand. 1. Sins contrary to hope are some of omission, others of commission. But by these the virtue of hope is lost only when they contradict the formal object of the virtue.

2. Sins of commission are opposed, some to the desire of eternal beatitude, others to the confidence of obtaining it.

462. I. To the desire of eternal beatitude is opposed: 1. the affection of this age, by which earthly things are desired more than heavenly things; 2. the inordinate affection of heavenly happiness, by which beatitude is sought from weariness of life and labor.

The former affection, when it passes into act, is a mortal sin if the ultimate end is placed in earthly things; for example, if someone is so disposed that he would desire to leave heaven to God if God would leave earth to him. The latter does not exceed venial sin, unless there is express rebellion against divine providence. But one licitly wishes death for himself in order to avoid sin or some other immense evil, provided that he submits himself to the divine will (II, 20; Cat. Rom., on the 1st precept, n. 7). Cf. n. 755, II.

463. II. To the fiducial expectation of eternal beatitude, desperation is opposed by defect, presumption by excess.

1. DESPERATION is diffidence of obtaining beatitude, or the means necessary for attaining it. It is a mortal sin, and indeed most grave and most dangerous; for hope having been taken away, men slip unrestrainedly into vices. Yet it is less grave than the sin of infidelity and hatred of God, because it is not directed against God according as he is in himself, but against God according as his good is participated by us. St. Thom., 2.2, q. 20, a. 3. - Whence desperation properly so called does not admit smallness of matter.

The causes of desperation are reckoned: defect of faith, inordinate adhesion to pleasures, spiritual sloth, presumption, a melancholic disposition (Tanquerey, II, p. 421).

The CONFESSOR ought to examine whether, from an affection of desperation, the customary offices of piety, especially when the precept urged, were interrupted or not: from this he will have a sufficiently safe indication of consent given or denied. Yet let him take note that many penitents despair not of the mercy of God, but of their own cooperation with grace: this is called pusillanimity, and admits smallness of matter (Panzuti, II, 33).

2. PRESUMPTION (which is more frequent than desperation) arises from defect of the fear of God, and is customarily defined: rash expectation of eternal beatitude or of the means for attaining it. It is of itself a grave sin, because it inflicts grave injury both upon divine justice, as if sin were to be held as nothing, and upon divine mercy, which the presumptuous man abuses for sinning more freely (Scavini, II, n. 849).

Hence: 1. He sins through presumption who hopes for salvation either only on account of his own merits or only on account of the merits of Christ, without any cooperation of his own works. - Likewise, he who is induced to sin by hope of pardon, so that hope of remission to be obtained from God is the motive inducing to sin, that is, the reason why he more easily either repeats sin or perseveres in sin, because God forgives ten sins as easily as five. But otherwise if someone, for example, should say: I shall accuse ten sins as easily as five or six; this of itself is only venial. 2. He who sins from passion with hope of pardon does not contract guilt of presumption properly so called: namely when hope of pardon to be obtained sometime through penance only accompanies the sinner while he sins or perseveres in sin, yet without being the reason or motive influencing toward sin. But men of this kind, persevering in sin under hope of sometime doing penance, are with difficulty excused from grave sin against charity owed to themselves, since they expose themselves to great danger of damnation (II, 21; H. Ap., IV, 8).

464. PRACTICAL RULES. 1. One must diligently inquire from the penitent why he despaired or presumed, in order to know whether the sin is or is not against hope, or even against faith. 2. One must inquire into the causes and effects of the sin; into the causes, so that the confessor may bring a remedy, by prescribing humility to the exalted, confidence and vigor of soul to the pusillanimous; but into the effects, so that from them he may come into knowledge of many other sins which are accustomed to be born from desperation or presumption. 3. The confessor should strive to excite in all penitents, together with divine fear, a great hope of eternal life, and true confidence toward God, Our Lord Jesus Christ, and the Virgin Mary Mother of God. For desire supplies strength, and a man without confidence is like a soldier without a shield. 4. Especially in the dying, let him raise hope with true detestation of sin; for many either yield to desperation, or are affected only by servilely servile fear, which does not suffice for salvation. Cf. Pratica d'amar G. C., c. 8 and 16; H. Ap., App. 2, § 2, n. 2).

Nothing to be observed.

269. • Hope is a supernatural virtue by which, with certain confidence, from the promise of God we expect future beatitude and the means for attaining it.

The primary material object of Hope is God to be possessed, according to that: "I will be thy reward exceeding great." Gen. 15, 1. The secondary material object is all the means necessary for attaining beatitude, as the remission of sins, the grace of God through the merits of Christ, etc.

The formal object is the benignity and fidelity of God in His promises because of the merits of Christ, joined with His omnipotence.¹

But the acts included in Hope are desire of eternal beatitude, firm confidence of arriving at it, and a soul raised up against occurring difficulties.

The sins opposed to Hope are despair and presumption. The former is a voluntary diffidence of obtaining beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it. - But the latter is a rash expectation of beatitude or of the means for attaining it.

270. Principles. - I. Hope is required in adults for justification by necessity of means. For man cannot arrive at God, his ultimate end to be attained, unless by his own acts he tends into Him; but this cannot be done without hope. This is also established from the Council of Trent.¹

II. Hope is necessary also by necessity of precept, since there is a true precept of eliciting acts of Hope at certain times in life. This is established from the 1st proposition condemned by Alexander VII (see p. XIII), and from the common opinion of the Doctors.

