Ignorance

WE have seen that we are responsible only for those actions which are performed with knowledge or advertence and freedom of choice. Whatever tends to prevent or lessen advertence, or to restrict liberty, will tend to diminish our responsibility. Ignorance affects advertence, fear and violence influence freedom of choice, and concupiscence influences both. Something must now be said on each of these causes which affect the voluntariness and imputability of our actions.

Ignorance is the absence of knowledge which the person who is ignorant should have. It is thus distinguished from nescience, which is merely the absence of knowledge, without the implication that the knowledge should be possessed.

Ignorance must also be carefully distinguished from error or mistake, which is a false judgement concerning something. Thus, if I simply do not know the person to whom I am speaking, I am in ignorance of his identity; if I mistake him for someone else, I am in error.

(a) With reference to the subject who is ignorant, ignorance is either invincible or vincible.

Invincible ignorance cannot be dispelled by the use of ordinary diligence. This may arise in my mind either because no thought of my want of knowledge occurs to me, and so the idea of making inquiries never enters into my head, or because I have failed to acquire knowledge on the point, though I made all reasonable efforts to do so. What efforts should be made in any given case depends on the character and circumstances of the person and the matter on which he is ignorant. If the matter is of great importance, if it affects the salvation of souls or the spiritual and temporal welfare of large numbers, great efforts must be made to dissipate ignorance; the efforts which would be sufficient in the case of one poorly instructed, or very much occupied with other weighty affairs, would not be It sufficient in other cases where these suppositions are not verified. In general, where knowledge is of obligation those efforts must be made to acquire it which ordinarily prudent and good men would exert in the circumstances.

Vincible ignorance is such as can be removed by the use of the requisite diligence. Various degrees are distinguished by divines according as some, or little, or no diligence is exercised to dispel it or means are used to foster it. If means are used to foster it, the ignorance is called affected; if little or no diligence is used to dispel it, it is called crass or supine; if some diligence is used, but not what is required in the case, it is called simply vincible ignorance.

(b) With reference to the object of ignorance, we must distinguish ignorance of law, fact, and penalty. 'There is ignorance of law, if the law’s existence is not known, as when a Catholic does not know that the Church forbids marriage within the third degree of kindred. There would be ignorance of fact, if it were not known that A. B. is related to C. D. within the third degree. Ignorance of the penalty is distinguished from ignorance of law when some special sanction is not known, though the law itself is known.

(c) With reference to the action of the subject, we distinguish antecedent, consequent, and concomitant ignorance. Antecedent ignorance is not voluntary, it is not willed by the subject; consequent ignorance is voluntary; concomitant is not expressly willed, but the action which is done with concomitant ignorance would ex hypothesi be done, even if the ignorance did not exist.

Invincible ignorance, as defined above, excuses from fault, so that, however bad an action done in invincible ignorance may be, it cannot be a formal sin. The reason is obvious; there is no knowledge in the agent of the malice of the action, and so the bad action is involuntary, and not imputable.

Vincible ignorance of the malice of the act, however, cannot excuse one who does wrong. He does not indeed will the evil in itself, but he wills its cause, and so it is voluntary in its cause and imputable. A person who sins in simply vincible ignorance, or even in crass ignorance, is indeed less blameworthy than one who sins with full knowledge of the malice of his act; the sin is only imperfectly voluntary, and less imputable than if perfectly voluntary. There is an apparent difference of opinion among theologians as to whether affected ignorance increases or lessens the malice of a wrong Prop. 2 damn. ab Alex. viii; 68 inter Baianas, can. 2202. action. With many modern authors it seems best to distinguish the motive with which in each case ignorance is fostered. If the state of ignorance is fostered through fear of being compelled by knowledge to abstain from the sinful act, such affected ignorance would seem to lessen the malice of the sin; the wrongdoer would not in this case venture to sin if he had full knowledge, and so he fosters his ignorance; his will is less malicious than if he sinned with full deliberation and consent. If, on the contrary, he merely fosters his ignorance to be able to plead it in excuse, and he is so bent on sinning that he would do the act in the same way even if he had full knowledge of its malice, then it does not seem to diminish the sin; it is rather a sign of an absolute determination to commit the sin.¹

We saw in a former chapter that the degree of malice which attaches to a sin committed in more or less culpable ignorance is measured rather by the sinfulness of the neglect to put away the ignorance, than by the sinfulness of the act in itself.

¹ Bucceroni, 1, n. 51, can. 2229.

Ignorance itself of what we are bound to know, as of the obligations of our state of life, of the truths of faith which are necessary to salvation, is sinful if consequent and vincible; antecedent and invincible ignorance is of course not sinful.

Ignorance does not render an act invalid which has all other requisites for its validity; and so baptism conferred by one who knows nothing about its effects will be valid, if the - matter and form are correctly applied with the intention of doing what the Church does. Substantial error or mistake about the person with whom marriage is contracted will invalidate the contract, while ignorance of who the person is will not, if there be the will to marry.

We saw in Chapter VI that if the legislator chooses, and if he thinks it will be for the public good, he may intend a positive law made by him to bind, not under pain of committing sin by its mere violation, but only under pain of being obliged to pay the penalty imposed. Such a law is, as we saw, called by theologians a penal law. Besides the rules and constitutions of certain religious orders, ecclesiastical legislation does not afford many examples of penal laws. As a rule, ecclesiastical laws are either moral laws or mixed; they forbid or command an action under pain of sin, and frequently they impose a penalty on transgressors.

It may be asked whether ignorance excuses from the penalty imposed by a law. This question is now settled by Canon 2229.

Sec. i. Affected ignorance, whether of a law or of a penalty only, excuses from no penalties latae sententiae.

Sec. ii. If a law has the words, shall have presumed, dared, knowingly, studiously, rashly, designedly done it, or other similar phrases which require full knowledge and deliberation, any diminution of imputability whether on the part of the intellect, or of the will, exempts from penalties latae sententiae.

Sec. iii. If a law has not those words, ignorance of the law, or even of the penalty alone, if it were crass or supine, exempts from no penalty latae sententiae, if it were not crass or supine it excuses from medicinal penalties, but not from vindictive penalties latae sententiae.

Certain conditions are required in order that any particular sin may be reserved. First of all it must be a grave sin such as forms the necessary matter of confession, for a venial sin which the penitent need not confess cannot be effectually reserved. It is not the practice of the Church to reserve merely internal sins; there must be an external act and as such gravely sinful. So that a slightly: indecent word, even if uttered with a seriously bad intention, would not fall under reservation if all sins of indecency were reserved. The sin must be completed and perfect in its kind, not merely attempted, for reservation is to be strictly interpreted. For the same reason it must be certain that the sin is reserved, so that any prudent doubt of law or of fact whether a particular sin is reserved is sufficient to enable the confessor to give absolution without special faculties. ‘4. Those who are under the age of puberty do not incur papal cases unless they are expressly included in the law. The only papal cases in which they are so included is the violation of the enclosure of nuns. The same rule may be applied to bishops’ cases, unless a bishop has made known his intention to bind even those who have not reached the age of puberty. Ignorance of a censure, unless it be crass or supine, excuses from the censure, as is expressly laid down in the Decretals.¹ As in papal cases the reservation of the sin is on account of the censure annexed to it, and ignorance excuses from incurring this, therefore ignorance will excuse one from incurring papal reserved cases to which a censure is attached. The reservation of false accusation of solicitation is very probably penal, as theologians gather from the words by Benedict XIV in the Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae, and as ignorance of a penalty excuses one from incurring it, therefore ignorance will excuse one from incurring this reserved case. This opinion, however, which many hold to be still probable, is hardly of practical importance, for the ecclesiastical judge who receives the false accusation will certainly warn the culprit of the penalty incurred by false accusation.

It is a disputed point whether ignorance excuses from incurring bishops’ cases or not. It excuses, indeed, from incurring any censure inflicted by any ecclesiastical superior, but it certainly does not excuse from incurring a reserved sin if the bishop has expressed his intention of reserving it even when committed in ignorance of the reservation. Otherwise it is probable that ignorance excuses in episcopal as well as in papal cases, for reservation is partly penal, and it cannot attain its end of deterring the faithful from committing reserved sins if they are ignorant of the reservation.

According to Canon 900, all reservation ceases: (1) When either the sick who cannot leave the house make their confession, or those about to be married with a view to marriage.

(2) Whenever either the lawful superior on being asked has refused to grant faculties for absolving a particular case, or in the prudent judgement of the confessor faculties for granting absolution cannot be asked for from the lawful superior without serious detriment to the penitent or without danger of violating the seal of confession.

(3) When the penitent is outside the territory of him who reserved the case, even though he left it only to obtain absolution. But, according to the Commission for the Interpretation of Canon Law a stranger (peregrinus) incurs the reserved cases of the place where he is staying (A.A.S. xii, 575)-

¹ C. 2, de const. in 6to; can. 2229, sec. 3, i.

As only males and those who are baptized can be validly ordained, the same two conditions are required in order to be subject to irregularity. There is nothing to prevent the same person from being subject to several different irregularities arising from different defects or crimes, nor from being subject to several irregularities of the same species arising from several crimes committed against different people, as from several homicides; but otherwise only one irregularity is contracted from one and the same cause though several times repeated, and so a priest who while under suspension celebrates Mass several times only incurs one irregularity (Can. 989).

Whenever there is a doubt either of law or of fact as to whether an irregularity has been incurred, almost all authorities agree that in practice it must be held not to have been incurred.

Irregularities are incurred even by those who are ignorant of them (Can. 988).

Besides irregularities which of themselves are perpetual impediments to the reception of Orders, the Code enumerates certain simple impediments which cease to exist on certain conditions. They are: (1) The sons of non-Catholics as long as their parents remain in error; (2) husbands who have wives; (3) those who hold an office forbidden to clerics; (4) slaves; (5) those bound to military service; (6) neophytes; (7) those who labour under infamy of fact (Can. 987).

I. Notion. Ignorance is the habitual lack of knowledge. It differs, therefore, from inadvertence, which is the actual lack of knowledge in one who habitually knows the matter.

II. Division. Ignorance is divided:

1. By reason of the subject, into negative, privative, and positive ignorance. Negative ignorance is ignorance in a subject not capable of knowledge, as in an infant or in a madman; it is usually called nescience. Privative ignorance is ignorance in a subject capable of knowledge. Positive ignorance is ignorance joined with error or the admission of the false; it is called simply error (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 3, n. 13; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 76, a. 2; De Malo, q. 3, a. 1).¹

2. By reason of the object, into ignorance of law and ignorance of fact. The former is that by which either the existence, or the meaning, or the extension, or the cessation of the law is unknown. The latter is that by which a fact or some circumstance is unknown, on which the application of the law depends. If someone does not know that the fast before Holy Communion is to be observed from the twelfth hour, there is ignorance of law. If someone does not know that he has eaten after the twelfth hour, there is ignorance of fact (St. Alphonsus, same place).

3. By reason of influence on the act, into antecedent and concomitant ignorance. Antecedent ignorance is that which is the cause of the act, so that the act would not have been placed if the ignorance had not existed, as if you kill a man thinking he is a wild beast. Concomitant ignorance is said to be that which accompanies the act but is not its cause, so that, even if it had been absent, the act would nevertheless have been placed, as if, prepared to kill an enemy, you kill him thinking he is a wild beast (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 8; St. Alphonsus, same place).

4. By reason of perfection, into full and half-full ignorance, according as the truth, for example the malice of the act, is not at all adverted to or is adverted to in some measure, as if someone doubts whether some act is evil, or whether from some action an evil effect is going to follow.

5. By reason of the power to dispel it, into invincible and vincible ignorance, according as it cannot or can be overcome by moral diligence. Invincible ignorance is, for example, the ignorance of one who does not even think about some matter, say, about the malice of an act.

6. By reason of fault, into inculpable and culpable ignorance, according as it ought not to have been dispelled, or ought to have been dispelled and was not dispelled. Thus, for example, one who does not know the duties of his state and does not learn them labors under culpable ignorance.

Culpable ignorance is distinguished into affected and non-affected. Affected ignorance is had if the truth is not sought precisely so that one may sin more freely. Otherwise it is non-affected. This latter is divided into crass or supine, simply grave, and light ignorance, according as one was wholly, or almost wholly, gravely, or lightly negligent in seeking the truth which ought to have been sought.

¹ Others do not call the ignorance which we have called negative ignorance properly so called, but nescience; and they distinguish ignorance properly so called into negative and privative, according as it is ignorance of knowledge not owed, as jurisprudence in a farmer, or of knowledge owed, as the Decalogue in a Christian.

III. Influence on the voluntary-free.

1. Full ignorance removes the voluntary-free character of a work placed from it or with it, and excuses from fault. For ignorance of this kind excludes all cognition. Now what is entirely unknown cannot be willed, according to the saying: nothing is willed unless known. Add the second proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: "Even if invincible ignorance of the natural law is granted, in the state of fallen nature this does not excuse the one acting from formal sin."¹

2. Half-full ignorance operates thus:

a) If the truth can be sought, and is not sought at all or not sufficiently sought, it does not remove the voluntary-free character of the work placed from it or with it, nor does it excuse from fault. For one who acts thus admits the work, whatever it may be, and rashly exposes himself to the danger of doing what is forbidden. Nevertheless, the aforesaid ignorance generally lessens the voluntary and the fault, since the cognition is less perfect. I said generally, because with respect to affected ignorance it is disputed whether it increases or lessens the voluntary. St. Thomas teaches: "Such ignorance seems to increase the voluntary and the sin" (I-II, q. 76, a. 4). Yet it does not seem to increase it by reason of itself or as such, since it involves a more imperfect knowledge; rather, it points to a greater inclination toward the evil act, and under this respect a greater sin.

b) If the truth cannot be sought, or has been sufficiently but fruitlessly sought, it removes the voluntary-free character and excuses from fault, according as the ignorance or doubt concerning the lawfulness of the work has been practically set aside, or has not been set aside, by the aid of a reflex principle; as will be explained more fully in the treatise on conscience. There we shall likewise say how great a diligence must be used in seeking the truth.

Note 1. Under the name of ignorance, forgetfulness is also understood; likewise inadvertence, which is actual ignorance in one who enjoys habitual knowledge.

Note 2. A sin committed with half-full ignorance and with the truth not sufficiently investigated is of the same species as a sin knowingly committed in the same matter.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, number 1292.

V. Knowability of natural law. Concerning this, it must first be seen how far the objects, and consequently the precepts, of natural law are distinguished when their knowability is considered; then how far ignorance can in fact have place concerning them.

1. The objects, and consequently the precepts, of natural law, by reason of knowability, are distinguished into primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary precepts are those which become known at first glance, as: good is to be done; evil is to be avoided; order is to be preserved. Secondary precepts are those which are immediately and easily deduced from the primary ones. To these belong the precepts of the Decalogue, except the circumstance of the third precept by which the day to be sanctified is determined. Tertiary precepts are those which are deduced mediately and with more difficulty from the primary or secondary ones, such as, for example, precepts concerning certain contracts to be avoided (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 94, aa. 4 and 6; q. 100, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, I, 171; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 1, n. 5).

2. Ignorance with respect to the precepts of natural law can have place in a human being of sound mind as follows:

a) Ignorance cannot be given with respect to primary precepts, because "these stand to practical reason as the first principles of demonstrations stand to speculative reason" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 94, a. 2). Moreover, first principles become known to each person (St. Alphonsus, I, 170).

b) Generally ignorance is not given with respect to secondary precepts considered in themselves. This is clear both from the notion of them handed down and from experience. I have said "generally" and "considered in themselves," because sometimes ignorance is present "in rude persons and for a brief time, or... with some apparently honorable circumstance added" (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 1, n. 5; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 94, a. 6), for example if there is question of a lie for saving the life of an innocent person.

c) Concerning tertiary precepts, ignorance is more easily had, as is deduced from their notion and from daily experience (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 100, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, I, 171).

V. Causes excusing from invalidation. "No ignorance of invalidating or incapacitating laws excuses from them, unless something else is expressly said" (can. 16, § 1). Likewise grave damage to be avoided does not prevent invalidation. The reason is that the common good requires that invalidating laws made in favor of the common good retain their force, even if the invalidation is unknown, or the act cannot be avoided without grave damage (St. Alphonsus, VI, 1079). Except the case in which the damage would be of such a sort that there would be place for epikeia (n. 143).

If, however, the invalidating law is purely penal, ignorance which excuses from fault brings it about that invalidation does not have place. In the case the condition is lacking, namely fault, which a purely penal invalidating law supposes. Hence one who inculpably did not recite the canonical hours makes the fruits his own (cf. can. 1475).

A cause excusing is one which brings it about that one who is subject to the law is not held to observe it. It differs from a cause exempting, which brings it about that someone ceases to be subject to the law (St. Alphonsus, I, 152).

The excusing causes are ignorance and inability. Ignorance brings it about that one who transgresses the law does not sin formally, but not that material sin is absent. Inability averts not only formal sin, but also material sin. Ignorance was discussed where there was speech about impediments of liberty (nn. 30-32), so that only inability must be treated.

I. Culpable ignorance; which can be a cause of sin to the extent that man, if he had expelled the ignorance, would have abstained from the depraved act. To this cause also belongs defect of consideration, which is a certain actual culpable ignorance, concerning which the prophet Jeremiah says: "With desolation the whole land is made desolate, because there is no one who reflects in the heart."¹

¹ Jer. 12:11.

I. Requisites on the part of the one vowing. There are required a will to bind oneself, sufficient knowledge of the thing promised or of the object of the vow, and perfect liberty.

1. A will to bind oneself, at least implicit; for this belongs to the essence of a vow. When the aforesaid will is lacking, there is a mere proposal (St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 201).

Corollary I. One who is ignorant of the obligation of a vow vows invalidly, because he lacks the will to bind himself; for the will is not borne toward what is unknown. Except one who wills to vow as others are accustomed to do, even if he merely is ignorant that an obligation arises; for he has an implicit will to bind himself (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

Corollary II. One who wills to vow, but positively excludes the obligation, does not vow; for although the obligation itself is the effect of a vow, nevertheless he who positively excludes the obligation does not have the mind, not even implicitly, of binding himself (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

2. Sufficient knowledge of the thing promised or of the object of the vow; namely, distinct knowledge is not required, but vague knowledge suffices; yet this, if distinct knowledge is lacking, is required per se. I said:

a) Distinct knowledge is not required, but vague knowledge suffices. The reason is that vague knowledge suffices for the one vowing to consent to the object, that is, to those things by which the object is constituted. Hence, for example, a vow of chastity is valid when the one vowing knows that by this vow carnal pleasures are renounced, although he is ignorant of precisely what these pleasures consist in; likewise even if he is ignorant of the "mysteries of life," as they are called.

b) Vague knowledge, if distinct knowledge is lacking, is required per se; for, when this too is lacking, the one vowing does not consent to the object, since it is in no way known. It is said per se, because even vague knowledge does not seem to be required if the one vowing expressly intends to vow what others vow; for then he implicitly consents to the object. Hence one who, for example, in vowing chastity, expressly intends to vow what is vowed by others seems to vow validly, even if he is ignorant, for example, that by a vow of chastity carnal pleasures are renounced. But a defect even of vague knowledge seems almost hypothetical.

Corollary I. Error obstructs validity if it concerns the substantial elements of the thing promised, that is, whether its substance,¹ or the final cause,² or a circumstance which notably changes the substance.³ The reason is that, while error concerning substantial elements remains, consent to the substance is lacking. That a circumstance which notably changes the thing also must be referred to the substantial elements follows from the fact that in this case, according to common estimation, there is a substance or thing morally diverse (St. Alphonsus, III, 198).

Corollary II. Error does not obstruct validity if it concerns either circumstances of lesser moment,⁴ or the impulsive cause.⁵ The reason is that consent to the substance of the thing promised is not lacking. And this holds even if the error gave occasion to the vow;⁶ for the question is not what someone would have done, but what he did. But the fact that, once the error was removed, he would not have consented, does not prevent the fact that he consented (St. Alphonsus, III, 198).

Corollary III. Religious vows, no less than other vows, are void because of error concerning substantial elements, because the reason given above, being drawn from the nature of the thing, must hold here too. Nevertheless, in practice, the said vows will scarcely be void except because of error concerning the very substance of the vows, because, when that error is lacking, error generally will not be such as to constitute a morally diverse object.

3. Perfect liberty, that is, such as is required for sinning gravely; for only an act fully human or fully deliberated suffices for undertaking an obligation (St. Alphonsus, III, 196). Hence vows are invalid when made before the age of discretion, or by one semi-insane, semi-drunk, semi-asleep, or arising from fear which so disturbs the use of reason that full deliberation is impeded. But vows emitted in fervor of devotion are valid, and generally also those which are emitted from sudden passion or levity of mind, because sufficient deliberation generally is present.

Fear which does not impede full deliberation influences a vow in this way:

a) The following do not obstruct validity: 1. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) struck from within, that is, by a cause that is not free; hence a vow emitted in danger of shipwreck is valid; 2. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) justly struck. The reason is that in each case, on the one hand, full deliberation is supposed, and on the other hand no injury has been done to the one vowing, so that no reason exists why the vow would be invalid; 3. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) unjustly struck, but not for extorting a vow, does not obstruct validity; hence a vow emitted so that God may rescue you from the hands of robbers is valid. The reason is that, in relation to the vow, no injury is inflicted on you (St. Alphonsus, III, 197).

b) At least by canon law, grave fear struck from without, unjustly, and for extorting a vow, obstructs validity (can. 1307, § 2). It is disputed whether such fear also by natural law impedes the validity of a vow. Some affirm, and they extend this also to light fear, because God does not accept a vow of this kind, lest He give force to unjust compulsion. Others deny, because, in their opinion, a sufficiently solid reason cannot be alleged why God would not accept a fully deliberated act (cf. St. Alphonsus, cited place).

¹ For example, someone vows a thing of his own which he judges to be glass, when it is a gem.

² Someone vows a Mass for the health of his father, when he is dead.

³ Someone vows a pilgrimage which he judges to be three leagues, when it is six leagues.

⁴ Someone vows a pilgrimage which he judges to be three leagues; but it is three and a half leagues.

⁵ Someone vows alms to be given to poor Peter, whom he judges to be religious, when he is irreligious.

⁶ Suppose that in the cases set forth under 4 and 5, had the error been absent, he would not have vowed the pilgrimage or the alms.

I. Division. Error is distinguished:

1. Into substantial and accidental. Substantial error is had: 1° when the nature of the contract intended by one party is different from the nature of the contract which the other party intends, as if you accept something as a gift, when the other party intends to lend it for use; 2° when the object of consent, at least morally speaking, is different from the object of the present contract, that is, the object upon which the expression of consent is borne, as if you intend to buy a gem, and the expression of consent is borne upon glass; 3° error concerning the person with whom one contracts can be substantial only then when, as in matrimony, the person constitutes the object of the contract.

Others, however, speak thus with respect to error concerning the person: error concerning the person can be substantial or accidental. In matrimony it is always substantial, because the person itself is the object about which the contract is made. In other contracts error is substantial if the person is intended per se and principally, as commonly happens in gratuitous contracts; for example, if you give alms to Peter, thinking him to be poor, when he is rich. Error is accidental if the person is something secondary, which most often has place in onerous contracts, for example if you buy something from Paul the heretic, thinking him to be Catholic; sometimes it also has place in gratuitous contracts, as if you give alms to Peter the poor man, thinking him to be Paul.

Outside the cases enumerated above, error is accidental.

2. Into error which gave cause to the contract, and such as did not give cause to it, according as the contract, with the error set aside, would not have been entered into, or nevertheless would have been entered into.

II. Influence upon the contract. Error concerning the nature of the contract, as is clear, makes the contract void. Hence now let us speak about error which concerns the object of the contract. Now then:

1. Substantial error makes the contract void. For it brings it about that consent is borne upon an object different from the object of the present contract, that is, from the object upon which the expression of consent is borne. Therefore consent is lacking with respect to the object of this contract (St. Alphonsus, III, 714; cf. can. 104).

2. Accidental error effects these things:

a) It makes the contract void if the contracting party attaches his consent to the accident in such a way that it falls back into a condition sine qua non (cf. can. 104). Otherwise it does not make the contract void, because it does not prevent consent from being borne upon the object of the present contract. But the case of nullification occurs especially in error concerning the person, and indeed, that we may apply what others according to the things said in n. 836 hold as substantial error, if the person is intended per se and principally, as commonly happens in gratuitous contracts; for example, if you give alms to Peter, thinking him to be poor, when he is rich. Otherwise it must be said if the person is something secondary, which most often has place in onerous contracts, for example if you buy something from Paul the heretic, thinking him to be Catholic; sometimes also in gratuitous contracts, as if you give alms to Peter the poor man, erroneously thinking him to be a religious (St. Alphonsus, III, 737).

b) It renders the contract rescindable if the error was induced by fraud, and indeed by the other contracting party, and gave cause to the contract. Otherwise it does not render the contract even rescindable.

The reason for the former is that a contract induced by the fraud of the other contracting party involves an injury inflicted by the other contracting party; and this injury must be repaired by him. It is repaired by the fact that the contract involving the injury is removed, in other words rescinded. Therefore it must be rescinded, or at least rescission of it must be offered, by him who inflicted the injury; corresponding to this obligation is the right of rescinding in him who has suffered the injury. If the contract has already been given to execution, the injury is repaired by the fact that the deceived person is restored to his former state with respect to his things (St. Alphonsus, III, 715).

The latter involves three things, namely:

a) Accidental error does not render the contract rescindable if it was not induced by fraud, but, for example, inculpably or fortuitously, or by a non-free cause; because an injury, at least a formal one, to be repaired is lacking.

b) Accidental error does not render the contract rescindable if it was induced by the fraud of a third party. The reason is that injury to be repaired by the other contracting party, for example by Peter, is absent. But an injury inflicted by a third party, Paul, upon one contracting party, James, is not a reason why the other contracting party, Peter, can be deprived, by rescission of the contract, of the right acquired through the contract with James.

c) Accidental error does not render the contract rescindable if it did not give cause to the contract. For from the fact that, with the error excluded, the contract nevertheless would have been entered into, it follows that the contract, equally as other contracts entered into without error, was acceptable to the will; hence, equally as those other contracts, it must be held as firm and non-rescindable.

Nevertheless, observe that if the due equality between wage and price has been injured because of error, it must be repaired; and if fraud has been added, the deceiver is bound to repair also other damages, if perhaps they have followed from the fraud (St. Alphonsus, III, 714 and 715).

Note 1. With respect to ecclesiastical matter, observe these words of can. 104: "In contracts error can give place to a rescissory action according to the norm of law"; likewise these words of can. 1684, § 1: "If someone ... circumvented by fraud ... has entered into a contract which is not null by the law itself, he can, ... once the fraud has been proved, obtain ... the rescission of the contract by the action which is called rescissory."

Note 2. What civil law establishes concerning error, see in the law of one's country.

I. The notion of betrothals. Betrothals¹ are the mutual promise of matrimony between one man and one woman who are capable. It is said:

1. A promise. Therefore a desire, a mere purpose, or a simple negotiation about entering matrimony does not suffice.

2. Mutual. Therefore it is not sufficient that only one party promise, even if the other accepts the promise; but a counter-promise also is required (canon 1017, § 1). As is clear from what has been said, betrothals constitute a contract, and indeed an onerous one; hence for them, as for every contract of this kind, consent is required:

a) Internal. If it is not internal, consent or volition is lacking in reality. Therefore a fictitious promise does not suffice, that is, one made externally but without the mind of promising. One who wishes to enter betrothals, but has the mind of not binding himself, seems not to enter betrothals, because he excludes that without which the contract cannot exist (cf. vol. I, n. 834). But one who wishes to enter betrothals acts validly, even if he has the mind of not fulfilling the obligation (cf. ibid.). In addition, one who has promised fictitiously is guilty of fraud, and therefore is bound to prevent or compensate the damage; even, if this cannot be done in another way, by now promising truly (St. Alphonsus VI, 832, 833).

b) Fully deliberate; for only an act of this kind can produce an obligation and the acquisition of a right. Hence betrothals entered, for example, in drunkenness, by one half-insane, are invalid; likewise betrothals made from a sudden movement of passion can be invalid (St. Alphonsus VI, 831).

c) Sufficiently free from error; wherefore it is enough to note:

α) Error concerning the person with whom betrothals are entered renders these betrothals invalid. The reason is that in betrothals the person constitutes the object of the contract. But error concerning the object of a contract invalidates the contract (vol. I, n. 836).

β) For the same reason, error concerning a quality or circumstances of the person with whom betrothals are entered renders these betrothals invalid if the error redounds into error concerning the person. Otherwise it does not invalidate them, because consent to the object of the contract is not lacking; nevertheless it renders them rescindable if, had the error not existed, the betrothals would not have been entered; practically, if the error concerns a notable defect. These things indeed do not of themselves hold for all onerous contracts, but with regard to betrothals they are admitted in law, as will be explained later (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 18, n. 2).

d) Sufficiently free from fear. Fear which so disturbs the use of reason that the act is not fully deliberate invalidates betrothals (vol. I, n. 840). These things set aside:

α) Fear, whether arising from within, or from a necessary cause, or inflicted justly or unjustly by a free cause, does not invalidate betrothals. The reason is that fear does not prevent the contracting party from furnishing perfect consent. But every contract is intrinsically constituted by perfect consent (St. Alphonsus VI, 844; cf. vol. I, n. 840).

