The Worship of God (First Commandment)

138. Notion. Prayer taken in a broader sense is an elevation of the mind to God; but taken in the stricter sense it is a petition of fitting things from God. This petition before God can be made either by mind alone or also by voice.

a. A twofold act concurs in prayer: one of the will, namely desire, by which we desire that some good be conferred by God or some evil averted; the other of the intellect, which is petition, or the manifestation of this desire, by which we endeavor to induce God to furnish what we desire.

b. Fitting things are called goods which can be desired honorably and fittingly: spiritual goods indeed absolutely, but temporal goods under at least the implicit condition that they contribute to the salvation of the soul.

c. Prayer is an act of religion: for by the very fact that we ask goods from God, we acknowledge the power and goodness of God and profess that we depend on God and need Him as the first author of our goods, which is the duty of religion.

¹ Fr. Schmid, Die Wirksamkeit des Bittgebetes, Brixen: Pressverein, 1895; Ch. Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, 3rd ed., Freiburg: Herder, 1899, IX, nn. 312-365; St. Alphonsus de Liguori, Del gran mezzo della preghiera.

139. Whether attention of mind is required for the essence of prayer. The question is referred to vocal prayer, namely whether vocal prayer performed with distraction of mind is essentially prayer. Internal attention is not required for the essence of prayer; wherefore wandering of mind during the course of prayer does not prevent prayer from being, as to substance, true prayer, provided it is begun with attention of mind and this attention virtually endures during the time of prayer.

a. With respect to prayer, a twofold attention is distinguished: external and internal. Attention excludes distraction; therefore external attention excludes external distraction. But external distraction consists in external actions which so occupy the mind that they entirely impede internal attention, such as conversation, the reading of some book, etc. Internal attention is the exclusion of internal distraction; internal distraction is a wandering of the mind to other things not pertaining to prayer. Therefore internal attention consists in application of the mind to prayer.

Internal attention is distinguished as threefold: material, by which attention is paid to the words of the prayer, so that they may be uttered entire and in their order; literal, by which attention is paid to the meaning of the words; spiritual, by which attention is paid either to God, who is worshiped by prayer, or to the mystery to be recalled to memory, to which the prayer is ordered, or to the good which is asked from God through prayer.

b. For the essence of prayer a twofold condition is required: a. intention, and indeed in order that prayer be formally true prayer, or a special act of divine worship, it is required and sufficient that it be begun with the intention of praying to God, and that this intention virtually endure through the course of the prayer. Without this intention the prayer would not be true prayer; but from this intention virtually enduring the prayer has it that it is formally true prayer and an act of divine worship. b. Attention to the act of prayer had at the beginning and virtually enduring is required, because without this attention prayer would not be a human act: for the one praying must know that he is praying. But just as the intention of praying, so also attention is judged to endure as long as no external action is placed which impedes the internal attention of mind and the intention of praying. Therefore for the essence of prayer there is indeed required internal attention of mind to the act of praying elicited at the beginning of the prayer; nevertheless through the course of the prayer formal internal attention is not required for the substance of prayer. From these things it is inferred that practically nothing else is required for validly reciting a prayer than that the one praying have at the beginning of the prayer the will of praying and that through the course of the prayer he avoid external distraction.¹

c. Therefore external distraction indeed impedes true prayer; but internal distraction does not impede it, because it does not prevent attention and intention from virtually enduring. Now the principal reasons by which Lugo shows that prayer recited with a distracted mind is substantially prayer are these: To pray signifies to speak with God and to manifest one's desires to Him; but one can do this even when plainly distracted. For if someone, wishing to manifest a petition to a king, reads it from writing while meanwhile he is plainly distracted in mind, he is to be said to speak to the king and to ask him. Moreover, all concede that the administration of the sacraments is valid, although the minister, plainly distracted, utters the form of the sacrament; but the form of extreme unction, which is deprecatory, could not in this case be valid if it were not even substantially prayer. Finally, all concede that one validly recites the office who is indeed plainly but involuntarily distracted; but if every distraction impeded the very essence of prayer, not even one involuntarily distracted would satisfy the obligation.

Whether distraction in prayer is a sin. It is clear that involuntary distractions in themselves are no sin; but voluntary distractions, although they do not corrupt the substance of prayer, nevertheless contain some irreverence toward God, however not grave; wherefore they are a venial sin, even if the matter concerns prayers which are not to be recited from precept.

¹ Cf. Lugo, De eucharistia, disp. 22, n. 29 ff.

140. Division of prayer. Prayer taken in a broader sense:

1. By reason of end is: a. adoration, by which we acknowledge before God the supreme excellence of God and our entire subjection; to this prayer of adoration is referred praise of God; b. thanksgiving for benefits received; from the virtue of gratitude man is bound several times in life positively to give thanks to God for goods obtained; c. petition, which is prayer strictly taken.

It is manifest that propitiatory prayer, by which remission of sins and punishments is asked, and likewise prayer of intercession, by which goods are asked for others, pertain to prayer of petition taken generally; wherefore they are not to be distinguished from it as diverse species.

2. By reason of mode, one prayer is mental, which is performed by the mind alone, namely by intellect and will; and the other is oral (vocal), which is performed at the same time by mind and mouth: for what is done by words alone is not prayer.

3. Oral prayer is one kind public, which is made in the name and by the authority of the Church; the other is private, which is made in the name and by the proper authority of the one praying. Therefore two things are required for public prayer: that it be made in the name of the Church and that it be instituted by the authority of the Church, such as the canonical hours, the greater litanies, etc. (n. 136, d).

No one can pray in the name of the Church except a minister of the Church, or a person deputed to this by the Church. Prayers instituted by the authority of the Church are performed according to a determinate form approved and prescribed by the Church. Prayers recited, although instituted and approved by the authority of the Church, are private prayer if they are performed not in the name of the Church, but in the name of the one praying, whether the one praying is an ecclesiastical or secular person.

4. By reason of the one praying, prayer is singular, which is made solitarily by only one person, and common, which is made commonly by several persons together. The Lord commends common prayer in a special way: Where two or three are gathered in My name, there am I in the midst of them.¹

¹ Matt. 18:20.

141. Who are to be prayed to. Although God alone is to be prayed to as the principal author and giver of goods, so that to pray to a saint in this way is true idolatry, nevertheless, as patrons and intercessors before God, these can usefully be invoked:

1. Angels and saints in heaven, which the Council of Trent teaches as of faith.¹

a. Privately, even baptized infants who died before the use of reason can be invoked.

b. Although there is no precept of invoking the intercession of saints, nevertheless he who would never invoke the Blessed Virgin Mary could not be excused from venial sin: for he would be guilty of neglect of salvation if he wholly neglected so efficacious a help.²

2. Saints and just persons existing on earth, which likewise is of faith from Sacred Scripture.³

3. It is very probable that souls detained in purgatory not only intercede for us, but that we also can privately invoke them.

a. Since the Church has defined nothing concerning this matter, there is not one opinion of theologians. Commonly now it is conceded that the souls of purgatory help us by their suffrages: for the communion of saints suggests this, and it is confirmed by the testimony of Sacred Scripture, from which it is established that souls detained in limbo prayed for the people.⁴ Nevertheless the older authors with St. Thomas deny this, because the souls of purgatory are in a state of punishment;⁵ but more recent authors, especially Bellarmine and Suarez, depart from them. And indeed, the state of punishment does bring it about that the souls do not pray for us as the saints in glory do, as if from their proper office; but it does not prevent them from being able to intercede for us, since they are in the state of grace and divine friendship.

b. Those who deny that we can usefully direct our prayers to the souls of purgatory contend that they do not know our needs and our prayers. But although the contrary cannot be demonstrated by certain arguments, nevertheless it is piously believed that God, either by Himself or through guardian angels, manifests our needs and prayers to them. The opinion which holds that we can usefully invoke souls is confirmed by the practice of many of the faithful.

¹ Sess. 25, De invocatione sanctorum.

² Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 25, De invocatione sanctorum.

³ Rom. 15:30; James 5:16.

⁴ Jer. 15:1; 2 Macc. 15:12 ff.

⁵ Summa, II-II, q. 83, a. 11, ad 3.

142. For whom one must pray. We can and must pray for all who can be helped by prayer and whom we are commanded to love from the precept of charity. Therefore one can and ought to pray:

a. Each one for himself, as is clear from the nature of the thing;

b. For his neighbor, even for a sinner and an enemy,¹ so that from prayers poured out for all, such as, for example, the Lord's Prayer, it is not licit without sin to exclude anyone positively. Yet we are not bound to pray for a determinate person unless he is constituted in grave or gravest necessity and a special relation of office or necessity intervenes with that person.

c. For the souls detained in purgatory, both for all in common and especially for those who are joined to us by a special bond, as parents and benefactors; for since their necessity is truly grave and since we can easily succor them in various ways, piety and gratitude suggest that we help them by prayer. Yet a strict obligation of praying for parents and other connected persons cannot be established, because it is not certainly established that they need our intercession.

¹ 1 Tim. 2:1-3; James 5:16; Matt. 5:44.

143. What must be prayed for. What goods we can ask from God is gathered first from the Lord's Prayer handed down to us by Christ, then from the prayers which the Church directs to God for her faithful. Therefore we can ask:

1. Supernatural goods, namely eternal beatitude and the means necessary for it; and these indeed absolutely, because by their nature they are necessary or useful for salvation and no one can abuse them for sin.

But it is not licit to ask them contrary to or beyond the order of divine providence, for example beatitude without good works, remission of sins without penance, grace greater than the highest saints have; but within the order of divine providence supernatural goods can be asked without limitation. Graces gratuitously given are not to be asked, except in the case of special necessity.

2. Natural goods, whether spiritual (sciences, arts) or bodily (health, riches, honors, dignities), can indeed be asked, but only under the at least implicit condition that God has foreseen that they will be profitable to us for salvation: for these are not of themselves useful for salvation, and therefore we can abuse them.

3. That God avert evils from us, both moral evils (sins, temptations) and physical evils (diseases, pains, want, misfortunes), unless it is useful for our salvation that we bear temptations and certain physical evils.

It is not to be asked that God entirely extinguish concupiscence in us, because this is contrary to ordinary divine providence; nor is it to be asked that we be able to avoid all or even the lightest sins, because this is a special privilege; but privileges are not to be asked. With regard to light sins, we can ask that we diminish them more and more or avoid determinate ones.

4. To ask from God a morally evil thing (evil of fault) is always a grave sin, even if the thing which is asked is in itself only lightly evil: for to ask from God help for an evil thing and thus to make Him the author of evil, even light evil, is grave irreverence toward God, because it is directly opposed to His infinite sanctity.

It is not licit to ask an indifferent thing without further relation to an honorable end, for example profit from a game without relation to another end, because it is not the petition of a true and fitting good. Yet because a petition of this kind is not directly opposed to some divine attribute, it is not a mortal sin.

144. Efficacy of prayer. Prayer made with the due conditions, from the liberal promise of God, has infallible efficacy of obtaining those things which are asked, whether he who prays is just or a sinner; and from the clear sayings of Sacred Scripture this seems to be certain of faith to theologians.

a. Insofar as prayer is a good work, with the suppositions to be supposed, there belongs to it the threefold effect common to all good works, namely meritorious of sanctifying grace, satisfactory for temporal punishments, and impetratory of actual graces. Insofar as prayer is a petition by which we implore God, powerful and merciful, that He succor our need, it has a special impetratory power of obtaining those things which are asked from God. Now here the discussion is of this special force and virtue of prayer for obtaining. But the conditions which are required for prayer infallibly to obtain that which it asks are commonly numbered as four, as will be said below.

Prayer deprived of the due conditions nevertheless is not wholly without every effect: for although it does not obtain infallibly from the promise of God, nevertheless from His kindness it will obtain at least the spirit of more fervent prayer.

b. Although it befits God, supremely powerful and kind, that He succor him who humbly implores His help, nevertheless prayer has infallible efficacy from the promise of God, whose promise cannot deceive. God in fact promised infallible efficacy to prayer made with the due conditions: Amen, amen I say to you, if you ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it to you.¹ Ask, and it shall be given to you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you, etc.²

Note. Since every prayer or petition intends to move God so that by His special intervention He may effect that which is asked, it can now be asked how God produces the effects of prayer, namely whether through natural causes or through supernatural causes.

a. If the effect of prayer is a good of the supernatural order, namely actual grace, God Himself produces it immediately, without the intervention of a natural cause.

b. If the effect of prayer is a good of the natural order, it can be produced by God in a diverse way:

a. Either God Himself produces the effect without the intervention of natural causes (at least acting in a natural way). In this case God, because of prayer, works a miracle, either according to substance or at least according to mode.

b. Or God, because of the foreseen prayer, from eternity so disposes and directs natural causes that the effect follows necessarily in time.

c. Or God foresees that the effect is going to follow from natural causes according to the present order without special intervention. In this case God by His intervention only prevents the effect from being frustrated through the influence of a free cause (of a demon or of man).³

Therefore the effects of prayers are sometimes miracles, which are produced by God Himself without the concurrence of natural causes; but more frequently they arise from natural causes, yet not without the special intervention of God. From these things the difference is clear between miracles and what are called hearings of prayers (Gebetserhorungen). For if hearing of prayers is taken generically for any effect which God produces because of prayer, even miracles are numbered among hearings of prayers; but if the term is taken specifically, hearing of prayers is opposed to miracle and signifies an effect which God produces because of prayer through secondary causes.

¹ John 16:23. Cf. 14:13-14.

² Matt. 7:7 ff. Cf. Luke 11:10; James 4:3; Ps. 49:15.

³ Cf. Suarez, De oratione, bk. 1, c. 18; Pesch, IX, n. 331 ff.

145. The conditions which are required in order that prayer have an infallible effect are comprehended in this brief formula: that prayer be made in the name of Jesus: whatever you ask the Father in My name, this I will do.¹ To pray in the name of Jesus signifies to pray in union with Jesus; but for prayer to be made in union with Jesus, four conditions are required, of which one is referred to the object, two to the mode, and the fourth to the subject of prayer.

a. The object of prayer ought to be useful for promoting the end intended by Christ, namely our salvation.²

If supernatural goods are asked, prayer has an infallible effect, although sometimes the very goods which are asked are not granted, but in place of them others which contribute more to our salvation. If natural goods are asked, prayer does not have an infallible effect, because those goods can be an impediment of virtue and an occasion of sinning for us; but if God foresees this, He does not grant them, although they are asked earnestly and constantly.

b. As to mode, prayer first ought to be made with confidence, without hesitation and distrust: therefore let us approach with confidence to the throne of grace.³ The divine promises especially demand this condition: for we pray in the name of Jesus if we pray with confidence in His merits.

This confidence proceeds from theological faith and hope: for first we must believe that God can and wills to succor men; then, because God has so often promised that He will hear prayers, we ought without doubt to trust that God will give what we ask, provided that it contributes to our salvation. This confidence, necessary for efficacious prayer, refers to prayer in general; a particular prayer by which a determinate good is asked can be joined with doubt whether God will grant it, both because there can be defect in the prayer, and because it is not evident to the one praying that what is asked is truly good. This doubt indeed does not impede, but diminishes the efficacy of prayer. Hence if someone by the grace of the Holy Spirit can pray with great confidence, he has a sign of future obtaining.⁴

Then it ought to be made with perseverance.⁵ Those goods indeed which are necessary here and now, such as helps for overcoming temptation, God grants immediately; but other goods He does not always bestow immediately. For certain goods, by a positive disposition of God, are not granted except after constant prayer, as the gift of perseverance; but other goods, both natural and supernatural, God does not confer except after some time, so that meanwhile through prayer we may dispose ourselves better for receiving them.

c. The subject of prayer ought to be in the state of grace: for he prays most in union with Jesus who prays in the state of grace. Not that the prayer of a sinner, if the remaining conditions are not lacking, is not heard, but that the state of grace contributes much to increasing the efficacy of prayer.⁶

The prayer of sinners is not only efficacious for obtaining, which is established from Sacred Scripture, where sinners are read to have been heard;⁷ but also for infallibly obtaining, because the efficacy of prayer is not founded on the dignity of the one praying, but on the mercy and promise of God.⁸ But if in Sacred Scripture it is said that God does not hear the prayers of sinners,⁹ this signifies that the prayers of sinners are less efficacious, or even inefficacious if namely sinners ask badly. From these things it is clear that great care must be taken not to deter sinners, as if their good works and prayers were useless before God.

Whether prayer made for others is of infallible efficacy. There are those who for the infallible efficacy of prayer require this condition also, that prayer be made for oneself. St. Augustine¹⁰ and St. Thomas¹¹ seem to require this; but others with Suarez¹² teach that of itself even prayer made for others has infallible efficacy, because the divine promise, wholly general, contains no limitation: Whatever you ask. Yet this difference intervenes between prayer made for oneself and for others: that he who in the due manner asks for himself things useful for salvation by that very fact acquires the disposition necessary for receiving graces; but by the fact that someone prays for another, this other does not acquire the necessary disposition; on the contrary, he can obstinately resist the graces which are asked, on account of which obstinacy prayer made for others can lack effect.

¹ John 14:13.

² John 16:23-24.

³ Heb. 4:16.

⁴ Suarez, De oratione, bk. 1, c. 21, n. 9.

⁵ Cf. Luke, c. 11.

⁶ John 14:13; 15:7, 16; 16:23.

⁷ Luke 18:14; 23:43.

⁸ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 83, a. 16; Suarez, De oratione, bk. 1, c. 25.

⁹ John 9:31; Ps. 65:18.

¹⁰ In Joannem, tr. 102, n. 1.

¹¹ Summa, II-II, q. 83, a. 7, ad 2.

¹² De oratione, bk. 1, c. 27.

146. Necessity of prayer. An adult man is bound to pray (with impetratory prayer), not only by necessity of divine precept, but also by necessity of means.

a. Concerning the necessity of divine precept no one doubts: for so many explicit testimonies of Sacred Scripture by which prayer is inculcated cannot be understood of counsel alone: Ask and it shall be given to you;¹ Be instant in prayer;² It is necessary always to pray and not to faint.³ The internal reason of this precept is: a. the obligation of exhibiting worship to God, which is exhibited by every kind of prayer; b. one's own indigence.

Prayer of petition prescribed need not be vocal: for we have no divine precept of vocal prayer. Nor do the words of Christ the Lord, Thus therefore shall you pray,⁴ contain a precept imposed upon individual faithful of using that formula of praying which He Himself taught.

b. Concerning the necessity of means, the question is whether adult man is bound to ask for himself the helps necessary for salvation. Most theologians say the affirmative opinion must be held not only as certain, but scarcely not as of faith. The reason is this: that must be called necessary by necessity of means without which ordinarily salvation cannot be obtained; but without prayer, according to the ordinary mode of providence, salvation cannot be obtained. For it is certain of faith that the grace of God is necessary for salvation; but according to the ordinary mode of providence, God does not confer efficacious helps of grace except on those asking: Ask and you shall receive,⁵ that is, according to the interpretation of the holy Fathers: if you do not ask, you do not receive.

¹ Matt. 6:9.

² Col. 4:2.

³ Luke 18:1. Cf. Luke 11:9; Matt. 26:41; 1 Pet. 4:7; 1 Thess. 5:17.

⁴ Matt. 6:9.

⁵ John 16:24.

147. When the precept of praying obliges. 1. When man is bound to pray of himself cannot be accurately determined; without doubt he is bound to pray frequently. Yet he who fulfills the obligation of praying arising from his own indigence also fulfills the obligation arising from the precept of worshiping God.

a. There are those who say that we are bound to pray every week; there are those who with St. Alphonsus say every month; there are those who say that to have prayed once a year is sufficient. But neither the weekly nor the monthly obligation is certainly established. The same must be said concerning the opinion of those who teach that there exists an obligation of praying at the moral beginning of the use of reason. Besides, since the faithful are bound on every Sunday to assist at the sacrifice of the Mass, those who rightly fulfill this precept also satisfy the precept of praying.

b. Therefore he who through a long time (through years) neglects every prayer sins in a twofold way, both because of neglected divine worship and because of neglected care of salvation. Yet in confession it is sufficient to indicate the time during which he omitted prayer, and the other sins which he committed because of neglected prayer.

2. But accidentally we are bound to pray as often as without prayer we cannot fulfill another precept or overcome temptation.

Note. From these things it now follows: a. that the precept of praying is satisfied even by merely internal prayer: for this precept refers to private prayer, and to it insofar as it is petition of divine help; b. that for those who are not constituted in sacred orders, there are no certain and determinate prayers which must be recited from precept; c. that neither of itself nor accidentally are we bound to pray morning and evening, before and after table. Therefore the omission of those prayers of itself is no sin, not even venial. Yet pastors and confessors ought earnestly and frequently to commend this pious exercise to the faithful: for if they neglect morning and evening prayers, it will soon happen that they rarely pray, and thus are deprived of the special help of God, and in dangers of sinning which occur daily fall into sins.

151. Notions. 1. Idolatry is superstition by which divine worship is exhibited to a creature, whether this is an animate or inanimate thing, or finally the demon himself.

Therefore two things are required for true idolatry: first indeed, that the worship which is exhibited to the creature be truly divine worship owed to God alone, or a testification of supreme excellence; then, that this worship be exhibited to the creature seriously and truly, not fictitiously and by simulation or for the sake of jest.

2. A twofold idolatry is distinguished: formal, which is committed with the intention of adoring a creature; and material, which is done only externally without the will of adoring a creature, as when someone from fear of death adores an idol.

3. Formal idolatry again is twofold: perfect, if someone adores a creature which he in fact thinks to be God; and imperfect, if someone, knowing that there is nothing divine in the creature, nevertheless worships it with divine worship from hatred toward God or from desire of obtaining something from the demon.

152. Its moral malice. 1. All idolatry is a grave sin, indeed the gravest after sins which are opposed to the theological virtues, because all idolatry inflicts grave injury upon God, who alone is the principle of all things.

Therefore even material idolatry is a grave sin, although less grave than formal: for although it is not true idolatry, nevertheless it is an external denial of faith and a lie injurious to God against the virtue of religion.

2. Perfect idolatry is a sin against faith and religion; imperfect idolatry indeed is not against faith, yet (insofar as it is idolatry) it is graver than that, since it proceeds from mere malice, not from ignorance, and involves great contempt of God. The former can be without fault, as if someone adores an unconsecrated host which in good faith he believes to be consecrated.

The sin of idolatry is committed not only by gentiles and magicians, but also by those who so worship and invoke saints as if they could furnish natural or supernatural gifts by their own power. In a certain broader sense, they commit idolatry who: a. attribute to false saints or to the damned the worship owed to true saints; b. take care that worship owed to saints be exhibited to themselves by feigned sanctity, false miracles, and false revelations. Today among baptized faithful, those commit the sin of idolatry together with the sin of apostasy who, imbued with the principles of materialism, worship nature as God in the manner of pagans, or who attempt to restore the worship which the ancient Germans exhibited to mythological figures (Wodan).

159. Notions. 1. Vain observance (Zauberei) is a superstition by which the demon is invoked for obtaining some effect by his help.

2. Vain observance, like divination, is twofold: one with explicit invocation of the demon, the other with implicit invocation, namely by employing vain means which have power neither from nature nor from God to produce such an effect. These means are called sacraments of the devil, because, when they have been placed, he produces the intended effect, as it were, by promise.

Vain observance differs from divination in this, that the latter is ordered to knowing hidden things by the help of the demon, but the former to obtaining by his help any external effects whatsoever. He who for obtaining an effect employs a vain and useless means, which neither by nature nor by the Church nor by God has been instituted for producing this effect, cannot expect this effect except from the demon.

Note. 1. Among the diverse forms of vain observance there widely wanders the observance of healings (magical medicine), which is the art of curing diseases or of avoiding misfortunes by employing diverse signs, inhalations, prayers, charms (Besprechungen), sacred things, etc. This superstition, like the rest, is found no more among Catholics than among non-Catholics, nor more among the lowest populace than among the cultivated and learned; indeed among the pagans it was already spreading widely. Therefore only by calumny can it be affirmed that superstition has arisen from the Catholic religion, inasmuch as that religion teaches that divine effects can be obtained from the use of prayer and sacramentals.¹

2. Prayers of this kind are made especially in three ways. For either physical means are employed (touchings, inhalations, ointments, etc.), which nevertheless do not have a known power of healing; or besides physical means there are also employed moral means (prayers, charms, adjurations); or finally only moral means (sympathetic cures).² Not every use of means of this kind must be charged with superstition: for besides the fact that God can produce the effect of health by His special influence on account of prayer, there are natural remedies which can contain a power of healing still unknown to us; nor finally can it be denied that a man by moral influence (in whatever way this is effected, for example by suggestion) can produce various effects of cure in another man. Yet frequently the use of these means is either plainly superstitious, or something of superstition is mixed with the use of a natural or supernatural means.

3. Pastors of souls should strive to know the diverse forms of superstition which are in use among the faithful committed to them, and should endeavor to root them out: for superstitious uses do not foster true religion and its exercises, but harm them as much as possible; for they obscure the purity of faith, impede a truly religious life, and retard the perfection of Christian life. To obtain this end, let him collect and destroy booklets which teach superstition, and let him instruct the people concerning the mode of acting which God observes, concerning the vanity of superstition, and also concerning the dangers which arise from its exercise.

¹ Cf. concerning this matter Stohr-Kannamuller, Handbuch der Pastoralmedizin, Freiburg: Herder, 1900, p. 403 ff.; Walter, Aberglaube und Seelsorge, Paderborn: Schoningh, 1904, p. 92 ff.

² By this name (Sympathiekuren) are called those cures which are not effected by natural remedies, but through the moral influence of some person endowed with a hidden power, which power they call sympathy.

160. Concerning the moral and specific malice of vain observance, the same must be said as concerning divination:

a. Vain observance with explicit invocation is always a mortal sin; vain observance with implicit invocation is frequently excused from mortal sin, both because of ignorance, and because of defect of certain faith, and because of defect of serious will.

Thus those do not sin mortally who hold it as an indication of misfortune that a certain person (an old woman) meets them on the first day of the year; who are unwilling to be present at a banquet where thirteen sit at table; who do not undertake a journey on Friday. Indeed, properly speaking, a sin of superstition is not committed by these, since they think neither of the demon nor of some higher power. Yet these things are foolish and contrary to sound reason.

b. Its malice consists both in illicit commerce with the demon and in superstition, by which some worship is exhibited to the demon by recurring to him and by expecting from him what ought to be expected from God alone.

c. Divination and vain observance do not differ from each other in species: for in both the virtue of religion is injured in the same way, because in the genus of morals it makes no difference whether knowledge of a hidden thing or some external effect is sought from the demon.

Berardi well observes that those who expect certain effects from foolish things are not immediately to be charged with the sin of superstition. For often they act from simplicity and error, without thinking about the influence of the demon; but for a sin of superstition to occur, it is required that the agent advert to the invocation of the demon and intend it in some way. Therefore if the confessor detects that penitents otherwise pious, who do such things, are in good faith, let him not charge them with sin, but rather teach them how vain their means are for obtaining the effect, or, if the matter so requires, let him tell them that the means employed by them, with some vain circumstance and the infallible expectation of the event removed, are entirely licit.¹

¹ Cf. Berardi, Praxis confessariorum, I, n. 433 ff.

161. Criteria for discerning vain observance. 1. Signs of this kind are especially these three: a. the insufficiency of the cause for producing the effect, since it has no such power either from itself or from God; b. the addition of a vain or false circumstance as necessarily required for obtaining the effect, even if the signs or means in themselves are good and holy; c. the infallible expectation of the effect on account of the mere application of these signs, as if from the work having been worked.

a. Therefore if certain prayers, images, blessed things, etc., are employed in such a way that there is attributed to them an infallible power of obtaining some effect, for example of escaping death or disease, of not falling into misfortune, of not dying without confession, etc., they are superstitious; but if they are employed in honor of God without vain adjuncts, with pious confidence of obtaining, if it shall have pleased God, that which is asked, they are pious and religious.

b. The faithful must very especially be taught and instructed not to foster superstitions in the use of sacred things and the sacramentals of the Church, lest, for example, they think that the greater effect is produced in the use of holy water the more abundantly it is sprinkled, and things of this kind.

2. In doubt whether the means employed possess a natural or supernatural power of causing such an effect, this twofold rule must be attended to:

a. If there is doubt whether some effect proceeds from a natural cause or from the demon, it must be attributed to natural powers, because very many powers of natural causes are unknown even to wise men. Therefore a means about which it is doubted whether it has natural power of causing the effect or not may be employed, yet with a protestation added against the influence of the demon.

It is licit to employ a means of this kind, because it is not established that the thing is evil; on the contrary, from the circumstances it can rather be considered honorable. Hence, so that such a means can licitly be employed, there ought to be at least a probable reason, especially drawn from comparison with other effects certainly natural, which suggests that the effect is produced by a natural power. Besides, it is always advisable that in a case of this kind a protestation against the intervention of the demon be sent before: for as long as the matter is doubtful, the protestation removes the invocation of the demon.

b. If the effect certainly is not from a natural cause and there is doubt whether it is from God or from the demon, it must be attributed to the demon, because miracles are not easily presumed. Wherefore in this case it is not licit to employ the doubtful means, because it contains a tacit invocation of the demon.¹

Nevertheless, a means of this kind which is truly doubtful, with the certain expectation of the effect excluded, can be excused from mortal sin if it is employed only once or twice, both because of the imperfection of the act and because there is no grave danger of commerce with the demon.

¹ Cf. Lacroix, l. 3, pr. 1, n. 28.

162. Criteria for discerning the grace of healings. Sometimes it happens that men, even rude men who do not enjoy a reputation for holiness, by the sign of the cross or by sacred prayers and inhalations heal diseases and wounds. These are not all at once to be condemned of superstition: for it can piously be believed that God even at the present time confers on some men, although they are not saints, the grace of healings for the common good.¹ But the signs to which one must attend in particular cases, so that vain observance can be distinguished from the grace of healings gratuitously given, are especially these:

a. Whether he who heals is alone in producing the same effect by the same means, or whether others also produce it, and whether he himself learned such power from others: for God ordinarily confers the grace of healings in such a way that it is a personal grace conferred upon a certain person. b. Whether the means which he employs are vain and foolish: indeed it can happen that the effect of a grace granted by God depends on certain external signs as on a condition, but these signs are never vain. c. Whether he thinks that the power of healing is in the very words or signs employed: for God confers the grace of healing upon the person, not upon external signs. Nevertheless supernatural powers of this kind gratuitously given will be very rare.²

If there are found those who heal diseases and wounds, whether of men or of animals, which not infrequently happens, these things are to be noted for practice:

a. First of all it will have to be inquired whether the means employed by them can produce the effect by natural power. If by at least probable reason the effect can be attributed to powers of nature, their use can be permitted, with a protestation against the influence of the demon premised.

b. But if the effect can be attributed to the powers of nature by no probable conjecture, the matter is not immediately to be rejected a priori as superstitious and illicit, but the fact with all its adjuncts must be examined diligently.

c. If, when the examination has been instituted, it is established that the matter is not certainly superstitious, especially if the prayers and invocations contain nothing false or foolish, if an infallible effect is not expected, and finally if those who employ the means are in good faith and attribute no infallible power to the means themselves or to the invocatory formulas, it is not necessary that the use of those means be interdicted. Yet it must always be advised that before the use a protestation be premised for rejecting any effect which may be produced by the help of the demon.

¹ Cf. 1 Cor. 12:9; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 178, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 18.

² Cf. Laymann, l. 4, tr. 10, c. 4, n. 4.

171. Notion. 1. Tempting God is defined as: a saying or deed by which someone explores whether God has or exercises some perfection (knowledge, power, mercy).

a. One temptation is called that of seduction to evil, another that of probation. Where there is question of tempting God, temptation of seduction to sin can have no place, neither actively, because God tempts no one in this way,¹ nor passively, because God cannot be induced to sin.

b. Temptation of probation is called active when God tempts man, in order to test his virtue;² and it is called passive when God is tempted by men, who intend to take an experiment concerning His perfections. Concerning this last temptation there is speech here, as is clear from the definition.

2. Tempting God arises especially from two vices: a. from infidelity, when someone, doubting concerning some perfection of God, intends to explore it; b. from presumption, when someone rashly (without a cause of necessity or utility) asks or expects from God an extraordinary effect.

From infidelity, if someone, doubting concerning the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, asks to see Christ hidden under the species. From presumption, if someone, firmly holding the real presence of Christ, asks to see in the consecrated host the divine Child, as several saints saw Him, or if someone for forty days abstains from food and drink while expecting from God the preservation of life. It is clear that in the same fact there can be a diverse intention of the agent.

¹ Jas. 1:13.

² Deut. 13:3; Tob. 2:12.

172. Division. A twofold tempting of God is distinguished: formal or explicit, and virtual or interpretative, according as God is tempted with an explicit intention or only with an implicit one, latent in the mode of acting.

a. Formal temptation can happen in two ways: a. when someone intends to explore some perfection of God, as if someone, doubting concerning the power of God, asks from Him a miracle; b. when someone intends to explore the will of God through an extraordinary sign, as if someone casts himself down from a very high tower with the mind of curiously testing whether God wishes to save him. Formal temptation for the most part proceeds from infidelity, although it can also proceed from presumption.

b. Virtual temptation is had if someone indeed does not intend to tempt God, yet does or omits something which of itself demands a miracle, as if someone expects health in a grave illness from God alone, natural means having been passed over, or if someone exposes himself to danger from which he could be freed by God alone through a miracle. Virtual temptation proceeds from presumption, since it is a rash expectation of divine help.

It belongs to the notion of temptation that something be expected from God, and that it be expected rashly from God.

a. It is not tempting God if someone expects nothing from God, which can happen in two ways: a. when someone exposes himself to danger because he wills the danger, as if someone enters a duel in the way in which today men enter it, without expecting, as formerly used to happen, a special intervention of God in favor of the innocent; or if a sick man rejects all medicines, either so that he may die more quickly or so that he may suffer the troubles of the disease. b. When the effect is expected from imprudence or stupidity contrary to all probability, as if someone without sufficient preparation undergoes an examination, trusting that by some chance he will nevertheless satisfy.

b. It is not tempting God if someone, from a just cause, for example from divine inspiration, or from necessity or great utility, where ordinary means are lacking, expects some effect from God alone. Therefore it is licit to ask a miracle from God from a just cause of necessity or utility, namely for one's own salvation or that of others, or for fulfilling the will of God, and under the condition, if it shall have pleased God. But it is not licit to offer or ask absolutely for a miracle for the conversion of heretics without divine inspiration, because for this end the testimonies of the Christian faith are present and suffice.¹

c. The judgments of God, commonly ordeals (Gottesurteile), which once were in use, such as the trial of fire or water for exploring innocence, are illicit: for in these the sin of interpretative tempting of God is committed by asking a miracle without necessity, wherefore in law they are expressly prohibited.² Nevertheless several prelates of the Church and also particular synods approved the use of ordeals. In this matter they must be excused from their good faith and from the circumstances of the times. Yet the supreme pontiffs never approved them, although it must be conceded that the same pontiffs neither immediately reprobated them nor took care severely enough that this abuse be eliminated. But if it is read that God declared the innocence of certain persons through a miracle, this must be explained from the fact that the purgations were chosen by the innocent themselves either from divine instinct or in good faith, or that the innocent were driven by force by others to the purgations.³

¹ Cf. 3 Kings 18:23, 24.

² c. cura 1, De purgatione vulgari (V. 35).

³ Kirchenlexikon, 2nd ed., "Gottesurteile."

173. Its moral malice. 1. Formal tempting of God is a sin mortal from its whole genus, which does not admit smallness of matter.

a. Formal tempting of God, whether it happens in one way or the other, inflicts grave irreverence upon God, because it is directly opposed to divine wisdom: for he who tempts asks and expects that God by His omnipotence produce an extraordinary effect for a vain and useless end. Therefore Christ answered: Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.¹

b. If formal tempting of God proceeds from infidelity, a twofold malice concurs: one against faith, which consists in doubting whether God is endowed with some determinate perfection; the other against religion, which consists in the irreverence by which someone demands from God Himself that He prove His perfections.

2. Interpretative tempting of God is a sin grave from its genus, admitting smallness of matter; yet for the most part it is a venial sin. It is a grave sin when someone rashly expects from God a miracle; but if he expects only special help from God from curiosity or levity, it does not seem to be a grave sin, unless there is introduced a danger of grave harm to oneself or another.

Therefore he who without a just cause, in danger of death, natural remedies having been omitted, expects divine help, sins gravely, because it is judged to be grave irreverence in so great a danger to expect health from God without necessity. He who in a slight illness, natural means having been rejected, hopes for health from God, sins only lightly; and he does not sin at all if he hopes that, with God helping, he will be freed naturally from such an illness. In like manner he sins only lightly who, through negligence unprepared, proceeds to a sermon hoping for special help from God; but an untaught cleric would sin gravely if he wished to preach without preparation, hoping that the matter would be suggested to him by God.

¹ Matt. 4:7.

174. Notion. In the broader sense sacrilege is any sin against religion, in which sense also divination, magic, blasphemy, etc., are sacrileges; but strictly and properly sacrilege is defined as: the unworthy treatment of a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is committed by any action by which the reverence owed to sacred things is injured.

a. Sacred thing is here taken broadly, so that under this name are comprehended sacred persons, sacred places, and sacred things: for these three are accustomed to be consecrated to God and His worship.

b. That is called a sacred thing which by the authority of God or of the Church has been deputed to divine worship. Therefore a person who by private purpose or vow has dedicated himself to God is not properly called sacred, but only that person who by the public authority of the Church has been consecrated to the worship of God.

c. So that it can be known whether some action is sacrilegious, attention must be given: a. to that for which the thing which is violated has been consecrated; b. whether the action is against that for which the thing has been consecrated. For only those actions committed by a sacred person or against a sacred person are sacrileges which injure him in that in which he is sacred. Thus a priest by fornicating commits sacrilege, because he has been consecrated to God for living chastely; by blaspheming or making himself drunk he does not commit sacrilege, because he has not been consecrated to God for avoiding these sins. Likewise sins, besides those to be enumerated below, which are committed against a priest, such as calumnies and insults, are not sacrileges, because these do not injure the sacred person himself, but his external goods: reputation and honor.

175. Division of sacrilege. A threefold sacrilege is distinguished: personal, local, and real, according as there is a threefold genus of sacred things: sacred persons, sacred places, and sacred things.

a. Besides these, however, there is no other sacred thing whose violation constitutes sacrilege, for example time, which is called sacred: for time is not in a special way consecrated to God. Therefore he does not commit sacrilege who sins on a feast day, or in Lent, or on the day of holy communion, nor must there be opened in confession the circumstance of the sacred time at which the sin had been committed.

b. Yet it is admitted that it is a grave sin to exhibit public games on Friday in Parasceve, such as are customarily exhibited on carnival days, especially if this is prohibited by a special law, not because irreverence is inflicted upon sacred time, but because irreverence is inflicted upon the Passion of the Lord and grave scandal is given to the faithful.

176. Moral and specific malice. 1. Sacrilege is a sin against religion, grave from its genus: for from the fact that something has been deputed to divine worship, special reverence is owed to it, and if this is injured, the irreverence redounds upon God; but it admits smallness of matter, because the irreverence which is inflicted on things consecrated to God affects God Himself only mediately.

2. Personal, real, and local sacrilege differ from each other in species, because, since there are three diverse genera of sacred things, the virtue of religion is injured by this threefold sacrilege in a morally diverse way.

And indeed all agree in this affirmation; but whether those three species of sacrilege are the lowest species, or whether in each one circumstances must be admitted which change the species of sacrilege, authors do not agree. Suarez affirms this latter opinion;¹ but to St. Alphonsus, who followed St. Thomas,² the denying opinion seems more probable (n. 34). Therefore according to him, he commits the same sacrilege specifically who violates a nun by striking her or by fornicating with her, and he who treats some sacrament or sacred image irreverently. And indeed we can follow this opinion in practice.

¹ Suarez, De religione, tr. 3, l. 3, c. 1, n. 8.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 99, a. 3, ad 2.

177. On personal sacrilege. 1. Personal sacrilege is defined as: violation of a sacred person. A twofold consecration of persons must be distinguished: one by which a person through ordination, to which tonsure also is referred, or through admission to the religious state, is deputed to divine worship; the other by which through a public vow of chastity, emitted either in sacred ordination or in religious profession, both solemn and simple, he is consecrated to God for preserving chastity.

2. The actions by which personal sacrilege is committed are three:

a. Violent laying on of hands upon a cleric or religious against the privilege of the canon.

b. Usurpation of jurisdiction over ecclesiastical persons by dragging them to a secular tribunal against the privilege of the forum, or by imposing on them a servile burden, for example of military service or of tribute, against ecclesiastical immunity, unless the Church consents.

c. A sin of lust committed by a person consecrated to God for preserving chastity, against the vow of chastity. Here it must be noted: a. that sacrilege is committed not only by the sacred person, but also by that one who, even if he is not sacred, participates in the sin of lust; wherefore, if this latter person also is sacred, a double sacrilege is committed on both sides; b. that by a sacred person sacrilege is committed not only through external sins, but also through merely internal sins against chastity.

Whether violation of a simple and private vow of chastity is sacrilege. It is certain that that violation is sacrilege in the broader sense; therefore he who violates a private vow of chastity commits a twofold sin, against chastity and against religion. That this violation is sacrilege strictly such must indeed be denied from the definition of a sacred person; yet because to St. Alphonsus (n. 35) it is more probable that sacrilege is committed also through injury of a vow of chastity privately emitted by a person, the affirming opinion can be held in practice as probable.¹

¹ Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 386 ff.

178. On local sacrilege. 1. Local sacrilege is the violation of a sacred place.

a. A sacred place in the strict sense is called that place which by the authority of the Church has been deputed to divine worship, and therefore consecrated or at least blessed. In this sense sacred places are churches, public oratories (not private nor semi-public), and cemeteries. A religious or sacred place in the broader sense is called any place destined by the authority of the Church for a pious and religious use, as the palace of a bishop, a parochial house, a seminary, a monastery, a hospital erected by the authority of the Church which has an oratory for celebrating, etc.

From a sacred and religious place there must be distinguished a pious place, which without the authority and intervention of the Church has been erected for exercising pious works, as a private oratory, a hospital erected by laymen.

b. Because sacrilege is committed by violation of the sanctity and immunity of a sacred place, there must be distinguished the sacred place to which sanctity belongs and the sacred place to which immunity belongs. Sanctity belongs only to a place strictly sacred, and indeed from the ceiling down to the pavement, even if it is interdicted or polluted; therefore sacrilege because of injured sanctity of a sacred place is committed only within this area. But immunity belongs also to a place sacred in the broader sense, and to a strictly sacred place also in its exterior parts, such as are the portico, sacristy, tower, roof above the church, underground crypt, stairway, and door of the church.

2. The actions by which local sacrilege is committed are these four.

First of all there must be noted the doctrine of those who with de Lugo¹ teach that all sins committed in a sacred place have some notion of sacrilege, because it is against the reverence owed to a sacred place that a place destined for the worship of God be converted into a place of divine offense; but grave sacrilege to be declared in confession is committed especially by those actions which by positive law are prohibited from being done in a church, of which kind are the four following.

a. Sins by which a church is polluted, even if they remain hidden and therefore the church is not in fact polluted.

The sins by which a church (oratory and cemetery) is polluted, if they have become notorious by notoriety of law or of fact, are these five:

a. Unjust shedding of human blood: therefore if blood is shed in a church either by chance or for just defense, it is not polluted. Besides, copious shedding of blood is required, and that the wound at least be inflicted in the church, even if the blood is poured out outside the church. Hence the shedding of human blood which happens, for example, from the nose or teeth because of a slap inflicted, neither pollutes the church nor consequently constitutes sacrilege in the said sense.

b. Unjust homicide, even without shedding of blood: therefore if a just homicide were done in a church, the church would not be polluted; but it suffices that the cause of death be placed in the church, even if death follows outside the church.

c. Illicit effusion of human seed, which can happen either through voluntary pollution, or through fornication, or through conjugal intercourse, which apart from necessity is illicit in a church; but necessity because of the danger of incontinence renders it licit even in a church; therefore by this licit intercourse the church is not polluted.

Other external sins of lust (touches, looks, filthy speech), although grave, probably are not grave sacrileges. But grave internal sins (impure thoughts and desires) certainly are not grave sacrileges, unless there is a desire of an act by which the church is polluted, and this desire is conceived of perpetrating that act within the church.

d. Burial of an excommunicated person, which must be understood of ecclesiastical burial, and indeed of a person specially and by name excommunicated. The burial of others in a sacred place is indeed interdicted, but from this the church or cemetery is not polluted.

e. Burial of a non-baptized person, which must be understood of pagans, Jews, and other unbelievers, whose burial in a sacred place causes that place itself to be polluted. As for the infants of the faithful who die without baptism, probably their burial in a sacred place does not induce its pollution.²

b. Profane actions, even indifferent ones, which either by their nature or from the prohibition of the Church are opposed to the sanctity of a sacred place, such as judicial actions and markets, public banquets, theatrical plays, secular parliaments, and generally all those actions, whether illicit or profane, which according to the common estimation of men are very unbefitting to the sanctity of the place, such as stabling of horses, evacuations of nature, dances, grave quarrels, etc.

a. To eat something privately in a church, even without necessity, does not exceed venial sin.³

b. It is customary to permit that plays which conduce to fostering piety be performed in church, and in like manner literary exercises.

c. Laymann judges that, if it happens without disturbance of the divine offices, it can be permitted, or at least tolerated, that in a cemetery or in the temple itself candles or other things which pertain to the devotion of the people be sold.⁴

c. Theft committed in a sacred place; yet in order that by theft perpetrated in a sacred place grave sacrilege be committed, it is required that the thing taken be grave and be joined by some special bond with the church, and therefore either belong to the church or at least be entrusted to its custody or use.

By law sacrilege is committed by taking away a sacred thing from a sacred place, or a non-sacred thing from a sacred place, or a sacred thing from a non-sacred place;⁵ by these words it is significantly said "from a sacred place," not "in a sacred place," so that it may be signified that theft committed in a sacred place is not sacrilege unless the thing taken belongs in some way to the church. Therefore he who in a church steals the purse of a rich man does not commit local sacrilege; but he who steals a sacred thing from a sacred place commits a double sacrilege, real and local.

d. Actions by which the immunity of a sacred place is violated, therefore actions by which the right of asylum is injured.

Ecclesiastical immunity is a privilege by which ecclesiastical things (persons, things, places) are free from certain burdens which are customarily imposed on other things in civil society. Local ecclesiastical immunity comprises the privilege granted to sacred places, by which criminals fleeing thither cannot be dragged out by lay power. This privilege is called the right of asylum. Although civil laws today do not acknowledge the right of asylum, nevertheless the Church does not yield her right unless she has derogated from it by concordats; indeed she inflicts excommunication on all who, by rash daring, order the immunity of ecclesiastical asylum to be violated, or violate it.⁶

Note. By burning or breaking into a sacred place real sacrilege is committed: for the place is injured insofar as it is a sacred thing.

¹ De poenit., disp. 16, n. 466.

² Schmalzgrueber, in l. 3, t. 40, n. 47.

³ Cf. Lacroix, l. 6, pr. 2, n. 266.

⁴ Laymann, l. 4, tract. 10, c. 7, n. 9.

⁵ c. Quisquis 21, c. 17, q. 4.

⁶ Constit. Apostolicae sedis, II, 5.

179. On real sacrilege. Real sacrilege is committed especially in three ways: a. by treating sacred things unworthily; b. by usurping sacred things unjustly; c. by buying or selling sacred things against the prohibition of the Church, which is the sin of simony.

Sacred things are of two genera: some which are ordered to divine worship by their essence, others which are so ordered only by the dedication of the Church. Of these, some (for example, sacred vessels) are deputed to divine worship by special consecration; others (as ecclesiastical goods) without special consecration. The former serve this end proximately, the latter only remotely. Therefore sacred things are:

1. The sacraments, of which the chief is the sacrament of the Eucharist.

a. Therefore sacrilege is committed: a. if the sacraments are invalidly confected, unworthily ministered, or unworthily received; b. if the sacred species are not renewed in their time with danger of corruption; c. if the most holy sacrament is left for a longer time (a whole day) without a burning lamp; d. if the most holy Eucharist is touched irreverently, but most of all if it is trampled upon or employed for superstitions; e. if vessels, corporals, etc., very unclean are employed for the sacrifice of the Mass.

b. Although Christ the Lord is really present in the most holy sacrament of the Eucharist, nevertheless the violation of this sacrament is not personal sacrilege, but real, because Christ in this sacrament does not exhibit Himself in His own person, but under inanimate species.¹

2. Sacred objects: sacred vessels, altars, crosses, images of saints, sacred oils, relics, Sacred Scripture, sacred buildings, and blessed things.

a. Grave sacrilege is committed: a. if sacred vessels which immediately serve for the sacred ministry, and therefore are accustomed to be consecrated or at least blessed, are employed for profane uses, for example chalices for banquets; but to employ for profane uses vessels which serve only mediately in the sacred ministry, such as cruets, a basin, etc., would not be a sin; b. if sacred oils, relics, sacred images are profaned by throwing away the former or by breaking images from contempt, etc.

b. Grave sacrilege is committed if the words of Sacred Scripture are employed for indecent and vain things; it would be venial if they were employed for jokes otherwise honorable. But if the words of Sacred Scripture are not employed for mere jokes, but for expressing one's own meanings by the words of Sacred Scripture, even all fault of irreverence can be absent, especially if the words of Christ the Lord Himself are not usurped and this is not done rather often and as if from custom. Yet one must take care lest a joking meaning be placed under the words of Sacred Scripture which occur in Mass and the divine office, lest an occasion be given for distractions that will arise during prayer. To employ fragments of books in which sacred words are contained for profane uses, if this is done without contempt, is not a profanation of Sacred Scripture and therefore not sacrilege. The same must be said concerning images of saints which are not blessed.²

c. It must be noted that no irreverence is committed if bones of meats or shells of eggs which are customarily blessed at Easter time are thrown away, because the blessing does not fall upon the bones or shells, but upon the meats and eggs. Likewise no irreverence is committed if things simply blessed (by an invocative blessing) are applied to profane but nevertheless decent uses, as if blessed candles are employed for having light for study, or holy water for mixing wine, or blessed salt for seasoning foods.³

3. Ornaments of the church or of ministers, which are customarily blessed, such as priestly vestments.

a. Sacrilege is committed: a. if these things are treated unworthily from contempt; b. if they are employed for profane uses. But to employ for profane uses those things which are not customarily blessed, for example curtains, candelabra, etc., to employ them for weddings, would not be a sin.

b. Negligence which is committed in cleaning and cleansing altars, images, or sacred utensils, and in cleaning and repairing sacred vestments, will not be mortal unless the sacred vessels are notably unclean or the vestments notably torn.

c. The canons of the ancient law severely prohibit sacred things ever to be employed for profane uses, not even when their form has been changed, for example stones and wood of a demolished church or worn-out vestments, but they ought either to be burned or employed for other sacred uses. But by contrary custom it has happened that sacred things, even if before they had been consecrated or blessed, are today licitly employed for profane uses, provided their form is first changed. Therefore stones and wood of a demolished church can be sold, and sacred vessels first melted down and vestments first cut apart can be employed for other uses.⁴

4. Ecclesiastical goods, under which name are counted:

a. Goods both movable and immovable of the Church, which are deputed for the sustenance of ministers, for the fabric of the church, or for other sacred uses; but not the goods of the ministers of the Church themselves.

Yet in order that sacrilege be committed by their theft or unjust detention, it is required that the goods have already passed into the dominion of the Church; therefore a legacy left to the Church is not yet a sacred thing unless it has been handed over to the Church.

b. Goods which pertain to some ecclesiastical institute, such as a monastery, a hospice, etc. For since these goods from the will of the donors are destined to no use except a pious one and have been accepted by the Church for this end, they are counted among sacred things, and their theft, detention, or defrauding is everywhere in law called sacrilege.

¹ Cf. Lessius, l. 2, c. 45, dub. 3, n. 16.

² Scavini, Theologia mor. universa, 4th ed., Milan: Oliva, 1890, II, n. 130.

³ Cf. Lacroix, l. 6, pr. 1, n. 227.

⁴ Cf. Gennari, Consultazioni moral. canon. liturg., 2nd ed., Rome: Monitore ecclesiastico, 1901, pr. 2, cons. 33.

180. Whether it is licit to touch sacred vessels. a. Consecrated vessels which are destined immediately to contain the most holy Eucharist, likewise corporals and purificators which after sacred use have not yet been washed, only clerics (even of first tonsure) can touch licitly; the same is granted by privilege to regular lay sacristans and to nun sacristans. Therefore this is not licit for secular lay persons without special faculty, but it does not exceed venial sin, and if a cause is present, it is not even venial.

b. Corporals and purificators before use, vessels and ornaments which do not immediately touch the most holy Eucharist, likewise other sacred things (Agnus Dei, relics, etc.), all can touch licitly.

a. Therefore if palls, corporals, and purificators which have already served for sacred use must be washed, their first washing must be done by a sacred person (this is the office of the subdeacon), and the water of the washing must be sent into the sacrarium.

b. Some authors (Lacroix, Suarez, Pasqualigo) probably affirm that the first washing can also be done by inferior clerics, indeed by tonsured clerics.¹

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 387.

181. Definition. Simony, named from Simon Magus,² is defined as: the studious will of buying or selling, for a temporal price, something spiritual or annexed to something spiritual.³

a. It is said: studious, that is, deliberate will; because for the essence of simony it is not required that the pact be actually completed by mutual consent, but it suffices that it be begun, because there is present the interior will of one party of making an agreement or of obligating another. Of buying or selling signifies any onerous pact by which a spiritual thing is exchanged for a temporal thing. For a temporal price signifies not only money, but any temporal good or advantage which is exchanged with a spiritual thing. Something spiritual or annexed to something spiritual signifies the matter about which simony turns, which can be either a spiritual thing or a temporal thing annexed to something spiritual.

b. He does not commit simony of itself who gives a spiritual thing for a spiritual thing, or a thing annexed to a spiritual thing for a thing annexed to a spiritual thing; therefore it is not simony to give a Mass for a rosary, a chalice for a ciborium, nor to exchange mutually spiritual things of diverse orders: the application of an indulgence or a dispensation for a sacred relic, because a spiritual thing is not given for a temporal thing. Likewise he does not commit simony of itself who serves a bishop in a spiritual matter, for example as preacher or confessor, with the intention that he may receive a benefice: for a spiritual thing is exchanged for a spiritual thing.

Note. This definition applies only to simony of divine law, not likewise to simony of ecclesiastical law. Simony taken universally can be defined as: a contract concerning something spiritual or annexed to something spiritual, forbidden by law from a regard for religion.

¹ Laymann, l. 4, tract. 10, c. 8; Reuter, pr. II, n. 452-503; Lacroix, l. 3, pr. 1, n. 56-246; Castropalao, tract. 17, disp. 3; A. Leinz, Die Simonie, Freiburg: Herder, 1902. Canonists treat simony diffusely throughout.

² Acts 8:18 ff.

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 100, a. 1.

182. Division of simony. Three things necessarily concur for simony: matter, pact, and price; wherefore simony is divided in three ways.

1. By reason of matter, into simony of divine (natural) law and of ecclesiastical law. a. Simony of divine law is committed when for a temporal thing a spiritual thing or a thing annexed to a spiritual thing is given; and this simony indeed is evil in itself and therefore prohibited by natural-divine law. b. Simony of ecclesiastical law is committed when a spiritual thing or a thing annexed to a spiritual thing is given for another spiritual thing or thing annexed to a spiritual thing, or when a temporal thing is given for another temporal thing, but each against the prohibition of the Church. But this simony is not evil in itself, but is evil only because it is prohibited by the Church.

It is simony of divine law if money is given for the sacraments, for the sacrifice of the Mass, etc.; it is simony of ecclesiastical law if ecclesiastical benefices are exchanged, or if money is given for blessed oil without the license of the Church. But when the prohibition of the Church has been removed, the exchange or buying and selling of these things is no longer simoniacal.

2. By reason of the pact, simony is divided into mental, conventional, real, and confidential. This division tends especially to this, that the penalties established by law against simony may be explained.

a. Mental simony is committed when a temporal thing is given or offered with the intention of obligating another to give a spiritual thing, or conversely, without any pact externally manifested.

Therefore for mental simony the mere internal proposal of giving a temporal thing for a spiritual thing does not suffice, but it is required that something actually be offered or given with the merely internal will of obligating another to return a spiritual thing, as if a cleric serves a bishop with the intention that a benefice be conferred on him as wages, or if a patron gives a benefice to someone in order to compensate him for services received, yet with no agreement outwardly made. The mere internal proposal of committing simony without any external execution would be purely mental or intentional simony, which the law, as pertaining to the merely internal forum, does not attend to.

b. Conventional simony is made by a pact or agreement of giving or receiving a spiritual thing for a temporal thing, but with the agreement not yet fulfilled from each side. And if the agreement has been fulfilled from neither side by delivery of the thing promised, it is called pure conventional simony; but if it has been fulfilled from either side by at least partial delivery of the thing promised, it is called mixed.

c. Real simony is had when the agreement has been completed from each side by delivery of the thing promised, or at least has begun to be fulfilled, as if, when the spiritual thing has been given, the temporal thing has been received at least in part.

Titius sells Sempronius a benefice for five hundred crowns, but neither the benefice nor the price has thus far been handed over - pure conventional simony. Titius has conferred the sold benefice, but Sempronius has thus far paid nothing of the price - mixed conventional simony. Titius has conferred the sold benefice and Sempronius has already paid either the whole price or at least part of it - real simony.

Concerning confidential simony it will be said below.

3. By reason of the price, it is divided into simony with a gift from the hand, from the tongue, and from service: for the temporal price in law is customarily called a gift.¹ A threefold diverse gift is distinguished: a. a gift from the hand, by which money or any external good which can be appraised by a temporal price is designated, as remission of debt, lending of money, etc.; b. a gift from the tongue, by which any patronage which is exhibited by the tongue or by speaking is designated, as praise, recommendation, intercession, defense, etc., made before another from agreement for a spiritual thing; c. a gift from service, by which any temporal service is designated, as service as a servant, administration of affairs, etc., from a pact of obtaining something spiritual.

Therefore simony is committed on account of a gift from the hand if someone gives another a benefice so that he may remit a debt to him; on account of a gift from the tongue, if someone gives another a benefice so that he may recommend him to a prince; on account of a gift from service, if someone gives another a benefice so that he may instruct the children of the one conferring the benefice.

¹ c. Sunt nonnulli 114, c. 1, q. 1.

183. Moral and specific malice. 1. Simony of divine law is a sin against religion, grave from its whole genus, which does not admit smallness of matter. Its malice consists in this, that the spiritual and sacred thing is judged to be valued no more highly than a temporal and profane thing, by which reason not only is the spiritual thing treated unworthily, but at the same time injury is inflicted upon God, the author of spiritual things. Therefore there is the precept of Christ concerning supernatural goods: Freely you have received, freely give,¹ and the words of reprobation of St. Peter to Simon Magus: Thy money be with thee unto perdition, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be possessed by money.² That this simony does not admit smallness of matter is clear: for a spiritual thing, however small, is by that very fact despised with the greatest injury to God, that it is equated with a temporal thing.

From these things it is clear that simony is a sin against religion, which is reduced to real sacrilege, although it is specifically distinct from it. Yet because its treatment is lengthy and filled with many difficulties, for the sake of clarity it is customarily set forth apart from sacrilege.

2. Simony of ecclesiastical law is a sin grave from its genus, which admits smallness of matter. This simony is evil because it is prohibited gravely by the Church from a motive of religion, namely for removing the danger of simony and therefore for guarding against irreverence toward sacred things. It admits smallness of matter, because the prohibitions of the Church, unless something else prevents, are accommodated to the matter, so that they are grave in grave matter and light in light matter.

3. Simony of divine law and of ecclesiastical law are sins of the same species, since even simony of ecclesiastical law is a sin against religion and therefore has the nature of true simony: for if the Church, from a motive of some virtue, commands or prohibits anything, by that very fact the thing commanded or prohibited becomes the matter of that virtue or vice on account of which the thing is commanded or prohibited; therefore even simony of ecclesiastical law is a sin against religion.

¹ Matt. 10:8.

² Acts 8:20.

184. Matter of simony of divine law is either something spiritual or something temporal annexed to something spiritual; therefore a twofold matter of simony is distinguished: the one is constituted by things spiritual in themselves, the other by things spiritual through connection.

a. Spiritual is understood as everything which either from itself or from the institution of God or of the Church is ordered to the salvation of the soul, whether as to substance it is a spiritual or a sensible thing.

This spiritual thing is of three genera: a. formally spiritual, which in itself and as to its substance is spiritual, such as sanctifying grace, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, supernatural virtues, graces gratuitously given, etc.; b. causally spiritual, which causes something spiritual, such as the sacraments, sacramentals, prayers both public and private, sermons, etc.; c. effectively spiritual, which is caused by something spiritual, such as acts of the power of order or jurisdiction: consecration, absolution, blessing, dispensation, excommunication, conferral of a benefice, etc.

b. Annexed to a spiritual thing is said of something temporal in itself, which nevertheless either by God or by the Church is annexed to something spiritual (a thing, right, or office).

A temporal thing can be annexed to a spiritual thing in three ways: a. antecedently, if a temporal thing preexists, to which a spiritual thing is then added, as are all things consecrated and blessed (sacred vessels, a temple, blessed oil), a plot of land or building to which the right of patronage adheres; b. consequently, if a temporal thing supposes a spiritual thing as the cause on account of which it is given, such as ecclesiastical benefices (the right of receiving temporal fruits), which are given on account of an office; c. concomitantly, if a temporal thing exists at the same time with a spiritual thing, as bodily labor to be undertaken in sacred functions. But labor annexed to a spiritual work is either intrinsic, when it is joined with the work of itself and necessarily, as the labor necessary in celebrating Mass, in carrying Viaticum, in preaching the word of God; or extrinsic, when it is joined to the work only accidentally, as the trouble which someone must undergo in celebrating with chant, in a distant place, at a determinate hour.