But this precept obliges of itself, like the precept of faith: 1) at the beginning of the use of reason, when namely eternal beatitude has been sufficiently proposed as the end to which each one ought to tend; - 2) in danger of death, namely that he may be strengthened against the temptations then accustomed to arise, and may be borne toward God, the ultimate end soon to be attained; 3) according to St. Alphonsus,² at least once in any given year; for it is difficult to persevere for so long a time in grace without an act of hope. Yet virtual hope suffices, just as virtual faith does (n. 248, 3°).

Like the precept of faith, it obliges by accident: 1) when from precept an act of other virtues must be elicited, for example of prayer, which cannot be exercised without an act of hope; 2) when temptation urges, and there is danger of consenting unless hope raises up the soul; 3) when a Christian has fallen into mortal sin and is held to strive toward justification;³ 4) when he is situated in danger of despair, for hope is a necessary means for overcoming this danger.

271. Questions. - Quaer. 1° In how many ways is the sin of presumption committed?

Resp. Chiefly: 1° if you presume to obtain eternal life by your own powers; 2° if you expect it without labor, from the mercy of God alone.⁴

Quaer. 2° Can there be smallness of matter in sins against Hope?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively as to presumption, although it is grave from its kind.

Resp. 2° Negatively as to despair, unless it is so called improperly, that is, pusillanimity or excessive diffidence concerning oneself. Because of imperfection of the act, it is often venial in sadness and impatience.

272. • Quaer. 3° Is it a sin against Hope to desire to live perpetually in this world, or on the contrary, from weariness to wish for death?

Resp. to the first: Affirmatively, because he who desires this stops in temporal life as in the ultimate end. - Thus commonly.¹

Resp. to the second: 1° It is not against Hope of itself, because it is not to withdraw from the ultimate end; 2° nor generally does it exceed venial sin, unless there is express rebellion against the order of divine Providence.

Quaer. 4° Is it presumption 1) because of hope of pardon; 2) with hope of pardon, a) to sin more easily, b) to persevere in sin, c) to repeat sin?

Resp. to the 1st: Affirmatively, if you understand that phrase, because of hope of pardon, in such a way that hope of pardon is the cause why someone sins more easily, or perseveres in sin, or repeats sin. Yet a sin repeated because of hope of pardon must not be confused with a sin repeated precisely for this reason, that it is accused in confession as easily several times as once, although this is a depraved disposition, very injurious to God.

Resp. to the 2nd: Negatively, if you take that phrase, with hope of pardon, in this sense: that hope of pardon to be obtained at some time through proper means only accompanies the sinner while he sins, or perseveres in sin, or repeats sin, without nevertheless being the reason or motive influencing him to sin. Yet men of this sort, if they persevere in sin, are with difficulty excused from grave sin against charity toward themselves, since by the common consent of the Doctors they expose themselves to great danger of damnation.²

273. • Quaer. 5° What are the remedies of despair?

Resp. The chief ones are the following: 1° consideration of the infinite goodness and mercy of God; - 2° frequent recollection of those men who after very many and most grave sins obtained pardon; - 3° meditation on the parables of the Holy Gospel, especially of the lost sheep; - 4° special devotion toward the Blessed Virgin, refuge of sinners; - 5° confidence in Christ affixed to the cross for us, etc.

274. Practical Rules. - First. Let the confessor inspect from what root especially despair in the penitent arises, so that he can apply fitting remedies according to the diverse cause. - But for the most part it is accustomed to arise proximately from apprehension of certain damnation. Remotely, however: 1° from sloth, by which someone thinks the means of salvation too grave, and therefore is deterred from employing them; 2° from lust or other inveterate sins, which turn the mind away from heavenly things, and because of the difficulty of emendation lead to despair; 3° from melancholy, which inclines to sadness and turns away from confidence, which is accustomed to generate joy of soul; 4° from scruples, by which the soul is cast down and oppressed.

Second. Penitents given to despair are to be governed by the confessor with great circumspection, prudence, and patience, according to the diversity of dispositions and the varied kind of despair. Those must be directed in one way who are driven into despair from malice, or from the weight of sins and a flagitious life; in another way those who are impelled to it from pusillanimity, or from diabolical temptation.

Third. Penitents who exhibit themselves as such are not immediately at first glance to be judged as carried away by despair, especially if they live in a Christian manner. For even devout souls are found who are harassed by almost continual temptations of despair; nor is it easily to be believed that they have sinned, especially gravely, although they think they have furnished consent to those temptations; just as excessive fear concerning the danger of salvation must not be confused with despair properly so called.

S. Th. I-II, q. 40, aa. 1 and 2; q. 25, a. 1; Q. D. de Virt. 4, a. 1.

794. Hope according to the name (elpis), in the proper sense, primarily signifies a certain passion of the sensitive irascible appetite; whence the word was used to designate also both an act of the will similar to the passion of hope, and the habit inclining to this act (I Cor. XIII, 13).

But in a derived and improper sense it is also taken: a) for the thing hoped for (Tit. II, 13; Rom. VIII, 24-25); - b) for him from whom we hope (Ps. XIII, 6; XXI, 10), in which sense we invoke the Blessed Virgin, saying: Hail, our hope; - c) for the means of acquiring the thing hoped for (merits, prayers of the saints, sacraments); - d) for the certitude of hope, which is its perfection (Rom. V, 4-5).