Objection. Grave fear, inflicted unjustly and for extorting consent, invalidates betrothals at least by canon law, just as it invalidates matrimony (canon 1087, § 1), according to that rule: connected things ought to have the same reckoning.

Response. The assertion seems to have to be denied; for since the application of the assigned rule is in itself rather difficult, the Code certainly, if it had wished the rule to be applied, would have stated that betrothals are invalidated by the said fear in the same way as matrimony.

β) Fear renders betrothals rescindable if it has been inflicted both unjustly and by the other contracting party, and has given cause to the contract. If one of the assigned conditions is lacking, fear does not render betrothals rescindable (vol. I, n. 840).

e) External, namely insofar as it must be made known to the other party. Of itself, however, it is indifferent whether it is manifested by words, in writing, or by a sign, for example by a nod. But, with positive law considered, it is required that the legitimate form, to be explained later, be observed (St. Alphonsus VI, 838).

f) Made known to the other party, as was explained in vol. I, n. 834.

g) Made known by the promisor or in his name (vol. I, ibid.).

h) Simultaneous, the one with the other, because otherwise they do not truly agree into one. Of itself, however, it suffices that one consent while the consent previously given by the other persists (vol. I, n. 834).

3. Of matrimony; others say of future matrimony, so that betrothals may be more expressly distinguished from matrimony not yet consummated, which formerly came under the name of betrothals concerning the present, while betrothals properly so called were called betrothals concerning the future.

4. Between one man and one woman. Hence there would not be betrothals if someone promised matrimony to two at the same time.

5. Capable, that is, it is required that the promisors be both actually capable of promising matrimony and at least later capable of contracting it; these things, however, need explanation, which we shall add in the corollaries.

¹ Betrothals are so called from promising, namely from the practice of the Romans, by which one who wished to take a girl as wife addressed her father or guardian with the solemn formula: "Do you promise?" and he responded: "I promise." She who was promised was the bride, that is, the promised one; he to whom she was promised was the bridegroom; he who promised was the sponsor; the whole contract was betrothals; the day on which it was entered was called sponsal.

III. Sufficiently free from ignorance; concerning which observe that ignorance differs from error. Ignorance is the mere defect of knowledge, and does not import an opinion or judgment; error, however, imports an opinion or judgment, and a false one. Now ignorance of the matrimonial object invalidates consent, because the will is not borne toward the unknown. Hence:

Corollary I. Those who are ignorant that matrimony is a permanent society between man and woman for procreating children contract invalidly (canon 1082, § 1). This ignorance is not presumed after puberty (canon 1082, § 2). It is said permanent; by this word indissolubility properly so called, or the essential property of matrimony, is not understood; otherwise the Code would also make mention of other equally essential properties, for example unity. But there is understood some permanence which must last more or less, and is supposed in every society.

Corollary II. Those who are ignorant that the procreation of offspring is obtained by means of bodily union seem to contract invalidly, because there is ignorance of the object, that is, of the right over the body in order to procreating children.

Corollary III. Those who are ignorant only of the mode of union or intercourse have sufficient knowledge of the object, because the said ignorance does not prevent them, by explicitly handing over the right over the body in order to procreation, from at least implicitly handing over the right to acts of themselves apt for generation. Thus also the Sacred Congregation of the Council.¹ The aforesaid things hold even if someone, once the truth was known, would not have entered matrimony, since the question is not what someone would have done, but what he did.

¹ March 15, 1856; December 18, 1869.

I. The formal causes of imputability are: 1° the malice of the delinquent; 2° the fault of the delinquent, whether in ignorance of the law or in omission of the diligence required so that the law may be observed (canon 2199).

1. Malice here is the deliberate will of violating the law; to it is opposed, on the part of the intellect, defect of knowledge, and on the part of the will, defect of liberty. Once the external violation of law has been posited, malice is presumed in the external forum until the contrary is proved (canon 2200).

Corollary I. Those who actually lack the use of reason are incapable of delict (canon 2201, § 1). The reason is that deliberation is absent.

Corollary II. Those habitually insane, although at times they have lucid intervals or seem sane in certain reasonings or acts, are nevertheless presumed incapable of delict (canon 2201, § 2). The reason is that deliberation in them is presumed to be absent until it is proved to be present.

Corollary III. A delict committed in voluntary drunkenness does not lack some imputability (canon 2201, § 3). This is clear if drunkenness does not wholly take away the use of reason; but if it wholly takes it away, the delict is imputed if it was foreseen at least in some measure (vol. I, n. 60). Besides, the imputability of a delict committed in voluntary drunkenness is less than when the same delict is committed by one who is fully master of himself, unless, however, drunkenness was sought precisely for perpetrating or excusing the delict. But when law is violated in involuntary drunkenness, imputability is wholly absent if drunkenness wholly takes away the use of reason; it is diminished if it takes it away only in part. The same should be said of other similar disturbances of mind (canon 2201, § 3), for example from morphine.

Corollary IV. Weakness of mind diminishes the imputability of a delict, but does not wholly remove it (canon 2201, § 4).

2. Ignorance of the violated law influences the imputability of the transgression in this way:

a) Inculpable ignorance removes the imputability of the transgression and consequently the delict (canon 2201, § 1).

b) Culpable ignorance diminishes imputability more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself (cited canon). Nevertheless, concerning affected ignorance it is disputed whether it increases or diminishes imputability (vol. I, n. 32).

Note 1. Ignorance of the penalty alone does not remove the imputability of the delict, but diminishes it somewhat (canon 2202, § 2).

Note 2. Those things which are established concerning ignorance, whether of the law or of the penalty, also hold concerning inadvertence¹ and concerning error² (canon 2202, § 3); likewise concerning ignorance of fact, for instance if someone strikes a cleric whom he certainly or probably holds to be a layman.

Note 3. Ignorance, or inadvertence or error concerning law or penalty or fact, is generally not presumed (canon 16, § 2).

3. Omission of due diligence. If someone has violated the law from omission of due diligence, the imputability is diminished in the manner to be determined from the circumstances by a prudent judge; but if he foresaw the matter and nevertheless omitted the cautions for avoiding it which any diligent person would have used, the fault is proximate to malice (canon 2203, § 1). Moreover, a fortuitous case which cannot be foreseen, or which when foreseen cannot be met, exempts from any imputability (canon 2203, § 2).

¹ It is actual ignorance in one who enjoys habitual knowledge.

² It is positive ignorance, or ignorance joined with the admission of what is false.

II. Requisites for someone actually to contract a penalty latae sententiae.

1. Requisites on the part of the delict. A penalty established by law is not incurred unless the delict has been perfect in its own kind according to the property of the words of the law (canon 2228). This condition regards the external part of the delict (n. 846); when the attempt of a delict is punished in law, consummation in the genus of attempt is required. Finally it must be observed that the property of the words requires strict interpretation; for example, the delict of homicide, which is punished by law, is not present unless death has followed. In doubt, whether of the external fact or of imputability, the penalty is not incurred, because from a doubtful cause no one is deprived by a certain right (cf. canon 2232, § 1: "who is conscious to himself of the delict").

2. Requisites on the part of the delinquent regard the formal part of the delict, or imputability. Therefore first recall that grave imputability is required¹ (canon 2218, § 2), but does not always suffice, for someone to be liable to a penalty. With these things attended to, certain things are noted or even established by the Code, of which some are general and regard ignorance and similar things which influence imputability; others concern the impubescent and cooperators.

a) General matters. alpha) Affected ignorance either of the law or of the penalty alone excuses from no penalties latae sententiae (canon 2229, § 1).

beta) If the law has the words: has presumed, has dared, knowingly, studiously, rashly, has acted deliberately, or other similar words which require full knowledge and deliberation, any diminution of imputability, whether on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will, exempts from penalties latae sententiae (canon 2229, § 2). It is said any diminution of imputability; hence even ignorance of the penalty, unless it is affected (cf. canon 2202, § 2); likewise even light fear.

gamma) If the law does not have those words:

1° Crass or supine ignorance of the law, or even of the penalty alone, exempts from no penalty latae sententiae. Ignorance of the law, or even of the penalty alone, which was not crass or supine excuses from medicinal penalties latae sententiae; but if the imputability of the delict is grave, it does not excuse from vindicative penalties latae sententiae (canon 2229, § 3, 1°, compared with canon 2218, § 2).

2° Drunkenness, omission of due diligence, weakness of mind, or impulse of passion, if, notwithstanding the diminution of imputability, the action is still gravely culpable, do not excuse from penalties latae sententiae (canon 2229, § 3, 2°).

3° Grave fear, if the delict tends toward contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority or toward public harm of souls, in no way exempts from penalties latae sententiae (canon 2229, § 3, 3°). With these things attended to, grave fear outside the enumerated cases excuses from penalties latae sententiae, at least on account of doubt; the doubt is introduced by canon 2218, § 2.

Note. Although the guilty person according to the norm of § 3, n. 1, is not bound by censures latae sententiae, nevertheless this does not prevent him, if the matter bears it, from being affected by another congruous penalty or penance (canon 2229, § 4).

b) Impubescent persons are excused from penalties latae sententiae, and are to be corrected rather by educational punishments than by censures or other graver vindicative penalties; but pubescent persons who have induced them to violate the law or have concurred with them in the delict according to the norm of canon 2209, §§ 1-3 (n. 849), themselves indeed incur the penalty established by law (canon 2230). Note that an irregularity from delict can nevertheless be contracted by impubescent persons (canon 985).

c) Cooperators. If several have concurred in perpetrating a delict, although only one is named in the law, those also who are mentioned in canon 2209, §§ 1-3, are bound, unless the law has expressly provided otherwise, by the same penalty; the others, however, are not likewise bound, but are to be punished with another just penalty according to the prudent judgment of the Superior, unless the law establishes a particular penalty against them (canon 2231).

Question. To what extent, if there is question of a penalty latae sententiae, is a declaratory sentence required?

Response. A penalty latae sententiae, whether medicinal or vindicative, binds the delinquent who is conscious to himself of the delict by the fact itself in both forums; nevertheless, before a declaratory sentence, the delinquent is excused from observing the penalty whenever he cannot observe it without infamy, and in the external forum no one can exact from him the observance of that same penalty, unless the delict is notorious, the prescription of canon 2223, § 4, remaining firm (canon 2232, § 1; n. 856).

A declaratory sentence carries the penalty back to the moment of the committed delict (canon 2232, § 2); this is practical, for example, in the case of restitution to be made of fruits received, which therefore must be computed from the moment of the perpetrated delict (cf. canon 2280).²

¹ At least insofar as the defect of grave imputability excuses from any penalty in the internal forum, and also in the external forum if the defect is proved for the external forum (cited canon).

² On the contrary, if someone incurs excommunication latae sententiae and before the sentence acquires an office, after the sentence the acquisition is not rendered invalid, as Cerato thinks, p. 20; for only acquisition after the sentence is invalid (cf. canons 2265, § 1, 2°; 2266; 2296, § 2).

Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act.—An act is human, or voluntary, when it is deliberately desired; and, since nothing can be deliberately desired unless it is known, an act done without knowledge is not human or voluntary. Thus, a delirious patient does not will the language he uses, for his mind is confused and he does not understand what he is saying.

With reference to the will of the person who is ignorant, three kinds of ignorance may be distinguished.

(a) Ignorance is concomitant (simultaneous with the act of the will), when it is not voluntary, and yet is not therefore the reason of the act that follows it, since that act would have been done, even had there been knowledge. This may be illustrated by the example of a hunter who intended to kill an enemy, and killed him only accidentally while shooting at an animal.

(b) Ignorance is consequent (after the act of the will), when it is voluntary, which may happen in different ways: first, when ignorance is affected, as when a person expressly desires to remain ignorant about his duties, so that he may have an excuse for his sins, or that he may not be disturbed in his evil life; secondly, when he neglects to acquire the knowledge he ought to possess, as when a hunter kills a man, thinking him an animal, because he took no pains to be sure before firing.

(c) Ignorance is antecedent (before the act of the will), when it is not voluntary, and is the cause of the act that follows since the act would not have been done, if there had been knowledge. For example, a hunter who has used reasonable diligence to avoid accidents, kills a man whom he mistook for a deer.

With reference to the responsibility of the person who is ignorant, there are two kinds of ignorance. (a) Ignorance is invincible when it cannot be removed, even by the use of all the care that ordinarily prudent and conscientious persons would use in the circumstances. Thus, a person who has no suspicions of his ignorance, or who has tried in vain to acquire instruction about his duties, is invincibly ignorant. (b) Ignorance is vincible when it can be removed by the exercise of ordinary care. There are various degrees of this species of ignorance: first, it is merely vincible, when some diligence has been exercised, but not enough; secondly, it is crass or supine, when hardly any diligence has been used; thirdly, it is affected, when a person deliberately aims to continue in ignorance.

Influence of the Various Kinds of Ignorance on the Voluntariness of Acts.—(a) Ignorance of an act, whether as to its substance or quality, makes an act involuntary, when the ignorance itself is involuntary, as will be explained in paragraph 29. Hence, if we refer to ignorance that is not blameworthy and to the guilt of violating the law of God, we may say: “Ignorance excuses.”

(b) Ignorance does not make an act involuntary before human law, unless the law itself presumes the ignorance or the ignorance is proved, as will be explained in the Question on Law (see 489 sqq.). For, when law is sufficiently promulgated or a fact pertains to one’s own self, the presumption is that ignorance does not exist, or that it is culpable. Hence, the general rule of law common to all forms of jurisprudence: “Ignorance does not excuse” (cfr. Canon 16 of the Code of Canon Law).

Effects of Concomitant, Consequent, and Antecedent Ignorance.—(a) Concomitant ignorance does not make an act involuntary, because it does not cause anything that is contrary to the will; but it does make the act that is performed non-voluntary, since what is unknown cannot be actually desired.

(b) Consequent ignorance cannot make an act entirely involuntary, since such ignorance is itself voluntary; but it does in a certain respect make an act involuntary, i.e., inasmuch as the act would not have been done save for the ignorance. (c) Antecedent ignorance makes an act entirely involuntary.

Effects of Invincible and Vincible Ignorance.—(a) Invincible ignorance, even of what pertains to the natural law, makes an act involuntary, since nothing is willed except what is understood. Hence, no matter how wrong an act is in itself, the agent is not guilty of formal sin (see 249), if he is invincibly ignorant of the malice involved.

(b) Vincible ignorance does not make an act involuntary, since the ignorance itself is voluntary; hence, it does not excuse from sin. It does not even make an act less voluntary and less sinful, if the ignorance is affected in order that one may have an excuse; for such a state of mind shows that the person would act the same way, even though he had knowledge.

Ignorance, passion and malice cause sin as follows:

(a) Every sin results from practical error (i.e., from a wrong decision as to what one should do here and now), for the will chooses wrong only after the intellect has decided on wrong. In this sense, then, it is said that all who sin are in error (Prov,, xiv. 22), and that every sinner is in ignorance (Aristotle, Nich. Ethics, Bk. III, c.1, 1110b 27). But not every sin results from speculative error (i.e., from a false notion or judgment about the lawfulness of an act in general). else we should have to hold that everyone who sins is in error against the faith;

(b) Speculative ignorance causes formal sin, when the ignorance is culpable and leads to wrongdoing, as when a person has never taken the pains to learn what the law of fast requires and in consequence violates the law, or when an automobilist through carelessness does not see a person crossing the street and runs him down. Speculative ignorance causes material sin, when the lack of knowledge is inculpable and leads one to do what one would not otherwise do, as when a child shoots a playmate, not knowing that this is a sin, or a soldier shoots a comrade whom, on account of darkness, he mistook for an enemy spy;

(c) Passion, by clouding the judgment and vehemently inciting the will, leads one to act against one’s better knowledge and to choose inordinately the concupiscences of pleasure, or possessions, or glory (I John, ii. 16). If the passion is voluntary, the resulting sin is formal; but, if the passion is involuntary and takes away the use of reason, the sin caused is material;

(d) Malice is found in a sense in every formal sin, inasmuch as every sin is committed out of choice. But malice in the strict sense, as here understood, is a choice of sin made, not on account of preceding ignorance or passion, but on account of some corrupt disposition of the sinner which makes sin pleasing or acceptable to him, such as a vicious habit or inclination which he cultivates, or willful despair or presumption which he entertains.

Ignorance and passion do not always make an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), and hence three kinds of formal sins may be distinguished according to the three kinds of causes from which they proceed:

(a) sins of weakness, which are those that result from antecedent concupiscence or other passion that lessens without taking away the voluntariness of an act. Since the First Person of the Trinity is especially described by the attribute of almighty power, sins of this kind are sometimes called sins against the Father;

(b) sins of ignorance, which are those that result from antecedent and vincible ignorance. Since wisdom is especially attributed to the Second Person of the Trinity, sins of this kind are called sins against the Son;

(c) sins of malice, which are those that proceed entirely from a free will that is undisturbed by ignorance or passion. Since love is especially ascribed to the Third Person of the Trinity, sins of this class are sometimes called sins against the Holy Ghost. Example: One whose heart is so set on wealth that he decides to sacrifice the friendship of God for new acquisitions; one who sees clearly the offense to God a sin entails, and deliberately chooses it; one who is so jealous of a neighbor that he schemes to ruin him; one who sins habitually without fear or remorse.

Those who have not the use of reason, either habitually (as children and the insane) or actually (as the intoxicated), may be invincibly ignorant of the Natural Law—for example, they may be unable to perceive even the difference between right and wrong. As to those who have the use of reason, they can be ignorant of the Natural Law only as follows:

(a) they cannot ever be invincibly ignorant of the most general precepts (such as “good is to be done,” “evil is to be avoided”), for since they know the difference between right and wrong, they must also perceive that which is contained in the concepts of right and wrong, viz., that the former is something desirable and which ought to be done, the latter something undesirable which must not be done;

(b) one cannot, as a rule, be invincibly ignorant of those precepts that are immediately inferred as necessary conclusions from the most general precepts (such as “that which was borrowed must be returned”), for the conclusion follows so easily from the manifest principle that only in exceptional cases could one be excused for not knowing its truth;

(c) one can, even as a rule, be ignorant of precepts that are inferred as necessary but very remote conclusions from the most general precepts, (such as “that which was borrowed must be returned at such a time or place, or in such a manner or condition”), for this conclusion is so far removed from its premise, and there are so many factors to be considered, that considerable knowledge and skill in reasoning are required for a correct judgment—things in which many people are lacking.

Ignorance of the Law of Christ.-(a) Outsiders may be in invincible ignorance of the Law of Christ. For many persons through no fault of their own, in times past or even today, have not heard the Gospel message: “How shall they believe Him of whom they have not heard?” (Rom, x. 14).

(b) Christians may be in invincible ignorance of the Law of Christ. For, just as want of a preacher causes a pagan to be invincibly ignorant of the necessity of Baptism, so a lack of instruction in Christian doctrine might leave a baptized person inculpably ignorant (e.g., of the duty of receiving the Eucharist).

Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness.—After the sins against faith itself come the sins against the Gifts of the Holy Ghost that serve faith (see 808): (a) against the Gift of Knowledge is the sin of ignorance; (b) against the Gift of Understanding are the sins of blindness of heart and dullness of understanding.

Culpable ignorance regarding truths of faith, as a distinct sin, is as follows:

(a) It is not distinct from its cause (i.e., negligence), for ignorance is not a sin at all, except in so far as it proceeds from negligence. Hence, one would not be obliged to accuse oneself of the sins of omission in regard to instruction in Christian doctrine and of ignorance in Christian doctrine, for these are but one sin.

(b) Culpable ignorance is not distinct from its effect (i.e., from a sin committed on account of the ignorance), if the truth one is ignorant of has to be known only on account of some passing duty that must be performed here and now; for in such a case the knowledge is required, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the duty. Hence, ignorance of fact or of a particular law is not distinct as a sin from the sin that results from it. Examples: Titus knows that he should not take money that belongs to another; but through his own carelessness he is ignorant of the fact that the money before him belongs to another, and takes the money. Balbus knows that the precept of the Church on fasting is obligatory; but through his own negligence he is unaware that today is a fast day, and does not fast. Titus and Balbus committed one sin apiece.

(c) Culpable ignorance is distinct from its effect, if the truth one is ignorant of has to be known for its own sake; for in such a case one sins against the virtue of studiosity (see 905) by not knowing something which one should know habitually, and also against some other virtue by violating its precepts as a result of one’s sinful ignorance. Truths one is obliged to know for their own sake are the mysteries of faith, the Commandments of the Decalogue, the Precepts of the Church, and the duties of one’s own state. Examples: Sempronius through his own carelessness does not know the mystery of the Incarnation, and as a result blasphemes Christ. Titus does not know that stealing is a sin, and therefore he steals. In both cases two sins are committed, the sin of ignorance and the sin that resulted from ignorance.

Confessors should examine in religion penitents who show signs of ignorance (e.g., in the manner of making their confession), and should grant or deny absolution according to the case.

(a) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary as a means of justification (see 790), the penitents should be dealt with as explained in 792.

(b) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary because commanded and there is urgent need of absolution (e.g., on account of mortal sin committed), the penitent may be absolved, if he is truly contrite and promises to repair his negligence by studying his religion, attending Sunday school, instructions, etc.

(c) If the ignorance is about the truths necessary because commanded, and there is no urgent necessity of absolution, the penitents may be sent away without absolution. Thus, children who have no serious sins to confess and who do not know how to say the act of contrition or other prayers, or who cannot answer simple questions of the Catechism, should be sent away with a blessing and told to study these things and return when they know them better.

Does ignorance cause the involuntary? - Ignorance with which someone acts either has itself causally in relation to that which is done, or has itself merely concomitantly with respect to that which is done. It has itself concomitantly "when ignorance concerns that which is done; nevertheless, even if it were known, it would still be done. For then ignorance does not induce one to willing that this be done, but it happens at the same time that something is done and unknown; as... when someone would indeed wish to kill an enemy, but, ignorant, kills him, thinking he is killing a deer. And such ignorance does not make the involuntary" (namely contrariwise), "because it does not cause something that is repugnant to the will; but it makes the non-voluntary" (or the involuntary merely privatively), "because what is unknown cannot be actually willed." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8.

But it makes the non-voluntary, whether that merely concomitant ignorance is involuntary, or whether it is not merely concomitant, but voluntary. Nevertheless there is a distinction between involuntary and voluntary ignorance in the case; because involuntary concomitant ignorance, since it simply takes away the voluntary, makes something simply non-voluntary. But voluntary concomitant ignorance, since it does not simply take away the voluntary, for it is voluntary, makes that which is done with that ignorance non-voluntary indeed in itself, but voluntary in some way in the cause. S. Th. de Malo, q. 3. a. 8.

Voluntary in the cause, namely insofar as the ignorance concerns a thing which ought to have been known, and perhaps someone knowing would not do what he does ignorantly. And if certainly he would do it even knowing, the voluntary is still had indirectly in the cause, by reason of that evil disposition which the willed ignorance leaves intact, and by reason of that action, for example hunting, which was the cause of the consequent act, for example homicide. To the point Suarez, on 1. 2, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 2, n. 19: "That ignorance does not excuse from fault; therefore neither does it take away the voluntary. He is bound to expel that ignorance in order to avoid the act, and voluntarily omits to do this; therefore he also acts voluntarily, at least indirectly. Therefore it matters nothing that this ignorance is not the cause of the act, and that if knowledge were present, the act would nevertheless take place; both because, although we grant that that act is not voluntary in ignorance as in a cause, nevertheless that ignorance will be a sufficient condition for that act to be voluntary indirectly, insofar as man is bound and can avoid it and does not do so; for what he would have done if knowledge existed does not excuse him, but rather in a certain way accuses him more, because that is an evil disposition and contrary to the obligation by which he is bound to avoid the act; and also because that effect is voluntary in another act directly willed, as, for example, the killing of a man in hunting. But voluntary ignorance, although it is concomitant, is the reason or condition that that prior act of hunting be done imprudently or incautiously, and consequently that in it the effect thence following is judged to have been willed."

Indeed, notwithstanding that evil disposition, he was still then bound, indeed much more, to know; and knowing, perhaps, notwithstanding that evil disposition, he would not have committed the monstrous crime with open eyes. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; Billuart, de Act. hum., diss. 1, art. 6, I say 3.

If ignorance is not merely concomitant, or does not have itself merely concomitantly in relation to that which is done, but is causing, or has itself causally, namely is the cause of doing that which is done, then that ignorance is either voluntary, or consequent upon a free act of the will, or it is not voluntary, or antecedent to a free act of the will. A free act of the will, namely concerning the ignorance itself, not concerning that which is afterward done from that ignorance. "But consequently," says S. Th. ibid., "ignorance has itself to the will insofar as it is voluntary."

Therefore when ignorance of this kind is the cause of doing that which is done, "since it is itself voluntary... it cannot cause the involuntary simply" (that is, contrariwise; since that which is done is voluntary in the cause from which it proceeds, i.e. in that willed ignorance). "Nevertheless it causes the involuntary according to a certain respect, insofar as it precedes the movement of the will to doing something, which would not be if knowledge were present," ibid.; that is, although that movement of the will is voluntary in the cause, nevertheless in itself it is altogether involuntary, for it would not be if knowledge were present. L. 1. 5. n. 4.

But if the causing ignorance, or that which is the cause of doing what is done, is not voluntary, or is antecedent, then ignorance causes the involuntary simply, since that which is done, by the very fact that it is caused by ignorance, would not be if knowledge were present, and accordingly is against the will. Nor indeed is that willed in itself; nor in any way willed in the cause. Therefore it remains totally or simply involuntary. "But antecedently," says the Holy Doctor ibid., "ignorance has itself to the will when it is not voluntary, and nevertheless is the cause of willing what otherwise one would not will; as when some man is ignorant of some circumstance of the act which he was not bound to know, and from this does something which he would not do if he knew: for example, when someone, diligence having been used, not knowing that someone is passing along the road, shoots an arrow with which he kills the passerby. And such ignorance causes the involuntary simply."

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1. As regards the insane, it is certainly not always established that they are not sufficiently in possession of themselves in an act of sin. Nor likewise is it established whether those who are hypnotized, and in hypnotic sleep execute the evil commands of the one hypnotizing, are not also sufficiently in possession of themselves. But in these cases the voluntary can easily be in the cause.

Whether ignorance renders the act objectively null? - R. Negatively. The reason is that our false estimation cannot change the objective truth of the thing. And thus an unbeliever who baptizes, thinking that a man is not really justified by baptism, nevertheless, if he has the intention of doing what the Church does, baptizes validly. A priest baptizing in a case of necessity with water which he falsely does not think to be natural, if the water is truly natural, baptizes validly. A pastor who assists at a marriage, falsely thinking that he still needs some special delegation of the bishop which he does not have, validly assists at it. Consequently it must be said that by ignorance an act objectively null is not validated. Therefore, if a confessor ignorant of reserved cases absolves from them, he by no means truly absolves from them. Bonacina, de Sacram., d. 1, q. 2, p. 1, n. 28; Sporer, de Matr., n. 48.

Is ignorance always sin? - One ignorance is invincible, another vincible. Invincible ignorance has place when someone suspects nothing at all concerning the thing itself and concerning the obligation of inquiring; or although he has fallen into suspicion of the thing and of the obligation of inquiring, nevertheless after using moral diligence, he could not know the thing. After moral diligence; for it is not necessary that the diligence to be used be the greatest, but it suffices that it be common and ordinary, proportionate to the person and to the matter about which there is question.

Vincible ignorance is had when someone not only comes into doubt about the thing and about the obligation of inquiring, but also has occasion of coming into knowledge of the thing, and nevertheless voluntarily passes it by. L. 1. 1. n. 3. Antecedent ignorance is always invincible; but not every invincible ignorance is antecedent. Even merely concomitant ignorance is invincible. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8. Invincible ignorance is involuntary; but vincible ignorance is voluntary.

Vincible ignorance is one thing directly voluntary, another indirectly voluntary, another voluntary accidentally. Directly voluntary ignorance is called affected ignorance. This is had when someone deliberately wills to be ignorant, whether because of weariness of learning, or so that he may sin more freely, or so that he may have an excuse, or so that he simply may not be drawn back from sin. Indirectly voluntary ignorance is had when someone omits to apply study to knowing, or neglects to learn because of mere laziness or sloth, because of the labor of learning, or because of other occupations. Ignorance of this kind is distinguished in two ways, namely into crass or supine, and into purely vincible. Crass or supine ignorance is in him who, although he does not studiously seek ignorance, nevertheless uses no diligence or almost no diligence to acquire for himself that knowledge which according to his condition he can have. Purely vincible ignorance is when someone uses some diligence for knowing the truth, but slight and by no means sufficient, considering the quality of the person and the gravity of the matter.