185. When it is simony to buy or sell a temporal thing annexed to something spiritual. 1. To buy or sell temporal things consequently annexed to something spiritual, according to the most common opinion, is simony of divine law: for the temporal thing which follows from the spiritual thing as from its root is so conjoined with the spiritual thing that in moral estimation it constitutes one thing with it, and therefore one can in no way be bought or sold without the other by private authority.

Therefore it is not licit to sell the right to the revenues of a benefice, which is founded in the spiritual right to pastoral offices as in its root and cannot be separated from it. Likewise it is not licit to buy or sell the right of living from the goods of a monastery, which is necessarily joined with religious profession, which is spiritual.

2. To buy or sell temporal things concomitantly and intrinsically annexed to something spiritual, according to the most common and true opinion, is simony of divine law: for the temporal thing which is concomitantly and intrinsically annexed to the spiritual thing is not appraisable by a price for the faithful from itself and independently of the spiritual thing; wherefore if it were sold, the spiritual thing itself would be judged to be sold.

Therefore it is not licit to receive something as a price for the labor and fatigue which are joined with the spiritual work of celebrating, preaching, consecrating a church, etc. The external work which is performed in celebration, administration of a sacrament, etc., is indeed distinct from the spiritual thing, but of itself in this case it has no value. For in order that something be appraisable by a price, that which is laborious to one person ought to be useful to another; but the external work of celebration or administration of a sacrament furnishes no utility to the faithful: for that which they value and seek, and which brings utility to them, is the spiritual thing alone.¹

3. It is licit to buy or sell temporal things concomitantly and extrinsically annexed to something spiritual: for what is concomitantly and extrinsically annexed can be separated from the sacred thing and therefore appraised by a price and sold independently of the sacred thing.

Therefore it is licit to give and receive money if a priest about to celebrate Mass must undergo the inconvenience of a long journey, or the fatigue of chant, or must remain fasting until noon. It is licit to receive something for sacred relics if to deprive oneself of them involves great inconvenience by reason of special affection.

4. It is licit to buy and sell temporal things antecedently annexed to something spiritual, provided the price is not increased because of the spiritual thing, nor the exchange prohibited by the Church. For the thing antecedently annexed to something spiritual on the one hand retains, after blessing or consecration, its physical value; but on the other hand the connection of the material thing with the spiritual blessing or consecration is not so great that by the intention of buyers and sellers one cannot be separated from the other. But if the price is increased because of the spiritual thing, simony of divine law is committed; and if the prohibition of the Church stands in the way of the sale, simony of ecclesiastical law is committed.

Therefore of itself it is licit to buy and sell blessed wax, sacred relics enclosed in precious cases, sacred vessels, sacred vestments, blessed medals and rosaries: for temporal things (wax, the case, etc.) have their own value, for which a price is licitly paid; but many things of this kind, as will be said below, cannot be bought and sold without simony because of the prohibition of the Church.

Note. Sacred relics, if we wish to speak properly, are themselves material things, to which a spiritual character is added, and therefore things antecedently annexed to something spiritual. But since relics, insofar as they are material, are of no value, they are customarily considered as spiritual things, and only the cases in which the relics are enclosed are held as material things appraisable by a price.

¹ Cf. Zeitschrift fur kath. Th., XXXIII (1909), p. 480 ff.

186. Simony of ecclesiastical law is committed especially in these ways:

1. To give or receive anything, even small, even spontaneously offered, on the occasion of an examination for parochial care, whether before or after the examination.¹ It is said on the occasion of the examination: for if something is given for the examination itself, namely for a positive mark, simony of divine law is committed.

2. To receive anything, even spontaneously offered, for the conferral of orders, even of first tonsure, for dimissorial letters, testimonial letters, or letters of formatae of the order conferred.² Nevertheless it is permitted that bishops receive a candle from those to be ordained, and the emoluments for dimissorial letters (so that orders can be conferred by another bishop) and for testimonial letters or formatae of the order conferred, determined by the sacred congregation by order of Innocent XI (the Innocentian tax).³

3. To sell and buy temporal offices canonically instituted, which are ordered to the administration of the temporal things of the Church (of sacristan, cantor, steward, procurator, defender of the church): for these are prohibited to be bought, whether by clerics or by laymen.⁴

But the right of burial in a determinate place can be sold: for by this pact ecclesiastical burial is not judged to be sold, nor the sacred place of burial, but the right of burying another in that place, which indeed is appraisable by a price, and its sale is not prohibited by the Church. Wherefore the practice has long prevailed in the Church that rights of this kind are sold everywhere.

4. To sell a part of a consecrated cemetery, the sale of which, as a thing antecedently annexed to something spiritual, would of itself be licit.

5. To sell blessed oil or sacred chrism even according to physical value, which likewise could be sold licitly of itself as annexed antecedently to something spiritual; nevertheless those churches are excepted in which, against the common law, a custom has prevailed of receiving something for compensating the expenses made for acquiring the material.⁵

6. To receive something for the erection, institution, communication, or aggregation of confraternities, under penalty of nullity of the act if anything is received for them.⁶

7. To commit to another, to be celebrated, a Mass which someone has undertaken to celebrate for a stipend, while part of the stipend has been retained by mutual pact.

8. To sell, expose as saleable, or exchange for another thing crowns, medals, and other things of this kind which are blessed and enriched with indulgences, and which by the very fact of the sale lose the indulgences.⁷

Nevertheless crowns, crosses, etc., do not lose the indulgences if the buyer of them commits to the seller himself the care of the blessing in his own name, even if he pays the price and the expenses of transmission only when the things already blessed are handed over to him.⁸

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 24, c. 18, De reform. Although in other cases the smallness of a gift offered (some flowers, a few fruits, moderate things to eat and drink) plainly excuses from the sin of simony, even of divine law, because these small things are not apt to induce an obligation, nevertheless even these are interdicted to examiners in a concursus: for the decree of the council establishes: that they receive absolutely nothing.

² Council of Trent, sess. 21, c. 1, De reform.

³ S. C. C., Oct. 8, 1678.

⁴ c. Consulere 38, De simonia (V. 3).

⁵ S. C. C., Dec. 20, 1879. Cf. Acta s. sedis, vol. XIII, p. 180 ff.

⁶ Constit. Quaecunque of Clement VIII, Dec. 8, 1604, nn. 11-12.

⁷ Decreta authentica S. C. Indulg., Ratisbon: Pustet, 1893, nn. 78, 82, 344. Cf. Fr. Beringer, Die Ablasse etc., 11th ed., Paderborn: Schoningh, 1900, p. 339 ff.

⁸ S. C. Indulg., July 10, 1896.

187. On a simoniacal pact. Declarations. a. A simoniacal pact is understood as any contract by which someone intends to obligate another to give a spiritual thing for a temporal price, or conversely.

b. A twofold simoniacal pact is distinguished: explicit, which is expressed by distinct words or signs: I give you one hundred for a canonry; and tacit or implicit, which is contained in some fact, from which, namely, when the circumstances have been considered, it appears that the temporal thing which is given and received is not a mere gift, but is conferred to obligate the other, so that he himself may give the spiritual thing.

So that it can be judged whether something is given with a simoniacal or a liberal mind, attention must be given to these three things: to the quality of the giver, to the quantity of the thing, and to the time of the donation. For if the gift is given by a rich and liberal man, or if the thing is of small price (a few things to eat or drink), or if it is given when necessity or opportunity requires it, it is not judged to have been given simoniacally, but liberally. On the contrary, if someone, at the time when the conferral of a benefice is imminent, should give a precious thing to the patron, although before he was not accustomed to give him gifts, he is judged to have given simoniacally.

Assertions. 1. To constitute true simony, some contract of giving a temporal thing for a spiritual thing, begun at least on one side, is essentially required; but any contract suffices, provided it is truly obligatory.

a. Any burden which is imposed on another suffices for committing simony, even if it obligates only from gratitude or from fidelity, not from justice, provided a new obligation is imposed on another which brings it about that his return is no longer gratuitous, but in some way owed. Hence it is simony if someone gratuitously gives a temporal thing on this condition, that the other likewise gratuitously give a spiritual thing.

b. It is licit to give a temporal thing with the hope of receiving something spiritual, or conversely, by way of gratitude, even if this hope is externally manifested, because in this way no pact is had, because no obligation is imposed, and from the other side no right is acquired.

2. Furthermore it is required that the temporal thing be given as a price, or as just compensation, for the spiritual thing; for otherwise the spiritual is not equated with nor exchanged for the temporal, which is required for the formal nature of simony.

Therefore simony is not committed if the temporal thing is given and received not as the price of the spiritual thing, but from another title, unless even this in a determinate case is prohibited by the Church. Several titles of this kind for giving and receiving a temporal thing for a spiritual thing exist, as will appear from the questions to be solved below; but the chief are: liberal gratitude, sustenance of the minister, poverty to be relieved, external labor, vexation to be redeemed, custom. If there is no other title for giving the temporal thing, in the external forum the temporal thing is presumed to be given as a price; in the internal forum it depends on the intention of the giver whether he has committed simony of divine law, or of ecclesiastical law, or none at all.

3. Simony is committed also when a temporal thing is given for a spiritual thing as a motive, that is, for moving another so that he may confer the spiritual thing, provided nevertheless that he acts with that disposition that he would not give the temporal thing if he knew that the other would not return the spiritual thing: for he who gives the temporal thing with this mind virtually gives it as a price.

4. Likewise simony is committed when a temporal thing is given as gratuitous compensation for a spiritual thing, or conversely,¹ in such a way, namely, that besides the natural obligation of gratitude, under the name of "gratuitous compensation," another obligation is imposed, whether of gratitude or fidelity or justice.

5. Finally, simony is committed when principally, although not solely, a temporal thing is given for a spiritual thing or conversely, because even in this case a true exchange of a spiritual thing with a temporal thing is made.

He commits simony who serves a bishop principally for obtaining a benefice as a thing owed for service, even if he attends upon him from other secondary motives also; but he does not commit simony who serves a bishop principally for conciliating his benevolence and secondarily also for obtaining a benefice, provided he does not intend the benefice as a thing owed for service, but as an effect of mere gratitude.²

¹ Therefore this proposition (45) was condemned by Innocent XI: "To give a temporal thing for a spiritual thing is not simony when the temporal thing is not given as a price, but only as a motive for conferring or effecting the spiritual thing; or even when the temporal thing is only a gratuitous compensation for the spiritual thing or conversely."

² Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 51.

188. Preliminary notions. a. An ecclesiastical benefice, which is defined as the right of receiving fruits from ecclesiastical goods, is properly annexed consequently to something spiritual; but it is considered together with the office as a spiritual thing, because it is inseparably joined with a spiritual office and is given only on account of the spiritual office, from which it springs forth as from its root.

b. From law it must be recalled that an ecclesiastical benefice is acquired in three ways: a. by election, when a cleric is elected by a chapter, which election must be confirmed by a bishop or by the pope; b. by presentation or nomination, when a cleric is offered by a patron to the superior, by whom he is then instituted as beneficiary; c. by collation or provision, when a benefice is freely given by the superior alone.

By presentation the right to obtain the benefice is acquired. Through installation in the benefice possession of it is taken.

c. Regular prelacies (generalates, provincialates, priorates, guardianates, etc., except nevertheless some abbacies and priorates which because of the goods annexed to them are true benefices) in the matter of simony, and especially in order to incurring penalties, are not comprehended under the name of benefice: for an ecclesiastical benefice in odious matters must be taken in the strict sense; but regular prelacies are rather offices than true benefices. Likewise parishes which have not been canonically erected and therefore are conferred in a revocable manner are by no means benefices properly so called.

Hence if someone gives a temporal thing for election to an office in religion, for example a priorate, he commits simony of divine law; nevertheless simony of ecclesiastical law is not committed if two agree concerning giving suffrage mutually to each other in order to obtain a regular office.

Note. The Church has prohibited every onerous pact especially in beneficiary matter, because, on account of the right of receiving temporal fruits, the danger was present that benefices would be treated as temporal things, and that for money the unworthy would be promoted while the worthy were left aside.

189. Assertions. 1. He commits simony who gives or receives something for obtaining in any way some ecclesiastical benefice.

a. He commits simony who gives something to electors for obtaining a vote, to a patron or collator for obtaining presentation, nomination, or confirmation; who gives or receives something for admission into possession of a benefice.

b. It is not simony by prayers to induce a bishop to give a benefice to someone, even if it is given because of the prayers; nor is it simony if someone by prayers obtains from another that he induce the bishop to confer a benefice, neither for him who asks or induces another to ask, nor for him who confers, nor for him who receives the benefice: for prayers do not have the nature of a price, but are ordered only to moving another to do something in favor of another, and no pact intervenes. But it is simony if the bishop says: I will confer the benefice on you if this person asks me, because in this case the prayers have the nature of a temporal price for which the spiritual thing is given.¹

c. It is not simony if a bishop confers a benefice on someone because of consanguinity or friendship or another temporal cause of this kind, both because no pact intervenes and because the other returns no temporal price, nor does the one conferring have the intention, as is supposed, of obligating him to return anything: for the temporal thing (consanguinity) is only the motive cause of conferring the spiritual thing; but it belongs to the nature of simony that the spiritual thing be given for the temporal thing in compensation for it.

d. It is not simony if a bishop gives a benefice to someone with the intention that he may be able to pay debts which he contracted with the bishop himself, because the bishop does not intend to receive an emolument beyond that which is already owed to him, nor does he impose a new obligation for paying the debt; wherefore he confers the benefice entirely gratuitously, unless he enters into a pact concerning the paying of the debt.

e. It is not simony if a bishop confers a benefice on a cleric in recognition of his merits, because the benefice is not given as wages owed, nor does any pact intervene.

2. He commits simony who by a temporal price, whether immediately or mediately, yet directly, prepares for himself the way to obtaining a benefice.

a. He who gives or receives something for procuring intercession for himself with the bishop or patron, so that he may obtain a benefice, commits simony, because by the offering of money he prepares for himself the way to obtaining a benefice. The same must be said if someone gives money to a mediate intercessor, unless the money is given solely for expenses, labor, loss of profit, etc.² This buying of intercession in order to obtain a benefice is simony of ecclesiastical law if the price is given independently of the efficacy of the intercession, and is simony of divine law if it is given only for efficacious intercession: for together with the intercession the benefice is also bought, which is a spiritual thing.³

b. He commits simony who gives money to a competitor so that he may cease to compete for the benefice: for by the money he prepares for himself the way to obtaining the benefice, since that abstention is not appraisable by a price except because of the spiritual thing which can be obtained through it.⁴

c. He commits simony who wagers with the collator of a benefice, for example for one hundred gold coins, that he will confer the vacant benefice not on himself but on another, if this is done so that the collator, for the sake of winning the money by the wager, may confer the benefice on the one wagering.

3. Simony is committed through any mutually onerous pact concerning benefices entered into without license of the superior, whether concerning a spiritual or a temporal thing.

a. Therefore it is simony: a. to give a benefice to someone with the pact that he undergo a new burden, even a spiritual one, for example of explaining the catechism, assisting the dying, etc.; b. to exchange benefices without license; c. a pact concerning resigning a benefice.

b. If a bishop in the collation of a benefice obligates another to pour forth prayers for him, he does not commit simony of divine law, because a spiritual thing is exchanged with a spiritual thing; but he commits simony of ecclesiastical law, which prohibits every agreement in the matter of benefices as simoniacal.

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 63.

² Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 439.

³ Lehmkuhl, I, n. 389.

⁴ St. Alphonsus, n. 103.

190. On confidential simony. Confidential simony, which has place only in ecclesiastical benefices, consists in this, that someone procures an ecclesiastical benefice for another in any way (by electing, presenting, conferring, resigning, etc.) under a certain confidence, that is, with the obligation that he resign it to himself or to a third person, or pay him from it a pension or part of the fruits. This simony can be mental, conventional, or real. Confidential simony can happen in four ways:

a. With reservation of access, when someone procures a benefice for another by this pact, that he himself or a third person, who here and now because of some impediment (for example, defect of age) is not yet capable of it, when the impediment ceases, may have access to the benefice, because the one for whom the benefice is procured resigns it.

b. With reservation of entrance, when someone yields a benefice conferred on himself, before possession has begun, to another by this pact, that after the death of this other or the laying down of the benefice, he himself, the one yielding, can enter into possession of it.

c. With reservation of return, when someone resigns to another a benefice which he already possesses by this pact, that he himself, the one resigning, at a determinate time may receive the benefice or return into possession of it.

d. With reservation of a part, when someone procures a benefice for another by this pact, that he pay to himself or to a third person part of the benefice or of the fruits.

191. On restitution of a price accepted simoniacally. The obligation of restitution in this matter can arise both from natural law and from ecclesiastical law. The law of nature obligates to restoring the thing accepted simoniacally only when, besides religion, commutative justice also has been injured; but ecclesiastical law sometimes obligates, as a penalty for the delict, to restoring the thing accepted simoniacally, even if only the virtue of religion and not commutative justice has been injured.

1. If simony was committed with injury of commutative justice, the price accepted simoniacally must be restored before the sentence of the judge: for from injury of commutative justice there arises by natural law an obligation of restoring. But commutative justice is injured: a. if a merely spiritual thing, having no temporal price, is handed over for a price; b. if for a price there is conferred what by office (from justice), and therefore gratuitously, ought to be furnished.

Hence he who accepted a price for a blessing, for the concession of a dispensation, for the consecration of a church, etc., must restore, because these things are merely spiritual. Likewise a parish priest who has accepted something for explaining catechism must restore; likewise a bishop who confers a benefice for a price, because each ought to do this from justice and therefore gratuitously.

2. If simony was committed without injury of commutative justice, the price accepted simoniacally does not have to be restored, unless restitution is imposed by the Church as a penalty for the crime, and then after the sentence of the judge. But restitution is imposed when simony has been committed: a. in beneficiary matter; b. in entrance into religion.

Therefore he who against the laws of the Church sold a blessed rosary enriched with indulgences, or sacred oil, is not bound to restore the price, unless this exceeds the material value of the thing sold, because he did not sin against justice, but only against religion, and the Church in this case does not impose restitution of the price. But he who resigns a benefice to another for money indeed does not injure commutative justice, because the fruits of a benefice are appraisable by a price; yet from the statute of law he must restore the money.

192. On returning the spiritual thing accepted simoniacally. a. If the temporal price has either been restored or has not yet been handed over, the spiritual thing, where it exists and can be restored, must be returned, unless the one handing it over yields his right: for dominion over the spiritual thing was transferred under the condition of receiving the temporal price; therefore, when the condition fails, the transfer of dominion fails, wherefore no title for retaining the spiritual thing is present.

b. But if the temporal price has been handed over and has not been restored, the spiritual thing, even if it is of such a kind that it can be restored, does not have to be restored unless restitution is enjoined as a penalty for the crime: for dominion over the spiritual thing has been validly transferred.

Hence he who simoniacally procured for himself relics of the saints or the right of patronage is not bound to give these up, because after the price has been handed over he has acquired dominion over them, and the Church does not enjoin restitution. But he who simoniacally acquired a benefice must both give up the benefice and restore the fruits received, because the Church, as a penalty for the delict, prevents both him who receives the benefice and him who receives the price from acquiring dominion.

193. To whom the price must be restored. If the obligation of restoring arises from injury of commutative justice, the thing must be restored to him who gave it, except in the case of a benefice; but if the obligation of restoring arises from ecclesiastical law alone, restitution must be made according to the disposition of law. But law disposes these things:

a. If the spiritual thing has not yet been handed over, restitution must be made to him who gave the price: for he has suffered the loss.

b. If the thing has already been handed over from each side, in the matter of benefices the price accepted, even if justice has been injured, must be restored to the church in which the benefice is situated; in other matters it must be restored to the poor.

194. Particular questions concerning simony.

1. To give another a temporal thing so that he may perform a spiritual thing for his own advantage, for example to give gifts to an adolescent so that he may frequent the sacraments, to give a dowry to a girl so that she may enter a monastery, is not simony; for these have the nature of a donation, although conditional, which imposes on the recipient no obligation of performing the spiritual thing, but intends only to incline his will toward the thing useful to him.

Whether it is simony or not to give these gifts with this intention, that the other is truly obligated to receive the sacraments or to enter religion, is disputed. Those who affirm simony bring as a reason that an exchange intervenes, since the giver acquires the right of demanding that the other perform the spiritual thing, and the recipient contracts the obligation of performing the same thing. Those who deny simony give as a reason that not every pact in this matter constitutes simony of divine law, but only a pact by which a spiritual thing is bought or sold for a temporal thing which is given as a price.¹

2. To give money to an impious man detaining sacred relics or other sacred things in order to redeem them is not simony, because the price is not given for the sacred thing, but so that it may be rescued from the danger of profanation.

Nevertheless, it is prohibited that the faithful voluntarily buy sacred relics which impious men expose for sale; rather the ordinary must be warned, who will take care that they be recovered opportunely.²

3. If of two persons playing, one exposes for the outcome of the game a spiritual thing (a rosary, the hearing of Mass), but the other a temporal thing, simony is not committed, because properly there is not made an equating between the spiritual and the temporal, but one, in place of a temporal thing, offers the execution of a spiritual thing, which the other accepts. Yet a mode of playing of this kind must be dissuaded because of scandal.

In like manner the priest does not sin who offers to a creditor one hundred Masses to be celebrated for him, so that he may remit a debt of one hundred florins.

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 59; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 437; Lessius, De iust., l. 2, c. 35, n. 66 s.

² S. C. Indulg., Dec. 21, 1878.

THE great precepts of the natural law which binds all men are summed up in the Ten Commandments given by God to the Israelites, which not to destroy but to fulfil, our Lord declared that he came They bind all men, and they will continue to do so as long as human nature is what it is; if only they were observed, the blissful state of happiness of which poets have dreamed, and reformers have striven in vain to bring about, would indeed be realized on earth. The first three Commandments lay down our duty toward God and constitute the first table; the rest, forming the second table, contain our duties toward our neighbour and our self-regarding duties.

The First Commandment, in the words of Exodus, is: “ I am the Lord thy God . . . thou shalt not have strange gods before me.’’!

Here God solemnly declares to us that he is our Lord God from whom we have all that we possess, on whom we depend absolutely, to whom we altogether belong. From this, our essential relation with God our Creator, is derived immediately our duty to worship him as our first beginning and last end. The fact that we derive our bodily origin under God from our parents lays upon us certain obligations in their regard; similarly, our relation to God imposes on us our highest duty of worshipping God, our Creator.

The acts of this worship, which natural reason thus prescribes, belong to the virtue which theologians call religion. They are acts such as prayer, worship in the stricter sense, sacrifice, offerings, tithes, vows, oaths, etc. Most of them will be more suitably treated of elsewhere; in this part we will consider the subject of prayer and worship, and then the chief sins against the virtue of religion. Exod. xx 2, 3.

PRAYER sometimes means any pious affection by which the mind and heart are raised to God. More strictly, it is the petitioning of God for what we stand in need of, and this is called the prayer of petition to distinguish it from the more general signification of the term.

Mental prayer is made with the internal faculties of the soul, while vocal prayer is made with the lips also.

Public prayer is offered in the name of the Church by authorized ministers in forms approved by the Church; all other is private prayer. Public worship is subject to the authority of the Church, which has regulated it by a large body of laws and decrees. Unauthorized forms of prayer may not be used in public worship, and it has been prescribed that only the litanies which are found in the Breviary and in the more recent editions of the Ritual, or such as have been specially approved by the Holy See, may be used in public. Moreover, no litanies may be published even for private use without the approbation of the Ordinary (Can. 1259).

For adults, prayer is a necessary means of obtaining salvation; for there are certain graces necessary for salvation, such as final perseverance, which God only grants in answer to prayer, as St Augustine teaches.¹1 Prayer is also of precept: “We ought always to pray and not to faint.² This precept is grave of itself, and for its fulfilment requires that we should pray frequently. Beyond saying this, it is difficult to determine precisely what neglect of prayer is required for a mortal or a venial sin, It would seem certain, however, that grave sin would be committed by altogether neglecting prayer for a whole year. The faithful rightly accuse themselves in confession when they have omitted morning or night prayers, for those times are the most suitable for fulfilling this duty, and if no prayers are said then, they will hardly be said at other times; moreover, the omission will usually be due to sloth or carelessness about spiritual things,

¹ De bono persev., c. 16.

² Luke xviii 1.

Our Lord promised that prayer when rightly made would be heard by God: “‘ I say to you, Ask and it shall be given you: seek and you shall find; knock and it shall be opened to you.¹ We learn from his teaching and from the nature of prayer what qualities it must have in order to be acceptable to God and heard by him. The object prayed for must be necessary, or at any rate useful for salvation. Not only spiritual blessings are proper objects of prayer but temporal blessings as well, as far as they conduce to the welfare of the soul. Prayer must be persevering: God has promised to hear prayer, but he has not promised to hear it at once. The time must be left to his wisdom and providence with due conformity to his holy will. Prayer must come from a humble heart, in which faith, hope, and charity dwell, in order to merit the promises of God. Moreover, God will not do violence to man’s free will, and so if prayer is offered for someone else, its effect to some extent depends on that person’s dispositions and free will. He may, if he pleases, put obstacles in the way, which will prevent the prayer from obtaining the precise effect wished for in his regard. ‘Theologians conclude that prayer must be made for one’s self in order to be infallibly heard by God.

¹ Luke xi 9.

We are obliged by precept only to pray to God, unless we admit with the common opinion that anyone who should never pray to the blessed Virgin Mary would sin venially by neglecting so powerful a means of salvation. We may, however, lawfully and with fruit pray to the angels and saints, more probably to the holy souls detained in purgatory, and in private to anyone whom with reasonable certainty we believe to be with God in heaven, that they may intercede with him for us.

We should pray for all men whom it will benefit without excluding anyone in our private prayers. It is useless praying for the damned, and the Church forbids her ministers to pray publicly for those who are excommunicated,

Worship here signifies any external action by which we show deference and respect to another. Such an act is grounded on the persuasion that the person honoured is worthy of our esteem, and that it is proper to mark our esteem by such an external act of deference.

If the qualities which command our respect belong to the sphere of civil life, our worship is civil; if they belong to the sphere of religion, it is religious worship. Religious worship which is paid exclusively to God on account of his infinite and uncreated excellence is called by divines latria. That paid to the saints is called dulia, while the special worship with which we honour the blessed Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, on account of her created but pre-eminent excellence is called hyperdulia.

Worship is absolute when the excellence which grounds our esteem is in the object honoured; it is relative when paid to some object on account of its connection with a person worthy of our esteem and honour.

In this chapter we will briefly consider the regulations of the Church with regard to the worship of the saints, their relics and images, and the principles which underlie that worship. We suppose the truth of the Catholic doctrine on this subject—that the worship which the Church authorizes to be paid to the saints, to their relics and images—is lawful, praiseworthy, and meritorious. In the first place, then, we are allowed privately to show that inferior worship, which is called dulia, to anyone whom we know with moral certainty to have died in the grace and friendship of God. We may also show marks of relative worship to anything connected with him during life. It is evident that there is nothing reprehensible in such worship; the world is accustomed to show similar marks of its esteem to its great statesmen, generals, poets, and inventors. The Church does not interfere with private worship provided there is nothing in it that is objectionable.

Public worship, however, is subject to the authority of the Church, and she regulates it both as to its manner and objects. No signs of public worship may be used besides those. which are sanctioned, nor may the accustomed and approved signs of honour be shown to any except those who have been canonized or at least beatified by the Holy See. Only the saints, not the beatified, are invoked in the public litanies, and ordinarily it is not lawful to erect churches or altars in honour of the beatified; this mark of honour is reserved for the canonized saints. The pictures of the saints are painted with aureoles, those of the beatified with rays. With the permission of the Ordinary it is not forbidden to place statues of men who have not been canonized or beatified in our churches provided there be no marks of religious worship shown them; and paintings of such men may, under the same condition, be placed on the walls or windows of a church. Such paintings, however, may not be placed over an altar.

The Church is very careful to guard against abuse and fraud in the worship of the saints, their images and relics, as is shown especially by the wise decree of the Council of Trent on the invocation of the saints and the veneration paid to their relics and images (sess. 25). In that decree it is specially prescribed that no new relics or miracles are to be admitted except with the Bishop’s approbation after making a diligent inquiry into the truth of the matter. The question of the authenticity of relics is one of fact and proved by the ordinary rules of evidence. When there seems to be moral certainty of the genuineness of a relic, the Church permits relative honour to be paid to it on account of the spiritual excellence of the person with whom it was connected. The honour is thus referred to the person of the saint and to God who is glorified in all his saints. It is quite possible for mistakes to be made about the genuineness of a relic; the infallibility of the Church does not enter here. When a mistake is detected, of course the honour previously paid to a false relic should stop. No one need be scandalized or distressed when any such discovery is made. The merit of the worship previously paid in good faith is not lost; the saint whose relic it was supposed to be was really honoured by marks of devotion shown to it out of love for him. It is as if a devotee of Shakespeare were to keep a bust in his room, and show it marks of honour because he supposed it to represent the great poet; if he found out that it was a bust of Thomas Cromwell, he would be disappointed, but neither he nor Shakespeare would have suffered any great loss.

Sins may be committed against the virtue of religion by excess or by defect in the same way as against other moral virtues. Sins against religion by excess come under the general term of superstition, of which there are several species. For the sin of superstition may be committed by worshipping the true God in the wrong way or by worshipping false gods. We will first briefly treat of the wrong ways of worshipping the true God, and afterwards of worship paid to false gods.

God may be wrongly worshipped either by false worship or by superfluous worship being paid him. Worship of God is false when its meaning is not in accordance with fact, or when the falsehood is in the person who performs the act of worship, as when a layman performs the duties of a priest, or when someone tries to gain credence for false miracles or false relics. The ceremonies and practices of the Jewish religion signified that the Messiah was to come, and so now, after the coming of our Lord, they could not be employed without superstition. Inasmuch as falsehood in religion is a grave injury to God, this species of superstition is mortally sinful.

Anything in the worship of God which does not tend to his honour and glory, or which is against the ordinances and practice of the Church, to whom the regulation of religious worship exclusively belongs, is superfluous worship and superstition. This sin is committed by attributing an infallible effect to a fixed number of prayers or acts of piety, or to the mere material wearing of scapulars or medals, or by unwarrantably acting against the rubrics while saying Mass or administering the sacraments or sacramentals of the Church. The intention of the Church is that scapulars, medals, and other pious objects should be used by the faithful with confidence in the goodness and power of God, whose aid is invoked on the wearers by the blessing of the Church. Ordinarily, however, this kind of superstition will not be more than a venial sin.

The sin of superstition is also committed by giving divine honour to false gods. This is done by idolatry, divination, vain observance, and magic.

By material idolatry divine worship is given to a creature through fear or for some other reason merely externally, without any intention of honouring it as God. It is a grave sin, for it is directly against the obligation of making external profession of the faith, and contains the grave malice of a lie in matters of religion.

Formal idolatry is perfect or imperfect. The former consists in honouring a creature as God, falsely thinking it to be God. The latter knowingly honours a creature as God, without any excuse of ignorance, out of hatred towards him, or wishing to obtain something thereby. Both are grievous mortal sins, but the latter is the more grievous on account of the greater knowledge and malice.

We here suppose that the devil, a wicked spirit of great intelligence and power, but subject to God, exists and continually interferes in the affairs of men in order to ruin them. This truth belongs to the Catholic faith and cannot be denied without sin. The sin of divination is committed when the devil is invoked expressly or tacitly in order to discover what is secret and hidden. There is express invocation of the devil when his aid is expressly implored. The devil is tacitly invoked when altogether inadequate means are used to find out what is occult, means which are not sufficient for the purpose naturally, and which have not been ordained by God for that purpose. The devil is eager to be appealed to in order the more easily to attain his own ends, and anyone who uses such inadequate means to find out hidden secrets virtually appeals to the devil to help him. A great variety of such means of divination has been in use from the earliest times among all nations; and periods which have witnessed a decay of faith have also witnessed a recrudescence of these superstitions. The following are some of the better known methods of divination practised from the earliest times. The devil sometimes takes possession of the body of a human being and manifests what is secret through it; this was called pythonism. The devil had his prophets as God had. In necromancy the devil answers through the dead called to life again. At certain places he gave oracles through idols. Sometimes he communicated with men through dreams, In all the foregoing methods we have the express invocation of the devil. He is tacitly invoked when the lines of the hand are consulted as indications of the future, as is done in chiromancy; or the course of the stars, as in astrology; or the flight or song of birds, as in augury; or some chance event is taken as foretelling what is going to happen, as in omens.

Divination is mortally sinful, for it is a great insult to God to hold intercourse with and seek aid from the devil, his bitter enemy; and, besides, it is most dangerous to the parties concerned. He is wont gradually to insinuate himself until he has his victim within his power, and then he works on him his evil will. Such practices as those of divination are specially declared to be hateful to God in Holy Scripture: ‘‘ Neither let there be found among you anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire; or that consulteth soothsayers, or observeth dreams and omens, neither let there be any wizard, nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead. For the Lord abhorreth all these things, and for these abominations he will destroy them at thy coming.”¹ Although tacit as well as express divination is grievously sinful of itself, yet it is frequently only venial on account of the ignorance and simplicity of those who indulge in it, or because they do not entirely believe that the future can be known by such methods, and they use them in joke or out of curiosity. In this way young people who consult gipsies or palmists are ordinarily excused from grave sin.

¹ Deut. xviii 10-12.

We know from Holy Scripture that almighty God has sometimes made known his will to men by means of dreams, and the devil, too, is able to fill the mind with his suggestions during sleep. If God in some rare instance uses dreams to make known his will, he should of course be lovingly obeyed. The suggestions of the devil, on the contrary, should be repelled and despised. We can distinguish between the two sources by observing whether the impulse received is towards good or evil, whether what is suggested is worthy of God, whether it tends to disturb our peace or leaves us tranquil and disposed to the service of God. Dreams have ordinarily a natural cause, but they are no indication of what the future will bring. We may not, then, guide our conduct by dreams; God has given us our reason and the Church to teach us what we should do; we must follow these and not dreams if we would act aright. Constantly to guide ourselves by dreams would be mortally sinful, to allow them to influence us occasionally and in matters of little moment would not be more than a venial sin.

There is no harm in casting lots to decide a doubtful claim; the parties merely agree to stand by what turns up by chance. It is superstitious and sinful to cast lots in order to discover some secret, or with a view to shaping one’s life according to the issue. Sometimes this method of deciding doubts has been adopted by holy men in consequence of an intimation received from God, or sometimes because no better way out of the difficulty appeared.

The use of the divining-rod under the belief that a stick of a special shape cut from a particular kind of tree or bush will point out hidden treasure, or mines, or springs of water, is superstitious and sinful. For it is certain that there is no natural force which acts in the arbitrary manner in which the divining-rod is said to act under the circumstances. It is not impossible but that particular individuals may be very sensitive to the presence of water or minerals even when hidden under the surface of the earth, and perhaps the frequent finding of springs by dowsers is partially to be explained in this way. Then by practice and experience a power of detecting the presence of underground water from the vegetation or other signs on the surface may be developed. There is also without doubt a great deal of fraud in such matters. Finally, the devil may sometimes intervene.

Modern spiritism is obviously the pythonism, necromancy, and other forms of divination which have been mentioned above. It is gravely sinful, therefore, to act as a medium or to consult one with a view to finding out something which is not known. Crystal-gazing, table-turning, the use of the planchette for occult purposes, is also divination and grievously sinful. It is not impossible that the movements of the table in table-turning and of the planchette are due to the unconscious action of the sitters. On this hypothesis it would not be unlawful to make experiments with a view to finding out the truth; divination comes in when by such means the sitters seek to discover what it is certain none of them knows, consciously or unconsciously.

It is well to bear in mind a remark which St Thomas Aquinas makes after St Augustine, that the devil wishes to excite among men a greater curiosity about occult matters “ so that being implicated in these observances, they may become more curious and get themselves more entangled in the manifold snares of pernicious error,””

The term vain observance is used by theologians to designate various kinds of superstition by which altogether disproportionate means are employed to procure a sure and certain effect. It comprises the use of charms, spells, and cabalistic signs, which are used to preserve persons and things from harm, or cure wounds and diseases, or acquire knowledge without the labour of study. It also signifies the superstitious observance of chance events and days, some of which are considered lucky, others unlucky. Magic is the art of wonderworking by the help of the devil.

Vain observance, or witchcraft and magic, is gravely sinful for precisely similar reasons as divination is. There is only an accidental difference between these kinds of superstition, for while divination uses disproportionate means to discover what is hidden by the help of the devil, witchcraft uses disproportionate means to obtain certain and wonderful effects by his help. Morally, therefore, there is no difference between divination and witchcraft. Like divination, witchcraft may contain an express or tacit compact with the devil, and although if the compact be express there will always be mortal sin, there will frequently be only venial when the compact is tacit. Ignorance or good faith or want of full confidence in the effect will in that case frequently excuse from serious sin. Moreover, there must be advertence to the total inadequacy of the means to obtain the effect desired, and to the danger of the devil’s intervention, otherwise there will not be the sin of superstition. And so people who do not like to undertake any journey on a Friday, or to sit down with thirteen 1 Summa Theol., 2-2, q. 96, a. 3, ad 2. at table, because they have always heard that it is unlucky, and because their fathers had similar scruples, may often be excused from sin.

In a case of doubt whether a particular effect is to be ascribed to natural causes or not, we should rather ascribe it to natural causes than to the devil, for we must not bring in the preternatural without necessity, and we do not yet know all the forces of nature. Thus many believe that telepathy really exists and is due to natural causes. In such a case of doubt, then, we may experiment and investigate the matter; it is advisable to renounce all intention of dealing with the devil as a precautionary measure. If, on the contrary, it is certain that the effect is not attributable to natural causes, it should be ascribed to the devil rather than to God in case of doubt; for God does not work miracles without good reason, and ordinarily the sanctity of the person concerned and other circumstances clearly show divine intervention when it takes place.

Many theologians hold that the phenomena of hypnotism are due to preternatural causes, and consequently they maintain that it is unlawful to induce the hypnotic state or to have any part in it. Others more probably think that the state itself and the susceptibility of the hypnotized subject to suggestion on the part of the hypnotizer, together with those phenomena which affect the bodily organs and the imagination, are due to natural causes. The rarer phenomena of clairvoyance by which scenes and passing events at a great distance are seen, or by which an ignorant medium shows knowledge which is not possessed in the normal state, must be attributed to preternatural causes. For it seems impossible that natural forces should be able to produce effects altogether beyond their range. Even if we admit that the hypnotic state and the bodily phenomena are due to natural causes, it does not follow that anyone may induce the hypnotic sleep merely for the sake of experiment or out of curiosity. Such a practice would be accompanied with grave dangers, moral and physical, and it is not lawful to permit one’s self to be deprived. of the use of reason, and to subject one’s self to another’s control, without good cause and proper safeguards. Medical men, however, and other persons of skill and experience cannot be precluded from using a means which is very probably innocent, with proper precautions and for a good reason,

In this and the two following chapters we will treat of sins against religion by defect. The first of these is tempting God, which a person commits by saying or doing something by way of experiment to discover whether God is wise, powerful, good, or endowed with some other perfection. There is a formal sin of tempting God when there is a positive intention to make an experiment with God; the sin is virtual when that intention is absent, but something is said or done which can have no other meaning than to find out whether God has some perfection or not. Even in this case there must be some reference to God, some desire or wish to implore his help; otherwise there cannot be any tempting of God.

Formal tempting of God is a mortal sin, as is obvious; for it is a grave insult to the divine Majesty, who has graciously given men all the knowledge about himself that they require, and it contains the malice of unbelief as well.

God is virtually tempted when, contrary to the designs of his Providence, we neglect natural means, trusting that he will give us special help. This too is of itself a grave sin, but it often becomes venial on account of want of knowledge, consideration, or advertence. Thus people are guilty of grave sin who refuse to send for the doctor and will not use the ordinary remedies when they or their children are seriously ill, trusting that God will work a miracle. A preacher who neglected to prepare properly for his sermon, or one who exposed himself to some slight danger through improper trust in the divine help, would only sin venially. After doing what we can, or if we can do nothing, then we may at once with full confidence have recourse to God in our necessities. The trials by ordeal, which were in vogue in the Middle Ages, were in the ninth century condemned by the Church as superstitious,

SACRILEGE is defined to be the irreverent treatment of sacred persons, places, and things. The irreverence consists in doing something which is specially repugnant to the sanctity of the object in respect of its sacred character. A person, place, or thing becomes sacred by being dedicated to the service of God by public authority, for it does not seem possible that the dedication of an object to God by private authority should be able to lay an obligation on others to treat it with the reverence due to sacred things. Such an effect requires public authority.

Objects become sacred in consequence of being dedicated to God’s service by an authorized person according to the form prescribed by the Church. Not every form of blessing, however, makes the blessed object sacred. We must distinguish between blessings which invoke the divine favour on the use of certain things, but which do not make them sacred, and blessings which hallow and consecrate the object so that it can no more be lawfully used for profane purposes. Food, or candles, or holy water, which are blessed in the former way, do not thereby become sacred, and may still be used for ordinary purposes; churches, chalices, and baptismal water are consecrated by special blessings and may only be used for the purposes to which they are dedicated (Can. 11471150).

The sanctity which belongs to a consecrated person is different from that which belongs to holy places, and this again is different from that which belongs to sacred things. So that the sins by which sacred persons, places, and things are violated are specifically different from each other. Theologians dispute whether these three species of sacrilege contain other lower species or whether they are themselves the lowest. Many of them hold that they are the lowest, and this seems to be the opinion of St Thomas.

Sacrilege in all its species is a grave sin of itself, inasmuch as irreverence shown to sacred things redounds to the dishonour of God, to whose service they are dedicated.¹

If, however, the matter be trivial, as, for example, some slight irreverence to the Blessed Sacrament, sacrilege will only be a venial sin.

¹ Summa, 2-2, q. 99, a. 3, ad 2.

Personal sacrilege is committed in three ways:

(a) By violating the privilege of the canon, by which it is forbidden under pain of excommunication to lay violent hands on the clergy or on religious (Can. 2343).

(b) By violating the privilege of the immunity of the clergy from civil jurisdiction, as far as this is still in force (Can. 120).

(c) When persons consecrated to God by the vow of chastity violate their vows. Such persons are all those who are in sacred orders, and all religious who take public vows even though they be simple and not solemn. All sins, therefore, against purity, whether internal or external, which these persons commit, or which others commit with them, are sacrileges. It is a disputed point among theologians whether a private vow of chastity makes the person sacred, so that sins committed against the vow are sacrilegious. Both opinions are extrinsically probable, though the negative view seems more in accordance with what was said above, in keeping with the common teaching of divines. The question is not of great practical importance, since sins committed against chastity by those who are under a private vow have certainly a twofold malice, one against chastity, and the other against religion; and sins against religion are called sacrileges in a wide sense,

Local sacrilege is also committed in three ways:

(a) By violating the immunity of sacred places as far as this is still in force. (b) By committing certain crimes in a church or public oratory, which has been consecrated or at any rate blessed, by which crimes they are polluted according to canon law. Those crimes are homicide, suicide, any shedding of blood by violence which constitutes a mortal sin, the putting of the church to impious and base uses, and the burial within a church or oratory of an unbaptized person, or of one who has been excommunicated after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence (Can. 1172).

(c) By performing certain actions and by committing certain sins which of their nature or by special disposition of law are especially repugnant to the reverence due to holy places, Sacrilege is thus committed by holding a public market in a church, or a banquet, or using it to stable horses or cattle. There is, to be sure, a special indecency and irreverence in committing any sin in church, but the malice contracted from this circumstance will only be mortal in certain special cases.

On this ground it is probable that only external and consummated sins against chastity contract the grievous malice of sacrilege from being committed in a church; internal or not consummated sins against purity probably do not contract the grave malice of sacrilege if they are committed there.

Real sacrilege is also committed in three ways:

(a) By treating with irreverence sacred things, such as the sacraments, Holy Scripture, relics, sacred images.

It is a sacrilege to administer or to receive the sacraments in a state of mortal sin, to quote the words of Scripture for the purpose of making an obscene joke, to treat sacred images and relics with contempt.

(b) By theft of sacred objects. Sacrilegious theft is committed by stealing a sacred object from a sacred place, or a profane object from a sacred place, or a sacred object from a place that is not sacred, according to an old decree of canon law.¹ In the first of these cases a double sacrilege is committed, local and real, as when a chalice is stolen from the tabernacle; in the last case real sacrilege only is committed, as when a chalice is stolen from a priest’s room. Local sacrilege only is committed in the second case, and, indeed, according to a probable opinion, then only when the object stolen belongs to the sacred place, or has been entrusted specially to the sacred place for safe keeping. If a thief picks a pocket in church, his sin probably has not the malice of a grievous sin of sacrilege, although it may be grievous as against justice.

(c) By committing the sin of simony, the treatment of which is reserved for the next chapter.

¹ c. 21, C. 17, q. 4.

Theft of ecclesiastical property or wilful damage done to it is sacrilege, for although the money or other property belonging to the church is not sacred in itself, still by damaging or stealing it an injury is done to those sacred persons, places, and causes that are supported by church property. The private property belonging to a cleric is not ecclesiastical property, but only that which belongs to a church, Religious Order, or pious institution erected by episcopal authority. Theft, therefore, of the private money of a cleric is not sacrilege.

It is not lawful, except for clerics or others who have care of them, to touch the sacred vessels which are used to hold the Blessed Sacrament. Palls, corporals, and purificators should after use be washed by a cleric preparatory to their being washed in the ordinary manner. A violation, however, of these regulations would not be a grievous sin of itself; indeed, when there was a just cause, it would be no sin at all (Can. 1306).

Simony derives its name from Simon Magus, who, as we read in the Acts of the Apostles, desired to buy with money the power of giving the Holy Spirit. It is defined to be a studious wish to buy or to sell for a temporal advantage something which is spiritual, or which is annexed to what is spiritual. The terms of this definition are technical and require some explanation.

Simony, then, is said to be a studious wish to buy or to sell, in order to emphasize the fact that although no explicit contract is entered into by the parties, there may still be simoniacal dealing between them. Thus, if a person makes a money present to a priest with the intention of obliging him to give him absolution for his sins in return, he commits a sin of simony, though there is no express bargaining between them.

In simony a temporal advantage is exchanged for something which is spiritual. The temporal advantage may be money and whatever is exchanged for money, or a service rendered, or favour, patronage, and defence. The spiritual object which is given for the temporal advantage is whatever has relation to the salvation of the soul. It may, then, be grace or the gifts of the Holy Ghost, or the sacraments and sacramentals, or prayer, or the use of spiritual power for absolving, dispensing, blessing, excommunicating, and so forth.

Something may be annexed to what is spiritual either antecedently or concomitantly or subsequently. The material of which a chalice is made is said to be annexed to a consecrated chalice antecedently, inasmuch as it existed and had its value before the chalice was consecrated. Something is annexed concomitantly and extrinsically to what is spiritual when it is associated with what is spiritual but only accidentally, as the extra labour associated with singing a late Mass. It is concomitantly and intrinsically annexed to what is spiritual when the connection is necessary, as the labour which must of necessity accompany any spiritual function. A temporal advantage is annexed to what is spiritual consequently, when it follows from and is derived from what is spiritual, as the right ? Acts viii 18. to the revenues of the parish is derived from the office of parish priest. There is no simony in buying or selling what is antecedently annexed to something which is spiritual, provided that the price be not increased on account of the connection with, what is spiritual, and provided the Church has not forbidden it. It is lawful to sell consecrated chalices or the fabric of a church for what the materials are worth. The Church has forbidden any money to be received for the holy oils, even so much as the cost of the oil. Similarly it is not simony to receive payment for extra labour spent on some religious function. It is simony to receive money for what is concomitantly and intrinsically annexed to that which is spiritual, for they are regarded as identical. It is also simony to buy or sell that which is consequently annexed to what is spiritual, for the accessory follows the principal.

Simony is called mental when no express contract is entered into between the parties. It is purely conventional if the contract has been expressly entered into, but has not yet been executed by either party; it is partly conventional when the contract has been executed by one of the parties. Simony is real when the contract has been executed by both parties to it.

Simony which is committed with reference to the presentation and election to benefices, or the resignation or reservation of them, is called confidential simony, in contradistinction to common simony which is committed in other matters.

Furthermore, simony is of divine law when it is against the law of God; it is of ecclesiastical law when it has been constituted by the prohibition of the Church. For, in order to remove all danger of simony against the law of God, the Church forbids certain contractual dealings where spiritual things are exchanged. Thus it is unlawful without due authorization to exchange benefices, which therefore would be simony by ecclesiastical law. Similarly the Church in certain cases forbids the sale of what is antecedently annexed to some spiritual object. It is thus unlawful to take money for the cost of the material in the holy oils, or to sell blessed rosaries or indulgenced crucifixes and other objects of piety. If this is done, simony is committed, and the objects lose all their indulgences.¹

¹ S.C. Indulg., July 12, 1847.

By the first precept are prescribed: devotion, prayer, adoration, sacrifice, oblation, and the worthy handling of the sacraments. We pass over sacrifice and oblation, concerning which in the treatise on the Most Holy Eucharist; likewise the worthy handling of the sacraments, concerning which in the treatises on the different sacraments. Therefore there remain to be treated: devotion, prayer, and adoration.

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 84.)

Adoration is spoken of in three ways, namely: 1. for any veneration whatever shown to someone because of the excellence of dignity, whether he is God, an angel, or a man; 2. for every act of religion, whether internal or external, by which divine worship is shown to God; 3. for a certain distinct act of religion, as it is taken here. And it is an external act by which we show reverence to God through gestures of the body, for example by genuflecting, prostrating ourselves, and the like. But in order that it be a true act of religion, showing due worship to God, an internal act must be joined to it; nevertheless the name of adoration is not given to that internal act except insofar as it is included in the external act (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 84, aa. 1 and 2).

Definition of Devotion.—Devotion is defined as “the will to give oneself readily to those things that pertain to the divine service.” We find an example of it in Exod., xxxv. 21, where it is said that the multitude offered first fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind. One who is devoted to another is strongly attached to that other’s interests, and so one who is devout is zealous for the service of God.

(a) Thus, devotion is an act of the will, that is, an offering of oneself to the service of God, the Last End. But devotion will be found in other acts in so far as they are done under the will’s impulse, such as prayer, adoration, sacrifice. The looks, gestures, and voice of those who pray or take part in services of divine worship are influenced by internal devotion, and so become fitting expressions of honor shown to God and an inspiration to beholders.

(b) Devotion contains a ready willingness, that is, the devout person is quick to choose the divine honor as a purpose, quick also to select and to employ suitable means for this purpose. The great model of this is Our Lord, who declared that His very food was to serve His Father (John, iv. 34).

(c) Devotion is exercised in things that pertain to the divine service, that is, to the worship or honor of God. Thus, he who offers himself to God intending the offering as an act of spiritual union or friendship exercises the virtue of charity, while he who forms the intention of doing good in order to glorify God exercises devotion. But devotion and charity are not separated, for charity inspires devotion and devotion nourishes charity.

Devotion should not be confused with emotion, spiritual consolation, or pious exercises known as devotions.

(a) Thus, emotion or pleasure of a non-religious kind is not devotion, though sometimes mistaken for it when the emotion or pleasure is of an elevating kind and occasioned by religious exercises. Neither esthetic joy (e.g., over the music, the ceremonies, the architecture of the church), nor literary pleasure (e.g. over a sublime passage of Holy Writ or a charming liturgical composition), nor intellectual satisfaction (e.g., over the refinement and culture imparted by religious truths), is necessarily joined with that strong attachment to God and inclination to do His will which is the soul of devotion.

(b) Spiritual consolations are sometimes called devotion, but they are not the same thing as the devotion we now speak of. Substantial devotion with which we are now concerned is in the will and consists in the strong inclination to praise and honor God, whereas accidental devotion is rather in the sensible appetite and consists in a feeling of sweetness or elevation in exercises of piety which sometimes reacts upon the body, as when a devout person weeps for joy at the thought of God. Substantial devotion is essential and should be maintained, even though there is no feeling of attraction or fervor. An example of this is furnished by Our Lord, who prayed earnestly during the agony in the garden and the desolation on the cross. Accidental devotion is not of itself evil, nor useless, and it may be desired and prayed for; but it is dangerous for those persons who are puffed up by it, or who become inordinately attached to it, or who are disposed to mistake it for substantial devotion, for, like the consoling vision of Thabor, it is passing and is not an end in itself.

(c) Devotions are various forms of external cult shown to God, Christ, the Blessed Virgin, the Saints, celebrated shrines, etc., whether of a liturgical or a popular, of a public or a private kind. Examples are the Forty Hours’ Devotion, novenas, consecrated days and months, the use of scapulars, medals, etc., pilgrimages, and the like. All these devotions that have the approval of the Church are good and useful in themselves. But devotees often made a bad use of them, substituting devotions for devotion and the non-essential for the essential, as when religion is made to center in pictures or music or a sentimental attachment for some favorite Saint. Persons who multiply external observances may be without the least degree of real devotion.

External and Internal Cause of Devotion.—The external cause of devotion is God, who by grace bestows the will of serving Him gladly, and therefore the Church prays God to bestow upon us the disposition of piety and devotion, and to increase in us devotion unto salvation. But there is also an internal cause, namely, mental prayer or consideration of divine things, for the will follows on the intellect. Hence, it is impossible to animate external acts of worship with true devotion, unless one practises daily or frequent mental prayer. The subjects of mental prayer that promote devotion are reducible to two:

(a) one should think on one’s own weakness (sins, dangers, temptations, etc.) and one’s need of God, for this serves to remove the impediments to devotion. Those who would be devoted to God must free themselves from presumption and self-confidence in the spirit of the pilgrim going up to the Temple who said; “I will raise my eyes to the mountains from which help cometh to me” (Psalm cxx, 1);

(b) one should think on points that will excite the love of God, such as the thought of His goodness, the memory of His benefits, the mysteries of the life of Christ; for these considerations by inspiring charity will thereby indirectly introduce devotion to God. “It is good for me to cling fast to God and to place my hope in the Lord,” said the Psalmist, after he had thought over the blessings received from Providence (Psalm lxxii. 28).

Prayer.—Prayer can be taken in various senses. (a) Thus, in the widest sense prayer is any act of religion or a holy life. St. Augustine says that a good life is the best of all prayers, and the command of Christ that we pray always has been understood to mean that we should always follow good. (b) In a less wide sense, prayer is the raising of the mind to God, in order to praise, adore, thank Him, etc. The motive of veneration here present distinguishes prayer from mere thoughts about God as when one studies or discusses theological subjects to satisfy curiosity or to impart information.

(c) In its strict sense, prayer is the asking for suitable things from God. By suitable things are meant such as are lawful and becoming, and hence it would not be a prayer, but a mockery, to ask God for help to accomplish sin or for miracles in trivial matters. We are now considering prayer in its strict and less wide senses.

The Psychology of Prayer.—(a) Prayer in its nature is an act of the reason, for it is a conversation or communication with God. It belongs, however, not to the speculative, but to the practical reason, since it is not a mere process of apprehension, judgment or reasoning, but the arrangement and presentation of requests, plans, etc., before God with a view to their acceptance by Him. By prayer, then, we do not understand thinking on God, as in meditation and contemplation (though these are known as mental prayer), but speaking to God.

(b) Prayer in its origin is an act of the will, for the practical reason presents before God only such things as are desired by him who prays. Prayer is the interpreter of desire. Indeed, God may take the will for the request and grant what has not yet been asked: “The Lord heard the desire of the poor” (Ps. ix. 17); “Before they cry I shall hear them” (Is., lxv. 24). Moreover, prayer should spring out of an inclination towards God Himself and a desire for union with Him (Ps. xli. 1. 2; Ps. xxvi. 4).

The Necessity of Prayer.—(a) Prayer is not necessary on God’s account, as though He needed to be informed of our wants, or could not be happy without our homage, or might be induced to change His plans; (b) it is necessary for our own sakes, for, although God could and sometimes does grant favors unasked, He wishes that ordinarily we should have the double benefit of the prayer and of the favor given in answer to the prayer. God could grant the crops of the fields without human cultivation, or even tools and finished articles without human invention or labor, but man would then lose the fruits that belong to labor of mind and body. Prayer is most beneficial, even when unanswered: it attracts man to perform his basic duty of honoring his Creator, to keep in use his spiritual powers, and to exercise the necessary virtues of faith, hope and charity; it gives him the privilege of speaking directly with God and with Christ and of asking for what he desires—an intimacy that must in time correct and elevate man’s whole spiritual life; then prayer is a pouring out of the heart to God the Heavenly Father, and this will afford relief in times of misfortune or peril.

The Duty of Prayer for all Adults.—(a) Prayer is necessary from divine precept, as is declared in many passages of Scripture. Thus, we are commanded to watch and pray (Matt, xxvi. 41), to pray always and not to faint (Luke, xviii. 1), to ask and to knock (Matt., vii. 7 sqq.), to pray without ceasing (I Thess., v. 17), to watch in prayers (I Peter, iv. 7). In the Mass the Lord’s Prayer is prefaced with the words: “Commanded by salutary precepts and admonished by divine instructions, we make bold to say: Our Father, etc.” There is, however, no divine precept of vocal prayer or as to the use of the form of words given by Christ, but one must pray at least mentally and in the manner indicated by Christ.

(b) Prayer is also necessary as a means (see 360), at least generally speaking; not that God could not save man without prayer, but that He has made it an indispensable condition, as is true also of Baptism, without which salvation is not conferred. This is the common opinion and it rests on strong arguments. Thus, there are certain necessary goods (such as perseverance) that cannot be had except through prayer, and there are certain necessary duties (such as the acts of faith, charity, and religion) that are not exercised apart from prayer. Then, there is the teaching of the Church and of the Fathers and Doctors that prayer is needed in order to observe the Commandments (Council of Trent), that no one is assisted who does not pray (Gennadius), that prayer is to the soul what breath is to the body (St. Benedict), that he who prays will certainly be saved, while he who prays not will surely be lost (St. Alphonsus).

Times and Frequency of Prayer.—As to the times and frequency of prayer, in fulfillment of the obligation, there are the same opinions and conclusions as for the acts of faith, hope, and charity (see 929 sqq., 1095-1097, 1593 sqq.). On this point we may conclude as follows:

(a) directly, or by reason of the precept of prayer itself, there is a duty to pray at the beginning of the moral life, frequently during life (whether daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, etc. cannot be precisely determined; but there is no practical difficulty, since those who devoutly hear Mass at the times commanded comply with the duty of prayer), and also in danger of death. At the outset of the moral life the reason and will should turn to God, and this is prayer at least in the widest sense; during life prayer should be frequent and continuous according to the words of Scripture; at the hour of death, prayer is necessary, since we are specially bidden to ask for perseverance till the end;

(b) indirectly, or by reason of some precept distinct from that of prayer, prayer is necessary whenever one needs to have recourse to God to fulfill some command or avoid something prohibited. Thus, one should pray at Mass, for according to church law Mass must be heard devoutly; one should pray when a dangerous temptation assails one, or when there are great calamities, especially of a public character, for according to the precept of charity one must help oneself and others in difficulties.

Practical Corollaries about Prayer with Reference to Confession.—(a) Practical Catholics, that is, those who comply with the precepts of the Church, but who accuse themselves of neglecting morning and evening prayers or grace at meals, cannot be judged guilty of sin, even of venial sin, on account of this neglect; for there is no common precept directly obliging to such prayers. But there may often be a venial sin for other reasons, as when the omission is due to a spirit of lukewarmness, or when indirectly there is a duty to pray at those times for special reasons, such as daily needs or temptations. We do not agree, then, with the opinion that omission of morning and evening prayers, especially when it is habitual, is never sufficient matter for absolution.

(b) Unpractical Catholics, that is, those who have been away from Mass or the Sacraments contrary to the laws of the Church as habitual transgressors, and who say nothing about their neglect of prayer, should be questioned whether in all the years of absence from their duties they have also omitted all prayers. For, if this be the case, they have sinned against the duty of prayer. Morning and evening prayer and grace at table should be earnestly recommended to all, because these are customs that have come down from the earliest times, and also because those who disregard them often come to neglect all prayer, or at least expose themselves to dangers or to the loss of precious graces.

To Whom May Prayer Be Offered?—Only God may be addressed as the Bestower of favors (“The Lord giveth grace and glory,” Ps. lxxxiii. 12), but the Saints may be prayed to as intercessors before God (“The smoke of incense of the prayers of the saints ascended up before God from the hands of the angel,” Apoc., viii. 4). Hence, the Church asks God to have mercy on us; it asks the Saints to pray for us. It is lawful privately to invoke the prayers of an infant who died after baptism, of a soul in Purgatory, and one may ask the prayers of those who are still alive, as St. Paul frequently does in his Epistles. There is no command that we pray to the saints, and hence one who did not pray to them would not be guilty of grave sin per se; but there would be grave sin, if their intercession was neglected on account of contempt, and venial sin, if one failed to call on them (especially on the Blessed Virgin, the Mediatrix of all graces) on account of negligence about one’s own spiritual good.

The Persons for Whom Prayer Is Offered.—There is an obligation of charity to pray for ourselves and also for others, for we should ask for the things that we are obliged to desire (see 2161). This duty is taught in Holy Scripture (e.g., Our Lord prayed for Peter; St. Paul asks for the prayers of his Churches; St. James, in v. 16, admonishes us to pray for one another that we may be saved); also in the creed and liturgy of the Church, for we profess belief in the communion of saints, and offer Masses and suffrages for the living and the dead. One should pray for enemies in common prayers that are offered for all, and in special prayers for them in particular, when there is a special reason, such as their grave necessity or the scandal that would be given if one refused to join in a special prayer for one’s enemy (Matt., v. 44); but one may not pray for the success of the evil projects of an enemy, and one is not obliged to make special prayers for him apart from necessity (see 1151). For the excommunicated one should pray in private prayers and also in public prayers, when this is permitted by the law, as in the services of Good Friday and under certain conditions in Masses (Canon 2262). For sinners prayers should be said, unless they are already lost. The souls in Purgatory are also to be prayed for, although the obligation does not seem grave, since it is not certain as to any particular soul that it is in need of our prayers. As to the blessed, one may pray for their canonization or accidental glory, not for their essential glory, which they already possess.