795. Hope, taken in the proper sense, is rightly defined: A movement of the appetitive power tending toward a future good, arduous, possible of attainment. It is said:

1. a movement of the appetitive power, that is, either of the sensitive appetite, or of the rational appetite or will, as was said in the preceding number;

2. tending toward a good, and thus it differs from fear, which concerns evil; moreover this good is sensible if it is a question of the passion of hope, but it is spiritual or even divine when it is a question of hope pertaining to the will;

3. future: for no one hopes for what he already has; and thus hope is distinguished from joy or delight, which concern a good already possessed;

4. arduous, that is, difficult of attainment: for no one hopes for what is immediately and easily in his power; and thus hope is distinguished from desire, which concerns any good whatever, without consideration of its difficulty or possibility;

5. possible of attainment, at least according to estimation, and therefore probably to be obtained; and thus it is distinguished from despair.

Therefore to hope is vividly to desire some good for oneself, and to trust that one will obtain it.

796. Hope necessarily supposes the love of concupiscence and desire; indeed it virtually includes them: for although someone can love, indeed even desire, what he does not hope for, nevertheless no one can hope for what he does not covet and desire. That love is the simple complacency of good, that is, the coaptation of the appetite to some good, by which the appetite becomes conformable and proportioned to the beloved, and this becomes connatural and fitting to it; desire is a movement, a tendency toward attaining that good. But beyond these, hope adds a firmer effort toward the attainment of the good, notwithstanding its difficulty. For when difficulties appear which allure man not to pursue the good, and at the same time the possibility of obtaining the good appears, hope brings it about that man does not abandon the pursuit of the good, but firmly perseveres in it; indeed, that on account of the difficulties he tends more toward the good. Therefore hope strengthens the appetite, makes it firm, rises up by fighting against difficulties, and lifts us above difficulties.

When someone hopes for the attainment of a good from the help of another, the act of hope is properly called expectation.

797. Divine or theological hope is defined: a divinely infused virtue by which, with certain confidence, we expect eternal beatitude and the means to it, to be obtained by divine help. There is indicated:

1. the genus to which hope pertains: a divinely infused or supernatural virtue;

2. the proper act of hope by which it is distinguished from other virtues: by which we expect;

3. the material object, or the matter about which it is concerned, both principal: eternal beatitude; and secondary: the means to obtaining it;

4. the formal object, or motive, of hope: by divine help;

5. the essential property of hope: with certain confidence.

798. Division of the treatise. - The treatise on hope comprises four parts:

1. the first treats of the object of hope and of the act of hope, which is known through the object: 1. concerning the formal object, 2. concerning the material object, 3. concerning the necessity of hope;

2. the second treats of the habit of hope, which is known through the act, and of the subject in which it inheres: 1. concerning hope as it is a virtue, 2. concerning the subject of hope and those having hope; 3. concerning the gift of fear of God;

3. the third treats of opposed sins: 1. concerning despair, 2. concerning presumption;

4. the fourth treats of the precept of hope.¹

¹ Concerning hope one can usefully consult: St. Thomas, in Q. D. de Virt. 4; and II-II, qq. 17-22, with the commentaries of Cajetan and Billuart; Bouquillon, De Virtutibus theologicis, with the annotations of Waffelaert; Billot and Schiffini in their respective work De Virtutibus infusis; Harent, in Dictionnaire de Theologie, article Esperance; Janvier, Conf. de N.-D.: L'esperance; in addition the moral manuals which are in everyone's hands.

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, aa. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8; de Virt., q. 4, aa. 1 and 3.

810. Theological hope is a morally good and honorable habit, because it has a good object: God, our supreme good, to be attained by divine help. Indeed it is a virtue because it is a habit rendering man perfect: for it makes him adhere to divine help and thus attain God, the supreme rule of human acts; but the perfection of man consists in this, that he adhere to God and attain his proper rule. Hence in the Scriptures the praise of hope is derived from this, that through it man is joined to God (Ps. XVII, 3; LXI, 8; XC, 1; Jer. XVII, 5, 7).

Nor say: hope includes imperfection, because it concerns a future and absent good. - The response is: although this in itself is imperfect, nevertheless for man in the state of the way it is not imperfection but perfection to expect, on account of divine help, those things which we cannot acquire by human power (q. 17, a. 1, ad 3; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1, ad 4).

811. Opposed errors. - Lutherans, Calvinists, Baius, Jansenists, and several modern philosophers, especially Kantians and evolutionists, said that hope is disordered; the Quietists and Semiquietists said that it is imperfect: because it includes the love of concupiscence by which we will God as a good to us and expect a reward; which love is disordered because it refers God to the creature, or at least is an imperfect, interested, and mercenary love. - The response is:

a) In two ways we refer something to ourselves: as a means to an end, and as perfect to perfectible, that is, as the end which we desire for ourselves. Now by the love of concupiscence we refer God to ourselves as the fount of supreme perfection by which we must be perfected; this certainly is not disordered: for thus God himself willed his Son to be incarnate for us. But hope does not refer God to us as a means to an end; rather, on the contrary, it refers us to God as to the end, because it desires God as our supreme good or supreme end. And indeed, our end is not on account of us, but we are on account of the end. Hence to desire the end is not to order it as a means to us, but to order us as a means to it. - In other words, we are only the end for whom we desire, in no way the end which.