Finally, accidentally voluntary ignorance is that which is not intended and is outside the intention, and which is had "when someone directly or indirectly wills something to which ignorance follows. Directly indeed, as appears in the drunk man, who wills to drink wine excessively, through which he is deprived of the use of reason; but indirectly, when someone neglects to repel the rising motions of passion, which, growing, bind the use of reason in the particular thing to be chosen." S. Th. de Malo, q. 3. a. 8.

Oblivion, inconsideration, and inadvertence are equated with ignorance. Therefore the same moral judgment must be made concerning these as concerning simple ignorance. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 3; L. 1. 1. n. 169; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 9; q. 76. a. 3.

Finally, one ignorance is of law, by which a law or precept is unknown, as if someone does not know that marriage is contracted invalidly with one related by affinity; another is of fact, by which a fact is unknown, as if someone contracting marriage with one related by affinity does not know that she is related by affinity; another is of penalty, by which someone is ignorant of the penalty added to the law, as if someone striking a cleric does not know that excommunication is attached to that striking.

Invincible ignorance is not sin; but vincible ignorance is sin if it concerns those things which someone is bound to know, but not if it concerns those things which one is not bound to know. The reason for the first part is that ignorance is called invincible because it cannot be overcome by study. But it is not imputed to man as negligence if he does not know those things which he cannot know. Therefore such ignorance, since it is not voluntary, because it is not in our power to repel it, is not sin. The reason for the second part is that whoever neglects to have or to do that which he is bound to have or to do sins by a sin of omission. Hence because of negligence, ignorance of those things which someone is bound to know is sin. Therefore it will be a sin to be ignorant of those things without knowledge of which one cannot rightly exercise a due act. Hence all are bound commonly to know those things which are of faith and the universal precepts of law; but individuals are bound to know those things which pertain to their state or office. But there are certain things which, although someone is naturally able to know them, nevertheless he is not bound to know, such as the theorems of geometry and contingent particulars, unless perhaps in some particular case that occurs.

St. Augustine, l. 3 de lib. arb., c. 19; Suarez, on 3. p., t. 5, d. 4, s. 8, n. 18; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 6; q. 76. a. 2, 3; Quodl. 1. a. 19; Quodl. 8. a. 15; L. 1. 5. n. 4, 26 ff.; Wurzburg, c. 1, a. 3; E. M.

Whether ignorance diminishes sin? - Antecedent, invincible, efficacious ignorance, or ignorance that is the cause of sin, "which totally excuses from sin, because it totally takes away the voluntary, does not diminish sin, but altogether removes it." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4. "Ignorance which is not the cause of sin, but has itself concomitantly to sin, neither diminishes sin nor increases it." S. Th. l. c., since it in no way influences the act of sin; nor consequently does it take away sin, insofar as it does not render it involuntary, but it takes it away only insofar as it renders it non-voluntary. S. Th. l. c. a. 3. But cf. 48.

Consequent ignorance that is purely vincible, or even crass or supine, efficacious, or the cause of sin, "diminishes the voluntary and consequently sin." S. Th. l. c. For the voluntary is had only indirectly or in the cause. Consequent affected ignorance, efficacious, or the cause of sin, "seems to increase the voluntary and sin; for from the intention of the will to sin it comes that someone wills to undergo the loss of ignorance on account of the liberty of sinning." Thus S. Th. l. c. a. 3 and others. But others deny this, and their opinion, says St. Alphonsus, H. A. tr. 19, n. 8, truly cannot be called improbable. For he who transgresses the law knowingly and prudently openly contemns it; he who affects ignorance still seems to fear the law somewhat. But one must distinguish; for ignorance of this kind can proceed from various affections and motives.

If someone affects ignorance because of weariness of learning, or not precisely so that he may not be drawn back from sin, but so that he may not be drawn back from such an action to which he strongly adheres, or even so that he may not be drawn back from sin, the sin is not thereby increased. For ignorance of itself diminishes the notion of a human act and formal contempt of the law. Moreover, if for this reason he wills to be ignorant, so that he may not be drawn back from sin, therefore if he knew, perhaps in reality he would be drawn back from sin. Therefore that ignorance shows a will not so confirmed in such a sin.

But if someone affects ignorance because he absolutely wills the sin itself, whether in reality it is prohibited or not, then the sin is increased, because that ignorance is a sign both of great affection toward sin and of greater contempt; since with such affection he pursues sin that he is willing also to suffer the loss of ignorance, and thus to sin, although perhaps the thing in itself is not a sin. Therefore although that ignorance also excuses, because it always conceals the condition of the work, nevertheless it accuses and increases the sin by reason of its cause. Luke 23:34; Acts 3:17; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 4, s. 2; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, s. 4, n. 183; Struggl, l. c. n. 36.

Since sins which proceed from ignorance are voluntary only in the cause, and consequently have no other malice than the malice which was present in the positing of the cause itself, the gravity or lightness of the sin which follows from it must be taken from that cause, not from the gravity or lightness of the thing which is derived from it. For this latter is voluntary and culpable only insofar as the ignorance itself is voluntary and culpable. And thus from lightly culpable ignorance of a physician or confessor, grave effects can follow, which consequently do not bring grave fault.

Is vincible ignorance of law a special sin of itself? - R. Negatively. For every law commanding its own observance implicitly commands knowledge of the same law. But it commands this only in order to the work which is commanded to be done or omitted. Therefore that vincible ignorance of law receives its species from the transgression of the law itself, for which it provides the cause or danger. And this has place also as regards ignorance of the articles of faith. For although knowledge of them, as the more common opinion has it, is commanded by a special precept and through itself, and therefore, standing in the obligation itself of knowing, such ignorance is culpable of itself, nevertheless this sin is opposed to the same virtue of faith. For the malice of sin against faith is in this, that someone offends the authority of the one speaking by not believing. But this irreverence is found not only when someone knowingly dissents from God speaking, but also when someone culpably neglects to examine whether it is the doctrine of God, and because of that negligence dissents from those things which are said by God. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 182 ff.; Laymann, l. 1, tr. 2, c. 4, n. 10; Viva, de Act. hum., q. 3, final article.

Can someone labor under an invincibly erroneous conscience as regards depraved desires and other merely internal acts, namely if no exterior action follows? - Speaking explicitly and generally about desire, Elbel has this, n. 127: "That many, at least among the more uneducated and less instructed, can inculpably persuade themselves that desires of this kind are not evil unless they are completed by deed, seems sufficiently certain; and Sanchez, Stoz, and La-Croix expressly teach this." This opinion, says S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 9, "I have never been able to judge probable.... With other learned recent authors I judge it little probable." The reason for this opinion is that if someone certainly knows the malice of the external action, and nevertheless wills to execute it, he already knows that he wills evil. How then will he be excused from sin? But as regards simple delectation, that invincible ignorance can more easily be present; for the tendency of the will toward evil is not so evident as in desire efficacious of itself. And the same also seems to have to be said of inefficacious desire.

Can children invincibly be ignorant of the malice of pollution? - R. Affirmatively, absolutely speaking, at least in some rare case, and at the beginning of a depraved habit. The reason is that the fact that an immodest look or touch, or the capturing of pleasure from procured pollution, or even from that which has naturally arisen, etc., are morally evil and illicit, is not so evidently made known from the very comprehension of the first principles, but discourse is needed to detect their malice. Therefore their malice can at least for some time be inculpably unknown. From this a prudent confessor will easily conclude that in such a contingency of fact one must proceed cautiously and prudently; and this caution and prudence, if it must always and with all be observed, especially in the matter of chastity, must be observed most of all with boys and girls. Elbel 128; Struggl l. c. n. 13.

When does the obligation of law cease? Obligation can cease in three ways: either on the part of the subject, or on the part of the superior, or on the part of the law itself. On the part of the subject it can cease: 1. Simply, through exempting causes, which totally withdraw him from the dominion of the law, for example if someone betakes himself outside the place which the law affects. 2. In a qualified way, through impeding causes, which impede or excuse from its fulfillment a subject remaining under the law. These causes are reduced to invincible ignorance, to fear, and to impotence. Ignorance, if it is invincible, excuses; because no one sins except by a voluntary act, and this presupposes knowledge. But if it is vincible and culpable it does not excuse; such it is when you were able and bound to know or to learn, and it came to mind to doubt, and you did not take pains to understand. L. 168, 170 ff. Cf. here 50, 51. Fear, namely grave fear, often excuses, since from it the observance of the law passes into a grave inconvenience. And so fear of death, e.g., often excuses not only from a positive precept, both human and divine, but sometimes even from an affirmative natural precept. Hence one is not bound, with danger of life, to confess integrally, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, etc. L. 175. Cf. here 62, 63. Impotence, even moral impotence, excuses. For if the object of the law, considered in itself, is not so difficult and grave, but from particular circumstances becomes such, then there is no longer that obligation which the legislator intends to impose, since that object has been notably changed. And thus David ate the loaves of proposition, prohibited to laymen, when he was in danger of undergoing a grave evil. 1 Reg. 21; Matt. 12, 3, 4. But grave inconvenience and harm must be proportioned to the gravity of the law, so that it may legitimately excuse from it. Since no one is held to the impossible, after someone has become unable to fulfill the law, he is excused, although he sinned in positing the cause; e.g., if someone squandered his goods, and then cannot pay his debts. L. 176. Cf. here 64, 65, 66, 171.

On the part of the superior it can cease: 1. Through dispensation, which is the legitimate relaxation of the law in a particular case. 2. Through privilege, which is a constant and permanent favor granted by a superior against or beyond the common law.

On the part of the law itself the law can also cease. For "it happens many times that something, in the majority of cases, is useful to be observed for the common welfare, yet in some cases is very harmful. Therefore, because the legislator cannot look upon all singular cases, he proposes the law according to those things which happen in the majority of cases, directing his intention to common utility. Hence, if a case arises in which the observance of such a law is harmful to the common welfare, it is not to be observed... But nevertheless this must be observed: that if the observance of the law according to the words does not have a sudden danger which must be met at once, it does not belong to just anyone to interpret what is useful and what is useless to the city; but this belongs only to the Princes, who on account of cases of this sort have authority in the laws to dispense. But if there is a sudden danger, not permitting so much delay that recourse can be had to the superior, necessity itself has a dispensation annexed, because necessity is not subject to law." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96, a. 6. Cf. here 179.

Do ignorance, fear, and grave inconvenience excuse from invalidation? - R. To the first: Negatively, because subjective ignorance, whether of fact or of law, does not supply the objective defect of the act; and thus there is no marriage, when there stands, e.g., the diriment impediment of consanguinity, whether it is contracted in good faith or in bad faith. - But if the invalidating law is penal, then, if ignorance excuses from guilt, it also excuses from the penalty of invalidation. But if guilt is admitted, yet the penalty of invalidation is unknown, then more probably this is not incurred, because invalidation is an extraordinary and exorbitant penalty, from which ignorance excuses. Schmalz., l. 5, t. 37, n. 105; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 32, n. 17. More commonly, however, they affirm that it is incurred, because since such ignorance does not excuse from sin against the law, neither consequently does it excuse from the penalty, although this is unknown. Suarez, l. 5, c. 22; Ithur., Cas. 53, n. 24. Nor indeed does ignorance excuse in any way if the invalidation was established principally to preclude evils which otherwise would flow into the commonwealth, but the penalty only accessorily, for coercing the person. And indeed the proper reason of an invalidating law is common utility.

R. To the second and third: There are not lacking those who affirm it, because positive law ought to yield to the natural law of charity, and because in the case there is a certain legitimate epikeia. But it seems one must answer with the common opinion: Negatively; because grave fear, and even gravest inconvenience, neither render the person capable, nor restore to acts the force taken away by law. But since laws of this sort primarily and directly tend to preserving the public good, no place is given to epikeia on account of merely private harm. And thus a marriage between blood relatives and relatives by affinity will be void, even to avoid death, even in the article of death. Private harm, I say; for if a common harm is present, since then the law would become harmful to society, invalidation ceases. L. 191; l. 3, n. 112; l. 6, n. 1029; de Privil., n. 57; Diana, t. 2, tr. 6, r. 62, 73; Sanch., de Matr., l. 3, d. 17, n. 3; Ithur., Cas. 53, n. 18; M. E., vol. 20, p. 177, 474.

Do ignorance, fear, and age excuse from penalty? R. To the first: Affirmatively for the internal forum, if ignorance excuses from guilt against the law, whether it is ignorance of law or ignorance of fact; for penalty is a certain natural consequence of guilt. - R. Negatively for the same forum, if ignorance does not excuse from guilt against the law, and is concerned with the penalty alone, understand an ordinary penalty; but not an extraordinary and exorbitant one. The reason of the distinction is that an ordinary penalty is always foreseen in some way from the nature of the crime itself, since natural light itself dictates that evil is to be punished according to its nature. But an extraordinary penalty cannot be foreseen even confusedly. R. Likewise negatively for the external forum. For knowledge of the law is presumed, unless, however, ignorance of the law seems probable, i.e., likely. For presumption yields to truth. L. 169; l. 6, n. 705, 1074; l. 7, n. 351.

R. To the second: Unjust and grave fear, which excuses from human law, whose obligation regularly is none with grave inconvenience, consequently excuses from the penalty annexed to human law. Hence, although perhaps it does not excuse from grave sin, because that which was prohibited was forbidden also by natural law, nevertheless it still excuses from the penalty, unless the positive law itself does not cease, as for instance if something is extorted to public harm. C. 5, De his quae vi.

To the third: From the indulgence of canon law, age excuses those not yet pubescent, C. 1, 2 de Del. puer.; C. 1, 60 de Sent. exc. By civil law minors are punished more mildly. C. I. Poen. 44, 53 ff.; C. B. 828. - Cf. here 195; Suarez, de Cens., d. 5, s. 1, n. 19; Castropalao, tr. 3, d. 1, p. 24, § 2, n. 8; Scavini, l. 1, n. 822, ed. 12, Milan 1874; Bouquillon, de lege, n. 159.

What if someone were promoted to sacred orders either invincibly ignorant of the obligation of chastity attached to them, or expressly unwilling to vow that obligation itself, or if he were compelled to this by grave fear, or if he were ordained in the very age of infancy? - Reply to the first: Some probably say that he is held to chastity, namely by force of the universal law itself of the Church. Others "probably judge that if the ignorance had been altogether invincible, the ordained man would not be held to chastity, neither from a vow nor from a precept of the Church, because the Church would not intend to oblige such a one; but otherwise if the ignorance had been culpable, or if someone intended to receive the order with the same obligation with which others receive it." Ignorance of this kind is not presumed in the external forum, since it concerns a law so clear and most commonly handed down.

Reply to the second: "In such a case he would be held to chastity not from a vow, but from the precept of the Church, which from a motive of religion would bind him to chastity, the vow being absent."

Reply to the third: One must distinguish: If he did not have the intention of receiving sacred ordination, he is not held, as having been invalidly ordained. If he had the mind of receiving sacred orders, and the fear was just, more probably he is held, because since he is unwilling unreasonably, such fear neither exempts from law nor invalidates the vow. If again he had the mind of receiving sacred orders, but the fear was unjust, more probably he is not held, because of the opposite reason. Wherefore he can validly contract marriage, "but he cannot minister in the order while the marriage stands, nor enjoy clerical privileges." But the nullity of the ordination must be established in the external forum by canonical process. Cf. 106.

Reply to the fourth: "It is certain that he who is ordained before the use of reason, although the ordination is valid, nevertheless is not held to chastity; whence he can validly and licitly enter marriage." Benedict XIV, Bull Eo quamvis tempore, May 4, 1745, commands that in the sixteenth year of age an option be given to them; and, if they wish to preserve chastity, they are admitted to the exercise of the order; otherwise, if they do not wish. And he adds that after ratification they invalidly contract marriage and are held to the divine office. If after the use of reason, but before puberty, some probably say that he is held, others not improbably deny it. The reason is that such a vow, from which this obligation more probably comes, "constitutes a man in an irrevocable state, in which the Pontiff never or rarely dispenses; whence such a vow requires a mature and perfect use of reason." L. l. 6, n. 80, 781, 809-811; S. Th. Suppl. q. 39, a. 2; Sanchez in Dec. l. 5, c. 6, n. 5-8.

Does ignorance excuse from the impediment of asking the debt? R. More probably affirmatively, if there is ignorance of law, namely of the human law prohibiting this. The reason is that just as ignorance excuses from the transgression of a human law, so also from the penalty. If there is ignorance of fact, namely that this woman is a blood relative of the wife, it is common that the impediment is not incurred. The reason is that where the fault of incest is lacking, the penalty is also lacking. This is clear also from C. Si quis 1, de Eo qui cognovit, etc., where this impediment is imposed on one sinning knowingly. Ignorance of the penalty also excuses with sufficient probability, since it is an extraordinary penalty. L. 1072, 1074.

Does ignorance excuse from incurring censure? Invincible ignorance, whether of fact, of law, or of penalty, i.e., of the censure attached, excuses from incurring it. For contumacy is lacking. Here forgetfulness and inadvertence operate the same as ignorance. Ignorance that is vincible and lightly culpable, or even gravely culpable if it is not crass or supine, also excuses from incurring censure; otherwise if it is crass and supine, from C. final, de Const., in VI, where it is said, "we do not wish the ignorant to be bound, when nevertheless their ignorance has not been crass or supine." But whether there is truly given gravely culpable ignorance which nevertheless is not crass or supine is disputed. Commonly they deny it; yet many affirm it, because for crass ignorance a certain highest negligence is required, and negligence can be gravely culpable although it is not the highest.

A fortiori affected ignorance, whether of fact, of law, or of penalty, does not excuse from incurring censure. Vincible ignorance that is gravely culpable, whether it is crass or supine, or, probably, even affected, excuses from incurring censure if in the Decree there is a clause: whoever does this knowingly, deliberately, rashly; whoever has presumed to do this, etc. For one who acts with ignorance of whatever kind surely does not act knowingly. And indeed, from the Holy Office, January 12, 1870, by these words, by rash daring, or from presumption, etc., it is signified that someone committed a delict not while compelled or ignorant, but prudently and knowingly; and moreover it ought not to be wondered that one devoid of every excuse is subject to censure. L. 43-45, 48.

What is required for incurring irregularity from delict? In order that irregularity from delict be incurred, i.e., from one's own delict, the human act must be: 1. external, for this irregularity is a penalty in the external forum; 2. mortally evil, because it is a grave penalty, to which light fault does not correspond; 3. fully consummated, for odious things are to be restricted. L. 348. But it is by no means required that the crime be public. Rather irregularity is incurred because of a crime even occult. Trent, sess. 24, chap. Liceat 6; L. 349. But is knowledge of the law of the Church prohibiting required? The most common and more probable opinion affirms; because this irregularity is a true penalty. Chap. Proposuisti, Dist. 82; L. 350. Is knowledge of the penalty, or of the irregularity, also required? It is controverted; and it must be affirmed with sufficient probability, because irregularity is as it were an extraordinary penalty. L. 351; book 6, n. 705. But as ignorance excuses from irregularity as from a penalty, so fear also excuses. Irregularity, however, is not had from any delict whatsoever, although enormous, but only from delicts constituted in Law, namely from the following:

1. Adalbertus confesses thus: 1. wishing to kill Titius, my enemy, I killed Caius, my friend. 2. By shooting a bullet at a deer, I at the same time pierced my enemy, sought on another occasion for death, standing hidden in a thicket. 3. Ignorant that it was a vigil, I ate meat; but out of laziness on Sunday I had not been present at Mass, in which the obligations occurring in the week are customarily announced.

Q. 1. Does ignorance cause the involuntary? 2. What is to be judged concerning Adalbertus?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 48. To the second: in the first case Adalbertus is not excused from the sin of homicide, since knowingly and willingly he killed a man. But if he used due diligence to guard against the homicide of another besides Titius the enemy, since his external act is not formally injurious to Caius, whom he killed altogether involuntarily, he is not to be bound to any restitution toward his heirs. But otherwise, if he omitted due diligence, or foresaw confusedly the danger of killing Caius. - I. M. 1370, 1372, 1373.

In the second case, either he used due diligence to guard against the damage of another, or he did not. If the former, the act is not voluntary, and consequently not a sin. If the latter, he is guilty of homicide. But since the enemy was standing hidden in a thicket, and Adalbertus thought he was killing nothing except a deer, he seems to be excused from homicide. - Elbel 46.

In the third case, either a thought occurred to him about an obligation perhaps to happen within the week, or no thought occurred. If the former, the ignorance was vincible, and he sinned against the precept of the Church by neglecting to inquire. If the latter, although he sinned by omitting Mass, nevertheless he did not sin by the omission of fasting. I. M. 8, 207, 288. - G. 12, 13, 14, 646 seqq.

2. Abundius, a priest approved for receiving the confessions of the faithful, experiences that his knowledge is slight and insufficient for duly carrying out that office; nevertheless he continues to hear confessions, because he has authentic testimony of the bishop concerning his suitability. Hence, through defect of knowledge and study, he commits various errors concerning the species of sins to be inquired into, and especially concerning the obligation of restoring. Having been rebuked by a confessor and bound to make restitution on behalf of the penitents, he had resolved seriously to apply himself to the studies of Moral Theology, and meanwhile to interrupt the sacred ministry, when behold, suddenly he is called to Titius, who is dying, and, as report has it, liable to various restitutions. He goes on uncertain, absolves the poor man while doubtful, not being able to discern the entangled conscience, and returns sad, muttering that he would again be liable to restitution on behalf of the penitent.

Q. 1. Is there sin in the case from ignorance, or are the aforesaid errors imputable to Abundius? 2. Did he sin gravely in each instance? 3. Is he liable to restitution?

R. To the first: the prior errors are indeed imputable to Abundius in themselves, because he labors under vincible and crass ignorance, and by persisting in it he was sinning gravely. But the errors committed in the confession of the dying Titius are by no means imputable to him; because, with such necessity standing, he could and ought to hear his confession, notwithstanding the defect of the required knowledge; and therefore the errors, not willed but only permitted, are judged in the case. I. M. 35.

To the second, affirmatively, in itself, namely if at least confusedly he adverted to his defect of knowledge, with the case of Titius excepted, however. But if he ever acted entirely inadvertently, then there was indeed sin in the cause, but actual sin was lacking. I. M. 288.

To the third: he is held to nothing if by keeping silent he behaved merely negatively, omitting to urge restitution. But he is held to restitution if he positively imposed the obligation of restitution on the penitent, or positively denied it, against justice, whether toward the penitent or toward others damaged. I. M. 1405 and V. 2, 828, 829. - G. 15, 16; I. M. 50, 51.

3. Antonius, by very often blaspheming, swearing, and detracting from the reputation of his neighbor, has contracted a habit of these sins. He often confesses them; and the confessor, with great care and solicitude, asks about the number of the aforesaid sins, and adds salutary admonitions. But since Antonius has confessed the same sins always throughout an entire year, although always with lesser frequency, his confessor resolved to deny him absolution.

Q. 1. Are sins from a contracted habit and custom truly voluntary and imputable? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, affirmatively, if one adverts to them in himself, as regularly happens. But if in reality due advertence and deliberation are lacking, when someone, for example, blasphemes, swears, etc., from a contracted habit, then there is no sin when someone blasphemes, or swears, etc.; but only in the cause, namely when he posits the cause. Therefore it is then useless in confession to ask the number of these material acts; because, since the whole guilt is in the cause, this is neither increased nor diminished from the greater number of subsequent acts, but depends on prudent foresight. But that cause is, first, the very frequency of acts, from which habit or custom is begotten. Nevertheless in practice it is often not adverted that, through that repetition of acts, a custom is acquired; indeed, often one hopes that he will not relapse again in the future. The cause, secondly, is negligence in removing that custom already acquired; whence the acts are indirectly voluntary. And thus, by adverting to this contracted custom, and nevertheless neglecting to root it out, the following acts are indirectly voluntary, even if actually guilt is lacking by defect of advertence, and by the same defect of advertence guilt was also lacking in the very contracting of the custom. But if one tries to root out the contracted custom, then guilt is no longer in the cause, although perhaps it had been present, since the cause has been retracted. Nor indeed is there voluntary, at least indirectly, if someone really seriously, as is supposed, tries to resist the custom. - If, actual guilt being set aside, sin is had only in the cause or indirectly, then, since the custom must therefore be removed so that the following evil acts may be prevented, if these are gravely evil, the obligation of removing the custom will be grave; if they are lightly evil, the aforesaid obligation will be light. Likewise, if the following acts are gravely evil, and are voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, then there will indeed be grave sin if there is grave negligence in rooting out the custom; but there will be only light sin if the negligence is light. - L. 1, 3, n. 127; l. 5, n. 14; I. M. 35-39.

To the second: whether Antonius, by blaspheming, swearing, detracting, always at least sinned gravely actually, in grave matter, depends on his actual advertence, and then the confessor rightly asks about the number of these sins. But if actual advertence was lacking, which in practice is difficult, then nothing remains except sin from the voluntary in the cause and from the indirectly voluntary. But such voluntary seems to be removed in the case from the fact that Antonius often confesses, and in fact also tries to diminish the frequency of those sins. For this shows that Antonius has retracted the contracted custom of sinning, and effectively strives to root it out. And then there is no reason why the confessor should be painstaking and scrupulous in asking about the exact number of sins. But the confessor acts badly in resolving to deny absolution to Antonius; for Antonius does not lack sufficient sorrow and purpose. - G. 2; I. M. 53 and V. 2, 809.

1. In the preceding Commentaries we have spoken about the nature of the human act; now we must speak about the impediments of the same human act. For having a human act there is required the exercise of an adverting intellect, the exercise of the free choice of the will, and the exercise of the other faculties proceeding from the free will. If we consider the fact itself, often we act without knowing what we are truly doing, thinking that we are doing something else. Often also we act, impelled by some vehement passion of concupiscence, or oppressed by some vehement passion of fear. Not rarely also we are forced to suffer, wholly unwilling, by an extrinsic force inflicted on the members of our body. Hence it is asked whether acts of this kind are truly human acts and imputable to the agent, since ignorance, concupiscence, fear, force, or violence seem to take away or diminish the aforesaid conditions and endowments of the human act. For ignorance takes away the prerequired cognition; concupiscence clouds and diminishes it; likewise concupiscence, fear, and violence hinder the inclination of the will. In the present Commentary there will be discussion only of ignorance. Concerning concupiscence, concerning fear, concerning force, there will be discourse in the following Commentaries.

2. Ignorance is distinguished into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent. Ignorance can be compared either to the will of the one ignorant, or to the action done ignorantly. With respect to the will, every ignorance is either antecedent, because it precedes the consent of the will, or consequent, because it follows the consent of the will. The former is involuntary, the latter voluntary. With respect to the action, it is either antecedent, because it is the cause of the act, or concomitant, because it is not the cause of the act. Hence the same ignorance can be antecedent and consequent in a diverse respect: antecedent, because it is the cause of the act; consequent, because it follows the consent of the will. Becanus, Tr. 1, C. 2, q. 10, n. 36.

3. The first question which is raised concerning ignorance, and which the Angelic Doctor in fact raises, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8, is: “whether ignorance causes the involuntary.” The question is not whether ignorance causes the non-voluntary, or the involuntary merely privatively. For it is evident and not disputable that an act from ignorance, or done with ignorance, destitute of the condition essentially required for the voluntary, is a non-voluntary act. Therefore the question is only whether an act of this kind is, besides, involuntary, namely involuntary contrarily. Understand involuntary with respect to the condition ignored, not with respect to the object known and willed. For he who, for example, eats meat on a forbidden day can be understood to will and operate two things. The first is to eat meat, which is not unknown by him; the other, that he transgresses the precept, is unknown by him.

4. Therefore ignorance with which someone acts either has itself causally in relation to that which is done, or has itself merely concomitantly with respect to that which is done. It has itself concomitantly “when ignorance is about that which is done; nevertheless even if it were known, it would nonetheless be done. For then ignorance does not induce one to will that this be done, but it happens at the same time that something is both done and ignored; as in the example posited, namely when someone indeed wished to kill an enemy, but, being ignorant, kills him, thinking that he is killing a deer. And such ignorance does not make the involuntary (namely contrarily), because it does not cause something which is repugnant to the will; but it makes the non-voluntary (or the involuntary merely privatively), because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 8. And this holds whether that concomitant ignorance is voluntary or is involuntary. Hence it is that the Angelic Doctor speaks generally and does not distinguish. Nevertheless a difference is present between involuntary and voluntary ignorance in the case, because, although neither causes the involuntary, concerning which the Holy Doctor properly treats, l. c., nevertheless involuntary concomitant ignorance, since it simply takes away the voluntary, makes the simply non-voluntary; but voluntary concomitant ignorance, since it does not simply take away the voluntary, for it is voluntary, indeed makes the non-voluntary in itself, but voluntary in the cause. “Therefore because that which is caused from the will is regarded as voluntary in morals, insofar as ignorance itself is voluntary, to that extent it falls short from this, that it causes the non-voluntary.” S. Th., De Malo q. 3. a. 8.