Things that May Be Prayed for.—(a) Evils.—One may never pray for moral evil, even of the slightest kind, and it would be a grave irreverence to beseech God to become our helper in the commission of sin. As to physical evils, one may not ask them as evils or for their own sake; but it is lawful to pray for them in the larger sense in which they are goods. Thus, for oneself one may ask from God sickness, poverty or death, in so far as these ills are means of correction, improvement, merit, penance, or escape from sin; for an enemy one may ask that God restrain him, even by the use of temporal misfortunes, if this be necessary to keep him from sin.

(b) Indifferent Things.—One may not desire an indifferent thing, if there is no moral purpose to justify it (see 83). Hence, one may not ask God for the gratification of idle wishes (e.g., that one win a game in which the only purpose in gain), but it does not seem that there is grave irreverence in so doing.

(c) Temporal Goods.—These may not be asked for from a primary intention, since we must seek first the kingdom of God and His justice (Matt., vi. 33), which are more important; neither may we ask for any determinate temporal thing unconditionally, since we are uncertain whether it will prove beneficial or harmful. But temporal things may be asked for from a secondary intention (that is, in so far as they are means that assist us to attain spiritual goods) and conditionally (that is, under the proviso that they will prove spiritually beneficial). Thus, the Church prays for protection against storms and disturbances, and asks for good weather, abundant harvests, peace, etc.

(d) Spiritual Goods.—Eternal salvation and the means thereto we should pray for as the principal objects of our desire and should ask for them unconditionally; for God is our true End, and the things that lead to Him cannot be harmful to us. Miracles may be asked for, but it is wrong to beg God for privileges that are reserved for others (e.g., to sit at the right hand of Christ in glory).

The Qualities of Prayer.—(a) As to its manner, prayer is either unaccompanied or accompanied by external acts of worship, such as bodily gestures or speech. But not infrequently the thoughts are voiced in words, and we then have what is known as vocal prayer. Prayer made by a private person for himself or others may be internal; but public prayer that is offered by the ministers of the Church in the name of the Church should be vocal, since it should be manifested to the people for whom it is being offered. But the use of words or other external signs is advantageous even in private prayer, since it excites greater devotion in a person and is a help to attention.

(b) As to persistence, prayer is continuous or interrupted. Prayer should be continuous if there is question of its cause, which is prayerfulness of spirit, or desire of salvation; and in this sense may be understood the words of Scripture that command us to pray always (Luke, xviii. 1; Eph., vi. 18; I Thess., v. 17 ), But if we speak of prayer itself, it is impossible to pray unceasingly in this life, as there are many other things that have to be done and rest is a necessity.

(c) As to quantity, prayers are lengthy or brief. Our Lord rejected the belief of the pagans that the efficacy of prayer depends on many words (Matt, vi. 7), but He did not forbid long prayers, since He often spent nights in prayer. The rule about the length of private prayers is that one should pray for such a space of time as is favorable to devotion, and should cease from prayer as soon as it becomes tedious; similarly, public devotions should not be so lengthened out that those present become wearied and inattentive. The Fathers of the Desert were wont to offer many brief but ardent ejaculatory prayers, fearing that prayer long drawn out would fall away from the fervor of intention with which it began. But, if devotion continues, prayer should not easily be broken off.

The Confidence Requisite for Successful Prayer.—(a) Confidence must exclude doubt or distrust in reference to God or prayer itself: “How shall they call on Him whom they have not believed?” (Rom., X. 14); “Let not that man (that wavereth) think that he shall receive anything of the Lord” (James, i. 6, 7).

(b) Confidence does not exclude doubt about one’s own dispositions (“It is not for our justice that we present our prayers before Thee, but for the multitude of Thy tender mercies”); on the contrary, the prayer of the Pharisee was not heard, because he trusted in himself (Luke, xviii. 9). Neither does confidence in prayer mean that one may ask unconditionally for temporal things (see 2161 c).

Intention and Attention.—Attention is the voluntary application of the mind to that which is done, or the consideration or advertence of the mind given to an act. It differs from intention, which is an act, not of the reason, but of the will, consisting in the purpose to perform an act. Prayer requires both intention and attention.

(a) There must be intention, for prayer in its origin is an act of the will and it pertains to religion only because of the devotion by means of which it is elicited. A man who, while reading aloud from a novel, recites the words of a prayer contained in the novel, does not pray, for his intention is pleasure or instruction, not worship. And even one who says or answers prayers attentively during services does not really pray if his motive is not one of religion. (b) There must be attention, for prayer is of its nature an act of the mind (see 2154). A parrot or a phonograph is not said to pray when it repeats the words of the Our Father or Hail Mary.

The Intention Required in Prayer.—(a) An actual intention is had when one either expressly or implicitly wills to offer a prayer, as when one says internally; “I will now say a prayer,” or when without such express act one deliberately performs that which is a prayer, making internal acts of faith, reciting the Rosary, reading from a prayer-book, etc. This kind of intention is necessary at the beginning of prayer, and is the best that may be had during the course of prayer.

(b) A virtual intention is had when one is occupied in prayer on account of an actual intention previously formed and not retracted, but here and now, on account of human weakness, one is thinking of indifferent things impertinent to the prayer and its purpose. This kind of intention continues unless withdrawn directly by contrary intention or indirectly by the performance of acts inconsistent with prayer. Virtual intention suffices during the course of prayer, for a continuous and uninterrupted actual intention is humanly impossible. The more the mind struggles to keep the thought fixed on one object alone, the more do other thoughts arise to distract, as experience proves.

(c) An habitual intention is had when one is occupied in prayer, not on account of any actual intention previously formed, but on account of a propensity or inclination resulting from previous acts. This is not properly an intention and it does not suffice for prayer, since with it the acts performed do not proceed actually or virtually from any determination of the will. Thus, a person who is asleep or intoxicated is not said to pray when he mechanically repeats well-known words of prayer, for his will has no part in those words, any more than the will of the somnambulist has part in the dangerous walks he takes.

The Attention in Prayer.—(a) By reason of its object, attention is external or internal, according as the mind is taken up only with the externals of prayer (i.e., the exclusion of external acts inconsistent with prayer and the proper bodily posture) or with the things internal to prayer (i.e., the words, sense and purpose of the prayer). Internal attention is called verbal or superficial when it is directed only to the words, as when a person who does not understand the meaning of a prayer says it carefully so as not to mispronounce the words; it is literal, when it is directed only to the sense, as when a person who says a very obscure prayer pays close attention so as to follow its meaning; it is spiritual, when it is directed to the purpose of prayer (i.e., the worship of God by an act of religion), or to the objects of prayer (i.e., eternal salvation or the means thereto, such as grace and the virtues, the mysteries of religion, etc.).

(b) By reason of its subject, attention is either perfect or imperfect. Perfect attention excludes every distracting thought, even such as are involuntary; imperfect attention excludes voluntary but not involuntary distractions.

Acts that Exclude External Attention.—What external actions are inconsistent with external prayer and exclusive of external attention?

(a) Those acts exclude external attention which either from their nature (on account of the great mental application they demand) or from the weakness of a person’s mind (for it is not everyone who can like Julius Caesar think on several things at the same time) make it impossible to have recollection in prayer when those acts are being performed. Acts of this kind are reading about other matters, painting, writing, carrying on conversation with those around, boisterous laughing, etc. But if the one who prays engages in these acts inadvertently (e.g., if a person reciting the Breviary does not notice that he is giving considerable attention to an inscription or advertisement on an adjacent wall), the distraction is merely involuntary and inculpable.

(b) Those acts do not exclude external attention that either not at all or only in slight measure interfere with internal recollection in prayer. Such acts are slow walking, riding, looking about at the scenery, picking a flower now and then, dressing, undressing, bathing, combing the hair, etc, The Church prescribes certain prayers to be said while the priest vests for Mass, and it was an old rule among the monks to join labor and prayer.

When External Attention Is Sufficient.—Is external attention sufficient in prayer when internal attention is voluntarily excluded?

(a) In public prayers external attention is sufficient as to a number of effects. Thus, in the administration of the Sacraments the want of internal attention in the minister does not make the Sacrament invalid, since the Sacraments produce grace ex opere operato; in public suffrages the indevotion and distraction of the priest do not deprive the beneficiary of the impetratory fruit, since the public prayers are offered in the name of the Church itself; in the Divine Office merely external attention suffices to fulfill the positive obligation, according to many, because it is not certain that the Church requires more.

(b) In all prayers mere external attention is insufficient for the personal effects of impetration, merit and satisfaction. For to pray with willful indevotion is not an act deserving of remission, reward and a favorable answer, but rather of punishment (“Before prayer prepare thy soul and be not as a man that tempteth God,” Eeclus., xviii. 23); it is disrespectful to God and therefore cannot claim the benefits of an act of worship.

The Kind of Internal Attention Required in Prayer.—(a) The minimum that suffices for the personal benefits of merit and impetration is the verbal or the literal attention, and the imperfect attention that is mixed with some unwilled distractions or mind wanderings. Indeed, a person who intends to pray well, but whose whole prayer is a continual distraction in spite of his efforts to be recollected, does not lose, but rather by reason of his good will and effort increases, his merit. But for spiritual refreshment there must be freedom from distraction; for, just as a student gets no mental nourishment from a lesson if his mind is many miles away, and a listener gets no instruction from a discourse spoken in a foreign language (I Cor., xiv. 4), so one who prays with an absent mind loses the devotion and joy that are afforded by actual communion with heavenly thoughts.

(b) The maximum that should be aimed at in prayer for the greater blessing it brings is the spiritual attention fixed on the presence of God and the perfect attention that keeps away as far as possible the interruption from any vain, perverse or extraneous thoughts.

Distractions.—Just as certain external acts exclude external attention, so also certain internal states exclude internal attention. These latter are known as distractions, and may be defined as internal acts or omissions opposed to the nature or purpose of prayer, but performed during prayer.

(a) Distractions are either acts or omissions. Thus, a person who slumbers lightly or is partly asleep during prayer is inattentive or wanting by omission; while the person who thinks out plots for stories or plays during prayer time is distracted or wanting by commission.

(b) Distractions are sometimes opposed to the nature of prayer. To the nature of vocal prayer belong the words and the sense, and hence, even though one is rapt in meditation, there is no vocal prayer if words are mispronounced or left out or so changed or transposed as to make nonsense or no sense, though negligence about a word here and there does not necessarily exclude superficial attention. Those who from long familiarity with forms of prayer are able to repeat them automatically, with no thought about the words or their meaning, direct or mystical, are not distracted if their thoughts are on the motive of prayer. But it would not be fitting to observe no order in these matters, for example, to dwell always on the glorious mysteries during passiontide prayer and on the sorrowful mysteries during paschal prayers.

(c) Distractions are sometimes opposed to the purpose of prayer. The purpose of prayer itself is the union of the mind with God, while the purpose of the one who prays is the special good to which he directs his prayer. Union with God is necessary above all in prayer, and though it need not be expressly thought on, as was said above (2169), yet there must be no thought in the mind contrary to it. Thoughts, desires and imaginations are contrary to the end of prayer when they are not means to that end (e.g., sinful thoughts, idle thoughts, thoughts on lawful occupations or affections that have nothing to do with the prayer), or when they are means to that end but are perverted to a purely natural use (e.g., when verbal attention is made an exercise in voice culture, or literal attention a grammatical study, or attention to the purpose of prayer means that one is speculating on foolish questions about divinity or thinking on the money, food, or clothing, for which one is praying as if they were the ends of prayer). Scrupulous persons make attention itself a distraction, for they worry all during prayer lest their thoughts be wandering, and so they are thinking about themselves rather than about the words, meaning or purpose of prayer.

(d) Distractions occur during prayer. Hence, an interruption is not a distraction, as when one who is praying is called to attend to some business or leaves off prayer for the moment to make a note of some important thought that came to mind. Neither is the breaking off of prayer a distraction, as when one starts to pray but feels so distracted or unwell as to give over for the time being the attempt to pray.

Voluntary and Involuntary Distractions.—(a) Voluntary distractions result in the first place from purpose, as when one who is praying deliberately dozes at intervals when he feels drowsy, or deliberately turns over in his mind the points of an address he intends to give; they result in the second place from negligence, as when the person who is praying does not expressly wish to be inattentive, but hurries through his words with no pains to keep his thoughts on what he is doing or why he is doing it. Those who rarely speak or read about divine things, but give themselves much to foolish reading or talk, prepare for themselves many distractions, unless they counteract this by special aids to recollection, such as pictures or prayer books.

(b) Involuntary distractions are those that result neither from purpose nor from carelessness, but from human weakness. Thus, a person who is troubled with scruples or with a severe headache or nervous strain, who is worn out bodily or much worried mentally, or who is surrounded by noise or disturbance, is often physically unable to concentrate his mind for any length of time, no matter how much he may desire to do so. Indeed, St. Thomas says that it is hardly possible for anyone to say an Our Father without some distraction, and many persons are distracted against their will by every slight sound or movement that falls under their notice.

Sinfulness of Distraction in Prayer.—(a) Involuntary distractions are not sinful, since one is not bound to the impossible. Hence, a penitent who has nothing except these distractions to confess may not be absolved, since there is no matter for absolution in his confession.

(b) Voluntary distractions are sinful, since, though one is free to address God at any time, one is bound to do this in a respectful manner and in spirit and in truth, as God requires. Communion with God is by means of the mind, and it is disrespectful to turn the mind away to other things when the communion has been sought. Besides, lip service is displeasing to God, just as burnt offerings were not acceptable when made without love. But the sin is of its nature only venial; for the intention to pray, together with the essential moral goodness of the act, is retained, and the defect consists in the circumstance that the intention is executed remissly (see 78).

When is voluntary distraction a grave and when a venial sin? (a) It is a venial sin when one says a non-obligatory prayer, even with the express will to be inattentive, and also when one says an obligatory prayer (such as the Divine Office) with distractions due to carelessness, but without abandonment of the intention to pray. (b) It is a mortal sin when one indulges in distractions from contempt, and also when one says an obligatory prayer with distractions that last during a notable part of the prayer and that are deliberately entertained.

Distractions during Divine Office are the absence of the attention which the Church requires under grave sin for satisfaction of the canonical obligation. There are two opinions about the kind of distractions that make recitation insufficient and gravely sinful.

(a) According to the older opinion, internal attention is required, but it seems that generally those who maintain this view do not hold that internal distractions alone deprive the Office of its sufficiency. Thus, they state that one who has had voluntary distractions may consider that he has fulfilled his duty, unless he is certain that he also adverted to his state of distraction and did nothing to end it.

(b) According to the opinion of many modern authors, external attention suffices. Hence, in this view mortal sin is incurred by notable defect in external, but not in internal attention.

Superstition.—Superstition is false religion, or a vice that offers improper worship to the true God or divine worship to a false god. Improper worship of the true God is either false or superfluous.

(a) False worship is opposed to the truth of religion (e.g., Old Testament rites which signify that Christ is still to come), or of rites (e.g., Mass by a layman, Mass according to a form disapproved by the Church), or of facts (e.g., fictitious revelations, ecstasies, mysticism, miracles, relies), or of morals (e.g., human sacrifice, praises of God to the accompaniment of lascivious words or music, etc.).

(b) Superfluous worship is offered when an external observance in no way serves the purposes of religion (viz., the glory of God, the elevation of the soul to Him, the repression of the passions), or is opposed to law or common custom. The purposes of religion are not served by actions foolish in themselves (e.g., the repeated mumbling of meaningless sounds) or in their intent (e.g., undue emphasis given to minor details of a religious act, such as color of the candles on the altar, the stature of the celebrant, the hour or condition of the weather, etc., as if weighty consequences depended on them). The chain prayer is another example of a superstition that places all the virtue of an act of worship in some small external circumstance. The law and custom are not followed in such superstitions as additional crosses, alleluias, credos, etc., made in violation of Mass rubrics, or a devotion consisting of fasts on Sundays, or new forms of piety that lack ecclesiastical approval. There is no superstition, however, in modes of worship approved by the Church (such as novenas, tridua, Gregorian Masses, and the like), for the Church recognizes no devotion or ceremony unless it is true and useful as an expression of religion.

The Sinfulness of Improper Worship of God.—(a) False worship is from its nature a grave sin; it is seriously insulting to God because it offers Him dishonor as honor, and it is also seriously harmful to man because it casts discredit by its falsity on the name of religion. (b) Superfluous worship is from its nature a venial sin, since it contains no notable irreverence towards God and, being outlawed, does not reflect on religion. Accidentally, however, it may be a mortal sin, as when it is performed in such a way as to cause great scandal.

Worship of False Deity.—Worship of a false deity is performed by offering a creature an act of homage due to God alone. Hence, there are three species of this superstition: (a) a creature is recognized as God, when it is offered a service (such as sacrifice) that testifies to supreme and infinite excellence (idolatry); (b) a creature is given the credit of divine knowledge, when instruction about hidden matters which only God could bestow is asked from it (divination), (c) a creature is treated as the supreme ruler, when assistance which only God can grant is sought from it (vain observance).

Definition of Idolatry.—Idolatry is the supreme worship of latria offered to a creature.

(a) It is supreme worship, and hence the inferior reverence of hyperdulia, dulia, or civil honor, offered respectively to the Blessed Mother, angels, saints, superiors, etc., is not idolatry. The external signs of worship that belong to God alone (such as sacrifice, temples, priesthood, altars, etc.), may never be used in the veneration of creatures; nor the signs that are common to God and creatures (such as genuflexions, prostrations, prayers, etc.), if the intention is to adore.

(b) Idolatry is offered, that is, by it an act of worship is intended or is at least performed in a serious manner. Hence, it would not be idolatry so to enact a pagan ceremony that the onlookers could understand that no religious rite was being performed (e.g., if it were done on the stage, or in a joking manner).

(c) Idolatry is offered to a creature, and hence the relative honor that is shown the images of the Trinity or of Christ on account of the persons represented by them is not idolatry. The creature to whom idolatry is shown is either a person (e.g., an Angel, the soul of a departed person, a living human being), or an irrational creature (e.g., the bull Apis, a sacred plant), or an inanimate substance (e.g., statues or pictures, the elements, the heavenly bodies), or a fictitious being (e.g., Jupiter and the other gods of mythology).

The Kinds of Idolatry.—(a) Idolatry is either internal or external. Internal idolatry has the intention to adore a creature, as when a Satanist offers sacrifice to demons. External idolatry performs an outward rite that signifies adoration of a creature, although there is no will to give adoration, as when a Christian out of fear of death reluctantly burns incense before an idol. (b) Internal idolatry is either perfect or imperfect. Perfect idolatry includes belief in a false god, as when an ignorant pagan prays to the sun and moon. Imperfect idolatry is committed when, without belief in a false god, there is the will to offer it divine worship on account of hatred of God, wish to obtain favors from demons, or the like.

The Sinfulness of Idolatry.—(a) Idolatry is a most grievous crime. It entails rebellion against the majesty of God, attack on the virtue of religion, unbelief or denial of faith, and scandal; and hence it is forbidden in the first commandment: “Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me. Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them” (Exod., xx. 3 sqq.).

(b) Idolatry in itself and in its highest degree is the most grievous of sins, for it includes both hatred of God (since it would deprive Him of His unique excellence by giving His honors to creatures) and blasphemous unbelief (since the idolater publicly professes that God is not above all). Now, it was said above that unbelief, hatred of God and blasphemy are the most enormous of sins (see 820, 895, 1301, 1302), and so it follows that the worst form of idolatry is graver than other sins.

(c) Idolatry, by reason of the dispositions of the person who commits it, may be less grievous than other sins. Thus, it is worse to hate or deny God internally than to worship an idol externally only; it is worse to blaspheme with great hatred and contempt than to practise idolatry with less malice. Imperfection of the act, as in cases of ignorance or want of consent, makes the sin venial, or no formal sin at all.

Comparison of Different Sins of Idolatry.—(a) Internal idolatry is worse than external idolatry, because the former, though not the latter, includes approval of the superstition committed. (b) Imperfect idolatry is worse than perfect idolatry, if both be considered precisely as idolatry, since the former proceeds from malice, and the latter from greater or less ignorance. (c) External idolatry is aggravated when its motive is more sinful or makes the act more voluntary (e.g., it is worse to pretend sacrifice to an idol if the motive is to ingratiate oneself with the idolaters or to spite the Christians, than if the motive is to escape death at the hands of the pagans).

Idolatry Possible in Christian Worship.—The guilt of idolatry may be incurred even by Christians offering worship to God. (a) Thus, in the adoration of the Eucharist there would be idolatry, at least material, if an unconsecrated host were exposed for veneration or given in communion. (b) In the veneration of the Saints there would be idolatry, if they were honored or invoked as if they possessed divine attributes.

Definition of Divination.—Divination (soothsaying, fortune-telling) is a form of superstition in which the evil spirits are invoked explicitly or implicitly with a view to the discovery of what is future or occult.

(a) It is a form of superstition, because it seeks to obtain through natural means knowledge that cannot be had except from God, or substitutes other teachers for God.

(b) It contains the invocation of evil spirits, for the information sought surpasses the powers of nature and, being illicit, cannot be expected from supernatural powers that are good (such as God, the Angels, the Saints).

(c) The invocation is explicit or implicit. There is explicit calling on the evil spirits when one prays to the demon or makes an agreement with him; there is implicit invocation when one does not address an evil spirit, but does employ means for the discovery of knowledge which are not adequate, either from their nature or from the will of God, for the desired effect.

(d) The knowledge desired is of future or occult things, that is, of such things as cannot be foreseen in their causes or discovered by natural means (such as the future acts of free beings, the secret thoughts of the heart).

Distinction between the Fact and Sin of Divination.—(a) The fact of divination—that is, the actual manifestation by evil spirits of things humanly unknowable—is not impossible, since the demons are far superior to man in intelligence and knowledge, and it is the teaching of revelation that they use their powers to mislead and seduce mankind. Their knowledge, however, does not extend to future contingencies, nor to the secrets of hearts, and their word cannot be relied on. A case of real communication by an evil spirit is that of the girl of Philippi possessed by a pythonical spirit (Acts, xiv. 16-18), and some think that the same can be said of the Witch of Endor (I Kings, xxvii. 7-25); but no doubt there have been many instances of divination in which the intervention of demons was only imaginary.

(b) The sin of divination is committed when one has the will to receive occult knowledge from forbidden sources, or uses the means to obtain knowledge from those sources, even though there be no communication or response on the part of the spirits of evil.

Forms of Explicit Invocation.—Divination in which there is explicit invocation of the demon is of various kinds according to the medium through which instruction is given or expected.

(a) Thus, the medium is direct if it is an external sensible appearance representing the demon (praestigium) or an internal picture in the imagination or a dream containing his answer (oneiromancy).

(b) The medium is indirect and rational when it is a human being, dead or living. Divination through the evocation of the departed is known as necromancy, while that which is given through living possessed persons is called pythonism. Modern Spiritism partakes of the character of both necromancy (since the spirits of the departed are consulted) and pythonism (since persons supposed to be under the control of familiar spirits act as mediums).

(c) The medium is indirect and irrational when it is some solid body (such as iron, stone or crystal) in which figures or signs appear; idols from which oracles are received; tables or ouija boards from which answers are given by raps or writing; divining rods supposed to lead the way to any hidden person or thing, etc. (geomancy); or some liquid body (hydromancy), or air (aeromancy), or fire (pyromancy), or the entrails of sacrificial victims or natural prodigies, such as lightning (haruspicy). Here also may be mentioned the superstition of ordeal by fire, boiling water, combat, etc., once used to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused person.

Forms of Implicit Invocation.—Divination in which there is only implicit invocation of evil spirits is manifold, just as the natural causes from which preternatural knowledge is expected are manifold. Among the principal forms are the following:

(a) that which is made from the human mind, when clairvoyance or clair-audience is employed. It is supposed that certain persons have the natural gift, at least when in a trance or hypnotic state, of perceiving what is done or said at a distance without any of the normal means of communication, and even of reading minds. This supposed inborn gift is sometimes called second sight or telepathy. Some authorities hold that there is sufficient evidence for vision at a distance as a sixth sense in certain individuals, especially among primitive peoples and persons bound by a tie of blood or intimate friendship. Moreover, many facts learned through telepathy seem to have been verified sufficiently to render telepathy probable. Accordingly, to believe telepathy or to practice it, excluding all superstition and invocation of demons, is not illicit.

(b) divination that is made from the human body in physiognomy, phrenology, and chiromancy. The physiognomist pretends that he is able to discover the hidden character, latent abilities or defects, secret thoughts, etc., by a study of the features or expression of the countenance. The phrenologist claims that he can read the mental and moral traits of a person from the bumps or prominences of the skull. The chiromantist, or palmist, promises to foretell the future, read the past, discover the present secret character and aptitudes of an individual from an inspection of the shape, lines and configuration of his hand and of the character of the lines and marks of his palms;

(c) divination that is made from non-human and necessary events in astrology. This pseudo-science gives predictions about the fortunes of an individual drawn from a study of his horoscope (i.e., the aspect of the heavenly bodies at the moment of his birth) and of certain rules of interpretation;

(d) divination that is made from non-human and contingent events in augury and auspice, which divine from the voices or manner of flight of birds; in omen or portent, which divine the future from some chance happening (such as meeting with a red-haired woman or a hunchback, a sneeze, etc.), in sortilege, which divines by lots or signs arbitrarily chosen (such as the letters that appear on opening a book at random, the numbers or figures that appear when cards are drawn or dice thrown). Superstitions about omens are of two kinds, some happenings being regarded as signs of good luck (e.g., to find a pin), others as signs of bad luck (e.g., to meet a black cat, to spill the salt, to break a mirror, to raise an umbrella in the house).

The Malice of the Sin of Divination.—(a) The Theological Species.—If there is explicit invocation of evil spirits, divination is of its nature a mortal sin that admits of no lightness of matter, for it gives divine worship to a creature, acts on friendly terms with the enemy of God, and prepares one for apostasy and eternal damnation. If there is no explicit invocation of the spirits of evil, the sin is of its nature mortal on account of the implicit commerce with the devil; but generally the sin will be light on account of the dispositions of the offender (e.g., because he is ignorant, or consults divination as a joke or from curiosity, or has no faith in it). Hence, the faithful should be warned not to go to fortune-tellers or put faith in dreams, but, apart from such cases as serious scandal, habitual direction of one’s life by superstition, cooperation in serious sin of a diviner, etc., the sin will usually be venial, at least in young people. Persons who occasionally act or omit to act in some indifferent matter on account of dreams they have had are often excused from all sin on account of the fear or hope which the dreams excited.

(b) The Moral Species.—All forms of divination, it is commonly held, belong to the same species of worship of a false god (Deut., xviii. 10-12). Yet, the confessor should be told about an explicit pact with evil spirits, if there was one, since thus he will be able to decide the gravity of the sin and to make inquiries about other sins that usually accompany such a pact (e.g., blasphemy, promise to serve the devil, sacrileges, etc.).

When Knowledge Is Obtained from God.—There is no sin of divination when knowledge is obtained from God.

(a) Thus, God can communicate directly in a vision or dream, and there are examples of this in Scripture, But generally one should not be guided by dreams as if they were means for supernatural knowledge, since nearly all dreams are produced by natural causes. It is not sinful to believe that a dream of an extraordinary kind (e.g., one in which the future is wonderfully foretold or a warning given, or which produces great spiritual good) was sent by God.

(b) God can communicate through other human beings, and hence it is not superstitious to put faith in the private visions or revelations that have been recognized by the Church, or that have the marks of genuineness required by the Church.

(c) God has sometimes communicated through the instrumentality of irrational beings or by means of portents. Thus, Gedeon took the words of enemy soldiers as a premonition of victory (Judges, vii. 15); Eliezer chose a sign by which to recognize the woman who should be the wife of Isaac (Gen, xxiv. 14); the ordeal of bitter waters was prescribed in Numbers, v. 11 sqq.; Josue discovered the guilt of Achan by lots (Josue, vii. 14), and St. Matthias was elected to the Apostolate by lots (Acts, i. 23-26). But these were exceptional cases in which men were inspired to consult God as they did, and it would be superstitious to seek knowledge in these ways against the will of God. Those who desire light and guidance should have recourse to the teachers God has provided on earth and should pray to God, leaving to Him the ways and means of His answer. Hence, the Church has declared it unlawful, even in private, to call upon the good spirits to give answers through automatic writing (Collect. de Prop. Fide, 1894), or to interrogate the dead at spiritistic seances (AAS, 1917, IX, 268). It is not superstitious, however, in a grave matter when there is no ordinary means of instruction at hand, to offer a prayer to God and then have recourse to lots to decide what course shall be followed (Prov., xvi. 33).

When Knowledge Is Obtained Through Natural Causes.—There is no sin of divination when knowledge of the future or of hidden things is obtained through proportionate natural causes or indications.

(a) Thus, knowledge of future happenings is naturally deducible from their necessary causes, when these causes are known. The effect may be predicted with certainty if the cause is so determined to one course that its result is invariable (e.g., the revolution of the earth around the sun always brings on the four seasons of the year); it may be predicted with the greatest probability if the cause is so constituted that almost always it has a certain consequence (e.g., a seed properly planted usually grows into a tree). Hence, there is no superstition in astronomical predictions, weather forecasts by meteorologists, tables of life expectancy drawn up by insurance experts, etc., since these are inferences from known scientific laws.

(b) Knowledge of hidden things is naturally deducible with more or less certainty from the presence of their known causes, or effects, or indications. Hence, a physician is not accused of superstition if he reasons out the character or phase of an internal disease from the symptoms that exhibit themselves. Moralists today generally agree that the use of the magic wand (divining rod, dipping rod, dowser) for the discovery of subterranean springs, mineral deposits, oil wells, etc., is not superstitious, although there is some difference of opinion and uncertainty about the cause of the phenomenon. It is true that many means of detection or discovery, supposedly scientific, are due to misunderstanding of scientific principles or of logic; but their authors, since they rely on natural causes, are guilty of ignorance or quackery rather than superstition.

What is the first precept of the Decalogue? - The first precept of the Decalogue is: I am the Lord thy God... Thou shalt not have strange gods. Exod. 20:2, 3. - This precept, as affirmative, prescribes first of all acts of the virtue of religion; as negative, it prohibits vices opposed to religion. But religion is the moral virtue which exhibits due worship to God as the first principle of all things. Hence after the theological virtues it obtains the first place, and accordingly the sins opposed to it are most grave and mortal from their genus. Worship imports honor and reverence. Worship generally, besides honor, or the external signification of excellence, imports submission to the person who is worshiped. Therefore honor comprehends worship, yet honor conversely does not involve worship, "because reverence and worship add above honoring a testification of internal submission." Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 14, s. 1, n. 3. Therefore worship owed to God includes service. "But by the same act man serves God and worships him; for worship regards the excellence of God, to whom reverence is owed; but service regards the subjection of man, who from his condition is obliged to exhibit reverence to God. And to these two things pertain all acts which are attributed to religion, because through all of them man professes the divine excellence and his own subjection to God, either by exhibiting something to him, or also by assuming something divine." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 81, a. 3 ad 2.

Some acts of religion are internal, others external. St. Thomas posits two internal acts: devotion and prayer. He makes the remaining external acts: adoration, sacrifice, offering of first-fruits and gifts, offering of tithes, vow, oath, adjuration, praise; to these below he joins the sanctification of feasts and the use of the sacraments, insofar as through this we profess God to be the author of grace, by which he affects our mind and soul so that he may subject them more and more to himself. Besides, absolutely all sacred observances and ceremonies ordained by the Church to the worship of God can be added, such as the erection of churches and altars, the use of things blessed by the Church, etc., which from the motive of religion are determined and prescribed by the Church.

But the acts opposed to religion are some such by excess, as superstition with its species, others by defect, as irreligiosity with its species. To superstition pertain idolatry, divination, vain observance; to irreligiosity, temptation of God, perjury, infidelity in promises, blasphemy, sacrilege, simony. In the present treatise we will speak only of those acts of religion and opposed sins which regard this first precept of the Decalogue; concerning the remaining things there will be speech in the two following precepts and in other proper places. For the first three precepts concern acts of religion; and in this first precept of the law the worship of God, the one true God, is commanded, and the worship of false gods is excluded; and besides idolatry, all other superstitions are excluded; consequently also dishonoring God is excluded. Cf. 465. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 81 seqq.; q. 122, aa. 1, 2; 1. 2. q. 100, aa. 4-8; L. init.; Struggl 8, 9; tr. 5, q. 1, nn. 4, 5, 6; Lessius, de Virt. relig., c. 1, dd. 1, 2.

What is devotion, and is it necessary? - Devotion is a certain will of promptly handing oneself over to those things which pertain to the service of God. Therefore devotion imports a certain special act of the will, namely of handing oneself over to God's service, and a certain special quality of this act, namely the aforesaid promptness. But there is a distinction between the handing over of self which is had through charity, and the handing over of self which is had through devotion. For through charity man hands himself over immediately to God, adhering to him through a certain union of spirit. But through religion man hands himself over immediately to works of divine worship. The object of charity and love is good; but the object of honor or reverence is something excellent. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 81, a. 4 ad 3; q. 82; q. 83, a. 15 c.

But devotion is altogether necessary, for it is impossible to execute those things which pertain to divine worship or service, which properly pertains to religion, without a prompt will of doing them. Whence, since it pertains to the same virtue to will to do something and to have a prompt will for doing it, devotion pertains to religion, and its first act is necessary for all following acts. Therefore devotion is a certain special act of religion by which someone promptly offers and hands himself over to divine worship; and at the same time it is a universal act insofar as it moves toward all acts of the service of God. But devotion can also be taken for habitual addiction to divine worship, in which sense a man is said to be truly devout. Likewise devotion can be taken not for the act, but for the quality of the act, namely for the very promptness and fervor by which devotion is manifested. And in this sense prayer is called devout. The aforesaid promptness consists in a determined and absolute affection which conquers every difficulty, so that the will is not delayed in the execution of divine worship when the occasion offers itself; but fervor is the intensity and vehemence of pious affection in divine worship. Devotion also signifies the whole pious manner of acting, and thus a life is called devout. And peculiar pious exercises are called devout exercises, in which sense there is often speech about this or that devotion, about these or those devout exercises, which are the matter of devotion, namely about which devotion is concerned. The extrinsic and principal cause of devotion is God; the intrinsic cause disposing us to it is meditation on divine goodness and divine benefits and at the same time consideration of our infirmity and need. Spiritual joy, gladness, sweetness, facility follow devotion per se. Whence devotion is also taken for this spiritual sweetness. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 82, aa. 3, 4; Lessius, de virt. relig., c. 2, d. 1.

What is prayer, and how many kinds are there? Prayer is taken here insofar as it signifies a certain deprecation or petition, according as Augustine says that prayer is a certain petition, and Damascene says that prayer is the petition of fitting things from God. Therefore prayer can be defined: a certain, as it were, conversation of our mind with God, in which we make known to him the desire of obtaining some thing. - Prayer is mental or vocal, according as it is carried out by mind alone, or the concepts of the mind are also expressed by the mouth. It is private or public, according as it is done by a private person and in a private name, or by the community, or by a minister of the Church in the name of the Church, in the mode prescribed by her. To this public prayer chiefly pertain the Mass and the canonical hours, concerning which we will speak specifically where there will be speech about the sacraments and about particular precepts. "Common prayer is that which is offered to God through the ministers of the Church in the person of the whole faithful people; and therefore it is necessary that such prayer become known to the whole people for whom it is uttered, which could not happen unless it were vocal. And therefore it has reasonably been instituted that ministers of the Church also pronounce prayers of this sort in a loud voice, so that they can come to the knowledge of all. But singular prayer is that which is offered by a singular person, of anyone praying either for himself or for others; and concerning the necessity of prayer of this sort, it is not necessary that it be vocal." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 83, a. 12.

Concerning public prayers, two things generally are to be attended to from Benedict XIV: 1. that these prayers and their formulas are not to be indicated and designated by private persons, but by Ecclesiastical authority, C. Quemadmodum, 23 Mar. 1743. 2. that in sacred rites no others are to be used except those which have been received by the Church, C. Inter omnigenas, 2 Feb. 1774, § 8. - Struggl 21; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 83; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 4, l. 1, c. 3 seqq.; Bouquillon, de Virt. relig., l. 2, p. 1; E. M. Therefore public prayers have their chief value from the dignity and sanctity of the Church, which principally prays, but not from the sanctity and dignity of the persons through whom the Church prays. Lugo, de Euch., d. 19, nn. 124, 125. And in this prayer a threefold fruit can be distinguished: general, which by the intention of the Church is applied to all the faithful; particular, which is applied to the one praying himself; and special or middle, which is applied to him for whom the one praying specially intends to pray. Private and public prayer can be taken in another way, according as it is not exhibited before others, or only before a few; or, on the contrary, as it is exhibited openly and manifestly before fairly many others. And in both senses worship generally can also be taken as private and public.

Is there a precept of prayer? - R. Affirmative. It is proved: 1. because very frequently in Sacred Scripture, both by Christ and by the Apostles, prayer is commanded as necessary for salvation. 2. Because, on God's part, God ordinarily is accustomed to bestow his graces upon us, if you except a few, for example, the beginning of faith, only under this condition, that we ask for them by prayer; therefore it is read: You have not, because you ask not.

Jas. 4:2. And Augustine on Ps. 39: "God wishes to give, but he does not give except to one asking." Ordinarily, since again and again God from his infinite mercy also confers his graces upon those who do not ask. And in this sense more probably and commonly they teach that prayer is necessary for adults also by necessity of means for salvation. For that can truly be said to be of necessity of means without which, considering the ordinary divine order of providence, salvation ordinarily cannot be obtained. Trid. sess. 6, c. 11. But on man's part, his need is supreme, so that each one by full right ought to cry out with the Prophet: Deliver me, because I am needy and poor. Ps. 108:21, 22. Therefore the Angelic Doctor says: "Every man is bound to prayer for procuring spiritual goods, which are not given except divinely; whence they cannot be procured in another way, unless they are asked from him." In 4, D. 15, q. 4, a. 1^†; 3 p., q. 39, a. 5; L. init.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 2; Struggl 22-24; E. M.

When does the aforesaid precept bind? - The precept of prayer binds frequently. It is proved. For it is the precept of Christ and of the Apostles that we always, at every time, without intermission pray; these words do not prove that one must pray at each physical moment, which would be impossible, but that one must pray frequently, at a suitable time. Luke 18:1; 1 Thess. 5:17. Moreover this precept obliges per se: 1. when a man obtains the use of reason; for then he is bound to turn himself to God, and to acknowledge him as the fountain of all goods and to subject himself to the supreme Lord of all things, for which prayer serves wondrously. S. Th. 1. 2, q. 89, a. 9. 2. at the time of death; for then final perseverance is especially necessary, and prayer is necessary for obtaining it. "Since it is established," Augustine says, "that God has prepared some things to be given even to those not praying, as the beginning of faith; others not except to those praying, as perseverance unto the end; surely he who thinks that he has this from himself does not pray that he may have it." Lib. de Don. Persev., c. 16, n. 39. 3. "At certain intervals of hours and times," as the same Augustine says, Ep. 130. Moreover some teach that one must pray under grave obligation at least once a year; others every six months; others nearly every month; others absolutely every month, in nearly the same manner as the precept of faith, hope, and charity is to be observed. But it obliges per accidens: 1. whenever some precept presses which cannot be fulfilled without prayer; for he who is bound to the end is also bound to the means. 2. When a grave temptation presses which cannot be repelled in another way. 3. Generally, whenever some special divine assistance seems necessary to us, as in some grave calamity, whether private or public.

For laymen and for simple clerics no precept is given for performing certain prayers. But for clerics constituted in sacred orders, for beneficiaries, and for religious destined for choir, there is present the precept of the Church of reciting the canonical hours. He who omits morning or evening prayers, per se, does not sin, if he omits them only sometimes. The reason is that there is no law which commands determined prayers on single days and at fixed hours. Yet the doctors warn that some fault of negligence and sloth is rarely absent. Moreover, in practice those cannot be excused altogether from some fault who omit them rather often, both because perhaps they scarcely pray at another time or in another way, and thus at some point they will fail in the precept of prayer, and because on account of the dangers which occur daily, prayer being neglected, they will fall into many sins. Roman Catechism, p. 4, c. 1; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 2; L. init.; Lessius, de Virt. rel., c. 2, d. 2, 3; E. M.

What are the conditions of prayer? - In order that prayer be made legitimately, it ought to be made with attention, humility, confidence, and perseverance. The first part is proved. Prayer is an act of the worship of God, and exterior worship cannot exist without interior worship. Therefore attention at least concomitant with the first intention is required on the part of the very nature of prayer. But he who is voluntarily distracted in mind, in the act by which he prays, incurs that rebuke of God: This people honors me with their lips, but their heart is far from me. Matt. 15:8. How indeed does he demand to be heard who does not hear himself? But per se he sins venially who without a just reason is voluntarily distracted; and this holds even if prayer is made without obligation, because he inflicts some irreverence upon God. The second part is proved. Humility is necessary on the part of the very petitioner, because he recognizes his need. It is written: He has regarded the prayer of the humble, and has not despised their petition... The prayer of him who humbles himself will pierce the clouds. Ps. 101:18; Ecclus. 35:21. The third part is proved. Faith is necessary on the part of God, whom we pray; namely, that we believe that we can obtain from him what we ask, by reason of the divine omnipotence and mercy, from which prayer obtains what it asks. All things whatsoever you ask when praying, believe that you shall receive them. Mark 11:24; Jas. 1:6. The fourth part is proved. Perseverance is required on the part of the effect of obtaining; for as need is shown more by it, so one is moved more to mercy. Yet prayer has the efficacy of obtaining from the grace of God, whom we pray, who also induces us to pray. But it ought to be persevering, as to the desire of praying, continuously; and as to prayer itself, by not interrupting it at appointed times. "Some things are not denied, but are delayed so that they may be given at a fitting time. Yet this can be impeded if they do not persevere in asking." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 15. Be instant in prayer, watching in it. Col. 4:2; Luke 11:8.

Does one pray who pronounces the words correctly and outwardly devoutly, if he voluntarily wanders in mind? Certainly; otherwise neither would he pray who wanders unwillingly, concerning which no one doubts; then, because prayer is petition, and only words and intention are necessary for petition. Therefore attention in the first intention suffices. As to outward devotion, external attention is had if one attends to pronouncing the words correctly, and is not occupied with a thing which cannot coexist with prayer, as if someone were listening to the conversation of others; not likewise if he clothes himself. Attention to God or to the sense of the words is internal attention. In vocal prayer the words are to be pronounced duly and correctly, not by syncopating or mutilating them, nor by corrupting their meaning, and they are to be pronounced so that, unless something obstructs, noise, deafness, one can hear himself. One can use a companion, and then it is necessary to hear him, namely, so that he communicates to him and makes his own what he hears from the companion, and thus the whole will be his, because hearing is in place of pronouncing. In order that prayer be profitable, the state of grace is not absolutely necessary. Therefore prayer also profits a sinner asking for things necessary to salvation. Struggl 27 seqq.; Elbel 419; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, aa. 13-16; Quodl. 3, aa. 8, 9; L. 1. 4, n. 176; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 4, l. 3, c. 4; E. M.

Whom besides God can we pray? - The Blessed Virgin Mary, as our mediatrix; the Angels, as guardians of men; all the Saints and friends of God, as our intercessors before God. Baptized infants, who died before the use of reason, can also be invoked privately, since they are saints and reign with Christ; and according to many the same is more probably to be said of the Souls detained in Purgatory. And indeed they are friends of God. Nor is it repugnant that those who need our prayers can usefully pray for us, just as the living usefully pray for one another, although they too need prayer to be made for them. More probably; for others deny it, chiefly because our necessities and prayers are hidden from them. But invocation of the Saints is of counsel, not of precept, since Trent, sess. 25, says only that it is good and useful to invoke them. Yet they commonly say that he is not to be excused from venial sin who would never invoke the Blessed Virgin, mediatrix of graces for us before God. Trent, sess. 25, de Invocatione, etc.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, aa. 4, 11; Gur., Comp. 262, Cas. 247; Struggl 31; Del Vecchio, v. 1, n. 663; E. M.

For whom can we pray? - We must pray neither for the Saints nor for the damned. For the former possess beatitude in heaven which will never be lacking; but the latter have already been immutably handed over to eternal punishments in hell. But it is honorable to pray for the just who are detained in the fire of purgatory. It is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins. 2 Mach. 12:46. Likewise it is permitted and we ought to pray for ourselves and, if the discussion is about private prayer, for all who dwell on earth, whether faithful, whether just or sinners, whether excommunicated or not, whether friends or enemies; namely, we must pray for all those whom we are commanded to love according to that saying of Christ: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. Matt. 22:39. Hence the Apostle says: I urge first of all that supplications, prayers, petitions, thanksgivings be made for all men... for this is good and acceptable before God our Savior, who wills all men to be saved. 1 Tim. 2:1 seqq. If the matter is of private prayer, etc.; for as to public prayer, see the exception in the treatise on Censures, n. 1111.

But this duty of praying for all is satisfied if someone, although he makes no special mention of others, nevertheless excludes no one in those prayers which are not poured forth for himself alone, such as the Lord's Prayer and the Angelic Salutation. For one must pray for all others to the extent that charity requires this, namely, in common. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 37, aa. 7, 8; Struggl 32; E. M.

What ought and can we ask when praying; what are the fruits of prayer, and are they certain? - R. To the first. First we ought to ask for spiritual goods, and these absolutely, because it is certain that we cannot abuse them: Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice. Matt. 6:33. But we can also ask for temporal goods, and for evils of temporal punishment, such as humiliation, poverty, etc., but conditionally; for they can sometimes help us toward salvation. Struggl 25; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, aa. 5, 6, 9.

R. To the second and third. Prayer, insofar as it is a free, good, supernatural work, is meritorious, and profits the one praying, and him alone, by condignity, namely if he is in the state of grace. Insofar as it is a laborious work, at least not lacking inconvenience, it is satisfactory, and can profit the one praying and others living by way of payment, and therefore more probably infallibly, by force of the communion of Saints; and the dead by way of suffrage, if and insofar as it has pleased divine Mercy. Prayer which is made for the dead, more truly from S. Thomas, Suppl., q. 71, a. 12, "as to the remission of punishment, avails him for whom it is made," although the measure of assistance furnished through our suffrages is unknown to us; but it depends on divine acceptance. For prayer profits them insofar as God, merciful and kind, accepts the satisfaction offered by us through it for the dead. But precisely insofar as prayer is prayer, it is impetratory, and profits oneself and other living persons and the dead. For prayer in obtaining does not rest upon the merit of the one praying, but upon divine mercy, which extends even to the evil, either on account of the salvation of him who prays, or also on account of the salvation of others and the glory of God. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 178, a. 2 ad 1. One undoubtedly receives what he duly asks. "And therefore four conditions are set down, with which concurring someone always obtains what he asks: namely, that he ask for himself, things necessary to salvation, piously and perseveringly," S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 15. "Pray for one another, that you may be saved; for the continual prayer of a just man avails much." Jas. 5:16 seqq. The prayers of many are more easily heard. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 7 ad 3.

That he ask for himself; "because man cannot merit eternal life for another by condignity, therefore consequently neither can someone sometimes merit by condignity for another the things which pertain to eternal life. And on account of this he who prays for another is not always heard." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 15 ad 2. "For it happens sometimes that prayer made for another does not obtain, even if it is made piously and perseveringly, and concerning things pertaining to salvation, on account of an impediment which is on the part of him for whom prayer is made." S. Th. l. c., a. 7 ad 2.

Things necessary to salvation; for the merit of prayer is principally ordered to beatitude. Therefore, if that which is asked is not necessary to salvation, nor manifestly contrary to salvation, then although the one praying can by praying merit eternal life, nevertheless he does not merit to obtain that which he asks. For what is more useful to the sick man, the physician knows better than the sick man. But if that which is asked is useful to salvation, he merits it not only by praying, but also by doing other good works; and therefore he undoubtedly receives what he asks, but at a fitting time, when he ought to receive it. S. Th. l. c., a. 15 ad 2.

Piously, that is, from the habit of virtue and grace, from charity, from religion, with humility, with faith. "Prayer, besides the effect of spiritual consolation which it presently has, has a twofold power with respect to a future effect, namely the power of meriting and the power of obtaining. But prayer, as also any other act of virtue, has efficacy for meriting insofar as it proceeds from the root of charity, whose proper object is the eternal good, the fruition of which we merit. Yet prayer proceeds from charity through religion as mediator, of which prayer is an act, with certain other virtues also accompanying, which are required for the goodness of prayer, namely humility and faith. For it pertains to religion to offer prayer itself to God; but it pertains to charity to desire the thing whose completion prayer asks. Faith, however, is necessary on the part of God, whom we pray, namely that we believe that we can obtain from him what we ask. Humility, however, is necessary on the part of the petitioner himself, because he recognizes his need. Devotion also is necessary, but this pertains to religion, of which it is the first act necessary for all consequent acts. But it has the efficacy of obtaining from the grace of God, whom we pray, who also induces us to pray. Whence Augustine says: He would not exhort us to ask, unless he wished to give. And Chrysostom says: He never denies benefits to the one praying, who by his goodness stirs them so that they do not fail to pray." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 83, a. 15.

Perseveringly: for since the force of prayer in impetration is from divine grace and mercy, it would be irrational always to be heard immediately, namely so that that grace and mercy may appear well. Nor indeed is it expedient for our salvation that we always be heard immediately, and therefore one must pray perseveringly, lest we impede grace if we do not persevere in prayer.

But God hears not only the prayer of the just man, but also that of the sinner "proceeding from a good desire of nature, not as though from justice, because the sinner does not merit this, but from pure mercy, the four conditions premised nevertheless being observed, namely that he ask for himself, things necessary to salvation, piously and perseveringly." S. Th. l. c., a. 16. The prayer of a sinner, although it does not proceed from sanctifying grace, nevertheless is made from actual grace, and is pious insofar as it asks something pertaining to piety. S. Th. l. c., a. 15 ad 1, a. 16 ad 2. Indeed prayer made with due conditions, that is, if it asks fitting things from God, with faith, with humility, with perseverance, is infallible by reason of Christ's promise, which pertains not only to the just, but also to sinners, and whether one prays for himself or for others, as is clear from the text of Jas. 5:16 seqq. "It is certain that prayer has a peculiar promise of God, by reason of which this obtaining is in its own way certain and infallible... Further, it is certain that this promise is not altogether absolute, but under certain conditions; these being posited, obtaining will be infallible, but not without them... It is certain that the state of grace is not simply necessary for obtaining... There is no reason why we should deny that the prayer of a sinner, which is apt to be heard, has an infallible promise... Everyone who asks receives... Everyone who asks, whether just or sinner... Whatever you shall ask in my name, this I will do... On account of this, the opinion which asserts that the promise is universal, whether one prays for himself or for others, seems sufficiently pious and probable... This infallible obtaining is not from justice, but principally from mercy, and also from simple fidelity." Suarez, de Relig., tom. 2, lib. 1, c. 23, nn. 2, 3; c. 25, nn. 2, 3; c. 27, nn. 1, 2, 4. Roman Catechism, de Poenit., p. 2, nn. 74, 76, p. 4, c. 2; S. Th., Quodl. 8, aa. 8, 9; C. G. l. 3, c. 158; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 26, s. 1; Suarez, de Poenit., d. 48, s. 3; Bellarmine, de Indulg., c. 13; E. M. 452.

How are the external acts of religion divided? - These acts are distributed into three classes. To the first pertain those acts through which someone exhibits his body for venerating God; such is adoration. To the second pertain those acts by which something from external things is offered to God. Concerning these a twofold consideration occurs. The first indeed is concerning those things which are given to God by the faithful, where one must consider sacrifices, oblations, first fruits, and tithes, and the sanctification of feasts, which is treated in the third precept of the Decalogue. The other is concerning vows, by which certain things are promised to God, and this must be remitted to the second precept of the Decalogue. Finally, to the third class pertain those acts by which something divine is assumed by men, which is either some sacrament, or the divine name itself. But there will be place to speak concerning the assumption of a sacrament in the treatise on the Sacraments. The assumption of the divine name, however, is made in three ways: in one way by way of an oath for confirming one's own words; in another way by way of adjuration for inducing others; in a third way by way of invocation for praying or praising. Concerning prayer it has already been said; concerning the others it will have to be said in the second precept of the Decalogue. Therefore here there will be discussion only of adoration, sacrifices, oblations, first fruits, and tithes. S. Th. 2. 2, qq. 84, 85, 86, 89; Bouquillon, de Virt. relig., l. 1.

What is adoration and of how many kinds is it? - Adoration is honor exhibited to another by an external gesture of the body, by which we testify our submission and the excellence of another; or insofar as it is a sign of internal estimation, reverence, and submission toward another, and consequently also of his excellence. Therefore adoration requires two internal acts: one of the intellect, the other of the will. The former is a speculative judgment concerning the excellence of another, and a practical judgment that it is honorable for us to be submitted to him on account of his excellence and our inferiority with respect to him. But the latter is the command of the will to lower oneself on account of that superior excellence in another. Whence at last the execution itself exists in the exterior gesture of the body.

Adoration is one thing political, another religious, according as it exhibits worship to another on account of a merely civil dignity or excellence, or on account of a supernatural excellence which is found in God and in his Saints. The latter comprehends under itself three species or quasi-species. The first is latria, which, with the genus taken for the species, is also simply accustomed to be called adoration; it is supreme and singular, which we owe to God alone, on account of the divine excellence proper to him, and which therefore is communicable to no other, according to Matt. 4:10. The second is dulia, which belongs to the Angels and other Saints, on account of the supernatural and created excellence which is in them. The third is hyperdulia, which is exhibited to the Blessed Virgin, on account of her supernatural and created excellence, but one altogether singular and greater and more eminent than all other created excellences. Species or quasi-species, because there is not sufficient agreement whether they are one species from one relation to God or threefold from a threefold diverse proper excellence.

Moreover any species of adoration is divided into absolute and respective. It is absolute when something is adored or worshiped on account of an excellence intrinsic to itself; and thus God, the Most Holy Trinity, Christ also as man, and the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist are adored with absolute worship of latria; but the Saints with absolute worship of dulia, and the Most Holy Virgin with absolute worship of hyperdulia. It is respective when something is adored or worshiped on account of an excellence and sanctity extrinsic to itself, but intrinsic to him to whom it is referred in moral estimation; and thus the Most Holy Name of Jesus Christ, the instruments of the Passion, and the Cross are adored with respective worship of latria; relics and images of the Saints, etc., with respective worship of dulia; images of the Most Holy Virgin, etc., with respective worship of hyperdulia. The title "The Penitent Heart of Jesus" is altogether condemned. Holy Office, 15 July 1892. The image of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, representing the Heart alone, is permitted only for private devotion, but is by no means to be exposed on an altar for public veneration. Holy Office, 26 Aug. 1891. Because there is one excellence of the Three Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is owed to them, and consequently one adoration. Trent, sess. 25, Decree on Invocation, etc.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 81, a. 3; q. 82, a. 2 ad 3; q. 84; q. 103, aa. 3, 4; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 2, l. 1, c. 2; Struggl 11 seqq.

A determinate place is not required for adoration as though by necessity of the thing itself, but only according to fittingness, not on account of God who is adored, as though he were enclosed by place, but on account of the adorers themselves: first indeed on account of the consecration of the place, from which those praying conceive special devotion, so that they may be heard more; secondly on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of sanctity which are contained there; thirdly on account of the gathering of many adorers, from which prayer becomes more fit to be heard. The obligation of adoration is abundantly satisfied by otherwise fulfilling obligations toward God, in which adoration of God is contained implicitly and often also explicitly, as, for example, when prayers are poured forth to God, when one assists at the sacrifice of Mass, etc. E. M.

Can men who have departed from life with a reputation for sanctity be adored? - They can be honored with private worship. But they cannot be honored with solemn and public worship, unless they have been numbered by the Supreme Pontiff in the Catalogue of Saints or Blessed. Public worship, however, is that which is exhibited in the name of the Church, or as instituted by her; private worship is that which proceeds only from private devotion, even if it is done before others. Therefore it is not licit to erect churches or altars in honor of Saints not canonized, or at least not beatified, cf. 463; nor is it licit to invoke them publicly in litanies, nor to expose their relics or images for public veneration, or to carry them around in processions. Yet it is permitted to keep these images or relics privately, to kiss them reverently, etc., because such worship is altogether private, which is not prohibited. Struggl 18; E. M.

Those are called Saints who solemnly, a definitive sentence having been issued, are enrolled by the Roman Pontiff in the catalogue of Saints, and their worship is permitted to all the faithful. Those are called Blessed who, from a special concession of the Roman Pontiff, can be honored with some public worship only in some place or in some Religious Institute. Those are Venerable concerning whom the cause of introduction of their beatification has been signed by the Roman Pontiff. Servants of God are those who have died with a reputation for sanctity or martyrdom. But "Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X... forbade Servants of God, whose causes are henceforth introduced, to be called Venerable; likewise he decreed that solemnities are not permitted to be carried out on the occasion of the decree issued concerning the introduction of the cause... nor panegyric orations. But he permitted that Servants of God be adorned with the title Venerable only after the decree issued concerning heroic virtue or concerning martyrdom, yet in such a way that from this permission no argument of granted veneration can be inferred or claimed... Solemnities for giving thanks to God even after the decree issued concerning heroic virtue or martyrdom he likewise prohibited; yet by this prohibition he did not intend to prevent the addition in Masses, as is fitting, of a collect for thanksgiving." S. R. C., 26 Aug. 1913. This Decree also contains several other prescriptions to be observed in the beginning of causes of Servants of God, namely so that the cause may be duly instituted. There are special Instructions concerning the processes of causes of Martyrs in regions of unbelievers. Cf. Consulente Ecclesiastico, 1905, p. 313 seqq. Likewise there is a Decree to be observed concerning judicial order in causes of Servants of God proceeding by way of an excepted case. S. R. C., 11 Nov. 1912. "Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X, for treating causes of lesser moment of Servants of God, namely concerning reputation for sanctity in general, concerning non-cult, concerning the validity and relevance of processes, and other similar things, constituted a particular Congregation." Decree S. R. C., 9 Dec. 1908.

You will resolve: It is by no means illicit to place an effigy or statue of some deceased person not canonized, whether in an oratory even public, or in a church, provided this is not done for honoring him with public worship, but from another manifest motive, for example, if he is the founder or benefactor of the church, or his statue is placed at his tomb in the church. Thus also images of emperors, kings, and other distinguished men could be hung; and the Basilica dedicated to Saint Peter at Rome is adorned with images or statues of Pontiffs not enrolled in the Catalogue of Saints. S. R. C., 14 Aug. 1894, Decr.

A priest can indeed accept a stipend and celebrate Mass in honor of a man deceased with a reputation for sanctity, or in thanksgiving for a benefit obtained, etc., provided that he takes the Mass from the feast or from the feria occurring on that day, but not from the common of non-Pontiffs, nor recites a special prayer concerning him or with his name. The reason is that to perform the sacred rite for the aforesaid intention is not to honor someone with public worship, since the intention of the celebrant is something altogether private. Elbel 443; E. M.

Note: For the public worship of relics, it must be certainly established that the relics to be venerated pertain to a Saint or Blessed one solemnly recognized as such by the Church. In addition, the seal of some Bishop or Prelate ought to be affixed; but the seal of the Bishop of the place suffices for relics to be honored with public worship, nor is an authentic written document necessary. In order that new relics, although authentic, be exposed for the public veneration of the faithful in a church or in a public oratory, it is required that they be recognized and approved by the Bishop of the place, even if they were sealed at Rome by the Apostolic Prefect. Trent, sess. 25, de Invocat., etc.; Sixtus V, Const. Dominus omnipotens, 13 Nov. 1588. For ancient relics, their immemorial exposition and public veneration suffice; this rightly supplies any other document and bears before itself a valid presumption of authenticity. For private worship only private moral certitude is required, such as, for example, is had from a man worthy of faith.

A relic of the Cross of Our Lord Jesus Christ for public veneration is to be separated from other Relics of Saints in a special case. S. C. Indulg., 22 Feb. 1847; S. R. C., 25 May 1906; A. A. S., v. 1, p. 507. One sins gravely by stealing notable relics, or even the smallest part of a very precious relic, for example of the Most Holy Cross, because, although they are not estimable by price, nevertheless this taking away can gravely sadden the possessor. But in the Roman district it is prohibited under penalty of excommunication to steal relics, even the smallest, pertaining to churches, from the Constitution of Clement VIII and Paul V. Therefore not in every case is the theft mortal sin, and it is a grave real sacrilege.

As to images, halos, or rays, cannot be placed on images of the deceased, although they are commonly held as Saints, unless they have been beatified by the Church; likewise neither tablets and images, nor lamps or any other lights, namely in veneration and worship, may be hung at their sepulchers. But with the license of the Ordinary or Bishop, it is permitted to keep similar relics of a Saint in a place separated from the church and secret, to receive offerings and tablets, and to recount in little books the benefits received, yet not without the recognition and approval of the Bishop, and with a declaration first made by the author that he does not intend to win for his statements any faith other than that of human history, as Urban VIII established in the Decree Sanctissimus, 13 March 1625, and another special Constitution Caelestis Hierusalem, 5 July 1634; S. R. C., 31 July 1821; General Decree, 14 Aug. 1894; Leo XIII, Const. Officiorum ac munerum, General Decree, sec. 13; Pius X, Encyclical Letter Pascendi, 8 Sept. 1907, paragraph De sacris Reliquiis.

