Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
On hope in itself and on its object
Hope taken generally is « a movement of the appetitive part toward a future good, arduous or difficult, yet possible of attainment. » Taken theologically, it is « a habit of mind infused by God, by which we expect with certain confidence the eternal life that is a good to be obtained with divine assistance. » It can be considered together with charity, and is then called formed hope; or without charity, and is then called unformed hope, as was said of faith.
Spes generaliter sumpta est « motus appetitivae partis in bonum futurum arduum seu difficile, possibile tamen adeptu. » Theologice sumpta, est « habitus animi divinitus infusus per quem certa cum fiducia aeterna vita bona, auxilio divino obtinenda, expectamus. » Potest considerari cum charitate, et dicitur spes formata, vel sine charitate, et dicitur spes informis, sicut dictum est de fide.
You will ask 1° whether unformed Christian hope is a virtue.
Petes 1° utrum spes christiana informis sit virtus.
I answer. Unformed hope is a virtue, but an imperfect one. 107 107 Here q. 17, a. 1, o.
Resp. Spes informis est virtus, sed imperfecta. 107 107 Hic q. 17, a. 1, o.
The reason for the first part is that even unformed Christian hope fits the definition of a virtue; for it is a good quality of mind infused by God, by which one lives rightly, and no one misuses it as a principle.
Ratio primae partis est, quia spei christianae etiam informi convenit definitio virtutis ; est enim bona qualitas mentis a Deo infusa, qua bene vivitur et nemo male utitur ut principio.
The reason for the second part is that hope without charity does not make a man simply good; for although it is a principle of a good act, it is not of an act meritorious in order to the last end, namely eternal life; and therefore it has not the standing and character of perfect virtue, as we said before of unformed faith.
Ratio secundae partis est, quia spes sine charitate non facit hominem simpliciter bonum ; licet enim sit principium actus boni, non tamen meritorii in ordine ad finem ultimum, vitam scilicet aeternam : ideoque non habet statum et modum perfectae virtutis, sicut ante diximus de fide informi.
Ob. That it is not hope, but presumption, to hope for beatitude without charity.
Ob. Non esse spem, sed presumptionem, sperare beatitudinem sine charitate.
I answer. That a sinner can hope without charity for beatitude, yet as to be obtained through charity; for at least he implicitly hopes to obtain the remission of sins, and thus, once charity has been obtained, to attain eternal life through it.]
Resp. Posse peccatorem sperare sine charitate beatitudinem, sed obtinendam per charitatem ; saltem enim tacite consequi sperat remissionem peccatorum, et ita obtenta charitate, per eam consequi vitam aeternam.]
You will ask 2° what the formal object quod of hope is.
Petes 2° quodnam sit obiectum formale quod spei.
I suppose 1° that the adequate and extensive material object of hope is eternal beatitude and all things leading to it, because all these fall under the object quo, that is, under the formal aspect of hope, which is assisting omnipotence, as I shall say presently.
Suppono 1° obiectum materiale adaequatum et extensivum spei, esse aeternam beatitudinem et omnia ad illam conducentia, quia haec omnia cadunt sub obiecto quo, seu sub ratione formali spei, qua est omnipotentia auxilians, ut dicam modo.
I suppose 2° that among all these beatitude is the primary and principal object, which is called the formal object quod, because it is that which is principally and first of all hoped for on its own account and by reason of itself, while the rest are hoped for by reason of it. But the difficulty is why beatitude should be the formal object quod of hope: is it formal or objective? Objective beatitude is God himself; formal beatitude is the possession of God, or the beatific vision.
Suppono 2° inter haec omnia beatitudinem esse obiectum primarium et principale, quod dicitur formale quod, quia est id quod principaliter primo per se et ratione sui speratur, caetera autem ratione illius. Sed difficultas est qua beatitudo sit obiectum formale quod spei : an formalis, vel obiectiva ? Beatitudo obiectiva est ipse Deus, formalis est possessio Dei, seu visio beatifica.
I answer. The formal object quod of hope is not formal but objective beatitude 108, although it connotes 109 formal beatitude, or the beatific vision. 108 Ibid., a. 2, o. 109 That is called a connotate which is included in some thing, and is known from its notion as naturally and necessarily following from it.
Resp. Obiectum formale quod spei non est beatitudo formalis, sed obiectiva 108, connotans 109 tamen beatitudinem formalem, seu visionem beatificam. 108 Ibid., a. 2, o. 109 Id dicitur connotatum, quod includitur in re aliqua, ex cuius notione cognoscitur ut naturaliter et necessario ex ea sequens.
Proof. of the first part. 1° The formal object quod and immediate object of hope, which is a theological virtue, must be something purely divine and uncreated, as appears in faith and charity; otherwise religion, through whose mediation God is attained by worship, would be a theological virtue — which is commonly denied. Yet only objective beatitude, that is, God himself, is something divine and uncreated, not formal beatitude, which is a created act. Therefore.
Prob. prima pars. 1° Obiectum formale quod et immediatum spei, quae est virtus theologica, debet esse aliquid pure divinum et increatum, ut patet in fide et charitate ; quia alioquin religio, qua mediante cultu altingit Deum, foret virtus theologica : quod communiter negatur. Atqui sola beatitudo obiectiva, seu Deus ipse, est quid divinum et increatum, non beatitudo formalis, qua est actus creatus. Ergo.