5. If ignorance is not merely concomitant, or does not have itself merely concomitantly in relation to that which is done, but is a cause, or has itself causally, namely is the cause of doing that which is done, then that ignorance is either voluntary, or consequent upon a free act of the will, or it is not voluntary, or is antecedent to a free act of the will. A free act of the will, namely concerning the ignorance itself, not concerning that which is then done from the ignorance itself. “Consequently,” says St. Thomas in the same place, “ignorance has itself to the will insofar as it is voluntary.” Therefore when ignorance of this kind is the cause of doing that which is done, “since it itself is voluntary..... it cannot cause the simply involuntary (namely contrarily, since that which is done is voluntary in the cause whence it proceeds, namely in that willed ignorance); nevertheless it causes the involuntary secundum quid, insofar as it precedes the motion of the will toward doing something, which would not exist if knowledge were present”; ib.; namely, although that motion of the will is voluntary in the cause, nevertheless in itself it is wholly involuntary; for it would not be if knowledge were present. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 4.

6. But if the ignorance causing, or which is the cause of doing that which is done, is not voluntary, or is antecedent, then ignorance causes the involuntary simply, since that which is done, by the very fact that it is caused by ignorance, would not exist if knowledge were present, and thus is against the will. Nor indeed is it, in itself, willed; nor in any way willed in the cause. Therefore it remains totally or simply involuntary. “Antecedently,” says the Holy Doctor in the same place, “ignorance has itself to the will when it is not voluntary, and nevertheless is the cause of willing what otherwise one would not will; as when some man is ignorant of some circumstance of the act, which he was not bound to know, and from this does something which he would not do if he knew: for instance when someone, diligence having been applied, not knowing that someone is passing along the road, shoots an arrow with which he kills the passer-by. And such ignorance causes the involuntary simply.”

7. Whether ignorance renders an act objectively null? — Resp. Negatively. The reason is that our false estimation cannot alter the objective truth of the thing. And thus an unbeliever who, in baptizing, thinks that a man is not in reality justified by baptism, if nevertheless he has the intention of doing what the Church does, validly baptizes. A priest baptizing in a case of necessity with water which he falsely does not think to be natural, if the true water is natural, validly baptizes. A parish priest who assists at matrimony, falsely thinking that he still needs a certain special delegation of the bishop which he does not have, validly assists at it. Cf. Bonac., De Sacram., D. 1, Q. 2, P. 1, n. 28.; Sporer, De Matr., n. 48.

8. Whether ignorance is always a sin? — Ignorance differs from nescience and from error. Nescience is the simple negation of knowledge; whence anyone who lacks knowledge of certain things can be said not to know them. Nescience, as is clear, is not a sin. But ignorance is the privation of knowledge, namely when someone lacks knowledge of those things which he is apt by nature to know. Error is to approve false things as true. “Whence it adds a certain act over and above ignorance: for there can be ignorance without the fact that someone makes a judgment concerning things unknown, and then the one ignorant is not erring; but when he now makes a false judgment about the things which he does not know, then he is properly said to err. And because sin consists in act, error manifestly has the account of sin (namely of itself or objectively); for it is not without presumption that someone make a judgment concerning things ignored, and especially in those things in which danger exists.” S. Th., De Malo q. 3. a. 7. It is not without presumption, namely again of itself or objectively; for subjectively and as to formal sin, or fault, presumption yields to truth, if in good faith, if invincibly, someone has erred, as must presently also be said concerning ignorance.

9. Although ignorance is joined with error, nevertheless it is distinguished from error. Likewise, although ignorance is joined with sin, nevertheless it is not always sin itself. “Since the will is of the good or of the apparent good, the will is never moved into evil unless that which is not good appears in some way to reason as good; and on account of this the will would never tend into evil except with some ignorance or error of reason.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77. a. 2. Ignorance indeed takes away cognition of the thing ignored, but it does not take away the use of reason. If the use of reason itself is lacking, as in infants, the insane, those sleeping, the drunk, the voluntary and the human act cannot be had from defect of the use of reason, unless perhaps in the cause. Yet practically it is not always easy to determine whether sometimes in these there is had a use of reason sufficient for grave sin.

10. Further, as concerns ignorance, a twofold ignorance must be distinguished by reason of the voluntary: one invincible, the other vincible. Invincible ignorance has place when someone suspects absolutely nothing concerning the thing itself and concerning the obligation of inquiring; or, although he has fallen into a suspicion of the thing and of the obligation of inquiring, nevertheless after moral diligence has been applied, he could not know the thing. It is said, after moral diligence; for it is not necessary that the diligence to be applied be the greatest, but it suffices that it be common and ordinary, proportioned to the person and to the matter in question. Cf.

St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 3. Vincible ignorance is had when someone not only comes into doubt of the thing and of the obligation of inquiring, but besides has the occasion of coming to knowledge of the thing, and nevertheless voluntarily passes it by.

11. Invincible ignorance is involuntary; but vincible ignorance is voluntary. Vincible ignorance is one thing directly voluntary, another indirectly voluntary, another voluntary per accidens. Directly voluntary ignorance is called affected ignorance. This is had when someone deliberately wills to be ignorant, whether on account of weariness of learning, or so that he may sin more freely, or so that he may have an excuse for sin, or so that he may simply not be drawn back from sin, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 9., q. 76. a. 3., De Malo q. 3. a. 8. Indirectly voluntary ignorance is had when someone omits to apply study for knowing, or neglects to learn on account of mere laziness or sloth, on account of the labor of learning, on account of other occupations. Ignorance of this kind is distinguished in two ways, namely into crass or supine and into purely vincible. Crass or supine is in him who, although he does not studiously seek ignorance, nevertheless applies no or almost no diligence to acquire for himself that knowledge which according to his condition he can have. Purely vincible is when someone applies some diligence for knowing the truth, but slight and by no means sufficient, with consideration of the quality of the person and the gravity of the matter. Finally, ignorance voluntary per accidens is that which is not intended and is outside the intention, and which is had “when someone directly or indirectly wills something upon which ignorance follows. Directly indeed, as is clear in the drunk man who wills to drink wine superfluously, through which he is deprived of the use of reason; indirectly, however, when someone neglects to repel the rising motions of passion, which, increasing, bind the use of reason in a particular eligible thing.” S. Th., De Malo q. 3. a. 8.; 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.

12. Moreover forgetfulness, inconsideration, and inadvertence are equated with ignorance. Wherefore the same moral judgment must be passed concerning these as concerning simple ignorance. Cf. Suarez, D. 4, S. 3.; St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 169.

13. Further, invincible ignorance is not sin; but vincible ignorance is sin, if it is of those things which someone is bound to know, but not if it is of those things which someone is not bound to know. The reason of the first part is that ignorance is called invincible because it cannot be overcome by study. But it is not imputed to a man as negligence if he does not know those things which he cannot know. Therefore such ignorance, since it is not voluntary, because it is not in our power to repel it, is not sin. The reason of the second part is that whoever neglects to have or to do that which he is bound to have or do, sins by a sin of omission. Whence, on account of negligence, ignorance of those things which someone is bound to know is sin. But the sin is graver in proportion as the ignorance is more voluntary. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 2., q. 19. a. 6., Quodl. 8. a. 15.

14. Therefore it will be a sin to be ignorant of those things without knowledge of which someone cannot rightly exercise a due act. Whence all are commonly bound to know those things which are of faith and the universal precepts of law; but individuals are bound to know those things which pertain to their state or office. But there are certain things which, although someone is born apt to know them, nevertheless he is not bound to know, such as the theorems of geometry and particular contingencies, unless perhaps in a particular case occurring. S. Th. l. c.

15. Having posited that ignorance can be sin, it is asked further: whether ignorance can also be a cause of sin? — Sin can be taken in two ways: formally, for subjective fault itself; materially, for the objective act itself of sin. — If the discussion is about the objective act itself of sin, how ignorance can be a cause of sin is shown thus. Toward that which is unknown as to all things, the will cannot be borne. But if something is known according to something and unknown according to something, the will can will it. And in this way ignorance is a cause of sin, as when someone knows that this one whom he kills is a man, but does not know that he is his father; or when someone knows that some act is pleasurable, yet does not know that it is sin. Further, the moving cause is twofold, one per se and another per accidens. Per se indeed is that which moves by its proper power; but per accidens, as removing what prohibits, or as the very removal of what prohibits. And in this way ignorance can be the cause of an act of sin. For it is the privation of knowledge perfecting reason, which prohibits the act of sin insofar as it directs human acts. Whence it is clear that not every ignorance of one sinning is a cause of sin, but only that which takes away the knowledge prohibiting the act of sin, not that which simply takes away the knowledge of the act of sin. If the will of someone, for example, is so disposed that, recognizing his father, he certainly would not kill him, and this man kills a man not knowing that he is his father, ignorance is the cause of the act of parricide; if on the contrary the will of someone is so disposed that he would not be prohibited from the act of parricide even if he recognized his father, ignorance of the father is not the cause of sin for this man, but has itself concomitantly to the sin; and therefore such a one does not sin because of ignorance, but sins while ignorant. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1. — If the discussion is about the subjective fault itself of sin, vincible ignorance can be a cause of sin or fault. The reason is that “ignorance is said to cause the act which the opposite knowledge was prohibiting.” But someone can deliberately will not to know certain things, lest he be drawn back from sin; someone can, on account of other occupations, neglect to learn those things by which he would be drawn back from sin. But invincible ignorance cannot be the formal cause of sin. For invincible ignorance can be the cause of effecting an act which would be sin if it were done voluntarily; yet simply it is never a cause of sin, because when it is present, not only is the act not sin, but it can even be virtue. Cf. n. 6. — S. Th. l. c. a. 3.; Suarez, Tr. 5, D. 4, S. 1, n. 5.

16. “But it must be considered that reason is directive of human acts according to a twofold knowledge, namely according to universal and particular knowledge. For one conferring about things to be done uses a certain syllogism, whose conclusion is judgment, or election or operation. But actions are in singulars. Whence the conclusion of the operative syllogism is singular; but a singular proposition is not concluded from a universal except by means of some singular proposition. Thus a man is prohibited from the act of parricide by this, that he knows that a father is not to be killed, and by this, that he knows this one to be his father. Therefore ignorance of either can cause the act of parricide, namely both of the universal principle, which is a certain rule of reason, and of the singular circumstance.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1. The former, by reason of the object, is ignorance of law; the latter is ignorance of fact. The first is had when either the general law itself is ignored, or the comprehension of some particular case under the aforesaid law. But the other is had when either the thing itself morally taken, concerning which the matter is, is ignored, as, for example, if you believe you are killing a wolf and you kill a man; or when some circumstance of the thing, likewise morally inspected, is ignored, as, for example, if you believe you are killing an enemy and you kill your brother. Ignorance of law happens both in the uneducated and in learned men themselves, who often go off into contrary opinions; ignorance of fact likewise can happen in all, from inconsideration, from forgetfulness, from inadvertence. Ignorance of law is one thing simply of law, commanding or prohibiting something; another is of the penalty constituted by law against transgressors of the law. This ignorance can happen more easily when the penalty is extraordinary.

17. Since ignorance can be a cause of sin, another question arises: whether ignorance can excuse entirely from sin? — Ignorance which is the cause of an act has of itself that it excuses from sin. The reason is that the voluntary belongs to the account of sin. But that ignorance causes the involuntary; since, as has already been said, ignorance is said to cause the act which the opposite knowledge was prohibiting; and thus such an act, if knowledge were present, would be contrary to the will, which the name involuntary imports.

18. But sometimes it does not excuse totally from sin, sometimes it excuses totally from sin. And this the Angelic Doctor declares thus, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 3: “That it sometimes does not excuse totally from sin can happen from two things. In one way from the part of the thing itself ignored. For ignorance excuses from sin insofar as something is ignored to be sin. But it can happen that someone indeed ignores some circumstance of sin, which if he knew, he would be drawn back from sinning, whether that circumstance makes for the account of sin or not; and nevertheless there still remains in his knowledge something through which he knows that it is an act of sin; for instance, if someone striking someone knows indeed that he is a man, which suffices for the account of sin, but nevertheless does not know him to be his father, which is a circumstance constituting a new species of sin; or perhaps he does not know that the one defending himself strikes him back, which, if he knew it, he would not strike him, which does not pertain to the account of sin. Whence although such a one sins on account of ignorance, nevertheless he is not totally excused from sin, because there still remains to him cognition of sin. In another way this can happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, namely, that ignorance itself is voluntary either directly, as when someone studiously wills not to know certain things, so that he may sin more freely; or indirectly, as when someone, on account of labor or on account of other occupations, neglects to learn that by which he would be drawn back from sin. For such negligence makes the ignorance itself to be voluntary and a sin, provided that it is of those things which someone is bound and able to know. And therefore such ignorance does not totally excuse from sin. But if the ignorance is such as to be wholly involuntary, either because it is invincible, or because it is of that which someone is not bound to know, such ignorance wholly excuses from sin,” if namely ignorance of this kind, invincible, is total by reason of the bad object unknown, and not only partial; for example, if someone in the example already adduced not only invincibly were ignorant of the circumstance of father, but also of the circumstance of man, and believed that he was striking and killing a beast.

19. Ignorance which is not the cause of sin does not excuse from sin. The reason is that ignorance of this kind does not cause the involuntary, but only makes the man not willing; but of the account of sin, as has been said, is the voluntary; and the voluntary is taken away by the involuntary, not by the non-voluntary; for the non-voluntary is simple lack and negation, just as white is taken away by black, but is not taken away by non-white, because non-white is a mere negation. — Wherefore when it is said that ignorance which is not the cause of the act does not excuse from sin, the sense is that of itself it does not excuse from sin, or does not have the force of taking sin away from the act, because it permits or leaves the act to be perfectly voluntary; but the sense is not that in the act in fact there perseveres the account of formal sin, for while ignorance stands, if it is invincible, the act lacks the condition required for sin, namely cognition of the malice of that act. But the Angelic Doctor, in the cited place, says simply that ignorance of this kind does not excuse from sin, because this ignorance in relation to the act has itself merely per accidens and not per se, as is clear from what has been said, since it influences nothing in the act, and knowledge considers those things which are per se, not those which are per accidens. — Wherefore, since that ignorance merely happens accidentally to sin, it neither accuses nor excuses the sin. It does not excuse, since it does not cause the involuntary; it does not accuse, because nevertheless it makes the act non-voluntary. But that by these things the Holy Doctor does not wish to affirm that in an act posited with such ignorance the account of sin is had, is confirmed from q. 6. a. 8., where, speaking of concomitant ignorance, which namely is not the cause of that which is done, and of what would be done still even if it were known, he says: “and such ignorance does not make the involuntary, because it does not cause anything which is repugnant to the will; but it makes the non-voluntary, because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed.” Moreover formal sin cannot exist in the non-voluntary. Cf. also q. 19. a. 2. ad 3.

20. The question now follows: whether ignorance diminishes sin? — “Ignorance which is not the cause of sin, but has itself concomitantly to sin, neither diminishes sin nor increases it,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4. The reason is that that ignorance influences nothing in the act of sin; whence, just as it does not excuse from sin, cf. n. 19, so also it neither increases nor diminishes sin, but leaves it wholly in that state in which it is. If a confessor, for example, is so disposed in soul that he absolves all penitents, whether prepared or indisposed for sacramental absolution, the fact that he is ignorant, whether voluntarily or non-voluntarily, of the principles of Moral Theology, this ignorance, as it is not the cause of the sin and does not excuse from that sin, so neither does it increase or lessen it. The same should be said of an ignorant physician of the healing art who is so disposed in soul that he wills to procure, as much as is in him, not the health, but the death of the sick.

21. But ignorance which is the cause of sin, and “which totally excuses from sin, because it totally takes away the voluntary, does not diminish sin, but wholly takes it away.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.

22. Ignorance alone which is the cause of sin, and yet does not totally excuse from sin, can diminish sin, because it diminishes the voluntary. Cf. n. 4. 5. Wherefore consequent ignorance indirectly voluntary, namely crass or supine ignorance, or purely vincible ignorance, and ignorance voluntary per accidens, since they diminish the voluntary, consequently diminish sin.

23. “Sometimes,” says the Angelic Doctor in the cited place, “ignorance which is the cause of sin is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or per accidens; as when someone does not will to labor in study, from which it follows that he is ignorant; or when someone wills to drink wine immoderately, from which it follows that he is made drunk and lacks discretion. And such ignorance diminishes the voluntary, and consequently sin. For when something is not known to be sin, it cannot be said that the will is borne directly and per se into sin, but per accidens. Whence there is less contempt there, and consequently less sin.”

24. Consequent ignorance directly voluntary, that is, affected ignorance, seems on the contrary to increase the voluntary, and consequently sin. “But it happens sometimes,” says St. Thomas in the cited place, “that such ignorance is directly and per se voluntary, as when someone of his own accord does not know something, so that he may sin more freely. And such ignorance seems to increase the voluntary and sin. For from the intention of the will toward sinning it comes about that someone wills to undergo the loss of ignorance on account of the freedom of sinning.” Thus indeed St. Thomas and others. But others deny it, and their opinion, says St. Alphonsus, H. A. Tr. 19. n. 8., in reality cannot be called improbable. For he who transgresses the law knowingly and prudently openly contemns it; he who affects ignorance still seems to fear the law somewhat.

25. But it seems that one must distinguish, for ignorance of this kind can proceed from various affections and motives. If someone affects ignorance merely on account of weariness or labor in learning, or not precisely lest he be drawn back from sin, but lest he be drawn back from such an action, to which he strongly clings, the sin certainly is not increased: for example, if someone were unwilling to know what the Church has defined concerning some matter, because he does not wish to depart from the Church’s definition, and otherwise wishes to think freely, as long as the Church’s definition is not certain to him. For then, if it happens in the matter that he dissents from the definition of the Church, without doubt this is with a lesser will, and without pertinacity, and with less contempt. But if someone affects ignorance for this end, lest he be drawn back from sin, the sin is increased precisely in the account of intrinsic inclination, and of the inclined will, and, in this sense, of the voluntary, since the man so loves that thing that on account of it he wills even to undergo the loss of ignorance; but it is diminished simply in the account of a human act, for ignorance, from whatever cause it may arise, per se lessens the account of a human act and the formal contempt of law. Moreover, in such a case that man wills to be ignorant for this reason, lest he be drawn back from sin. Therefore, if he knew, perhaps in reality he would be drawn back from sin. Therefore that ignorance shows that the will is not so firmly established in such a sin. Finally, if someone affects ignorance because he absolutely wills the sin itself, whether in reality it is prohibited or not, wholly contemning the law, the sin certainly is increased, because that ignorance is a sign of great affection toward sin and of greater contempt, since he pursues sin with such affection that he wills even to suffer the loss of ignorance and thus to sin, although perhaps the thing in itself is not sin; as if someone, in the example adduced, should be unwilling to know the definition of the Church, because he has decreed to think thus, whatever the Church may think. And in this sense indeed St. Thomas in the cited place seems to be understood. Cf. Suarez D. 4. S. 2.; Lugo, On Penance, D. 4. S. 4. n. 183.; Struggl, cited place, n. 36.

26. As regards the species of sins from ignorance, concerning sins not foreseen, which are done from voluntary ignorance totally depriving one of the use of reason, such as the sins of the drunken and of those voluntarily insane, let us neither say that these are not in the genus of morals, considering those acts in themselves, nor confess that the aforesaid are according to themselves sins, because at length they are somehow voluntary; but let us say that they are circumstances of sins, and pertain to the circumstance what, signifying the effect. And the reason is that these are voluntary only in their causes.

For from this, that they are in some way voluntary, since to be voluntary in the cause is to be voluntary in some way, they are in the genus of human and moral acts, and they are not excused from all fault. But from the fact that they are voluntary only in their causes, they are not sins according to themselves, but, drawn away from their proper species, they are circumstances of the sins of which they are effects, and they look to the species of those sins in which they are voluntary. And thus homicide and blasphemy of God from drunkenness are reduced to the species of drunkenness, insofar as those two subsequent sins pass over into the circumstance of this first sin, the sin of drunkenness. Whence Augustine, in book 22 Against Faustus, says: “Lot is to be blamed not as much as that incest, but as much as the drunkenness merited.” Not foreseen; for if sins are foreseen in some way, with their proper objects, then the sins are of the same species of which they would be if they were done by one knowing. And in this way the Jews were guilty of the death of Jesus Christ, although, if they had known, they would not have crucified him. 1 Cor. 2:8. Cf. Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.

27. Concerning sins likewise not foreseen, which are done from ignorance of fact, culpable on account of negligence, as when one occupied with hunting kills a man instead of a stag, it must be said that they pertain to the species of sins directly willed, for instance of dangerous hunting, and of similar acts by which those sins are caused. The reason is that more is required for the account of a proper species than the simple account of the voluntary; for that from which the species of sin is taken must be intended per se. Whence, although those sins are voluntary in their causes, nevertheless, because they are not voluntary in themselves, they are not intended per se, and because of this they are not according to themselves sins, neither as elicited acts, nor as commanded acts; but they are events, or effects of sins, not intended nor foreseen, although foreseeable, and because of this aggravating circumstances, yet not themselves drawing into their own species, but they themselves are drawn away into the species of their causes. “For when something,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4., “is not known to be sin, it cannot be said that the will is borne directly and per se into sin, but per accidens.” The Holy Doctor is speaking of ignorance indirectly voluntary and culpable. — Concerning sins also not foreseen, which are done from ignorance of law culpable on account of negligence, the very same seems to be said on account of the same reason. And thus he who on a fasting day eats twice on account of culpable negligence in knowing the Church’s laws of fasting does not contract any malice specifically other than that of that voluntary ignorance. Cf. Cajetan in the cited place of St. Thomas, La Croix, l. 1. n. 757-760.

28. And here it is asked: whether vincible ignorance of law is a special sin per se? — R. Negatively. For every law commanding the observance of itself implicitly indeed commands cognition of the same law. But it does not command this except in order to the work which is commanded to be done or omitted. Therefore that vincible ignorance of law receives its species from the transgression itself of the law, of which it supplies the cause or danger. And this has place also as regards ignorance of the articles of faith. For although knowledge of these, as the more common opinion has it, is commanded by a special precept and by itself, and therefore, if one rests in the obligation itself of knowing, such ignorance is per se culpable, nevertheless this sin is opposed to the virtue of that same faith. For the malice of sin against faith is in this, that someone offends the authority of the one speaking by not believing. But this irreverence is found not only when someone knowingly dissents from God speaking, but also when someone culpably neglects to examine whether it is the doctrine of God, and because of that negligence disbelieves the things which are said by God. Cf. Lugo, On Penance, D. 16. n. 182 seq.; Laymann l. 1. Tr. 2. c. 4. n. 10.; Viva, On Human Acts, q. 3. final article; Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4.

29. Therefore, since sins which proceed from ignorance are only voluntary in the cause, and consequently have no other malice than the malice which was present in positing the cause itself, it follows that the gravity also of that malice is not to be judged from the thing itself viewed in itself, which is the effect of that ignorance, but from the quantity of malice of the same ignorance. And thus the measure of the guilt of a physician in homicide, the guilt of an advocate in the harm of his client, the guilt of a confessor in the harm of his penitent, the guilt of a parish priest in the harm of his parishioner, is not from harm of this kind viewed in itself, but from the degree of negligence in examining some particular fact, or in considering some law; which negligence indeed can be very slight, although from it even the gravest harm can follow. — But guilt for a bad effect from ignorance is incurred, although an effect of this kind does not follow; and the sin can be repeated, if, while advertence of ignorance of this kind remains, someone again determines to persevere in it. For example, a parish priest is ignorant of the impediments of matrimony, and knowingly and prudently goes on exercising his office, but meanwhile no matrimony is contracted; attending to his ignorance, he neglects again and again to acquire due knowledge. The parish priest is guilty of errors, not only those which he commits, but also those which he probably is going to commit, voluntarily neglecting to acquire knowledge altogether necessary to his office, and he multiplies sins as often as with a new will he neglects to give effort to the study of those impediments. — But if someone grieves over that ignorance, and henceforth applies study according to his powers, those things which arise from the prior negligence will not further be imputed to him.

30. Whether actions which someone does from a contracted habit are to be held as human, and therefore imputable. — R. 1.º Speculatively. They are human and imputable, if he adverts to them, in themselves; otherwise in the cause only, as long as nevertheless he has not retracted the habit, nor tries to root it out. 2.º Practically. “Sinners of this kind who are badly habituated, although they have cognition less ready than others, nevertheless always have some actual cognition of their crimes sufficient for rendering the acts deliberate and mortal.” St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 4. par. Thirdly, l. 3. n. 127., Treatise on Human Acts XIV.

31. But he who knowingly and prudently sins from habit, and not from some passion arising, or from ignorance, sins from malice; for he who has a habit always rejoices in this, that he operates from habit, as long as he uses the habit. “For to anyone having a habit, that which is fitting to him according to his proper habit is per se lovable, because thus it becomes in some way connatural to him, according as custom and habit is turned into nature. But that which is fitting to someone according to a vicious habit is that which excludes spiritual good; from which it follows that man chooses spiritual evil in order to obtain the good which is fitting to him according to the habit. And this is to sin from certain malice. Whence it is manifest that whoever sins from habit sins from certain malice.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 78. a. 2. Sins from malice are those which are committed with the full affection of the will. He who has been accustomed to commit a sin is indeed proved to love and foster it. But he who studies to amend a custom, if sometimes by force of custom he slips, sins rather from infirmity. Cf. following Commentary n. 27.

13. • DEFINITION. Ignorance, taken generally, is the lack of knowledge.

DIVISION. Ignorance is distinguished:

1. Positive or negative, according as it is the lack of knowledge due, or not due, for example, ignorance of canon law in a rustic.

2. Of law, or of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of a law or of a particular fact.

3. Vincible, or invincible, according as, diligence being applied, it can be overcome, or not. But it is invincible physically, if in no way it can be overcome ¹; morally, however, if, moral diligence being applied, it cannot be removed. That diligence is considered moral which prudent men, according to the gravity of the matter, are accustomed to apply. Moreover, vincible ignorance is not given unless there is known, at least in confusion, an obligation of inquiring further; because the first idea is not in the power of man.

¹ There is no use of this consideration in morals; for nowhere do Theologians inquire whether ignorance is physically, but only whether it is morally, vincible.

Hence mention must also be made of concomitant ignorance, by which someone is ignorant of what he is doing, but would still act, even if he were not ignorant. It in no way influences the act. - Scav.

Vincible ignorance is distinguished as threefold, namely 1. simply such, when some diligence, though not sufficient, is applied to drive it away; 2. crass or supine, when no or scarcely any study is placed in investigating the truth; 3. affected, when someone voluntarily flees the means of laying aside ignorance, lest he be drawn back from his purpose.

Perfect forgetfulness and full inadvertence are to be referred to invincible ignorance. But these, if they are not perfect and proceed from negligence, pertain to vincible ignorance.

4. Antecedent ignorance is that which precedes every will; consequent, however, that which in some way follows it ².

² To the point St. Thomas (I-II, q. 6, art. 8): Ignorance is antecedently related to the will when it is not voluntary, and nevertheless is the cause of willing what otherwise one would not will... And such ignorance causes the involuntary simply.

But ignorance is consequently related to the will insofar as the ignorance itself is voluntary... But since the ignorance itself is voluntary... it cannot cause the involuntary simply; nevertheless it causes the involuntary in a certain respect, insofar as it precedes (that is, causes) the motion of the will toward doing something, which would not be, knowledge being present.

And from these things it is clear that antecedent ignorance is called that which is neither voluntary nor vincible, and thus neither culpable; but consequent ignorance is both voluntary and vincible, and more or less culpable.

14. Principles. - I. Invincible ignorance utterly removes the voluntary, both because it itself is not voluntary, and because nothing can be voluntary where there is no cognition. Therefore no act proceeding from invincible ignorance can be imputed to the agent.

Thus likewise one must determine concerning forgetfulness and perfect inadvertence, since the same reason recurs.

II. Vincible ignorance does not remove the voluntary. For ignorance of this sort, whether directly or indirectly, is truly voluntary. Nevertheless it lessens the voluntary, because it is the cause of willing that which, if it were absent, someone would never will. Say the same also, by parity of reason, concerning imperfect forgetfulness and inadvertence.

III. Crass ignorance and affected ignorance much less lessen the voluntary, and consequently sin. The reason is that the former arises from grave negligence, but the latter is retained deliberately for sinning more freely.

You Will Resolve. - 1. A spouse sinning with a woman whom he invincibly does not know to be the sister of his wife is guilty of adultery, but not of incest, as being invincibly ignorant of it.

2. Children who have done things illicit in themselves without any anguish of conscience or suspicion of malice, in reality have not sinned formally, even if they have already attained the use of reason; and therefore afterward they are not held to confess them, when they understand that they are illicit, since material sins are not matter of confession.

3. If a confessor or judge notices that he lacks sufficient knowledge for discharging his office as is fitting, and neglects to acquire the knowledge, or before he acquires it proceeds to exercise his function, he will be held for the errors which in some way at least he foresaw, because they are voluntary to him, at least in the cause.

4. If negligence in laying aside ignorance is culpable only venially, the deed following from it will be imputable only unto venial fault. The reason is that acts of this kind are voluntary, and thus culpable, only in the cause; therefore, since the cause, namely ignorance, does not reach grave fault, the effect also cannot exceed light fault.