Images of the Blessed are to be painted with rays only; of the Canonized, with a diadem around the head. Ferraris, v. Veneratio SS., n. 46. Likewise images of Our Lord and the Blessed Virgin, of Angels and Saints, ought to be painted or sculpted in that form and habit which from ancient time has been in use in the Church. Urban VIII, Const. Sacrosancta Tridentina, 15 March 1642; Benedict XIV, Const. Sollicitudini, 1 Oct. 1745.

As to the Blessed, it is not permitted to name churches or altars after them, and their images and relics can be retained and exposed only in those churches in which it is permitted to celebrate their office. Urban VIII, cited Decree Sanctissimus; Clement XI, Const. 82, n. 11. Images of Saints are laudably blessed, and privately any priest can bless them. S. R. C., 12 July 1704. S. R. C., 27 Sept. 1659; 17 Apr. 1660; 12 June 1660, Boianen.; Pius X, Motu proprio Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910; L. 1. 3, nn. 45, 532; Epist. Resp. at the end of c. 1; Benedict XIV, de Canon. SS., l. 2, c. 11; Struggl 18; Scav., ed. 12, Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 168 seqq. There is an Instruction of the S. R. C., 22 May 1912, on the privileges which, in the triduum or octave to be celebrated within the year from beatification or canonization, are usually granted by Rescript of that Sacred Congregation from the Supreme Pontiff. E. M.

463.a What is the nature and obligation of sacrifices? - The offering of sacrifices, considered in common, is from the natural law itself. For it proceeds from natural reason that, just as some things are offered to temporal lords in recognition of dominion, so also we should offer to God, as the supreme lord of all, certain sensible things as a sign of due subjection and honor. But the determination of sacrifices is from human or divine institution. The sacrifice which is offered exteriorly signifies the interior spiritual sacrifice by which the soul offers itself to God, because exterior acts of religion are ordered to interior acts. But the soul offers itself to God in sacrifice, as to the principle of its creation and as to the end of its beatitude. Therefore the honor of sacrifices is to be exhibited to God alone. This also we see observed in every republic, that its supreme ruler is honored by some singular sign which, if it were offered to anyone else, would be the crime of lese majesty. Trent, sess. 22, c. 3.

Moreover there is a threefold good of man. The first indeed is the good of the soul, which is offered to God by a certain interior sacrifice through devotion and prayer and other interior acts of this sort, which are ordered to divine reverence. The second is the good of the body, which is offered to God in a certain way through martyrdom and abstinence or continence, or when someone subjects his own body to some affliction on account of divine reverence, and it is offered by exterior sacrifice. The third is the good of exterior things, from which an exterior sacrifice also is offered to God, if it again is ordered to divine reverence: directly indeed, when we immediately offer our things to God; mediately, when we communicate them to neighbors on account of God.

But sacrifices are properly so called when something is done concerning things offered to God, as that animals were killed and burned, that bread is broken and eaten and blessed. And the name itself sounds this: for sacrifice is so called from this, that man makes something sacred.

Hence sacrifice is commonly defined: the offering of a sensible thing, made to God by a legitimate minister, through real change, for acknowledging his supreme dominion and our subjection. Wherefore only priests offer sacrifices which are specially ordered to divine worship not only for themselves, but also for others. But other sacrifices anyone can offer to God for himself. All are bound to offer interior sacrifice to God, for all are bound to offer a mind devoted to God. Likewise all are bound to offer exterior sacrifice to God when exterior acts of other virtues are assumed into divine reverence, which fall under precept. But as to the exterior sacrifice by which something is exteriorly offered to God in protestation of divine subjection, under the New Law the faithful are bound to that one sacrifice which Jesus Christ instituted at the Last Supper, concerning which there will be discussion in the treatise on the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and on the Eucharist. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 85; Lessius, de Virt. Rel., c. 2, d. 4.

463.b What is the nature and obligation of oblations? - By the name of oblation here is understood the presentation of some thing for the worship of God, not so that some sacred thing is as it were consumed, as in sacrifice, but so that it remains whole to be deputed to divine worship, or to be expended for the uses of ministers. In the New Law, oblations of this sort are free, unless they are to be made from the necessity of the Church or from introduced custom. Since the priest is mediator between God and the people, oblations are to be presented to him by the people, not only that he may assume them for his own use, but that he may faithfully dispense them in those things which pertain to divine worship and for the uses of the poor, who, as far as possible, are to be sustained from the goods of the Church, because the Lord too had purses for the use of the poor.

Likewise in the New Law there is no special obligation to offer first fruits from the fruits of the earth received, unless according to the custom of the country and the need of the ministers of the Church. For first fruits are given by way of oblation, of whose nature it is that it be voluntary. But first fruits are offered because we ought to exhibit to God that which is chief, and in recognition of the benefit of God, who grants the earth and the fruits of the earth. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 86.

463.c Is there, and of what sort, an obligation of paying tithes? - The precept of tithes is partly of natural law, partly of positive law. "For natural reason dictates that the people should furnish the necessities of life to those who ministered in divine worship for the salvation of the whole people, just as stipends for livelihood are owed by the people also to those who watch over the common utility, namely Princes and soldiers and others of this sort.... The determination that a tenth part be paid was instituted by the authority of the Church in the time of the New Law.... Thus therefore it is clear that men are bound to the payment of tithes, partly indeed from natural law, but partly also from the institution of the Church, which nevertheless, the circumstances of times and persons being considered, could determine another part to be paid.... Ministers of the Church ought to have a greater care for promoting spiritual goods among the people than for collecting temporal goods; and therefore... they laudably do not demand tithes of the Church where they could not be demanded without scandal, because of desuetude or because of some other cause. Nor, however, are those in a state of damnation who do not pay in those places in which the Church does not ask, unless perhaps, on account of obstinacy of mind, they have the will not to pay even if they were asked. "But the root of the payment of tithes is a debt, by which carnal things are owed to those sowing spiritual things, according to that saying of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 9:11: If we have sown spiritual things among you, is it a great thing if we reap your carnal things?... For upon this debt the Church founded the determination of the payment of tithes. But all things whatsoever a man possesses are contained under carnal things, and therefore tithes are to be paid from all things possessed.... And therefore in the New Law men are bound to personal tithes, according to the custom of the country and the need of ministers. But the right of receiving tithes is spiritual, for it follows that debt by which expenses are owed to ministers of the altar from the ministry, and by which temporal things are owed to those sowing spiritual things; this pertains only to clerics having the right of souls. Tithes are owed by the faithful to clerics insofar as they are ministers of the altar sowing spiritual things among the people. Whence such clerics, insofar as they have ecclesiastical possessions, are not bound to pay tithes; but from another cause, namely because they possess by their own right, or by succession from parents, or in any other way of this sort, they are obliged to pay tithes. Clerics are bound to give a tithe to the Supreme Pontiff if he should require it. For natural reason dictates that provision be made from all goods for him who has care for the common state of the multitude, whence he can execute those things which pertain to the common salvation." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 87.

What are the acts opposed to religion? - "Something is opposed to true religion in two ways: in one way by excess, when, namely, that which belongs to religion is exhibited unduly to another; this pertains to superstition. In another way, as it were by defect of reverence, when, namely, God is contemned; this pertains to the vice of irreligiosity.... But superstition impedes religion as to this, that God not be taken up for worshiping.... But through irreligiosity religion is impeded as to this, that God, after he has been taken up, not be honored." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 3.

What is superstition? - "Superstition," says S. Thomas, "is a vice opposed to religion according to excess, not because it exhibits more in divine worship than true religion, but because it exhibits divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in the manner in which it ought not." 2. 2, q. 92, a. 1. "But the principal impediment of religion is that man adhere to a false god.... And therefore in the first precept of the law the worship of false gods is excluded.... But all other superstitions proceed from some pact entered into with demons, tacit or express; and therefore all are understood to be prohibited in this which is said: You shall not have strange gods." 2. 2, q. 122, a. 2 ad 1, 2, 3; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1702.

Of how many kinds is superstition? - On the part of the thing which is given worship, the species of superstition are three: idolatry, divination, vain observance. For either a creature is worshiped as God, and this is idolatry; or from it, as from God, knowledge of hidden things is asked, and this is divination; or finally some help is implored, and this is vain observance. All these are mortal by their nature, since they inflict grave irreverence upon God, by attributing to a creature what is owed to God.

By reason of the mode in which worship is exercised, one superstition is that of false worship, if it signifies something false, for example if someone now offers worship to God through ceremonies of the Old Law; if a layman worships God as a public minister of the Church; if someone on the part of the Church exhibits worship to God contrary to the manner constituted by divine authority through the Church and customary in the Church. Another is the superstition of shameful worship, if it contains certain things injurious to God, for example if someone should introduce dishonorable and insulting words in his prayers. Another is the superstition of superfluous worship, if it contributes nothing to the true worship of God, for example the ceremony of hearing Mass before sunrise, with a fixed number, position, order of candles, etc.

This last species, scandal being excluded, ordinarily is judged only venial, because the matter is slight, and it ought rather to be called mere simplicity than positive irreverence. But the other two are regularly mortal, because they are gravely repugnant to divine honor and worship, which rests upon truth and sanctity. Regularly; for it does not seem grave if something slightly false is mixed into true worship from lightness, from lack of consideration. Lugo, de fide, d. 14, s. 3; d. 20, n. 23 seqq.; Struggl 2 seqq.; L. 3, 4; S. Th. 2. 2, qq. 92, 93; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 1702, 1707.

What is idolatry, of how many kinds is it, and what kind of sin is it? - Idolatry is defined: an action by which worship owed to God alone is exhibited to a creature. It is threefold: perfect, imperfect, and simulated. The first renders divine honor to a creature, falsely judging it really to be God. The second indeed renders divine honor to a creature, but either from hatred of the true God, or from desire of obtaining something from a demon or another creature, not being ignorant that the same lacks divinity. Finally the third exhibits that honor to a creature, from fear of death alone, without internal affection, as happened to certain Christians in times of persecutions. Each of these kinds of idolatry is a grave sin. It is proved: "Just as in an earthly republic it seems most grave that someone should bestow royal honor upon another than the true king... so among sins which are committed against God, which nevertheless are the greatest, it seems most grave that someone should bestow divine honor upon a creature; because, as far as in him lies, he makes another God in the world." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 94, aa. 3, 1; L. 12, 13.

What is divination? - Divination is defined as the tacit or express invocation of a demon for knowing hidden things. Tacit or express, because it can be done in a twofold way: either by expressly invoking that help of a demon, and it is called express, or by employing certain means, useless and ineffective of themselves, for imploring the aid of a demon, and it is called tacit. Here it must be noted that it is not required that the demon at some time have made a pact that he would concur with the use of some vain means. For by the very fact that someone knowingly uses means lacking all proportion to the end, he invokes in act the aid of the demon, who is accustomed to mingle himself in these things. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, aa. 1, 2; L. 5, 6, 8.

Of how many kinds is divination? - Divination is distinguished into several species, but only materially, by reason of the diverse means. The principal species of divination through express invocation of a demon are: 1. Pythonism, when namely a demon, occupying the body of some man or woman and emitting voices from there, discloses hidden things. 2. Vaticination, when a demon uses the work of pseudo-prophets to signify hidden things. 3. Necromancy, when a demon answers through the dead or through those called back to life. 4. Oracle, when a consulted demon, hiding in images, answers. 5. Prestige, when the demon himself strikes the eyes by apparitions. 6. Oneiromancy, when a demon discloses hidden things through dreams. 7. When he foretells hidden things through certain figures or signs which appear in inanimate things, "and indeed if these appear in some terrestrial body, say in wood or iron or polished stone, it is called geomancy; if in water, hydromancy; if in air, aeromancy; if in fire, pyromancy; if in the entrails of animals immolated on the altars of demons, haruspicy." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, a. 3.

Divination which is made without express invocation of a demon is twofold: one uses the dispositions of certain things; the other uses certain things which are seriously done by men for inquiring into something hidden. To the first pertain: 1. Chiromancy, as it were divination from inspection of the hand. 2. Physiognomy from the lineaments of the face. 3. Haruspicy from the entrails of animals. 4. Augury from the chattering of birds. 5. Auspice from their flight, position, feeding. 6. Astrology from the stars. 7. Geomancy, hydromancy, pyromancy, aeromancy from signs in earth, in water, in fire, in air. 8. Omen from words said without intention. But to the other pertains sortilege, as it were divination from lots, for example by considering what occurs to one opening a book, what one receives from slips secretly deposited, who throws more points of dice, what figure arises from melted lead thrown into water. "Thus therefore it is clear that there is a threefold genus of divination, of which the first is through manifest invocation of demons... the second is through the mere consideration of the disposition or motion of another thing... the third is when we do something so that something hidden may be manifested to us... but under each of these many things are contained." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, a. 3; L. 6; Struggl 20, 21.

Note: Natural effects must be carefully distinguished from free effects. For the former can often be conjectured, as, for example, from the song and flight of birds or from the aspect of the stars, weather, rain, or serenity of the sky, etc., is conjectured. For experience establishes that a natural connection exists among these things. But one must speak otherwise concerning the latter. A disposition or state of mind sometimes can in some way be conjectured from color of face, or other external signs, although in practice one should generally abstain from such conjectures, on account of the danger of rash judgment. But free acts, whether past or future, can never be known with certainty.

To divination is to be attributed whatever hidden thing is known in another way than through revelation or through natural means; for no other means is given for investigating hidden things. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, aa. 1, 7; q. 96, a. 2; L. 9, 10.

What kind of sin is divination? - Divination from its genus is mortal, both because it attributes divine honor to a creature, by wishing to know from it things known to God alone, and because society with a demon is a great contempt of God, a betrayal and apostasy from God, since the demon is his perpetual enemy. Hence the Apostle warns: I do not want you to become associates of demons. 1 Cor. 10:20; Deut. 18:10-12. Yet tacit divination can sometimes be excused from mortal sin on account of simplicity and ignorance, or on account of defect of certain faith. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, aa. 2, 4; L. 7; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 3, l. 2, c. 8, n. 15; Laym. l. 4, tr. 10, c. 3, n. 4; Struggl 19.

You will resolve: He is not free from grave fault who, using means disproportionate for some knowledge, protests that he intends no commerce with the demon; for he acts against his own protestation, and implicitly invokes the demon, since neither God nor an Angel mingles himself with such things.

Those sin gravely who ask soothsayers concerning their fortune or their future life, unless they act from simplicity, jest, or for the sake of curiosity, without giving faith to the sayings. Yet if the soothsayer acts seriously, they can with difficulty be excused from gravely culpable cooperation. Reuter 43; L. 8, 10; S. Th., Quodl. 3, a. 22.

Is it ever permitted to conjecture future things from dreams? - There are four kinds of dreams: 1. Natural, which have their origin from natural causes, for example, occupations or temperament of body. 2. Casual, which arise from the varied concurrence of phantasmal representations. 3. Those which are from God as author. Judg. 7:13; Dan. 2:19; Matt. 1:20; 2:12, 13, 19. 4. Those which have the demon as author. Deut. 18:10. Moreover, from natural dreams it is not superstitious to conjecture the present health of the body, or its future state, or even the manner and discipline of living, because among these there is a true and natural connection. Yet it would be superstitious to conjecture from them future freely contingent things, since these proceed only from the free and changeable will of man. From casual dreams it is superstitious to derive future things, because by the very fact that they are casual they cannot be accommodated for signifying any matter. Ecclus. 34:7. But he would not seem to sin mortally who, on account of a preceding dream, omits or performs an indifferent action; because this seems to proceed rather from a certain simplicity of mind, or excessive timidity, for example if someone should omit a walk because he dreamed that on it he would be treacherously killed on this or that day. Dreams which are certainly or more probably from God we can, indeed we are bound, says S. Alphonsus, n. 9, to believe, since God at times promised that he would speak in this way. Acts 2:17; Num. 12:6.

To believe diabolical dreams is mortal, unless ignorance or simplicity excuses, since it is to found truth upon a lie, and to enter into society with a demon. In this sense Scripture says: You shall not practice augury, nor observe dreams. Lev. 19:26. But whether a dream is from God or from a demon is difficult and dangerous to define. Struggl 24; L. 9; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, a. 6.

Note: The general rule for discerning whether dreams come from a demon is: if they impel to evil, or if one experiences himself disturbed and less prompt for good. But otherwise, if the dream impels to good, or one feels himself readier for it; nevertheless one must always proceed with humility and fear, since the devil often transforms himself into an angel of light. Struggl 25; L. 9.

Is astrology ever permitted? - Astrology is of two kinds, natural and judiciary. By the first, natural effects are predicted, some certain, others probable; by the second, freely contingent effects are foretold from consideration of the position and motion of the stars. Now natural astrology is licit, as is clear. But judiciary astrology is altogether illicit and superstitious, because heavenly bodies can do absolutely nothing upon man's free will. L. 10; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 95, a. 5. Those who, by judiciary astrology either by themselves or through others, have inquired concerning the state of the Christian republic are to be understood, from the Warnings for the Jubilee, as those who have inquired by the said Astrology concerning the life or death of the Roman Pontiff; their censures the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis preserved intact. Leo XIII, Const. Singulares, Kal. Nov. 1899; S. Penit., 20 Feb. 1900; E. M.

Is the use of lots ever licit? - Some lots are divisory, others consultory, others divinatory. Divisory lots, which are employed for settling disputes, etc., with both parties consenting, are licit, since they contain nothing superstitious, but are as it were a certain species of contract; and they are also approved in Scripture by these words: The lot suppresses contradictions. Prov. 18:18; 16:33. Except, by positive law, all elections to ecclesiastical prelacies and benefices, which ought to be made by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; this also holds concerning disputes about the same benefices. C. Ecclesia 3, de Sortil. Yet the doctors more probably judge that only this is forbidden, so that if the lot is used, the elections are illicit but valid. The reason is that nowhere are they declared invalid, if one election of a Prelate having jurisdiction is excepted. C. Quia propter, de Elect. Cf. Schmalz., l. 5, p. 2, t. 21, n. 38 seqq. Secular offices also are to be distributed not by lot, but according to the aptitude of persons; although among several equally apt and worthy persons, one can act by lot. Thus also, if several have deserved death, and it is not expedient that all be punished, it can be determined by lot who among them is to be killed. C. A. 835, 841; C. B. 659, 752; John 10:24.

Consultory lots, by which inquiry is made what should be done in this or that matter, are generally illicit, because they contain temptation of God and danger of diabolical fraud. Generally, for sometimes they are licit: when they are done by divine instinct or command, as happened in the election of Matthias, Acts 1:26; when necessity and honorableness of the cause require it, for example an urgent necessity of salvation, and no more apt mode of overcoming the doubt appears, provided they are done with prayer having first been made, with due reverence, and judgment is expected from God alone, and divine things are not turned to earthly affairs, etc. Divinatory lots, by which through the throwing of dice the knowledge of a hidden or future thing is inquired into, and this is sortilege, are in no way permitted, since neither from their own nature, nor from that of other things, nor from the institution of God or of the Church, does that casting of lots have any force for the aforesaid effects. Yet if God himself should impel one to cast a lot, which should scarcely ever be thought, then it will be licit, just as it was licit for Joshua when he used it to investigate the hidden crime committed by Achan. Josh. 7:14. "Moreover, if someone were to ask from God through lots the manifestation of hidden truth, such sortilege would not be superstitious, but a temptation of God, or another sin of irreligiosity, as Laymann teaches with Sanchez, n. 9." Struggl 26; L. 10, 11; S. Th., Quodl. 12, a. 35; 2. 2, q. 95, a. 8.

Is the use of the divining rod licit? - This rod, whose first mention, they say, was made in the fifteenth century, is from hazel and is forked. They use it for finding treasures, veins of waters, shifted boundaries of fields, thieves, murderers, etc. There are not lacking those who defend its use as natural; but deservedly this is commonly denied. For intention alone can contribute nothing to physical motion. Moreover the rod is moved according to the mind of the bearer, so that if he seeks metals, not water, the rod is not moved if it finds water, and conversely. Add that it remains unmoved in the hands of him who protests that he wills nothing superstitious, as examples prove. Yet it must not be denied that it can also happen naturally that some rod is moved toward one part rather than another; and thus it can serve for detecting waters or metals, namely by force of natural attraction, as is clear concerning the magnet. But then this happens constantly, and independently from the intention of the one using it, and never in matters moral, or insofar as they are moral, to be investigated, for example thieves. Hos. 4:12; L. 8; Albit., de Inconst. in Fide, c. 32, n. 26.

What is vain observance? - Vain observance consists in this, that someone employs means neither proportioned by their nature nor instituted by God or by the Church for obtaining a certain effect. It differs from divination in that the latter is ordered to knowledge of hidden things, but vain observance to any effects whatsoever to be obtained. It agrees with divination because it also rests upon a pact, express or tacit, with a demon. It matters little indeed that a demon is not expressly invoked; for he is invoked equivalently. For since God does not mingle himself with vain things, the effect can be expected only from a demon. Since someone uses inept means, he uses them not as causes but as signs, and thus they pertain to pacts of significations entered into with demons. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 96, aa. 1, 2, 3; L. 24.

Of how many kinds is vain observance? - There are four species of vain observance, which are distinguished only materially by reason of effects. 1. If certain useless things are observed for acquiring an infusion of knowledge, without other study, and it is called the notory art. It differs from divination because the latter directly regards speculative knowledge; the former directly regards an infusion of knowledge for one's own convenience, but indirectly the knowledge itself. Thus they sin who take a prepared potion, or employ a certain prayer, so that they may immediately become learned. 2. If useless things are observed for obtaining health, and it is called the observance of healths. Thus they sin who use unknown names and certain empty ceremonies for driving away animals; or who carry amulets, wrappings, or something similar for repelling diseases. L. 18; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 178, a. 2. 3. If from consideration of some trifling event it is determined what will be future, and someone thence regulates his actions, and it is called the observance of events. It differs from divination, both because observations of this sort are without any reason and art, whence they are more vain and superstitious, and because they look to directing one's own acts; but divination rather intends speculative knowledge of hidden things. Thus he would sin who refused to sit with thirteen at table as though this were a sign of death, although this for the most part can be excused, since no true faith is given to this matter, but there is a certain simple and empty fear. 4. If the observance concerns bodies to be variously changed and other wondrous or harmful effects to be produced, and it is called magic or malefice. Malefice contains a threefold moral malice against religion, charity, and justice. One malefice is amatory, or a philter; another is poisonous. The former is for exciting carnal love or hatred toward some person, the demon moving the phantasy of the man or the humors of the body, yet doing nothing upon the will; whence it does not induce necessarily to committing sin. But the latter is for inflicting harm upon someone, whether in his goods or in his health.

Job 1:12; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 178, a. 2. But here it must be noted that possession consists in this, that a demon in some way is united to a human body, and works extraordinary things in it and through it. But if the demon does not seem to reside in the body of a man, but only works externally, vexing it in various ways, then there is obsession. It must be noted besides that "power over demons has not been committed to man, so that he could licitly use them for whatever he wished." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 96, a. 2 ad 3. Struggl 28, 41, 42, 43; Suarez, cc. 15, 16; L. 15, 23; S. Th., Quodl. 4, q. 9, a. 16; 2. 2, q. 96.

What kind of sin is vain observance? - As divination, so also vain observance is a grave sin, both because it attributes divine honor to a creature by expecting from it what ought to be looked for from God alone, and because it rests upon a pact, and consequently imports society with a demon. Yet many times that which contains only an implicit invocation of a demon can be excused from mortal sin by reason of ignorance and lack of consideration, or of very doubtful faith. L. 15; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 96.

You will resolve: Those are guilty of superstition who wear ligatures marked with certain characters, who invoke certain unknown names, or employ a certain number of crosses or prayers for healing wounds, for making themselves invulnerable, etc. Likewise those who wear certain prayers to St. Bridget or other prayers, expecting an altogether infallible effect from them. Yet they are not to be blamed, indeed they are very much to be praised, who wear pious medals, sacred effigies, or relics of the Saints, hoping that they will specially obtain divine help for themselves. Those also are guilty of superstition who hold some days as fortunate and others as unfortunate, so that they direct their actions from this; or who for expelling diseases require herbs gathered on such a feast, etc.

But it is not superstitious to observe the moon or the times more apt for gathering herbs, cutting trees, etc.; nor to wear sacred things or words of Sacred Scripture for the honor of God or of the Saints, and for imploring their help. Likewise it is not superstitious to recite a certain number of prayers, nor to do all those things which can increase devotion, provided that an infallible force is not attributed to them. Nor is it in any way superstitious, indeed it is very religious and pious, to recite novena prayers, or to repeat prayers so many times in the worship of Our Lord, or of the Blessed Virgin, or of some Saint, by reason of indulgences which are attached to such a number of prayers, or by reason of mystical signification for increasing devotion; for example, a ternary in honor of the Most Holy Trinity, a quinary in honor of the five wounds of Our Lord Jesus Christ, a septenary because it recalls to mind the six days of creation and the seventh on which the Lord rested, a novenary in honor of the nine months in which Christ was in the womb of his Mother, etc., provided that infallible force is not attached to such a number, to a certain day, or to a fixed time. Struggl 33, 34; Cajetan, in q. 96, aa. 3, 4; L. 17-22; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 96.

In doubt concerning the natural cause of some effect, is it permitted to make an experiment? - Vain observance is discerned from the insufficiency of the cause, from some vain circumstance, and from the infallibility which is attributed to a fallible thing. L. 16. In doubt whether effects come from a natural cause or from a demon, they can be attributed to the powers of nature; for the possession of right prevails, since many things lie hidden from us which are altogether natural, and we can altogether investigate them. And therefore it is licit to procure those effects by experiment, since it is not established that the thing is evil. Yet a protestation against any intervention of a demon is deliberately made beforehand. Holy Office, 26 July 1899. But in doubt whether effects are produced by a demon or by God, if it is certain that they cannot come from a natural cause, they are to be attributed to a demon, unless the sanctity of the operator or other clear indications persuade the contrary; because it is rash to think that miracles are always being done. Whence then it is not licit to try whether the effect will follow or not. L. 20; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 96, aa. 1, 2; Struggl 32; La-Croix, l. 3, p. 1, n. 28; E. M. 485.

Does magic introduce a new species beyond vain observance? - R. Negative. For magic does not differ from vain observance except merely materially, because its effects are more wondrous, for example, the changing of bodies, etc. But in moral species it differs neither from vain observance nor from divination, because it matters little whether knowledge of hidden things or wondrous effects are sought from a demon. Therefore these three in the moral line contain the same malice in species. But whether these three are distinguished from idolatry, some deny, because they contain implicitly the worship of a demon, and implicit and explicit do not change the species. Others affirm, because these three contain only commerce with a demon, whose help man implores. Ex. 22:18; Struggl 39.

What can be done to remove a malefice? - It is permitted to use natural remedies sought from medicine for correcting corrupt humors; exorcisms, sacraments, pilgrimages, invocations of Saints; and the destruction of the signs through which the demon harms, yet without another malefice. It is also permitted to place a contrary sign, provided it is honorable of itself. The reason is that this is nothing other than to remove the sign and dissolve the pact with the demon. If a sorcerer can remove the malefice in a licit way, it is permitted to summon him to this, to ask him, indeed even to induce him by money, and this even if it is established that he will do this through a new malefice, just as for a cause it is permitted to ask a usurer for a loan at usury. And the reason is that, since I have the right to ask what can rightly be furnished by him and is indifferent, it will be imputed to his malice if he does it badly.

If the sorcerer cannot remove the malefice except through a new malefice, it is not permitted to induce him to this, because this would be to induce him to sin and to cooperate in an intrinsically evil act. If it is doubted whether he can remove it without a new malefice, it is not permitted to ask it of him, because the presumption stands against it, that he knows no mode except an illicit one. But it can more easily be presumed that he who placed the signs can destroy them without a new malefice, than he who did not place them. Whence, if this latter offers his work, he must first be examined concerning the mode of dissolving it. Suarez, c. 17, n. 10; L. 24 seqq.; Struggl 44 seqq.

What must be thought concerning more recent superstitions which are circulated? - Of superstitions of this sort there are various effects known to all: mechanical, physiological, psychological, spiritual effects. Likewise various causes are employed or are said to be employed for producing effects of this sort; whence various names are taken either from the effects or from the causes, namely magnetisms, animal magnetism, spiritism, rotating tables, somnambulism, hypnotism. But two things are to be noted in a matter of this sort: namely the proportion or disproportion of the effect with the natural cause; and the honorableness or shamefulness of the acts which are employed, or of the conditions which are required beforehand, for example, that the magnetized person subject himself wholly to the will of the magnetizing person and hand himself over to his judgment. From the former disproportion or proportion, superstition is had or not; from the latter honorableness or shamefulness, even without superstition, the thing will be able to be illicit, as immoral.

As to the preternatural character of the aforesaid effects, that must be carefully observed: whether, although some effect can absolutely be produced by a natural cause, it is in fact produced by this cause, or rather by another preternatural cause, all its circumstances being considered. Moreover magnetism, animal magnetism, spiritism, rotating tables, somnambulism, and hypnotism, according to those effects which commonly happen in their use, are not permitted; since either in reality they do not differ from divination, vain observance, magic, and malefice, since the effects, considering their intrinsic nature, the mode by which they are produced, and other circumstances, exceed the powers of natural causes; or they are excited by shameful and immoral acts; or certainly they often bear before themselves both that disproportion and this shamefulness. Therefore it is also illicit to be present at experiments of these effects, although merely passively, since it is a sin of cooperation in an intrinsically evil thing, especially in the evocation and consultation of spirits. Holy Office, 30 March 1898; S. Th. 2. 2, qq. 95, 96; C. G. l. 3, c. 114; Quodl. 12, a. 13; Ferraris, Supplem., v. Magnetismus.

But if the discussion is merely about magnetism or electricity and about hypnotism applied to certain diseases to be cured, and about effects altogether of an inferior and natural order, although wondrous, which are obtained in hospitals and in the care of other sick persons, and due cautions are employed in their use, nothing indeed appears which contains superstition, nor are they per se opposed in any way to honorable morals. For the same effects are obtained by several other natural causes, especially in natural somnambulism, in sleep and dream. Therefore as to merely natural effects, magnetism is not illicit. But it is illicit as to preternatural effects, considering the mode in which natural causes operate, such as rotating tables, at which consequently it is not permitted to be present. Animal magnetism is likewise illicit as to the extraordinary effects of magnetic sleep, somnambulism, and clairvoyance. Somnambulism is a certain state midway between wakefulness and sleep, in which certain wondrous effects are produced in the faculty both sensitive and intellectual of the soul, which is placed under the command of the magnetizer. Nor indeed, as regards hypnotism, can there be any difficulty from suggestion by which it is excited; for nothing is more common and natural than suggestion, either from other persons or from things themselves, affairs and occupations, by which a certain idea is excited in us, by which we are struck and then led, and which in sleep also, with its various changes, is represented to us. Yet unless due cautions are employed, and its use is altogether moderate, as much as the necessity of the disease requires, there is not absent danger of grave harm, both physical and moral. And it is altogether illicit as to other wondrous and altogether preternatural effects. For at the same time insensibility and a wondrous excitation of the senses are had. E. M.

What is irreligiosity? - Irreligiosity is a vice which is opposed to the virtue of religion by defect, and which tends to inflict irreverence upon God either directly in himself, or indirectly in sacred things or persons. In the first mode it is divided into temptation of God, perjury, infidelity in promises, and blasphemy. In the other mode, into sacrilege and simony. Concerning perjury, infidelity, and blasphemy, in the second precept of the Decalogue; concerning the rest here it will have to be said. Yet S. Thomas treats blasphemy insofar as it is opposed to confession of faith, qq. 13, 14. But cf. q. 13, a. 2 ad 2. Suarez, tr. 3, l. 1, c. 1, n. 8.

What is temptation of God? - Temptation of God is a saying or deed by which someone tests whether God is powerful, wise, merciful, or has some other perfection. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 97, a. 1; L. 29; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 3, l. 1, c. 2, n. 14.

Of how many kinds is temptation of God? - It is twofold: one explicit and formal, the other implicit and interpretative. The first is when someone directly intends the testing of divine perfections, and this generally arises from infidelity, although it can also come from lightness, curiosity, imprudent confidence, etc.; for example, if someone doubting concerning some article of faith should ask from God a miracle, or if someone should throw himself down from a high tower, curiously to test whether God is powerful to preserve him from death.

But the second is when someone does not properly intend that testing, but rashly, without any necessity or utility, says or does something which, the circumstances being considered, by its own nature seems to be referred to it. This happens: 1. when someone tests the divine will concerning some future thing. 2. when someone without just cause neglects ordinary remedies and rashly expects an extraordinary effect from God alone, for example, if someone in a dangerous illness rejects all medicine, wishing to be miraculously healed by God. 3. when someone without any necessity casts himself into such danger that he can scarcely be freed without a miracle of God, for example, if someone through the whole of Lent, without a special instinct of God, should wish to abstain from all food and drink, expecting from God an extraordinary preservation of his life. Here note that if someone acts only rashly, without any respect to God, not trusting certainly in divine providence, but by a certain foolish confidence believing that perhaps by chance he will overcome such or such a danger, he does not sin against religion, but only against the fifth precept of the Decalogue. Suarez, de Relig., tr. 3, l. 1, cc. 2, 3; L. 29; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 97, a. 1.

What kind of sin is temptation of God? - Temptation of God is a mortal sin from its genus. It is proved, because it inflicts grave irreverence upon God; hence it is written: You shall not tempt the Lord your God. Matt. 4:7. And this holds whether the temptation is explicit or implicit. Concerning explicit temptation it is clear, because that explicit intention of testing the divine perfections is an explicit contempt of God himself. But concerning implicit temptation it is demonstrated from this, that even an implicit petition, namely that God work contrary to the order of his providence, from mere curiosity or arrogance, without necessity, very evidently redounds to grave injury to him; for it is to act with God as with a favorer of curiosities.

Temptation of God can be only venial not only on account of ignorance, inadvertence, defect of consent, but also on account of smallness of matter. Thus, for example, he would sin only venially who, laboring under illness, should neglect natural remedies and expect health for himself from God by imprudent confidence, or rather presumption; for that man does not seem to commit a grave disorder, since he does not truly ask a miracle from doubt, or from grave lightness and curiosity of testing divine power. Indeed he is excused even from all fault if he hopes that he will be naturally freed from such a disease, with God helping. Likewise he sins per se only venially who from negligence comes unprepared to preach the word of God, hoping for special help from God. Yet if temptation of God comes not only from an imprudent and presumptuous testing of a divine perfection, or only from an imprudent and presumptuous imploration of divine help, but from doubt concerning the divine perfections, then there will be no smallness of matter. For smallness of matter is not given in deliberate doubt against faith. Therefore then sin will have place against religion and also against faith, mortal from its whole genus. L. 29, 30, 32; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 97, aa. 2, 3, 4.

1. Renatus, a parish priest, from devotion toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, and to promote it more and more, often speaks to his parishioners about the Heart of Jesus doing penance for us, and counsels them this special devotion, namely toward the Penitent Heart of Jesus, and this frequent invocation: Penitent Heart of Jesus for us, have mercy on us.

2. Nicolinus, a parish priest, likewise to promote devotion to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, propagates among his parishioners certain new emblems of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus in the Eucharist. For he asserts that worship toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus in the Eucharist is more perfect than simple worship toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, since it embraces the Sacrament of the Eucharist itself, which is the Sacrament of love.

3. Nicolaus, a parish priest, propagates a special cult toward the adorable Face of the Divine Redeemer, and one diverse from that usual one, up to now attributed to the image of the Holy Face.

4. Lucianus, a parish priest, from devotion toward St. Joseph, propagates a special cult of this Saint under the title: of St. Joseph, friend of the Sacred Heart. But from devotion toward the Most Holy Virgin he preaches that she is to be worshipped under the title of Our Lady of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and distributes among his parishioners images of that Virgin which represent her standing with hands spread out, and the child Jesus standing likewise before her knees.

5. Lucas, with every effort, from devotion and love of Our Lord Jesus Christ, propagates devotion toward the Most Holy Soul of Jesus Christ, makes an image representing it, and institutes Confraternities in its honor. He likewise propagates devotion toward the Interior of the Blessed Virgin Mary; he also makes an image, and institutes a Congregation of nuns. Finally, among the faithful he propagates a certain formula of prayer "for obtaining that all men may recognize the supreme dominion of Christ and of Mary Immaculate over all creatures."

Q. What is to be held concerning these various cults?

R. Renatus does not act rightly, nor can he persevere in that practice. For the Holy Office, 15 July 1893, prohibited and condemned the titles: Penitent Heart of Jesus, Penitent Heart of Jesus for us, Penitent Jesus, Penitent Jesus for us. M. E., v. 8, p. 1, p. 175.

Nicolinus likewise does not act rightly, nor can he persevere in his practice. For by the Holy Office, 3 June 1891, it was decided: "The new emblems of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus in the Eucharist are not to be approved by the Apostolic See. For fostering the piety of the faithful, the images of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus already used and approved in the Church are sufficient; because the cult toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus in the Eucharist is not more perfect than the cult toward the Eucharist itself, nor another from the cult toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus." Monit. Eccles., v. 7, p. 1, p. 101. But when doubts had been proposed: "1. Whether the images of the Sacred Heart representing the Heart alone without the rest of the body can safely be distributed? 2. Whether they are approved at Rome? 3. Whether they must be withdrawn from the houses of the faithful, where they are an object of veneration?" The Holy Office, 26 Aug. 1891, responded: "To the first, second, and third: The image of the Most Sacred Heart of Our Lord Jesus Christ, concerning which there is question, is permitted from private devotion, provided it is not exposed on altars to be worshipped with public veneration." M. E., v. 9, p. 1, p. 32.

Nicolaus likewise must abstain from the propagation of the aforesaid special cult, and one diverse from the usual one, toward the adorable Face of the Divine Redeemer. For, when the doubt had been proposed concerning approving or at least permitting a cult of this sort, the Holy Office declared: It is not expedient. Therefore Nicolaus may indeed propagate the cult toward the image of the Face of the Divine Redeemer, or copies of that image, but as it was already usual from ancient times, namely so that in the minds of the faithful, from veneration and contemplation of the aforesaid image, the memory of the sufferings of Christ may grow more day by day, and in their hearts sorrow for faults and an ardent desire of repairing the injuries inflicted on the divine Majesty may be increased. M. E., v. 7, p. 2, p. 221.

As regards Lucianus, concerning the cult of St. Joseph under the title Friend of the Sacred Heart, the Fathers of the S. I. C. "decreed, with the approval of Our Most Holy Lord Leo XIII, that there is not to be an interlocution concerning the matter proposed. Besides, they ordered that the Sacred Congregation of Rites be warned lest in the future decrees, rescripts, etc., be issued in which the new title mentioned above is approved in any way, or even in which mention simply is made of it." M. E., v. 7, p. 2, p. 220. But as regards that title and image of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the same S. I. C., 3 Apr. 1895, decreed "that the title indeed can be admitted, but the images are not approved and are to be removed from public veneration."

As regards Lucas, although that prior cult contains nothing false, nor even anything incongruous, nevertheless it is a new cult, as it is proposed, and is not to be propagated publicly without the approval of the Church. "The Most Holy One.... commanded... that the writers are to be warned who sharpen their talents over.... arguments which savor of novelty, and, under the appearance of piety, strive to promote unaccustomed titles of cult even through journals, that they desist from their plan, and weigh the danger which lies beneath of drawing the faithful into error even concerning dogmas of faith, and of giving an occasion to haters of Religion for disparaging the purity of faith, Catholic doctrine, and true piety." Holy Office, 15 July 1893, M. E., v. 8, p. 1, p. 175. And this especially, in this cult of the Soul of Christ, is to be noted: that in it the whole Humanity of Christ and Christ the Redeemer appear less clearly than in the cult of the Most Sacred Heart, the Most Precious Blood, the Five Wounds, and the other mysteries of the life and Passion of Jesus Christ; whence surely the cult seems less suitable to be spread among the people.

But concerning the other cult toward the Interior of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the following doubts were proposed: "1. Whether and how it is fitting to approve the title of the Interior of the Blessed Virgin Mary, which the new Institute of the Sisters A. of M. of the diocese of P. assumes? 2. Whether, the aforesaid title being admitted, it is fitting also to admit among the other feasts of the aforesaid Institute that of the Interior of the Blessed Virgin Mary?" The Holy Office, 13 Dec. 1893, responded: "To both, negatively." But as regards that prayer, the Holy Office, 12 June 1895, decreed: "the prayer concerning which there is question is not to be approved, nor propagated among the faithful, nor enriched with indulgences."

Andreas, a priest, often heard speak about notable Relics; but he does not know what they are. He also heard speak about the exposition of Relics, and blessing with Relics, and also about their procession, but he does not know how all these things ought to be done. Wherefore he desires to be instructed briefly in all these things, as regards those things which more belong to practice.

R. Notable Relics are the Body, Head, Arm, Leg, or that part of the body in which a Martyr suffered, provided it is whole and not small, and legitimately approved by the Ordinaries. S. R. C., 8 April 1628, to 3, Urbis. Bones of the femur would not be. Nor likewise the tibia. S. R. C., 3 June 1662, Dubium. - Thorns from the Crown of Our Lord Jesus Christ are counted among notable Relics, and are worthy of special cult. - Notable relics are to be kept not in monasteries, but in the exterior Church of nuns.

As regards the exposition of Relics, in all Churches it is licit to expose Relics, provided they are recognized by the bishop. S. R. C., 2 Sept. 1690, Fundana. - The abuse is to be eliminated of placing the Relics of Saints and pious images upon the tabernacle in which the most august sacrament is reserved; nor before the little door of the tabernacle, even if it is a Relic of the Most Holy Cross. S. R. C., 31 March 1821, to 6, General Decree; 12 March 1836, to 1, Triden. - But a Relic of the Most Holy Cross is to be separated from the Relics of Saints. - Under the Relic of some Saint, exposed to public veneration among candlesticks, a pall ought not to be used. S. R. C., 7 Apr. 1832, to 3, Ariminen. - When Relics of Saints are exposed, beyond the lamp, at least two lights must continuously burn upon the altar, though not at night; otherwise they are not to be exposed. S. R. C., 22 Jan. 1701, to 9, Congr. Mont. Coron. - Relics of the Blessed can be exposed, as images and statues, in churches in which the office and Mass of the Blessed can be recited and respectively celebrated.

As regards blessing with Relics, a priest in a private Mass, the Mass having been finished, vested in the sacred vestments, can distribute ashes and present relics to be kissed, if there is such a custom, after Mass is completed. S. R. C., 16 March 1833, to 5, n. 2704. - Before the wood of the Holy Cross openly exposed, one must genuflect on one knee in passing. S. R. C., 23 May 1835, to 2, n. 2722. In blessing with a relic of the Most Holy Cross, it is not licit to sing: Benedicat vos omnipotens Deus, Pater, etc. S. R. C., 23 May 1835, to 3. - Blessing and the kiss of the Relic are to be omitted as long as the Most Holy Sacrament remains exposed. S. R. C., 17 July 1900.

As regards the procession of Relics, it is not licit, for any cause or custom whatever, to carry Relics of Saints processionally under a baldachin; nevertheless it can be tolerated and permitted that the wood of the Most Holy Cross and the other Instruments of the Lord's Passion, with attention to the peculiar veneration of these, and to the almost universal custom, be carried under a baldachin, provided it is done separately and apart from the Relics of Saints, to whom this distinctive honor is by no means fitting. S. R. C., 27 May 1826, n. 2647, General Decree. The decree seems to have to be understood of ordinary processions, which are customarily celebrated every year, but not of solemn ones for the translation of some sacred Image or Relics. - Relics of the Blessed are not to be carried about in processions. S. R. C., 27 Sept. 1659.

Beatrix, a nun, had a spiritual friendship with another nun, Sanctina. When she was now near death, Beatrix asked of her that, if it pleased God, she would reveal to her the state of her soul after her death. With her hand stretched out toward the Crucifix, Sanctina nodded with her head. But, when Sanctina had piously died in the Lord, Beatrix immediately began to be disturbed by scruples; whence, approaching the confessor, she manifests the matter to him. You have acted very badly, the confessor responds; for, in these matters, the devil is accustomed to mingle himself. For it is not licit to inquire into things which God wills to be hidden, according to that saying of Eccl. 3:22, Do not seek things higher than you. But God wills the state of the soul after death to be hidden; which is clear from this, that when the rich man asked that Lazarus be sent to his living brothers, this was denied, as is said in Luke 16:29. Beatrix, more disturbed by this response, asks her Superior that before night she call Fr. Thomas, her extraordinary confessor; otherwise she certainly will not be able to sleep quietly and in peace.

Q. What will the extraordinary confessor be able to respond to Beatrix?

R. Fr. Thomas will be able to respond with that which St. Thomas would respond, Quodl. 3, a. 22. "I respond that it must be said that, since sin is against nature... to seek the fulfillment of a natural desire is not a sin, unless some disorder is added, as is clear in the taking of food and drink. But man naturally desires to know. Hence, if he seeks knowledge of some thing, it is not a sin, unless perhaps by accident, that is, through some disorder added; for example, if through the study and inquiry of some science someone is impeded from those things to which he is held to attend; for example, if a preacher is impeded from the office of due preaching on account of the study of geometry; or also, if someone seeks to know something, trusting proudly and presumptuously in his own ability; or if some other disorder of this sort should happen concerning this. But no disorder seems to be in this inquiry, if someone should seek from one dying to know his state after death, nevertheless submitting this to divine judgment. Hence no reason appears why this ought to be said to be a sin, unless perhaps he inquires from a doubting of faith concerning the future state, as though tempting.

But to that which is objected to the contrary, it must be said that God wills many things to be thus hidden from us, knowledge of which we cannot acquire by our own powers or merit; which nevertheless he wills to be revealed to those asking humbly and piously, according to that saying, Matt. 2:25, You have hidden these things from the wise and prudent; and have revealed them to little ones. Hence it is not marvelous if God was unwilling that some things be revealed to the proud brothers of the proud rich man, which nevertheless he wills to be revealed to the faithful asking piously and humbly."

"He does not sin gravely," says La-Croix, l. 3, p. 1, n. 18, "who enters into an agreement with another, that the one dying first appear to the survivor, God permitting this, being about to warn the other concerning things pertaining to salvation; for in this he intends to know nothing by the aid of the devil. Nevertheless there could be venial sin present on account of curiosity or danger of deception."

Gerafinia, perfectly restored to health from a grave illness of influenza, makes a vow of abstinence and fasting for her whole life, on all Sundays and the days of the Nativity and of Easter. For she has heard that it is an efficacious and infallible remedy for preventing a relapse. And she holds this as altogether certain, since in fact she has now persevered in perfect bodily health for three years.

Q. 1. What is vain observance? - 2. Is Gerafinia guilty of superstition; and is she bound by the vow?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 478 seqq. To the second: Gerafinia is guilty of superstition. The reason is that fasting, observed on the aforesaid days, is not of itself an infallible means for preventing a relapse into influenza. But she resolved to observe it with certain faith in the effect that would follow.

Besides, she is not bound by the vow. For the cult is superfluous, foreign to the custom of the Church, and bearing singularity before itself. Hence a vow of fasting ordinarily on Sundays and on the more solemn feasts of the Church is null, especially when the one vowing by no means observes fasting on other days. Nevertheless, superstition being excluded, of itself it would not exceed venial sin. Indeed it would not even be venial if someone fasted from mortification. But it is better to abstain from such a fast, and therefore the doctors commonly teach that a fast promised on Sunday can be fulfilled on Saturday; and, if someone has vowed to fast for a month, that he is not bound on Sunday. But if someone accustomed to fast on other days sometimes fasts, from some good end, on Sunday, he does not sin. - Reuter, p. 2, n. 427; Lig. 4; G. 258-260; I. M. 466.

Hedvigis, laboring under a grave illness, consults several physicians, but in vain. Hence she first approaches Pancratius, who prescribes to her that she wear an artfully fashioned necklace for exciting the electric, biotic fluid. When she had done this for some time and had experienced some relief, she consults Nicetas, another physician, indeed an honest man, who counsels her to be subjected to hypnotism for exciting magnetic sleep in her, in which a benign crisis of the infirmity will be had. And he asserts that he will do this with every superstition and every other illicit circumstance entirely removed. But Hedvigis, since she is a timorous woman, before she furnishes her consent, seeks the counsel of the confessor.

Q. Has Hedvigis, in the first case, sinned; and what ought the confessor to respond to her in the other?

R. Hedvigis, in the first case, sinned in no way. The reason is that in applying that remedy there was no superstition, and no other illicit circumstance. As regards superstition, there is no doubt that electric fluid exists in inanimate bodies, of altogether marvelous power and efficacy. Therefore nothing prevents that the same fluid exists in animate bodies, in plants, in animals, in man, and that in these it obtains a still special efficacy from the soul, which is the intrinsic principle of life; whence a fluid of this sort is also called biotic. And certainly, as electricity excited from without in man can be gravely harmful to man, like other elements, why also can it not, when excited in due manner, produce salutary effects, which also happens in other elements applied extrinsically to the organism? And thus in fact there are several who are well or badly disposed according to the various state of the electricity of the air. But there is nothing illicit and immoral in this, that someone should wear a necklace made from a determined metal, or from sealing wax, or from another similar material apt for exciting or extinguishing electricity.

As regards the other case, since there is question only of merely exciting sleep, which can be excited by several natural means, it does not seem that superstition must necessarily therefore be asserted. And every superstitious cause being removed, as, for example, if this were done by the mere command of the will, and likewise every immoral circumstance being removed, as, for example, if a dishonest touch were used, nothing is then had which appears illicit. Wherefore it does not seem that the confessor, in the case, can burden Hedvigis' conscience with grave sin. Indeed, the oracles themselves of the Holy See condemn not magnetism, but the abuse of magnetism. And it is well established among the doctors that those things are to be judged natural which are not established to exceed the powers of nature, whether from the effects themselves which followed, or from the causes applied, or from the manner of applying these. But, since this matter generally is not without grave danger, the confessor will indeed act prudently by exhorting Hedvigis that she apply another remedy and omit this one. D'Annib., ed. 3, p. 2, n. 53. Cf. G. 271 seqq.

It will not be beside the matter here to note that, just as in this matter of magnetism and hypnotism there are several who hold all things as natural and licit, so on the contrary there are not lacking those who hold all things as superstitious and illicit. The former and the latter err together. - Speaking of fascination, St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 117, a. 3, ad 2, says: "It must be said that from the strong imagination of the soul the spirits of the conjoined body are changed, which change of the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the subtler spirits come.... Thus therefore, when some soul has been vehemently moved to malice, as happens especially in old women, her look is made poisonous and harmful according to the aforesaid mode, especially to children, who have a tender body and one easily receptive of impression. It is also possible that, by the permission of God, or even from some hidden pact, the malice of demons cooperates in this, with whom sorceress old women have some covenant."

When the aforesaid change has been produced in the body, as St. Thomas says in the same place, "the continuous air is infected up to a determined space." And this indeed is verified in contagious diseases, which are not always communicated by bodily touch, but also without touch, and therefore through infected air. And thus through this change of one's own body an exterior body can be changed. St. Thomas, ibid., ad 3. What, then, prevents some impression from being produced naturally by a look, for example, imagination also assisting? - And thus Scavini, 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 1, n. 247, commemorating this doctrine of St. Thomas concerning fascination, says: "One is natural, of which we have an example in magnetism, when from the fixed gaze of another someone easily receives impressions.... Another is superstitious and is called common fascination, which is believed by the common people, namely that those looking with an envious mind harm.... Here also we note that not all things which are believed to be deceits are such; for the sagacity and imagination of man can have many parts; for how very powerful it is, and of how many evils it is a cause, philosophers everywhere prove by inescapable arguments and facts." Besides, St. Thomas wisely warns, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 4: "Where manifest indications of someone's malice do not appear, we ought to hold him as good, interpreting for the better insofar as it is doubtful." - Yet it is rightly counseled then to premise a protestation of not willing the effect, if some superstition lies beneath. Cf. D'Annib., l. c.; St. Thomas, Quodl. 12, a. 13.

Macrina, a nun most observant of regular discipline, frequently fasts, rises at night to pray, and exercises other austerities of the body. When Petronia the superior had learned these things, she prohibits all things to Macrina. For she says that sanctity does not consist in these things; and, with attention to Macrina's physical constitution, that this is to tempt God, assuredly a grave sin. Although Macrina is not of robust health, nevertheless she is altogether well. But preferring obedience to her superior, she submits herself altogether to her.

Q. 1. What is temptation of God, and what kind of sin? - 2. What is to be thought concerning Macrina? - 3. What is to be thought concerning Petronia?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 487 seqq. To the second: Macrina indeed is to be praised on account of her virtue of penitence and obedience. That Macrina was led by the good spirit of God in the exercise of that exterior penitence is clear from this, that although she was not of very strong health, nevertheless she was well; whence it can also be gathered that in fact she had not been indiscreet by exercising penances beyond her strength. It is especially clear from the promptitude of her obedience; whence it is also gathered that she was moved not by a certain pursuit of singularity, but by a true desire of virtue.

To the third. Petronia indeed errs when she says that sanctity does not consist in exterior penitence, in order to contemn it. For although sanctity essentially and formally is not in this exterior penitence and mortification, nevertheless it consists in it instrumentally; since several other virtues themselves also do not essentially constitute sanctity; nevertheless they are most valid means and instruments for acquiring sanctity. St. Thomas, Quodl. 4, a. 24. She likewise errs when she affirms that Macrina tempts God. For then Macrina would have tempted God, when Macrina, seeing, for example, that she was being weakened in her powers by those exterior austerities, had still persevered in that manner of acting, for the sake of making trial of the goodness and power of God, expecting from him that she be preserved unharmed. And in such a case she would have sinned not only against the first precept of the Decalogue, but also against the fifth precept, if by acting thus she had exposed herself to grave danger of life, without any necessity or proportionate utility, but only from the rash inclination of her own will. Wherefore Petronia gravely errs when she affirms a grave sin.

Besides, Petronia, in this matter, interferes with the office proper to the confessor, contrary to the Decree of the S. C. EE. and RR., 17 Dec. 1890. For spiritual direction properly pertains to the confessor, which by its nature also embraces the exercise of these penances. Hence, according to the present practice of the Sacred Congregation, for private penances of this sort, which are in no way public, nothing is required except the approval and permission of the confessor; but for those which would in some way be public, the approval also of the superior is required, for preserving the right order of the whole Community.

But in granting or denying exterior penances of this sort, due discretion and prudence must be preserved. "For there are some directors so imprudent that they seem to place every progress of the soul in burdening it with fasts, hairshirts, bloody disciplines, burnings, and similar things. But others seem altogether to reprove external mortifications, as useless for spiritual progress, placing all perfection in interior mortification. But these also err, as the first do, because bodily mortifications aid internal ones, and are in some way necessary, when they can be exercised, for restraining the senses; and therefore we read that they were practiced more or less by all the Saints.... To assert absolutely: External mortifications profit nothing, or little, is the greatest error." St. Alph., H. A., last treatise, App. 1, n. 23. Cf. this whole number and the following ones.

1. Theofridus, on feast days, is accustomed to go to Church, yet not with the mind of honoring God, but of seeing his betrothed, and inviting her to come together into another place. Hence during the whole time of the sacred functions he morosely feeds his eyes by looking at his betrothed, and in her, in his own mind, he takes complacence to himself, and with shameful touches upon himself he is venereally delighted.

2. Livonia and Vibiana stubbornly contend and quarrel with each other over the ownership of a certain prayer book, in church. Hearing the shouts, Andronicus, the church custodian, immediately runs up, who at once, with his staff, beats the women and casts them out of the church. But behold, while Livonia hastens to go out, she is driven against the door of the church and pours forth blood from her nostrils.

I am the Lord thy God... thou shalt not have strange gods. Exod. 20. 2.

This precept, as affirmative, prescribes in the first place the acts of Religion, by which the worship due to the Divinity is rendered; as negative, it prohibits vices opposed to Religion.

The vices opposed to Religion are 1º superstition by excess; 2º irreligiosity by defect.

83. Sacrilege, insofar as it is a sin of lust, is the violation of a sacred place, thing, or person through a venereal act; therefore besides sin against chastity it also embraces sin against religion. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 154, a. 10; L. 454.

84. Concerning a sacred person. Proposition. Carnal and personal sacrilege "properly and strictly is called illicit intercourse, or any sin of the flesh, of a person bound and consecrated to God by a solemn vow of chastity, as by profession of an approved Religion, or by reception of sacred Order from the subdiaconate inclusively. The reason is that sacrilege properly and strictly is violation of a sacred thing; but a sacred thing is properly called one which by public authority and rite is instituted and consecrated to the worship of God; but by solemn vow alone of profession or of sacred order a person is consecrated to the worship of God by the public authority of the Church, solemnly accepting that vow in the place of God; not likewise by a simple vow privately emitted. Wherefore a sin of the flesh of a person bound to chastity by a simple vow alone is not indeed strictly a sacrilege properly so called, since it is not of a sacred person; nevertheless it is a special sin against the virtue of Religion and the second precept of the Decalogue, namely violation of a vow and of a promise made to God, and therefore it must also necessarily be explained in confession according to all." Sporer, 615; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 7, D. 27, n. 17 seqq.; Suarez, de Relig., T. 1, Tr. 3, l. 3, c. 2 and 3. But since the solemn vow of chastity is a vow of perfect chastity, as a simple vow of perfect chastity includes external and internal acts, so also and much more does a solemn vow; and consequently a merely internal sin against chastity of a person sacred to God is also sacrilege.

85. Corollaries. Hence one bound by a solemn vow of chastity who sins carnally perpetrates a sin containing threefold malice: of immodesty against chastity; of infidelity against God, on account of non-fulfillment of the promise made to him; of sacrilege on account of violation or profanation of a person consecrated to God. But the gravity of sacrilege is of three degrees, if it has an accomplice: 1. grave, if the carnal sin is of a non-sacred person with a sacred one; 2. graver, if it is of a sacred person with a non-sacred one; 3. gravest, if it is of a sacred person with a sacred one. Cf. here n. 67; L. 456.

Note. 1. It is probable that there is no need to express whether the vow was solemn or simple, because the opposite opinion is also probable, namely that violation of a sacred person bound by a simple vow of chastity is also true sacrilege. Nor likewise is it necessary to say if the person is sacred by a double title, because he is a religious and a priest, because one constituted in sacred orders is more probably and truly held to chastity only by reason of the vow annexed to the Order, as is gathered from Cap. Cum olim 6, de Cleric. coniug.; Sanchez, l. c.; L. 454, 455; Lugo, de Poenit., D. 16, n. 146-150.

2. "It must altogether be held that a religious commits sacrilege who would be lingeringly delighted concerning the carnal sin of another, or who would pollute another with his hands, even without his own delectation." L. 457. Likewise he commits sacrilege who induces a sacred person to a sin of lust, although he himself does not sin with that person; for he cooperates in sacrilege. G. 424. On the contrary, it is sufficiently probable that he does not commit sacrilege who, having a vow of chastity, by his counsel induces another to carnal sin, because one emitting a vow of chastity regards not another's chastity, but only his own. Whence then he would sin by scandal. Understand, however, if he did this for another end than from positive affection of lust; otherwise he would now sin directly against his own chastity, of which he emitted the vow. Billuart, Diss. 6, art. 8; Ithurriaga, Cas. 53, n. 29; Lugo, l. c., n. 151 seqq.; L. 157.

3. Personal sacrilege in affection would be present if someone polluted himself by thinking with delectation of a male Saint or a female Saint, or, what is most horrible, of Our Lord Jesus Christ himself or of the Blessed Virgin herself.

86. Concerning place. Proposition 1. Sacred place here is understood only as church, that is, a place consecrated by the Bishop for divine offices, or even simply blessed from roof all the way to pavement; and cemetery, that is, a place blessed and deputed for burying the dead. Wherefore private oratories are excluded, since they are not true churches, nor are they solemnly blessed by the rite prescribed for a public oratory in the Roman Ritual, but by the blessing which is had in the same Ritual for a new house or place. S. R. C., June 7, 1899, n. 4025. Also excluded are all other parts of the church which are in no way contained within the roof and pavement, such as cells, cloister, sacristies, dormitory, the roof above the church, the door outside the threshold of the church, the atrium. L. 460; Billuart, Diss. 6, art. 8.

87. Proposition 2. Merely internal sins are not to be held as sacrileges, at least not as gravely such, because they do not seem especially to affect the sacred place, unless there is had a desire of sinning externally in the sacred place itself, even if that desire is had outside the sacred place; for then it is sacrilege in affection. But as regards external sins, it is certain among all that grave sacrilege is committed by consummated acts, namely by voluntary pollution, fornication. Here it must be observed: 1. that several from St. Alphonsus, 438, probably hold that sacrilege in a church is committed only by public effusion of semen, although others probably say that even occult effusion and illicit intercourse are grave sacrilege; Lugo, de Poenit., D. 16, n. 462, affirms this to be more common and truer. - 2. That several apud the same Holy Doctor hand down as probable that, scandal being prescinded, marital intercourse had in a church is never sacrilege. L. 36, 334, 434, 458, and l. 6, n. 920. And others more probably deny this, unless it is done from moral necessity, that is, "on account of the long sojourn of a spouse in a church." Lugo, de Poenit., D. 16, n. 463. But whether, besides these consummated acts, grave sacrilege is committed by other grave external non-consummated sins is disputed. Some probably affirm, others probably deny. L. 459; Sporer, 619; Billuart, l. c.; Lugo, l. c., n. 464, 466; Suarez, de Relig., T. 1, tr. 2, l. 3, c. 7. "Yet Lugo and others passim rightly except the case unless someone exercises immodest things of this kind in a sacred place with great irreverence to the church, as if he were publicly to touch a prostitute immodestly before the altar, if he were to exhibit lascivious comedies in a sacred temple, etc.; for then it must not be denied that properly a crime of sacrilege is committed, because grave irreverence would be done to divine worship, to which the sacred place is deputed and consecrated." Sporer, ibid.; Billuart, l. c.; Suarez, l. c.

