Chapter — Marc, Institutiones Morales
Chapter II: On the Necessity of Hope
St. Alphonsus, l. c.; Perrone, de Virt., n. 82; Lahousse, op. cit., c. 2, a. 2; Billot, Thes. 27-28; Lehmkuhl, 1, n. 430; Aertnys, l. II, n. 21.
Necessity, as we have already said, is either of means or of precept; but it regards hope, both habitual and actual.
- II. Actual hope, at least implicit, is necessary for all adults endowed with reason, by necessity both of means and of precept.
By necessity OF MEANS; for if it is a question of the just, they need hope so that they can rightly ask for the graces necessary for persevering. Whence St. Paul (Rom. 8:24): By hope we are saved. If it is a question of sinners, they need hope so that they may dispose themselves for justification (Trent, Sess. 6).
By necessity OF PRECEPT; both because the natural law prescribes that the means necessary for obtaining the end be applied; and because the divine letters positively inculcate hope. Wherefore the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:17): Command them not to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God. See n. 470.
IT IS ASKED. When does the precept of hope oblige?
Resp. 1. It obliges by reason of the virtue, that is, PER SE: a) at the beginning of the use of reason, or, more rightly, of spiritual life, when namely eternal beatitude has been sufficiently proposed as the end; b) in danger of death, so that man may be strengthened against temptations, and be borne into God, the ultimate end soon to be attained; c) more often in life (at least once in any year), because without an act of hope we can neither persist in divine justice nor operate meritoriously.
For the rest, there is no reason why the faithful person should be anxious about this obligation, for virtual hope suffices, which is everywhere exercised by the faithful, for example when he prays or receives the sacraments.
- It obliges by reason of a peculiar circumstance, therefore PER ACCIDENS: a) when someone is in danger of desperation; b) when from precept an act of other virtues must be elicited, for example of prayer or penance, which cannot be exercised without at least an implicit act of hope; c) in every temptation, when there is danger of consenting unless hope raises up the soul (II, 20; H. Ap., IV, 13).
- From these things you will gather: 1. It is not dishonorable, as Calvinists, Baianists, and Jansenists affirm, but most pleasing to God, to be moved by theological hope to operating well. This is confirmed by the words of Trent: "If anyone shall say that the justified man sins while he operates well in view of eternal reward: let him be anathema" (Sess. VI, c. 31).
There is not given, in this present life, a state of love so perfect that the mind is never moved either by fear of punishments or by desire of remuneration, as the Quietists dreamed, especially since hope and fear, in time of temptation, often seem necessarily required against a fall (cf. St. Alph., Pratica d'amar G. C., c. 16). - Wherefore that 7th proposition of Michael Molinos was condemned by Innocent XI: "The soul ought not think either of reward or of punishment; nor of paradise, nor of hell; nor of death, nor of eternity" (cf. Storia delle eresie, c. 12, a. 5).
The notion of reward, which is had in hope, does not include any imperfection in the Christian religion, as the Kantians and Evolutionists said. Nor are we bound directly, from a special precept, to exercising explicit acts of fear, insofar as fear is distinguished from hope or from other acts of virtues. Thus commonly Valentia, Sanchez, etc.