That this is lawful the Scriptures teach, constantly exhorting the faithful that they act on account of heavenly beatitude (Mt. VI, 33; XIX, 29; I Cor. IX, 25; Eph. I, 16; Col. III, 23-24; Heb. XI, 25-26; Apoc. II, 10; Ps. CXVIII, 112; Prov. XI, 18; Eccli. XII, 2; I Jn. III, 3); likewise the Church by the voice of Councils, for example, Trent, sess. 6, cc. 11 and 16, can. 31, and of Pontiffs, for example, Alexander VIII (props. 10 and 13 condemned).

b) Then that love, although it is less perfect than the love of dilection and charity, nevertheless is not disordered and positively imperfect, because it does not positively exclude the motive and love of charity, but only abstracts from them: for because we love God as our supreme good, we do not thereby deny that he is in himself supremely good and supremely lovable.

812. They object that a work done with a view to reward, in the case of eternal life, is mercenary. But it is disordered and vile to act on account of reward. - The response is:

a) A mercenary is properly one who orders the more noble as a means to the vile, for example, to money; or who acts only on account of reward, or even only on account of a temporal good. Hence by St. Thomas, q. 19, a. 4, ad 3, mercenary love is rather said to be that by which one loves God on account of temporal goods. But of hope it cannot be said: 1. that it acts on account of temporal reward; or 2. that it acts only on account of reward, because it does not exclude another honorable motive, although the hope of a merely spiritual and future reward powerfully incites to good. Hence reward is not the exclusive motive of acting, but an adjunct as a help. - Nor 3. does hope order God to beatitude, but it demands beatitude and further orders it to God, as was said in the preceding number, a, and n. 805.

b) But those who boast that they act on account of duty, as they say, and not on account of reward, deceive themselves or others: for experience shows that men begin to act with a view to reward, and only gradually are allured to a good of a higher order and to pure love, elicited without a view to reward. Indeed a necessary condition that we will and love something is that it also be our good; otherwise we could not desire it. But for that reason our good will not always and necessarily be the motive of acting, namely, in every act, nor a fortiori the principal or exclusive motive.

813. Hope is a theological virtue, because it attains the very supreme rule of human acts, God; for 1. it has God as its formal object: for it attains the omnipotence of God as efficient cause, insofar as it relies upon his help; 2. it also has God as its primary material object: it attains God as final cause, insofar as it expects beatitude in his possession.

Moreover it is a virtue distinct from the other theological virtues: for we can adhere to God either on account of himself, and this we do through charity; or as to the principle from which something comes to us. But from God there comes to us both the knowledge of truth, and faith is concerned with this, and the possession of divine goodness, concerning which hope is concerned.

Faith precedes hope, because it proposes the object of hope as possible; but hope precedes charity and introduces to it: insofar as someone hoping to be rewarded by God is enkindled to loving God on account of himself; as was said in the treatise De Virtutibus, n. 625.

814. Hope without charity is called imperfect or unformed, because the ultimate perfection is lacking to it, namely, the perfect tendency to the ultimate end; and because it hopes for beatitude only from future merits which someone thinks he will acquire, but not from present merits already had.

815. Hope is a supernatural virtue, both objectively, because as its object it has the very omnipotence of God supernaturally helping us to supernatural things; and subjectively, because it is produced by a supernatural principle: for since the act of hope is a means to a supernatural end, it too must be supernatural; moreover it will not be supernatural unless it is produced by a supernatural principle, the grace of God. Hence:

1. hope is a virtue infused per se;

2. the act of hope is produced by the habit of hope as by a principle, among those who possess it; in others it will exist only from actual grace;

Hope is a supernatural virtue through which, with certain confidence from the promise of God, we expect future beatitude and the means for obtaining it.

The primary material object of hope is God to be possessed. But the secondary object is all the means necessary for obtaining beatitude, such as remission of sins, the grace of God through the merits of Christ, etc.

But the acts included in hope, or the formalities of hope itself, are love, desire of eternal beatitude, firm confidence of arriving at it, and raising up of the soul against occurring difficulties. - Cf. Mazzella, disp. 5, art. 2, § 1; and art. 3, § 2.

The sins opposed to hope are despair and presumption. The former is voluntary diffidence of obtaining beatitude and the means necessary for attaining it. - But the latter is disordered confidence of obtaining beatitude without the means ordained by God.

I Say. Hope in adults is required both by necessity of means and by necessity of precept. The first is clear from the fact that man cannot arrive at obtaining God, his ultimate end, unless by his own acts he tends toward him: but this tendency necessarily supposes hope, indeed, as we said, it is one of the formalities of hope itself. - The other is clear both from the Apostle saying, I Tim. vi, 17: "I command ... not to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God," and from proposition 1 proscribed by Alexander VII and related above, n. 152.

But when, and in what manner, the precept of hope presses is to be determined by the same rules which we established above, n. 153, concerning faith.

Question 1. Can smallness of matter be had in the sin of presumption?

Response. Affirmatively, both because it is commonly admitted by theologians that the sin of presumption is indeed mortal from its genus, but not from its whole genus, and because the malice of this sin finally consists in this, that a good thing is expected in an undue way. Besides, this sin is ordinarily committed by presuming to obtain eternal life either by one's own powers alone, or without any labor, and from divine mercy alone: but through this an injury is not inflicted on God directly and immediately. Therefore. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 21.