See many other things on ignorance elsewhere passim, especially in the treatise on Conscience, on Laws, on Sins, and on Contracts in general, where error is treated. - See Cases, vol. I, no. 12 and following.

"2. Although invincible ignorance of the natural law be granted, in the state of fallen nature this ignorance does not excuse one who acts from it from formal sin." Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"10. That they did not sin who, not knowing Christ, crucified Him, and that whatever is done through ignorance is not to be ascribed to guilt." Chapters of Abelard condemned by the Council of Sens and by Innocent II in the year 1140.

88. There are certain dispositions of mind and body in which man is not in possession of himself, and concerning which nothing special occurs to be said here, namely: the defect of reason in infants; but in adults, insanity whether total or partial (monomania), sleep whether full or semi-full, drunkenness, hallucination, diabolical obsession. In all these, if the use of reason is wholly lacking, liberty will be lacking; if some advertence remains, the act will be more or less free according to the very degree of cognition. - But since ignorance and error much more frequently influence human acts, these must be treated especially.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 76; Suarez, disp. IV; Salmanticenses, op. cit., cap. XIV; St. Alphonsus, De act. hum., n. 26-29; Billuart, diss. I, art. 9; Bouquillon, n. 332-334; Ballerini P., n. 35-58; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du clerge, XX, 1898, p. 1153-1161; Didiot, Morale surnaturelle Fondamentale, n. 383-432.

94. (A) Ignorance morally invincible, whether actually or in the cause, removes the free, and therefore imputability, concerning that which is unknown. For, by force of the principle that nothing is willed unless previously known, we do not freely will that which we do not know; but that which is invincibly unknown is not known in itself, as is clear, nor even in the cause, since the ignorance is supposed to be invincible, and consequently cannot morally be dispelled.¹

¹ What is voluntary in itself and in the cause, and also imputability (responsabilite), will be set forth more fully where the morality of human acts is treated.

It is said concerning that which is unknown; for it can happen that the one operating perceives some morality of the act, although not the whole: thus one who kills an innocent person whom he does not know to be a priest is not indeed guilty of sacrilege, but of homicide, because he knowingly killed a man unjustly.

On this head, often children and the rude, who do dishonorable things, whose malice they do not well understand, are excused more or less from grave sin according to the degree of ignorance.

95. (B) Ignorance actually vincible does not remove the free, but diminishes it, at least if it is not affected. - It is said actually vincible, that it may be distinguished from ignorance which formerly was vincible, although here and now it is invincible.

(a) The reason for the former is that vincible ignorance, as is clear from the notion itself, supposes at least some cognition or thought concerning the obligation of inquiring; now he who neglects to inquire, when he is bound to do so, by that very fact freely intends, at least confusedly, the effects which are foreseen to follow from his action. Thus, if a hunter discharges a gun at some object, not knowing whether it is a wild animal or a man, he rather freely consents to homicide; if he thinks it is a wild animal, while suspecting it to be a man, he consents less freely, but nevertheless in some degree.

96. (b) The reason for the latter is that something is less free the less knowledge there is of it; but, in our case, there is only confused or probable knowledge, or even mere suspicion; therefore the free and the fault are diminished, and indeed the more so the less the cognition is.

It has been said at least if it is not affected; for more commonly theologians, after St. Thomas,¹ hold that affected ignorance does not diminish, but increases sin, since the agent intends to sin more freely. Yet some deny this with Lugo,² because, they say, it is worse to violate a known precept than not to wish to know it in order that it may be violated without remorse: for something of reverence and fear is shown in the second case. - In practice, the matter depends on the intention of the agent at that instant when he does not wish to inquire: if in reality he intends nothing except to sin more freely and boldly, his culpability is not diminished; but if he neglects to inquire from a certain reverence toward the law, which he fears to violate, the fault is diminished.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 76, a. 4.

² Lugo, De Paenitentia, disp. XVI, n. 183.

97. (C) Ignorance here and now invincible, which nevertheless formerly was vincible, indeed removes the actual free and the free in itself, but leaves the voluntary in the cause.

For it can happen that ignorance was formerly vincible and culpable, without nevertheless being adverted to here and now; suppose, if a confessor has not sufficiently cultivated theology, or has for a long time and culpably interrupted the study of it, he can hand down an erroneous decision to a penitent, without being conscious of this error. In this case he is not free, nor does he incur sin at that instant in which he inadvertently deceives the penitent; but if, while he was studying theology, he was conscious of omitted diligence and foresaw, at least in a confused way, the evil effects that would follow from negligence, by that very fact he willed those effects, more or less freely and culpably according to the degree of cognition; and thus those effects are not actually and in themselves free, but only in the cause.

Hence, if someone has retracted the fault of ignorance formerly committed, by suitable penance and due diligence, he can be equated with one who labors under invincible ignorance.¹ Nevertheless, if even after penance he is ignorant of those things which are necessary for undertaking his office,² he ought to abstain from exercising it until he has acquired the necessary knowledge; for by freely exercising an office without competent knowledge, he would commit a new sin.

¹ Gury-Ballerini, t. I, note to n. 37; Bouquillon, nn. 277, 333.

² Here it is a question of competent knowledge, not of eminent knowledge, which is found in the most learned; the confessor, judge, physician, etc., who possess the former and use proportionate diligence, can exercise the office without fault, even if sometimes they err.

98. Corollary. Since the will is freer the more perfect cognition is, it is of the greatest interest to acquire true knowledge, especially of those things which are useful for living honorably and religiously. But because knowledge influences the will the more as it occurs more vividly to the agent, frequent reconsideration or meditation of noble things serves not a little for living rightly; for since the will is blind and is illuminated only by the intellect, he who thinks rightly is inclined to acting rightly; and by frequent meditation of honorable things the custom of living honorably is gradually formed.³ It is likewise very expedient to think seriously concerning the morality of the act in itself and in its effects before we act, so that, with all things carefully weighed, we may choose what is better.

³ Not only mystics, but also rationalists and positivists have recognized this utility of meditation, such as J. Payot, Education de la volonte, Paris, 1904, p. 92-134, and Fouillee, in the cited work, Les idees-forces.

To be free, an action must proceed (1) from internal inclination, without constraint; (2) from a full knowledge of the end intended, and (3) from indifference of the will.¹

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 5 sqq., qu. 76 sq.

An action that is performed without constraint is called spontaneous. Obstacles to spontaneity are: 1. VIOLENCE. —By violence (vis, violentia, coactio) is meant the state of being driven by some external force which the agent is unable to resist. Since the will itself cannot be subjected to violence, its interior acts (actus eliciti s. interiores) are never forced. The only acts that can be affected by force are those mediate acts known as imperati.² Acts performed under absolute compulsion, the subject resisting internally, are involuntary (actus simpliciter involuntarii). When the compulsion is not absolute, the acts performed under it are more or less voluntary, according to the degree of resistance offered.³

² Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 4: "An act of the will is twofold: one is immediately its own, as elicited by it, namely to will; the other is an act commanded by the will and exercised through another power, such as walking and speaking. These are commanded by the will but exercised through a motive power. Therefore, with respect to acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence insofar as the exterior members can be prevented by violence from executing its command. But with respect to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be inflicted upon it. The reason is that an act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior knowing principle, just as natural appetite is a certain inclination from an interior principle but without knowledge. What is coerced or violent, however, is from an exterior principle. Hence it is contrary to the nature of an act of the will itself that it be coerced or violent, just as it is contrary to the nature of a natural inclination or of the motion of a stone that it be borne upward. For a stone can be carried upward by violence, but it cannot be that this violent motion comes from its natural inclination. Similarly, a man can be dragged by violence, but that this should be from his will is contrary to the nature of violence." —Cfr. St. Anselm, De Lib. Arbitr., c. 5: "A man cannot will unwillingly, because he cannot will while unwilling to will." (Migne, P. L., CLVIII, 496). God can ex nolente facere volentem per gratiam efficacem (St. Alphonsus, De Act. Human., n. 19), and, by His omnipotence, cause the human will to act or abstain from acting; but He cannot properly speaking compel it, because He cannot cause it to will and not to will the same thing at one and the same time. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 4: "It does not belong to divine providence to corrupt the nature of things, but to preserve it." —IDEM, De Veritate qu. 22, art. 8: "God can change the will by necessity, yet He cannot coerce it."

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 5. —That internal compulsion (necessitas) destroys the freedom of the will has been indirectly defined by the Church. Cfr. Prop. Damnat. Baii, prop. 46: "Voluntariness does not belong to the nature and definition of sin." Prop. 67: "Man sins, even damnably, in that which he does necessarily." —Prop. Damnat. Jansenii, prop. 3: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, freedom from necessity is not required in man; freedom from coercion suffices." —Prop. Damnat. ab Alexandro VIII. (7 Dec., 1690), prop. 1: "In the state of fallen nature, for formal sin and demerit that freedom suffices by which the act was voluntary and free in its cause—original sin and the will of Adam sinning." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1046, 1067, 1094, 1291). —Cfr. Th. Müncker, Der psychische Zwang in seinen Beziehungen zu Moral und Pastoral, Düsseldorf 1922.

2. IGNORANCE. —When a man has no knowledge of the end intended, he is said to be ignorant. Moral ignorance may therefore be defined as a lack of that knowledge which a person ought to have in order to perform the duties of his office or vocation. It is impossible to will a thing that lies outside the scope of one's knowledge.⁴ If a man unknowingly directs his action towards such an object, that action is in so far forth involuntary (involuntarium).⁵

⁴ "Quod latet, ignotum est," "Ignoti nulla cupido," are Scholastic axioms.

⁵ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Lib. Arbitr., III, c. 19, n. 53: "It is not charged to you as a fault that you are unwillingly ignorant, but that you neglect to seek what you do not know." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 1297).—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 76, art. 2-3.

Ignorance may be culpable or inculpable (culpabilis s. inculpabilis), vincible or invincible (vincibilis s. invincibilis).

Invincible ignorance is that which cannot be overcome by the use of ordinary intelligence. It involves no moral responsibility.

Vincible ignorance, on the other hand, —the kind that can be dispelled by the use of ordinary intelligence, —may, in certain circumstances, diminish moral responsibility, but never entirely abolishes it; for whatever is done in a state of vincible ignorance, is willed at least indirectly, and to that extent is voluntary.

Ignorance due to gross negligence is called crass or supine (ignorantia crassa); when means are used to foster it, it is called affected (ignorantia affectata). Both crass and affected ignorance are sinful.⁶

⁶ Cfr. Job XXI, 14; John IX, 41; XV, 22.

3. FEAR. —Fear (metus) is a disturbed condition of the mind caused by real or imaginary danger. Fear does not always destroy free-will, but generally diminishes accountability.⁷

⁷ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 6; qu. 41-44; St. Alphonsus, De Act. Human., n. 20—22.

Fear is grave or slight (metus gravis s. levis) according to the nature of the danger by which it is caused. As fear, generally speaking, does not exercise compulsion, the actions which it inspires are voluntary, though the degree of their imputability varies in proportion to the disturbance excited in the mind. Both canon and civil law regard acts inspired by grave and unjust fear as void.⁸ If serious evil or danger suddenly overwhelms a man, so as to deprive him momentarily of the use of reason, the acts he performs in that state are involuntary; in other words, a man may sometimes be so disturbed by fear that free-will is suspended.

⁸ Cfr. J. Laurentius, S.J., Instit. Iuris Eccl., Freiburg 1903, pp. 458 sqq.; E. Taunton, The Law of the Church, London 1906, p. 345.

4. CONCUPISCENCE. —Concupiscence (concupiscentia), in the general sense of the term, is any movement of the sensitive appetite towards its proper object.⁹ More particularly, it is that inordinate inclination to evil which is in human nature since the fall of Adam and Eve.¹⁰

⁹ Cfr. Catechismus Romanus, P. III, c. 10, qu. 5: "It must be known that concupiscence is a certain agitation and force of the mind by which men, impelled, seek pleasant things that they do not have."

¹⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 30, art. 1-3: "Concupiscence is the appetite for a delightful good ... according to sense, ... the sensitive appetite, a passion of the sensitive appetite." Cfr. qu. 77, art. 1 and 7. —St. Alphonsus, De Act. Human., n. 23-25; Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, pp. 203, 217, 245, 261 sqq., 283 sqq.

Concupiscence may precede or follow the action of the will. In the former case it is called antecedent; in the latter, consequent.

Antecedent concupiscence (concupiscentia antecedens) is involuntary when it completely impedes the use of reason, and in that case there is no accountability. Men are often "blinded by passion." When the use of reason is not entirely suspended, the guilt of an evil act may be greatly diminished by passion.¹¹ Thus, to kill a man in a rage is less criminal than to murder him in cold blood.

¹¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 7: "Sometimes passion is so great that it entirely takes away the use of reason, as is evident in those who become insane through love or anger; and then, if such passion was voluntary from the beginning, the act is imputed as sin because it is voluntary in its cause. ... But if the cause was not voluntary but natural, as when someone through illness or some similar cause falls into such a passion as entirely takes away the use of reason, the act is rendered wholly involuntary and consequently is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes, however, passion is not so great that it entirely interrupts the use of reason; and then reason can exclude the passion by turning to other thoughts, or prevent it from obtaining its effect, because the members are not applied to action except by consent of reason. Hence such passion does not entirely excuse from sin." (Cfr. qu. 10, art. 3; qu. 73, art. 6).

Consequent concupiscence (concupiscentia consequens) may to some extent obscure the light of reason, but as a rule increases the malice of evil acts ¹² because it is either deliberately excited by the will or, at any rate, willed in its cause.¹³

¹² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 7: "Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but rather makes something voluntary. For something is called voluntary because the will is borne toward it; through concupiscence the will is inclined to will what it desires, and therefore concupiscence tends more to make something voluntary than involuntary." —Qu. 77, art. 1: "A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot directly draw or move the will, but it can do so indirectly, and in two ways: first, by a certain distraction ... and secondly, on the part of the will's object, which is the good apprehended by reason."

¹³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 6: "Consequent passion does not diminish sin, but rather increases it, or more properly is a sign of its magnitude insofar as it shows the intensity of the will toward the sinful act. And so it is true that the greater the lust or concupiscence with which someone sins, the more he sins." —IDEM, De Veritate, qu. 26, art. 7: "Consequent passion itself in the lower appetite is a sign that the movement of the will is intense. For in a passible nature the will cannot be strongly moved toward something without some passion following in the lower part. Hence Augustine says that while we bear the infirmity of this life, if we have no passions, we do not live rightly." —The passage of St. Augustine here referred to by the Angelic Doctor is De Civitate Dei, XIV, c. 9, n. 4 (Migne, P. L., XLI, 451).

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, qu. 76 sq. —V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., Freiburg 1904, pp. 73 sqq. —A. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit, pp. 48 sqq. —Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus Theol. Mor., Vol. I, tr. 1, c. 3-6. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 41 sqq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., Haaren 1910, pp. 59 sqq. —F. P. Kenrick, Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, pp. 7 sqq. —W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 177 sqq., 184 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, Bruges 1922, pp. 69 sqq., 77 sqq., 81 sqq.

I. NOTION OF IMPUTABILITY. —There is a distinction between responsibility, imputability, and morality.

"Responsibility is the condition of a man who, having sufficient knowledge, and being free from coercion, can act or not act, as he chooses, and is therefore accountable for his determination. Imputability is the character of an act which is freely performed, so that the good or evil of it is attributable to him who performs it. The morality or immorality of an act is its conformity or non-conformity with the moral law." ¹ Imputation is the judgment by which a man is declared to be the free cause of an act and held responsible for its consequences.

¹ R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, p. 84.

Before judgment on the authorship of an act can be definitely pronounced, it is necessary to inquire, (i) whether the agent to whom the act is imputed is really its author (imputatio facti), and (2) whether he was free to act and is responsible for his conduct (imputatio iuris sive legis).

The judgment by which an act is imputed to a man is pronounced either by his own conscience ² or by civil or ecclesiastical authority, and may be true or false. God alone always "judgeth justly," ³ because He is "the searcher of hearts." ⁴ Human judgments are just only in so far as they coincide with those of God.

² Cfr. 1 Cor. IV, 3 sq.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 112, art. 5; Theo. Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 173 sqq.

³ Jer. XI, 20.

⁴ Ps. VII, 9 sq.; cfr. Jer. XVII, 10; XX, 12; John II, 23; Rom. XIV, 4, 10; Acts I, 24; XV, 8; 1 Cor. IV, 5; 2 Cor. V, 10; Apoc. II, 23; XX, 12.

1. A man is responsible for an act (be it of commission or omission) in exact proportion to the degree of liberty which he enjoys. Hence only free acts are imputable, i. e., attributable to the agent for reward or punishment. In other words, where there is no freedom of choice, there is no imputability, and the greater a man's power to determine his actions, the greater his merit or demerit, and vice versa.⁵

⁵ Cfr. W. Schmidt, Der Kampf um die sittliche Welt, pp. 301 sqq.

2. Of course, no human being is entirely free. It was shown in the first part of this treatise how the will is influenced by individual as well as social factors. In addition to these there are certain others which diminish responsibility, e. g., ignorance, inadvertence, habit, and various mental disturbances.

a) IGNORANCE (ignorantia) is the absence of knowledge which a person should have.⁶ The civil courts (except in the case of children) do not admit ignorance as a mitigating circumstance in cases of serious transgression, but proceed on the principle that "ignorance of the law does not excuse."

⁶ Cfr. E. Taunton, The Law of the Church, pp. 365 sq.; J. Hollweck, Die kirchlichen Strafgesetze, Mayence 1899, pp. 77 sqq.

Moral Theology, on the contrary, acknowledges the existence of culpable ignorance by which responsibility and guilt are diminished. The reason is not far to seek. A sin that springs from ignorance does not indicate a positive evil tendency of the will. That there are peccata ignorantiae the New Testament teaches in numerous passages. Christ prayed for his executioners: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do/' ⁷ In one of the discourses reported by St. John, Jesus says: "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin." ⁸ St. Peter, after accusing the Jews of having killed the Author of life, added: "Brethren, I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers."⁹ St. Paul regrets that he persecuted Christ and His Church, but adds: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." ¹⁰ Note, however, that ignorance can never altogether excuse any one from performing the duties proper to his state of life, because every man is strictly bound to inform himself with regard to these duties.¹¹ b) INADVERTENCE (inadvertentia) signifies the omission of such care as duty requires one to take with regard to one's obligations. Civil jurisprudence imputes acts of inadvertence that involve injury to others. Not so Moral Theology. Sins committed through inadvertence (peccata inadvertent iae) are not altogether imputed because they spring from defective knowledge. There can be no guilt in the theological sense of the term where there is no dolus, i. e., a deliberate intention of violating the law, or culpa lata, i. e., criminal carelessness or neglect of that ordinary care which every sensible person is supposed to exercise in important matters.¹² An evil action may be premeditated (malice prepense or aforethought), or committed in a fit of passion (dolus repentinus). This distinction is important in cases where a man takes the life of another. If he acts with malice aforethought, he is guilty of murder; if carried away by passion, his crime is merely man-slaughter.

⁷ Luke XXIII, 34.

⁸ John XV, 22.

⁹ Acts III, 17.

¹⁰ 1 Tim. I, 13.

¹¹ Cfr. Luke XII, 47 sq.; Jas. IV, 17.

¹² Cfr. Codex Iuris Can., can. 2199 sq.; Ex. XXI, 29 sqq.; Numb. XXXV, 22 sqq.; Deut. XIX, 4-6.

Negligence means failure to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations that ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence may be slight, ordinary, or gross. These principal degrees have been shaded off in opposite directions by the Roman jurists and the Schoolmen (latissima, latior, lata; levis, levior, levissima),¹³ c) CUSTOM (consuetudo) or habit is a facility acquired in performing certain acts by frequent repetition. If a man always acts in the same manner, he gradually acquires a certain facility. As a determinant of the will, this facility may be a means either of virtue or of vice, and as the proverb says, often becomes second nature.¹⁴ Habit diminishes but does not destroy free-will. In so far as a habit is freely acquired, it increases responsibility, and in so far as it is good, it augments merit. If one has unconsciously acquired a bad habit, the sinful acts are not imputable until the wickedness of the habit and its acts is realized. As soon as it is realized, the duty arises of rigorously combatting the evil habit. By falling back into a bad habit a man incurs grave responsibility, because he almost invariably acts against his better knowledge and his conduct has in it something tending to that state of which our Saviour says that it is "worse than the first." 15 Acts which are, as it were, mere mechanical consequences of a habit, are imputable only in so far as the habit itself is voluntary (voluntarium in causa). d) There are many different kinds of MENTAL DERANGEMENT or psychic abnormality. Illusions, hallucinations, fixed ideas, hypochondria, melancholia, hysteria, morbid fear in its various forms (especially agoraphobia, i. e., the dread of crossing or being in the midst of open spaces), severe nostalgia (homesickness), and all forms of quasi-amentia impede the normal exercise of reason and must therefore be regarded as extenuating circumstances, though they do not entirely destroy free-will unless they develop into actual insanity. In all such cases medical experts should be consulted. Note, however, that theologians must sometimes assume moral guilt where physicians and lawyers deny the existence of responsibility. For while it is quite true that the genuine symptoms of insanity are rarely simulated, that many crimes (especially sexual perversities) are pathological, and that an insuperable disinclination to labor and a slanderous tongue may be symptoms of neurasthenia or hysteria, it is equally certain that not all forms of mental derangement entirely destroy the freedom of the will.

¹³ Cfr. V. Patuzzi, Ethica Christiana, Vol. V, Bassano 1790, pp. 229 sq.: "The broadest fault is equated with deceit and fraud, and in truth consists in explicit deceit, as if a soldier standing watch pretended to sleep so that the enemy might enter. A broader fault is implicit deceit, as if the keeper of a flock, who can drive away a thief or wolf by shouting, nevertheless remains silent. A broad fault is the omission, in guarding another's property or avoiding damage, of that diligence which prudent and sensible men commonly employ in caring for their own affairs, as if a servant should neglect to close the door of the house at night. A slight fault consists in the omission of that diligence which more diligent men and heads of households are especially accustomed to employ; as if someone should place a borrowed golden vessel in his own room, even with the door closed, but without drawing the bolts. Finally, the slightest fault imports the omission of that diligence which only the most cautious and circumspect customarily employ, such as that of a man who locks jewels in a chest but does not test or examine by hand whether it is firmly closed." —E. Voit, Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 6th ed., Würzburg 1769, n. 744, p. 494: "A broader fault is called presumed deceit, or the omission of due diligence, from which, although an evil intention to harm is not altogether manifestly inferred, it can nevertheless prudently be presumed. Such a fault exists in one who does not indeed intend harm to his neighbor, but nevertheless foresees that it will result from his action or its omission."

¹⁴ Cicero, De Finibus, V, c. 25: "Consuetude quasi altera natura." — Cfr. St. Augustine, Confessions, VIII, c. 5, n. 10: "For from a perverse will lust arose; and while lust was served, custom arose; and while custom was not resisted, necessity arose." — IDEM, De Musica, VI, c. 7, n. 19: "Non frustra consuetudo quasi secunda et quasi affabricata natura dicitur." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 753, 1173). —IDEM, Serm., 17 (a/. 28 inter Homilias, 50), n. 3 (P. L., XXXVIII, 125). —St. Bernard, De Consid., IV, c. 3, n. 8: "Nil tam durum, quod duriori non cedat." (P. L., CLXXXII, 777). —Cfr. Jer. XIII, 23. 15 Matth. XII, 43 sqq.; cfr. Prov. XXVI, 11; Luke XI, 24 sqq.; Heb. X, 26; 2 Pet. II, 20 sqq.

3. The CONSEQUENCES of an act (eventus sequentes) are imputable to the agent whenever they follow from the act in the ordinary course of events and can therefore be foreseen, either definitely or at least in confuso, or when they are organically connected with the act from which they flow and form a moral whole with it. When an act that is in itself licit entails evil consequences which the agent can foresee, these consequences are imputable to the agent, provided the act is neither physically nor morally necessary. Consequences which follow an act with purely physical necessity are not imputable in the court of morals, though they can and must be reckoned with in secular jurisprudence.¹⁶

¹⁶ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 20, art. 5; Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., pp. 122 sqq.

READINGS. —On imputability in general: M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 182, 543 sq. —R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, pp. 84 sqq. —Theo. Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 173 sqq.

On ignorance: A. Boudinhon in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, p. 682.—J. F. Delany, ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 648 sqq.—Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq.—E. Taunton, The Law of the Church, pp. 365 sq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, pp. 71 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, pp. 48 sqq.

On negligence: Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 27, 409 sq., 539. —J. F. Delany in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X, p. 737.

On mental derangement as a diminuent of responsibility: A. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit, 2nd ed., pp. 214 sqq. —Ig. Familler, Pastoral-Psychiatrie, Freiburg 1898. —S. Weber, Zwangsgedanken und Zwangszustände, Paderborn 1903. —R. v. Kraft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis, 13th ed., Stuttgart 1907. —W. Wille, Die Psychosen des Pubertätsalters, Vienna 1898.—K. Hilty, Ueber Neurasthenie, Berne 1897.—Krauss, Der Kampf gegen die Verbrechensursachen, pp. 295 sqq. —J. Bessmer, S.J., Störungen im Seelenleben, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1907. —IDEM, Die Grundlagen der Seelenstörungen, Freiburg 1906. —Th. Braun, Die religiöse Wahnbildung, Tübingen 1906, pp. 13 sqq. —Jas. J. Walsh, "Scruples, Obsessions, and Dreads," in the Ecclesiastical Review, Vol. LVI (1917), No. 4, pp. 360-375.—O'Malley-Walsh, Essays in Pastoral Medicine, New York 1906, pp. 211 sqq. —Fr. a Barbens, O. M. Cap., Introductio Pathologica ad Studium Theol. Mor., Tarracona 1917, pp. 81 sqq.

Ignorance is the privation of knowledge in some way owed; and thus it differs from nescience, which is the simple negation of knowledge. But error is a false judgment. A layman is nescient; a confessor is ignorant of moral theology. Both err when they hold fornication to be a venial sin. Inadvertence, finally, is actual inconsideration or oblivion of habitual knowledge.

Ignorance is divided with respect to the ignorant subject and his circumstances; with respect to the object ignored; and with respect to the act of the will to which it is referred or which it affects.

1. With respect to the subject, ignorance is invincible which could not be dispelled by any diligence whatever, or at least not by moral diligence. Moral diligence does not require that all means be employed, but denotes a human mode of diligence, accommodated to our condition, which, varying according to the varied gravity of the matter, prudent persons are accustomed to employ in their own affairs and to require from others. Therefore not only perfect ignorance, which excludes suspicion of the truth, can be invincible, but also imperfect ignorance, which is compatible with a doubt that has been judged contemptible.

Ignorance is vincible which could have been removed by moral diligence. Again this ignorance is of negligence, when someone is turned away from the study of knowing by various other reasons; it is affected when someone directly wishes to be ignorant. And the name affected ignorance has customarily been reserved for ignorance which is blameworthy. Yet a certain will of being ignorant can also be praiseworthy. For although knowledge per se is good and advantageous, in the present condition of our infirmity certain things are happily unknown, for example, for the greater guardianship of chastity, for the easier exercise of charity toward one's neighbor.

According to the degree of negligence, ignorance is crass or supine, which has not seized even an easy occasion of knowing; it is simply vincible, which has omitted only sufficient application. The theologian who in no way applies himself to acquiring the science is crassly ignorant of it; he who is not sufficiently diligent is simply ignorant of it. He is deceived by crass ignorance who, needing to know whether midnight has passed or not, does not even consult the clock which lies near him; he labors under simply vincible ignorance who neglects to rise from bed and take a few steps to consult the clock.

2. With respect to the object, law, fact, and penalty can be ignored.

Ignorance of law is had in two ways: more strictly, when that which is contained in the law is unknown; less strictly, yet properly, when the very existence of the law is not known. This law can be natural, positive divine, or positive human: either ecclesiastical or civil.

Ignorance is of fact when the conditions required for the application of the law are unknown to be present.

Ignorance of penalty is that ignorance of law by which it comes about that you do not know that a special penalty has been annexed to some delict.

He labors under ignorance of law who does not know that postulants can and ought to be received within the enclosure of nuns (c. 540, § 3), or that a law of pontifical enclosure exists for nuns; under ignorance of fact, he who does not know that such a religious house is a monastery of nuns; under ignorance of penalty, he who does not know that violation of that enclosure has been sanctioned with excommunication.

3. With respect to the act of the will, ignorance can antecede or follow the act of the will, according as it has a voluntary cause or not; it can be a cause [removing the prohibiting thing ¹] of an act which without ignorance would not have been done, or exercise no account of causality, or merely accompany an act which, with attention to the disposition of the will, would not be prohibited by knowledge of the law or fact.

Therefore there is a twofold respect: in the former, the origin of ignorance is considered; in the other, its effect; whence we would have a twice two-membered division. Yet by received usage one three-membered division is substituted for the two two-membered divisions in this way: antecedent is said of ignorance which is invincible or involuntary and at the same time a cause of willing; concomitant, that which is not a cause of willing; consequent, that which is directly or indirectly voluntary and at the same time is a cause of willing.