88. Note. Through voluntary and illicit effusion of semen the church remains polluted, so that one would have to abstain from divine offices, if this became known, until the church itself is reconciled. C. unic., de Consecr. Eccl., in 6.

89. Concerning things. Proposition. By the name of sacred thing is understood any other object, sacred or holy, distinct from a sacred person and place, as in this matter especially "the sacraments themselves, by which man is sanctified, hold the highest place; the chief of these is the Sacrament of the Eucharist, which contains Christ himself. And therefore the sacrilege which is committed against this sacrament is the gravest among all. But after the sacraments, consecrated vessels for the reception of the sacraments hold the second place, and sacred images themselves and relics of the Saints, in which in some way the very persons of the Saints are venerated and honored; then those things which pertain to the adornment of the Church and of the ministers." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 99, a. 3; Laymann, l. 4, Tr. 10, c. 7, n. 12, 13.

90. Corollaries. 1. Real sacrilege will be, in the present matter, the lustful handling of these objects, "as if on linens or vessels sacred vessels semen were poured forth, if a blessed candle, or, what is horrible, the sacred Eucharist were used for an amorous philtre, in order that thus the abused woman may be more vehemently inflamed with lust. He commits real sacrilege who lustfully handles images and relics of the saints, sacred vestments, rosaries, crosses, medals, or who, by gazing upon a sacred image of Christ, the Blessed Virgin, or some saint, defiles himself. In these cases the malice of sacrilege must be explained in confession. L. 456. 457. Cf. here n. 222.

“26. The prayer of one foreknown [as damned] avails no one.” Proposition of John Wycliffe condemned at the Council of Constance.

“50. In vain do we cry to God: My Father, if it is not the spirit of charity that cries. — 59. The prayer of the impious is a new sin; and what God grants them is a new judgment upon them.” Propositions of Paschasius Quesnel condemned by Clement XI.

“7. He who, in praying, asks for something singular and determinate asks for evil and asks evilly, because he asks for a negation of good and a negation of God, and prays that God be denied to him.” Proposition of Eckhart condemned by John XXII in 1329.

“14. It is not fitting for one who is resigned to the divine will to ask anything from God, because asking is an imperfection, since it is an act of one’s own will and choice, and is to will that the divine will be conformed to ours, and not that ours be conformed to the divine; and that saying of the Gospel, Ask and you shall receive, was not spoken by Christ for interior souls, which do not wish to have a will; indeed, souls of this kind arrive at such a point that they cannot ask anything from God. — 15. Just as they ought not to ask anything from God, so neither ought they to give Him thanks for anything, because each is an act of one’s own will. — 22. To assert that in prayer it is necessary to help oneself through discourse and through thoughts when God does not speak to the soul is ignorance. God never speaks; His speech is operation, and He always operates in the soul when it does not impede Him by its discourses, thoughts, and operations. — 23. In prayer it is necessary to remain in obscure and universal faith, with quiet and forgetfulness of every particular and distinct thought concerning the attributes of God and the Trinity, and thus to remain in the presence of God to adore, love, and serve Him, but without producing acts, because God is not pleased with these. — 24. Whatever thoughts occur in prayer, even impure ones, even against God, the Saints, the faith, and the sacraments, if they are not voluntarily nourished nor voluntarily expelled, but are tolerated with indifference and resignation, do not impede the prayer of faith; indeed, they render it more perfect, because the soul then remains more resigned to the divine will. — 25. Even if sleep supervenes and one sleeps, nevertheless actual prayer and contemplation take place, because prayer and resignation are the same, and while resignation endures, prayer also endures. — 26. Those three ways, the purgative, illuminative, and unitive, are the greatest absurdity that has been spoken in mystical theology, since there is only one way, namely, the interior way. — 27. He who desires and embraces sensible devotion neither desires nor seeks God, but himself; and he who walks by the interior way acts evilly when he desires it and endeavors to have it, both in sacred places and on solemn days. — 30. Everything sensible which is expressed in the spiritual life is abominable, filthy, and unclean. — 32. Neither before nor after Communion is any preparation or thanksgiving required—for these interior souls—other than continuance in solid passive resignation, because in a more perfect manner it supplies for all the acts of the virtues which can and do take place in the ordinary way. And if, on this occasion of Communion, movements of humiliation, petition, or thanksgiving arise, they are to be repressed whenever it is not discerned that they are from a special impulse of God; otherwise they are impulses of nature not yet dead. — 33. A soul which proceeds by this interior way acts evilly if on solemn days it wishes by some particular effort to stir up in itself some devout feeling, since for interior souls all days are equal, all are festive. And the same is said concerning sacred places, because for souls of this kind all places are equal. — 34. To give thanks to God with words and tongue is not for interior souls, which ought to remain in silence, placing no impediment to God’s operating in them; and the more they resign themselves to God, the more they experience that they cannot recite the Lord’s Prayer, or Our Father. — 35. It is not fitting for souls of this interior way to perform operations, even virtuous ones, from their own choice and activity; otherwise they would not be dead. Nor ought they to elicit acts of love toward the Blessed Virgin, the Saints, or the Humanity of Christ, because, since these objects are sensible, such also is the love toward them. — 36. No creature, neither the Blessed Virgin nor the Saints, ought to sit in our heart, because God alone wills to occupy and possess it. — 55. By this interior way, although with much suffering, one arrives at purging and extinguishing all the passions, so that nothing further is felt, nothing, nothing; nor is any disquiet felt, as in a dead body, nor does the soul allow itself to be moved any further. — 56. The two laws and the two cupidities—one of the soul and the other of self-love—endure as long as self-love endures; hence, when this has been purged and killed, as takes place by the interior way, those two laws and two cupidities are no longer present, nor is any fall thereafter incurred, nor is anything further felt, not even venial sin. — 57. Through acquired contemplation one arrives at the state of no longer committing sins, either mortal or venial. — 58. One arrives at a state of this kind by no longer reflecting upon one’s own operations, because defects arise from reflection. — 61. When the soul has arrived at mystical death, it can no longer will anything other than what God wills, because it no longer has a will, and God has taken it away from it. — 62. By the interior way one arrives at a continuous and immovable state in imperturbable peace. — 63. By the interior way one arrives even at the death of the senses; indeed, the sign that someone remains in the state of nothingness, that is, of mystical death, is that the external senses no longer represent sensible things, so that they are as if they did not exist, because they do not succeed in causing the intellect to apply itself to them. — 64. A theologian has less disposition for the contemplative state than an uneducated man: first, because he does not have so pure a faith; second, because he is not so humble; third, because he does not so greatly care for his own salvation; fourth, because he has his head filled with phantasms, species, opinions, and speculations, and cannot enter into that true light.” Propositions of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

“9. I recently considered whether I should wish to receive or desire anything from God; I wish to free myself very well from this, because if I were one receiving from God, I would be under Him or beneath Him, as a servant or a slave, and He would be as a Lord in giving; but it will not be thus in eternal life.” Error of Eckhart condemned by John XXII in 1329. Cf. nn. 452, 455.

“18. He who in prayer uses images, figures, species, and his own concepts does not adore God in spirit and truth.” Proposition of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

“Is a certain formula to be approved for obtaining that all men acknowledge the supreme dominion of Christ and Mary Immaculate over all creatures? — Resp. The prayer in question is not to be approved, nor propagated among the faithful, nor enriched with indulgences.” Holy Office, 12 June 1895.

“26. Praise which is offered to Mary, as Mary, is vain.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1698.

“The Saints reigning together with Christ are to be venerated and invoked, and they offer prayers to God for us, and their relics are to be venerated. I most firmly assert that images of Christ and of the Mother of God ever Virgin, as well as of the other Saints, are to be had and retained, and that due honor and veneration are to be imparted to them.” Tridentine Profession of Faith.

“I constantly hold that there is a Purgatory and that the souls detained there are aided by the suffrages of the faithful.” Tridentine Profession of Faith. [The source prints the section number “437”; corrected here to “457” from the numerical sequence and the subject indicated in the book’s contents.]

“The suffrages of the faithful living, namely, the sacrifices of Masses, prayers, and alms, and other offices of piety which, according to the institutions of the Church, are customarily performed by the faithful for other faithful, profit them—the souls of Purgatory.” Greek Profession of Faith prescribed by Gregory XIII. The same is contained in the same words in the Oriental Profession of Faith prescribed by Urban VIII and by Benedict XIV.

“1. Whether it is expedient to approve, or at least to permit, a special worship of the adorable Countenance of the Divine Redeemer, distinct from that customarily rendered until now to the image of the Holy Face, which is being most greatly propagated through the annals of the relevant archconfraternity by the priests called Priests of the Holy Face (Sainte Face), established at Tours. — 2. Whether, in order to propagate or establish the worship concerning which there is question in the other query, it is expedient to dedicate a church or public oratory, to establish confraternities, and even to found some religious congregation or institute under the title of the Holy Face. — Resp. To the 1st: It is not expedient. — To the 2nd: In the negative; and according to the intention.

“The intention is: in adopting the title of the Holy Face, both in the Brief dated 16 Dec. 1884 granting special indulgences to the confraternity erected at Tours under such a title, and in the Brief dated 30 March 1885 elevating the confraternity to the rank of an archconfraternity, the Holy See did not in the least intend to favor, much less either directly or indirectly to give approval to, a special and distinct worship to be rendered to the adorable countenance of the Redeemer in that manner which is especially proposed and propagated by those called Priests of the Holy Face.

“The Holy See intended to favor solely the veneration already shown from ancient times toward the image of the Countenance of the Divine Redeemer, or toward copies of that image, so that, from the veneration and contemplation of the aforesaid image, the memory of the Passion of Christ may increase more from day to day in the minds of the faithful, and in their hearts sorrow for sins and an ardent desire of making reparation for injuries inflicted upon the Divine Majesty may be augmented.” Holy Office, 4 May 1892.

“The Supreme Sacred Roman Universal Inquisition wholly prohibits and condemns the title: The Penitent Heart of Jesus — The Heart of Jesus doing penance for us — Jesus doing penance — Jesus doing penance for us.” Holy Office, 15 July 1893.

“1. When certain matters concerning devotion toward the Most Holy Soul of Our Lord Jesus Christ had been referred by the Sacred Congregation of Rites to the Holy Office, on Wednesday, 10 March 1875, it was decreed: Care is to be taken lest, under the pretext of devotion toward the Most Holy Soul of Christ, novelties deserving reprobation creep into the public worship of the Church in images, formulas of prayer, and other sacred things, or anything new be introduced without consultation of the Holy See, especially if they are derived from devotions or visions neither examined nor approved. Moreover, in the writings sent to the Sacred Congregation of Rites certain things are found which are by no means to be approved, without the amendment of which it is not to be permitted that those writings be published among the people.

“2. In the year 1883, petitions having been presented for the foundation of an Institute for the adoration of the Most Holy Soul of Our Lord Jesus Christ, on Wednesday, 10 May of the same year, the same Most Eminent Fathers issued the decree: The Sacred Congregation responds to the petitions: In the negative. And this is to be written to the Bishop, who is to withdraw the indulgences attached to the prayers and to each word of them, and is to place no faith in the revelations concerning which there is question; and the decree issued in the year 1875 is to be communicated to the Bishop.

“3. Finally, in the same year and on the same Wednesday, when a certain formula of prayer to the Soul of Jesus Christ was called up for examination, the Most Eminent Fathers ordered it to be amended and ordered the decree reported above to be communicated to the Bishop who had approved it.” Holy Office, May 1901.

“1. Whether and how it is expedient to approve the title of the Interior of the Blessed Virgin Mary, which the new Institute of the Sisters A. of M., of the diocese of P., assumes. “2. Whether, if the aforesaid title is admitted, it is also expedient to admit among the other feasts of the aforesaid Institute that of the Interior of the Blessed Virgin Mary. — Resp. To each: In the negative.” Holy Office, 13 Dec. 1893.

“The worship of St. Joseph under the title Friend of the Sacred Heart (ami du S. Cœur) was made the object of a special examination; and the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Cardinals, General Inquisitors in matters of faith and morals, all the circumstances, especially those occurring in the case, having been maturely weighed, decreed, with the approval of Our Most Holy Lord Pope Leo XIII, that no pronouncement was to be made concerning the matter proposed. — Furthermore, the aforesaid Most Eminent Fathers ordered that the Sacred Congregation of Rites be admonished not thereafter to issue decrees, rescripts, etc., in which in any manner the new title concerning which there is question above is approved, or even in which it is simply mentioned.” Holy Office.

“The worship of the Heart of St. Joseph had already been reproved by Gregory XVI, and for this reason medals which displayed it together with the Most Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary were prohibited.” Sacred Congregation of Indulgences, 19 Feb. 1879; Sacred Congregation of Rites, 14 June 1873. [The source prints “Gregory XIV”; corrected here to “Gregory XVI” as required by the historical chronology of the cited devotion.]

“Whether the temporal nativity of any Saint or Blessed, except that of the Virgin Mother of God and also that of St. John the Baptist, can be celebrated by a liturgical rite or by another manner of sacred solemnity. — Resp. In the negative, even if the celebration should take place on the day of death or on any other day assigned to the commemoration of the same Saint or Blessed.” Sacred Congregation of Rites, 19 Dec. 1893, General Decree.

With regard to the worship to be rendered to the Holy Thorn, “the Decrees are to be observed, especially the Decree in Tridentina, 12 March 1836, and the others concerning the worship to be exhibited and prescribed for Relics of the life-giving Cross and of the other instruments of the Lord’s Passion.” Holy Office, 17 Sept. 1897. — The Decree in Tridentina, to the 1st, declares that a Relic of the Most Holy Cross is not to be exposed above the Tabernacle containing the Eucharist. The other, in Varsavien., to the 12th, declares that one knee is to be bent before a Relic of the Most Holy Cross exposed in the principal place upon the altar. These things are also confirmed by other Decrees.

“Whether the practice of separating Relics of the Most Holy Cross of Our Lord Jesus Christ from relics of the Saints is correct and to be retained. — Resp. In the affirmative, and to the Most Eminent Prefect according to the intention. And the intention was that it be written both to the Most Eminent Vicar of the City and to the Most Reverend Sacristan of the chapel of the Apostolic Palace, to whom the custody of sacred relics pertains, that the decrees previously issued for the separation of Relics of the Most Holy Cross from relics of the Saints be restored to force.” Sacred Congregation of Indulgences, 22 Feb. 1847.

“Whether in a solemn procession of the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, both on the day of Corpus Christi and in Holy Week, it is lawful to carry instruments of the Most Holy Passion of Our Savior Jesus Christ, namely, a fragment of the Most Holy Cross or of the Thorn. — Resp. In the negative.” Sacred Congregation of Rites, 17 June 1684, n. 1731.

“Whether outside the feast of Corpus Christi and its octave it is lawful, in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary or of the Saints, to carry the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist in evening processions, and also images or relics of the Blessed Virgin herself and of the Saints. — Resp. In the affirmative, with the consent of the Ordinary, as regards the first part; in the negative as regards the second.” Sacred Congregation of Rites, 31 Jan. 1896, nn. 3878, 3997.

“Can ancient reliquaries with Relics, which lack an authentic document and formerly belonged to suppressed monasteries, be exposed upon the altar, as has been done from time immemorial? — Resp. In the negative.” Sacred Congregation of Rites, 23 June 1892, Lauden., to the 5th.

“There are many relics enclosed in precious silver reliquaries in nearly all the churches of the diocese, even the poorest, for which authentic documents are not held, nor is there knowledge that such documents formerly existed, nor is the time known from which those relics have been possessed. Their number is considerable; and although the reliquaries savor of antiquity, nevertheless there exists in the archives of the parishes or in their histories no certain document proving their authenticity. Yet they are venerated by the peoples with great piety, so that this worship cannot be prohibited without scandal. Therefore, since they are very ancient, so that antiquity itself can constitute an argument sufficient to produce moral certainty, and since among all they have always been and are in the greatest veneration, the Bishop petitioner thinks that worship of this kind can be permitted; nevertheless, to remove every anxiety, he implores the judgment of Your Holiness concerning this. — Resp. Ancient relics are to be preserved in that veneration in which they have hitherto been held, unless in a particular case there are certain arguments that they are false or spurious.” Sacred Congregation of Indulgences, 20 Jan. 1896.

“1. Whether the anterior part of the arm, which is called the forearm, separated from the other, upper part of the same arm, can be held as a notable relic. — 2. Whether the same is to be said of that upper part of the arm, namely, insofar as it too can be held as a notable relic. — 3. Whether the heart, tongue, and hands, if they are miraculously preserved intact, ought to be held as notable relics. — Resp. In the affirmative.” Sacred Congregation of Rites, 27 June 1899.

“I profess that which was defined against the Iconoclasts: that images of Christ and of the Virgin Mother of God, as well as of the other Saints, are to be had and retained, and that due honor and veneration are to be imparted to them.” Oriental Profession of Faith prescribed by Urban VIII and by Benedict XIV.

“29. Likewise, whether he believes and asserts that it is lawful for the relics and images of the Saints to be venerated by the faithful of Christ.” Articles from the Bull Inter cunctas of Martin V concerning which those suspected of the errors of Wycliffe and Hus are to be questioned.

“69. The prescription which, generally and without distinction, notes images of the incomprehensible Trinity among images to be removed from the Church, as furnishing to the uneducated an occasion of error: on account of its generality, rash and contrary to the pious practice observed in the Church, as though there existed no images of the Most Holy Trinity commonly approved and safely to be permitted. From the Brief Sollicitudini nostrae of Benedict XIV, of the year 1745. — 70. Likewise, the doctrine and prescription generally reproving every special worship which the faithful are accustomed to render to some image in particular, and their having recourse to it rather than to another: rash, pernicious, injurious both to the pious practice observed in the Church and to that order of providence by which God willed that these things not take place in all memorials of the Saints, He who distributes to each his own as He wills. From St. Augustine, Letter 78, to the clergy, elders, and entire people of the Church of Hippo. — 71. Likewise, that which forbids images, especially those of the Blessed Virgin, to be distinguished by any titles other than denominations analogous to mysteries of which express mention is made in Sacred Scripture, as though other pious denominations, which the Church approves and commends even in her public prayers, could not be ascribed to images: rash, offensive to pious ears, injurious to the veneration due especially to the Blessed Virgin. — 72. Likewise, that which wishes to extirpate as an abuse the custom by which certain images are kept veiled: rash, contrary to the practice observed in the Church and introduced for fostering the piety of the faithful.” Propositions of the Synod of Pistoia condemned by Pius VI.

“25. It is unlawful for a Christian to place an image of God the Father seated in a church.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII.

From the Brief of Urban VIII, 15 March 1642: “Sacred images are not to be exposed under new forms of dress, but only in that form in which from ancient times they have customarily been exhibited in the Roman Church.” Decree n. 810.

“1. Whether images of the Sacred Heart of Jesus representing the Heart alone, without the rest of the body, may safely be distributed. — 2. Whether they are approved at Rome. — 3. Whether they must be withdrawn from the homes of the faithful where they are objects of veneration. — Resp. To the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd: The image of the Most Sacred Heart of Our Lord Jesus Christ concerning which there is question may be permitted for private devotion, provided that it is not exposed upon altars to be honored with public veneration.” Holy Office, 26 Aug. 1891.

“New emblems of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus in the Eucharist are not to be approved by the Apostolic See. For fostering the piety of the faithful, the images of the Most Sacred Heart already used and approved in the Church are sufficient, because worship toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus in the Eucharist is neither more perfect than worship toward the Eucharist itself nor different from worship toward the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus. Furthermore, the same Most Eminent Fathers ordered that the intention made known by this Sacred Congregation at the command of Pope Pius IX of holy memory, on Wednesday, 13 Jan. 1875, be communicated, namely, that other writers also, who sharpen their talents upon these and other arguments of this kind which savor of novelty, and who under the appearance of piety endeavor to promote unaccustomed forms of worship and titles even through periodicals, are to be admonished to desist from their purpose and to weigh the danger there is of drawing the faithful into error even concerning dogmas of faith, and of furnishing to those who hate religion an occasion for detracting from the purity of Catholic doctrine and of true piety.” Holy Office, 3 June 1891.

Nevertheless, by the Brief Admotae nobis of Leo XIII, 16 Feb. 1903, the title and worship of the Eucharistic Heart of Jesus is approved. “Petitions have been presented to Us … that through Us a pious Archconfraternity under the title of the Eucharistic Heart of Jesus be instituted by Apostolic authority. But We, to whom nothing is more ancient or more pleasant than that a confraternity of the faithful, which, by a worship not wholly dissimilar to that which is professed toward the Sacred Heart, recalls through peculiar exercises of veneration, love, and a grateful and reverent disposition that act of supreme love by which Our Redeemer, pouring forth all the riches of His Heart, instituted the adorable Sacrament of the Eucharist so that He might abide with us until the end of the ages, should obtain a fitting seat in this fostering City, the center of the Catholic world, have judged that assent should be given to these pious desires. These things being so, etc.”

“The Bishop of the diocese of L. asks whether a certain devotion called the Mighty Hand may be considered lawful. It consists in images and medals which represent an open hand having a wound within it and, upon the tips of its fingers, the images of the Child Jesus, of Mary Most Holy, of St. Joachim, and of St. Anne. — Resp. The aforesaid image was previously condemned by the Council of Trent, and let the Bishop take care that the images, medals, and every writing or formula of prayer pertaining to the said devotion be destroyed.” Holy Office, 13 March 1891.

“The Archbishop of N. humbly sets forth that a new article of devotion has been placed on sale there under the name New Cross of the Immaculate Conception. It is a medal in the form of a cross, bearing the image not of Our Lord Jesus Christ, but of the Immaculate on one side, and of the Sacred Hearts with the monogram of the Blessed Virgin on the other. He therefore asks the oracle of Your Holiness whether such a devotion may or may not be approved. — Resp. 14. The aforesaid devotion, as it stands, is not to be approved.” Holy Office, 13 March 1901.

“More than once there has been consideration of a norm to be prescribed for venerating the Blessed Virgin, Mary the Mother of God, under the title Our Lady of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and of images of the Blessed Virgin herself which represent her standing with hands extended and the Child Jesus likewise standing before her knees. And it was decreed that the title indeed could be admitted, but that the images were not to be approved and were to be removed from public veneration, and that they were to be tolerated only in the church of the Sodality of Issoudun; but that, insofar as it could be done, images of the Blessed Virgin Mary carrying the Child Jesus in her arms were to be introduced. Hence the Sacred Order, being greatly solicitous for the law of supplication, which corresponds to the law of belief, after the matter had been maturely weighed, confirming the former decrees and, insofar as need be, renewing them, again disapproves the images concerning which there is question above and forbids them to be proposed to the veneration and piety of the faithful; and where they have been tolerated, it commands that they be cautiously and prudently removed and approved images substituted in their place. — It will not be beside the point here to recall to mind the general admonition appended to the decree of Wednesday, 13 Jan. 1875. (Cf. the preceding paragraph.)” Holy Office, 3 April 1895.

"Our Most Holy Lord... declared, established, and decreed that images and the other things aforesaid, and anything else carrying before itself and indicating veneration and cult, of any persons whatever who have died with a reputation for sanctity or martyrdom, whenever that reputation may exist, are not to be placed in oratories or public or private places, or in churches, whether Secular or Regular, of any Religion, Order, Institute, Congregation, or Society whatsoever, before they are canonized or declared Blessed by the Apostolic See; and, if any have been placed, they are to be removed, just as he commanded them immediately to be removed.

2. And likewise he prohibited that henceforth books of the same persons be printed, containing deeds, miracles, or revelations, or any benefits whatsoever as received from God through their intercessions, of those who have departed from life celebrated by reputation or opinion of sanctity or martyrdom, as stated, without the recognition and approval of the Ordinary, who in recognizing them is to employ Theologians and other pious and learned men for counsel; and, lest henceforth fraud, or error, or anything new and disordered be committed in a matter so grave, he is to transmit the instructed matter to the Apostolic See and await its response. But the revelations and miracles and other aforesaid benefits which hitherto have been printed in books containing the life and deeds of these persons without recognition and approval of this kind, His Holiness wills and commands to be judged in no way approved.

3. He also forbade and prohibited that at the sepulchers of these persons tablets and images of wax or silver, or of any other material whatever, whether painted or fashioned and sculpted, be hung or affixed, and lamps or any other lights be lit, without recognition by the Ordinary to be made wholly as above, and to be referred to and approved by the Apostolic See.

4. Declaring that through the above-written things he does not will nor intend to prejudice in any way those who are venerated either by the common consent of the Church, or by immemorial course of time, or by the writings of Fathers and holy men, or by the knowledge and tolerance of the Apostolic See or of the Ordinary through a very long time.

5. But so that the foregoing may be more diligently observed, he strictly commands all and singular, both Ordinaries and Inquisitors of heretical depravity, that each in his own Diocese or Province carefully keep watch lest, without the aforesaid approvals, images with the aforementioned signs be exposed, or the aforesaid miracles, revelations, and benefits be published, or other things be done against what has been disposed above.

6. But transgressors, if they are Regulars, are to be punished with deprivation of their offices and of active and passive voice, and also suspension from Divine things; but if they are secular Clerics, likewise with deprivation of their offices, suspension from Divine things, and from the administration of Sacraments and the execution of their Orders respectively, and with other penalties to be inflicted at the judgment of the aforesaid Ordinaries or Inquisitors, according to the manner of the fault.

7. But those who shall have printed books or painted, sculpted, or in any way fashioned or formed images, and the rest of the craftsmen in any way offending concerning the foregoing, let them lose all the aforesaid things, and besides be affected with monetary and other, even corporal, penalties, according to the gravity of the crime, at the judgment of the same Ordinaries or Inquisitors.

8. Anything whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding." Urban VIII, 13 March 1625.

"Whether the practice of separating Relics of the Most Holy Cross of Our Lord Jesus Christ from Relics of the Saints is accurate and to be observed? - Resp. In the affirmative." S. C. Indulg. 22 Feb. 1847.

"Whether nuns, or pious women living a common life under a rule, can, with the license of the Ordinary, first wash Corporals, Palls, and Purificators? - Resp. In the negative." S. R. C. 12 Sept. 1857.

"Having received responsive letters of the Bishop of Corneto concerning the petition of nuns who were prohibited by the Bishop from bleaching Purificators for the service of their Church, the Sacred Congregation granted the requested bleaching, not only for the service of their Church, but also of the whole city, provided that the Purificators are first washed by some Priest and the ablution is placed in the sacrarium." S. R. C. 12 Jan. 1636.

"Whether the custom of exacting an annual canon is sustained in the case? An annual canon of 35 centesimi to be exacted from any parish whatever for obtaining the material of the Most Holy Oils and remunerating the ministers distributing the same. - Resp. The custom can be tolerated." S. C. C. 20 Dec. 1879. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 13, p. 180 ff.

"Whether one who buys crosses, medals, etc., in order to distribute them after they have been blessed with the application of indulgences, can ask their price from the recipients without fault, or without danger of losing the indulgences? Whether they are lost only when someone has made those things his own and has used them with the intention of gaining Indulgences? - Resp. In the negative to the first part; to the second, it does not need a response." S. C. Ind. 22 Feb.; 12 July 1847; 2 Oct. 1840; 15 May 1886.

"... His Holiness... strictly commanded that the Christian faithful, under any pretext whatever, even of redeeming Sacred Relics and remains of the Saints, although enclosed in a little case and furnished with a seal, presume neither to buy nor trade for them, both in the City and outside it. Furthermore he commanded that whoever finds sacred relics standing for sale is to notify the Ordinaries of the places, whose concern it will be to provide opportunely. Therefore the same Most Holy Lord ordered this Decree to be made and published..." S. C. Ind. 21 Dec. 1878. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 11, p. 365. Likewise Letters of the Most Eminent Cardinal Vicar, by command of Our Most Holy Lord Leo XIII, were given to the Bishops concerning the sacrilegious commerce of false relics, on the 16th day before the Kalends of February 1881. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 14, p. 59.

851. 1. Notion. The theological virtues, of which we have treated, intimately and directly unite us to God; nevertheless, because we remain distinct from God and dependent upon Him, it is necessary that we acknowledge His infinite excellence by a special worship. Now the supernatural virtue by which the will is inclined to render to God the worship due to Him on account of His infinite excellence is called religion.²

¹ In this treatise we shall set forth the first three precepts of the Decalogue: the first, namely: "I am the Lord thy God... Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me. Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything that is in heaven above or in the earth beneath... Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them"; the second: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; the third: "Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath day" (Exod. 20:2-8).

² Worship in general is an act by which we venerate someone on account of his excellence; it is also called veneration, and is rendered to any person truly excellent. But the worship which is rendered to God, on account of His infinite excellence, is called the worship of latria or adoration, while the worship rendered to the saints retains the name of dulia or veneration. Formerly, however, these words were predicated indiscriminately of God and creatures. Cf. De Incarnatione, n. 255-256.

852. 2. Principal acts. Considered psychologically, religion embraces manifold acts. (a) First, when we consider the divine excellence, we cannot but admire His infinite perfections and supereminent goodness. (b) This admiration, moreover, soon begets love: for the will is drawn affectively toward the infinite goodness which we have perceived with the mind. (c) Yet reverential fear is joined to love: for while we think of the divine majesty and holiness, we clearly behold our own littleness and imperfection, and we appear before God only with fear. (d) Thence arises the religious sense, or veneration and adoration, by which, with love and fear together, we worship God as first principle and supreme Lord, and subject our whole being to Him. Moreover the habitual will of promptly handing over and devoting oneself to divine worship is called devotion.³ (e) But because we know that all the goods which are in us, both natural and supernatural, have been conferred gratuitously by God, we acknowledge Him as a distinguished benefactor, and offer Him acts of thanksgiving. (f) But, since daily we need new benefits and new graces, which we are able to obtain only from God, we have recourse to Him by prayer, that we may obtain them. (g) Sometimes also it happens that, because of our frailty, we commit sin and inflict upon God an offense which ought to be repaired: thence arises a sense of penance, by which we strive to compensate the injury inflicted upon the Supreme Deity. (h) Among the various acts which are able to express the aforesaid dispositions, sacrifice certainly stands forth, or the offering and immolation of a victim publicly made, in the name of the whole community, in order to acknowledge the supreme dominion of God.⁴

³ Devotion, when it is exercised, becomes an act; but generally it is taken as a habitual disposition.

⁴ The acts of religion are enumerated somewhat differently by St. Thomas (Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 82-91) according to the ontological order: a) interior acts, which are the more principal, namely devotion and prayer; b) exterior acts, by which some exterior things are offered to God, namely sacrifices, offerings, first-fruits, and tithes; or by which something is promised to God, as vows; or by which something divine is assumed, namely an oath and the assumption of the divine name.

These indeed are the principal acts of the virtue of religion. Others are less principal, as oath and vow; others, from positive law, are ordered to the sanctification of certain days, as cessation from servile work and assistance at the sacrifice of the Mass.

853. 3. Place among the virtues. From this it follows that the virtue of religion is a special virtue, not properly theological, but the most excellent among the moral virtues.

(a) The virtue of religion is a special virtue, or one distinct from others. For it pursues a special good, namely the worship due to God, and indeed on account of a special motive, namely His supreme and singular excellence. Now where a particular object and motive are present, there is a distinct virtue.

(b) Theologians unanimously teach that this virtue is not properly theological: for while a theological virtue immediately regards God Himself, religion of itself directly regards the worship due to God. Nevertheless supernatural religion, of which we are here treating, supposes the theological virtues, and cannot be perfect unless in its own sphere it embraces certain acts of these virtues. Thus only by faith do we know the supernatural excellence of God, which we worship by religion; when we pray, we must elicit an act of hope; true devotion, by which we hand ourselves and our goods over to God, involves an act of charity.⁵

⁵ Some spiritual authors, especially of the school of the seventeenth century in France, take the virtue of interior religion as a complex of the theological virtues by which we perfectly worship God through Christ, the perfect adorer of the Father. Thus Olier, Introduction a la vie et aux vertus chretiennes, ch. I, where, among other things, he writes: "Finally Our Lord, in order to expand His holy religion toward God, and to multiply it in our souls, comes into us and leaves Himself on earth in the hands of priests as a host of praise, in order to communicate to us His spirit of a host... He pours Himself out in us, He insinuates Himself into us, He perfumes our soul and fills it with the interior dispositions of His religious spirit."

(c) Wherefore religion far surpasses the other moral virtues. For virtues are more perfect insofar as they are nearer to the last end; and therefore the theological virtues are better than the rest, because they immediately attain God, the last end. But among the moral virtues religion stands forth: for it approaches God more nearly, because it is ordered directly to divine honor and worship, while the other moral virtues tend only indirectly to the honor of God, by prescribing duties toward the neighbor and ourselves.

854. 4. Division of the treatise. Treating of the acts of the virtue of religion, and treating of the vices opposed to the same, we shall speak:

I. Of the more principal acts, adoration and prayer;

II. Of the secondary acts, oath and vow;

III. Of the social act, or the sanctification of Sunday and feasts.

And thus we shall set forth the first three precepts of the Decalogue.

We shall speak both of the principal acts of religion themselves, and of the sins opposed to religion.

Passing over those acts of which we have already spoken, sacrifice, the worship due to Christ, the Blessed Virgin, the Saints, relics, and images, we shall briefly treat of adoration and prayer, and also of devotion, which renders us more prompt for each act.

855. 1. Notion. In the broad sense, adoration is an act by which we profess the excellence of another and our subjection toward him; in this sense kings and men endowed with excellence are said to be adored.² In the strict sense it designates the act by which we profess the infinite excellence of God and His supreme dominion, and our dependence upon Him; of this we speak here. Adoration embraces a twofold act: internal, by which the intellect and will together acknowledge the divine excellence and their own subjection;³ external, or the manifestation of this interior sense by some sensible sign, for example, by sacrifice, prostration upon the earth, genuflection, and other such things, which vary among different nations.

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 84; Suarez, De Virtute et Statu Religionis, Tr. I, l. II, c. 1-2; Billuart, diss. III, art. 1; Bouquillon, De virtute religionis, Bruges, 1880, n. 46-50; Muller, § 40; M. d'Hulst, Careme 1893, Conf. I; Tyrrell, External Religion, La Religion exterieure, lectures II-IV.

² 3 Kings 1:16; Acts 10:25.

³ St. Thomas, with many other theologians, enumerates adoration among the external acts of religion, because he considers it especially as a bodily act; but he supposes that it is nothing other than the expression of interior adoration (Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 84, a. 2).

856. 2. Thesis: properly so-called adoration, internal, external, and public, is due to God. (A) Scripture. Christ, tempted by the devil, answered him:⁴ "For it is written: The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and Him only shalt thou serve." Moreover He thus openly declares to the Samaritan woman that this adoration ought to be internal:⁵ "But the hour cometh, and now is, when the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth. For the Father also seeketh such to adore Him. God is a spirit; and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." That it ought likewise to be public, and therefore external, is clear from the institution of the eucharistic sacrifice, by which the sacrifice of Christ on the cross is vividly represented:⁶ for sacrifice is an external and public act of adoration, offered to God in the name of the whole community.

⁴ Matt. 4:10.

⁵ John 4:23-24.

⁶ This we proved in De Eucharistia, n. 153-161.

857. (B) Reason shows the same. (a) For God is the supreme Lord of men: since He created them out of nothing, and indeed as to their whole being, both as to substance and as to faculties; besides, He conserves them in being; for by their own weight they tend to nothingness, since they are from nothing, and unless they were positively sustained by God at every instant, they would be reduced to nothing; indeed, He concurs with them in acting: for although they enjoy activity implanted in them by God, they cannot break forth into act unless they are helped by the supreme cause of all things. Therefore men, entirely as they are, depend upon God and are constituted under His dominion. But the supreme Lord, upon whom all things depend, has a right, and indeed a strict right, that His dominion be acknowledged by all rational creatures: for they are rational for this reason, that they may follow the order of reason and spontaneously and freely confess their dependence upon the supreme Cause; this indeed is done by adoration, by which we profess God as first principle and last end, or, in other words, as supreme Lord; therefore God has a strict right that He be adored by men, and he who denies it to Him is guilty of true injustice.

858. (b) That this adoration ought to be not only internal, but also external, is clear from a twofold argument:

1. External worship is necessary by reason of itself. For God is the author not only of the soul, but also of the body, and has lavished upon us not only spiritual but also bodily benefits; therefore we depend upon God also as to the body; therefore we ought to express that dependence not only internally, but also in a sensible mode, namely by using the body which we have received from Him. - This indeed will be still more apparent if it is noted that man, as leader of sensible creatures, is as it were the pontiff of irrational nature, and therefore is bound to praise and adore God not only in his own name, but also in the name of inferior creatures. But this he cannot do better than by exhibiting external worship by the help of the body, which is a microcosm, or compendium of the whole of sensible nature.

2. External worship is necessary also by reason of internal worship, namely to express and foster it. For we are so constituted by nature that the interior affections of the soul, especially when they are more vivid, are expressed in a sensible mode, by the eyes, countenance, gesture, and whole bearing of the body; therefore if man truly and sincerely reveres and loves God, spontaneously and as it were necessarily he will manifest reverence and love by external acts, words, gesture, and the whole bearing of the body; but we are bound sincerely to love and adore God; therefore also to express this worship by external acts. - Otherwise internal worship would soon perish: for since, from what has been said, man is naturally prone to manifest outwardly the interior feelings of the soul, when external signs and ceremonies decrease, generally the very sentiments of religion are diminished, and when such signs are removed, commonly religion itself perishes. Nor is this wonderful: for man is led by sensible things to spiritual things, by external things he is stirred to the thought and practice of interior things, and if incentives of this kind are lacking, gradually even the dispositions of the soul languish and are extinguished.

Augustine had already observed this:⁷ "For those praying," he says, "do with the members of their body what is fitting for suppliants, when they fix their knees, when they extend their hands, or even prostrate themselves on the ground, and if they visibly do anything else; although their invisible will and the intention of the heart are known to God, nor does He need these signs in order that the human mind may be opened to Him; but by this man rather stirs himself to praying and groaning more humbly and fervently." Nor can it be said that from this it happens that our religion consists only in external rites; for, as the Angelic Doctor deservedly says,⁸ "because in all acts of latria, that which is external is referred to that which is internal, as to the more principal, therefore external adoration itself is done for the sake of internal adoration; namely that, through the signs of humility which we exhibit bodily, our affection may be stirred to subject itself to God, because it is connatural to us that we proceed through sensible things to intelligible things."

⁷ De Cura pro mortuis, c. V, Migne, P. L., XL, col. 597.

⁸ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 84, a. 2.

859. (c) This adoration ought not only to be external, but also public or social. For man was born for society, and in fact lives in society. Now not only each man, but also society itself, as a moral person, arises from God and depends upon Him; therefore it is necessary that not only private individuals worship God, but also that the whole commonwealth, after the manner of one body, exhibit adoration to God. - For this reason indeed God chose a special day, which would be as it were exclusively devoted to divine worship: for He willed that on this day all should rest from servile work, so that they might be able to exhibit public honor to God, as we shall explain below.

860. 3. Points to be noted for practice. (a) Therefore the faithful should be admonished that external and public acts of religion are indeed necessary, but derive their principal value only from interior acts: "God is a spirit; and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." Wherefore genuflections, inclinations of the head, and other signs of adoration should be performed with the intention of worshiping and loving God.

(b) Since, from what was said in the Treatise on the Incarnate Word, n. 243-246, Christ is the mediator of religion and the supreme Pontiff, through whom the Angels praise the divine majesty and the Dominations adore it, nothing is more fitting than to praise, adore, and glorify God through Christ: "Through Him, and with Him, and in Him, is to Thee, God the Father almighty, in the unity of the Holy Spirit, all honor and glory."⁹

⁹ Roman Missal, Canon of the Mass.

After the preliminary notions concerning prayer have been set forth, we shall explain: 1. its necessity; 2. its efficacy.

³ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 83; Suarez, Tr. IV, lib. I-III; Billuart, diss. II, art. 2-6; St. Alphonsus, little work on prayer written in Italian (Del gran mezzo della preghiera) and translated into various languages; Bouquillon, op. cit., n. 129-225; Lehmkuhl, n. 338-347; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 313-324; M. d'Hulst, Careme 1893, 3rd Conference; O. Lefranc, La Priere, Paris, Lethielleux, 1904.

861. Notion and species. Prayer, in the broad sense, is a pious elevation of the mind to God; it is distinguished from study, by which we think of divine things without pious affection. Under this respect it embraces the principal acts of religion, namely adoration, thanksgiving for benefits received, penance for sins, meditation on divine things, petition for spiritual goods, etc. - In the strict sense, it is commonly defined as the petition of fitting things from God. That this petition, when it is made with due submission, is truly an act of religion is easily understood: for it proceeds from an intimate sense of our need, and is at the same time a practical acknowledgment of divine excellence and goodness; for we do not ask graces from God unless we are inwardly persuaded that He is the fountain of goods, and at the same time full of mercy, so that He can and wills to help us.

Prayer is mental when it is performed by the mind alone, namely by the intellect and will: by the intellect, namely, we think of God, of the things to be asked, and of the motives on account of which it is expedient to obtain them; by the will, we desire that such or such a grace be granted to us by God. - It is called vocal, or oral, when it is performed not only by the mind, but by the mouth, by words or other signs. - Again, vocal prayer is private if it is made by the one praying in his own name; public if it is made in the name and authority of the Church, by a minister deputed for this; thus the recitation of the divine office is public prayer: of this we treat in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 132-160.

862. 1. Errors. Not only atheists, pantheists, and agnostics deny both the necessity and the utility of prayer, but also most rationalists,¹ because, they say, it is foolish to ask God to change the immutable laws of nature, or decrees conceived from eternity. But the Quietists rejected prayer as something imperfect for interior souls; thus Molinos said:² "It is not fitting for one resigned to the divine will to ask anything from God; because to ask is an imperfection, since it is an act of one's own will and choice, and is to will that the divine will be conformed to ours, and not that ours be conformed to the divine; and that saying of the Gospel: Ask and you shall receive, was not said by Christ for interior souls, who do not wish to have a will; indeed souls of this kind come to such a point that they cannot ask anything from God."

¹ J. Simon, La Religion naturelle, 4th Part, ch. 2; for refuting him, see Bougaud, Le Christianisme, t. V, ch. 4; Gondal, La Religion, 1894, l. III; Tanquerey, De Veri Religione, n. 16-19.

² Proposition 14, condemned by Innocent XI, apud Denzinger, n. 1101.

863. 2. Thesis: Prayer is necessary for all adult wayfarers by necessity of precept, indeed by necessity of means, at least according to the ordinary law of God.

Here there is question of prayer properly so called, or of the petition of supernatural goods from God. This, according to all, is necessary as to adults, as long as they live, from a divine precept; but, according to the common and true opinion, it is necessary also by necessity of means, from the ordinary law, insofar as it is a means instituted by God for obtaining, in the present order of things, graces necessary for salvation.

864. (A) Scripture often inculcates the necessity of prayer, asserting that petition is an efficacious means for obtaining grace, or for overcoming temptations, and indeed in such a way that from this it can be gathered that without prayer grace cannot be obtained or temptations overcome: "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you. For everyone that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened";³ as if He were saying: petition is the means of obtaining grace; therefore, if you do not ask, it will not be given to you. Again Christ says:⁴ "Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation." The Apostles likewise command the faithful to be instant in prayer,⁵ and to watch in prayers.⁶ These things indeed, taken all together, suppose not only a precept, but a necessity of means; for the exhortation to pray that we may obtain grace and overcome temptations supposes that we cannot, at least from the ordinary law of God, attain either without prayer.

³ Matt. 7:7-8; cf. Luke 11:9-10.

⁴ Matt. 26:41.

⁵ Rom. 12:12; Col. 4:2.

⁶ 1 Pet. 4:7.

865. (B) The Fathers likewise often attribute victory against temptations and perseverance in good to prayer, as if it were a means necessary for this. Their doctrine is thus summarized by the author of the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, who very probably is Gennadius of Marseilles (flourished in the year 495): "We believe that no one comes to salvation unless God invites him; that no one invited works out his salvation unless God helps him; that no one merits help unless he prays."⁷ Augustine especially taught this, asserting that the gift of perseverance is given only to those praying,⁸ and that God does not command impossibilities; since He admonishes "both to do what you can, and to ask what you cannot."⁹ Trent made these words its own:¹⁰ "For God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes both to do what you can, and to ask what you cannot; and He helps that you may be able." Manifestly therefore the Council supposes that certain things are impossible, if the grace by which they can be done is not asked.

⁷ De ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, c. 56, P. L., LVIII, 995.

⁸ "Indeed, since it is clear that God has prepared some things to be given even to those not praying, as the beginning of faith; but others only to those praying, as perseverance unto the end, certainly he who thinks he has this from himself does not pray that he may have it" (De dono perseverantiae, c. 16, n. 39, P. L., XLV, 1017).

⁹ De natura et gratia, c. 43, n. 50, P. L., XLIV, 271.

¹⁰ Sess. VI, ch. 11, Denzinger, n. 686.

866. (C) The matter indeed depends upon the will of God, who could, if He wished, grant grace even to those not praying. Nevertheless it was altogether fitting that grace should be given only to those asking. For it is consonant with reason that man himself, who needs grace for salvation, should concur, as he can, at least by prayer, in coming to the aid of his own necessity. The Catechism of the Council of Trent declares this thus:¹¹ "For, since God owes nothing to anyone, it surely remains that the things which we need should be sought from Him by prayers; and He gave these prayers to us as a necessary instrument for obtaining that which we should desire: especially since it is clear that there are certain things which it is not permitted to obtain except by His help." Afterwards it explains the utility of prayer: (a) by praying we exhibit honor to God; for thus we profess that we are subject to Him, whom we acknowledge as the author of all goods, in whom alone we hope, whom alone we have as the refuge and protection of safety and salvation. (b) By praying we also exercise the virtues of the soul: faith, because the more studiously we pray, the greater and more certain faith we have in divine care and providence; hope, because we ought to ask grace only with confidence; charity, since it is necessary to contemplate the divine goodness in prayer, and, besides, by frequent conversation with God we are enkindled to His love; humility, since, in order to pray, we ought to be conscious of our own need. - Therefore it was most fitting that at least certain goods should be granted only to those asking.

¹¹ Catechism of the Council of Trent, P. IV, c. I, n. 3.

867. (D) From this the difficulties proposed by the Quietists already remain solved: for an act commanded by God, which otherwise carries with it such great utility, cannot be imperfect. - Nor do the arguments of the Rationalists have greater force.

They indeed object that God cannot acquiesce in our petitions unless He changes His counsels. St. Thomas had already anticipated this difficulty; for, as he rightly observes,¹² God indeed decreed all things from all eternity, but, in disposing the present order of things, He foresaw our prayers, and could so order secondary causes that effects consonant with our petitions would be produced at the due time. Hence, when we pray to God, we do not pray for this purpose, that we may change the divine disposition, but that we may obtain that which God disposed to be fulfilled through prayers, namely, that in time we may receive what almighty God disposed before the ages to give to us. - In vain likewise do they add that our prayers cannot be heard without the laws of nature perishing. For this is first of all false when we ask spiritual goods: if we pray God that He help us to do good, by enlightening the intellect or strengthening the will, we by no means demand that our liberty be destroyed, but rather that it be strengthened. The same can be said of temporal goods: when we ask for health, we do not ask that physiological laws cease, but only that God so dispose secondary causes that, these being rightly applied, we can be cured from illness.

¹² St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 83, a. 2.

Nor does it help to say that prayer is not necessary because God, who knows all things, does not need that we set forth our necessities to Him, as Kant said, reheating an old objection; for, as St. Thomas rightly says,¹³ "it is not necessary that we offer prayers to God in order to manifest to Him our needs or desires, but that we ourselves may consider that in these things recourse must be had to divine help"; for thus we better acknowledge our weakness, conceive greater confidence toward God, and concur with Him by greater effort in acting well.

¹³ Ibid., a. 2, ad 1.

868. 3. Practical corollaries. (A) The law of praying, like the precept concerning faith, hope, and charity (above, nn. 644, 718, 754), obliges either by itself or by accident:

(a) By itself, rather frequently in life, though the time cannot be mathematically determined. Hence the faithful are to be exhorted to pray daily, especially in the morning, to ask the helps which they need for that day, and in the evening, to give thanks for benefits received, to elicit penitence for sins, and to hand over their soul to God before they take sleep. Those who omit morning and evening prayers do not indeed sin directly; but experience shows that those who do not recite them, other things being equal, fall into sin more frequently than those who pray daily.

(b) By accident, as often as some duty of Christian life cannot be fulfilled, or a temptation overcome, without prayer. Hence the faithful are to be exhorted to have recourse to prayer whenever some more arduous duty presses, some business of greater moment, or a more dangerous temptation.

869. (B) Prayer must indeed be made in spirit and truth: for God, to whom the hidden thoughts of men lie open, hears prayers even if they are not uttered by the mouth. Yet vocal prayer has its own utility:¹⁴ (a) for stirring up interior devotion, by which the mind is more easily elevated to God, because through external signs internal affection is suggested and rendered more intense; (b) for rendering more perfect service to God, namely that man may serve God according to that whole which he has received from Him, not only by the mind, but also by the body, and thus offer the accumulated sacrifice of soul and body.

¹⁴ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 83, a. 12; Catechism of the Council of Trent, l. c., n. 28.

Yet one must not indulge in much speaking, by which the mind is often distracted; for it is better to recite fewer and shorter prayers attentively and devoutly than more extended ones with almost no attention or mediocre devotion: "And when you are praying, speak not much, as the heathens. For they think that in their much speaking they may be heard. Be not you therefore like to them. For your Father knoweth what is needful for you, before you ask Him."¹⁵ - Especially to be avoided is the vain display of hypocrites:¹⁶ "And when ye pray, ye shall not be as the hypocrites, who love to stand and pray in the synagogues and corners of the streets, that they may be seen by men... But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy chamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret; and thy Father who seeth in secret will repay thee." The chamber of which there is question here "can be referred to the heart of man, which it is not enough to enter, but which, besides, ought to be closed, lest anything break in or flow into souls from without, by which the integrity of prayer could be violated."¹⁷

¹⁵ Matt. 6:7-8.

¹⁶ Matt. 6:5-6.

¹⁷ Catechism of the Council of Trent, n. 28.

870. (C) Therefore prayer ought to be attentive; for it would be foolish to ask God that He kindly lend an ear to our prayers, if we ourselves do not attend to what we say. For since prayer is an ascent of the mind to God, the words of prayer are poured forth rashly and irreverently if the mind voluntarily wanders from God, and no effort is applied to dispel distractions. - Nor does external attention suffice for true prayer, by which only every action by its nature incompatible with internal attention is excluded; but, more probably, internal attention, or application of the mind to God, is required.¹

¹ Yet according to Lugo (De Eucharistia, disp. XXII, n. 25-41), probably internal attention is not required for the essence of prayer, but external attention suffices, provided prayer is begun with the intention of praying and attention of mind, and attention perseveres virtually. - But it is difficult to conceive how attention virtually remains in one who is fully distracted, as is said below.

(a) Attention, on the part of the object, can be diverse: if the mind is occupied with rightly pronouncing the words, it is called superficial, or verbal; if with rightly understanding the words, it is called literal, or intellectual; when attention is given to worshiping God Himself, or to a particular mystery, or to the good which is asked, spiritual, or mystical, attention is had; and this is more perfect than the rest, provided however that the mind is truly attentive and does not wander in vain thoughts.

On the part of the subject, attention is more or less perfect and intense or remiss, directed to one object, or divided among several. - Some distinguish between actual attention, which is actually exercised, and virtual attention, which perseveres in virtue as long as it has not been retracted. But this distinction by no means pleases St. Alphonsus, and deservedly: for it is difficult to conceive how attention, which is an act of the mind, remains virtually in one who is distracted, even involuntarily. The matter is otherwise with intention, which, since it belongs to the will, perseveres virtually in the effect. But he who has his mind occupied elsewhere, even if involuntarily distracted, cannot be called attentive even virtually, since he by no means attends to the things which he recites.

871. (b) For the validity of prayer any internal attention suffices, even superficial and remiss. For, the intention of praying being posited, which we suppose to have been elicited from the beginning of prayer and not retracted, as soon as attention is present, even verbal and remiss, there is true speech with God, and a pious petition to Him, as is clear from comparison with men who recite words which they do not understand well, but nevertheless will to express all those things which are contained in the writing.

872. (c) Voluntary distractions in themselves or in their cause, admitted without a sufficient motive, are a venial sin by their nature, because they imply a certain irreverence against God; but they are not a mortal sin, unless otherwise gravely evil or shameful; involuntary distractions, however, even many and long-lasting, constitute no sin.

They are voluntary in themselves when one actually gives consent to them; in their cause, when, before prayer, vain thoughts are freely admitted which are foreseen to be a cause of distractions. They are involuntary when we apply ordinary diligence to forestall or expel them. - Voluntary distractions are venial sins, even in prayers which are not from precept, unless they are excused by a sufficient motive: because, as soon as we will to speak with God, we are bound to do this reverently. But if, while praying, a useful thought occurs, to turn it over for some time is not even a venial sin, provided a proportionately sufficient reason is present.

Distractions, even voluntary ones, do not destroy the substance of prayer; for, notwithstanding these distractions, the soul can remain turned toward God, and sincerely desire to obtain graces; but God, who has known our frame and is prone to mercy, deigns to hear prayers, even if they are infected by certain light faults. - Nor are certain external actions incompatible with true prayer, such as walking, working with the hands, etc., which by no means impede the elevation of the mind to God. Wherefore it is altogether expedient to pray while walking or working; nor is it to be feared that the distractions which then naturally occur are sins: for to admit useful distractions while someone recites certain prayers among manual labors is no sin; for who will accuse as guilty of irreverence him who, among common actions, strives to rise in mind to God, although several times he admits other thoughts even voluntarily? The rigid Concina indeed did not hesitate to assert this, but in this he was deservedly reproved by the other theologians.²

² Concina, In Decalogum, lib. II, diss. 2, c. 9, § 3, n. 8-9; Bouquillon, n. 219, refutes him.

873. (D) We ought to pray, from charity, not only for ourselves, but also for the neighbor, and indeed preserving the order described above, n. 805: for prayer is one of the principal means by which we can help him spiritually. We are not bound to pray specially for determined persons, unless these are constituted in grave or very grave necessity, or are joined to us by a special bond of blood or office. It is not licit to exclude enemies from common prayers.

Nor should the souls detained in Purgatory be passed over, since they are joined to us by a peculiar bond, as we explained in the Treatise on God the Rewarder, n. 49.

874. The effect of prayer is threefold: meritorious, insofar as it can obtain sanctifying grace and its increase, the conditions required for merit being posited, above, n. 199-200; satisfactory, because, since it is an arduous work, it can satisfy for sins; impetratory, insofar as it has the power of obtaining the actual graces which are asked from God, the conditions enumerated below being posited. Since the first two effects have been treated elsewhere (above, n. 196, and De Poenitentia, dogmatic part, n. 75-79), it remains here to speak of the last: 1. whether and in what sense prayer is efficacious; and 2. by what conditions?

875. Thesis: Prayer, clothed with the due conditions, has the power of obtaining, with moral infallibility, what is asked from God.

It is explained. This infallibility is not absolute, but conditioned, nor does it arise from the dignity of prayer alone, but from the superadded promise of God. For if only the dignity of prayer in itself is considered, it indeed has a certain aptitude for obtaining those things which are asked, namely from the goodness and mercy of God; but it does not have infallible efficacy, because of itself it introduces no necessity, since God remains free in such a case to exercise or not to exercise His mercy. But when the divine promise accedes, God owes it to Himself to bestow those things which He has promised, not indeed from strict justice, nor from mere liberality, but from fidelity. Wherefore the infallibility is not absolute, but conditioned and moral, namely provided that the thing asked is necessary or very useful for salvation (below, n. 879-883). For the primary reason on account of which God promised to hear prayers is that He wills us to attain our supernatural end, since all temporal and spiritual goods are finally referred to this end. Hence, if, according to His wisdom, He foresees that some grace in particular, all things considered, will be more harmful than useful, He is not bound by force of His promise to grant it, but will give another more useful or more opportune one.

876. It is proved. (A) Scripture many times proclaims the efficacy of prayer.

(a) An example is had in the prayer of Abraham, who by repeated prayers obtained that wicked Sodom would be spared if ten just men were found in that city;³ in the preservation of the city of Segor, which was saved only by the prayers of Lot;⁴ in the case of the Israelite people, which, when it had deserved to be destroyed, was able to escape ruin by the intercession of Moses.⁵ Besides, Ecclesiasticus thus describes the wondrous effect of prayer:⁶ "The prayer of him that humbleth himself shall pierce the clouds; and till it come nigh he will not be comforted; and he will not depart till the Most High behold... My son, in thy sickness neglect not thyself: but pray to the Lord, and He shall heal thee." The angel of Tobias declares the same poetically:⁷ "When thou didst pray with tears and didst bury the dead... I offered thy prayer to the Lord." - Likewise, in the Gospel, the publican who poured forth a humble prayer went down justified to his house.⁸

³ Gen. 18:16-33.

⁴ Gen. 19:18-22.

⁵ Exod. 32:7-14; cf. Ps. 105:23.

⁶ Eccli. 35:21; 38:9.

⁷ Tob. 12:12.

⁸ Luke 18:14.

877. (b) But the promises of Christ, repeated rather often, have special force:⁹ "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you. For everyone that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened. Or what man is there among you, of whom if his son shall ask bread, will he reach him a stone?... If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him!" - This is true especially of prayer made in the name of Christ, that is, through Him, and with Him, and in Him, insofar as we trust not in our merits, but in His: "And whatsoever you shall ask the Father in My name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. If you shall ask Me anything in My name, that I will do¹⁰... Amen, amen I say to you, if you ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it you. Hitherto you have not asked anything in My name. Ask, and you shall receive, that your joy may be full."¹¹

⁹ Matt. 7:7-11.

¹⁰ John 14:13-14.

¹¹ John 16:23-24.

(c) Truly, promises of this kind have been proved true by the event. One of the thieves who hung from the cross with Christ prayed thus: "Lord, remember me when Thou shalt come into Thy kingdom. And Jesus said to him: Amen I say to thee, this day thou shalt be with Me in paradise."¹² - The Apostles in the cenacle "were persevering with one mind in prayer, with the women, and Mary the mother of Jesus";¹³ and on the day of Pentecost, "they were all filled with the Holy Spirit."¹⁴ - Stephen the protomartyr prays for his persecutors: "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge,"¹⁵ and soon Saul is converted. - Cornelius the centurion prays earnestly, and thus obtains the gift of true faith: "Thy prayers and thy alms are ascended for a memorial in the sight of God."¹⁶ - Peter, prince of the apostles, is kept in prison: "Prayer was made without ceasing by the Church unto God for him";¹⁷ soon an angel leads him out of prison. - Paul and Silas, who had preached the Gospel at Philippi, are sent into prison; but there "praying, they praised God,"¹⁸ and soon they are divinely delivered. - And many other such facts could be alleged from ecclesiastical history, by which the truth of the promises of Christ would be confirmed.

¹² Luke 23:42-43.

¹³ Acts 1:14.

¹⁴ Acts 2:4.

¹⁵ Acts 7:60.

¹⁶ Acts 10:4.

¹⁷ Acts 12:5.

¹⁸ Acts 16:25.

878. (B) The Fathers often inculcate the same, not a few of whom wrote entire treatises on prayer.

(a) Thus, among others, Tertullian concludes his book On Prayer thus:¹⁹ "For what has God denied to prayer from spirit and truth, He who requires it? We read and hear and believe how great are the proofs of its efficacy. Ancient prayer indeed delivered from fires, and from beasts, and from hunger, and yet it had not received its form from Christ. But by how much more fully is the prayer of Christians prayed! It does not station an angel of dew in the midst of fires, nor close the mouths of lions... but it instructs those suffering, and feeling, and grieving, with endurance; it enlarges grace with virtue, so that faith may know what it obtains from the Lord, understanding what it suffers for the name of God... But now the prayer of justice turns away all the wrath of God, keeps watch for enemies, supplicates for persecutors... It also washes away faults, repels temptations, extinguishes persecutions, consoles the fainthearted, delights the magnanimous, leads travelers, calms waves, stupefies robbers, feeds the poor, rules the rich, raises the fallen, supports those falling, holds those standing. Prayer is the wall of faith, our arms and weapons against the man who watches us on every side." St. Cyprian has similar things in the book On the Lord's Prayer.²⁰

¹⁹ Tertullian, Liber de Oratione, c. 29, P. L., I, 1195-1196.

²⁰ Apud Migne, P. L., IV, 520-544.

(b) Among the Greeks, let Gregory of Nyssa be heard:²¹ "Prayer is the defense and safeguard of chastity, the moderation of anger, the calming and repressing of pride, the cleansing away of the tenacious memory of injuries, the routing of envy, the removal of injustice, the correction of impiety. Prayer is the strength of bodies, the abundance of the home, the right constitution of law and statutes in the city, the strength of the kingdom, the trophy of war, the security of peace, the reconciliation of those dissenting, the preservation of those joined together. Prayer is the seal of virginity, the fidelity of marriage, a shield for travelers, the guardian of those sleeping, the confidence of those watching, fertility for farmers, safety for sailors. Prayer is the advocate of the accused and of those pleading a cause, the relaxation and loosening of the guilty and of chains, rest for the weary, consolation of the sorrowing, delight of the soul for the rejoicing, solace of those mourning, the crown of those contracting marriage, the celebration of a birthday feast, the funeral of the dying." Our Gregory proceeds, enumerating very many facts from which the efficacy of prayer is clear.

²¹ De oratione dominica, Orat. I, P. G., XLIV, 1123.

879. In order that prayer be truly efficacious, certain conditions are required on the part of the object which is asked, of the subject praying, and of those for whom one prays.

(A) On the part of the object, the things which are asked ought to be such that they conduce to eternal salvation: for prayer, like other supernatural goods, ultimately tends to eternal beatitude.