Question 2. Is it presumption to commit the same sin several times, because one committed several times is accused as easily as one committed once?

Response. Negatively, because the penitent sins more easily not from the facility of obtaining pardon, but from the lesser difficulty of confessing, although this is an evil disposition most injurious to God. - For the rest, he who sins, or perseveres in sin, from hope of pardon as from a motive of sinning, or under hope of pardon with the purpose of persevering in sin, must be distinguished from him who sins from frailty or passion, yet with hope and purpose of repenting, and thus of obtaining remission of sins. The first certainly admits presumption, but not the other, who rather sins less, because as St. Thomas says: "Through this he seems to have a will less firmly fixed upon sinning." - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 21, art. 2, ad 3. - St. Alphonsus, n. 22. - Baller., note (a), p. 175.

Question 3. Can the sin of despair be venial by reason of matter?

Response. Negatively, and the reason is that to admit deliberate diffidence of obtaining eternal beatitude or the means necessary for obtaining it is to deny the attributes of God, and especially his mercy, which certainly is mortal from its whole genus. - But despair can be, and sometimes is, only a venial sin, when it arises from sadness or impatience, because then perfect consent is lacking.

Question 4. What are the remedies of despair?

Response. The chief ones are the following: 1st. consideration of the infinite goodness and mercy of God; 2nd. frequent recollection of those men who after very many and very grave sins obtained pardon; 3rd. meditation on the parables of the holy Gospel, especially of the lost sheep; 4th. special devotion toward the Blessed Virgin, refuge of sinners; 5th. confidence in Christ fastened to the cross for us, etc. Yet let the confessor attend to the following practical rules.

Rule I. Let him examine from what root especially despair arises in the penitent, so that he can apply fitting remedies according to the diverse cause. - But for the most part it is accustomed to be born proximately from apprehension of certain damnation; but remotely: 1st. from sloth, by which someone thinks the means of salvation too grave, and therefore is deterred from employing them; 2nd. from lust or other inveterate sins, which turn the mind away from heavenly things and, because of the difficulty of amendment, lead to despair; 3rd. from melancholy, which inclines to sadness and turns away from confidence, which is accustomed to generate joy of soul; 4th. from scruples, by which the soul is cast down and oppressed.

Rule II. Penitents given to despair are to be moderated with great circumspection, prudence, and patience, according to the diversity of characters and the varied genus of despair. For those who from malice, or from the weight of sins and a disgraceful life, have been driven into despair are to be directed in one way; those who from pusillanimity or from diabolical temptation are impelled to it in another.

Rule III. Penitents who exhibit themselves as such are not immediately on first appearance to be judged as carried off by despair, especially if they live as Christians. For there are found souls, even devout ones, which are agitated by almost continual temptations of despair; nor is it easily to be believed that they have sinned, especially gravely, although they think that they have furnished consent to them; just as neither is excessive fear concerning the danger of salvation to be confused with despair properly so called.

(D. Thomas, IIa IIae, from q. 17 to q. 22.)

Hope taken generally is « a movement of the appetitive part toward a future good, arduous or difficult, yet possible of attainment. » Taken theologically, it is « a habit of mind infused by God, by which we expect with certain confidence the eternal life that is a good to be obtained with divine assistance. » It can be considered together with charity, and is then called formed hope; or without charity, and is then called unformed hope, as was said of faith.

You will ask 1° whether unformed Christian hope is a virtue.

I answer. Unformed hope is a virtue, but an imperfect one. ^{107 107} Here q. 17, a. 1, o.

The reason for the first part is that even unformed Christian hope fits the definition of a virtue; for it is a good quality of mind infused by God, by which one lives rightly, and no one misuses it as a principle.

The reason for the second part is that hope without charity does not make a man simply good; for although it is a principle of a good act, it is not of an act meritorious in order to the last end, namely eternal life; and therefore it has not the standing and character of perfect virtue, as we said before of unformed faith.

Ob. That it is not hope, but presumption, to hope for beatitude without charity.

I answer. That a sinner can hope without charity for beatitude, yet as to be obtained through charity; for at least he implicitly hopes to obtain the remission of sins, and thus, once charity has been obtained, to attain eternal life through it.]

You will ask 2° what the formal object quod of hope is.

I suppose 1° that the adequate and extensive material object of hope is eternal beatitude and all things leading to it, because all these fall under the object quo, that is, under the formal aspect of hope, which is assisting omnipotence, as I shall say presently.

I suppose 2° that among all these beatitude is the primary and principal object, which is called the formal object quod, because it is that which is principally and first of all hoped for on its own account and by reason of itself, while the rest are hoped for by reason of it. But the difficulty is why beatitude should be the formal object quod of hope: is it formal or objective? Objective beatitude is God himself; formal beatitude is the possession of God, or the beatific vision.

I answer. The formal object quod of hope is not formal but objective beatitude ¹⁰⁸, although it connotes ¹⁰⁹ formal beatitude, or the beatific vision. ¹⁰⁸ Ibid., a. 2, o. ¹⁰⁹ That is called a connotate which is included in some thing, and is known from its notion as naturally and necessarily following from it.