¹ Since ignorance is a non-being, it effects nothing positive, but removes the obstacle which knowledge would oppose. Therefore it is called removing the prohibiting thing.

That positive laws can be invincibly unknown is outside controversy and is clear per se. That there are remote conclusions of natural law which can be invincibly unknown is no less manifest. For there are many questions, for example, concerning the obligation of restoring in this or that case; concerning the origin of such an impediment of marriage (for example, consanguinity in the first degree of the collateral line), about which learned men themselves have disputed with one another for centuries and do not agree. On the contrary, that certain first principles and almost immediate conclusions, for example, that good must be done, that evil must be fled; that homicide and adultery generally are not lawful ¹, are known by all men of sound mind, is also not doubted. There then remain several principles or corollaries not so proximate and not so remote, whose ignorance is judged more severely by some than by others. And today we rather incline to the more benign side. Thus almost no one now doubts that the malice of pollution can be unknown for a long time by an adolescent or young man. Nor are there lacking those who think that certain onanistic abuses between spouses, at least in certain circumstances, can be excused in good faith.

¹ Indeed adultery is never permitted by natural law; but some can now be ignorant of that absolute universality of the prohibition: wherefore we have excluded invincible ignorance only from its general prohibition.

What habit effects. A habit for the most part does not remove sufficient knowledge of a good or evil act ². Nevertheless "it can happen that someone having a vicious habit sometimes acts not from habit, but from a passion rising up or even from ignorance." (St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 78, art. 2.) This happens more easily to those who wish to correct the habit and yet, impatient or distracted, pour out certain blasphemous or even scurrilous words, or perform brief touches on themselves. Concerning this matter, this too seems to be observed: the knowledge which is enough for a good act remains more easily with a good act than, with an evil habit, is preserved the knowledge which is necessary for an act at least gravely evil: both because an upright man wishes more formally to use his habit, so that he would be said by St. Thomas, l.c., to "operate from the habit itself"; and because less perfect deliberation is required for a good act than for an act gravely evil.

"Some obvious circumstance of malice, which the agent habitually knows, can scarcely ever be handed over to oblivion or inadvertence in such a way that there is not sufficient knowledge for contracting malice. Thus, for example, who would not laugh at a priest or religious who, after sinning against chastity, said that he had in no way attended to the vow or to the sacred state?" (Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor., I, 77, 3.)

² Cf. St. Alphonsus, De actibus humanis, XIV; Theol. mor., l. 8, n. 127; l. 6, n. 4, § tertio.

1. The gravity of that guilt must be judged from the conscious degree of negligence. Moreover, that negligence can be the omission of actual consideration, whose necessity, nevertheless, someone notices, whether this flows from habitual and conscious inconsideration or not; and it can be habitual ignorance of things which, whether by a common obligation or by a special obligation of state, one must know according to every time. (St. Thomas, De malo, q. 3, art. 8.)

Therefore he can be blameworthy who is accustomed to act precipitately and does not apply himself to his own amendment, and he who, through his own sloth, does not acquire the knowledge required by his office.

How many sins there are in number, in the latter case, is not so easily defined. For as often as someone wished to be ignorant, or formally or virtually neglected an occasion of learning, so often will he sin on account of ignorance.

Moreover, as often as an ignorant person has committed himself to a probable danger of inflicting harm, for example by exercising an office, so often also will he sin unless he is excused by necessity. Wherefore he ought to abstain from exercising the office until he can exercise it without probable danger. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, Op. th., I, Tr. 1, c. 3, n. 55.

As to the species of the sin, either there is had a special precept of knowing, and then from the nature of that precept its violation has its species. Wherefore blameworthy ignorance of the articles of faith will be opposed to faith itself, although the ignorant person does not sin by formal heresy, unless he is so disposed in act that he would not adhere even to a known definition of the Church ¹.

Or that precept does not exist; and then the sin of ignorance receives its species from the transgressions which are foreseen in confused fashion as going to follow. For every law which commands or forbids a work, implicitly, in order to that work, imposes knowledge of itself. Cf. Bucceroni, Institutiones theol. mor., I, 52.

¹ Cf. Lugo, De fide, d. 20, n. 182, 191.

Effect of ignorance on the voluntary. 1. Antecedent ignorance causes the good or evil act which has been produced by the ignorant person to be involuntary simply. For it is not voluntary in itself, and it denotes such a disposition of the agent that, had he known, he would have acted otherwise.

2. Concomitant ignorance, as such, renders the act non-voluntary, although not involuntary ². For involuntary, strictly, is what is repugnant to the will. But what is done with concomitant ignorance would be done even knowingly.

3. Consequent ignorance, as such, makes the act voluntary in the cause, yet in itself involuntary, since, with knowledge present, it would be omitted.

But what if it is affected, or directly voluntary in itself? That ignorance, if it concerns the morality of the thing, is in itself a sin which, according to the thing in question, can be grave or light. That it renders the act more voluntary than simply vincible ignorance is manifest per se. Moreover, it is a sign of great propensity to that thing for the sake of which someone wishes to be ignorant: for example, to reading a book about which he wishes not to know whether it is prohibited; and in this respect it is said, rather improperly, to increase the voluntary. But with respect to the very violation of the prohibiting law to which the ignorant person exposes himself, it betrays a greater or lesser affection than if he sinned knowingly, according to the motive by which he is led. If from contempt of authority as such, it will be a sign of worse affection; if, on the contrary, he wishes to be ignorant lest, being conscious of the matter, he should in some way be delayed from sin, the affection can be less than that of one sinning knowingly. Cf. Ball.-Palm., I, tr. 1, n. 51; Lehmkuhl, I, 76.

Even in good acts directly voluntary ignorance demonstrates a great affection for a praiseworthy action. Thus he betrays a very beneficent mind who wishes to be ignorant of the habits of a beggar lest, perhaps some malice of his being detected, he should give alms less promptly.

Finally, by a universal account, an act done with ignorance is less voluntary than one which is done knowingly. Yet except ignorance directly chosen for this reason, that the note unknown is utterly disregarded. For he wills a good action more, for example, who refuses to consider its danger because he intends to assist the sick or devote himself for his country with every danger; he wills more to transgress a precept who, from contempt of the precept, affects ignorance of it.

² St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 6, art. 8.

Effect of ignorance on merit and sin. Because the condition of merit and sin is voluntariety, ignorance, other things being equal, removes, diminishes, or increases merit or sin by precisely the same account by which it removes, diminishes, or increases the voluntary. Wherefore invincible ignorance, whether of law or fact, whether antecedent or concomitant, necessarily removes sin.

Whence Augustine: "So far is sin a voluntary evil, that in no way is it sin if it is not voluntary. And this indeed is so manifest that no fewness of the learned, no multitude of the unlearned, dissents from it" ¹. Yet Baius denied this concerning infidelity, prop. 67: "Purely negative infidelity in those among whom Christ has not been preached is a sin"; which St. Pius V, by the Bull Ex omnibus afflictionibus, 1 Oct. 1567, condemned among those proscribed as "heretical, offensive to pious ears." (Denz., n. 1068.) But the Baians and Jansenists denied the same thing concerning all natural law, prop. 2, from the 31 which were proscribed by Alexander VIII, decree of 7 Dec. 1690, "as rash... and heretical," and it sounded thus: "Although invincible ignorance of natural law be granted, this, in the state of fallen nature, does not excuse one operating from it from formal sin" (Denz., n. 1292).

Yet do not for this reason think that the unknown law of nature is violated without detriment. For not only is the ignorant person deprived of the merit and also of the connatural influence of a good action, but also, since every act materially but intrinsically evil is unnatural or contrary to nature, through a certain trace which every action leaves in man, it is opposed to the good and happiness of the agent. Therefore they err who rejoice over a sin committed ignorantly, or who grieve that they do not live among less cultivated nations, where they could do several things ignorantly against the law of nature. Ignorance of the natural law can never be apprehended as good.

And in a similar way an act materially good is not useless to the ignorant person, although unknown goodness does not produce merit.

But simply vincible ignorance diminishes merit or sin. That is, he who proposes to do something which he suspects to be good or which he fears may be evil, by this intention either merits or sins, yet less than if he had perceived the goodness or malice; nor does it pertain to merit or sin whether the act is in truth materially good or evil. For the true object of the will is the act as it is apprehended by the intellect.

Finally, directly voluntary ignorance for the most part diminishes, sometimes increases, merit or sin, as was explained above concerning the voluntary.

¹ De vera religione, c. 14, n. 27 (P.L. 34, 133).

Effect of ignorance on the penalties of the external forum. Modern civil laws are not accustomed to establish any mitigation of penalty on account of ignorance of the law or of the penalty.

Among them ignorance of law is said to harm. From this, however, in pronouncing a penalty, the judge is not prohibited from admitting some excuse of ignorance; also in fiscal matters, friendly settlements are admitted on account of ignorance of an illicit act.

But in the canonical forum, far greater account is had of ignorance, at least if this can be sufficiently proved, for "ignorance or error concerning the law or the penalty is generally not presumed" (c. 16, § 2).

Moreover these principles are laid down. C. 2199: "All causes which increase, diminish, or remove fraud or fault, by that very fact increase, diminish, or remove the imputability of the delict."

C. 2201, § 1: "The violation of an unknown law is not imputed at all, if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise imputability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself."

C. 2218, § 2: "Not only those things which excuse from all imputability, but also those which excuse from grave imputability, likewise excuse from any penalty, whether latae or ferendae sententiae, even in the external forum, if the excuse is proved for the external forum."

Concerning penalties latae sententiae, moreover, these things are established: 1. Affected ignorance, whether of the law or only of the penalty, excuses from none. 2. "If the law has the words: he shall have presumed, he shall have dared, knowingly, studiously, rashly, with deliberation he shall have acted, or other similar words which require full knowledge and deliberation, any lessening of imputability, whether on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will, exempts from penalties latae sententiae." 3. If it does not have those words: crass or supine ignorance exempts from none; ignorance not crass or supine, whether of the law or only of the penalty, excuses from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative ones. Cf. c. 2229.

What those penalties are will be said later. Let us only observe that excommunication is always a medicinal penalty.

Effect of ignorance on the value of certain acts.

Insofar as voluntariety is required for value, so far, and neither more nor less, ignorance will be able to obstruct the value of an act. Thus he satisfies the precept of hearing Mass who hears Mass, not knowing that it is Sunday: because the intention of fulfilling the precept is not itself prescribed; he validly baptizes who does not know that baptism is a sacrament, provided that, by performing the essential rite, he wills to do what the Church does: because nothing more ought to be voluntary; baptized persons marrying validly confer upon themselves the sacrament who do not know that matrimony is a sacrament, because they will the contract which is the sacrament; but those contract matrimony invalidly who have been ignorant that matrimony is a permanent society between a man and a woman for procreating children (c. 1082, § 1), because the substance of the contract must have been admitted voluntarily; one half-asleep makes a vow invalidly, because perfect deliberation is required for a vow.

Whatever we have said about habitual ignorance is valid for inadvertence; indeed, ignorance has no effects except insofar as it begets inadvertence.

There will be a fuller discourse concerning ignorance where we shall treat of human acts and sins. Meanwhile it is enough for our matter to note the following things.

218. DEFINITION. Ignorance is defined as the defect of due knowledge. One is invincible or inculpable, namely that which cannot be overcome or taken away, because either doubt concerning the necessity of the thing to be known never came into the mind; or, even if it came into the mind, nevertheless knowledge could not be acquired by moral diligence. Another is vincible or culpable, namely that which, by the application of moral diligence, could and ought to have been overcome (recall the things said n. 16).

219. PRINCIPLES. I. Invincible ignorance excuses from the observance of law, and at the same time from the guilt of fault. For no one can be strictly obliged to that which he does not know, nor could know; and no one sins except by a voluntary act, which essentially presupposes knowledge (cf. n. 125).

II. Invincible ignorance of the law also excuses from the guilt of the penalty annexed to the law. The penalty is decreed in the law on account of fault. Therefore, when the cause ceases, the effect also established by the law ought to cease, as the Doctors commonly teach (I, 160).

If, however, in the external forum, a penalty is dictated by a judge upon one materially delinquent, it must be undergone, as was said above (n. 191).

220. IT IS ASKED. Whether he is excused from the penalty who knows the law which he transgresses, but is ignorant of the penalty annexed to the law?

Resp. Negatively, of itself, because reason dictates that evil, according to its nature, is to be punished.

There is exception: 1. If the penalty is most grave, exceeding the merit of the crime. 2. If it is an ecclesiastical censure, which those who are ignorant do not incur, unless the ignorance is crass, or gravely culpable. The reason is, because to incur a censure there is required contumacy, or virtual contempt of the law. Indeed, if the censure is imposed on those presuming, or sinning rashly, deliberately, or knowingly, crass ignorance excuses; indeed even, not improbably, affected ignorance, because this, although it is grave negligence, nevertheless is not knowledge (cf. n. 1269).

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 76; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XXVI; ed. G., II, p. 695; Ami du Clerge, 1898, p. 1153; Huber, Hemnisse der Willensfreiheit; Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1909, p. 253.

287. DEFINITION. Ignorance, in general, is lack of knowledge in a capable subject. One ignorance, which is called negative or nescience, is lack of knowledge otherwise not owed, for example, in a rustic who does not know canon law. Another, which is called privative, is lack of owed knowledge, for example, in a confessor who does not know the things which pertain to the administration of the sacrament of penance. Another, which is called positive, or of depraved disposition, or also of contrariety, or error, is assent given to the false as to the true, or dissent from the true as from the false, for example, in a heretic (H. Ap., III, 13).

To ignorance are referred both FORGETFULNESS, which is privation of remembrance of a thing formerly known; and INADVERTENCE, which is lack of actual knowledge and defect of consideration in acting. This, if it comes from a depraved habit or from passion, is called ignorance of evil choice.

Here we consider ignorance insofar as it is lack of owed knowledge, whether it has error annexed to it or not; whether it is habitual or merely actual, as inadvertence.

DIVISION. Multiple ignorance is distinguished (V, l. c.):

1. By reason of object, it is of right or of fact. Ignorance of right is had if someone does not know the law, or is ignorant that something has been prescribed or prohibited: for example, if he is ignorant that fasting must be observed on Ember Wednesdays. Ignorance of fact is had if someone is ignorant of the existence of a fact, or of its circumstances: for example, if he is ignorant that today is an Ember Wednesday (cf. n. 40, 4.).

2. By reason of the action which is done ignorantly, ignorance is causing the act or merely accompanying. It is called causing the act when in some way it influences the work, and is the reason why the act is placed, either simply, or clothed with such a circumstance. It is had in him who can say: if I had known, I would not have done it, or I would not have acted in such a mode: for example, a hunter killing a friend whom he believes to be a wild beast would by no means have killed him if he had known that he was a friend. Moreover, ignorance causes the act not of itself, because, since it is privation and not a being, it cannot of itself influence; but per accidens, namely insofar as it removes knowledge, which, if it were present, would impede the work.

Ignorance merely accompanying is said of that which in no way influences the act; because, if knowledge were present, the work would be placed equally, indeed perhaps more easily and promptly, for example, if someone, thinking he is killing a stag, kills his enemy, whom nevertheless he would have killed even if he had known him (H. Ap., XIX, n. 8).

3. By reason of subject, ignorance CAUSING THE ACT is invincible or vincible. Invincible is that which cannot be overcome, either because doubt concerning the opposite does not occur, in which case it is physically invincible; or because, when moral diligence has been done, it cannot be put aside, and in this case it is called morally invincible. This ignorance is also called antecedent, because it altogether precedes the consent of the will. But vincible is that which a man does not overcome when he can and ought. It is also called consequent, because it follows the determination of the will, insofar as ignorance itself is voluntary and proceeds from free will. As is clear, there is not given vincible ignorance unless the obligation of inquiring further is known, at least confusedly; for the first thought of things is not in man's power (cf. n. 20 and n. 218).

VINCIBLE or consequent ignorance is subdivided into affected and non-affected. Affected, or directly voluntary, is that by which someone industriously labors, or in which he desires to remain, willing namely to be ignorant of the precepts of the law: either so that he may have an excuse for sin already committed; or so that he may not be drawn back from sin to be committed, according to that (Ps. 35:4): He would not understand that he might do well. This ignorance is found in those who, deliberately, neither attend sacred sermons or instructions, nor seek counsel in doubts, lest they be deterred from an evil purpose. Non-affected ignorance, or indirectly voluntary, is either crass, or simply vincible. Crass ignorance is had in him who, although he does not affect to be ignorant, nevertheless neglects to learn those things which he can and ought to know. This is also called supine, because the thick and fat, and those who lie supine, are accustomed to be idle. But if the negligence is common or light, so that some diligence is applied, yet not sufficient, the ignorance is called simply vincible. This is more or less culpable according to the various measure of negligence and the gravity of the thing concerning which the matter is treated. See St. Alph., III, 269; ed. G., I, p. 549; VII, 48; ed. G., IV, p. 291.

288. PRINCIPLES. I. Concomitant ignorance makes neither the voluntary nor the involuntary positively; but it makes the non-voluntary or involuntary privatively. The reason for the first is, because such ignorance has itself per accidens to the work which is done, and influences nothing into it. The reason for the second is, because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed (V, n. XXVIII).

II. Antecedent or invincible ignorance altogether takes away the voluntary. For whatever proceeds from it is by no means voluntary, neither in itself as being unknown, nor in its cause, namely in ignorance, which is plainly involuntary. But the work is done against the inclination of the agent, if not actual, at least habitual and interpretative. Thus the Doctors commonly (V, n. XXVII). Cf. however n. 125.

III. Consequent or vincible ignorance does not take away the voluntary, but lessens it, yet sometimes increases it. IT DOES NOT TAKE AWAY; because it is voluntary, and therefore its effect is voluntary. But IT LESSENS: for that which is willed only indirectly and per accidens is less voluntary than that which is intended in itself and directly. Whence Doctors commonly say that ignorance excuses, if not from the whole, at least from so much. But IT INCREASES the voluntary, if it is affected, not indeed by reason of itself, since ignorance, as such, is always opposed to the voluntary; but by reason of its cause, which is greater aversion from the right and greater affection into the depraved. For, as St. Thomas (1.2, q. 76, a. 4) observes: "from intention toward sin it comes about that someone wills to undergo the damage of ignorance, on account of the liberty of sinning" (V, n. XXIX).

289. From these things you resolve: 1. Those who do not observe feasts and fasts from ignorance, because they are accustomed to be little solicitous concerning knowing them, are not excused from sin, because their negligence is vincible. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 78, 3. But if, suspecting nothing concerning an occurring feast or fast, they omit the ordinary means of knowing for one or another week, they are excused from sin, because by such omission they did not fail in the required diligence, and therefore the ignorance is not vincible.

2. He who, noticing that the knowledge necessary for exercising an office is lacking to him, voluntarily performs the office, is held concerning the errors which he foresaw at least confusedly. But if the errors are grave, he remains in a habitual state of sin as long as he has not revoked his evil will, by not seizing the occasion of putting away ignorance. Cf. the things which will be said below n. 317.

3. If negligence in putting away ignorance is only venially culpable, the deed following from it, although grave in itself, will be imputable only unto venial fault. For acts of this kind are voluntary by reason of the cause.

Note. See many other things concerning ignorance in the treatises on Conscience, on Laws, on Sins, on Contracts...

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 8; q. 19, a. 6; q. 76.

80. Ignorance properly is the lack of knowledge in a subject capable of it, for example of astronomy in a priest. It differs:

1. From nescience, which is the simple negation of knowledge in an incapable subject, for example in a child or a madman;

2. From error, which is not a mere lack but a positive act of the intellect judging a thing to be otherwise than it is; it arises from ignorance or rashness;

3. From inadvertence, which is the lack not indeed of habitual knowledge but of actual consideration;

4. From forgetfulness, which is the privation of knowledge previously had.

But since moralists treat only of due duties and undue sins, they often take ignorance more strictly, not indeed for a negation, but for the privation of knowledge which ought to be in someone, such as theology for a confessor. Hence some distinguish negative ignorance, privative ignorance, and even positive ignorance or ignorance of false disposition, if it includes error.

81. Ignorance is divided:

1. By reason of the object which is unknown, it is ignorance of law, whether natural or positive, whether divine or human, whether of the law itself or of the penalty joined to it, by which, namely, the existence or extension or sense of the law itself is unknown; and ignorance of fact, by which a fact or a concrete circumstance of fact determining the present application of the law is unknown.

Thus he who does not know that on the vigil of Pentecost one must fast, or that heretical books are prohibited, is in ignorance of law; he who does not advert that this day is the vigil of Pentecost, or that this book is heretical, is in ignorance of fact.

2. By reason of the subject or person who is ignorant, ignorance is invincible or vincible. Invincible or involuntary ignorance is that which could not be removed by moral diligence; but vincible or voluntary ignorance is that which could have been so removed.

Moral diligence is that which prudent persons are accustomed to employ, and which varies according to the various circumstances or quality of the business, person, place, etc.; for example, it will be greater in a priest for rightly executing his office than in a rustic, greater where there is question of the goods of life than of fortune, where there is question of notable harm to a third party than of a small one.

Vincible ignorance is inculpable if it ought not to have been removed; but culpable if it ought to have been. But moralists, attending only to due and undue things, use the words culpable and vincible indiscriminately, and often call culpable ignorance vincible, and call inculpable ignorance invincible.

1. Speculatively one can still distinguish absolutely invincible ignorance, if it can in no way be removed; morally invincible and absolutely vincible ignorance, if absolutely it can be removed but only with toil and difficulty (because there is not given a proximate moral power for overcoming it); and morally vincible ignorance, if it can be removed morally and by ordinary diligence. But moralists do not treat of these.

Invincible ignorance can arise from a twofold head: either because someone has not thought at all about the truth to be sought or about the danger of error (for the first idea is not in man's power), or because, if he has thought and employed diligence, nevertheless he has not arrived at the truth. Whence it is not voluntary.

On the contrary, vincible ignorance is voluntary, whether directly and in itself, as if someone wills to be ignorant; or only indirectly from negligence, as if he omits to inquire when he ought to inquire; or only in the cause, if he wills something upon which ignorance follows (for example, drunkenness). But there are many degrees in it, which are usually reduced to three: a) ignorance strictly or simply vincible, when diligence is employed to overcome it, but not sufficient diligence, or not the whole diligence which is morally possible, or not all that which the quality of the business and person demands: it is indirectly voluntary; b) crass ignorance, when no or scarcely any diligence has been employed for acquiring knowledge, and supine ignorance, if this was so for driving away ignorance: it is voluntary, either indirectly, or in the cause; c) affected, malicious, or directly willed ignorance, when someone expressly and deliberately wills to be ignorant for any end whatever: whether so that he may act at pleasure and not be drawn back from his purpose, or so that he may have an excuse in sins committed or to be committed, or because of disgust, etc., especially if he studiously wills not to know so that he may not be drawn back from sinning but may sin more freely.

2. Several modern authors regard that three-membered distinction as not correct, because it is made with respect to a twofold diverse terminus: for ignorance is antecedent or consequent relative to the will itself of being ignorant; but it is antecedent or concomitant relative to the will of the work to be known. Nevertheless it seems that it can be rightly understood and defended by saying that the three aforesaid ignorances are distinguished by reason of both termini at once, namely, by considering at once the act of the will concerning ignorance and the act of the will concerning the work.

3. By reason of the act of the will together with the work, ignorance is:

a) Antecedent, which does not follow from the will but precedes its act, and yet is the cause to it of willing and doing what it would not will nor do if knowledge were present (according to the present disposition). Hence ignorance is the cause of the work because it removes knowledge which would impede the work, for example if someone, thinking he is killing a beast, kills a friend whom he would not have killed if he had known: such a person acts from involuntary ignorance. For all antecedent ignorance is invincible, but not conversely, because invincible ignorance is not always the reason for doing that which otherwise would not be done.

b) Concomitant, which precedes the act of the will and is joined to it, yet not as the cause of willing and doing that which is done, because even if it were not present, nevertheless the thing would be done (according to the present disposition), for example if someone, thinking he is killing a beast, kills an enemy whom he would also have killed if he had known: such a person acts with involuntary ignorance. It is also invincible.

c) Consequent, which in some way follows from an act of the will directly not willing or indirectly neglecting to inquire, and is directly or indirectly voluntary and at the same time precedes the work so that it can be the cause of willing and doing it, for example if someone voluntarily neglects to inquire about the danger of killing a man, whom, if he knew, he would not kill, or about a day of abstinence, although, if he knew that abstinence was required, he would abstain; such a person acts from voluntary ignorance. Consequent ignorance is vincible, as voluntary, whether it is vincible at the moment when the work is placed, or was formerly vincible, provided that the work was foreseen and because of it ignorance ought to have been guarded against. Otherwise it would be invincible with respect to the work, although vincible in itself, and therefore antecedent or concomitant with respect to the work which is placed.

82. Principles. I. Antecedent ignorance removes the voluntary according to that which is unknown, because it is invincible; indeed it renders the work positively involuntary simply, because it makes something against the habitual inclination of the will: for the work would not be done if ignorance were absent.

Hence: that which is done from involuntary antecedent ignorance is positively and simply involuntary; therefore such ignorance excuses.

We said: according to that which is unknown, for under another respect it can be voluntary: thus he who kills a man or a friend, thinking him to be a beast or an enemy, voluntarily shoots the arrow, but does not shoot it into a man or into a friend; and he who sins with a woman, not knowing that she is joined in marriage, although he is not guilty of adultery, nevertheless is guilty of fornication.

II. Concomitant ignorance removes the voluntary because it is invincible, but does not render the work positively involuntary, because this is not against the inclination of the will but would also be done if ignorance were not present; therefore it makes the non-voluntary. Hence: that which is done with involuntary concomitant ignorance is non-voluntary; and of this ignorance it is said: it does not accuse, nor does it altogether excuse, namely, from the habitual disposition of the will.

III. Consequent ignorance does not make the simply involuntary, but renders the work simply voluntary, because it itself is vincible and voluntary. Yet it generally (even if it is affected) makes the involuntary in a certain respect, because it is against some inclination of the will, insofar as it is the cause of doing that which would not be done if knowledge were present; hence it diminishes the voluntary and the sin according to the degree of vincibility, so that sometimes it even makes a mortal sin venial.

But it must be well noted: ignorance exceptionally in no way diminishes the voluntary, namely, if it is so affected that someone precisely chooses it in order to sin more freely or so as not to be drawn back from sin. Namely, this in no way makes the involuntary, nor therefore diminishes the voluntary and sin, but rather increases it, not by reason of itself but by reason of the cause, because there is a greater affection toward evil. For then it comes from a greater intensity or more intense inclination of the will toward sinning that someone wills to undergo ignorance.

Hence: that which is done from voluntary or consequent ignorance is simply voluntary, but ordinarily involuntary in a certain respect, and then less voluntary. This ignorance does not excuse, but accuses.

83. Observations. - 1. The general doctrine concerning ignorance is briefly expressed in canon 2202, § 1: "The violation of an unknown law is in no way imputed, if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise imputability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself."

2. The things which we have said about ignorance can be applied to inadvertence and forgetfulness, and to error. Error includes ignorance; full inadvertence and perfect forgetfulness are equated with invincible ignorance; but if they are not perfect, but arise from negligence, they are equated with vincible ignorance. Whence canon 2202, § 3: "The things which are established concerning ignorance also hold for inadvertence and error."

10. Definition. - Ignorance, taken generally, is the lack of knowledge.

Division. - Ignorance is distinguished:

1° On the part of the subject, into positive (or privative) and negative (or nescience), according as it is the lack of knowledge owed, or of knowledge not owed, for example ignorance of canon law in a countryman. Each differs from error; for the latter denotes a discrepancy between that which the mind judges and the thing concerning which it judges. Thus, with respect to a usurious contract, he labors under ignorance who does not know it to be usurious (lack of cognition); but he labors under error who, although he knows it to be usurious, nevertheless judges it lawful. Therefore every error is ignorance, but not conversely. How error differs from fraud, see n. 882. 3°.

2° On the part of the object, into ignorance of law and of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of a law, or of a particular fact.

3° On the part of the cause, or of the will from which it proceeds, into vincible and invincible, according as, with diligence applied, it can be overcome or not. - But invincible ignorance is physically such, if in no way it can be overcome; morally such, if, after moral diligence has been applied, it cannot be removed.¹

But that diligence is judged moral which prudent persons, according to the gravity of the matter and according to their own capacity, in such circumstances, are wont to employ.¹

4° On the part of the action which is done from ignorance, one kind is antecedent, which is in no way willed and is the cause of the work, so that, if the ignorance itself were not present, the work would not be done; as if someone pierces a man whom he invincibly thinks to be a wild beast, and would not have killed him unless he had been ignorant that he was a man. Another kind is concomitant, which neither is voluntary, nor is the cause of the work, so that, although it were absent, the work would equally be done; as if someone, invincibly thinking that he is killing a wild beast, kills a man long sought for death, whom he would also have killed if he had known him. Another kind is consequent, which in some way follows an act of the will unwilling or negligent to inquire, and is directly or indirectly willed; and therefore it is otherwise called vincible ignorance. Haine, ib. p. 11. q. 27.