Wherefore, if there is question of supernatural goods, namely salvation and the means necessary or truly useful for it, they can be asked absolutely, but not against or beyond the order of divine Providence. Thus graces by which all difficulties and temptations are removed, which in the present life are necessary for our probation, ought not to be asked; nor, without condition, graces gratis given, as the gift of prophecy or miracles, since from these pride is not rarely nourished.

Natural goods, as knowledge, prosperity, health, riches, honors, can be asked only conditionally, namely insofar as God foresees that they will profit us; for not rarely these are harmful to us. Say the same concerning the removal of certain evils, which can be useful for our sanctification. Hence it is not becoming to ask things altogether indifferent to salvation, for example, gain from a game. But to ask things morally evil, for example help for stealing or for killing an enemy, is in itself a grave sin, both because it involves desire of an evil thing and because a grave injury is inflicted upon God by asking that He cooperate in an evil action.

880. (B) On the part of the subject praying, the state of grace, humility, confidence, and perseverance are desired:

(a) The state of grace; for although the prayers of sinners are often heard, when otherwise they will to do penance, as is clear from the examples of the publican and the thief alleged above, nevertheless a special infallibility is attached to the prayers of the just, as is clear from many words of Scripture: "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just: and His ears unto their prayers";¹ - "If you abide in Me, and My words abide in you, you shall ask whatever you will, and it shall be done unto you";² - "If our heart do not reprehend us, we have confidence toward God; and whatsoever we shall ask, we shall receive of Him, because we keep His commandments and do those things which are pleasing before Him."³ And deservedly: for those who enjoy the state of grace are the friends of God, keep His commandments, and strive to please Him; therefore it is not wonderful that their prayers are more easily heard by God.

¹ Ps. 33:16.

² John 15:7.

³ 1 John 3:21-22.

881. (b) Humility, by which, conscious of our weakness and misery, we lean not upon our merits or strength, but upon the divine mercy. Thus indeed Abraham, who prayed thus:⁴ "I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes"; and thus Daniel:⁵ "For it is not for our justifications that we present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy tender mercies"; thus also the publican, humbly beseeching God, was heard, while the proud Pharisee, who trusted too much in his own justice, by no means pleased God.⁶ On the other hand it is openly said:⁷ "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble." The reason is that God does not will to give His glory to another, and therefore refuses grace to those who abuse it in order to exalt themselves against Him.

⁴ Gen. 18:27.

⁵ Dan. 9:18.

⁶ Luke 18:9-14.

⁷ James 4:6.

(c) Confidence, which altogether trusts in the merits and promises of Christ. For this honors God, and sweetly disposes Him to hear us:⁸ "Because he hoped in Me, I will deliver him: he shall cry to Me, and I will hear him." Wherefore Christ required confidence of those whom He cured: "Have confidence, son, thy sins are forgiven thee."⁹ Hence also James said:¹⁰ "But let him ask in faith [confidence], nothing wavering. For he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea, which is moved and carried about by the wind. Therefore let not that man think that he shall receive anything of the Lord." Truly, if someone lacks confidence, by that very fact he doubts the goodness and promises of God, and therefore does not deserve to obtain mercy. "Let us go therefore with confidence to the throne of grace."¹¹

⁸ Ps. 90:14-15.

⁹ Matt. 9:2.

¹⁰ James 1:6-7.

¹¹ Heb. 4:16.

882. (d) Perseverance, because, while God grants certain goods at once, namely those which are necessary here and now, He does not usually give certain others except after assiduous prayers, so that meanwhile we may be better disposed for receiving graces. Christ teaches this by various parables and examples: thus the importunate friend finally obtains the loaves which first had been denied him;¹² thus the Canaanite woman, first repulsed, and indeed several times, on account of perseverance in prayer, obtains the healing of her daughter.¹³ - And indeed it is not rarely expedient that only after long and fervent prayers do we obtain what we desire; for thus we more vividly conceive our unworthiness and inability, and esteem more highly what is obtained with more difficulty.

¹² Luke 11:5-8.

¹³ Matt. 15:21-28.

883. (C) On the part of those for whom one prays. It is controverted among theologians whether prayer made for others is infallibly efficacious or not.

Many with St. Thomas respond negatively:¹⁴ "For it happens sometimes that prayer made for another does not obtain, even if it is made piously and perseveringly, and concerning things pertaining to salvation, because of the impediment which exists on the part of him for whom one prays, according to that saying:¹⁵ If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not toward this people. Nevertheless prayer will be meritorious for the one praying, who prays from charity." Yet not a few, after Suarez,¹⁶ hold the affirmative opinion; for the words of Christ "Whatever you shall ask" are altogether universal; besides, prayer for others is not only commended, but is declared efficacious: "He that knoweth his brother to sin a sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him who sinneth not to death";¹⁷ - "Pray for one another that you may be saved; for the continual prayer of a just man availeth much."¹⁸

¹⁴ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 83, a. 7, ad 2.

¹⁵ Jer. 15:1.

¹⁶ Suarez, De religione, Tr. IV, lib. I, c. 27.

¹⁷ 1 John 5:16.

¹⁸ James 5:16.

In our judgment, the matter can be composed thus: prayer made for others is infallibly efficacious in the sense that it obtains some effect of grace; but those for whom one prays are sometimes badly disposed and pertinaciously resist the grace offered to them. - Whatever may be the case, to pray for others is a most excellent work of charity.

884. Corollary: concerning the Lord's Prayer. Among the prayers which we are accustomed to recite, the Lord's Prayer stands forth, which Christ Himself taught the apostles as the norm of other prayers. In it indeed, as St. Thomas rightly says,¹⁹ "not only are all things asked which we can desire, but also in that order in which they ought to be desired; so that this prayer not only instructs us to ask, but is also formative of our whole affection."

¹⁹ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 83, a. 9; many Fathers explained this Lord's Prayer, such as Tertullian, St. Cyprian, and, after them, the Catechism of the Council of Trent, p. IV. Cf. Hurter, Patrum opuscula selecta, t. II.

In the preface, very brief indeed but full of mysteries, filial confidence is stirred by these words: Our Father, who art in heaven. If He is Father, in Him shine forth charity, indulgence, kindness, mercy; if He is in heaven, His power is great and infinite; and therefore He can and wills kindly to hear our prayers. By the word our, the faithful are taught that they are brothers to one another and ought to pray for one another.

Moreover the petitions are ordered according to the order of charity, so that we attend first to God, then to ourselves. In relation to God, we ask that the sanctity and glory of the divine name be increased: Hallowed be Thy name; then, moreover, that the kingdom of God be extended, or the preaching and practice of the Gospel: "Thy kingdom come"; and therefore that the will of God be fulfilled on earth, His laws diligently observed and commandments kept, so that He may be able to reign in the minds of men: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." - In relation to ourselves, we ask first "our daily bread," that is, not only the supports of material life, but also and especially spiritual food, namely the word of God, the eucharistic bread, and the other graces by which the soul is nourished; afterwards, that the impediments to eternal beatitude be removed, namely sins: "And forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors"; from which we are powerfully moved to forgiving others, since the remission of sins depends upon the condonation of injuries; and consequently that we may overcome the temptations by which we are allured to sin: "And lead us not into temptation." Finally, as in a brief compendium, we ask that we be delivered from evil, not indeed from all evils, but only from those which can bring no utility to the soul; and that the evils by which we are sometimes pressed, we may bear with a patient, indeed even willing, soul.

885. Note. Thus far concerning prayer which is directed to God Himself. And indeed God alone is to be prayed to as the first and principal author and giver of goods. Since Christ is the God-Man, our prayers can and ought also to be directed to Him; besides, as man, He is the most perfect mediator, "always living to make intercession for us";²⁰ and therefore our prayers, offered through Christ, obtain greater efficacy.

²⁰ Heb. 7:25.

Besides, from what has been said in the Treatise on the Incarnate Word, n. 300-306, it is good and useful to invoke the saints, and especially the Blessed Virgin; for Trent declares:²¹ "that the Saints reigning together with Christ offer their prayers to God for men; that it is good and useful suppliantly to invoke them: and, in order to obtain benefits from God through His Son Jesus Christ our Lord, who alone is our Redeemer and Savior, to have recourse to their prayers, assistance, and help." From these things it is clear: (a) that the invocation of the saints is indeed good and useful, but not necessary for salvation; (b) that graces are to be expected not from the saints themselves, but from God; (c) that the intercession of the saints rests upon the merits of Christ, who alone is our Savior and Mediator properly so called, while the saints are mediators only improperly and secondarily.

²¹ Trent, sess. XXV, apud Denzinger, n. 860.

886. 1. Genuine concept of devotion. In order that the other offices of religion may be more easily fulfilled, devotion is infused into our hearts and increased by repeated acts, or the will of promptly handing oneself over to God and to His worship. For devotion is so called from devoting, and among the Gentiles the devoted were those who devoted themselves to the gods unto death for the safety of the commonwealth. Therefore it is proper to devotion to hand oneself wholly over to the service of God promptly and cheerfully. It can indeed be considered as an act, but here it is taken for a habitual disposition.

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 82; Suarez, op. cit., Tr. IV, lib. II, c. 6-8; St. Francis de Sales, Introduction a la Vie devote (Philothea), where devotion is excellently treated.

(a) This indeed presupposes the love of God and arises from it, but it is as it were a more intense degree of charity. The first degree of charity consists in this, that all the precepts of God be rightly observed; but when we arrive at that degree of perfection that we not only keep the commandments, but also solicitously, diligently, promptly, and cheerfully do good works, charity receives the name of devotion. Wherefore, according to St. Francis de Sales, if charity is compared to fire, devotion can be likened to flame.

887. (b) Devotion therefore ought to be distinguished from diverse devotions, or spiritual acts and services by which worship toward such a mystery or such a saint is exercised: these are diverse according to the disposition and inclination of each one, and according to various times, while the former is substantially the same in all minds and in various ages. Besides, devotions have their force from interior devotion, and profit insofar as they increase this; wherefore, if true devotion is diminished by their multiplication, they are carefully to be cut back, lest devotion itself perish.

What sortilege is

77. 1. Sortilege is divination by lots, or that which is exercised by inspecting how some action succeeds, done by you for the end of obtaining an indication: as if, with this intention, you throw dice, observe what occurs by opening a book at that place which chance has offered, set forth unequal straws, etc. Cf. St. Thomas, 2a 2ae, q. 95, art. 3.

Divination

2. Divination designates that kind of superstitions by which someone, by the help of the demon, expressly or tacitly (if you seriously use an inept means), invokes, wishes to know contingent and freely future things, or other things hidden and inaccessible to himself. Hither therefore come praestigia, pythons, oneiromancy, geomancy, haruspices, auguries, etc.

Magic

3. Magic rather embraces those superstitions by which marvelous effects are sought (on account of the satisfaction of vain curiosity): various changes of bodies, etc.

Evocation of spirits?

4. Evocation of spirits, namely of souls separated from the body. For if you should expressly wish a demon to appear, there is divination which they call praestigium. Moreover, concerning that evocation B. P. write:¹ "It is established by faith that God does not wish the souls of the dead to be evoked by men ... This is the certain doctrine of the Church."

To this pertains the recent response of the Holy Office,² by which there is reprobated the practice of someone who, while protesting that he rejected every commerce with the demon, nevertheless was attempting to evoke the very souls of the dead.

Superstitions of this kind

5. And other superstitions of this kind. Therefore they will be those which tend to this: that hidden things be disclosed, marvelous things be accomplished, commerce be entered into with spirits or separated souls. Sufficiently and more than sufficiently our modern spiritism is touched by this article.

When they are taught

6. They are taught, or are handed down as if an art: not indeed the art of simulating them (for they mostly consist in frauds), but the art of exercising them, although the writer is conscious of the vanity of the means.

Are commended?

7. They are commended, not if the facts of "spiritism," etc., are merely reported.

Notable matter is required

8. On account of the reason made in explaining article 11, it is necessary that those superstitious arts be either taught or commended sufficiently diffusely.

What of hypnotism and magnetic phenomena, as they say?

9. But what of the various arts of modern hypnotism or magnetism?

Deliberately we have abstained from these names, by which many too easily suppose superstitious arts, although that moral canon had to be recalled: in doubt, the matter must be presumed to pertain to the natural order, that is, to the secondary causes of this world.

First of all, concerning medical hypnotism, which is practiced even by Catholic physicians, no question can be raised.

Its use does not transcend the natural order, and, with due cautions, is most honorable. Cf. Theol. mor.

As to other phenomena, several already (for example, the simple motion of tables) have a natural and sufficiently open explanation in spontaneous impulses, "suggestions" of the imagination, and so forth. Concerning some, if all fraud is absent, the explanation appears less easy and perhaps still escapes us. Therefore cautiously, and only if a proportionate cause has manifestly failed, will you pronounce that there is superstition objectively.³

And so, as pertains to our matter:

a) Scientific books about hypnotism and magnetic phenomena are by no means affected by the present article.

b) Books which strive to offer fodder of this kind to popular curiosity, although they are often harmful, nevertheless cannot in themselves, or commonly, be ascribed to superstitious books.

What of books of pagans

10. On account of a similar reason, on account of which heretics of the more ancient age, whose heresies have become almost harmless, can already be frequented at least by the learned, books of the more ancient pagans which treat of divinations foreign to present-day use seem also immune from positive reprobation.

¹ Tr. 6, s. 1, n. 99.

² March 30-April 1, 1898.

³ For subjective persuasion can differ by defect or excess from the objective reason of the matter. Here, however, the persuasion or intention of the writer is not observed.

Which litanies are common

90. 1. The most ancient and common litanies are the Litanies of All Saints¹ and the Litanies of the Dying.

Litanies of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus

2. To the Litanies approved by the Holy See must now be ascribed the Litanies of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, which by decree of April 2, 1899, were approved for the whole Church.

Force of episcopal approval

3. The other Litanies which only a Bishop has approved can have only private use, so that publicly, even without the intervention of a sacred minister, they are prohibited from being recited in Churches or public oratories.

What if litanies are published without approval

4. Yet if the necessary approval is lacking, the use of a sheet or writing exhibiting Litanies is not prohibited. The general reason already repeated more than once returns. Thus the common opinion. But booklets or books of litanies which lack approval incur the reprehension of the immediately following article 20.

¹ These, with a few changes, recur in various sacred ceremonies, as in the Office of Holy Saturday, in Rogations, in sacred Ordination, etc.

1. NATURE OF PRAYER.—Prayer (εὐχή, προσευχή, oratio) may be broadly defined as the act of raising the mind to God. All intelligent creatures are bound to think of God now and then and hold converse with Him in order to exercise their faith, hope, and charity.¹ This converse may be mental (verbum mentis) or vocal, i.e., expressed in words (verbum oris).²

¹ St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 7: “Faith believes; hope and charity pray. But without faith they cannot exist, and by this very fact faith also prays.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 234).—IDEM, Epist., 130 (al. 121), c. 9, n. 18: “In faith, hope, and charity themselves, we always pray with continual desire. But for this reason, at fixed intervals of hours and times, we also ask God in words, so that by signs of things we may admonish ourselves, may make known to ourselves how much progress we have made in this desire, and may stir ourselves more ardently to increase it. For a more worthy effect will follow when a more fervent affection precedes it.” (P. L., XXXIII, 501).

² Ps. XXIV, 1.—St. John Chrysostom, Homil. in Gen., XXX, c. 7: “Prayer is discourse with God.” (Migne, P. G., LIII, 280).—St. John Damascene, De Fide Orth., l. III, n. 24: “Prayer is an ascent of the mind to God or a request of fitting things from God.” (P. G., XCIV, 1089).—St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., LXXXV, n. 7: “Your prayer is speech to God: when you read, God speaks to you; when you pray, you speak to God.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1086).—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 250: “Prayer, taken broadly, is an elevation of the mind to God, or any pious affection of the soul toward God and supernatural things. In the stricter sense, however, it is a request of fitting things from God.”—A. Poulain, S.J., The Graces of Interior Prayer, 2nd ed., pp. 1 sqq.

Prayer in all its forms—adoration, praise, petition, thanksgiving—constitutes an act of divine worship, because when a man prays he honors and reveres God and acknowledges Him to be the author of all goodness. Prayer is, therefore, not merely man’s voluntary acknowledgment of his entire dependence on God, but likewise the first and most immediate act of worship, and consequently an essential element of that natural religion which is found among all nations, even the most degraded savages.³

³ E. v. Lasaulx, Studien des klassischen Altertums, Ratisbon 1854, pp. 137 sqq.; J. Döllinger, Heidentum und Judentum, Ratisbon 1857, pp. 199 sq., 369, 526 sq.; W. Schneider, Die Naturvölker, Vol. II, pp. 269 sq., 347 sqq.; C. Ausfeld, De Graecorum Precationibus, Leipsic 1903.

Prayer attains its highest and most perfect development in the Catholic Church, which teaches that we must “adore the Father in spirit and in truth,”⁴ and assures us that we have in Christ a Mediator through whom we shall receive whatever we ask for in His name.⁵

⁴ John IV, 24.

⁵ John XV, 16; cfr. Matt. VI, 9; Mark I, 35; Luke XI, 1 sqq.; John XIV, 13 sq.; XVI, 23; Heb. V, 7; VII, 25.

In Gen. IV, 26 we read that Enos, the son of Seth, “began to call upon the name of the Lord.” This rather obscure text can not mean, as some pretend, that Enos invented prayer or was the first to introduce public worship. The former hypothesis is unlikely on a priori grounds, while the second is refuted by the fact, attested by the same holy Book, that long before Enos was born, Cain and Abel publicly “offered gifts to God.” As to what the passage does mean, exegetes are not agreed. Some think it marks the institution of solemn public sacrifice. Others regard it as a testimony to the ancient use of the name “Yahweh,” thinking that Enos began to worship God by that name. A third group maintains that in the days of Enos the pious Sethites began to be known as children of Yahweh, in opposition to the wicked descendants of Cain, who called themselves “sons of men.” The last-mentioned assumption derives plausibility from the fact that in Gen. VI, 2 the Sethites are called simply “sons of God.” However, we rather incline to the opinion that Gen. IV, 26 was originally a gloss, explaining that before Enos it was forbidden to pronounce the name of God, and that this gloss, through an error made by some careless copyist, slipped into the sacred text.⁶

⁶ Cfr. A. B. Ehrlich, Randglossen zur hebräischen Bibel, Vol. I, Leipsic 1908, pp. 25 sq.

2. EFFICACY OF PRAYER.—Christ said: “Your Father who is in heaven, [will] give good things to them that ask him.”⁷ This oft-repeated promise can have but one meaning, namely, that the right kind of prayer is sure to be heard by God. Prayer, in other words, is absolutely certain in its effects. Moreover, it strengthens man’s friendly relations with God, confirms faith, invigorates hope, kindles love, enlightens the intellect, steels the will, purifies the heart, and thus disposes the soul for the fruitful reception of grace.⁸

⁷ Matt. VII, 11; cfr. XVIII, 19 sq.; Jas. V, 16.

⁸ Ps. XLIX, 15; John XVI, 24; cfr. Tertullian, De Orat., c. 24: “Prayer alone is what conquers God. . . . Prayer is the wall of faith, our arms and weapons against the man who watches us from every side. Therefore let us never walk unarmed. By day let us remember our station, by night our vigil. Under the arms of prayer let us guard the standard of our emperor; let us await the angel’s trumpet while praying.” (Ed. Leopold, P. II, 16).—St. John Chrysostom, Homil. in Gen., XXX, n. 5: “For prayer is truly a great thing, a great security, a great treasure, a great harbor, an inviolate place.” (Migne, P. G., LIII, 279).—Pseudo-Augustine, Append. Serm., 47 (al. 226 de Temp.): “The prayer of the just is the key of heaven. Prayer ascends and God’s mercy descends. Although the earth is low and heaven high, God nevertheless hears the tongue of a man, if he has a clean conscience.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIX, 1838).—Serm., 55 (al. 4 ex Homil., 50), n. 1: “He truly knows how to live rightly who knows how to pray rightly.” (P. L., XXXIX, 1849).—On Luther’s teaching concerning the efficacy of “right prayer” (oratio vera) see Denifle, Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 109 sqq. (Eng. tr. by R. Volz, Luther and Lutherdom, Vol. I, Part I, Somerset, O., 1917, pp. 113 sqq.)

Besides these general effects, prayer has a very special one, namely, to obtain for us the things for which we ask, provided, of course, we pray in the right spirit, i.e., with due regard to God’s honor and the salvation of souls. It is in this sense that Christ says: “All things whatsoever you shall ask in prayer, believing, you shall receive.”⁹

⁹ Matt. XXI, 22; cfr. Matt. VI, 5 sqq.; VII, 7 sq.; XVIII, 19 sq.; XXVI, 39, 42; Mark XI, 24 sq.; John XIV, 13 sq.; XV, 7, 16; XVI, 23; cfr. 1 Kings III, 18.—F. Schmid, Die Wirksamkeit des Bittgebetes, Brixen, 1895.

When St. Monica grieved for her wayward son Augustine, a bishop advised her “to pray for him to the Lord” and consoled her with the assurance: “It is impossible for a son of so many tears to be lost.”¹⁰

¹⁰ “It cannot happen that the son of so many tears should perish.” St. Augustine, Confessiones, III, c. 12 (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 691).

The objections usually made against the efficacy of prayer are inspired by Pantheistic or Deistic prepossessions and cannot stand the clear white light of Christian revelation.¹¹ Prayer is not incompatible with belief in God and the immutability of His Providence. We do not appeal to God to tell Him our needs, which He knows better than we, but to recall to our own minds the truth that He is the Author of all goodness and that we depend entirely on His bounty.¹² When we pray we do not mean to persuade God to change His eternal decrees; on the contrary, our prayers have entered into those decrees, as secondary causes, from all eternity.¹³

¹¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 83, art. 2.—IDEM, Contra Gentiles, III, c. 95 sq.—V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 4th ed., pp. 36 sq.

¹² Matt. VI, 8, 32.—St. Augustine, Serm., 56 (al. 48 de Divers.), c. 3, n. 4: “Lest perhaps someone say here: If [God] knows what is necessary for us, why do we say even a few words? Why do we pray? He Himself knows what He knows to be necessary for us. But for this reason He wished you to pray, that He might give to one who desires, lest what He gives be held cheap, because He Himself has inspired the desire itself.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 379).—IDEM, Epist., 130 (al. 121), n. 17: “What reason He does this, who knew what was necessary for us before we ask Him, can stir the mind, unless we understand that our Lord and God wishes our will, which He cannot be ignorant of, to become known to ourselves, but our desire, by which we may be able to receive what He prepares to give, to be exercised in prayers.”—IDEM, ibid., n. 18: “Hence also that which the Apostle says (Phil. IV, 6) is not so to be understood as though [our petitions] became known to God, who indeed knew them before they existed, but that through patience they should become known to us before God, not through boastfulness before men.” (P. L., XXXVIII, 500 sq.).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 83, art. 2, ad 1: “It is not necessary for us to address prayers to God so that we may manifest our needs or desires to Him, but so that we ourselves may consider that in these matters recourse must be had to divine aid.”—IDEM, ibid., ad 3: “God out of His liberality bestows many things upon us even when not asked, but He wills to bestow certain things upon us when we ask, and this is for our benefit, namely, that we may acquire a certain confidence in having recourse to God and that we may recognize Him as the author of our goods.”—Catech. Rom., P. IV, c. 2, qu. 7.

¹³ Matt. XXIV, 20.—Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, c. 1: “This one true God, by His goodness and almighty power . . . by a most free counsel, at once from the beginning of time fashioned out of nothing both creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal. . . . But all things which He created, God by His providence protects and governs, reaching mightily from end to end and ordering all things sweetly. For all things are naked and open to His eyes (Heb. IV, 13), even those which will come to pass by the free action of creatures.”—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 83, art. 2: “By divine providence it is disposed not only which effects shall occur, but also from which causes and in what order they shall proceed. Now among the other causes the causes of certain things are human acts. Hence men must do certain things, not that by their acts they may change the divine disposition, but that by their acts they may fulfill certain effects according to the order arranged by God; and the same is also true in natural causes. And it is similar also regarding prayer; for we do not pray in order to change the divine disposition, but that we may obtain that which God disposed to be fulfilled through prayers.”

St. Thomas says: “All mistakes in this matter arise from failing to note the difference between the system of the universe and any particular system (universalem ordinem et particularem). There is nothing to hinder any particular system being changed, whether by prayer or by any other means; for there is that existing beyond the bounds of the system which is capable of changing it. But beyond the system that embraces all things nothing can be posited whereby such system could possibly be changed, depending as it does on the universal cause. Therefore the Stoics laid it down that the system established by God could nowise be changed. But they failed in a right appreciation of this general system in supposing that prayers were useless, which was taking for granted that the wills of men, and their desires whence their prayers proceed, are not comprehended in that general system. For when they say that the same effect follows whether prayers are put up or not,—follows, that is, as part of the universal system of things,—they manifestly reserve and except prayers as not entering into that general system. Supposing prayers included in the system, then effects will follow from them by divine appointment as from other causes. One might as well exclude the effects of other every-day causes as exclude the effect of prayer. And if the immutability of the divine plan does not withdraw the effects of other causes, neither does it take away the efficacy of prayer. Prayers, then, avail, not as changing a system arranged from eternity, but as being themselves part of that system. And there is no difficulty in the efficacy of prayer changing the particular system of some inferior cause, by the doing of God, who overpasses all causes, and who consequently is not bound by the necessity of any system depending on any cause; but, on the contrary, every necessity of system dependent on any inferior cause is checked by Him, as having been instituted by Him. Inasmuch, then, as pious prayers avail to alter some points of the system of inferior causes that was established by God, God is said to ‘turn’ or ‘repent.’ Hence St. Gregory says that God does not change His counsel, though He sometimes changes His sentence,—not the sentence which declares His eternal arrangements, but the sentence which declares the order of inferior causes, according to which Ezechias was to die, or some nation to be punished for its sins. Such change of sentence is called in metaphorical language ‘repentance,’ inasmuch as God behaves like one repentant, to whom it belongs to change what He has done. In the same way God is said metaphorically to be ‘angry,’ inasmuch as by punishing He produces the effect of anger.”¹⁴

¹⁴ Summa contra Gentiles, III, c. 96 (Rickaby, God and His Creatures, pp. 258 sq.). In the above passage, according to Fr. Jos. Rickaby, S.J., whose free translation we have adopted (God and His Creatures, London 1905, p. 259), St. Thomas admirably, though perhaps inadvertently, “hits off the real meaning of what he and Aristotle called ‘contingent’ in reference to a ‘particular system,’ but (apart from the doings of free will) every event is ‘necessary’ in the ‘general system,’ on the hypothesis of that system being. The killing of a sheep by lightning is a contingency unprovided for in the ovine economy, but pre-arranged in the general economy of the universe, in which general system it is an hypothetical necessity: it must be, if the system is to stand as it is.”

3. THE OBJECT OF PRAYER.—Whatever man may legitimately desire, he may also pray for. “It is permitted to pray for what it is permitted to desire.”¹⁵ The opinion that we are permitted only to pray in a general way that God’s “will be done on earth as it is in Heaven,” is contrary to Revelation. Both the Old and the New Testament, especially the Epistles of St. Paul, contain numerous instances of prayer offered for specific objects. Christ Himself prayed not only for the salvation of mankind in general, but for particular favors, of which the very prayer He taught His disciples enumerates no less than seven. St. Paul says: “Be nothing solicitous, but in every thing,¹⁶ by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, let your petitions¹⁷ be made known to God.”¹⁸

¹⁵ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 83, art. 6.—St. Augustine, Serm., 56 (al. 48 de Div.), n. 2: “Many ask for what they ought not to ask, being ignorant of what is expedient for them. Therefore he who invokes must guard against two things: lest he ask for what he ought not, and lest he ask it from one from whom he ought not.”—IDEM, ibid., n. 4: “The words which our Lord Jesus Christ taught in the [Lord’s] Prayer are a form of desires. You are not permitted to ask for anything other than what is written there.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 378, 379).—IDEM, Epist., 130 (al. 121), n. 23: “Therefore let there at least be shame in asking for things which one is not ashamed to covet.” (P. L., XXXIII, 503).

¹⁶ ἐν παντί.

¹⁷ τὰ αἰτήματα ὑμῶν.

¹⁸ Phil. IV, 6; cfr. Matt. VI, 9 sqq.; Luke XXII, 32; XXIII, 34.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 83, art. 5.

a) Unconditionally we should pray for the supernatural graces of the moral order and for sanctification, i.e., eternal beatitude and whatever is required to attain it,—sufficient and efficacious grace, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the higher graces of the interior life. Conditionally we may pray for such favors and blessings as do not immediately serve the purpose of self-sanctification, e.g., the charismata, visions, miracles, revelations,—provided, namely, that the circumstances of the case are not such as to render our prayer a tentatio Dei. Conditionally we may and should also petition God for the good things of the natural order. The condition is that we do not desiderate these temporal blessings inordinately, i. e., for their own sake, but with due subordination to our supernatural destiny and the kingdom of God. A superabundance of temporal goods entails many temptations and dangers, and therefore, generally speaking, man should not desire or pray for wealth unless it is probable that he will employ it well, and even in that case he should exclude all inordinate desire by adding to his prayer the condition: “Provided it will help me to save my soul.”¹⁹

¹⁹ Prov. XXX, 8 sq.; Matt. VI, 33; XIII, 22; XXIV, 20; 1 Tim. VI, 8–10; Jas. IV, 3, 15; V, 17 sq.—Prop. Damnat. Mich. de Molinos, n. 14 sq. (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1234 sq.).

b) It is wrong and strictly forbidden to pray for anything that would surely prove detrimental to one’s own salvation or the salvation of others (mala ordinis moralis), e.g., for the withdrawal of some indispensable grace, or that some one might sin, even if it were only as a means of humiliation and reform.²⁰

²⁰ Cfr. Rom. III, 8; Gal. II, 17.—St. Augustine, Serm., 56 (al. 48 de Div.), n. 3: “In the holy Psalms you have read that the one who speaks in the Psalms seems to call down many evils upon his enemies. And indeed, someone says, the one who speaks in the Psalms is just; why, then, does he wish such evils upon his enemies? He does not wish them, but foresees them: it is the prophecy of one who foretells, not the desire of one who curses. For in the spirit they knew to whom evil was to happen and to whom good; and through prophecy they spoke as though they wished for what they foresaw. But you, how do you know whether the one upon whom you now call down evil will not become better than you? But I know that he is wicked, you say. And do you know that you are wicked? Although perhaps you dare to judge concerning another’s heart, which you do not know, yet you do know that you are wicked.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 378).

Evils of the natural order (mala physica), on the other hand, may be made the object of prayer in so far as they are licit means for the attainment of a higher end.

READINGS.—Bl. Albertus Magnus, Tract. de Forma Orandi, ed. A. Wimmer, Ratisbon 1902.—St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, P. V., c. 10 (ed. 2a, Vicetia, pp. 434 sqq.).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 83.—St. Alphonsus de’ Liguori, Prayer, the Great Means of Salvation, tr. by J. B. Coyle, C.SS.R., London 1922.—G. Tillmann, Das Gebet nach der Lehre der Heiligen, Vol. I, Freiburg 1874.—A. Stöckl, Das Christentum und die modernen Irrtümer, Mayence 1886, pp. 140 sqq.—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 31 sqq.—L. Lemme, Die Macht des Gebetes, Barmen 1887.—O. Lefranc, La Prière, Paris 1904.—I. M. L. Monsabré, La Prière. Paris 1906.—S. Schiffini, S.J., Tractatus de Virtutibus Infusis, pp. 574 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 151 sq., 157 sqq.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 209 sqq.—Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Pastoral., Vol. II, pp. 497 sq., 505 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 269 sqq.—J. J. Wynne, S.J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 345 sqq.—Fisher, A Treatise on Prayer, London 1885.—Jos. Egger, S.J., Are Our Prayers Heard? London 1910.—Aug. Poulain, S.J., The Graces of Interior Prayer (tr. by L. Yorke Smith, 4th ed., London, s. a.).—Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, 5th ed., St. Louis 1924, pp. 43, 91, 127 sqq., 133, 142 sq., 266 sqq., 431, 433, 435.—C. Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. IX.

1. THE NECESSITY OF PRAYER.—Prayer is necessary for every adult human being because without it no one can be saved. It is necessary by virtue of a positive divine command (necessitate praecepti), as may be gathered from many passages of Sacred Scripture; but it is also necessary as a means to attain salvation (necessitate medii) because prayer is the ordinary instrument which God has provided for obtaining the graces without which no man can save his soul.¹

¹ Cfr. Gury, Compendium Theol. Mor., I, n. 251: “Prayer is necessary for all adults by necessity of precept, indeed more probably by necessity of means. The former is proved from numerous passages of Sacred Scripture, e.g. Mt. XXVI, 41, Lc. XVIII, 1. The reason for the latter is that prayer is the ordinary means established by God for obtaining necessary graces (Io. XVI, 24).” Cfr. Cat. Rom., P. IV, c. 1, qu. 2–4.

Christ Himself inculcated the duty of prayer by word and example. “Thus therefore shall you pray,” He says: “Our Father who art in heaven,” etc.² “Watch ye, and pray that ye enter not into temptation.”³ “Going out, he went into a desert place: and there he prayed.”⁴ “And I say to you, ask; and it shall be given you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you.”⁵ “He spoke a parable to them, that we ought always to pray.”⁶ “He said to them: Pray, lest ye enter into temptation.”⁷ “And being in agony, He prayed the longer.”⁸

² Matt. VI, 9 sqq.

³ Matt. XXVI, 41.

⁴ Mark I, 35.

⁵ Luke XI, 9 sqq.

⁶ Luke XVIII, 1.

⁷ Luke XXII, 40 sqq.

⁸ Luke XXII, 43.

The Apostles faithfully echo the teaching and reinforce the example of their Master. “Let us rejoice in hope,” says St. Paul, and be “patient in tribulation, instant in prayer.”⁹ “By all prayer and supplication praying at all times in the spirit.”¹⁰ “Pray without ceasing.”¹¹ Saint Peter writes: “Be prudent, therefore, and watch in prayers.”¹² St. John assures us that “whatsoever we shall ask according to his will, he heareth us.”¹³

⁹ Rom. XII, 12; cfr. Col. IV, 2.

¹⁰ Eph. VI, 18.

¹¹ 1 Thess. V, 17.

¹² 1 Pet. IV, 7.

¹³ 1 John V, 14.

The Fathers of the Church again and again insist on the necessity of prayer. Thus St. Cyprian says: “The Lord taught us to pray, not only by words, but also in deed, praying frequently Himself and thus showing us by His example what our duty is. . . . If He who was without sin prayed, how much more must sinners pray? If He spent the whole night in watching and praying, how much more should we pray and watch!”¹⁴ Saint Ambrose writes: “The Lord Himself spent all night in prayer, in order to invite you by His example to pray.”¹⁵ And St. Augustine: “Christ, who was the only-begotten Son, co-eternal with the Father, appeared in the form of a servant, and as such could have prayed silently; but He desired to appear petitioning the Father in such a way as to remember that He was our teacher,” i. e., in whatever He did, He never forgot that He was our teacher.¹⁶

¹⁴ De Dom. Orat., c. 29: “The Lord taught us to pray, not only by words, but also in deed, praying frequently Himself and entreating and showing by the testimony of His example what it behooved us to do. . . . But if He who was without sin prayed, how much more does it behoove sinners to pray! And if He watched throughout the whole night praying with continual prayers, how much more ought we to watch at night in frequent prayer.” (Corpus Script. Eccles. Lat. Vindob., Vol. III, I, 288).

¹⁵ Expos. in Ps., 118, s. 8, n. 45: “The Lord Himself spent the night in prayer, that He might invite you by His own example to pray.”—Cfr. the same Father’s Expos. in Lucam, l. V, n. 10: “The Lord also is first said to have prayed (Lc. V, 16), certainly not for aid, but for example; for He gave a model for imitation, not seeking influence to obtain something.” (Migne, P. L., XV, 1313, 1638).

¹⁶ Tract. in Ioan., 104, n. 2: “The Lord, the only-begotten and co-eternal with the Father, could, in the form of a servant and from the form of a servant, if this were necessary, pray in silence; but He willed so to present Himself to the Father as a petitioner that He remembered He was our teacher.” (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1902).

In view of these and many other similar texts we may say without exaggeration that it is the unanimous teaching of Sacred Scripture and tradition that no adult who has the use of reason can be saved without prayer, and that whoever habitually neglects this indispensable means of grace, forfeits his soul’s salvation.

“Even to the baptized and to the saints prayer for divine assistance is always necessary,” says the second Council of Orange, “in order that they may be enabled to attain a happy end or persevere in good works.”¹⁷

¹⁷ Conc. Arausic. II, can. 10; cfr. Vol. II, of this Handbook, p. 101, note 9.

2. WHAT IT MEANS TO PRAY WITHOUT CEASING.—In saying that we ought to pray “always” and “without ceasing,”¹⁸ Sacred Scripture does not, of course, mean that we must be continually engaged in actual prayer, but that we should have that habitual or virtual disposition which the theologians call “a good intention” and through which man’s whole life becomes, as it were, one continuous prayer or act of divine worship. “Therefore, whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God,” says the Apostle.¹⁹ “Whatever you do,” writes St. Augustine, “do with a good intention, and you will be praising God.”²⁰

¹⁸ Luke XVIII, 1; XXI, 36; 1 Thess. V, 17; cfr. Eph. VI, 18.

¹⁹ 1 Cor. X, 31.

²⁰ Enarr. in Ps., XXXIV, s. 2, n. 16: “Who can endure praising God all day? I suggest a remedy whereby you may praise God all day, if you wish. Whatever you do, do well and you have praised God. When you sing a hymn, you praise God: what is your tongue doing unless your conscience also praises Him? You have ceased singing the hymn and depart to refresh yourself? Do not get drunk, and you have praised God. You depart to sleep? Do not rise up to curse, and you have praised God. You conduct business? Do not commit fraud, and you have praised God. You cultivate a field? Do not stir up strife, and you have praised God. By the innocence of your works prepare yourself to praise God all day.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 341).

Gury tersely explains the duty of prayer as follows: “The command to pray obliges frequently, but not without intermission, because to pray without intermission is impossible on account of human weakness. The words, ‘pray al- ways,’ or ‘pray without ceasing,’ therefore, according to the common interpretation of theologians, mean that we must pray frequently, whenever an occasion offers, and never cease to pray because of disgust, sloth, or discouragement; in other words, that we must direct all our actions to God.”²¹

²¹ Compend. Theol. Mor., I, n. 251: “The precept of praying obliges frequently, but not without intermission, which is impossible for human weakness. The words, therefore, ‘we ought always to pray,’ signify, according to the common interpretation of the doctors, that one must pray frequently at an opportune time and never cease because of weariness, sluggishness, dejection of spirit, or even that our actions generally must be directed to God.”

What we may call the moral continuity of prayer consists in preserving the virtue of charity, which is the true source of all prayer. We should pour out our soul before God, as it were, frequently and in the most ardent manner of which we are capable. This is the sense of the maxim: “Pray often, but briefly,” which governed the conduct of so many saints.²²

²² Cfr. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., XXXVII, n. 14: “Your desire is your prayer, and if the desire is continuous, the prayer is continuous. For the Apostle did not say in vain: ‘Pray without intermission’ (1 Thess. V, 17). Do we bend the knee without intermission, prostrate the body, or raise the hands, that he may say: ‘Pray without intermission’? Or if we say that we pray thus, I think we cannot do this without intermission. There is another interior prayer without intermission, which is desire. Whatever else you do, if you desire that sabbath, you do not cease to pray. If you do not wish to cease praying, do not cease desiring. Your continuous desire is your continuous voice. You will be silent if you cease loving.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 404).

“When charity grows cold,” says St. Augustine, “the heart becomes silent; when love burns warmly, the heart calls to God. If charity glows always, your heart prays, and if you pray always, you desire always, and if you desire, you think of Heaven.”²³

²³ IDEM, ibid.: “The coldness of charity is the silence of the heart; the burning of charity is the cry of the heart. If charity always remains, you always cry, you always desire; if you desire, you remember rest.”

“The cause of prayer,” says St. Thomas, “is the desire of the heart, from which prayer must proceed, and which must be continuous in us, either actually or virtually, for the power of this desire is in everything that we do out of charity. Now we must ‘do all to the glory of God,’ as the Apostle says; and therefore our prayer must be continuous. ‘Through faith, hope, and charity,’ as St. Augustine puts it, ‘we pray incessantly with a continuous desire.’”²⁴

²⁴ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 83, art. 14: “The cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer must proceed; and this must be continuous in us, either actually or virtually, for the power of this desire remains in all things which we do from charity. But we ought to do all things for the glory of God, as is said in 1 Cor. X, 31. And according to this prayer ought to be continuous. Hence Augustine says: Through faith and hope and charity we always pray with a continuous desire.”

By entertaining such a desire habitually, and with the aid of short and ardent exclamations known as ejaculatory prayers (preces iaculatoriae sive iaculatae), we can comply almost literally with the command to pray without ceasing.²⁵

²⁵ St. Augustine, Epist., 130 (al. 121), c. 10, n. 20: “The brothers in Egypt are said indeed to have frequent prayers, but nevertheless very brief ones and as if hurriedly ejaculated, lest that watchfully raised intention, which is most necessary for prayer, vanish and grow dull through longer delays. And by this they also show sufficiently that this intention, just as it must not be blunted if it cannot last, so if it does last, must not quickly be broken off.” (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 501).—Cfr. P. Bürger, Unterweisungen über die christl. Vollkommenheit, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1905, pp. 325, 344 sq.

Christ Himself gave us the most effective ex- ample of continuous prayer. He was able to say: “You ought to pray always,” for His life was one long, uninterrupted prayer. In all He does thoughts of eternity flash through the veil of His sacred humanity. In Him all things are consecrated and brought nearer to God, because all are envisaged from the vantage point of eternity. While His days are devoted to labor for the glory of God and the benefit of His fellowmen, His nights are given to watching and praying.²⁶

²⁶ Cfr. Hettinger-Müller, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. II, 9th ed., p. 468.

Continuous praying does not necessarily involve the use of many words. “To make many words,” says St. Augustine, “is one thing, to have lasting devotion, another. It is written of our Lord that He spent whole nights in prayer and that He prayed for a long time. Of the brethren in Egypt we are told that they often prayed, but their prayers were very short and, as it were, stealthily ejaculated,²⁷ in order that the carefully nurtured devotion which is most necessary for prayer, should not disappear or be weakened in consequence of the length of time. By this they show that they do not allow their devotion to become dulled, if it cannot be continuous, and, on the other hand, do not stop short when it continues. Therefore, do not employ many words when you pray, but pray much when you have devotion. To employ many words when praying means to waste words in a necessary matter; but to pray much means to knock constantly and with pious insistence at the door of Him to whom we direct our petitions. For here sighing and weeping is always better than much talking.”²⁸ In this passage St. Augustine gives the name of orationes iaculatae to those short and oft repeated prayers which are so effective if they come straight from the heart and are practiced habitually. He compares them with arrows shot to Heaven. An early example occurs in Numb. XII, 13: “Moses cried to the Lord, saying: O God, I beseech thee, heal her [Miriam].” This brief ejaculation is described by the Talmud as a model prayer.²⁹

²⁷ “They had frequent prayers, but nevertheless very brief ones and as it were ejaculated.”

²⁸ See note 25, supra.

²⁹ Berachoth, 34a. On ejaculatory prayers a modern theologian says: “Short prayers are greatly to be commended to the faithful, namely, brief petitions by which we beseech good things from God for ourselves or others, and pious aspirations by which we briefly elicit acts of charity, confidence, sorrow for sins, or others. They provide great usefulness, inasmuch as by them many graces are obtained, virtues increased, temptations most easily conquered, the intellect imbued with heavenly light, affection lifted up, will inflamed, whatever earthly attachment and deformity is in us gradually cleansed, and in a certain way we emulate the blessed themselves in heaven. They can be made day and night, at home and abroad, and are hindered by no business; rather they make all business easier. Some aspirations are more fitting for beginners, others for those advancing, others for the very pious or perfect. But let each person elicit the affections to which, through the grace of the Holy Spirit, he feels himself drawn. Above all, it is profitable to elicit acts of charity frequently and, while supplicating, to offer oneself and one’s own to the most Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary.” (E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. III, Vienna 1884, p. 520).

3. THE DUTY OF PRAYING.—No detailed rules can be given for guiding the individual in complying with the duty of prayer, properly so called. Beyond a few general precepts all is left to custom and personal inclination and necessity. Certain definite prayers are prescribed for divine service, in the administration of the Sacraments, in the use of sacramentals, etc. Custom requires the saying of morning and evening prayers and grace before and after meals.³⁰ Though this custom does not entail a universally binding precept, one who would not pray at all, either because of neglect or indifference, could hardly escape sinning, and continued neglect of prayer is a sure indication of lukewarmness and spiritual sloth.³¹

³⁰ Ps. LIV, 17 sq.; LXIII, 7; Wisd. XVI, 28; Eccles. XXXII, 17; Deut. VI, 10; Matt. XIV, 19; XV, 36; XXVI, 26; John VI, 11; Rom. XIV, 6; 1 Tim. IV, 3–5.—Doctrina XII Apost., c. 8: “Pray thus three times a day.” (Funk, Patres Apost., Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 21).—Constitut. Apost., l. VII, c. 47–49 (ed. Funk, I, 455 sqq.).—Tertullian, De Orat., c. 10: “How rash it is either to pass the day without prayer (Eph. IV, 26), while you cease to make satisfaction to your brother, or to lose the prayer through persevering anger.” (Ed. Leopold, P. II, 7).—IDEM, ibid., c. 20: “But neither to take food before, nor to approach the bath before, interposing prayer, befits the faithful. The refreshments and foods of the spirit are to be held before those of the flesh, and heavenly things before earthly.” (Ed. Leopold, II, 14).—IDEM, Apol., c. 39: “We do not recline at table before prayer has first tasted of God. . . . In like manner prayer ends the banquet.” (Ed. Leopold, I, 112).—St. Jerome, Epist., XXII, n. 37: “Let food not be taken unless prayer has been offered beforehand, nor let one depart from the table unless thanks are returned to the Creator.” (Migne, P. L., XXII, 421).

³¹ Cfr. Gury, Compend., I, n. 253: “It is asked whether one sins who omits morning or evening prayers. 1. The answer is negative precisely in itself, if they are omitted only now and then. The reason is that there is no law commanding set prayers on each day and at certain hours. Many nevertheless say that it is venial by reason of the general custom of the faithful. But in practice those who omit them more frequently cannot be excused, both because they do not pray more at another time or in another way and so frequently fail the precept of prayer, and because on account of the dangers which occur daily, when prayer is neglected they fall into more sins. The preacher or catechist, however, will act more prudently if he abstains from expounding that controversy.”

Man has special need of prayer when he is exposed to temptations and dangers, whether of body or soul, or beset by tribulations and trials.³² It would be a mistake to pray only when the soul is favorably disposed, for it is precisely in the state of spiritual dryness that we stand most in need of grace. We must, therefore, cultivate a prayerful disposition and try to preserve it by frequently raising the mind to God and leading a good Christian life.

³² Ps. CXIX, 1; Matt. VI, 13; XVII, 20; XXVI, 41.

4. THE DIVINE OFFICE.—Clerics in higher orders are bound by the law of the Church to recite the Divine Office.

“All men,” says a recent writer, “should be constantly prostrate before the Divine Majesty to offer Him their praises and thanks, to implore the forgiveness of their sins and the helps necessary to salvation. But since the laity, distracted by earthly cares, acquit themselves but very imperfectly of this great duty, God has charged His Church to supply their inability and neglect. The Church, in fact, supplies this by the holy Sacrifice of the Mass, which is constantly and uninterruptedly offered throughout the whole day, and also by the Divine Office, which is the appendix of the Sacramental Sacrifice. . . .

“The Church is a perfectly organized society, the members of which are conjointly responsible for one another. From this relation arise social duties which are superior to mere individual obligations, just as the general good predominates over the individual. Among the social duties the Liturgical Prayer occupies the first place, and is therefore the most important social work of the priest. The spiritual progress of each member of the Church depends, before all, on his fervor in prayer. In like manner, the increase and prosperity of the Church, and consequently the salvation of the world, depends on the piety with which the priests acquit themselves of their function of official intercessors, both in the Mass and in the Divine Office. Their official intercession . . . en- joys a far greater power than their private prayers can possibly attain. . . .

“The solution of the important, troublesome, and perplexing problems now agitating human society, depends, even in the purely economic and social domain, on the principles of moral theology, and they cannot be properly settled without the coöperation of the clergy. The present increase of exterior activity, on our [the clergy’s] part, obliges us so much the more to insist on the primal importance of the interior life and of union with God. Prayer, and especially the Liturgical Prayer, is in itself the most fertile social work, for without it all the others would be barren of results. It is prayer that will regulate our zeal and inspire the choice of means, willed by God and endowed with His grace. Prayer will animate and sustain our courage and enable us to persevere in our holy undertakings. Prayer will duly prepare our field of labor, by drawing heavenly blessings upon it; and prayer alone will impart fecundity to all our labors and exertions. Blessed Gabriel Perboyre was wont to say: ‘It is only through prayer that we are able to benefit souls.’ If the Apostles wrought wonders in converting nations, it was because they were united to God, prayed without ceasing, and acted only through the powerful influence of the Holy Ghost. We can, therefore, perceive the deplorable error of those who regret, as it were, the time devoted to the Divine Office, under the plea that it could be more profitably employed in works of zeal. Nothing is more disastrous to the Apostolic laborer than such practical Pelagianism, which pretends it has no need of divine grace to succeed in its labors. Such is not the calm, arduous, and fertile activity of men of God; it is nothing more than an inordinate and sterile agitation, inspired by earthly views and aims, and subject to the impressions of the moment; it chokes the interior life and terminates in provoking wearisomeness, apathy, and dislike for earnest labor. Experience shows that the priests who are miserly of their time in reciting the Divine Office, are very prodigal of it when there is question of labors and amusements foreign to true sacerdotal zeal.”³³

³³ Willi-Girardey, C.SS.R., The Priest’s Canonical Prayer, St. Louis 1919, pp. 13, 24, 25 sqq.—Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor. l. IV, n. 140–179 (ed. Gaudé, II, 560 sqq.); M. Wittmann, De Horar. Canonic. Utilitate Morali, Augustae Vindel., 1810; E. J. Quigley, The Divine Office, Dublin 1920.

The Divine Office is known popularly by the name of Breviary. This term, in liturgical language, designates a book which contains the regulations for the recitation of the canonical office. The Roman Breviary, which, with rare exceptions, is now used throughout the Latin Church, is divided into four parts according to the seasons of the year: winter, spring, summer, and autumn. It consists of the following elements: (1) the Psalter; (2) the Proper of the season; (3) the Proper of the Saints; (4) the Common; (5) certain special offices. The Psalter is divided according to a special plan. The Proper of the season contains the office of the different liturgical seasons,—Advent, Christmastide, Septuagesima, Lent, Holy Week, the Paschaltide, and the time after Pentecost. The Proper of the Saints contains the lessons, antiphons, and other liturgical formularies used on the feasts of the saints. Under the designation “Common” come all the lessons, gospels, antiphons, responsories, and versicles which are not reserved to a special occasion, but may be employed for a whole group of saints,—Apostles, evangelists, martyrs, confessors, pontiffs, confessors who were not pontiffs, abbots, virgins, and holy women.

Each day of the year has its own office. In fact, it would be correct to say that each hour of the day has its own office, for, liturgically, the day is divided into hours, founded on the ancient Roman divisions of three hours apiece, namely, Prime, Terce, Sext, None, Vespers, and the night Vigils. In conformity with this arrangement the Office is portioned out into the prayers of the night vigils, that is to say, Matins and Lauds. Matins is divided ordinarily into three nocturns, to correspond with the three watches of the night, nine o’clock, midnight, and three o’clock in the morning. The day offices correspond more or less to the following hours: Prime to 6 A. M., Terce to 9 A. M.; Sext to midday; None to 3 P. M.; Vespers to 6 P. M. The Office of Compline, which falls somewhat outside the above division, and is of more recent origin, was recited at nightfall.³⁴

³⁴ F. Cabrol, O.S.B., in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. II, pp. 768 sqq.

The obligation of reciting the Breviary, as stated above, binds all clerics in major orders, even those suspended, excommunicated, or interdicted. Only those who by permission of the Supreme Pontiff have been reduced to the lay state are excused from this duty.

By special privilege the office may be commuted into other prayers. The “Ordo Divini Officii Recitandi,” which differs in different dioceses as well as in religious communities, indicates the office to be said day by day by those for whom this particular order is prescribed either iussu praesulum or otherwise.

The obligation of reciting the Divine Office begins on the day of the reception of the subdiaconate, and on the hour that corresponds to the time of ordination. Thus one who is ordained subdeacon before nine o’clock in the morning, must begin with the Prime, whereas one ordained after that hour, i. e., towards noon, is bound to recite the office of the day from Sext.

The obligation of saying the Divine Office binds under pain of mortal sin (ex genere suo gravis), for two reasons: first, because its end and object, namely, the worship of God, is a grave obligation and the Divine Office is an important means of attaining the same. Hence, a cleric, who, without sufficient cause, omits to say the entire Office, or a notable part of the Office of the day, commits a mortal sin.

Why in this place concerning religion. - Adhering to the logical distribution, St. Thomas, when he has completed the articles concerning prudence, at once takes up justice, the cardinal virtue of which religion is a potential part. Most theologians of today, however, with whom we agree, prefer the order of dignity, so that they treat first of religion rather than of justice.

Utility. - In its positive part the treatise on religion embraces several things whose importance is immediately manifest. For the general exposition of acts of worship offers occasion to instruct the candidate of theology concerning the genuine notion of liturgy and its right estimation, and to preserve him from several practical errors. Concerning the efficacy of prayer one must speak prudently, and it is fitting, by a few notions, to prepare the way for mystical theology itself. The things then proposed concerning prayer, concerning oath and vow, pertain to daily use. It is of particular importance to know what must be thought concerning a fictitious oath, lest that holy thing become an instrument of tyrannical oppression, and in what way the power of invalidating vows must be understood.

The order of speaking will be this: first we shall treat of varied worship in general and of liturgy, then of prayer, then of oath and adjuration, finally of vow. The Decalogue itself is the author of this order for us, since prayer has customarily been referred to the first precept, but oath and vow to the second precept.

What worship is. Every care concerning some thing is marked by the name of worship or cultivation: care of the body, of knowledge. More specially, however, it signifies the recognition and practical observance of the excellence of a Superior. Thus all acts by which man subjects himself to God so that he may render to Him what is owed to Him are acts of divine worship. And such are all acts of the virtue of religion.

When we say this, we by no means affirm that those acts are wholly acts either of worship or of religion: for not insofar as they are directed to our good, but insofar as they express an order toward God, are they acts of worship. But that they may be acts of religion or worship, it is enough that they manifest an affection of subjection toward God and of trusting reverence.

Finally, more strictly, acts of worship are acts protestative of divine excellence and of man's subjection under God; or the acts which we have called elicited acts of religion.

Of how many kinds worship is. I. Worship is interior, in devotion of the mind, and exterior, which is subdivided into private and public. Public ritual worship is called liturgical, of which below. Sacraments also pertain to public worship: for they are at the same time for the remedy of sin and for divine worship: whether by consecration they depute a man to divine worship, as Baptism, Confirmation, and Order; or purify the consecrated worshiper, as Penance and Extreme Unction; or prepare worshipers and represent a holy thing, i.e. the union of Christ and the Church, as Matrimony does; or are themselves acts of worship, as is the confection of the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is done by sacrificing.

From c. 1256, public worship is that which is rendered "in the name of the Church by persons legitimately deputed for this and by acts which from the institution of the Church are to be exhibited to God, the Saints, and the Blessed alone." In this canon, as is clear from the Constitution Quamvis iusto, 30 April 1749, § 12, of Benedict XIV, to which we are referred in a note, the particle and adds not a second required condition, but another form of public worship, so that it has only the force of or.

Acts which are permitted to be exhibited only to God, the Saints, and the Blessed are: to place images on an altar, to depict them with halos, rays, or another sign which manifests and excites worship, to hang votive tablets or votive gifts at their tombs, to light a lamp before relics or to propose them for public veneration. On the contrary, that persons not beatified be depicted on the walls or in the colored windows of a church, without a sign of sanctity; that, with the Ordinary consenting, to whom the matter must be referred, things obtained "from a vow" with testimony of a grace received be kept secretly: these do not pertain to public worship.

Although not a few pious writers are still accustomed, in describing the lives of Saints, to insert protestations which have their name from Urban VIII, nevertheless those decrees have now been abrogated by the Constitution Officiorum of Leo XIII, 25 January 1897. Cf. our De prohibitione et censura librorum, n. 19 note and 79.

Today only these can be honored with public worship who by decree of the Holy See have been numbered among the Saints or Blessed. This discipline was introduced by Alexander III (1159-1181), and perfected by Urban VIII. Therefore, concerning the formal canonization of Servants of God who are prior to Alexander III and are named in the martyrology, the Church is not solicitous. Immemorial worship rendered to Servants of God who lived after Alexander III and before the time fixed by the Constitution of Urban VIII¹ can remain in the state in which it is. Indeed, concerning their beatification a process can be instructed "by way of worship or of an excepted case," so that that worship may be formally approved. Once this approval has been obtained, the Servant of God is equivalently beatified. Cf. canons 2125-2135. More recent Servants of God, on the contrary, cannot be beatified or canonized unless it has first been established that no public worship had been given to them. Therefore the process is called "by way of non-worship." - From the decree of S.R.C., 26 August 1913, Servants of God can no longer be called Venerable from the time their cause has been introduced, but only from the time the heroicity of virtues or martyrdom has been proved.

Canonization, but not Beatification, contains an infallible and irreformable judgment. Therefore "Saints can be honored everywhere and by any act of worship of that genus (dulia); but the Blessed cannot be honored except in the place and manner which the Roman Pontiff has granted" (c. 1277, § 2). These modes are shown, some from immemorial custom, others from a special indult. Cf. Wernz, Ius Decret. t. 3, n. 367.

Private worship is honorably bestowed on him whose sanctity is morally certain to you. Thus baptized infants, although, because they have exercised no heroic virtues, they are not subjects of canonization (Wernz, t. 3, n. 365), can be invoked by parents and brothers as true intercessors before God.

¹ I.e. the year 1534. On account of a particular cause, however, that time is taken with a certain greater latitude. Cf. Epitome iur. can. II, 602.

— II. Worship is distinguished as latria, which is proper to the infinite divine Majesty; dulia, which honors the singular likeness with God which the Saints participate. The special name hyperdulia is today reserved to acts by which the singular dignity and sanctity of the Virgin Mother of God is honored, on account of the peculiar proximity to God which divine maternity conferred upon her. Cf. 2, 2, q. 103, art. 4, ad 2. Hence indeed she is akin to the Word, because she is consanguineous with the human nature which the person of the Word espoused to Himself.

Except sacrifice, which is proper to the worship of latria and pertains to public worship, other external acts, according to the intention of the one honoring and the circumstances, can manifest latria or dulia: thus genuflection, the lighting of lamps, and also fumigation (the offering of incense).

— III. Worship is distinguished besides as absolute and relative. Absolute worship is terminated at persons; relative at things which are connected with a person and thus participate a certain sanctity, which is the cause why they cannot be treated unworthily and can be positively affected with honors: relative honors indeed, because they are mediately referred to a person. Among these things, relics themselves are placed. Cf. c. 1255 § 2. Persons themselves who represent others more worthy, e.g. Legates who represent a Prince or the Supreme Pontiff, are honored with relative worship. But we can, almost as we honor God in His Saints, merely use an image for representing to ourselves a person, and thus directly, through the image, honor the person represented: then the image itself is not honored. The declared reason for relative worship shows why the worship of an image is not the same as the worship of the person; why the image of a less worthy person can be honored more than the image of a more worthy one; and why the various images of the same person are honored in various degrees.

— Concerning the worship of relics, cf. canons 1283-1287.

That we may gather these things into a few points: a) Only those relics can be honored with public worship in churches which have legitimately been "authenticated." b) Holy relics whose documents of authenticity have perished cannot be exposed for public veneration without the judgment of the Ordinary of the place. In these matters the Vicar General needs a special mandate. c) Ancient relics are confirmed in the possession of their veneration, unless it is certain that they are false. d) Ordinaries of places must prudently remove from worship a relic which they know certainly not to be authentic; and at the same time restrain imprudent attacks.

Notable relics, or those which in some church are honored with great veneration of the people, cannot validly be alienated or transferred perpetually into another church without permission of the Apostolic See. Notable relics are the body, head, arm, forearm, hand, leg, or that part of the body in which the martyr suffered, provided that it is entire and not small (c. 1281, § 2). The same cannot be kept in private houses or oratories without the express license of the Ordinary of the place (c. 1282, § 1). Relics of the Most Holy Cross are never to be exhibited for public veneration in the same case with relics of the Saints, but are to have their own separate case (c. 1287, § 2). Finally, "to sell sacred relics is wrong" (c. 1289, § 1).

— Concerning the worship of sacred images. Cf. cc. 1279-1281, 1385 and 1399.

The blessing of images is not prescribed by any canon as to be done; but "if images exposed to public veneration are solemnly blessed, this blessing is reserved to the Ordinary, who nevertheless can commit it to any priest" (c. 1279, § 4). - No unusual image can be placed in churches, even exempt ones, or in sacred places unless it has been approved by the Ordinary of the place: to this certain cautions are prescribed by c. 1279, §§ 1-3. - "Precious images, i.e. those outstanding by age, art, or worship, exposed to the veneration of the faithful in churches or public oratories, ... are never to be repaired without consent given in writing by the Ordinary; who, before he grants license, is to consult prudent and expert men" (c. 1280). - Precious images, or those which in some church are honored with great veneration of the people, cannot validly be alienated or transferred perpetually into another church without permission of the Apostolic See (c. 1281, § 1). - Sacred images to be printed must be submitted to ecclesiastical censorship; moreover printed images are prohibited which are alien to the sense and decrees of the Church (c. 1385, §§ 1, 3°; and 1399, 12°).