Proof. of the first part. 1° The formal object quod and immediate object of hope, which is a theological virtue, must be something purely divine and uncreated, as appears in faith and charity; otherwise religion, through whose mediation God is attained by worship, would be a theological virtue — which is commonly denied. Yet only objective beatitude, that is, God himself, is something divine and uncreated, not formal beatitude, which is a created act. Therefore.

2° That is the formal object quod of hope which hope principally and first attains on its own account and by reason of itself, and by reason of which the rest are attained. Yet only objective beatitude, that is, God himself, is that, and not formal beatitude. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The one who hopes does not seek God on account of the possession, otherwise he would place his last end in a created act; but he seeks the possession of God on account of God. Likewise, he does not seek the possession of God as a thing that beatifies, but as the mode and application of the God who beatifies, so that the whole reason of beating is God himself. Thus the avaricious man seeks money as a thing, but he does not seek possession as a thing; for he does not seek possession as something to be possessed, but as the mode and application of the thing to be possessed. Therefore.

Proof. of the second part. God is not the object of hope except as to be possessed. Yet he is possessed through the beatific vision, which is formal beatitude. Therefore in the formal object quod of hope there is conveyed by connotation and obliquely the beatific vision, or formal beatitude, as the condition and application of the formal object.

[From this you will gather that neither can the aggregate of formal and objective beatitude be called the formal object quod of hope, both because this aggregate is not something purely divine and uncreated, and because formal and objective beatitude in the object of hope are not two things or two causes, but only one thing and one cause with the application of the cause; so that the whole formal aspect of the object is objective beatitude, that is, God, while its possession is only the condition required in order that it beatify: just as, when fire applied to wood burns it, fire and the application are not two causes but one only, which is fire alone.]

You will ask 3° what the formal object quo of hope is.

I answer. The formal object quo of hope is assisting omnipotence, that is, affording or offering helps ¹¹⁰. ¹¹⁰ Ibid., a. 1, c., and the unique question on hope, a. 1.

Proof. That is the formal object quo of hope which is the motive and reason why we hope for or expect from God, with certain confidence, eternal beatitude and the means leading to it. Yet this motive is assisting omnipotence. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. We cannot hope with certain confidence for beatitude except from one whom we know to be able and willing to give it. Yet God, as omnipotent, can give it, and as assisting, that is, affording or offering helps, wills to give it. Therefore.

[You will ask 4° whether it is lawful to hope in man.

I answer. It is not lawful to hope in man ¹¹¹, but in God alone, as in the primary cause of our beatitude; because he alone, as principal cause, can lead us to it. But it is lawful to hope in man, or in some creature, as in a secondary and instrumental agent through whom we are helped to attain whatever goods are ordered to beatitude: and in this way we turn to the saints, and ask certain things of other men. ¹¹¹ Ibid., a. 4, o.

Hence you will infer that it is also lawful to place some hope in our own merits acquired by the grace of God, as in instrumental causes, since they are means ordered by God to salvation, and all confidence is ultimately referred back to the very author of grace and of merits.]

1° : Hope remains in all faithful wayfarers, even in sinners who do not despair or presume.

Proof. 1° because the Council of Trent, session VI, chapter 6 and canon 3, and session XIV, chapter 4, requires hope in sinners who dispose themselves to justification. St. Thomas, in the preceding question 17, a. 8, teaches that hope, in the order of generation, precedes charity, and in Ia IIae, q. 65, a. 4, that faith and hope can exist without charity.

2° A habit is destroyed either accidentally, by the destruction of its foundation, or per se by its contrary, or by the destruction of its object. Yet the foundation of hope, which is faith, remains in faithful sinners, and sins of any kind, except despair and presumption, are not contrary to hope; there remains also the formal object quod of hope, namely future beatitude arduous and possible, and the formal object quo, at least assisting omnipotence. For although a sinner cannot hope to attain beatitude while remaining in the same state, he can nevertheless hope, by the assistance of omnipotence, to change his state, and, once it is changed, to obtain beatitude through grace and charity.

[I said 1° : « In all faithful wayfarers, » because in heretics, since in them the foundation of hope, which is faith, is destroyed, hope also is destroyed; hence, although they may seem to hope, their hope is not theological, but human and false.

I said 2° : « Who do not despair or presume, » because despair and presumption are contrary to hope: of these below.]

I say 2° : In the damned hope does not remain, but it does remain in the souls in Purgatory. ^{112 112} Ibid., q. 18, a. 3, o.

Proof. of the first part. Hope is concerned with future beatitude as possible. Yet it belongs to the condition of the misery of the damned that they know that they can in no way escape damnation and arrive at beatitude. Therefore.

It is confirmed. Hope is founded on faith. Yet faith does not remain in the damned, as we said in the treatise on Faith, dissertation IV, article 2, On those having faith, I say 2°. Therefore neither does hope.

Proof. of the second part. With respect to the souls in Purgatory, beatitude is still absent, arduous, and to be attained through grievous punishments, and thus it is the object of hope.

I say 3° : Theological hope, neither as to its act nor as to its habit, remains in the blessed. ^{113 113} Ibid., a. 2, o.

Proof. 1° from the Apostle, Rom., VIII, 24, who says : Hope that is seen is not hope; for what does a man see, why doth he hope?