Vincible ignorance is distinguished in three ways, namely: 1° simply such, when some diligence, yet not sufficient diligence, is applied to dispel it; 2° crass or supine, when no, or scarcely any, zeal is put into investigating the truth; 3° affected, when someone voluntarily shuns the means of laying aside ignorance, lest he be drawn back from his own purpose.

To invincible ignorance perfect forgetfulness and full inadvertence must be referred. But these, if they are not perfect, or if they proceed from culpable negligence, belong to vincible ignorance.

11. Principles. - I. Invincible ignorance entirely takes away the voluntary, both because it itself is not voluntary, and because nothing can be voluntary where there is no cognition. Therefore no act proceeding from invincible ignorance can be imputed to the agent. Thus likewise one must determine concerning perfect forgetfulness and inadvertence, since the same reason obtains. - Antecedent ignorance precisely causes the involuntary, and indeed positively, because, if knowledge were present, the act would not be placed.

II. Vincible ignorance does not take away the voluntary. For ignorance of this sort, whether directly or indirectly, is truly voluntary. Nevertheless it diminishes the voluntary, because it is the cause of willing that which, if it were absent, one is supposed never to have willed. The same also, by parity of reason, say concerning imperfect forgetfulness and inadvertence, and also concerning consequent ignorance.

III. Crass ignorance and affected ignorance diminish the voluntary much less, and consequently sin. The reason is that the former arises from grave negligence, while the latter is retained deliberately for sinning more freely, and therefore is an indication of a very intense voluntary, under which respect it also increases the sin. S. Th., De malo, q. 3. a. 7.

IV. Concomitant ignorance causes the involuntary, but only negatively, or the non-voluntary, not positively, because it is not against the inclination of the will; for the agent rejoices when he notices it. Hence it does not wholly excuse from sin, because it does not take away every habitual or actual conditioned will of sinning; nor again does it wholly cause sin, because it is involuntary and invincible. Hence he who from such ignorance kills, as if it were a wild beast, a cleric who is his enemy, remains guilty of internal homicide because of the evil will of killing his enemy, if he had known him; nevertheless he is excused from external homicide, nor does he incur excommunication, irregularity, or restitutions; because an external act not voluntarily placed does not induce these penalties, and an internal act does not induce them. Haine, ib. p. 13. q. 29.

Resolutions. - 1° Children who have done things illicit in themselves without any pang of conscience or suspicion of malice did not formally sin in reality, even if they had already attained the use of reason; and therefore afterwards they are not bound to confess them, when they understand those things to be illicit, since material sins are not matter for confession.

2° If a confessor or judge notices that he lacks sufficient knowledge to discharge his office as is fitting, and neglects to acquire knowledge, or before he has acquired it continues to exercise his office, he will be held for the errors which he foresaw at least in some way, because they are voluntary to him, at least in their cause.

3° Those who through their own fault are not accustomed to hear Mass on Sundays and are little solicitous about the feasts and fasts to be observed, as such persons have become accustomed, are not excused from sin if they do not observe the feasts and fasts, on the ground that they are ignorant of them; for the ignorance is vincible, since they voluntarily neglect to apply the means by which they could know them. But if only once or twice they have omitted Mass, whether with or without their own fault, and have not even suspected that a feast day or day of fasting was occurring during the week, they are excused from sin, since their ignorance is invincible; for he cannot be called voluntarily negligent in applying the means of dispelling ignorance who does not even think about applying them. - Likewise they sin who, dwelling in the country, far from a church, have neglected to inquire from books, or, if they do not know how to read, from others, for example Catholic neighbors, concerning feasts and fasts. But those are excused who, unskilled in reading and living among non-Catholics, have no one to admonish them concerning these things. The reason for both is the same as that which was brought forward just now.

4° If negligence in laying aside ignorance is culpable only venially, the deed following from it will be imputable only to venial fault. The reason is that acts of this sort are voluntary and therefore culpable only in their cause; therefore, since the cause, namely ignorance, does not reach grave fault, the effect cannot exceed light fault.

5° Vincible ignorance of a thing knowledge of which is prescribed by reason of itself (for example, of the mysteries of Faith, n. 257 sqq.) is a sin specifically distinct from that which is done from ignorance of this sort; because one sinning in this way acts against two diverse precepts issued for a diverse motive (n. 213). But if cognition is prescribed only by accident, by reason of the work to be done, it is not a special sin, but only one sin against that virtue

to which belongs the observance of the precept that is vincibly ignored. For by the same precept by which I am bound, for example, to fast, I am also bound to inquire. Hence, if through negligence in inquiring I do not fast, it is enough if I confess: I violated the fast. Haine, ib. p. 14. q. 31.

See many other things concerning ignorance elsewhere passim, especially in the treatise on Conscience, on Laws, on Sins, and on Contracts in general, where error is treated.

39. Notions. To cognition concerning the morality of an act there is opposed ignorance. Ignorance is taken more broadly for any lack of cognition in a capable subject; but more strictly (and better in moral theology) it is accepted as: the lack of due cognition. Therefore in this sense ignorance is distinguished from simple nescience, which is the lack of any knowledge, whether due or not.⁵ Thus, for example, for a confessor living in Europe not to know the Japanese language is nescience; but not to know Moral Theology is ignorance. Moreover ignorance is distinguished from error, for "error," as St. Thomas teaches,⁶ "is to approve false things for true; whence it adds some act over ignorance. For there can be ignorance without someone passing judgment about things unknown; and then he is ignorant and not erring. But when he already passes a false judgment about those things which he does not know, then he is properly said to err." But in practice ignorance, accepted in the sense explained above, is the mother of error; for ignorance is a habit, but error is an act or judgment proceeding from the habit of ignorance. We treat at the same time of ignorance and error.

⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 76, a. 2.

⁶ De malo q. 3, a. 7.

40. Divisions. 1. By reason of the object ignorance of fact and ignorance of law are distinguished. The first is present when someone is ignorant of some substantial or accidental fact, for example, when someone does not know that this book, which he reads, is heretical. The other is ignorance of law, and is present when someone does not know some law,⁷ either commanding or prohibiting; for example, when someone reading a heretical book does not know the ecclesiastical law punishing the reading of heretical books.

⁷ To ignorance of law there seems also to be reduced ignorance of the penalty to be inflicted on transgressors of the law. For such a penalty is the sanction of the law and its integral part, and therefore ignorance of the penalty is partial ignorance of law or right.

41. 2. By reason of the subject, that is, of the ignorant man, ignorance is distinguished as invincible and vincible. The first is that which, with moral diligence having been employed, cannot be conquered or driven away. The other is that which could be driven away by moral diligence, but from negligence or evil will is not driven away. - Moral diligence is considered that which is customarily employed by prudent and God-fearing men in such circumstances. But I say: in such circumstances; for the same diligence is not always to be employed. For if there is question of a grave matter, for example, of the validity of a sacrament, greater diligence is required than if there is treatment of a light matter, for example, of the narration of some harmless little story, which perhaps is not true. Yet supreme or extreme diligence is never required. For neither divine nor human legislators are to be considered tyrants, willing to oblige subjects to learn with extreme diligence all the minutest obligations of the law. - Since vincible ignorance arises from culpable negligence or from evil will, it also is culpable;⁸ but invincible ignorance is inculpable.

⁸ Those authors who teach that vincible ignorance can be inculpable take ignorance for nescience, but not in the strict sense for lack of due knowledge.

42. Vincible ignorance is customarily subdivided according to the diverse degrees of negligence and culpability occurring:

a) Into simply vincible, when only slight negligence in driving it away was present.

b) Into crass or supine, when there was almost no diligence, but grave negligence opposed to driving away the ignorance. Crass or supine ignorance in a grave matter is gravely culpable; but it is a light sin in a light matter. Therefore crass or supine ignorance is not always the same as gravely culpable ignorance (as is taught by some authors), but only then, when there is question of a grave matter.

c) Into affected ignorance, which is ignorance deliberately willed by him who wishes to have either some excuse from sin, or not to be drawn back from sinning; for example, someone doubting whether a book is on the Index does not ask, although he can easily ask, lest perhaps he should have to desist from reading that book. Those who labor under ignorance of this kind as if say to God: "Depart from us, and we do not want the knowledge of your ways."⁹ As is plain, this ignorance arises from an affection toward sin. Such affection is various: "Some do not wish to attend to the law, so that they may act according to their pleasure; they would be drawn back from acting by reverence for a known law; others, so that they may act according to pleasure more freely and without remorse; they are prepared to violate the known law, yet have retained some reverence for it; others, because they contemn the law itself and the authority by which it is issued, by which reason many apostates of our age care nothing for what the Church teaches or what she commands."¹⁰ - This affected ignorance is the worst and not only does not excuse from sin committed in transgression of the law, but even increases it, since such an ignorant man employs an evil means for sinning more freely. Wherefore it was also very fittingly established by the Code of Canon Law, c. 2229, § 1: "Affected ignorance, whether of the law or only of the penalty, excuses from no latae sententiae penalties."

⁹ Job 21:14. S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8 and q. 6, a. 3.

¹⁰ Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 164.

43. 3. By reason of the act of the will ignorance is distinguished as antecedent, concomitant, consequent.¹¹ Antecedent ignorance is that which precedes every act of the will, so that in no way is it willed or voluntary; but it is the (negative) cause of willing or doing that which would not be done if knowledge were present. For example, someone in hunting kills a friend, invincibly thinking that he is killing a stag. He would never have killed the friend if he had known the matter. Antecedent ignorance is always invincible and therefore inculpable, but not vice versa is every invincible ignorance antecedent. For antecedent ignorance adds above invincible ignorance that it is the cause of an action which would not occur if ignorance were absent, as is plain in the example brought forward.¹²

Concomitant ignorance is that which likewise precedes every act of the will intending the ignorance itself, and is not willed, and therefore is invincible just as antecedent ignorance is, from which however it differs in this, that it is not the cause of the work. It has place in him who is so disposed that he would posit the work or action even if he knew that which he truly here and now does not know; for example, someone who is disposed to kill his enemy wishes in hunting to kill a stag. Yet by an unforeseen chance he kills his enemy in place of the stag. In this case the killer always remains guilty of internal homicide because of the evil will of killing the enemy, and this especially if, once the truth of the matter has been inspected, he rejoices over the killing committed. Nevertheless, as Billuart rightly observes,¹³ he is excused from external homicide and from penalties and censures which are inflicted only for an external act. In practice concomitant ignorance not rarely becomes crass ignorance, indeed even affected ignorance.

Consequent ignorance¹⁴ is that which follows from some act of the will willing it either directly or indirectly. If the will directly wills it, it is affected ignorance, of which there has already been discussion above. But if it wills it indirectly, it is simply vincible or even crass ignorance. Therefore consequent ignorance and vincible ignorance are the same in reality, although they differ according to concept. For it is called consequent because it follows an act of the will; but it is called vincible because the will can conquer it. Each ignorance also coincides with culpable ignorance, at least if ignorance is taken in the strict sense for the lack of due knowledge.

For relieving the memory we set down the following two schemata:

Ignorance

I.     antecedent                 consequent
       ||                         ||
       invincible                 vincible
       ||                         ||
       inculpable                 culpable

       invincible > antecedent = antecedent
                                  = concomitant

that is, really, although not formally, a) antecedent ignorance is the same as invincible and inculpable ignorance; b) consequent ignorance is the same as vincible and culpable ignorance. Yet invincible ignorance extends more broadly than antecedent ignorance (which in the schema is expressed by the sign >), since it also includes concomitant ignorance.

II.    Antecedent ignorance
              v
       act of the will              concomitant ignorance
              v
       Consequent ignorance

¹¹ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8.

¹² Cf. Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 9.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ This ignorance is also called by St. Thomas and Aristotle ignorance of evil choice (S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8).

44. Note. Although we have enumerated together this threefold division of ignorance, nevertheless ignorance is not called antecedent, concomitant, and consequent with respect to the same thing, as someone could easily suspect. For it is called antecedent and consequent with respect to the interior act of the will, which either never willed the ignorance (antecedent ignorance), or at some time willed it or at least from negligence permitted it (consequent ignorance). But ignorance is called concomitant not so much with respect to the interior act of the will, as rather with respect to the exterior action, which antecedent ignorance precedes and causes, but concomitant ignorance accompanies in a kind of parallel way, having no influence of itself upon its morality.¹⁵ Whence Cajetan says very well:¹⁶ "Whatever would be imputed to the agent without that (concomitant) ignorance, is imputed to the agent with it: and by this fact, it neither excuses nor accuses." All these things become clear in the example brought forward: If a hunter laboring under antecedent ignorance kills a friend, this ignorance precedes not only the exterior action of killing, but also and especially any act whatever of the will willing or permitting it. For the will never willed this ignorance nor the killing. But if the hunter, prepared to kill his enemy, truly kills him here and now, but ignorantly, this ignorance was in no way willed and therefore is invincible and precedes the act of the will desiring it here and now; but it accompanies the preceding and non-retracted intention of the will to kill, and besides this the external action of killing, upon the morality of which, however, it has no influence of itself. Whence such a one does not kill because of ignorance, but kills while ignorant or with ignorance. But if a hunter kills some man with consequent ignorance, this ignorance indeed accompanies the external action, but follows some prior act of the will, which either directly or indirectly willed it.¹⁷ - The same doctrine can also be stated briefly in this way: All three species of ignorance accompany the external action; indeed antecedent and consequent ignorance cause this action, since otherwise it would not occur. Antecedent and concomitant ignorance are invincible; but consequent ignorance is vincible.

¹⁵ Thus also the text of St. Thomas, S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8, seems to be understood. Yet in some sense concomitant ignorance also accompanies the act of the will, insofar as, namely, it accompanies the preceding and non-retracted intention of the will.

¹⁶ Commentary on I-II, q. 76, a. 3.

¹⁷ Cf. Billuart, l. c. diss. 1, a. 9, and S. theol. I-II, q. 76, a. 1.

Preliminary note. To ignorance also are to be referred forgetfulness and inadvertence, which, if they are perfect, are equivalent to invincible ignorance; but if they are imperfect, they exercise the same influence upon the morality of the act as vincible ignorance. Therefore the following two principles are valid in the same way concerning ignorance and concerning inadvertence and concerning forgetfulness.

45. Principle 1. Invincible (antecedent) ignorance takes away the voluntary, and therefore also the imputability of any act which has been produced from it.¹⁸ Authors are accustomed to say briefly: Antecedent ignorance excuses from sin.

The reason is that he who acts from invincible ignorance inculpably lacks cognition of the morality of the act. But nothing is willed unless it is foreknown. Wherefore the Jansenistic proposition (2) was condemned by Alexander VIII: "Although invincible ignorance of natural law be given, this, in the state of fallen nature, does not excuse one acting from it from formal sin."¹⁹ St. Augustine expressly says: "It is not imputed to you as fault if you are unwillingly ignorant."²⁰

Resolves: a) He does not sin who eats meat on Friday while invincibly thinking it is Thursday.

b) Infants before the use of reason do not sin when perpetrating something against natural or divine law.

c) A youth invincibly ignorant that some book is on the Index of prohibited books sins if he reads it and afterward, when he perceives the prohibition, rejoices over the reading, saying that he would have read the book even if he had known the prohibition. He sins not indeed by the reading itself, since it was done with invincible ignorance, but by the joy afterward had.

¹⁸ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 76, a. 3 and q. 6, a. 8.

¹⁹ Denz. 1292; cf. also ibid. 1068.

²⁰ De lib. arb. 3, c. 19 (Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 1297).

46. Principle 2. Vincible ignorance a) does not take away the voluntary; b) nevertheless diminishes it, unless c) it is affected.

The reason for the first is that, notwithstanding vincible ignorance, the acts could and should have been foreseen and known. For since vincible ignorance itself is voluntary, the effects also following from it are voluntary. Peter Abelard seems to have taught the contrary, and therefore his proposition was condemned: "that whatever is done through ignorance is not to be ascribed to fault."²¹

The reason for the second is that here and now perfect cognition is truly lacking, which, if it were present, the action would not occur. But when perfect cognition is lacking, the perfect voluntary also is lacking, or the voluntary is diminished. Nevertheless vincible ignorance (at least if it is crass) is not accustomed to diminish the voluntary to the point that an act otherwise mortally evil becomes a venial sin.

The reason for the third is that affected ignorance is accustomed to arise either from an evil will causing it for sinning more freely,²² or from contempt of the law.

Resolves: a) A confessor, physician, advocate, etc., who from very imperfect knowledge necessary to their office err in particular cases, sin, because they could and strictly should have procured sufficient knowledge for themselves. For their ignorance is vincible and culpable.

b) The faithful who neglect to learn the truths of faith and the precepts of morals sin if from ignorance they err concerning faith or transgress moral precepts. Nevertheless their sin is less than if they knowingly transgressed the same precepts.

c) The faithful are bound to acquire sufficient cognition of the truths of faith and morals, lest from ignorance they err in matters which pertain to the salvation of the soul.

The two principles enunciated can also be briefly expressed thus:

1. Antecedent ignorance causes the simply involuntary. Consequent ignorance causes the simply voluntary and the involuntary in a certain respect.

2. Concomitant ignorance indeed causes the non-voluntary, but not the involuntary²³ (concerning the distinction between the involuntary and the non-voluntary, see below n. 56).

3. Antecedent ignorance excuses; consequent ignorance accuses; concomitant ignorance neither excuses nor accuses.

²¹ Denz. 377.

²² Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 76, a. 4: "Ignorance (affected) seems to increase the voluntary and sin: for from the intensity of the will toward sinning it comes about that someone wishes to undergo the harm of ignorance because of liberty in sinning." Cf. also De malo q. 3, a. 8.

²³ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8.

47. Scholion 1. On the inadvertence of the customary sinner. It can happen that a man is so bound up in evil habits that he elicits evil acts without any actual advertence to the malice, and those habits become as a second nature. This indeed can occur, for example, from the habit of blaspheming, fornicating, lying. In these cases a distinction is needed: Either the evil habit has been efficaciously retracted through sincere contrition, and then the acts produced without advertence are involuntary and therefore inculpable; or the evil habit has not been retracted, and then the individual acts do not lack fault, because they should have been foreseen and guarded against; indeed such acts are graver sins, since they proceed from a deep-rooted habit freely admitted.²⁴ Nevertheless in the confessional customary sinners of this kind are not to be too much tormented so that they state the number of individual acts. For investigation of the exact number is impossible, and rude penitents are accustomed to answer the questioning confessor whatever comes into their mouth, as St. Alphonsus says. Therefore it suffices if the confessor asks through what length of time the penitent has lived in such a habit, and about how many acts he committed each day.

Scholion 2. On ignorance of ecclesiastical laws and penalties. Although ignorance of invalidating or incapacitating laws (for example, impediments of marriage, irregularities) does not excuse from the same, unless something else is expressly said (c. 16, § 1), nevertheless "The violation of an unknown law is in no way imputed, if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise imputability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself" (c. 2202, § 1). But as often as because of ignorance (or some other cause) the transgression of the law was not gravely culpable, no ecclesiastical penalty is incurred (c. 2218, § 2). Grave fault, however, is not always required if there is question of imposing penances or penal remedies.

As to ignorance of ecclesiastical penalties, these things have been established: a) Ignorance of only the penalty does not take away the imputability of the delict, but diminishes it somewhat (c. 2202, § 2); b) Affected ignorance, whether of the law or only of the penalty, excuses from no penalty; but crass and supine ignorance excuses from penalties alone, if the law has the words: shall have presumed, shall have dared, knowingly, deliberately, rashly, with purpose aforethought shall have acted, or other similar words; c) Other ignorance indeed excuses from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative penalties (c. 2229).

²⁴ S. theol. I-II, q. 78, a. 2; cf. also below n. 90.

830. It is asked: Does ignorance excuse from this impediment? Authors disputed much whether this impediment is incurred even if one or each of the contracting parties did not know that it was imposed for the crimes recounted above. - The much more probable opinion taught that ignorance does not excuse from this impediment; today this has become certain and is admitted by all, since the Code of Canon Law, can. 16, § 1, establishes without any restriction: "No ignorance of invalidating or incapacitating laws excuses from them unless something else is expressly stated." But all diriment impediments of matrimony are invalidating laws, and the impediment of crime is not expressly exempted.

Ignorance, taken generally, is the lack of knowledge; but it is divided in many ways, and is:

1st. Positive or negative, according as it is the lack of knowledge due, for example, of moral theology in a confessor; or not due, for example, ignorance of canon law in a rustic.

2nd. Of law or of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of a law, or of a particular fact.

3rd. Vincible or invincible, according as, diligence being employed, it can be overcome, or not. But invincible ignorance is physically such if it can in no way be overcome; but morally such, if, moral diligence being employed, namely that which prudent men are wont to employ according to the gravity of the matter, it cannot be removed.

Vincible ignorance is distinguished as threefold, namely: 1st, simply such, when some diligence, yet not sufficient, is employed to drive it away; 2nd, crass or supine, when no, or scarcely any, zeal is applied in investigating the truth; 3rd, affected, which is directly willed, as when someone directly and positively wills to be ignorant of something, either that he may sin more freely, or that he may have an excuse from sins, or for some other reason.

To invincible ignorance are to be referred perfect forgetfulness and full inadvertence. But these, if they are not perfect, and proceed from negligence, pertain to vincible ignorance.

4th. Antecedent or consequent, according as it precedes an act of the will or follows it; whence the former is also called involuntary, invincible, and therefore inculpable; but the latter voluntary, either directly or indirectly, vincible, and more or less culpable. But each is a cause of willing or doing that which would not be done if knowledge were present. This last thing only, namely that it is the cause why the will wills what otherwise it would not will, antecedent or consequent ignorance adds beyond simply invincible ignorance, to which this does not necessarily belong. Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 13.

Here also mention is to be made of concomitant ignorance, which is had when someone is ignorant of what he is doing, but would still do it even if he were not ignorant; for example, if someone killed an enemy thinking him to be a wild beast, yet would still have killed him if he had not been ignorant. It in no way flows into the act, but only accompanies it by accident. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 26 and seq.

Invincible ignorance wholly removes the voluntary, because no voluntary can be present where no knowledge is had; but vincible ignorance does not remove it. For such ignorance is truly voluntary, either directly or indirectly, and in morals what is caused from the voluntary is reputed voluntary. Yet if this ignorance is indirectly voluntary, namely either simply vincible, or crass or supine, then it diminishes the voluntary, and consequently sin, because it diminishes, although in a diverse degree, the knowledge of the malice of the act. But if it is directly voluntary, that is, affected, then, according to St. Thomas, "such ignorance does not excuse sin either wholly or in part, but rather increases it." Yet this greater malice seems to have to be understood of the depravity of the will, while it positively neglects to learn the law in order to sin more freely, but not of the very infraction of the law, which indeed is sinful because known in some way, but nevertheless less so than if it were perfectly known. Cf. St. Thomas, QQ. DD., q. 3, De Malo, art. 8.

The voluntary properly so called, although diminished, can suffice for grave sin. And this must be adverted to. But the gravity of the sin is taken first from the gravity of the arising obligation, for instance, from a positive precept or from the matter considered in itself; as in children the necessity of learning the catechism, and in a confessor the necessity of knowing those things which are required for rightly fulfilling his office. Secondly, to this must be added the gravity of negligence, which is measured according to the mode of diligence which the matter demands. Cf. Ballerini, Op. Mor., v. 1, tr. I, n. 904.

You Will Resolve. 1st. A spouse sinning with a woman whom he invincibly does not know to be the sister of his wife is guilty of adultery, but not of incest.

2nd. Children who have done things illicit in themselves without any anxiety of conscience or suspicion of malice have in reality not sinned formally, even if they had already attained the use of reason; and therefore afterward they are not bound to confess those things, when they understand them to be illicit, since material sins are not matter for confession.

3rd. If a confessor adverts that sufficient knowledge is lacking to him for discharging, as is fitting, his office, and neglects to acquire knowledge, or before he acquires it goes on exercising his office, he is guilty of the errors which he foresaw at least in some way, because they themselves, at least in cause, are voluntary.

4th. If negligence in laying aside ignorance is culpable only venially, the deed following from it will be imputable unto only venial fault; because acts of this kind are voluntary, and therefore culpable, only in cause; since therefore the cause, namely ignorance, does not reach grave fault, the effect also cannot exceed slight fault.

5th. Ignorance can be concerned either with those things which ought to be known at any time whatever, or with those things which here and now only ought to be known; for example, upon any faithful person there lies the burden of knowing the truths of faith and the obligations of his state, and a similar burden is imposed upon a physician of investigating the disease of this sick person. In the first case the ignorance is habitual; in the other, actual. The one culpably ignorant of things necessary to be known is in some manner in the state of habitual sin; namely, he sins as often as there is present a recognized occasion of acquiring knowledge, which nevertheless he voluntarily neglects. In the second case the physician sins when the necessity of investigating shines forth to his mind, but he does not investigate.

6th. Error renders an act null if it is concerned with that which constitutes the substance of the act or falls back upon a condition sine qua non; otherwise the act is valid, unless something else is provided by law; but in contracts error can give place to a rescissory action according to the norm of law (Can. 104).

Ignorance on the part of the will is divided into ignorance antecedent, concomitant and consequent¹ : and of ignorance taken in this sense the question is here. Antecedent ignorance is that which precedes every act of the will, so that it is not at all willed or voluntary; it is nevertheless the cause of willing or doing what would not be done if knowledge were present: as in one who, with sufficient diligence used, kills a friend, thinking invincibly that he was killing a stag, whom he would not have killed had he known him to be a friend. It is also called invincible. Yet antecedent and invincible ignorance do not coincide, for antecedent, as here taken, adds over and above simply invincible ignorance that it be the cause why something is done which would not be done were it absent; which does not belong to every invincible ignorance, as is clear in concomitant ignorance, which, as I shall say presently, is invincible, and yet not antecedent. Whence every antecedent ignorance is invincible, but not conversely. ¹ Here q. 8, a. 4, c.

Concomitant ignorance is that which also precedes every act of the will, nor is it at all willed, and therefore invincible, like the antecedent, but it is not the cause of willing or doing what would not be done if knowledge were present. It is clear in one who killed an enemy, thinking invincibly that he was killing a stag, whom he would just the same have killed had he known him to be an enemy.

Consequent ignorance is that which follows an act of the will, so that it is willed either directly or indirectly, and it is the cause why something is done which would not be done were it absent. That which is directly willed is called affected, as when someone directly and positively wills to be ignorant of something, whether that he may sin more freely, or that he may have an excuse in sins, or on account of something else; of this is understood that Job, XXI, 14 : The wicked said to God: Depart from us, and we will not the knowledge of thy ways. And that Psal., XXXV, 4 : He would not understand that he might do well. Indirectly willed it is, when someone, although he does not will directly and positively to be ignorant, yet neglects to learn; whence this ignorance is called voluntary or willed indirectly and in its cause, namely negligence of learning. Which negligence, if it be grave, such that either none or only very slight diligence was used according to the quality of the matter, the ignorance is called crass and supine; but if the negligence be slight, such that notable diligence was used in learning, yet not wholly sufficient, the ignorance is called light or lightest, according to the quantity of diligence used in learning, respectively to the quality of the thing to be learned. These things noted,

I say 1° : Antecedent ignorance causes the involuntary simply¹; because the work proceeding from it is done without cognition, and is, as to the circumstance ignored, against the inclination, whether actual, or habitual and interpretative, of the agent; for he would not will to do it if the ignorance were absent. It is clear in him who, sufficient diligence being used, thinking invincibly that he was killing a stag, killed a friend. For although this killing, as to the substance of the act, and as it is a killing as such, be voluntary, yet not inasmuch as it is the killing of a friend; under that reason indeed it repugns the inclination of the slayer, and is done without cognition. ¹ Ibid.

I say 2° : Concomitant ignorance does not make the voluntary simply; because the work proceeding from it is done without cognition, or with an ignorance which is neither voluntary in itself nor in its cause, since it is invincible. Nor does it make the involuntary positively and contrarily; because this work is not against the inclination of the agent, for it would be done just the same if cognition were present. But it makes the involuntary negatively, or not voluntary; because it is done without the cognition required for the voluntary. It is clear in him who, thinking invincibly that he was killing a beast, killed an enemy, whom he would just the same have killed had he known him.

I say 3° : Consequent ignorance causes the voluntary simply, because it itself is simply voluntary, whether directly in itself, or indirectly in its cause, namely negligence of learning. Therefore the work proceeding from it is voluntary simply; for he who wills the cause wills also the effect. If you say that it is done without cognition, I answer that it is done indeed without formal cognition and in itself, yet not without virtual cognition and in its cause, namely in the ignorance which could and ought to have been driven away. He however is said to know virtually who could and ought to have known and would not. Yet it causes the involuntary secundum quid; because the work following from it is against some sort of inclination of the agent, for if knowledge were present, it would not be done, as is supposed. But if you suppose the ignorance to be so affected that, were it absent, the work would nonetheless be done; as if, e.g., someone rejects knowledge, not that with it present he may abstain from sin, but that he may sin without remorse: I confess that then it will not be involuntary secundum quid, but also neither will it be consequent ignorance in the sense of the conclusion, which is precisely that it be the cause why that is done which would not be done were it absent.