2° That is the formal object quod of hope which hope principally and first attains on its own account and by reason of itself, and by reason of which the rest are attained. Yet only objective beatitude, that is, God himself, is that, and not formal beatitude. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The one who hopes does not seek God on account of the possession, otherwise he would place his last end in a created act; but he seeks the possession of God on account of God. Likewise, he does not seek the possession of God as a thing that beatifies, but as the mode and application of the God who beatifies, so that the whole reason of beating is God himself. Thus the avaricious man seeks money as a thing, but he does not seek possession as a thing; for he does not seek possession as something to be possessed, but as the mode and application of the thing to be possessed. Therefore.
2° Illud est obiectum formale quod spei, quod principaliter primo per se et ratione sui a spe attingitur, et ratione cuius caetera attinguntur. Atqui id est sola beatitudo obiectiva, seu Deus ipse, non beatitudo formalis. Ergo. — Prob. min. Sperans non quaerit Deum propter possessionem, alias poneret finem ultimum in actu creato ; sed quaerit possessionem Dei propter Deum. Item, non quaerit possessionem Dei ut rem beatificantem, sed ut modum et applicationem Dei beatificantis, ita ut tota ratio beatificans sit ipse Deus. Sic avarus quaerit pecuniam ut rem, possessionem autem non quaerit ut rem ; non enim quaerit possessionem ut possidendam, sed ut modum et applicationem rei possidendae. Ergo.
Proof. of the second part. God is not the object of hope except as to be possessed. Yet he is possessed through the beatific vision, which is formal beatitude. Therefore in the formal object quod of hope there is conveyed by connotation and obliquely the beatific vision, or formal beatitude, as the condition and application of the formal object.
Prob. secunda pars. Deus non est obiectum spei, nisi ut possidendus. Atqui possidetur per visionem beatificam, quae est beatitudo formalis. Ergo in obiecto formali quod spei importatur de connotato et in obliquo visio beatifica, seu beatitudo formalis tamquam conditio et applicatio obiecti formalis.
[From this you will gather that neither can the aggregate of formal and objective beatitude be called the formal object quod of hope, both because this aggregate is not something purely divine and uncreated, and because formal and objective beatitude in the object of hope are not two things or two causes, but only one thing and one cause with the application of the cause; so that the whole formal aspect of the object is objective beatitude, that is, God, while its possession is only the condition required in order that it beatify: just as, when fire applied to wood burns it, fire and the application are not two causes but one only, which is fire alone.]
[Ex his colliges quod neque aggregatum ex beatitudine formali et obiectiva possit dici obiectum formale quod spei, tum quia istud aggregatum non est quid pure divinum et increatum, tum quia beatitudo formalis et obiectiva in obiecto spei non sunt duae res aut duae causae, sed una res tantum et una causa cum applicatione causae ; ita ut tota ratio formalis obiecti sit beatitudo obiectiva, seu Deus, eius autem possessio, conditio tantum requisita ut beatificet : sicut, dum ignis, applicatus ligno, comburit, ignis et applicatio non sunt duae causae, sed una tantum, quae est solus ignis.]
You will ask 3° what the formal object quo of hope is.
Petes 3° quodnam sit obiectum formale quo spei.
I answer. The formal object quo of hope is assisting omnipotence, that is, affording or offering helps 110. 110 Ibid., a. 1, c., and the unique question on hope, a. 1.
Resp. Obiectum formale quo spei est omnipotentia auxilians, id est praebens aut offerens auxilia 110. 110 Ibid., a. 1, c., et quaest. unica de spe, a. 1.
Proof. That is the formal object quo of hope which is the motive and reason why we hope for or expect from God, with certain confidence, eternal beatitude and the means leading to it. Yet this motive is assisting omnipotence. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. We cannot hope with certain confidence for beatitude except from one whom we know to be able and willing to give it. Yet God, as omnipotent, can give it, and as assisting, that is, affording or offering helps, wills to give it. Therefore.
Prob. Illud est obiectum formale quo spei, quod est motivum et ratio cur speramus seu expectamus a Deo, certa cum fiducia, beatitudinem aeternam et media ad illam conducentia. Atqui istud motivum est omnipotentia auxilians. Ergo. — Prob. min. Non possumus sperare certa cum fiducia beatitudinem, nisi ab eo quem novimus posse et velle eam dare. Atqui Deus, ut omnipotens, potest eam dare, et ut auxilians, seu praebens aut offerens auxilia, vult illam dare. Ergo.
I answer. It is not lawful to hope in man 111, but in God alone, as in the primary cause of our beatitude; because he alone, as principal cause, can lead us to it. But it is lawful to hope in man, or in some creature, as in a secondary and instrumental agent through whom we are helped to attain whatever goods are ordered to beatitude: and in this way we turn to the saints, and ask certain things of other men. 111 Ibid., a. 4, o.
Resp. Non licet sperare in homine 111, sed in solo Deo, tamquam in primaria causa beatitudinis nostrae ; quia ipse solus tamquam causa principalis ad eam nos perducere potest. Licet autem sperare in homine, vel in aliqua creatura, tamquam in agente secundario et instrumentali per quod adiuvamur ad consequenda quaecumque bona in beatitudinem ordinata : et hoc modo convertimur ad sanctos, et ab aliis hominibus aliqua petimus. 111 Ibid., a. 4, o.
Hence you will infer that it is also lawful to place some hope in our own merits acquired by the grace of God, as in instrumental causes, since they are means ordered by God to salvation, and all confidence is ultimately referred back to the very author of grace and of merits.]
Hinc inferes etiam esse licitum spem aliquam ponere in propriis meritis ex gratia Dei acquisitis, tamquam in causis instrumentalibus, siquidem sint media a Deo ad salutem ordinata, et tota fiducia ultimate refundatur in ipsum authorem gratiae et meritorum.]