(1) This paragraph concerning liturgical worship we must credit to Rev. Fr. I. Hanssens, S.J., professor of sacred liturgy in the Pontifical Gregorian University and in the Pontifical Oriental Institute.

I. Conditions of a Good Definition. Liturgy is called the whole order of liturgical acts. But these acts, in order that liturgy may constitute some species and be the object of its own science, must: 1) have some proper nature, i.e. refer one and the same quality by which they both agree among themselves and differ from other acts of the same genus; and furthermore this quality must in some way be natural or essential, i.e. be joined by an intimate connection with those acts and constitute their intrinsic reason; 2) by reason of that nature, have neither too slight a place nor too light an importance among the acts of Catholic life.

That this order of acts exists and must be called by the name of liturgy will soon appear.

II. Insufficient Definitions. Such, on the contrary, would not be a liturgy which would be only the decorative part of worship, ceremonial, aesthetic; - or its ecclesiastical and human part, opposed to the other part, i.e. the essential and divine part instituted by Christ Himself. For, although perhaps such a sense can also be attributed to the word liturgy itself (let the grammarians see to it), liturgy conceived in this way would not have a sufficient place among the acts of ecclesiastical life; besides, the quality by which liturgical acts would be constituted would not be natural or essential, but wholly exterior and accidental. Nor is it enough to say that liturgy is that part of worship which comprises the sacrifice of the Mass, the sacraments and sacramentals, and canonical prayer; or that it consists of those acts whose norms the liturgical books legitimately define: for again in such definitions any intrinsic and essential note is lacking.

For this reason we cannot make our own the definition defended by the distinguished Callewaert, a man so well deserving of liturgy, according to which "liturgy is public worship insofar as this is ordered by ecclesiastical authority"¹, and which the author himself equates with the definition proposed in the notable manual of Thalhofer-Eisenhofer². It has rightly been objected to this definition that it establishes a specific reason too exterior, i.e. the ordering impressed on worship by the Church, and thus excludes from liturgy the rites themselves, at least insofar as they are already defined and instituted by Christ Himself, such as, for example, the Eucharistic sacrifice itself in the Mass, and the substantial rites of the sacraments³.

III. The True Definition. This is reached partly by deduction and partly by induction. For several centuries, however, all experts have connected liturgy with the public worship of the Church (concerning worship and specifically concerning public worship, cf. above n. 165, 166). Yet liturgy cannot yet be defined by public worship itself; for there are some acts of public worship in the Church which are not counted among liturgical acts: for example, sermons. Therefore proceeding further, we shall say that liturgy is public worship in the Church insofar as it consists of rites, or that it is the public and ritual worship of the Church; but by this note, that it is ritual, the specific reason of liturgical worship is constituted. A rite, moreover, can be defined as an exterior action to be done according to a definite form, by which some effect is signified and, ex opere operato, taken properly or more broadly, is produced, either in the sanctification of souls or, as in our case the matter stands, for the honoring of God. Every rite, although it is simple and stripped of all pomp, nevertheless necessarily possesses some stability and gravity. Liturgy is composed not only of rites instituted by the Church, but besides, indeed chiefly, of rites instituted by Christ, even before and apart from every ordering impressed upon them by the Church. As to the rites of the sacraments, although principally they tend to the sanctification of souls, nevertheless at the same time and equally immediately they are directed to the honor of God, and this by the very fact that they express and signify themselves as effecting the sanctification of the faithful, which is a most excellent work of divine power and goodness. Ceremonies are secondary rites, completing the principal rites and adding beauty and majesty to them, so that indeed they beget similar effects, but through rites properly so called.

Liturgical worship, although of itself it suffices that it be exercised in the name of the universal Church but apart from the community, nevertheless has been so instituted that it ought per se to be performed by the very legitimate and public (officielle) communities of the Church, i.e. collectively and hierarchically; and in fact it is usually performed in that way. This is true of Mass, of the canonical hours, which are the common office of some group, even if, by way of habit or exception, they are permitted to be recited apart from choir: this is true of the administration of all the sacraments and of the sacrament of Penance itself, as is clear from its history.

¹ Liturgicae Institutiones: Tractatus primus, Bruges 1910, p. 6, n. 6.

² Handbuch der katholischen Liturgik, 2nd ed., t. 1, 1912, p. 4.

³ D. Franco de Wyvls, Tydschrift voor Liturgie, 1920, p. 140.

— You ask, what are rubrics?

Rubrics are those rules which prescribe only the exterior manner of ritual actions, with no distinction made between rites and mere ceremonies, between necessary rites and adventitious rites, and with no explanation added of their sense or efficacy. For example, in exactly the same way they describe the rites occurring in the incensation of the altar and the rites proper to the consecration itself. The rubric therefore is the "letter" of ritual worship; but the "spirit" of this worship is the native signification of the rites and their proper efficacy.

The rubric must be animated and ruled by the spirit. In turn the spirit itself is subject to other necessities, which it pertains to the rubrics legitimately to define and to confer on them the force of law. Thus it happens that, while the spirit of the prayer Domine non sum dignus to be said in distributing Communion requires that it be recited by the faithful person himself, nevertheless on account of decency or for some other reason, the rubric fittingly establishes that it be pronounced by the priest himself in the name of the faithful person. By the same reason the dialogue Mass is consonant with the spirit of the liturgy, but it can be ignored by the rubric, indeed on account of extrinsic reasons it could be condemned by it.

The Spiritual Value of the Liturgy. It is scarcely necessary to say how great these parts are in the life of the universal Church. Is not public worship to be rendered to God to be placed among her more principal duties? But now, who does not see that in reality public worship is almost wholly contained in liturgical worship? Therefore, the faithful who become partners of liturgical worship, how fitting it is that they perform so great a duty worthily and intelligently!

Nor is fruit for souls lacking from such participation. For:

1. Liturgical worship, because it is ritual, pours into the soul the sense of some mystery and superhuman power, which greatly helps men to approach God with greater reverence.

2. For the same reason, i.e. because it is ritual, liturgical worship appears endowed with an efficacy which transcends ordinary human powers, and thus begets greater confidence.

3. Because it is adorned with pomp, it brings much beauty and majesty to the whole Catholic religion.

4. Because it is public, it excellently illustrates before all eyes the nature of the Church as she is a society.

5. Because it is stable and one, it awakens the sense of unity in time and unity in space, that is, of continuous tradition and catholicity. Therefore it is a most powerful remedy against excessive individualism and a document accommodated to all souls of a truly Catholic life, that is, collective and hierarchical.

6. Finally, by reason of the very means which it uses for signifying the honoring of God, it at the same time contributes most efficaciously to the Christian instruction of the faithful, namely by reason of the mysteries which are commemorated in it, by reason of the readings and chants which it contains, and especially by reason of the sacramental rites by which grace is poured in.

Certainly several of those salutary effects are not proper to liturgy as such: nevertheless even these usually in fact, at least with such great efficacy, are begotten by liturgy alone, either because, so far as most of the faithful are concerned, the collective and social exercise of religion is contained in liturgical worship, or because, as has been said, the principal means of sanctification which the Church uses, under another aspect, are also acts of liturgical worship.

Excesses to Be Avoided. 1. Nevertheless every excess must be abstained from in exalting the merits of liturgy; nor must its ambit be so extended that it seems to comprehend the whole spiritual life both of the universal Church and of individual faithful. For liturgy is public and ritual worship and nothing besides. Therefore whatever does not have the character of a worshipful act and does not consist in rites must wholly be denied to liturgy. But who will seriously deny that very many such works exist both in the spiritual life of the Church and in that of the faithful? Think of the whole office of public teaching or the use of jurisdiction in establishing laws and ruling the faithful: very many works of charity, etc.; but among the faithful, worship of private devotion, and especially the custom of pious contemplation and of examination of conscience; fasts, vigils, and the other exercises of penance, not to speak of many other things which are too manifestly distant from liturgy by the whole heaven.

2. Nor is the name of Catholic piety rightly reserved to liturgy, while outside it a place is conceded only to devotion that is wholly private. For a false supposition underlies this distinction; because not only those things which are exercised publicly in the Church, but all other good works also which are done at the will of or with the approval of the Church within her limits, although they are in some way private, nevertheless, on account of the communion of saints, are truly works of the whole Church and acquire their proper dignity from this. For the publicity of the acts of the Church, in relation to spiritual effects and especially to the communication of merits, is nothing other than a certain sacramental. Therefore the Church is badly defined as a "society of liturgy."

3. But must not at least the whole remaining spiritual life be subject to liturgical worship? Must not this be its center, as they say, so that all other spiritual actions are either preparation for or continuation of liturgical worship? There is someone who affirms this. But this necessity could be defended in some way if liturgy were not only materially (which it truly is) but also formally penance, thanksgiving, ascetical life, etc. For then liturgy would be the same as the public and legitimate exercise of the whole Christian and spiritual life. Nevertheless even then it would have to be demonstrated that the Church proposes that public exercise as one and excellent, so that the private exercise would be excluded or at least the public would always have to be preferred to it. This does not seem able to be said rightly. For in this assertion there lies hidden always the same error by which it is affirmed that only that which is public (officiel) is done with the Church and through her.

But moreover, liturgy is not formally penance, thanksgiving, ascetical life, etc., but only worship, and indeed public and ritual worship. But can worship, especially public and ritual worship, be the center of the whole spiritual life? There is no reason for asserting such a thing. For although to serve God is the one end of our whole life and of the Church's life, nevertheless God is not served principally by worship.

Yet again it is not denied that liturgy is of such great importance that its exercise is worthy to be carefully prepared and continued by apt readings and meditations; and this seems to us to be liturgical life. Nevertheless it must be noted that such preparation and continuation is no longer formally the exercise of liturgy.

But at least, even if some coordination only without subordination is admitted between liturgy and the remaining acts of spiritual life, is not liturgy nevertheless, as it were, the exemplar and teacher of the whole spiritual life? Certainly liturgy, since it is an ecclesiastical institution, enjoys immense authority; and on the other hand some unity in our spiritual life is greatly to be desired. But the authority which liturgy enjoys from the institution of the Church has force only insofar as liturgy is worship, not insofar as it is an exercise of penance, prayer, ascesis, etc., since all these things it is only materially. Moreover, the Church never hints that she wishes to propose, by her public worship, an exemplar of the whole spiritual life.

— You ask concerning "liturgical spirit."

And first, what is it? It consists in those dispositions of intellect and will, indeed also of sensibility, which are necessary or useful for performing a liturgical act well, i.e. integrally and worthily. But that it should be done fruitfully pertains at least to the spirit of the liturgy, because liturgy does not formally intend this end. Many things are often attributed to liturgical spirit as if they were proper to it, which pertain to it only materially. Thus that liberty of soul and mind in liturgical meditation, i.e. in that meditation which is exercised in the very performing of a liturgical act, for example in singing the Office. For why could someone not use the same liberty in meditating on the psalms or other passages of sacred Scripture apart from every action of liturgical worship? And so, while the liturgical spirit is altogether necessary, and too often is greatly lacking, in the exercise of liturgical worship itself, outside that worship it must be said not to be required; but individual acts of spiritual life must be done in that manner and with those dispositions of soul which their nature demands for greater spiritual usefulness, always with the authority of the Church preserved.

531 2º is confirmed by can. 1255 § 2; 3º can. 1256; Note can. 1257. - 533 can. 1255 § 1. - 534 cf. can. 1287 and 1288. - 535 1º-2º is confirmed by can. 1150. The things for use etc. a) can. 1187. - 537 is confirmed by can. 1255 § 1, 1276. - 538 can. 1277. III can. 1255 § 2. - 539 2º can. 1281 § 2; 3º can. 1283 and 1285 §§ 1-2; 4º can. 1282;

5º can. 1287; see also can. 1286, 1289 and 2326. - 540 can. 1279, 3º can. 1279 § 1; see also can. 1280 and 1281 § 1. - 552-553 can. 1502, which says: "As regards the payment of tithes and first-fruits, particular statutes and laudable customs in each region are to be observed." - 554 and following are confirmed by can. 1261; penalties, can. 2325. - 578 penalties, can. 2325. - 581 is confirmed by can. 132 § 1. - 582 can. 1154; as regards the right of asylum, can. 1179 says: "The Church enjoys the right of asylum, so that the guilty who have fled to it are not to be extracted from it, unless necessity urges, without the assent of the Ordinary, or at least of the rector of the church." But violation of a church, which formerly was called pollution, now occurs in the same way as before, except that, in place of the effusion of human semen, can. 1172 § 1 n. 3 has substituted: "impious or sordid uses, to which the church has been devoted." - 583 On real sacrilege, see can. 1150. - 584 can. 727 §§ 1-2 clearly explains what simony of divine law is, what simony of ecclesiastical law is; cf. also can. 1441, 1465 § 2 and 1539 § 1. - 585 3º is confirmed by can. 728. But simony, etc., can. 730. - 588 2º and 3º can. 730. - 591 1º can. 729 and can. 2392; but from this can. n. 2 the incapacity of which under c) is reduced to a simple privation of the right of electing, presenting, nominating, and indeed only as regards those who have such a right. 2º the censure has been taken away; there is only a prohibition, can. 570. 3º there is a simple prohibition of trading in the stipend of Masses, can. 827, and the penalties from can. 2324 henceforth will be only ferendae sententiae. - 592 is confirmed by can. 729.

S. Th. II-II, q. 81, a. 1-6; q. 84, a. 1, ad 1.

645. Religion, according to Lactantius, is said etymologically from re-binding (re-ligando), because it repeatedly binds men to God by knowledge and love, to whom they are already bound through dependence; but according to Cicero from re-reading (relegendo), because the religious man frequently meditates, treats again, and mentally reads again those things which pertain to God and His worship, because we are accustomed especially to treat again those things which more deserve veneration and fear. We pass over the opinion of St. Augustine, who says that religion is from re-choosing (reelegendo) that which we have lost by sinning, because this etymology does not seem possible.¹ But whether you choose the one or the other etymology, always "religion properly imports order, namely, a moral ordination, to God," upon whom we depend or to whom we owe veneration. St. Thomas aptly says, q. 81, a. 1:

¹ The other two are possible and are still proposed today by the learned. Thus Reville explains the word as Lactantius does; Max Muller holds with Cicero.

"Whether religion is said from frequent re-reading, or from the repeated choice of that which was negligently lost, or whether it is said from re-binding, religion properly imports order to God. For He is the one to whom we principally ought to be bound as to an unfailing principle; to whom also our choice ought assiduously to be directed as to the ultimate end; whom also by neglecting through sinning we lose, and by believing and by professing faith we ought to recover."

Hence a) most broadly, it is taken objectively for the complex of all our offices toward God, whether of the intellect, or of the will, or of the executive powers, and consequently of all dogmas, laws, and institutes by which men are obligated to God; and subjectively for the fulfillment of all offices toward God (Jas. I, 26, 27);

b) Most strictly, it is taken for the supreme worship which we owe to God alone (godsdienst) and for the virtue which inclines us to this (godsdienstigheid);

c) By excellence, it is said of the institute or state of those who, through the evangelical counsels, perfectly dedicate their whole life to divine worship.

646. The virtue of religion is defined: a virtue inclining man to exhibit due worship to God as the first principle of all things.

It is a virtue, because it renders due worship to God; but to render to someone what is owed to him is good and best; therefore religion renders man perfect, and therefore it is a virtue.

It is one virtue, because it has one object: for it exhibits honor to God according to one account, insofar as He is the first principle of the creation and governance of things.

It is a special virtue, because it has a special object; for to God, on account of His singular excellence, insofar as He transcends all things infinitely according to every manner of excess, there is owed a special honor, which is called the supreme worship or worship of latria, distinct from dulia, which is rendered to the saints or to those more worthy on account of their own excellence.²

² On the virtue of religion, these can usefully be consulted: St. Thomas, q. 81-100 with the commentaries of Cajetan and Billuart; Suarez, De Virtute Religionis; Dignant, De Virtute Religionis; Tanquerey and Prummer in their manuals; Monsabre, La Priere; Janvier, Conf. de N. D.: La Justice envers Dieu; Gardeil, L'education personnelle et surnaturelle de soi-meme par la vertu de religion, in Rev. Thomiste, 1919-20; Dom Lottin, L'Ame du culte: la vertu de religion.

647. Religion is not a theological virtue but a moral virtue, because it does not attain God Himself, the ultimate end, but is concerned with the means to the end, namely, with our acts, which are something created: for it does not have God as its immediate object, whether material or formal. But it is a moral virtue, whose:

1. Material object, or that which it intends to exhibit, is divine worship: worship is a certain testimony of submission unto the acknowledgment of the excellence of another; and therefore divine worship consists in acts by which man protests the divine excellence and his own subjection to God, and thus honors God as first principle and supreme lord;

2. Primary material object (others say the formal quod), which religion principally, per se, and by reason of itself intends to exhibit by divine worship, is a certain due equality between the worship exhibited and God's right to it, by which equality the worship exhibited is proportioned to the right which God has to it: not an absolute equality, but an imperfect and relative one, by which we render worship to God as much as is possible according to the consideration of human faculty and divine acceptance;³

³ St. Thomas, a. 5, ad 3.

3. Formal object, or the immediate and proximate motive on account of which we exhibit due worship to God, is the special honesty of the said equality: for man wills to render due worship to God and thus preserve equality between himself and God, because this is good and is owed.

God, insofar as by reason of excellence He has a right to man's worship and holds man obligated to worship, is not the object which religion immediately attains, but only mediately the end to whom the debt is rendered. In the same way, the person to whom we render what is owed to him is not the object of justice, but only the end to whom that which is just is rendered.

648. Corollaries. From the aforesaid doctrine it follows:

1. That divine excellence is not the formal object or proximate motive of religion, but only the remote foundation on account of which God has a right to worship and worship is owed to Him.

2. The debt which religion attends to is strict or legal, indeed most strict, because God has the supreme right that worship be exhibited to Him. Yet we are not able to render that debt to equality (a. 5, ad 3), both because we do not render all that we have received, for example, being itself; and because we do not render as much as we owe, since we always receive new benefits; and because we do not pay from our own things but from the goods of God Himself. Hence even by payment the debt increases, since through it a new benefit is conferred upon man. Namely, we confer no utility upon God, but we perfect ourselves, "because by this, that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; and in this its perfection consists" (a. 7).

3. Religion is not justice strictly so called, both a) because it does not render to God to equality, as has been said, and b) because it is not toward another perfectly distinct: for insofar as we are creatures and servants of God, to whom as supreme lord of all we are subjected, we are something of God; hence religion, which acknowledges that subjection, supposes a certain special conjunction of Creator and creature, whereas strict justice rests upon perfect distinction. Hence religion falls short of perfect justice and is a potential part of it.

4. Since religion is a moral virtue, it is in the mean: for although under one respect there cannot be excess in its matter, insofar as the worship rendered to God cannot be excessive in quantity, nevertheless according to other circumstances excess is found, for example, because worship is exhibited to one to whom it ought not be exhibited, or when or how it ought not be exhibited (a. 5, ad 3).

5. Fidelity, observance, and gratitude toward God are not virtues distinct from religion, because by them God is worshiped under the same account, as creator and governor (a. 3, ad 1).

6. Religion differs from piety toward God: for the former is the virtue by which we worship God as creator and lord; the latter is the gift of the Holy Spirit by which we venerate God as father.

7. It differs also from obedience and humility: from obedience, because this of itself is not ordered to testifying to divine excellence, but inclines to observing the precept of any superior, because it has been commanded by him; from humility, which does not directly testify to submission to another, but represses the appetite lest it tend toward lofty things beyond the limits of its condition which it has received from God, because this is fitting to our lowliness, and therefore it submits itself to the divine rule, not indeed to honor the majesty of God (as religion does) but to confess our own nothingness. Yet these virtues have their ultimate foundation, principle, and root in reverence toward the supreme authority of God and thus in religion, to which they are akin.

8. It differs also from the theological virtues, which are not ordered to the formal testification of divine excellence, nor do they formally regard debt. But they are the foundation of infused supernatural religion, as the end is with respect to means: for by them we immediately adhere to God Himself, the ultimate end; but religion orders our acts as due means unto reverence, love, and glory of God (a. 5, ad 1). And similarly one must speak of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are connected with the theological virtues. Hence St. Thomas, a. 2, ad 1: "To revere God is an act of the gift of fear. But it belongs to religion to do certain things on account of reverence for God. Hence it does not follow that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it is ordered to it as to something more principal: for the gifts are more principal than the moral virtues."

9. It differs especially from charity, which loves the goodness of God in itself as communicated to us. Namely, religion precisely worships the excellence of God which transcends all things and cannot be communicated; hence in the same way as justice rests upon every manner of distinction from another, so also religion rests upon a certain distinction (imperfect) from God. "The object of love is the good; but the object of honor and reverence is something excellent. Now the goodness of God is communicated to the creature, but not the excellence of His goodness. And therefore charity, by which God is loved, is not a virtue distinct from charity by which neighbor is loved. But religion, by which God is honored, is distinguished from the virtues by which neighbor is honored" (a. 4, ad 3; cf. q. 82, a. 2, ad 1).

10. Religion is more excellent than all the moral virtues, because it approaches more nearly to the ultimate end, God: for it performs those things which are directly and immediately ordered to divine honor.

S. Th. II-II, q. 81, a. 1, ad 1; a. 3, ad 2 and 3; a. 4, ad 1 and 2; a. 7 and 8; q. 83, a. 12.

649. Worship is honor with submission and acknowledgment of dependence exhibited to someone on account of his excellence; namely, it is honor exhibited to someone superior and more excellent: for a superior exhibits honor to an inferior, not worship; for example, God honors the saints, a master honors disciples, but does not worship them. Now honor is a testification or protestation concerning the excellence of another's goodness, a sign of esteem which we exhibit to another on account of his excellence. Therefore divine worship is honor with submission and acknowledgment of dependence exhibited to God on account of His excellence. In other words: it is a certain testification and mark of submission to the acknowledged excellence of the first principle, God; a sign which signifies submission toward God, the supreme Lord (a. 3, ad 2; a. 4 and 6).

650. There is a natural and divine precept of worshiping God. It is proved:

a) From reason: 1. For God, because He is the first exemplary and efficient principle, and creator, is supreme Lord, and indeed Lord as regards our being and as regards all things which pertain to us; but a servant ought to acknowledge and worship his lord; therefore man too ought to acknowledge his dependence upon God and worship Him.

2. Similarly God, the first principle acting freely, is our distinguished benefactor, from whom we have received all things gratuitously from mere goodness; but to a benefactor there is owed the worship of gratitude.

3. Likewise God is the first final principle or ultimate end, upon whom all things specially depend, insofar as they ought through their whole existence to tend toward Him and glorify Him above all things; therefore man ought to acknowledge this dependence and procure that highest honor for Him.

b) From Scripture, Exod. XX, 2...: "I am the Lord thy God... Thou shalt not have strange gods before me... Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing... thou shalt not adore them nor worship them... Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain... Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day... the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God"; in which words are contained the three offices of fidelity, observance or reverence, and service toward God, according to which it is owed that we order our acts with respect to God.

651. Elicited and commanded acts pertain to divine worship. For divine worship is constituted by our acts. Now the acts by which we worship are some elicited by religion, others only commanded. Elicited acts are those which, not through the mediation of another habit but immediately, are produced by religion and according to their own nature directly pertain to the worship of God, such as prayer, genuflection, adoration, etc. Commanded acts are those which it produces through the mediation of another habit or virtue by which they are immediately elicited and to which by their nature they pertain: thus fasting or almsgiving, which are elicited by temperance and mercy, if they are ordered to divine worship, are commanded by religion. For just as the will moves other powers to the end, so one virtue moves others to its own end: religion often uses acts of other virtues insofar as they are suitable for worshiping God, and thus directs them to its own end (a. 1, ad 1; and a. 8).

652. Worship is internal and external. Elicited acts are some principal and internal, namely, devotion and internal prayer; others secondary, destined to the internal acts, and external, such as vocal prayer, sacrifice, etc.

Now not only is internal worship commanded, as is clear from John IV, 23-24, and was demonstrated, n. 650; but also external worship, which is the sensible expression of internal worship, accomplished by various external acts of the body, must necessarily be exhibited:

1. By reason of itself, because man consists of soul and body, and because each depends upon God; therefore he ought to worship God with both soul and body;

2. By reason of internal worship, both a) because it is its natural effect by which it is manifested, for man naturally manifests internal affections; and b) because it is the means by which it is aroused and fostered: for man needs sensible things in order to be aroused to spiritual things (a. 7; q. 83, a. 12; q. 84, a. 2);

3. By reason of social worship, because not only the individual man, but also natural society as such, since it is from God and has received benefits from Him, ought to revere Him and acknowledge dependence, which surely cannot be done except by external acts. Worship exhibited by society is called public.

653. Worship is absolute or relative. Absolute worship is that which is owed to someone on account of proper and inherent excellence: such worship is owed to God, that is, either to the divinity abstracting from the persons, or to the three persons together, or to one of the three, to the humanity of Christ, and to the Holy Eucharist; relative worship is that which is rendered to someone on account of an extrinsic excellence which is not in him, but which is in another with whom he has a relation of representation or connection: in this way the name and images of God, the cross of Christ, the instruments of the Passion, and relics are worshiped (a. 3, ad 3).

In this last lecture of our course I propose to make a brief excursion with you into the border-land of science, a region chiefly occupied by imposture and superstition. To show there is such a territory, we have only to name a few of its inhabitants, such as mesmerism, animal magnetism, odylism, hypnotism, mind-reading, faith-cures, clairvoyance, spiritism, including table-rapping, spirit-rapping, most of which have been used in connection with medicine. I do not maintain that all of these are mere vagaries, empty shadows, without the least reality, mere ghosts and hobgoblins, mere phantoms of the heat-oppressed brain, or cunning devices of impostors to deceive a gullible crowd of the ignorant public. Yet most of these are such beyond a doubt, and as such are totally unworthy of our attention.

Medicine is a science; it deals with undoubted facts and certain principles, and with theories in so far as they are supported by well-ascertained realities. The border-land of which I speak presents to our investigation few certain facts. It is chiefly the domain of imposture. Charlatans and showmen and medical quacks call things facts that are not facts. Among all the inhabitants of the shadowy region that I have enumerated, there is only one considered to-day by the science of medicine as worthy of its attention. It is hypnotism. As its first origin is connected with the history of mesmerism, and the latter, though itself a phantom, has been used as the chief patron of all other phantoms, I will premise a few words about mesmerism itself.

I. Mesmer was born about 1733, studied in Vienna and there became a doctor of medicine in 1766. Soon after, he began to speculate upon the curative powers of the magnet, and claimed to have discovered the existence of a force in man similar to magnetism and the source of strong influence on the human body.

In 1775 he published an account of the medical powers of this animal magnetism, which from his name was afterward called mesmerism. Paris was then the centre of attraction for scientific discoverers and pretenders. Thither Mesmer betook himself and there he soon created a lively sensation by the exhibition of mesmeric trances, some of which were accompanied by clairvoyance—that is, the power of seeing objects concealed from the eyes. He was also supposed to work some inexplicable cures.

The secret of his art he could not be induced to reveal even for the sum of 340,000 livres, which was offered him in compensation. People began to doubt whether he had a real secret, or whether he was a rank impostor. A royal commission was appointed to examine into the matter. Our Benjamin Franklin, then in Paris, was one of the commissioners. Their report was unfavorable. They found no proof of the existence of a fluid such as animal magnetism, and thought that all that was not imposture could be accounted for by the power of imagination. In a secret report they pointed out very strongly the dangers likely to arise from this unhealthy stimulus to the imagination. Their verdict does honor to their learning and their common-sense. Mesmer left Paris, and he died in obscurity in 1815.

But his pretended discovery did not die with him. It was a mine of resources to charlatans and impostors generally. There were strange effects produced, and at the sight of the inexplicable men lose their wits. The gullible public wondered, restless minds experimented, and many pondered thoughtfully on facts, most of which were not facts at all. But after eliminating all the elements of imposture and exaggeration there seemed to remain a residue of phenomena that were strange and unaccountable.

About 1840 the vaunted claims of the many clairvoyants were exposed before the French Academy of Medicine, which passed a resolution rejecting mesmerism altogether as unworthy of notice on the part of scientific men. The theory of a mesmeric fluid, until then the only one advanced, had evidently to be abandoned. Science with all its tests could find no such cause of the results produced. But in 1842 an English physician, Dr. James Braid, hit upon a more plausible theory. He conjectured that the actions of the mesmeric subject could be explained without a fluid by the suggestion of phantasms to him on the part of the mesmerizer. Dr. Carpenter, then a great authority, defended his theory; but the medical branch of the British Association disdained to consider the matter. Dr. Braid thought the mesmeric trance was only a state of somnambulism artificially brought about, and he coined the word hypnotism to indicate the artificial sleep. Other attempts to promote the cause of hypnotism were made in the United States and other lands, but no very definite or scientific results were reached until 1878, when the celebrated Prof. Charcot and others made its nature and possibilities the subject of a thorough study and abundant experimentation at the Paris hospital of La Salpétrière and in other places. At present it is admitted by distinguished medical scientists that hypnotism is a reality, capable of being utilized for important purposes. Many effects have been demonstrated to be produced by it as real as any ordinary phenomena of nature. But on the explanation of their causes there hangs still a cloud of obscurity.

The Paris School of Doctors attribute the effects to physical causes, chief among which are diseases of the nerves. Those of Nancy trace the phenomena to a psychical source, namely, to suggestion—that is, action on the subject through his imagination excited by words, signs, or in any other manner. This appears to be, in the main, the theory of Dr. Braid vindicated by modern science. Probably enough, both schools are right in their way, the suggestions not taking effect except where nervous affections have prepared the way. The beneficial results claimed for hypnotism by the scientific men who have made its study a specialty are chiefly as follows:

1. It acts as a temporary sedative, quieting the excited nerves of the patient. It was thus employed, for instance, on an old woman who was near her death, and who had not been able to make necessary preparations for that important event, being beside herself with nervous agitation. She obtained by this means a calm condition for some seven or eight hours. Hypnotism was for her like the visit of a good angel from heaven.

2. It is used as an anæsthetic in place of chloroform, which in many cases cannot be applied without great danger to health, or even life. Thus perfect insensibility may be procured and long continued, allowing sometimes of the performance of protracted surgical operations that would otherwise be almost impossible.

3. At other times it is employed as a mere pain-killer without depriving the patient of consciousness, so that the hurt is felt indeed, but not attended with keen suffering.

4. It is claimed that the skilful application of hypnotism can at times not only alleviate the pain of an injury, but even cure nervous affections more or less permanently, removing, for instance, the defect of stammering.

5. There are not wanting cases in which even moral improvements are claimed to be produced, at least in the removing of bad habits, such as drunkenness. If hypnotism can cure intoxication permanently, or even for a season, it deserves to be encouraged. Yet even then it must be used with great caution, for there may be very evil consequences resulting from its use. To realize fully the dangers and the evils attendant upon hypnotism you must understand the three stages through which the patient is made to pass—those of lethargy, catalepsy, and somnambulism.

Each of these is a disease in itself, and thus it is seen at once that a treatment which employs diseases as its means of cure must be of a dangerous kind. After the patient has been hypnotized by any of the various processes—the chief are mesmeric passes of the hypnotizer’s hands, his eyes fixed into the eyes of his subject, or the latter’s on an object so held as to strain his eyes—the first stage of hypnotism is obtained, that of lethargy. In the lethargic state, the subject appears to be sunk in a deep sleep; his body is perfectly helpless; the limbs hang down slackly, and when raised fall heavily into the same position. In this condition all the striated or voluntary muscles react on mechanical excitement. Without an accurate knowledge of anatomy, much harm may be done by the experiment.

The second stage is that of catalepsy, certainly not a healthy condition to be in. Its grand feature is a plastic immobility by which the subject maintains all the attitudes given to his body and limbs, but with this peculiarity, that the limbs and features act in unison. Join the hands of the patient as if in devout prayer, and his countenance assumes a devout expression; clench his fist, and anger is depicted in his features.

The third stage is that of somnambulism. The skin is now insensible to pain, but excessive keenness is manifested in the sight, hearing, smell, and muscular sense. Here the impostor can play off his pretended clairvoyance or second sight; for the subject will discover objects hidden from sight by the sense of smell and other senses affected with abnormal power. The somnambulist will now exhibit the utmost sensibility to suggestions made to him by the hypnotizer, so that he seems to be almost entirely controlled by the influence of the latter’s will. This is what chiefly favored the early theory that a mesmeric fluid emanated from the mesmerizer by means of which he could act in his subject as he pleased. The experiment by suggestions seems to succeed best with hysterical patients, which fact confirms the morbid character of the hypnotic trance.

If any distinguished scientist or Doctor who can afford it wishes to make a special study of hypnotism, which is still so imperfectly understood, he may render a valuable service to humanity, and in particular to the science of medicine. But if any ordinary physician asked my advice about devoting attention to this pursuit. I would emphatically tell him, “Leave it alone: you are not likely to derive real benefit from it, and you are very likely to inspire your clients with distrust of you when they see you deal with matters which have deserved a bad name on account of the charlatanism and the superstitious abuses usually connected with them.” This is not my opinion alone, but also that of distinguished writers on the subject.

When there is question of hypnotic séances or exhibitions such as are designed to feed the morbid cravings of the public for what is mysterious and sensational, I would call special attention to the following objections against such practices.

1. Medical authorities maintain that it requires at least as much knowledge of therapeutics to use hypnotism safely as it does for the general practice of medicine, and requires of a physician who engages in it a more thorough mastery of his profession than many other branches of the healing art, and therefore that it is as objectionable to allow non-professionals to deal with hypnotism as it would be to allow medical practice promiscuously to all persons without a Doctor’s diploma. In fact, in Russia, Prussia, and Denmark none but licensed physicians can lawfully practise hypnotism. Aside from a variety of accidents which may result to the subject hypnotized from the ignorance of physiology in the hypnotizer, there is this general injury sustained, that even strong subjects frequently experimented upon contract a disposition to be readily thrown into any of the three morbid states of the mesmeric trance. All these states are real diseases and are allied to hysteria, epilepsy, and a whole family of nervous troubles, any one of which is sufficient to make a patient very miserable for life, and even to lead him to an early grave.

2. The moralist has still stronger objections against the use of hypnotism, except when it is used as a means to most important results. He maintains that one of the greatest evils that can befall a man is the weakening of his will-power; this leaves him a victim to the cravings of his lower appetites. Now the frequent surrender of one’s will to the control of another is said (very reasonably, it would seem) to bring on a weakening of the will or self-control. We see this exemplified in the habitual drunkard. He loses will-power to such an extent that he can scarcely keep his most solemn promises or withstand the slightest temptations. There is a very serious question asked by the moralist upon another resemblance of an hypnotic subject to a drunkard. He asks whether any man has a right for the amusement perhaps of the curious lookers-on to forfeit for awhile his manhood, or the highest privilege of his manhood—his powers of intellect and free-will. He admits that we do so daily in our sleep. But then he argues that sleep is a necessity of our nature directly intended by the Creator, a normal part of human life. Besides it is a necessary means for the renewal of our strength, and on the plea of necessity the moralist may admit the use of hypnotism when it is needed for the cure of bodily diseases. But for the mere amusement of spectators he maintains that it is wrong for a man thus to resign his human dignity, as it would be wrong for him to get drunk for the amusement of lookers-on. Still, in this latter case the evil would be greater, for in drunkenness there is contained a lower degradation, inasmuch as the baser passions are then left without all control, and are apt to become exceedingly vile in their licentious condition. The hypnotic subject has at least the mind and will of the hypnotizer to direct him. Here, however, appears the need of another caution, namely, that the hypnotizer should be known to be a virtuous man; else the evil that he can do to his subject, as is readily seen, may be even worse than that resulting from a fit of drunkenness. And as men who occupy even respectable positions may yet be vile at heart, it is very desirable for prudence’ sake to have no one hypnotized in private without the presence of a parent, close relative, or some other party, who will see to it that nothing improper be suggested during the trance. For the scenes gone through during the hypnotic state, though not remembered by the subject upon his return to consciousness, are apt to recur to him afterwards like a dream, showing that they have left traces behind them.

3. Legal writers and lawyers have serious charges against hypnotism. This practice, they maintain, if publicly exhibited to old and young, begets dangerous cravings for sensational experiments. Turning away men’s attention from the sober realities and duties of social life, it prompts them to pursue the unnatural and abnormal. It was this craving that in less enlightened ages led men to the superstitious practice of astrology and witchcraft. At present it leads to such vagaries and unchristian and often immoral practices as are connected with spiritism, faith-cures, mind-reading, and similar foolish or criminal or at least dangerous experimentations which dive into the dark recesses found in the border-land of the preternatural. The atmosphere of that region is morally unhealthy and should be barred off by the guardians of public morals.

The most common objection of legal writers is directed against the various crimes to which hypnotism is apt to lead men of criminal propensities. They point to the statements of Dr. Luys, a respectable authority on hypnotism, who says: “A patient under the influence of hypnotism can be made to swallow poison, to inhale noxious gases. He can be led to make a manual gift of property, even to sign a promissory note or bill, or any kind of contract.” Indeed, how can notaries or witnesses suspect any fraud when even the Doctor needs all his experience and all his skill to avoid falling into error? In criminal matters a man under suggestion can bring false accusations and earnestly maintain that he has taken part in some horrible crime.

After considering the objections to the use, or rather abuse, of hypnotism, I may add some further explanation of hypnotism itself—of its nature so far as it is known to science. Science has ascertained the reality of the phenomena and facts—not single facts only, scattered here and there, but groups of facts uniformly obedient to certain laws of nature. It has not yet discovered the exact cause or causes of all these phenomena, but it gives plausible explanations of them, both in the physical theory of the Paris School and in the psychical theory of the Nancy School of Physicians. Science has discarded the original theory of a mesmeric fluid as the cause of these phenomena, just as it has discarded the formerly supposed fluids of electricity and magnetism. Of electricity the “Century Dictionary” says: “A name denoting the cause of an important class of phenomena of attraction and repulsion, chemical decomposition, and so on, or, collectively, these phenomena themselves.” The true nature of electricity is as yet not all understood, but it is not, as it was formerly supposed to be, of the nature of a fluid. Similarly we may define hypnotism as the collection of peculiar phenomena of a trance or sleep artificially induced, or the induced trance or sleep itself.

The true cause of these phenomena is not yet understood, but there is no apparent reason for attributing them to a special fluid; they seem to be peculiar ways of acting, belonging to man’s physical powers when his nerves are in an abnormal condition. By laying down these definite statements we gain the advantage that we isolate hypnotism from the frauds and empty shades, from the ghosts and hobgoblins with which it used to be associated in the border-region which we have undertaken to explore. Science deals with well-ascertained facts. Now of mesmerism, animal magnetism, and its kindred, odylism, we have seen that we have no reliable facts. We have done with those unsubstantial shades. But of hypnotism we have well-known facts, and we have shown it to be placed on a scientific basis.

Of clairvoyance, mind-reading, palmistry, spiritual science cures we have no certain facts, but we have many impostures connected with them. If ever we get real and undoubted facts proved to be connected with them, we ought to examine them with care. Science is not afraid of any portion of nature; all it dreads is ignorance, and what is worse, error. Error with regard to facts may be committed in two ways—by admitting as facts what are not facts, and by denying facts. Now, there are facts certain and well ascertained, numerous and widely known, connected with some other portions of the border-land of science that we have not yet looked into, though I have mentioned their names. He who would assert that spiritism, table-turning, spirit-rapping, and so on are mere idle talk, sheer impostures, is not well read in the literature of the present day. By denying all reality to these phenomena he strays as far from the truth as if he allowed himself to believe mere fabrications. They are not impositions, but they are worse; they are superstitions. By superstitions I mean here the practice of producing results which cannot possibly proceed from the powers of nature, and which could not without absurdity be attributed to the interference of the Creator or His good angels.

Some persons strenuously object to introducing any reference to God into scientific works. Science consists in tracing known effects to their true causes. If there were no God, He could not be a true cause and it would be unscientific to introduce His agency. But if there is a God and He acts in the world which He has made, we must take His actions into account when we study His works. Some say, “I do not believe in a God.” That may be, but that does not prove that there is no God. Belief is a man’s wilful and fine acceptance of what is proposed to him on the authority of some one else. Students have most of their knowledge on the authority of their professors and other men of learning. If a medical student would say, “I do not believe in microbes nor in contagion by disease germs,” that would not kill the germs nor protect him against contagion. Nor would it show his superior wisdom, but rather his extravagant conceit and ignorance. So with those who believe not in God.

There are others who believe not in the existence of devils or fallen angels. That is not so bad; but yet they must remember that their refusal to believe in devils does not prove that there are none. The greatest enemies of science are those who blindly maintain false statements and false principles of knowledge. Let us look for the truth in every investigation. Even Huxley, in the midst of his attacks on dogmatic religion, protests also against dogmatic infidelity. Science, he says, is as little atheistic as it is materialistic. All this must be remembered chiefly when we undertake to explore, as we are now doing, the unknown region which we have called the border-land of science. There we find many strange phenomena, and we are trying to discover their true nature and true causes. If we can explain some of them by natural causes, as by the powers of the imagination when it is in an abnormal or hypnotic state, very well, let us explain them. But let us not rashly conclude that all other phenomena can be thus explained. Do not reason this way, as some writers have done: “Some effects,” they say, “were formerly attributed to witchcraft or deviltry and can now be explained by hypnotism. Therefore all other mysterious effects can also be thus explained. Therefore there is not and never was such a thing as witchcraft or deviltry. So, too, some events often reputed miraculous can be explained by natural causes, therefore no miracle has ever happened.” That is the reasoning of rash and ignorant men, and not of scientific minds. It does not follow from the fact that God usually works by natural causes, that He cannot on special occasions and for very important reasons show His hand, as it were, and act so manifestly against the course of nature as to show us that it is He who is at work and He wants us to mind Him. History furnishes many instances of this kind.

Least of all have Christians a right to deny this, and we must remember that the civilized world is Christian, almost entirely. Christians believe in the reliability of the Bible, and in it we are constantly informed of countless miracles in various ages. If all these accounts are false, then Christianity is a vast imposture. Christ appealed to them as to His credentials in His mission to the world. “If you do not believe Me,” He said, “believe My works, for they give testimony of Me. The blind see; the lame walk; the dead are raised to life.” If He spoke falsely, He was a deceiver; if He worked those marvels by hypnotism, or any other natural cause, He was an impostor. There is no middle way. Either by working true miracles He proved Himself to be what He claimed to be, the Son of God, or He was the most bold and detestable impostor that has ever appeared on earth. This no Christian can suppose, this no historian would admit; therefore, we must grant that He worked miracles, and miracles are realities to be taken into account by the writers of history, and scientific workers must not sneer at them.

Scientific men in their investigations need not expect to come into contact with miracles; but they may and do find in the border-land of science facts which reveal the agency of intellectual beings distinct from men, and too vulgar in their manifestation to be confounded with God or His blessed angels. Such agents in the book of the Scriptures are called devils, and intercourse with them is styled superstition, seeking their assistance is magic or witchcraft, and consulting them is divination or fortune-telling. All these practices are directly and strictly forbidden in the Scriptures, and yet they are commonly enough in use in our own day to procure effects that gratify the curiosity of such, especially, as have no settled belief in supernatural religion.

Some of these effects are connected with bodily cures and thus are of interest to physicians. For instance, spiritualistic mediums, whether connecting their practices with magnetism or not, though entirely ignorant of medicine, are at times able to state the exact bodily indisposition of sick persons living at a great distance, put into communication with them by holding some object belonging to them. They will indicate the seat of the disorder, its nature and progress, its complications. They propose simple and efficacious remedies, using not infrequently technical terms which are certainly unknown to them before. They manifest the thoughts of others, reveal family secrets, answer questions put in languages of which they know nothing. To deny facts attested by thousands of witnesses of various nations belonging to various religious denominations or professing no religion whatever, is not the spirit of science. It it estimated that 100,000 spiritist books and pamphlets are sold yearly in the United States alone. It is certain that much, very much imposture is mixed up with many undeniable facts, but that does not dispose of the real facts mixed up with the impostures. Tyndall once caught an ill-starred spiritualistic impostor at his juggling. He concluded that all other spiritists were impostors. The world now laughs at him for his foolish reasoning.

Of course, I do not suppose that spiritism is mainly employed in such matters as would directly interest the physician. It has grown into a system of religion and morals, very peculiar and at variance with the Christian religion, a system rather resembling the religion of Buddha, with its reincarnations and transmigrations of souls while struggling after eternal after-progress. This is fully and clearly explained in an article on “Spiritism in its True Character” in the English publication called “The Month,” for September, 1892. But with this phase of it we are not now concerned. As to the facts, it is enough to remark that spiritists claim a following of 20,000,000. Suppose there are only one-half that number. 10,000,000 people are not readily deceived about matters of their daily observation, for their meetings or séances consist chiefly of those manifestations which others call impostures.

Their adherents are chiefly among the educated classes, I believe. Certainly they include multitudes of doctors, lawyers, professors, scientists, magistrates, clergymen, close students, keen intellects, even such men as Alfred Russell Wallace, Profs. Morgan, Marley, Challis, William Carpenter, and Edward Cox. If one has still lingering doubts on this matter let him read the four learned articles written by my predecessor in this chair of Medical Jurisprudence, Rev. James F. Hoeffer, S.J., the former president of Creighton University. They are found in the “American Catholic Quarterly Review” for 1882 and 1883.

What must we think of the nature of spiritism, with its spirit-rappings, table-turning, spirit-apparitions, and so on? Can such of the facts as are not impostures and realities be explained by the laws of nature, the powers of material agents and of men? All that could possibly be done by the most skilled scientists, by the most determined materialists who believe neither in God nor demon, as well as by the most conscientious Christians, has only served to demonstrate to perfect evidence that effects are produced which can no more be attributed to natural agency than speech and design can be attributed to a piece of wood. One principle of science throws much light on the nature of all those performances, namely, that every effect must have a proportionate cause. When the effect shows knowledge and design, the cause must be intelligent. Now many of these marvels evidently show knowledge and design; therefore the cause is certainly intelligent.

A table cannot understand and answer questions; it cannot move at a person’s bidding. A medium cannot speak in a language he has never learned, nor know the secret ailment of a patient far away, nor prescribe the proper remedies without knowledge of medicine. Therefore these effects, when they really exist, are due to intelligent agents, agents distinct from the persons visibly present; invisible agents, therefore, spirits of another world.

Who are these agents? God and His good angels cannot work these wretched marvels, the food of a morbid curiosity, nor could they put themselves at the disposal of impious men to be marched out as monkeys on the stage. The spirits which are made to appear at the séances are degraded spirits. Spiritualists themselves tell us they are lying spirits. Those lying spirits say they are the souls of the departed, but who can believe their testimony if they are lying spirits, as they are acknowledged to be? This whole combination of imposture and superstition is simply the revival in a modern dress of a very ancient deception of mankind by playing on men’s craving for the marvellous. Many imagine these are recent discoveries, peculiar to this age of progress. Why? This spirit-writing is and has been for centuries extensively practised in benighted pagan China, while even Africans and Hindoos are great adepts at table-turning. It is simply the revival of ancient witchcraft, which Simon Magus practised in St. Peter’s time; which flourished in Ephesus while St. Paul was preaching the Gospel there. It is more ancient still. These were the abominations for which God commissioned the Jews in Moses’ time to exterminate the Canaanites and the other inhabitants of the Promised Land. In the Book of Moses called Deuteronomy, or Second Law, admitted as divine by Catholics, Protestants, and Jews alike, we have this fact very emphatically proclaimed by the Lord. He says: “When thou art come into the land which the Lord thy God shall give thee, beware lest thou have a mind to imitate the abominations of those nations; neither let there be found among you any one that ... consulteth soothsayers, or observeth dreams and omens, neither let there be any wizard, nor charmer, nor any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead.”

Is not this just what spiritualists pretend to do? Many may call it only trifling and play. The Lord does not. The Scriptures continue: “For the Lord abhorreth all these things, and for these abominations He will destroy them at thy coming.” I certainly do not mean to say that all that passes for spiritualism is thus downright deviltry to-day, nor was it so in pagan times. Much imposture was mixed with it. The oracles of the pagan gods and goddesses were not all the work of the pythonic spirits. Much was craft of the priests of idols; and yet all were abominations before the Lord, on account of the share that Satan took in the deceptions.

What must be the attitude of the scientific man towards all such matters? It should be an attitude of hostility and opposition. Science should frown down all imposture and superstition. Medicine in particular, intended to be one of the choicest blessings of God to man, should not degrade its noble profession by pandering to a vulgar greed for morbid excitement. Not only will you personally keep aloof from all that is allied to quackery and imposture, but in after-life your powerful influence for good will be most efficient in guarding others against such evils, and even perhaps in withdrawing from such associations those who have already got entangled in dangerous snares. At all events the enlightened views you shall have formed to yourselves on all such impostures and impieties will be a power for good in the social circle in which your mental superiority and your moral integrity will make you safe guides for your fellow-men.

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"Superstition," says St. Thomas,² "is a vice opposed to religion according to excess; not because it shows more in divine worship than true religion, but because it shows divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in the manner in which it ought not."

334. • Idolatry is an action by which worship owed to God alone is rendered to a creature; and this happens not only by sacrifice, but by any sign of honor by which someone intends to submit himself to a creature as to God, for example by genuflection.

Idolatry is distinguished as twofold, namely: 1° Material or simulated, when someone without internal affection, from grave fear, shows worship to an idol. It would also be called material if it proceeded from invincible error, for example if someone, falsely thinking a host to be consecrated, were to adore it. - In the first case it would be a mortal sin; in the second, none, as is clear.

2° Formal and proper, which is done 1° by adoring a creature as God; 2° by showing worship to a demon or another creature as if to God, or at least from the mind of obtaining something from such a creature which can be asked from God alone.³

335. • Vain observance is superstition which employs means neither proportioned nor instituted by God for obtaining a certain effect.

It is of three kinds, namely: 1° Notory art, or the art of acquiring knowledge without labor. 2° Art of healings, or the art of healing by various signs or sacred things. 3° Observance of events, by which from consideration of some fortuitous event it is conjectured that something favorable or unfavorable will be in the future.¹

Principles. - I. Vain observance is a grave sin, because it attributes divine honor to a creature, while it expects from it what must be expected from God alone; and because it rests upon an implicit pact with a demon. Yet it can often be venial from imperfection of the act, from simplicity, from some ignorance, or from timidity, as happens especially among the uneducated in the observance of events.²

II. Vain observance is discerned especially: 1° from the insufficiency of the cause for naturally producing the effect; 2° from the joining of a vain or false circumstance as if necessarily required; 3° from the infallibility which is attributed to means in no way infallible.³

III. In doubt whether effects proceed from a natural cause or from a demon, they can be attributed to the powers of nature; and therefore it is licit to procure them, because it is not established that the thing is evil. Yet Doctors counsel a previous protestation against any intervention of a demon. - But in doubt whether effects are produced by a demon or by God, if there is present a certain probability that they cannot proceed from a natural cause, they are to be attributed to the demon, unless the sanctity of the one working or other clear signs persuade the contrary, because it is rash to think that miracles are always occurring. Hence it is not then licit to try whether the effect is going to follow or not. - St. Alph.,¹ St. Thom.,² and others commonly.

336. You will resolve. - 1° Those are guilty of superstition who wear ligatures marked with certain characters; who invoke certain unknown names, or employ a certain number of crosses or prayers for healing wounds, for rendering themselves invulnerable, ... etc.²

2° Likewise those who wear certain prayers, expecting an effect altogether infallible from them. - Yet those are not to be blamed, indeed are very much to be praised, who wear pious medals, sacred images, or Relics of Saints, hoping that they will specially obtain divine help for themselves.³

3° Likewise those are guilty of superstition who regard certain days as favorable and others as unfavorable, so that they direct their actions from this; or who for expelling diseases require herbs gathered on such a feast, ... etc.⁴

4° But it is not superstitious to observe the moon or times more suitable for gathering herbs, cutting trees, etc.; ... nor to wear sacred things or words of Sacred Scripture for the honor of God or the Saints and for imploring their help. Likewise neither to recite a certain number of prayers, nor to do all those things which can increase devotion, provided that an infallible power is not attributed to them.⁵

5° Nor is it in any way superstitious, indeed it is very religious and pious, to recite novena prayers, or to repeat prayers so many times in worship of Our Lord, or of the Blessed Virgin, or of some Saint, provided that an infallible power is not attached to such a number, to a certain day, or to a fixed time.⁷

337. Definition. - Divination is the inquiry of hidden things by the help of a demon.

Division. It is 1° express, if it is done through the express invocation of a demon; 2° tacit, if that invocation is only in disproportionate means.

Various kinds of divination are distinguished, of which sort are especially: 1° Judicial Astrology from the stars; 2° Augury from the song or flight of birds; - 3° Auspice from the song of birds; - 4° Haruspicy from the entrails of animals; - 5° Chiromancy from the lines of the hand; - 6° Geomancy from signs in the earth; - 7° Omen from a fortuitous event; - 8° Necromancy from invocation of a dead person; - 9° Oneiromancy from dreams; - 10° Sortilege from lots; - 11° Oracle from idols; - 12° Vaticination from prophets or cards.¹

338. Principles. - I. Whatever of hidden things is known in another way than by revelation or by natural means must be attributed to divination; for no other means is given for investigating hidden things. - But in doubt whether knowledge arises from natural means or not, whether from a good or from a bad spirit, the rules set forth above concerning vain observance must be applied (n. 335, II).

II. Express divination can never be excused from mortal sin, not even through ignorance; for it is clear that a pact with a demon, or to invoke him, even without a pact, is something most gravely illicit.

This is clearly established from Sacred Scripture, Deut. 18. 10; Lev. 20. 6.

III. But tacit divination can sometimes be excused from mortal sin because of simplicity or ignorance, or because of defect of certain faith.²

339. You will resolve. - 1° He is not free from grave fault who, using disproportionate means for some knowledge, protests that he intends no commerce with a demon; for he acts against his protestation, and implicitly invokes the demon, since neither God nor the Angels mix themselves with such things. - Yet otherwise in doubt whether the effect is had from a natural cause, as was said concerning vain observance³ (n. 335, II).

2° Natural effects must be carefully distinguished from free effects; for the former can often be conjectured, as, for example, from the song and flight of birds, or from the aspect of the stars, one conjectures storm, rain, or serenity of the sky, etc.; for by experience it is established that there is a natural connection among these things. But one must speak otherwise of the latter.

3° Character or state of soul can sometimes in some way be conjectured from the color of the face or other external signs, although in practice for the most part one must abstain from such conjectures because of the danger of rash judgment. But free acts, whether past or future, can never be known with certainty.

4° Those sin gravely who inquire from diviners about their future fortune or life (in English: to consult fortune-tellers; card-cutting); unless they act from simplicity, jest, or from cause of curiosity, without giving faith to the things said.¹ - Yet if the diviner does this seriously, they can with difficulty be excused from gravely culpable cooperation.

340. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is the use of lots ever licit?

Resp. 1° Dividing lots, by which it is discerned what is to be assigned to each in settling lawsuits or in distributing things, are certainly licit, since they are entirely free from all superstition.

Resp. 2° Consultory lots, by which the divine will is investigated so that it may be known what is to be done, are not licit unless they are made by a special impulse of God, or there is question of a grave affair in which another counsel is lacking. The reason is that, according to ordinary providence, God does not will that inquiry be made in this way about His will, but recourse must be had to prudent men or ecclesiastical Superiors.

Resp. 3° Divinatory lots, by which the manifestation of a hidden thing is sought, for example from the casting of dice, etc., ... are always gravely illicit, as containing at least tacit invocation of a demon. Superstition of this sort is properly called sortilege, by which name also other kinds of superstitions commonly come.²

341. • Quaer. 2° Is it licit to conjecture future things from dreams?

Resp. Negatively, ordinarily, because dreams almost always proceed from natural causes, for example from the stirring of humors, etc. ... Besides, dreams sent by God are very rare, and are joined with signs through which they can be certainly discerned from natural or diabolical dreams.³

Quaer. 3° Is the use of a divining rod licit?

Resp. 1° Certainly it is to be condemned as often as the rod is moved or not moved according to the mere intention of him who holds it in his hand, and is not moved in the presence of another thing not sought, although of the same nature. For there is no proportion between a natural thing and the intention of man. Hence those sin gravely who use a rod for seeking a thief, or for detecting the stone marking the boundary of a field.¹

Resp. 2° To some the use of the rod for detecting waters or metals does not seem certainly to be condemned, if the rod is moved over these things in every case equally, whether they are sought or not. Yet a protestation against diabolical operation, which perhaps can be present, will prudently be made, and every superstitious spirit must be excluded.³

342. • Quaer. 4° Is Magnetism licit?

Preliminary note. A threefold principal effect or degree is attributed to Magnetism: a) the state of sleep, by which the senses are lulled, as in natural sleep, but often so that "neither the greatest crash reaches the ears of the one lulled, nor can any violence of iron or fire excite him." Thus the Postulate of the Bishop of Lausanne, 19 May 1841; b) the state of somnambulism, in which someone, although he is altogether destitute of the use of the senses, nevertheless sees, hears, speaks, and responds to all things about which he is interrogated; c) the state of clear intuition, or wonderful knowledge of one's own or another's state, and of remedies suitable to illnesses, as well as vision of the actions of other men, even far distant, and of all things which are done both near and far.

Resp. Theologians formerly went off into three opinions, of which the first ascribes all, the second none, the third some of its effects to the devil. This third opinion can no longer be approved practically, and the first seems altogether to have to be admitted. For the simple will, or intention of the magnetizer, or even the consent of the magnetized person joined to this will, is declared to be either the sole or certainly the primary cause of all and individual of these three effects; but this cause is altogether disproportionate to individual effects. For that cause cannot be called proportionate: 1) the will with its immanent acts, because the whole power of an immanent act is consumed in the will itself, and does not pass over to an effect extrinsic to itself; nor 2) the will using the ministry of another power, because thus it is circumscribed by the faculty of that other power, so that the effect cannot exceed the faculty itself of this other power. (In what way, for example, will a Magnetizer who endeavors to know some matter which he is ignorant of be able to transmit knowledge of this thing into the magnetized person?) - nor 3) a fluid, because between a spiritual and a material substance there is no medium. Therefore these words of the Encyclical of the Holy Congregation of the Inquisition, dated 4 Aug. 1856 (see p. XLIX), can be applied to each degree: "In all these things, whatever art or illusion" (namely the magnetizers) "may use, since physical means are ordered to non-natural effects" (of which sort is also sleep, as described above), "there is found deception altogether illicit and heretical, and" (which ordinarily is present in the manner of magnetizing) "scandal against uprightness of morals." Wherefore we think that one must altogether subscribe to these words of the illustrious Perrone:¹ "Although not a few Catholics have judged and still judge that in general the use itself of magnetism was proscribed and eliminated by the Church, yet there are not lacking those, and learned and pious ones, who deny this. Nevertheless we are persuaded that, if not theoretically, yet practically, magnetism of this sort was and is disapproved by the same Apostolic See."

Nor does the declaration of the same Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition, 28 July 1847, stand in the way: "With every error, sortilege, explicit or implicit invocation of a demon removed, the use of Magnetism, namely the mere act of employing physical means otherwise licit, is not morally forbidden." For the Sacred Congregation, as consultants of the same Holy Congregation have often holily testified, never instituted any examination about the physical question of this magnetism.

Hence precisely it will not be licit to consult magnetizers even about the nature of illnesses, so that it may be discerned what cure is to be applied to them. For unless, as we saw in n. 335. III, there is present a certain probability that certain effects proceed from a natural cause, it is not licit, not even with protestation against any intervention of a demon, to employ means even only doubtfully superstitious; but the effects of magnetism, far from being certainly or probably to be said to proceed from a natural cause, rather are to be attributed to a demon according to things commonly happening. Therefore practically, etc. - It is added that, as will soon be said, it cannot be asked from a magician that he remove a spell unless it can reasonably be presumed that he knows natural means for this. Therefore likewise remedies for illness must not be sought from magnetism unless it can reasonably be presumed that they are to be known in a natural way; but certainly the contrary must be presumed. Therefore. Cf. Capellm. p. 37 sqq.

Quaer. 5° What about Spiritism?

Resp. It is certain today that turning or knocking tables and the other means which Spiritism uses are partly deceitful tricks, partly diabolical superstitions,¹ and therefore that it is illicit either to try the operations of Spiritism, or to approve them, or to favor them in any way, for example by being present.

343. I. - Magic, taken broadly, or natural or artificial magic, which is called white magic, is the art of doing wonderful things, at least apparently, through natural causes or the industry of man, without any ministry of a demon.

Magic, strictly said, is the art of doing wonderful things which, although they are not supernatural, nevertheless surpass the powers of man, and therefore can happen by the help of a demon alone, explicitly or implicitly invoked.

II. Malefice is the art of harming with the intervention of a demon. It is distinguished as twofold, namely amatory and venomous. Amatory malefice, or a love potion, is a diabolical art by which lubricous love or hatred in some person toward another is vehemently excited, by changing the imagination and exciting it more vividly, by showing more beautiful appearances, and by moving libidinous humors. Venomous malefice is precisely the art of harming the neighbor by the help of a demon, and this in various ways, for example by illnesses, stupidity, etc.²

Malefice is commonly called sortilege, because through it an evil lot is cast upon those against whom vengeance is exercised through diabolical operation. Hence in Canon Law and in ecclesiastical history magicians and witches are called male and female sorcerers.

344. You will resolve. - 1° Magic does not differ from vain observance except in that its effects are more wonderful, for example the changing of bodies, etc. But in moral species it differs neither from vain observance nor from divination; because it matters little whether knowledge of hidden things or wonderful effects are sought from a demon.

2° But malefice differs in species from other superstitions, because beyond the sin opposed to Religion it adds damage to the neighbor.