Proof. 2°. When that which gives the species is removed, the species is dissolved, and the same thing cannot remain. ¹¹⁴ Yet in the blessed the formal object from which hope has its species is removed. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The formal object of hope is future beatitude not yet possessed. Therefore in the blessed, etc. Hence, although the blessed still seem to hope for something, either for themselves, as the glory of the body, or for others, as essential beatitude itself, it is not theological hope, but hope commonly and broadly so called, or rather desire flowing from the love of charity. ¹¹⁴ Ibid., o.

[You will ask whether fear joined to hope is good.

I answer. A fourfold fear is distinguished : human, servile, filial, and initial. ^{115 115} Here q. 19, a. 2, o.

1° Human or worldly fear is the flight from temporal evil through offense against God. It is mortally or venially evil, according as it leads into mortal or venial sin. Hence that saying, Matt., X, 28 : Do not be afraid of those who kill the body. And, Luc., IX, 26 : Whoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed. Nevertheless, just as evil love of temporal things does not constitute a particular species of vice, but wanders generically through all the vices; so too, proportion being kept, human fear, considered absolutely.

2° Servile fear of God is the flight from sin out of dread of the punishment to be inflicted by God. It is twofold : 1° Fear servilely or formally servile, by which only the punishment is dreaded, without the mind pursuing guilt with hatred; so that a man would wish to sin if no punishment impended. This fear is evil and vicious, both because it does not exclude the will to sin, and because it holds the punishment of sin dearer than the guilt itself. 2° Fear servile only materially, by which the mind truly turns away from guilt on account of punishment indeed, yet is not so disposed that it would commit sin if the punishment were absent. This latter fear corresponds to the virtue of hope, and it is good, though not perfect; for it arises from a well-ordered love of self. Hence Christ the Lord, Luc., XII, 5 : I will show you whom you shall fear. Fear him who, after he has killed, has power to cast into hell. Yea, I say to you, fear him. And the Council of Trent, session VI, canon 8 : « If anyone shall say that the fear of hell, through which we take refuge in the mercy of God with sorrow for sins, or abstain from sinning, is a sin, or makes sinners worse : let him be anathema. »

3° Filial, or chaste, fear is the fear of sin, in order to avoid offending God. « It belongs to sons to fear the offense of a father, » says the Angelic Doctor ¹¹⁶. This fear is most excellent, because it arises from charity; indeed it grows as charity grows; for the more one loves God, the more one fears to displease him by sin. Such fear wonderfully aids hope, since the more we shrink from offending God and distrust our own strength, the greater reason we have for hoping. ¹¹⁶ Ibid.

4° Initial fear is the flight from sin primarily as it is the evil of guilt, secondarily as it is the cause of punishment. It is called initial, 1° because it belongs to those beginning to walk in the way of God's commandments; for they are led partly by love of virtue, partly by dread of punishment; 2° because the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, Ps. cx, 10.]

I. Question I. What is theological hope? Answer. It is a supernatural virtue, by which the human will hopes for eternal beatitude, to be obtained by the help of God. It is called a supernatural virtue, because it is either taken for the habit, which is infused by God, or taken for the act, which is elicited by the power of divine grace. The remaining words distinguish hope from the other theological virtues: for it is proper to hope to attain God precisely as he is our eternal beatitude, which we cannot reach by our own powers; therefore there is added: to be obtained by the help of God.

II. The object of hope is twofold: material and formal. The former is God to be possessed, and is called the primary material object. The latter, or formal object, is God himself as omnipotent — that is, the aiding omnipotence. The secondary object is the divine aids, the good works brought forth by the power of graces; likewise temporal goods, insofar as their use, made good through grace, paves the way to eternal beatitude. The foundations, then, of Christian hope are the omnipotence of God, his mercy, and the immense merits of Christ the Lord. Frequently, therefore, must we repeat from the depths of our heart: But I have hoped in thy mercy: Psalm 12. My God is my helper, and in him will I put my trust: Psalm 17. And this must be kept before the eyes: I am thy protector, and thy reward exceeding great: Genesis 15. Be of good courage, then, in the hope of life everlasting, which God, who lieth not, hath promised: Titus 1 [recte].

III. The subject of hope is neither the blessed, nor the damned, nor heretics. Concerning the blessed and the damned there is no disagreement. In Heretics, just as there is no theological faith, so neither is there hope. In Catholics alone, then, whether journeying on the way or dwelling in Purgatory, is theological hope found. For although those souls are secure of obtaining the reward, the reward is nevertheless absent.

IV. Question II. Is there a precept of hope? Answer. All affirm it, and the holy Scriptures perspicuously impose it. Hope in the Lord. Nay, as the Prophet adds, the life of the faithful is a life of hope: For thou, O Lord, singularly hast settled me in hope: Psalm 4. For what is our life — or rather our pilgrimage — but the way to our Fatherland? Thither all our desires must conspire. This truth the Council of Trent defined, session 6, chapter 6; and Alexander VII condemned the following thesis: A man is at no time of his life whatever bound to elicit acts of faith, hope, and charity by force of the precepts pertaining to those virtues. This precept obliges as soon as the light of reason shines forth, and that of itself; as also when one must depart from this world. Finally, this precept presses of itself unto the frequenting of the acts of this virtue. Many teach that there is no determinate time at which such a precept presses. By what reason so great a paradox can be asserted by Christian men, I truly do not perceive. Christians can scarcely recite the Lord's Prayer sincerely without eliciting acts of hope. Per accidens this precept presses whenever a grave temptation against hope strikes the soul; when the Sacrament of Penance is to be performed; when the precepts of charity and of prayer press; and so forth.