From what has been said you will gather that antecedent ignorance altogether excuses from sin, because it causes the involuntary simply: but concomitant does not altogether excuse, because it does not take away all willingness, whether habitual or actual conditioned to sinning; nor yet accuse, because it is involuntary and invincible. Whence, in the case posited, he who kills an enemy, thinking invincibly that he kills a beast, remains always guilty of internal homicide, on account of the evil will of killing the enemy, if he knew him; he is nevertheless excused from external homicide and from the punishments and censures, which are inflicted only on account of the external work, because the external work is not voluntary. Consequent however causes sin, because it causes the voluntary simply; it diminishes nevertheless, because it causes the involuntary secundum quid, and the lighter it is the more it diminishes, so that sometimes it makes venial out of mortal.

What I have said here of ignorance can be said of inadvertence, which is a kind of actual ignorance, or at least is equated to ignorance in ordine to the voluntary. Let these things suffice now on the present matter, for there will be further mention of it when treating of the causes of sins.

I say : Invincible ignorance of divine positive law can be given, not only among infidels, to whom the Gospel has not been announced, but also among the faithful, to whom it has been announced¹. ¹ 2a 2ae, q. 10, a. 1.

The first part is certain and is admitted by all the orthodox, especially after the condemnation of this proposition : « Negative infidelity, in those among whom Christ has not been preached, is sin. » It is number 68 among the Baians condemned by St. Pius V.

It is proved 2°. According to ordinary law of God, the unique medium of knowing the mysteries of faith is the preaching of the Gospel, according to that word Rom., X, 14 : How shall they believe him whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? Whence Christ, Joann., XV, 22, says of the Jews : If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin — namely of infidelity, as Aug. interprets it, Tract. 89 in Joann.

And thence flows the second part, which one or another denies, being herein singular against the unanimous sense of the others. For if, because the Gospel is announced in no manner to infidels, invincible and blameless ignorance of all the mysteries and precepts of faith can exist in them, therefore those also among the faithful to whom it is not sufficiently announced, or as regards certain precepts, can invincibly and blamelessly ignore them : because what the defect of promulgation of the whole law effects with respect to infidels, that does the defect of promulgation of this precept effect with respect to a particular person; especially since from one precept known, another cannot be deduced with which it holds no connection.

It is confirmed. Divine positive law thrusts knowledge of itself upon us no more than human law. But invincible ignorance of human law can be given. Therefore.

You will say against the first part : Every ignorance of divine positive law at least necessary to salvation is culpable. Therefore vincible. — Proof of the antecedent. It arises from fault; for if man were to convert himself to God as he ought and can by the help of grace, which God denies to no one, as we said in the first part, God would instruct him concerning those things necessary to salvation, either through internal inspiration, or through a preacher, as St. Thomas teaches, Lect. 3 on chapter X Rom., and elsewhere. But ignorance which follows from fault is culpable. Therefore.

Answer. I deny the antecedent. In proof whereof I distinguish the minor. Ignorance which follows from fault is culpable, if it was foreseen in the fault, or could humanly have been foreseen, I concede; if it was neither foreseen nor could have been foreseen, I deny. For, that an effect following per accidens upon some voluntary cause be voluntary and imputable, it must, as I said so often already, be foreseen, or morally able to be foreseen, as about to follow from that cause. But they of whom the question treats neither apprehend, nor can morally apprehend, their conversion to God to be an ordered and suitable medium for driving away the ignorance of faith, concerning which they do not even think, or ever thought. Confer what I said in my great Work, tract on God, dissert. VII, art. 8, obj. 5.

You will insist Every adult can attain salvation, as is plain from what was said art. 8 cited. Therefore he can drive away the ignorance of those things at least necessary unto salvation.

Answer. I distinguish the consequence. Therefore he can physically drive away ignorance etc., insofar as he can be instructed by God, and would in fact be instructed, were he to convert himself to him, I concede the consequence; morally, so that it be imputed to him as fault, if he drive it not away, I deny, since he knows not that he can, nor that necessary knowledge would follow from his conversion. But there is no implication [contradiction] that someone can morally attain the end which he knows, and be able to attain the means only physically, when he knows them not.

Note that the precepts of natural law are commonly distinguished, with the Author¹, into three classes: Some are first and most universal, which are rather principles of other precepts than precepts, such as : « Good must be done, evil avoided. What you do not wish done to yourself, do not to another. » Secondary are more determinate, which are deduced from the first immediately and by easy discourse, such as the precepts of the Decalogue. Tertiary are those contained obscurely in both, and deduced from these mediately and with difficult discourse, such as the precepts which prohibit certain contracts, as usurious or simoniacal, and many others. ¹ Hic infra, q. 100, a. 1, c.

It is agreed among theologians that there cannot be invincible ignorance of the first precepts, nor of the secondary considered in themselves, in adults having perfect use of reason; because the first are per se known and are understood from the mere apprehension of the terms; the secondary are deduced from the first immediately by an easy and obvious discourse, of which even ruder men are capable.

I said: « Of secondary precepts considered in themselves; » because, if they be considered as clothed with circumstances good and apparently excusing from sin, as to tell a slight lie to save the life of an innocent man, to steal to relieve one gravely needy, etc., it is more probable, with Sylvius, the Salmanticenses and several others, that they can be invincibly ignored, at least by ruder men and for some time; because on account of this circumstance they become obscure and are reduced to the third class. The question is therefore concerning the more remote and more obscure precepts of the third class. Wherefore

I say : There can be in adults having perfect use of reason invincible ignorance of natural law regarding the more remote and more obscure precepts, which are said to be of the third class. This is most common opinion against certain Louvanists and a few others.

It is proved by the authority and reasoning of St. Thomas, below, q. 100, a. 1, c, where he says: « Certain [precepts of the natural law] there are for whose judgment much consideration of diverse circumstances is required, which to consider diligently does not belong to everyone, but to wise men; just as to consider the particular conclusions of sciences belongs not to all, but to philosophers alone. » And further: « Certain things there are which by subtler consideration of reason are judged by wise men to be observed; and these are so of the law of nature, that however they need instruction whereby the lesser may be taught by the wise. » And a. 11, c, of the same question: « Certain things there are whose reason is not so manifest to everyone, but only to the wise; and these are the moral precepts superadded to the Decalogue. » — I subjoin. But not all are or can be wise; not all are capable of subtler consideration or more difficult discourse; nor is it granted to all to be instructed by the wise. Therefore, according to St. Thomas and the truth of the matter, the more obscure precepts of natural law, which are remote conclusions from the first, can be invincibly ignored, no otherwise than the remote conclusions of the sciences.

The adversaries answer 1º that the remote precepts of natural law can be invincibly ignored speculatively, but not practically; and that St. Thomas must be understood of speculative ignorance.

Sed contra : 1° Therefore, according to St. Thomas, as it pleases the adversaries, the remote precepts of natural law can be invincibly ignored speculatively, because they are difficult, obscure and of subtler consideration. But they are not less difficult and obscure, indeed more so, in practice than in speculation, on account of the diverse circumstances which practice involves. Therefore. 2° St. Thomas wrote this part with respect to ignorance in practice, since thence they take their argument against us. If thus in this place, why not in another? Therefore the answer is gratuitously invented, nay false.

They insist : If men, as far as in them lies, purged away depraved affections and habits, and prayed as they ought, God would enlighten them, or remove from them the occasion of acting against natural law; which since they neglect, their ignorance is voluntary and culpable.

I answer. I deny the consequence, which the adversaries feign quite gratuitously. For where has God promised this? That it may be more evident, the 2° conclusion is proved by overturning this principal foundation of the adverse opinion. According to the adversaries, that ignorance of natural law must be held vincible which could be conquered 1° by study and human inquiry, 2° by purging depraved affections and habits, 3° by assiduity in prayer, 4° by right use of what is already known. For these are the four modes by which Steyaert and other Louvanists say ignorance of natural law is vincible, so that, if these being in place it is not conquered, it will be invincible. But ignorance of natural law is given which, all these means being employed, could not be conquered. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Jerome, Epist. XI, quoted by Augustine, taught that simulation was licit, and erred. Cassian, Collat. 17, and others taught that the officious lie, for instance for the liberation of one's country, is licit, and erred.

St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 67, a. 2, c, teaches that a judge is bound to condemn as guilty one juridically proved innocent; St. Bonaventure teaches the contrary: one or other erred concerning natural law. For many centuries Catholic and most pious doctors dispute about this case and several others pertaining to natural law, for instance about certain contracts, whether they are usurious, whether simoniacal, etc. But all these employed the above-named means. It would be impious to deny this of the holy Doctors of the Church St. Jerome, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, rash to deny it of others. Therefore.

The adversaries respond that these holy Doctors and others erred speculatively only, and not practically.

Sed contra. To be silent about others, St. Thomas composed his second and third parts of the Summa with a view to forming morals, avoiding sins, exercising virtues, administering and receiving sacraments, and singularly this article about which there is question, for duly exercising the office of judge; all which pertain to practical doctrine. Therefore, if he erred, he erred practically, and not speculatively only, as a Thomist doctor would now err if consulted by a judge he answered according to the opinion of St. Thomas: for it is not only practice to act, but also to teach and counsel in acting; nor is he alone culpable practically who does the evil work, but also he who cooperates with it by teaching and consenting. Nor say that St. Thomas gave no assurance; for he is held to give assurance who teaches something absolutely as true and obligatory, as St. Thomas does in the present case and in many others. And even if he gave no assurance to others, nevertheless he himself erred with a view to practice, since by thus teaching he did not know but that many would follow his doctrine.

Therefore when we read in Scripture : Ask, and you shall receive, John, XVI, 24. If any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not, James, I, 5. Thou hast given a warning to them that fear thee, that they may flee from before the bow, Psal. LIX, 6 : these and similar texts are understood to mean that God, of his grace, will enlighten him who prays and does what in him lies regarding those things necessary with necessity of means, and for avoiding formal sins.

It is confirmed 2°. God does not always enlighten him who does what in him lies, of grace, according to the aforesaid modes, regarding those things which are of positive divine law, as the adversaries commonly admit. Therefore neither regarding those things which are of natural law.

Obj. 1° from St. Thomas : The Angelic Doctor, Quodlib. XIII, a. 13, says : « In two ways someone is bound to sin: one way, by acting against the law, as when someone fornicates; another way, by acting against conscience, even if it be not against the law... But that which is done against the law is always evil, nor is it excused by being according to conscience. » But he who acts against the more remote precepts of natural law acts against the law. Therefore his ignorance is not invincible; otherwise he would not sin.

I answer. This celebrated text of St. Thomas, which the adversaries at once urge, and which they boast never solved, never to be solved, does not fight even against us. For of our own accord we confess with the holy Doctor that everything done against the law formally is sin; because sin is defined : « A word, deed or desire against the law. » Whence to be formally against the law and to be sin are convertible. But that something be against the law formally, this law must be known, or morally able to be known, to exist; otherwise through defect of sufficient promulgation it will not be actually obliging, and what is done will not be formally against it, but materially only. Truly therefore says St. Thomas that everything done against the law formally, namely against the law virtually known, or invincibly unknown (for otherwise it is not done formally against the law), such as fornication, is always sin, and is not excused by its being according to conscience erring by vincible error dictating that to be licit. Moreover see more about this text, Dissert. on Probabilism, art. 3, obj. 3.

Obj. 2° : Concupiscence and ignorance are two wounds of human nature inflicted by original sin. But every concupiscence is vincible. Therefore every ignorance is vincible. This is almost the sole foundation of the Louvanists from reason.

I answer. I distinguish the minor. Every concupiscence is vincible as to its motions and stimuli, I deny. Experience shows it, and the Apostle thrice asked this of the Lord and obtained it not, II Cor., XIII, 8. As to consent, I concede. And to this same Apostle it was said, ibid., 9: My grace is sufficient for thee. So likewise every ignorance is vincible as to consent; for man can not consent to any ignorance whatever, doing morally what in him lies to conquer it, and thus make himself immune from all culpable ignorance. But, just as he cannot arrest all involuntary motions of concupiscence, so neither all involuntary errors of ignorance.

But if perhaps the question be not of concupiscence and ignorance themselves, but of those things to which concupiscence does not impel, v. g., fornication, adultery, etc., and of things done out of ignorance, I grant that the former we can conquer and avoid, not the latter. The reason of the disparity is evident, because, if those things to which concupiscence impels us, for instance fornication, adultery, etc., we could not conquer and avoid, since they are elsewhere supposed known, nothing would be wanting to formal sin, and thus we should be necessitated to sin formally; which cannot be admitted. But supposing invincible ignorance, the things we do through it are unknown to us, and therefore material sins only, and not formal.

I say : Invincible ignorance of the law of nature excuses from formal sin the one acting from it. This is against Luther, Calvin, Jansenius and the Jansenists, defined by Alexander VIII, 7 December 1690, in the condemnation of this proposition: « Even if invincible ignorance of the law of nature be granted, in the state of fallen nature it does not excuse from formal sin the one acting from it. » It is the second among 31.

It is proved 1° from Sts. Augustine and Thomas. Aug., lib. III, de lib. Arbit., cap. 18, n. 50: « Is there so great a deceit [of ignorance] that it can by no means be guarded against? If it is so, there are no sins. » St. Thomas, here q. 76, a. 3, c, speaking of invincible ignorance in general, expressly says: « But if it be such ignorance as is altogether involuntary, either because it is invincible, or because it concerns what one is not bound to know, such ignorance altogether excuses from sin. »

It is proved 2° by this fundamental reasoning of St. Thomas. That which takes away from the act the character of the voluntary, and renders it involuntary, excuses from formal sin; for sin is a moral act, consequently free and voluntary. But this is what invincible ignorance of the law of nature effects; for the voluntary is defined as « that which is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end ». Therefore.

They answer that invincible ignorance of the law of nature, and the things done from it, are voluntary in us in Adam, since they are effects of that sin.

III. Ignorance is the privation of knowledge. Error is the approbation of falsity. One ignorance is of law, which is ignorant of a law or precept; another of fact, which admits knowledge of the law, but is ignorant of the fact. One is vincible, or voluntary, consequent, and culpable — this can be conquered by diligence and study, and through negligence is not conquered. Another is invincible, which can be overcome by no study — this is without all fault. Of vincible ignorance, one kind is affected, which repels knowledge: He would not understand, that he might do well. Another is crass and supine, which applies no diligence at all to know those things which one can and ought to know.

X. Ignorance truly invincible, whether of right or of fact, just as it excuses from fault, so it exempts from censure. Ignorance venially vincible excuses from a censure for the incurring of which a mortal fault is required. Ignorance nevertheless is not presumed in the exterior forum unless it be proved, as is said in chapter Ignorantia on the rules of law in the Sixth. Ignorance of fact excuses, but not of law. He who knows that homicide is forbidden by divine right, but is invincibly ignorant of the ecclesiastical law forbidding it under a censure, does not according to very many incur the censure, although he sin against natural and divine right: because, they say, for the contracting of a censure contumacy is necessary, which an admonition ought to precede. For the penalty of censure differs from those penalties passed either by the civil forum or by the ecclesiastical forum, which are contracted even if they be ignored, when the law is known. Wherefore a homicide, from whom the law forbidding it is not hidden, is obnoxious to capital punishment even if he be ignorant of this penalty. Similarly he who knows the ecclesiastical law forbidding such an act would incur irregularity from a delict, although he were ignorant of such a penalty. On the contrary, if he were invincibly ignorant of the ecclesiastical law, just as he would be immune from fault, so he would be free from irregularity from a delict.

Albert, a young Catholic who applies himself to the study of medicine with this intention, that after his studies have been completed he may practise the medical art, does not hesitate also to give a great span of time to pleasures. His parents and teachers warn him to prepare himself more diligently for undertaking that rather burdensome state; nevertheless, matters proceed almost as before. At fixed times he undergoes examinations with by no means unhappy success, since he always gives evidence of sufficient learning, although because of laziness he is ignorant of some things in each examination. Finally, at some point, he is admitted to practise the art, and he goes to a certain city in order to seek a livelihood there by his art. He undertakes the care of the sick, and immediately finds himself to be ignorant of many things altogether necessary for him to know, since very often the remedies prescribed by him seem to be of no benefit, and indeed not rarely to increase the disease. After some months he is so distressed by scruples of conscience that he lays open his whole condition to his confessor and asks what is to be done. Hence it is asked:

1. When is ignorance culpable?

2. When a bad act has been performed from invincible ignorance, at what time and in what way is sin committed?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. When is ignorance culpable?

Ignorance is culpable if it concerns what we are bound to know and if it is voluntary. There is no guilt attaching to ignorance about what we are under no obligation to know. Neither can we be blamed for ignorance which we can not help. The degree of culpability for voluntary ignorance about what we are bound to know will depend upon the seriousness of the matter and the degree of voluntariness in the ignorance. If the matter is serious and if there was great negligence in not procuring the requisite knowledge, grave sin will be committed. On the other hand, if either the matter be trivial or the negligence slight, no more than a venial sin will be committed.

2. When a bad action is done out of voluntary ignorance, is the sin committed when the agent culpably neglected to procure knowledge or when the act is done; and of what species is the sin?

Per se, inasmuch as formal sin consists in doing wrong or neglecting duty with advertence, formal sin is committed when the doer of a bad action, which is the result of voluntary ignorance, culpably neglects to procure the requisite knowledge. At the time when the bad action is done through ignorance the doer of it does not advert to the wrong that he is doing, and so the act can not be a formal sin at the time when it is done. Of course if the bad act is not merely the result of ignorance, but at the time when it is done there is some suspicion of its not being right, or some advertence to its malice, then the harm done will not only be voluntary in its cause, but also voluntary in itself. But then it will not be done out of voluntary ignorance, but out of malice here and now.

A sin of ignorance is of the same species as the act done out of ignorance would be if it were committed with knowledge. For the law which is violated by the sin is violated also by voluntary ignorance concerning it, inasmuch as every law imposes on those who are subject to it the obligation of obtaining knowledge of it, and voluntary ignorance is a violation of this obligation.

3. Albert neglected his work when he was a medical student. In spite of warnings from professors and parents he gave a great deal of time to enjoyment. In each examination he managed to show sufficient knowledge to pass, though there were some subjects of which he was ignorant. When he began to practise, he soon found out his deficiencies. His prescriptions often seemed to do harm to his patients instead of good. After some months he became so uneasy that he spoke on the subject to his confessor and asked him what he was to do. After satisfying himself that there are good grounds for Albert’s scruples the confessor should tell him that he must give some time to study now, so as to make up for his idleness in his student days. He knows what subjects he neglected, and he should apply himself to those in the first place. Until he can make up for lost time he should not undertake cases where his ignorance is likely to be an obstacle to his treating them properly. On one pretext or another he may call in some other medical man, and forego his own fees in such cases. If he does what he can in this way, he need not give up his practice, as all serious danger of doing harm will be removed, and he will soon gain the knowledge without which he should not have begun to practise at all. He committed sin in neglecting his studies, and as the matter was serious, nothing less than the lives and health of his patients, and the negligence was apparently grave, the sin was a grave one. He must be sorry for this and resolve to make up for it as far as he can in the future and then he may be absolved.

Many people speak of the error of philosophical sin without knowing very distinctly in what it consists. The distinction between philosophical sin and theological sin is neither new nor chimerical, as some imagine. It is from Saint Thomas, who says that sin is considered in one way by the Theologian and in another by the Philosopher. [Ia. 2, q. 71, a. 6, ad 5.] The former, he says, examines the nature of sin insofar as it is an offense against God, and the latter insofar only as it is contrary to reason. It is the same sin viewed under different aspects. According to the one it is called theological, and according to the other it is called philosophical. According to the one it offends God; according to the other it offends reason.

Since Theology is ordinarily taught in Latin, the terms employed in it must be understood according to the force they have in that language. The word offendere, which in French signifies to offend, has various significations in Latin according as it is taken in the proper or in the figurative sense. In the proper sense it signifies what happens to a body which is in motion and which strikes another upon encountering it. In the figurative sense it is said of a rational being who acts against the will, against the inclinations of another, against the respect and against the obedience which he owes him. This signification is the one most used in our language.

The Theologians, following this usage of the Latin Language, say that sin, taking the force of the terms, is an offense against God, offensa Dei, only insofar as it strikes against the obedience which is owed to him; that when neither God nor his commands are known by the one who commits the sin, this sin, speaking rigorously, ought not to be called an offense against God, because then it does not directly strike against this obedience nor against his commands, which the sinner does not know. But this sin always offends reason, because it is against the lights of conscience and against that law written in our hearts, which are not things different from reason. This is what must first be well conceived in order to understand the question of philosophical sin. This perhaps appears a vain subtlety when speaking Theology in our language; but it is not so in the customary language of Theologians, that is to say, in the Latin language. After all, in matters of this kind one must always agree upon the signification which usage attaches to words.

It is then necessary to make a very important observation. It is that the Theologians who have made all these precise distinctions, and principally the Jesuits, when saying that the sin of a man who does not know God is not properly called an offense against God, do not thereby deny that it is a sin, and a sin punishable by damnation. On the contrary, most of the Theologians say that, even in this supposition, the sinner is justly punished with Hell, because although he does not act against the commands of a known God, he nevertheless acts against the law which that God has placed in his heart; that this law marks out his duty for him and makes him understand that he violates it by not following it; which, according to them, suffices to render him guilty of the penalties with which this God, altogether unknown though he is to him, punishes him in this life and in the other. Thus almost all the Theologians agree that the sins of the Barbarians which gave rise to this question, as soon as they are against the natural law, are punished by God in hell; but they do not all reason from the same principles, and they posit different ones from which they equally conclude the just punishment of these sorts of sinners.

Some lay down as a principle that an invincible ignorance of God is never found, at least for a long time, among the Barbarians who have the use of reason, whether their natural light, stirred by the sight of creatures, suffices to give them this knowledge, or whether God acts interiorly in them by ways which are unknown to us and of which they alone could give an account. What Saint Paul says of the Pagans in the Epistle to the Romans gives great authority to this System. However that may be, this principle being laid down, it follows that the sins of these Pagans offend not only reason but also the obedience which they owe to God, and that they are offenses against God in the most exact signification that this term can have in scholastic language.

The other Theologians have reasoned from an altogether opposite principle, which they believed to be more conformable to experience. They have said that there could be among some Barbarians an invincible ignorance of God; but to this principle they add that other one of which I have already spoken: that in order for the sin of a Barbarian to merit damnation, it is not necessary that it be directly against the obedience owed to God, nor that the sinner know distinctly that the law which he violates comes from that God; but that it suffices that he commit this sin against the lights of his conscience, which marks out his duty for him and makes him understand at the same time the obligation he has to conform himself to this law, which is written in his heart. That, by not doing so, he justly incurs the disfavor of God and the punishment attached thereto for all eternity. In this manner, neither in the one opinion nor in the other is there among the Barbarians any purely philosophical sin, that is to say, one which purely offends reason without offending God, either directly or indirectly, and which does not merit Hell, when it has the other conditions required for the essence of mortal sin.

All this having been set forth, it will be easy to understand in what the error of philosophical sin consists. It consists first in saying that certain Barbarians perform actions against the natural law, such as homicides, adulteries, etc., which are not mortal sins worthy of damnation, because in all those who are ignorant of God sins are purely Philosophical, that is to say, only against reason, and in no way Theological, that is to say, they are not against God, whom the sinner does not know and by them, consequently, God himself does not hold himself offended. [In Decreto Alexandri VIII, 24 Aug. 1690.]

A second Proposition may be made which will contain the same error, or an altogether similar error founded upon the same principle. It is this: that not only those who are ignorant of God and who have never known him, but also those who are not ignorant of him, if, when acting against the Law, they do not actually think that they offend God, do not in fact offend him; that their sins are purely philosophical, because they see clearly that they are against reason, but that they are not Theological, because they do not think that they are against God, and thus they are not worthy of being eternally punished. This concerns the sins of an infinity of libertines who, they say, commit the most horrible actions and abandon themselves to the most extreme debaucheries without ever thinking that God forbids them. It is precisely in these two Propositions that the error of Philosophical sin consists, and it seems in fact expressed in the famous Theology Thesis of Dijon about which so much clamor was made some years ago.

It was denounced to the Bishops and to the Pope as a new heresy of the Jesuits. It was condemned by Alexander VIII on the twenty-fourth of August in the year 1690. The Jesuits, who were as much scandalized by it as the others, anticipated the condemnation of the Pope by being the first to condemn it in public writings. They subsequently produced, among others, one entitled The Error of Philosophical Sin Combated by the Jesuits, in which they demonstrated that this had never been the doctrine of their Society. They showed, moreover, that this very Thesis was in no way conformable to the writings of the Professor of Dijon, which they caused to be authenticated and brought to Paris. They printed extracts from them which contained only the common doctrine in Theology on this subject. And in fact, in reading the writings of the Professor, one does not comprehend how he could have made a Thesis of this nature.

This is not the place to enter into the detail of the defense of the Jesuits, nor of the calumnies which were published against them on this subject. Nothing was omitted in order to tear them apart and to render them odious everywhere. For this purpose people dared to falsify the writings of the Professor; to cite the objections which he made to himself as though they had been his assertions; and to make him advance not only the most detestable but also the most extravagant maxims, so that, in order to say what people made him say, not only would he have had to be a libertine by profession, but also mad in the sovereign degree. And what is surprising, and what will never be believed unless one is willing to take the trouble to compare the writing of the Jesuits with those of their Adversary, is that after these Fathers had published the true extracts from the writings of the Professor in order to show the falsification that had been made in them, no other answer was given than that it was by a figure of Rhetoric that he had been made to speak in that manner. [The true extracts are in the Second Letter to a Man of the Court. The false extracts are in the Denunciation of the New Heresy, art. 3, third denunciation, pp. 81-82.]

However that may be, in order to execute the design proposed here, the Jesuits declare, first, that they condemn this doctrine as scandalous, as rash, as offensive to pious ears, and as erroneous, which are the qualifications with which the Holy See censured it.

Second, they declare, and they have always declared with truth, that this was never the doctrine of their Society, and that none of their Authors ever taught it.

Third, not only is this doctrine not that of their Society, but none of the principles of their Theology leads to it. Some of their Theologians have held, after several others, that invincible ignorance of God can exist for some time among some Barbarians; but they have added at the same time that these Barbarians, acting against the lights of their conscience, committed not only philosophical sins but mortal sins worthy of hell, as I explained previously. Others have held that, in order to offend God in this manner, it is necessary to know him; but they have at the same time laid down as a principle that invincible ignorance of God was impossible, as several other Theologians think. In a word, in reasoning in this manner they have reasoned as people reason in all the Catholic Schools. From neither the one nor the other of these two principles taken separately does the error of philosophical sin with respect to the Barbarians follow. And there has never been, so far as is known, any other Jesuit who joined them both together, except a Spaniard, namely Arriaga, who did so after the example of some other non-Jesuit Theologians, but who was neither followed nor preceded in such a doctrine by the Theologians of his Society, not even by the Professor of Dijon, who in fact admits neither ignorance nor forgetfulness of God that renders sin purely philosophical, and who expressed himself as he did only in a purely metaphysical and morally impossible hypothesis, as he expressly says himself.

In the fourth place, the Jesuits declare that the constant and universal doctrine of their Society is that the sins of libertines, of habitual sinners, and of the hardened are imputed to them in themselves or in their cause; that their Theologians follow in this only the common doctrine in the Catholic Schools; that every ignorance or inadvertence which has its source in the free will of the sinner cannot excuse his sin. And, on the occasion of the Thesis of philosophical sin, they did not fear to challenge their Adversaries to show anyone among the great number of Jesuit authors of every kind - Interpreters of Scripture, Scholastic Theologians, Controversialists, Casuists or Canonists, Preachers or those who composed Treatises of devotion, and even Philosophers themselves - they challenge their Adversaries, I say, to produce any one of them who, when treating of ignorance or inadvertence with respect to our duties, did not distinguish that which is culpable from that which is not; or who did not always suppose this distinction; and who did not say, when treating the matter, that voluntary ignorance or inadvertence never excuses the evil which one has thus ignored through a criminal negligence. So constantly has this doctrine, which is directly opposed to the error of philosophical sin, always been that of their Society.

After this, what is the charity, what is the equity, what is the sincerity of those who wish to persuade the world that the error of philosophical sin is the doctrine of the Jesuits? Where is the good faith of those who every day, in Books and in Theses, affect maliciously to inveigh against the error of Philosophical sin more vehemently than against those of Nestorius and Arius, in order to cause its infamy to fall back upon the Jesuits, who detest it more than they do, and whose Society, of all the Societies that are in the Church of God, has always openly professed to be the most submissive and the most universally submissive to the decisions of the Holy See which concern faith and morals? I pass to the article of probable opinions.