§ 3. On Ignorance

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 76; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XXVI; ed. G., II, p. 695; Ami du Clerge, 1898, p. 1153; Huber, Hemnisse der Willensfreiheit; Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1909, p. 253.

287. DEFINITION. Ignorance, in general, is lack of knowledge in a capable subject. One ignorance, which is called negative or nescience, is lack of knowledge otherwise not owed, for example, in a rustic who does not know canon law. Another, which is called privative, is lack of owed knowledge, for example, in a confessor who does not know the things which pertain to the administration of the sacrament of penance. Another, which is called positive, or of depraved disposition, or also of contrariety, or error, is assent given to the false as to the true, or dissent from the true as from the false, for example, in a heretic (H. Ap., III, 13).

To ignorance are referred both FORGETFULNESS, which is privation of remembrance of a thing formerly known; and INADVERTENCE, which is lack of actual knowledge and defect of consideration in acting. This, if it comes from a depraved habit or from passion, is called ignorance of evil choice.

Here we consider ignorance insofar as it is lack of owed knowledge, whether it has error annexed to it or not; whether it is habitual or merely actual, as inadvertence.

DIVISION. Multiple ignorance is distinguished (V, l. c.):

1. By reason of object, it is of right or of fact. Ignorance of right is had if someone does not know the law, or is ignorant that something has been prescribed or prohibited: for example, if he is ignorant that fasting must be observed on Ember Wednesdays. Ignorance of fact is had if someone is ignorant of the existence of a fact, or of its circumstances: for example, if he is ignorant that today is an Ember Wednesday (cf. n. 40, 4.).

2. By reason of the action which is done ignorantly, ignorance is causing the act or merely accompanying. It is called causing the act when in some way it influences the work, and is the reason why the act is placed, either simply, or clothed with such a circumstance. It is had in him who can say: if I had known, I would not have done it, or I would not have acted in such a mode: for example, a hunter killing a friend whom he believes to be a wild beast would by no means have killed him if he had known that he was a friend. Moreover, ignorance causes the act not of itself, because, since it is privation and not a being, it cannot of itself influence; but per accidens, namely insofar as it removes knowledge, which, if it were present, would impede the work.

Ignorance merely accompanying is said of that which in no way influences the act; because, if knowledge were present, the work would be placed equally, indeed perhaps more easily and promptly, for example, if someone, thinking he is killing a stag, kills his enemy, whom nevertheless he would have killed even if he had known him (H. Ap., XIX, n. 8).

3. By reason of subject, ignorance CAUSING THE ACT is invincible or vincible. Invincible is that which cannot be overcome, either because doubt concerning the opposite does not occur, in which case it is physically invincible; or because, when moral diligence has been done, it cannot be put aside, and in this case it is called morally invincible. This ignorance is also called antecedent, because it altogether precedes the consent of the will. But vincible is that which a man does not overcome when he can and ought. It is also called consequent, because it follows the determination of the will, insofar as ignorance itself is voluntary and proceeds from free will. As is clear, there is not given vincible ignorance unless the obligation of inquiring further is known, at least confusedly; for the first thought of things is not in man's power (cf. n. 20 and n. 218).

VINCIBLE or consequent ignorance is subdivided into affected and non-affected. Affected, or directly voluntary, is that by which someone industriously labors, or in which he desires to remain, willing namely to be ignorant of the precepts of the law: either so that he may have an excuse for sin already committed; or so that he may not be drawn back from sin to be committed, according to that (Ps. 35:4): He would not understand that he might do well. This ignorance is found in those who, deliberately, neither attend sacred sermons or instructions, nor seek counsel in doubts, lest they be deterred from an evil purpose. Non-affected ignorance, or indirectly voluntary, is either crass, or simply vincible. Crass ignorance is had in him who, although he does not affect to be ignorant, nevertheless neglects to learn those things which he can and ought to know. This is also called supine, because the thick and fat, and those who lie supine, are accustomed to be idle. But if the negligence is common or light, so that some diligence is applied, yet not sufficient, the ignorance is called simply vincible. This is more or less culpable according to the various measure of negligence and the gravity of the thing concerning which the matter is treated. See St. Alph., III, 269; ed. G., I, p. 549; VII, 48; ed. G., IV, p. 291.

288. PRINCIPLES. I. Concomitant ignorance makes neither the voluntary nor the involuntary positively; but it makes the non-voluntary or involuntary privatively. The reason for the first is, because such ignorance has itself per accidens to the work which is done, and influences nothing into it. The reason for the second is, because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed (V, n. XXVIII).

II. Antecedent or invincible ignorance altogether takes away the voluntary. For whatever proceeds from it is by no means voluntary, neither in itself as being unknown, nor in its cause, namely in ignorance, which is plainly involuntary. But the work is done against the inclination of the agent, if not actual, at least habitual and interpretative. Thus the Doctors commonly (V, n. XXVII). Cf. however n. 125.

III. Consequent or vincible ignorance does not take away the voluntary, but lessens it, yet sometimes increases it. IT DOES NOT TAKE AWAY; because it is voluntary, and therefore its effect is voluntary. But IT LESSENS: for that which is willed only indirectly and per accidens is less voluntary than that which is intended in itself and directly. Whence Doctors commonly say that ignorance excuses, if not from the whole, at least from so much. But IT INCREASES the voluntary, if it is affected, not indeed by reason of itself, since ignorance, as such, is always opposed to the voluntary; but by reason of its cause, which is greater aversion from the right and greater affection into the depraved. For, as St. Thomas (1.2, q. 76, a. 4) observes: "from intention toward sin it comes about that someone wills to undergo the damage of ignorance, on account of the liberty of sinning" (V, n. XXIX).

289. From these things you resolve: 1. Those who do not observe feasts and fasts from ignorance, because they are accustomed to be little solicitous concerning knowing them, are not excused from sin, because their negligence is vincible. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 78, 3. But if, suspecting nothing concerning an occurring feast or fast, they omit the ordinary means of knowing for one or another week, they are excused from sin, because by such omission they did not fail in the required diligence, and therefore the ignorance is not vincible.

2. He who, noticing that the knowledge necessary for exercising an office is lacking to him, voluntarily performs the office, is held concerning the errors which he foresaw at least confusedly. But if the errors are grave, he remains in a habitual state of sin as long as he has not revoked his evil will, by not seizing the occasion of putting away ignorance. Cf. the things which will be said below n. 317.

3. If negligence in putting away ignorance is only venially culpable, the deed following from it, although grave in itself, will be imputable only unto venial fault. For acts of this kind are voluntary by reason of the cause.

Note. See many other things concerning ignorance in the treatises on Conscience, on Laws, on Sins, on Contracts...