V. Hope is accompanied by fear, which is the flight of an arduous evil that cannot easily be avoided. It is divided into filial, initial, servile, and worldly fear — which last is base. Servile fear is good; God urges it, Matthew 10: Fear ye him that can destroy both soul and body in hell. This fear is from the Holy Ghost, yet it is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. But filial and chaste fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost; as also initial fear, which is not distinguished from the first except as the imperfect from the perfect.

VI. Question III. Is there a precept of fear? Answer. All affirm it. It is evident from holy Scripture. In Deuteronomy chapter 10 God says: And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God? And David, Psalm 33: Fear the Lord, all ye his saints. This precept is a peculiar one.

VII. Question IV. What are the vices opposed to hope? Answer. They are desperation and presumption. Desperation is described as an efficacious will of casting away the eternal salvation to be obtained from the divine mercy. It is a most grave sin: for it thinks ill of the divine mercy.

VIII. Presumption is a perverse, or inordinate, confidence in the divine mercy. It is a grave sin; and into it, more frequently than into desperation, fall those sinners who trust that they will attain eternal glory without fasting, without the buffeting of the flesh, and without laborious works. Wherefore those Christians who lead their life in games, in banquets, in solaces, in promiscuous conversations of men and women, do not hope in God, but tempt God; and although they do not commit the sin of presumption properly so called, which is joined with heresy, they are nevertheless in a continual sin of carelessness of their own eternal salvation. They persevere in sins from an excessive confidence in the divine mercy. This crass negligence alone, this stupid torpor and indolence in the gravest business of eternal salvation, is a grave sin. Long perseverance in sins from hope of the divine mercy is a punishment of the divine vengeance, which scatters penal blindnesses upon illicit desires.

The Seraphic Doctor, in his Diaeta, titulo 5, cap. 4, de spe, on that text Deuteron. 24: You shall not take in pledge the lower millstone, nor the upper, among the other virtues warns that hope and fear are not to be withheld from the sinner: for spiritual Hope is the lower millstone, and sustains the soul from below, and raises it upward, lest through excessive dejection it rush into despair. But Fear is the upper millstone, pressing the soul downward, lest it vanish through elation: between these millstones (says the holy Doctor) the best milling of the soul takes place, that is, the contrition of sin. Of the first millstone, namely of hope, we must treat here; but of fear I shall treat in the following disputation.

Penitents, especially children, are apt to say that they have sinned through presuming on God's mercy. When asked what they mean, they say: " I thought I would do something and then confess it." Are such penitents really guilty of presumption?

No! What is presumption? St. Thomas defines it, in his Summa, II. II. qu. 21, a. 1, as "an immoderation of hope by which someone tends toward some good as possible through divine power and mercy when it is not possible, as when someone hopes to obtain pardon without penance or glory without merits." Any such excessus spei is sinful, for underlying it, as the angelic doctor explains (l. c. a. 2) is an intellectus falsus, viz. a false supposition that God pardons those who continue in their sins. Excessus spei arises from this erroneous idea, as a motus quidam appetitivus; and it is sinful because every appetitive movement that conforms itself to a false judgment is in itself evil and a sin.

The explanation given by St. Thomas of the nature and sinfulness of presumption shows that this sin has not been committed in the case under discussion. He is presumptuous, one who hopes to obtain pardon without penance; for this excessus spei, being a motus appetitivus, is based upon a false assumption that God will pardon one who refuses to amend his ways. Our penitent, however, thought that he could confess his sin; consequently he did not make the mistake of supposing that God would pardon him if he persisted in sin, but he was right in believing that the Lord would have mercy upon him if he repented and confessed. Therefore the motus appetitivus is based upon this correct supposition, viz., upon the hope of pardon, and is not sinful. On the contrary, the intention to confess the sin is apparent in this thought, and is contained implicate in it, and is in itself good, so that such a penitent sins less than he would have done without thinking of his conversion; for without this thought his will would have been more inclined to sin and its malice would have been greater. "To sin in the hope of receiving pardon at some future time, with the intention of abstaining from the sin and doing penance for it, is not presumption; rather, this diminishes the sin, because through it one seems to have a will less firmly fixed upon sin" (Th., I. c. q. 21, ad 3). Hence, according to St. Albertus Magnus, Adam sinned less grievously, "Because he sinned in the hope of pardon."

It is with good reason that Lehmkuhl warns confessors (I. n. 312) to make sure that penitents who accuse themselves of presumption are really guilty of this sin. For "if anyone sins from frailty or passion while at the same time hoping that he will afterward obtain pardon, and consequently determining at least implicitly to be converted afterward and withdraw from sin, he does not commit the sin of presumption; indeed, as the writers note, the sin is rather diminished" (/. c).

If, however, the sin of presumption has been committed, how ought we to deal with it? Is it invariably a mortal sin? In its nature it is a mortal sin, but propter indeliberationem vel imperfectionem actus it may, like other sins that are in their nature grievous, become merely venial. Modern moralists, such as Gury, Lehmkuhl, and others, are of opinion that whoever commits a venial sin through presumptuous confidence in God's mercy commits also a venial sin of presumption. Elbel, on the contrary, thinks that in this case there is no real presumption, "because by this happiness is not expected to be obtained rashly or by means in no way ordained by God for this end."—Dr. Kilian.