3° Amatory malefice does not induce one necessarily to perpetrating a sin of luxury, because it does not remove liberty, but only vehemently excites to lust toward some determined person, by changing the imagination and exciting it more vividly, by presenting more beautiful appearances, and by moving libidinous humors.¹

Quaer. Can it be asked from a magician that he remove a malefice?

Resp. Negatively, unless it can reasonably be presumed that he knows natural means for this. - Thus commonly Theologians.² Cf. n. 319.

345. • Temptation of God is a word or deed for taking an experiment about God through an extraordinary effect rashly expected from Him. - Thus the common doctrine with St. Thom.³

But it proceeds from a twofold vice, namely either from infidelity, when someone doubting about some perfection of God says or does something with the mind of obtaining from God a manifestation of that perfection, and this is called formal or express; or from mere presumption, when someone, doubting nothing about the perfections of God, without necessity wills to obtain either the manifestation of the divine will or special help of God through wonders, and this is called implicit or interpretative.

It is certain that formal or express temptation of God is always a mortal sin against Religion. - But if it is only implicit, often because of ignorance or inadvertence it can be venial, although of itself it is more probably mortal.¹

You will resolve. - 1° Those formerly sinned gravely against Religion who demanded that their innocence be proved by duel, by burning iron, etc., or who without a just cause freely offered themselves to martyrdom, unless they were excused by good faith or divine inspiration. - Nevertheless it is licit to ask from God a miracle under the condition, if it has pleased Him, as often as there is a grave cause for our own or others' salvation, or for fulfilling the divine will, or, as St. Thom.² says, when there underlies a just necessity or pious utility and the other things which ought to concur for this. For then it is not to tempt God, but to request the help of God at an opportune time.

2° Likewise he sins gravely who, without a just cause, exposes himself to danger of death because he expects divine help; but if he acts only rashly, without certainly trusting in divine Providence, he does not sin against Religion, but only against the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

3° He sins only lightly who in a light illness, with remedies rejected, hopes for health from God; because there is not a grave disorder there. Indeed he is excused from all fault if he hopes that he will be freed naturally from such an illness with God's help.³

4° Likewise he sins of himself venially who from negligence approaches unprepared to preaching the word of God, hoping for special help from God.

346. • Sacrilege is the violation or unworthy treatment of sacred things. It is distinguished as threefold: 1° personal; 2° local; 3° real.

Principles. - I. Sacred here is called whatever is deputed to divine worship from divine or ecclesiastical institution, and therefore deserves special reverence. - St. Thomas.¹

Hence 1° Sacred persons are those who are deputed to divine worship through Sacred Tonsure, or through religious vows, or more probably also through any vow of chastity.

2° Sacred places are those which by the authority of the Church are dedicated to worship, as temples and public chapels (not private ones), yet consecrated or blessed; likewise blessed cemeteries. L. IV. 460.

3° Sacred things are those which pertain to divine worship or are proximately referred to it, as Sacraments, consecrated vessels, Relics or images of Saints; likewise those things which pertain to the adornment of the Church or of ministers; finally ecclesiastical goods, even movable ones. - St. Thom.²

II. Sacrilege is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is opposed to the most excellent moral virtue, namely Religion, and for the most part regards grave matter. - Yet it can become light by reason of smallness of matter or imperfection of the act.³

III. Sacrilege differs in species according as it affects a person, place, or sacred thing; hence in confession those circumstances must be explained. - St. Alph.⁴ St. Thom.⁵

347. You will resolve. - 1° Personal sacrilege is committed: 1) by inflicting violent hands on a Cleric or Religious; 2) by any sin of luxury perpetrated by or with a person bound by a vow of chastity; 3) by violation of personal immunity. - But it will not be sacrilege to detract from a priest, because his person alone is sacred, but not his reputation.⁶

2° Local sacrilege is committed: 1) by all sins by which a Church is polluted by Law, namely by illicit shedding of human blood or seed, homicide, or burial of an excommunicated person or infidel in the Church; 2) by all sins which are done against the immunity and sanctity of a sacred place, as breaking in, despoiling, theft, quarrels, and similar things; 3) by actions unbecoming the sanctity of the place, as are markets, assemblies, and the din of judgments, unless a grave cause excuses.¹

3° Real sacrilege is committed: 1) by unworthy administration or reception of the Sacraments; 2) by unworthy treatment of sacred Relics, images, etc.; 3) by profanation of sacred vessels, instruments, or ornaments; 4) by theft of a thing pertaining to divine worship or to the Church; 5) by abuse of Scripture, for example by twisting its words to vain things, etc.; 6) by neglect of sacred vessels, corporals, etc., in those who ought to care for these things religiously.²

348. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is violation of a person bound by a simple vow of chastity outside Religion sacrilege?

Resp. It is controverted. The more probable opinion of St. Alph.³ affirms, because through any vow of chastity man is truly consecrated to God. For one's own will suffices for consecrating one's own acts to God, while for public consecration public authority is required.⁴ See p. LXXXIX. 7.

Besides, whoever is bound by a vow of chastity, as often as he violates this, certainly commits a twofold sin: namely one against chastity, and the other against Religion. - Lacroix.⁵

Quaer. 2° Are all sins of luxury committed in a Church or cemetery sacrileges?

Resp. 1° Merely internal sins are not to be held as sacrileges, because they do not seem specially to affect the sacred place, unless there is a desire of sinning externally in the sacred place itself. - Thus commonly.⁶

Resp. 2° As to external sins, it is certain that sacrilege is committed through consummated acts, namely through voluntary pollution, fornication, etc. This is openly clear from Canon Law. But whether it is also committed through other grave external sins, for example gravely impure touches, is controverted. St. Alph.,⁷ Collet, etc., more probably affirm.

Quaer. 3° Is every theft in a Church sacrilege?

Resp. 1° It is established that every theft of a sacred thing is sacrilege, and also theft of a non-sacred thing nevertheless committed to the custody of a sacred place, as is clear from Canon Law.¹

Resp. 2° As to things which by chance or by accident are found in the Church, as purses, a watch, etc., it is probably controverted on both sides.

349. • Quaer. 4° Does the injury of any goods whatever belonging to Clerics constitute sacrilege?

Resp. Negatively, but only injury of goods which Clerics possess not in their own name but in the name of the Church, and of which they cannot dispose, and of those which pertain to the adornment of the church, because these alone are sacred.² (II) p. 479.

Quaer. 5° To whom is it licit to touch sacred vessels?

Resp. If they actually contain the Blessed Sacrament, outside a case of necessity or danger of profanation, it is licit for no one, without grave sin, to touch them, even mediately, except for a priest or deacon; otherwise, for all Clerics without special permission. The same is licit for sacristans, whether regular laymen, or oblates of secular congregations, or nuns; likewise for those who in clerical dress serve churches. For other laymen it is prohibited under venial sin to touch them immediately, unless a reasonable cause excuses.³

But it is licit for all to touch other sacred things, of which sort are, for example, Agnus Dei, at least from modern custom, Relics of Saints, sacred ornaments, except those which immediately touch the holy Eucharist, as, for example, corporals, palls, purificators after use and before washing. But the first washing of these must be performed by a cleric in sacred orders, yet probably it can also be performed by a tonsured cleric; but it cannot be done without venial sin by a layman, or even by a nun or pious women living a common life under rule;⁴ but the second and third washing, although more suitably done by a cleric, can nevertheless be done without sin even by a layman. It would also be venial not to throw the water of the washing into the sacrarium.⁵

350. Definition. - Simony, so called from Simon Magus, is the studied will of selling or buying for a temporal price something spiritual, or something annexed to the spiritual. It is said studied will, not only because, no differently from other sins, it demands deliberation, but also because for its essential malice it is not required that the pact be completed by mutual consent or in reality; but the interior affection even of one suffices, namely the simoniacal will of making a pact or of obligating.

A temporal price is distinguished in Canon Law¹ as of three kinds: 1° a gift from the hand, or recompense of any temporal thing estimable by price; 2° a gift from the tongue, or patronage, under which name come praises, commendations, prayers, etc., to be interposed from pact in favor of the one conferring the spiritual thing; 3° a gift from service, or any servitude, or offices furnished to another, for example servitude or any similar office.

351. • Likewise, the temporal thing annexed to the spiritual is threefold: 1° antecedently, to which the spiritual thing accedes, as the right of patronage inhering in land; 2° consequently, which depends on the spiritual, as the fruits of a benefice or office; 3° concomitantly, as labor in sacred functions. But labor of this sort is annexed to the spiritual thing either intrinsically or extrinsically. It is called intrinsically annexed if it is not easily separable from the thing itself; otherwise it is called extrinsically annexed. Thus celebration of Mass is labor intrinsically annexed to a spiritual thing; but extraordinary fatigue, as singing, delay until midday, a long or difficult journey to be undertaken for celebrating, and other similar things pertain to labor extrinsically annexed.

Division. Simony is distinguished as:

1° Mental, if it is done merely internally or without pact, as if someone recommends a son to the collator of a vacant parish, and meanwhile under the appearance of a liberal gift sends silver vessels to him with this internal intention, that he move and oblige him to nominate his son.

2° Conventional, if a pact indeed intervenes, but is in no way carried into execution, at least by both parties.

3° Real, if the pact is fulfilled by each party, at least inchoatively.

To this is added confidential Simony, which is done by any pact, or confidence, in election or presentation to benefices, or in resigning them, etc.¹

Simony is also distinguished as of divine or natural law, and of ecclesiastical law. The former is had if the thing simoniacally exchanged is spiritual from its nature, as are indulgences, Sacraments, etc.; but the latter, if something is done against some law which has been made by the Church because of either the danger or the appearance of simony.

352. Principles. - I. For Simony it is required that the temporal thing be given or accepted, either formally or virtually, for the spiritual thing itself and in exchange for it, so that an equating of the spiritual thing with the temporal thing is made, or a commutation, from the primary motive of having one thing for the other as a price or just compensation. The reason is clear from the very definition of Simony. Hence if some honest motive intervenes, by force of which the temporal thing is given, and in turn the spiritual, one would no longer be the motive of the other, but only its impelling cause, and therefore it would not be Simony.

I said: 1° formally, that is, that someone directly intends to receive the spiritual in place of the temporal thing and because of its estimation.

I said: 2° virtually, namely that someone wills to obtain the spiritual thing proximately and immediately through the temporal thing, and no other true and honest motive intervenes. For in this will there is virtually included the intention of commuting one thing with the other.

II. It is licit to give for a price the temporal thing annexed to the spiritual antecedently and concomitantly extrinsically, provided the price is not increased because of the spiritual thing annexed. But in no way is it licit to give for a price what is annexed to the spiritual concomitantly intrinsically, or inseparably, nor what is annexed consequently.

The first reason is because the thing and the labor of the action are truly estimable in themselves by price. Yet by Canon Law the sale of balsam which is contained in Chrism is prohibited, although it preexists the consecration; because since it is of small price, the Bishop would seem to sell Sacraments.²

Nevertheless, as to blessed Oil or Sacred Chrism, Scavini observes that in some cathedral Churches the use has prevailed that something is accepted from particular Churches for compensating the expenses made in obtaining the matter.

The second reason is because what is intrinsically annexed to the spiritual is inseparable from it; hence the thing itself or the action would be judged to be sold. Yet, even apart from extrinsic labor, something can licitly be accepted for sacred ministry by reason of a stipend or support, as is established from the practice of the Church. For natural equity demands that honest support be granted to those who are vacant for the utility of others. Hence Christ:¹ The laborer is worthy of his hire. And the Apostle:² Know you not that they who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the holy place; and they who serve the altar partake with the altar? So also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel.

The third reason is because that which is consequent is judged spiritual, or bound to the spiritual. It is also derived from a special disposition of Canon Law.

III. Simony is a most grave sin; and if it is of divine and natural law, it does not admit smallness of matter. But if the Simony is of ecclesiastical law, there can be smallness of matter in it according to St. Alph.³ - The reason is that any spiritual thing, from comparison with a temporal thing, is treated as vile with great injury against God Himself. This is established also from the words of St. Peter to Simon Magus:⁴ Thy money perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be possessed with money.

353. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it Simony to give principally indeed a temporal thing for a spiritual, but not uniquely?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is that even thus there is present a comparison of the temporal thing with the spiritual. For the motive which is added, however honest it may be, does not destroy the malice and impiety of the prior motive because of which the temporal thing is principally given. This is established also from propositions 45 and 46 condemned by Innocent XI (p. XVI).

Quaer. 2° Is it Simony to give or procure for a Superior a temporal thing for conciliating him to oneself with a view to obtaining a benefice or office?

Resp. Negatively, if the primary intention is of giving the temporal thing gratuitously; because then the immediate comparison is made of a temporal thing with a temporal thing, namely the benevolence of the Superior. But otherwise if the spiritual thing is intended as a due recompense, not, however, as the effect of gratitude of soul. This intention, unless the opposite either is established or can be gathered from adjuncts, for example from the smallness of the gift, etc., is to be presumed to exist virtually, if another title is lacking, for example of removing an unjust vexation, etc.¹

Quaer. 3° Is it Simony to perform sacred functions principally because of a stipend, or to receive something for sacred doctrine?

Resp. to the first. Negatively, at least more probably, because the stipend is not received as the price of the sacred thing, but as something owed to the person who is occupied for the sake of the neighbor. - Lacroix and others commonly,² against some. Therefore if some inordinate affection intervenes (for there will be no fault if need or another honest cause impels one to seeking stipends of this sort), it will not be the vice of Simony, but of avarice.

Resp. to the second. Affirmatively, if the instruction tends to the spiritual good of others, because it is a spiritual thing, unless nevertheless it is accepted by title of stipend or support. But otherwise if the instruction is merely temporal, for example in handing on an explanation of Sacred Letters or Theology.³

354. • Quaer. 4° Is it Simony to redeem oneself with money from unjust vexation concerning benefices, or another spiritual good, for example Sacraments, etc.?

Resp. Negatively, at least more probably, because liberation from vexation, which alone is directly intended, is something temporal. - Hence you can give money to your enemy if he tries through fraud to impede the collator from favoring you. - St. Alph.⁴ and others commonly. Indeed Doctors agree in the same, even if he wishes to impede by prayers alone. But you cannot give money to those who can harm or benefit by electing or presenting to a benefice or by conferring it; for to offer money to them lest they harm would be the same as to offer it so that they benefit, that is, so that they not deny consent.⁵

Quaer. 5° Is it Simony to give or accept something for entrance into Religion?

Resp. 1° It is certain that it is not licit to give or accept something for entrance alone; because this would be a commutation of a sacred thing, of which sort Religion is, with a temporal thing.

2° It is certain also that it is licit for a poor monastery to exact something for the support of the one entering, because then the spiritual thing is not commuted with the temporal; and otherwise equity demands that something be received, lest the monastery fall burdened by expenses.

3° It is likewise certain that it is licit for a monastery to exact something for the support of Novices, because since they do not yet pertain to Religion, and can depart at will, and often in reality do depart, it is not equitable for the monastery to undergo so grave a burden for them. Yet the Religion of Friars Minor can receive nothing from a special decree.

4° But if there is question of a wealthy monastery, it is controverted. St. Alph.¹ denies, unless the one to be received is old or infirm. Besides, now all doubt vanishes because of the difficulty of the times. For no monasteries are found so wealthily founded that they need no alien help at all for the present and the future. Besides, as is established from several decrees, Nuns always can exact the established dowry, and for choir nuns they ought to [n. 1188. II. 3)].

355. • Quaer. 6° Does a priest commit Simony who promises a Mass to a layman for the outcome of a game, while the companion puts up a temporal price?

Resp. Negatively of itself, because by this reason a spiritual thing is not properly equated with a temporal thing, just as it is not equated when Mass is said for a stipend; but only the execution of a spiritual thing is offered in place of a temporal thing which would otherwise have to be handed over. For he does not sin who offers to a creditor 100 Masses to be celebrated for him, so that he remit a debt of $100; therefore by parity neither does he sin who promises a Mass for the outcome of a game, while the other puts up $1. - Thus Voit² against others. - Besides, a game of this sort rarely lacks some scandal, and therefore must always be dissuaded from.

Quaer. 7° Does a priest commit Simony who for Mass exacts a stipend above the usual tax or one established by the Bishop?

Resp. Negatively, unless he acts with a simoniacal mind; because, since he has another title of exacting remuneration, comparison between the spiritual and the temporal is lacking. He would indeed sin against obedience or justice by exacting more than is equitable, but not at all against Religion. - Yet Voit¹ contradicts, with others, because (he says) then every just title of exacting the temporal thing is lacking.

356. • Quaer. 8° What about so-called stole fees?

Resp. 1° By common law it has been established: a) that their payment not be a condition without which sacred functions are not performed, and therefore that it not be exacted before those functions; b) that after the sacred functions to which they are annexed by diocesan law or laudable custom, they can be exacted, and indeed from justice,² except from the poor; c) that those who maliciously strive to alter laudable custom are restrained by the Bishop, not by the priest.³ - But a custom cannot be called laudable when it is forbidden by the Holy See or by the Ordinary (cf. Conc. Pl. Balt. II, p. 290, Doc. VI), or has proceeded from the exaction of priests.

Resp. 2° According to the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, it belongs to Bishops "in ... diocesan synod, or otherwise, as it shall have seemed to them in the Lord, with the counsel of priests also employed, to establish a just" manner "by which among priests dwelling together ... the alms which the faithful spontaneously confer on occasion of the administration of the Sacraments of Baptism or Matrimony are distributed, with consideration not neglected of the stronger right and the graver burdens of the pastor."¹

Moreover, in various dioceses it has been established that stole fees which proceed from functions exercised in another's parish or for the sake of another's parishioner are remitted to the proper pastor. Yet this must not be understood of offerings altogether voluntary, or of those to which the faithful are obliged neither by diocesan law nor by custom; nor even of that part of the owed offering which exceeds the tax established by law or custom; for as to that part it is altogether voluntary.

Resp. 3° As regards specifically the administration of Sacraments, on the occasion of:

a) Confirmation, if it is joined with a pastoral visitation, as is customary, "let it be ... in the choice of those who are visited whether they prefer to pay that which was previously customarily paid by them, a certain sum of money having been fixed, or rather ... to furnish provisions" to the Bishop.¹

b) Eucharist, nothing is customarily accepted.

c) Penance, confessors "should not apply pecuniary penances to themselves ... nor should they ask or accept anything from penitents as a reward of their ministry."² "Even things offered spontaneously," the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore³ warns, "under whatever name, let them refuse; nor let them allow even the Mass alms itself to be offered in this sacred tribunal."

d) Extreme Unction, nothing is accepted. "But if a priest has made a long journey for visiting them, nothing forbids that the necessary expenses of the journey be given to him; but let it be absent that they be exacted from the poor."⁴

e) Orders, "let Bishops and other collators of orders, or their ministers, accept nothing ... even spontaneously offered, under whatever pretext."⁵ Yet a Bishop conferring Orders in place of another or outside the cathedral in favor of some convent or college will be able to accept expenses of the journey.

f) Baptism and Matrimony. It is certain: 1) that nothing can be exacted where there is not diocesan law or laudable custom. But this cannot be called laudable if it had proceeded not from the piety of the faithful, but from the exaction of priests, as Canonists explain.

2. "Those things which, from the zeal of piety after baptism or matrimony has been conferred, are spontaneously offered by the faithful under the name of alms" a priest, if he wishes, can accept.⁶

Resp. 4° Around burial it has been established:

I. By common law: 1° a) For ground to be deputed to burial (for the word burial comes also in this sense), not yet blessed, something can be exacted or accepted; b) but not for ground already blessed, c) unless either custom is present, or something is offered liberally, or something is sought by reason of the location or more honorable place.

The first part of the response is clear from the fact that ground of this sort is something profane, and therefore can be sold and bought without any stain of simony; the second from L. III, Decr. T. XXVIII, c. 13; the third from the fact that the custom is not called depraved in the cited law, except in the case in which "the digging of a grave is not first permitted for the deceased before a certain price is paid to the Church for the ground in which they are to be buried"; - that a free offering is prohibited by no law; - and that location or a more honorable place is something profane, estimable by price.

2° For the act and office of burial, things spontaneously offered, as is clear of itself, can be accepted, and, where custom is in force, something can also be exacted by title of support.

3° For the burial of the poor, whether as to place or act, nothing can be exacted by pastors.¹

II. By our law, or by the statutes of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore,² the price paid for a place of burial is to be employed for preserving, restoring, and adorning cemeteries, and, if anything remains, for promoting works of charity or religion by the judgment of the Ordinary. "But we strictly forbid," say the Fathers, "that ever, under whatever pretext, without permission of the Ordinary, ecclesiastical men dare to make their own the monies which are derived from cemeteries; but if they shall have attempted this, let them be punished with most severe penalties."

"Where there is custom," says De Angelis,³ "it is admitted ... that for a common place in a cemetery a tax be paid, which is called of burial; and the reason for paying this tax is a partial reintegration of the sum expended for the building of the cemetery, and of the expenses which are made for the preservation and custody of the same place; just as here at Rome there is also such a tax, and it is noted in the said Statutes of the Clergy, chap. 6" (the Statutes of the Roman Clergy are denoted). "But for the poor, burial ought to be gratuitous; and what is rightly reprehended in these exactions is the vexatious mode by which they are made, so that permission for burial is not given unless the sum of money has been paid; ... concerning which last case, as Doctors observe, the disposition of Chap. 13, h. t."⁴ is to be understood. See this above under 1°.

357. You will resolve. - 1° He does not commit Simony who exchanges Relics with Relics;¹ because thus the spiritual is not given for the temporal. The same must be said of other sacred things, if you except benefices, whose exchange, lest it be done by proper authority, is prohibited by the Church.

2° He does not commit Simony who sells blessed wax, rosaries, crosses, or medals to which indulgences are annexed, or sacred Relics enclosed in precious cases, or other similar things; because these are not sold by reason of the sacred thing, but by reason of the price of the temporal thing annexed; but otherwise if, because of the sacred thing itself, these were sold for a greater price. It must be observed besides that by several decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences it has been forbidden that blessed rosaries, crosses, or medals be exposed for sale.¹

3° He does not commit Simony who pays money to a heretical prince, lest he be impeded from entrance to the Church or from frequenting religious assemblies of Catholics; or to a malevolent man, lest he be unjustly defamed by him and barred from a benefice to which he has or can have a right. The reason is that in this way the temporal thing is not given for a spiritual right, but for removing or impeding injury, which is something temporal.

4° Those are not to be accused of Simony who serve gratuitously or for an inadequate wage, so that by this occasion they may demonstrate their probity or dexterity with hope of sometimes obtaining some benefice; because they do not expect that spiritual thing as the price of their labors. - Elbel.²

5° Nor are those culpable of Simony who from gratitude furnish a temporal thing for a spiritual thing received, and vice versa. Thus a Chaplain would not sin who more gladly furnished services to a Bishop from whom he obtained a benefice, nor a Bishop who conferred a benefice on a Cleric in recognition of services; because these are not furnished as a price. Besides, it is honorable and laudable to show oneself grateful for an accepted service. Yet one must carefully beware lest disguised Simony lie hidden under the title of gratitude; but this would happen where there intervened an implicit pact of giving a benefice for temporal service, or vice versa.³

6° But it would be Simony to perform sacred ministries precisely because of the price to be received as such, for example to accept money for absolution from sins, from censures, or for dispensation in a vow, oath, irregularity, and matrimonial impediments. The reason is that it is a spiritual act both by reason of the principle or spiritual power and by reason of the end or salvation of souls. Yet money is licitly accepted on occasion of dispensations, especially when another just cause is not present, by title namely of commutation or alms, or of support of the burdens of the Pontificate, for coming to the aid of the necessities of the Church, for example of Temples, Missions, etc., or for other pious uses, for example for relieving the poor, for endowing hospitals, for the expenses of tribunals by which dispensations are granted, etc. For a suitable stipend must be assigned to the various officials or ministers employed for expediting causes.

358. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Must the spiritual thing acquired simoniacally be restored?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, as to benefices; thus the common and certain opinion of Doctors. The reason is that laws, as a punishment for the delict, stand in the way, so that the one receiving can acquire dominion of neither the price nor the benefice. And since the acquisition of the benefice is invalid, by that very fact dominion of the fruits cannot be acquired; and therefore these also must be restored.

Resp. 2° Negatively, as to the rest, although the judge can enjoin restitution as a penalty of the crime. Thus the common opinion with Schmalzgrueber.¹ The reason is not only because certain things cannot be restored, for example Sacred Order, but also because for the transfer of a spiritual thing to be valid by divine law, for example of most holy Relics, nothing more is required than the power of transferring in the one and of receiving dominion of the thing in the other; but, unless there is some defect from elsewhere in either, this power is present in both as to a spiritual thing. Therefore. But if the transfer is valid by divine law, it will also be valid by human law, since by this law simoniacal provisions alone of benefices, almost only, are decreed invalid.

Quaer. 2° Must the price accepted simoniacally for a spiritual thing be restored?

Resp. 1° If only the crime of simony intervened, but no injury of justice, there is no obligation of restoring the simoniacal price before a condemnatory sentence of a judge, unless the price itself exceeds the estimation of the temporal advantage which is transferred with the spiritual thing to another. Thus Suarez, Lessius, Laymann, Reiffenstuel apud Schmalzgr.¹

Resp. 2° But where the simoniacal pact is also opposed to commutative justice, the price must be restored before every sentence of a judge. Thus the common opinion. The reason is that, from the injury of commutative justice, the obligation of restoring arises by the very law of nature.

Quaer. 3° To whom must the simoniacal price be restored?

Resp. 1° If the price has been given, but the spiritual thing has not yet been handed over, the common opinion teaches that the price must be restored to him who gave it, unless the judge shall have decreed otherwise. The reason is that laws establish vindicatory penalties only against real simony.

Resp. 2° But if the handing over has followed on both sides, before sentence it can probably be restored either to the giver, or to the church, or to the poor.²

Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.¹

By this precept there is prohibited any irreverence toward God, whether by the vain usurpation of His Most Holy Name, or by blasphemy, or by an oath or vow either illicit or violated.

III. The means of advancing in the pious and devout life are some general and common, others particular.

The particular means are diverse according to the different grade which the pious have reached, and according to the inclination of grace, their condition, and their disposition; so that especially those virtues are inculcated to them which are opposed to the predominant vice, or better correspond to the duties of state or the motions of grace.

The general means common to all are spiritual exercises, namely the practice of mental prayer, frequent remembrance of the divine presence, mortification, and discussion of conscience. To these external means can be added: the direction of the confessor together with reading of books which treat of the spiritual life, a definite rule or good ordering of life, reception of the sacraments, and sanctification of the social relations which we have with others.

IV. Mental prayer, although it is not necessary for salvation, is nevertheless the most apt means for sanctifying the soul by divine love; for, as St. Alphonsus testifies, Pr. conf., n. 122, "prayer and sin cannot dwell together; but the soul will either leave prayer or sin," cf. Eccli. VIII, 40; Jer. XII, 11. Hence let the confessor induce the pious into the habit of mental prayer, establish for them the time to be spent on this exercise, e.g., half an hour morning and evening, assign to them the truths to be meditated upon, teach them the method of meditating fruitfully, and sometimes, e.g., each month, require an account of this method. - And let him watch that they pass no day without some consideration of truths, that they frequently pour forth pious affections and fervent ejaculatory prayers, and, as far as they can, read attentively and piously in a spiritual book.

Now mental prayer consists of three parts: preparation, meditation, and conclusion.

1. Preparation is contained in three acts, to be elicited briefly: namely an act of faith concerning the presence of God, an act of humility on account of sins committed, and an act of supplication for divine light.

2. Meditation or reconsideration itself, which ordinarily, and always by beginners, is to be instituted from a spiritual book, and concerning matter which seems more profitable to each one, namely with a greater affection of devotion, fruit of virtue, and utility in avoiding defects, such as the last things, the goodness or benefits of God, the malice of sin, and before the rest the life and Passion of Christ. - Moreover the principal part and end of meditation is not the speculative consideration itself of truths by the intellect, but rather is in eliciting affections, making petitions, and strengthening purposes through the appetitive faculties: the meditation itself ought to tend to these fruits and ought to be left behind for their sake when a man perceives himself to be moved in soul. Hence:

a) Affections constitute the fitting response by which the soul addresses God after God has illuminated it and intimately addressed it. In view of various circumstances, acts of faith, confidence, gratitude, adoration, praise, humility, contrition, and especially charity are to be elicited, by which the soul offers itself wholly to God and conforms itself to His holy will, and which it cannot exercise repeatedly enough. Thus it should wish, affectively and effectively, to be led by God and to be submitted to Him.

b) It is helpful to repeat petitions in prayer: for God is not accustomed to grant helps except to those asking, and no time is more opportune for asking than the time of mental prayer. Therefore in this, with humility and confidence, let light, remission of sin, perseverance, etc., be asked for, first of all the gift of holy love; yet all through the merits and Passion of Christ.

c) Purpose is necessary so that the fruit of prayer may endure and the light granted by God may be applied to the directing of life. But purpose, that it may be efficacious, should not be general, e.g., of avoiding any defect whatever or giving oneself wholly to God, but concretely determined and particular, e.g., of avoiding such a defect in such a manner or on such an occasion, of better exercising some virtue by this special means, of tolerating such an annoyance, of obeying such a superior or such a rule, of mortifying oneself in such a thing and at this moment, etc.

3. The conclusion is completed by three acts: a) thanksgiving for the lights received in meditation; b) determination of standing firmly by the purposes formed, and of immediately executing them; and of remembering them rather often during the day, just as the sentence which more strongly moved the soul; c) urgent petition from God for help, to be obtained through Christ and Mary, for executing the purposes.⁴

⁴ Garrigou-Lagrange, L'Oraison commune, in the periodical La Vie spirituelle, t. VIII, can also be compared.

V. Frequent remembrance of the divine presence, from which we several times offer our acts to God, break forth into pious ejaculatory prayers, renew the supernatural intention rather often, and thus avoid sins because of fear and reverence toward God present, and from love of Him advance daily in the practice of virtue, according to that: Walk before me and be perfect, Gen. XVII, 1.

It is namely a frequent and habitual elevation of mind and heart into God present, a loving attention of the soul to God, whom it beholds in every thing, in every event, and especially in itself; a simple gaze, but full of love, directed toward God, by which the soul, without any force or more intense effort, but as if by a connatural tendency, is borne into God, whom it knows to be present. Thus the soul is vividly conscious of the presence of God; it feels itself under His eye, searching all things, and under His operative activity; and rather often it recollects itself within itself for finding God in an act of loving sweetness.

For God truly is: 1) in all things by essence, presence, and power, that He may have care for all, especially for those who invoke Him with confidence, for the Lord is near to all who invoke Him;

2. in all events, because all are ruled by His wise providence, and they are not judged rightly unless they are considered according to the intention of the first cause;

3. specifically in the soul of the just: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit come to them and remain with them, that they may have divine life and rejoice in the joy of the divine presence and love, John XIV, 23.

Remembrance of the divine presence contributes much:

a) to avoiding sin, from fear and reverence toward the supreme and infinite majesty present;

b) to advancing in virtue and spiritual life, from the fact that we sustain the struggle and effort while our God sees and, as it were, applauds;

c) to stimulating confidence and charity toward God, who from mere benevolence toward us, with His knowledge, wisdom, love, counsel, and omnipotence is in us for our good;

d) to supernatural consolation and spiritual joy of fruition concerning the presence of God and His highest goodness.

For this exercise in practice it helps:⁵ 1) to carry some special sign or have it within one's room; 2) often to elevate the mind and heart to God present everywhere, or even inhabiting the soul, and to repeat an act of love, yet without any force or desire of sensible consolation: for he who truly loves never forgets the person loved; 3) to love solitude and seek it as far as possible, for enjoying the presence of God and His love; 4) and to ask this love and the memory of His presence from God. "Every evil," says St. Teresa, "comes from this, that we do not consider God present... Let us not think that even a single lifting of the eyes in remembrance of Him is left unrewarded by God."

⁵ St. Alphonsus, o. c., n. 168.

IX. Corollary. - Therefore true devotion is much impeded by:

1. adhesion to earthly consolations, even licit ones; for the spirit and the flesh are opposed to each other;

2. deliberate venial sins, because they make charity tepid;

3. an excessive abundance of occupations, which distracts the mind, dissipates the heart, and calls one away from God. Hence if many occupations are imposed on someone by office, let him take care to do them for the cause of pleasing God, and from time to time amid occupations to recollect himself in God.

XII. Warning concerning false devotees. - Aertnijs, Th. P., n. 212, notes:

"From truly devout persons those are to be distinguished whose devotion is either hypocrisy, for deceiving others, or illusion, by which they themselves are deceived. All their devotion consists in external exercises of religion; namely they frequent church, recite many prayers, confess often, and several times in the week receive Holy Communion. Nevertheless they neither understand nor care for true and solid virtue, but teem with vices; they remain in church longer than is fitting, with disturbance of parents and neglect of the domestic matter; they frequent the Sacraments that they may be seen by men and praised; wherefore, if the confessor does not indulge them to communicate as often as they would wish, they bear the rebuff badly; in the confessional they desire to converse with the confessor for a long time, without any utility or necessity. The spirit of mortification is altogether lacking to them; therefore they gape after delights in food and drink, abhor labor, and are talkative. They lack humility and obedience; therefore they do not subject themselves to the direction of the confessor, but the confessor would have to obey their nods; they deceive the confessor, while they confess only very light faults, but graver ones, such as we here enumerate, they do not accuse; they affect praises and honors, cling to their own sense, are impatient of correction, spurn others and correct them arrogantly. They are destitute of charity toward the neighbor, whence they are very troublesome to their household, spare the good name of no one, envy others, are easily angry, etc. - Among persons devout in appearance are to be numbered certain matrons and young ladies who wish to join a worldly life, given to delights and luxury, with piety; hence they frequent both theaters and church, attend nightly dances and sacred processions, read romantic books and books of prayers, frequent the Sacraments and pursue worldly circles.

"Indeed there are those who also wish to be contemplative and are eager always to speak about spiritual things. Meanwhile there lies hidden, or even appears, often an immense pride, tenacity of one's own judgment, foolish imaginations, false madnesses. They neither cultivate nor understand virtues; they are wholly lacking in a spirit of mortification, humble and simple obedience, genuine charity toward the neighbor, patience.

"Such persons are to be brought back to true humility, then to a pure intention in all things. Afterward they are to be directed according to the common rules, and carefully taught in what true devotion consists."¹⁵

¹⁵ Theol. Mechl., Treatise de Virtutibus, n. 90, q. 2. Cf. St. Francis de Sales, Introduction a la vie devote, p. I, ch. I.

328. Notion. Three things are ordinarily signified by the name devotion:

1. Certain exercises of piety; in this sense we speak of devotion toward the Eucharist, toward the Five Wounds, etc.

2. Attention and a certain spiritual consolation in prayer.¹ It is ordinarily called accidental or affective devotion. In this sense we say: I made meditation with great devotion, or without devotion.

3. The first act of the virtue of religion, in which sense it can be defined: Devotion is a certain will [i.e., an act of the will] to give oneself promptly to those things which pertain to the service of God. Thus St. Thomas.²

The word devotion itself, considered in itself, signifies a habit rather than an act, and indeed devotion is not rarely taken as a habit;³ but then it does not really differ from the virtue of religion itself. Following the Angelic Doctor, however, we take devotion insofar as it is an internal act of religion and insofar as it is elicited by a firm, constant, and generous will. St. Thomas rightly proves in this manner that devotion is to be considered as an act:⁴ "By acts, and not by habits, we merit, as was established above.⁵ But devotion has a special notion of meriting. Therefore devotion is a special act." Not everyone who sometimes proposes to give himself to the service and worship of God is called devout, but he who does this from a stable and constant virtue. Christ had devotion most perfectly, who could say of himself: "In the head of the book it is written of me that I should do thy will: O my God, I have desired it, and thy law in the midst of my heart";⁶ and: "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me."⁷ It is to be noted that the will to give oneself promptly to those things which pertain to the service of God can arise not only from the virtue of religion, but also from the virtue of charity; but in different ways. For if such a will intends a union of friendship with God, it is an act of charity; but if it intends the worship and service of God, and indeed as something due because of God's excellence and our subjection, it is an act of religion. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point:⁸ "It belongs immediately to charity that man give himself to God by adhering to him through a certain union of spirit; but that man give himself to God for certain works of divine worship belongs immediately to religion, but mediately to charity, which is the principle of religion." Just as charity commands all the virtues, and consequently also the virtue of religion, so likewise the virtue of religion, through the act of devotion, commands the other acts which pertain to the worship of God. Hence devotion has a most general influence upon all the other acts.⁹ For why do we worship God by prayer, sacrifice, and ceremonies? Because we wish to give ourselves and all our things to the divine service. Hence it appears how necessary devotion is in the spiritual life, so that, when it is lacking, human acts of divine worship become remiss and imperfect; indeed, the vice of acedia arises. Just as the virtue of religion is intimately connected with the virtue of charity, so the act of the virtue of religion, which is devotion, is closely joined with the act of charity which is ordinarily called a good intention in all our works.¹⁰

¹ In the German language, Andacht.

² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 82, a. 1. In the German language this devotion could perhaps be called self-consecration and zealous surrender to God, devotedness (Selbstweihe und eifrige Hingabe an Gott, Ergebenheit).

³ Piety (Frömmigkeit).

⁴ S. theol., l.c., in arg. Sed contra.

⁵ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 21, a. 3 and 4.

⁶ Ps. 39:8ff.

⁷ John 4:34.

⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 82, a. 2 ad 1.

⁹ Ibid., a. 1 ad 2.

¹⁰ Good intention (Gute Meinung, bonne intention).

329. The causes of devotion are partly extrinsic and partly intrinsic. The principal extrinsic cause is God through his grace. This grace, both sanctifying and actual, is altogether necessary for a supernatural and meritorious act of devotion. For with sanctifying grace all the theological and moral virtues are infused, as was said above, I, n. 472. Now the infused virtue of religion does not elicit a supernatural act of devotion unless actual grace excites and assists it. The acquired virtue of religion, however, can elicit some act of devotion even without grace. The secondary extrinsic cause of devotion is often the example and moral influence of other devout men, as is evident from daily experience.

The intrinsic cause of devotion is meditation and contemplation both of God's beneficence and excellence and of the humanity of Christ, and of human dependence upon God the Creator, Governor, and Mover. For from contemplation of God and Christ charity is excited, which is the proximate cause of devotion, according to the words: "It is good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God."¹¹ But from consideration of human dependence and defects arises the desire for divine assistance, according to the words: "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me: my help is from the Lord, who made heaven and earth."¹² From these things it appears clearly how necessary good and frequent meditation is for the religious life.¹³

¹¹ Ps. 72:28.

¹² Ps. 120:1.

¹³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 82, a. 3.

330. The effects of devotion are several:

1. Spiritual joy.

For devotion, as was just said, is caused principally by meditation on the divine excellence and beneficence. But this meditation produces spiritual delight, according to the words: "I remembered God, and was delighted."¹⁴ Accidentally, however, this consideration causes a certain sadness in man the wayfarer,¹⁵ according to the words: "My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God: when shall I come and appear before the face of God? My tears have been my bread day and night."¹⁶

2. Accidental or affective devotion.

For the spiritual joy arising from devotion does not remain in the mind alone, but overflows into all the human faculties, causing sweet consolations, even sensible ones. God is accustomed to grant this affective devotion to beginners in the spiritual life, lest they be deterred by the difficulties which arise. As time advances, however, this devotion gradually ceases; indeed, it not rarely gives place to spiritual aridity, God thus disposing it for our testing. Accidental devotion, although it is much less than substantial devotion, nevertheless is not to be despised as useless or evil in itself. Therefore Innocent XI condemned the proposition of Michael Molinos:¹⁷ "He who desires and embraces sensible devotion does not desire or seek God, but himself; and he acts badly who, walking by the interior way, desires it and strives to have it, both in sacred places and on solemn days." On the other hand, affective devotion is not to be esteemed excessively, nor ought a man to grieve from the lack of it, since substantial devotion alone suffices.

3. Facility and promptness in performing the other acts of religion, such as praying, adoring, sacrificing, etc., and even the acts of the other virtues.

The reason is that a devout mind is prompt to please God through all virtuous acts.

4. An excellent influence also upon bodily gestures and one's manner of acting.

For because of the intimate union of body and soul, a mind truly and constantly devoted to God shines forth even in the body, so that the countenance, bodily gestures, voice, and ecclesiastical ceremonies to be performed appear under the influence of devotion.¹⁸

From all these things we are convinced of the great value of devotion and are admonished to pray with the Church "that we may be instructed by an affection of pious devotion," and that "God may increase devotion in us unto salvation."

¹⁴ Ps. 76:4. Hence the most devout St. Paul said of himself: "I exceedingly abound with joy in every tribulation" (2 Cor. 7:4).

¹⁵ Cf. S. theol., l.c., a. 4.

¹⁶ Ps. 41:3ff.

¹⁷ Proposition 27 (Denz. n. 1247).

¹⁸ Cf. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion § 9.

We must treat individually: 1. the notion and division of prayer; 2. its object; 3. its necessity; 4. its efficacy, where its properties also will be discussed; 5. certain particular prayers, and notably the canonical hours.

331. Name. The name prayer is employed in one way by profane writers and in another in theology. St. Jerome writes concerning this matter: "According to grammarians, oratio is every discourse of those speaking, whose etymology they explain thus: Oratio is the reason of the mouth. But in the sacred Scriptures we rarely read oratio according to this sense, but rather that which pertains to prayers and supplications."¹⁹ St. Thomas aptly explains from this etymological derivation of oratio, as though oratio were the reason of the mouth,²⁰ how prayer taken in the theological sense is an act of reason, and thence he deduces its real definition.²¹

¹⁹ Ep. ad Cypr. 139 (140); in Migne, Patr. lat. 22, 1168.

²⁰ Reason of the mouth (Vernunft des Mundes).

²¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 1 and a. 17 ad 3.

332. Definition. In the theological sense, prayer is ordinarily taken in three ways:

1. In the general sense, for any act of religion, and indeed for the whole religious life. Hence that saying of St. Augustine: The best prayer is a just life. Thus also the Ordinary Gloss²² explains the admonition of Christ and the Apostle, "Pray without ceasing," saying: "Always live justly; for the just man never ceases to pray unless he ceases to be just; therefore he always prays who always acts well." Prayer accepted in this general sense has been called vital prayer, concerning which St. Catherine of Siena treats well.²³

2. In the broad sense, for every pious movement of the mind toward God. In this sense the holy Fathers often speak concerning prayer, e.g., St. Gregory of Nyssa:²⁴ "Prayer is converse and conversation with God"; St. John Chrysostom:²⁵ "Prayer is speech to God"; St. Augustine:²⁶ "What is prayer except the ascent of the soul from earthly things to heavenly things, the seeking of things above, and the desire of invisible things?" and: "Prayer is the conversion of the mind to God through a pious and humble affection."²⁷ The words of St. John Damascene²⁸ are most well known: "Prayer is the ascent of the mind to God." In this broad sense of prayer he also prays who elicits acts of faith, hope, and charity; who meditates on the divine mysteries; who praises God; who gives thanks to God for benefits conferred, etc. But not every elevation of the mind to God is prayer in this sense; for he who thinks about divine things solely for the sake of learning or teaching does not pray. Therefore a pious movement of the mind toward God is always required for prayer, namely, one which is made for the sake of venerating him.

3. In the strict sense, for deprecatory prayer. In this sense there is the almost classical and most well-known definition likewise given by St. John Damascene:²⁹ "Prayer is the petition of fitting things from God." St. Thomas³⁰ also adopts this definition, and St. Bruno the Carthusian aptly explains it, saying: "Prayer is the reason of the mouth which we, bowed down, offer, laying open our desires."³¹ But in order that our petition directed to God be true prayer, it is required that it concern things which are fitting and lawful. For prayer is an act of religion or of the worship of God. But he who would ask indecent and illicit things from the most holy God would not worship God, but mock him.

Prayer is an act of religion. It is not difficult to prove that prayer accepted in the second and third senses is truly an act of the virtue of religion. For by praying we acknowledge the divine power and goodness and profess our need and dependence upon God. All these things constitute true worship of God. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point:³² "It belongs properly to religion to offer reverence and honor to God; and therefore all those things through which reverence is offered to God belong to religion. But through prayer man offers reverence to God, insofar, namely, as he subjects himself to him and, by praying, professes that he needs him as the author of his goods. Hence it is manifest that prayer is properly an act of religion." Therefore we aptly pray: "Let my prayer be directed as incense in thy sight."³³ For good prayer is sweet-smelling incense before the divine majesty.

From these things it follows that the principal end of every prayer ought to be divine worship. Therefore when someone prays, e.g., for health to be recovered, he ought first and principally to intend divine worship and his own subjection under God; secondarily, however, he can desire his health. Hence at least implicitly he ought to say to himself: I ask health from the best and greatest God, provided this is the good pleasure of his adorable providence. For the rest, in practice any prayer made with true confidence includes by that very fact this due veneration of God. For no one would pray with confidence unless he were inwardly convinced of the divine omnipotence and goodness and unless he felt his own need.

²² On 1 Thess. 5:17; cf. Ecclus. 18:23 and Luke 18:1.

²³ Dialogue, c. 66.

²⁴ Orat. 1 de orat. dominic. (Migne, Patr. graec. 44, 1125).

²⁵ In Gen. hom. 30, n. 5 (Migne, l.c. 53, 280).

²⁶ Sermon 73. This text is frequently cited by both ancient and modern authors, but it is listed by Migne among the spurious sermons of St. Augustine.

²⁷ Lib. de spiritu et anima (Migne, Patr. lat. 39, 1887).

²⁸ De fide l. 3, c. 24 (Migne, Patr. graec. 94, 1090).

²⁹ L.c.

³⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 1.

³¹ In Migne, Patr. lat. 142, 169.

³² S. theol., l.c., a. 3.

³³ Ps. 140:2.

333. What do we intend by praying? It must be kept before the eyes that in deprecatory prayers we by no means intend to manifest our necessities to God, since the omniscient God knows them even before our manifestation. Nor do we wish by our prayers to change the decrees of divine providence, since this is impossible because of God's immutability. The nearly primary end of our deprecatory prayer, besides divine worship, is to remove the obstacles existing in ourselves which impede the fulfillment of our desire.³⁴ For through prayer clothed with due conditions we are rendered fit to receive divine benefits.

For in praying we exercise nearly all the virtues: humility, by professing that we are weak and totally dependent upon God; faith, by believing in God's omnipotence and goodness; hope, by hoping for his assistance; charity, by tending toward a close union with God. Hence Hugh of St. Victor³⁵ rightly says: "Prayer is the devotion of the mind, i.e., a conversion to God through a humble and pious affection supported by faith, hope, and charity." And the Roman Catechism³⁶ teaches: "God therefore wishes us to employ this exercise of prayer, so that, burning with zeal for asking what we desire, we may advance by such assiduity and desire to the point that we are worthy that those benefits be conferred upon us which our soul, previously empty and confined, was unable to receive."

Since good and salutary prayer is so excellent a means both of our eternal salvation and of obtaining other goods, we need the grace of God in order to pray well. Hence the words: "The Spirit helpeth our infirmity; for we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit himself asketh," i.e., causes us to ask, "for us with unspeakable groanings."³⁷

To explain the essence of prayer still better, it is useful to note certain things concerning the remote and proximate subject of prayer.

³⁴ St. Augustine expresses this beautifully: "The rational creature offers prayers to God ... that it itself may be built up, not that God may be instructed" (De gratia N. Testam. c. 29, in Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 568). Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 2, and Summa c. gent. III, 96.

³⁵ De modo orandi c. 1 (Migne, Patr. lat. 176, 979).

³⁶ Part 4, c. 2, q. 9.

³⁷ Rom. 8:26.

334. The remote subject of prayer is the same as the remote subject of religion, since prayer is an act of the virtue of religion. It can be said generally: All those are the remote subject of prayer, or can truly pray, who can and wish with pious affection to subject themselves to the divine majesty, acknowledging their own need and dependence. Hence the following cannot pray rightly:

1. Those in whom all true humility is lacking. Therefore it is related concerning the giants of the Old Testament: "The ancient giants did not obtain pardon for their sins, who were destroyed trusting to their own strength."³⁸

2. The demons and the damned. But if Satan asked from God permission to tempt Job, or if the demons cast out from the Gerasenes asked to enter the swine, or if the rich man who rejected Lazarus, buried in hell, asked that his tongue be cooled with water, or if the same man asked that Lazarus be sent to his father's house to warn his brothers, all these petitions are not true prayers which worship God, but only desires manifested.

On the contrary, the following can pray:

1. All sinners and even men who are not predestined. The contrary opinion of John Wycliffe and Pasquier Quesnel was condemned.³⁹

2. Christ as man,⁴⁰ all the angels and saints. For all these most perfectly acknowledge their own dependence and God's dominion. Christ prayed most fervently in the garden of Olives; the saints and angels pray both for their own accidental glory and for our salvation. Nor let anyone say that the citizens of heaven cannot pray because even before prayer they see in the essence of God whether the thing requested will occur or not. For this foreknowledge is not so certain,⁴¹ and although it is present, it does not impede prayer. For Christ, who most certainly knew all future events, prayed to the Father in the garden of Olives that the chalice of the Passion might pass. Therefore, just as Christ in the garden asked for deliverance from the Passion in order to show the repugnance and affection of his human nature, which manifestation was joined with the most perfect subjection and reverence toward God the Father, so the citizens of heaven can pray to God from a simple affection of charity toward those living on this earth, nevertheless subjecting this affection to the efficacious divine will.⁴²

3. The souls in purgatory also can more probably pray both for themselves and for those living on this earth. Theologians by no means agree concerning this matter, nor to this day has the Church defined anything. The older theologians seem more commonly to deny to the souls in purgatory the power of praying, at least in a deprecatory manner. Thus, e.g., St. Thomas⁴³ writes: "Those who are in purgatory ... are not in the state of praying, but rather of being prayed for." From the sixteenth century onward, however, several authors defend the affirmative opinion. John Medina⁴⁴ (d. 1546) seems to have been the first who taught thus. He is followed by Valentia,⁴⁵ Sylvius,⁴⁶ Bellarmine,⁴⁷ Bonacina,⁴⁸ Elbel,⁴⁹ nearly all modern authors, e.g., Lehmkuhl,⁵⁰ Noldin,⁵¹ Christian Pesch,⁵² Wirthmüller,⁵³ etc. Truly convincing arguments, however, can be brought forward for neither opinion. St. Thomas seems to speak only of deprecatory prayer. And indeed it is difficult to understand what these souls can ask for themselves, or how they know the necessities of men on this earth. On the other hand, since these souls are not idle and do not lack perfect subjection to God and acknowledgment of the divine excellence, prayer of praise and thanksgiving and general deprecation for the Church militant is not to be denied to them.⁵⁴

³⁸ Ecclus. 16:8.

³⁹ The Council of Constance condemned proposition 26 of Wycliffe: "The prayer of one foreknown," i.e., not predestined, "avails nothing" (Denz. n. 606). Clement XI proscribed the propositions of Pasquier Quesnel: proposition 50, "In vain do we cry to God: My Father, if the spirit of charity is not that which cries"; proposition 59, "The prayer of the impious is a new sin; and what God grants them is a new judgment upon them" (Denz. nn. 1400, 1409).

⁴⁰ Cf. S. theol. 3, q. 21, a. 1.

⁴¹ Cf. ibid. 1, 2, q. 113, a. 8.

⁴² Cf. ibid. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 11.

⁴³ Ibid., ad 3 and a. 4 ad 3; cf. also John of St. Thomas, disp. 26.

⁴⁴ De orat. q. 5. Gabriel Biel (d. 1495) is sometimes alleged as the first who taught thus.

⁴⁵ T. III, disp. 6, q. 2, p. 7.

⁴⁶ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 83, a. 11.

⁴⁷ De purgat. l. 2, c. 15.

⁴⁸ De hor. can. disp. 192, p. 1, n. 8.

⁴⁹ Theol. mor. II, n. 398.

⁵⁰ Theol. mor. I, n. 482.

⁵¹ De praeceptis n. 141.

⁵² Prael. dogm. IX, n. 324.

⁵³ Die moralische Tugend der Religion § 11.

⁵⁴ Cf. below, n. 344.

335. The proximate subject of prayer is not the will, but practical reason. Thus St. Thomas,⁵⁵ and it is manifestly evident from the definition of prayer, which is the ascent of the mind to God, or the petition of fitting things from God. For to pray is to speak to God, to intimate and manifest one's desire. But these acts belong to practical reason. Since, however, the desire of the will also operates in prayer, the will incites to the act of prayer. Therefore, although prayer is an act of the virtue of religion residing in the will, nevertheless it is formally elicited by reason. Nor is this a contradiction. For in order that an act be called elicited by some virtue, it is not necessary that it be in the same power in which the virtue itself is; but it suffices that through this virtue it be directed to its proper end, with no other virtue mediating. Thus, e.g., we say that the external confession of faith is an act elicited by faith in the intellect, although this confession is made by another power.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ L.c., a. 1. John Medina (De orat. q. 2) and certain Scotists teach that prayer is an act of the will.

⁵⁶ Cf. Billuart, De orat. a. 2, and Cajetan, Comm. in 2, 2, q. 81, a. 4.

336. Division of prayer. The divisions of prayer are not assigned in the same manner by diverse authors. The principal divisions are the following:

1. Mental or internal prayer and vocal or external prayer.

Mental prayer is perfected by acts of the intellect and will alone. In this prayer we recall with fervent zeal, e.g., the divine attributes, such as goodness and clemency, the infinite benefits conferred upon us by God, the Christian virtues, our poverty, etc.; and in this manner affections of love, desires for heavenly things, and resolutions to lead a perfectly Christian life are caused in us. The highest degree of this prayer is called contemplation,⁵⁷ by which the mind beholds and admires God himself and his perfections with a pure eye, without discourse and disturbance, and is joined to him by a certain sweet bond of most fervent love. Therefore in contemplation three things meet: the consideration of truth without discourse, admiration, and spiritual delight. Hence Pseudo-Augustine⁵⁸ says most acutely: "Contemplation is the joyful admiration of clearly perceived truth." Contemplation is by no means sterile and idle, as the Quietists dreamed, but on the contrary becomes the fruitful parent of all Christian virtues, which indeed are often exercised in a truly heroic degree. The lower degree of mental prayer is simple meditation, which consists in the pious and discursive consideration of religious truths for the purpose of drawing from them good resolutions for the moral life. Therefore the essential difference between contemplation and meditation consists in this, that contemplation is intuitive, but meditation is discursive.⁵⁹ Meditation is very necessary for every Christian man who wishes to make progress in the spiritual life.

Vocal prayer is that which is perfected by the mind and words and other external acts. St. Paul speaks concerning it: "By him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of praise always to God, that is to say, the fruit of lips confessing to his name."⁶⁰ Vocal prayer ought to express in words that which has been conceived inwardly. This expression indeed is not necessary in order that our desires become known to God, but so that our interior devotion may thereby be more greatly excited, so that the whole man, i.e., consisting of soul and body, may pray, and finally so that public prayer may be more greatly fostered. From the beginning, not only of Christianity but of the whole human race, vocal prayers have been offered to God. Christ himself also frequently, but especially in his Passion, uttered vocal prayers. From what has been said it follows that vocal prayer does not consist in words alone, but necessarily requires at least some operation of the mind. What attention of mind is necessary for every prayer, however, will be said below, n. 354.

⁵⁷ The word contemplation is taken in diverse senses by mystical and ascetical authors. Cf. Poulain, Des grâces d'oraison (1909), c. 5.

⁵⁸ De spiritu et anima c. 32 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 802).

⁵⁹ St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 180, a. 3 ad 1.

⁶⁰ Heb. 13:15.

337. 2. Public and private prayer.

Public prayer is uttered by a public minister of the Church and is performed in the name of the Church for the salvation of the people. Private prayer is performed mentally or vocally in the name and by the proper authority of the one praying. Therefore three things are required for public prayer: 1. that such a prayer be instituted by the Church; 2. that such a prayer be made in the name of the Church; 3. that such a prayer be made by persons legitimately deputed for this.⁶¹ If even one of these is lacking, the prayer is private. Hence a priest privately reciting the Divine Office, to which he is bound by a precept of the Church, performs public prayer; but the same priest saying the Rosary from his own devotion performs private prayer. Public prayer, which is also sometimes called common, always ought to be vocal, as St. Thomas⁶² teaches: "Prayer is twofold: common and individual. Common prayer is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church in the person of the whole faithful people; and therefore it is necessary that such prayer become known to the whole people for whom it is uttered, which could not be done unless it were vocal. And therefore it is reasonably instituted that the ministers of the Church pronounce prayers of this kind even in a loud voice, so that they can come to the knowledge of all. But individual prayer is that which is offered by an individual person praying, whether for himself or for others; and it is not of the necessity of prayer of this kind that it be oral." Since all the prayers of the Divine Office and of the liturgy are public prayers, clerics consequently ought to pronounce these prayers orally; otherwise they do not satisfy the ecclesiastical precept, as will be said specifically below, n. 376, concerning the canonical hours.

3. Prayer is divided into supplications, prayers, petitions, and thanksgivings.

This division is taken from the epistle of St. Paul, who says: "I desire therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all men."⁶³ These four parts are explained in this manner by the Angelic Doctor:⁶⁴ "Three things are required for prayer, the first of which is that the one praying approach God, whom he prays to: this is signified by the name prayer, because prayer is the ascent of the intellect to God. Secondly, petition is required, which is signified by the name petition, whether the petition is proposed determinately, which some properly call a petition, or indeterminately, as when someone asks to be helped by God, which they call supplication.... Thirdly, a reason for obtaining what is asked is required; and this is either on the part of God or on the part of the petitioner. The reason for obtaining on the part of God is his holiness, on account of which we ask to be heard ... and to this pertains supplication, which is a sacred appeal, as when we say: Through thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord. But the reason for obtaining on the part of the petitioner is thanksgiving, because by giving thanks for benefits received we merit to receive greater ones.... In several collects of the Church also these four can be observed, as in the collect of the Trinity: what is said, Almighty eternal God, pertains to the ascent of prayer to God; what is said, who hast given to thy servants, etc., pertains to thanksgiving; what is said, grant, we beseech thee, etc., pertains to petition; what is placed at the end, Through our Lord, etc., pertains to supplication." Other explanations of the words of St. Paul are also offered by other authors.

4. By reason of the end toward which the man praying proximately tends, prayer is sometimes divided into adoration, thanksgiving, and petition.

If the one praying intends the acknowledgment of the supreme divine excellence and of his own subjection, adoration or praise of God takes place; if by praying he intends to give thanks for benefits received, it is thanksgiving; but if by praying he wishes to obtain new graces, it is petition or deprecatory prayer, to which are also referred propitiatory prayer, by which someone asks remission of sins and punishments, and intercession, by which someone asks goods for other men.

⁶¹ Cf. Code of Canon Law, canon 1256.

⁶² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 12.

⁶³ 1 Tim. 2:1.

⁶⁴ L.c., a. 17.

In this paragraph we respond to the following three questions: 1. What things can be asked in prayer? 2. For whom is prayer to be made? 3. To whom are our prayers to be directed?

338. The general rule in this question is a proposition taken, not indeed according to the very words but according to the sense, from St. Augustine: It is lawful to pray for that which it is lawful to desire.⁶⁵

Applications of the rule. a) It is lawful to ask in prayer not only for goods in general, but also in particular. The contrary doctrine proposed by Socrates,⁶⁶ Wycliffe, the Illuminati, and the Quietists is false and contradicts Sacred Scripture, in which we are commanded to ask also for particular goods. The most manifest example is the Lord's Prayer itself, in which seven particular and determinate petitions are contained.

b) It is lawful to ask determinately and absolutely for goods necessary to eternal salvation, such as the required grace and all other means necessary to salvation. The reason is that no one can abuse these goods and that God truly wishes us to ask for them, admonishing us: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God."⁶⁷ Indeed, it is not only lawful but also better to ask for goods of this kind in an absolute manner, because in this manner we pray more attentively and because we are accustomed to pray for and desire goods the more fervently the more particularly they are regarded.⁶⁸ Hence the doctrine of the Quietists is false which teaches that even spiritual goods necessary to salvation are to be asked for only conditionally, namely, under the condition that God has predestined us to eternal salvation, and that man ought to renounce even eternal life if God has thus decreed. The falsity of this doctrine is evident from the fact that God sincerely wishes all men to be saved,⁶⁹ and that no one is reprobated to hell before foreseen demerits. Graces gratuitously given and charisms, e.g., the gift of tongues, miracles, etc., may not be asked for absolutely in prayer, but only conditionally, because these graces are not means directly useful to the eternal salvation of the one possessing them, but rather benefit other men.

c) It is lawful in prayer to ask also for temporal goods, not indeed so that we establish our end in them, but as certain aids by which we may be assisted in attaining eternal beatitude.⁷⁰ This is also confirmed by the practice of the Church, which asks in prayers, e.g., for rain, fair weather, health, etc. But when we ask temporal goods from God, we ought always to add at least the implicit condition that we do not expect our prayers to be heard if the temporal goods are obstacles to our eternal salvation. Since temporal goods in fact are often obstacles to salvation, they are to be sought through prayer cautiously and not too avidly.

d) It is also lawful in prayer to ask for physical evils both for oneself and for another, provided, however, that they are asked for as means of obtaining spiritual goods of great value. Thus St. Paul desired to be dissolved and to be with Christ; thus the saints not rarely asked for poverty, infirmity, persecutions, etc. Nevertheless, prayer of this kind is to be made with great caution, especially if there is question of asking for the physical evil of one's neighbor, because deceptions will very easily be present and because the intention of the one praying is not rarely not so pure.⁷¹

e) It is not lawful in prayer to ask for a morally evil thing, e.g., assistance in perpetrating theft or fornication. For such a prayer would be a grave sin, at least speaking objectively, because he who wished to have the most holy God as a cooperator in a sin, even one light in itself, would commit grave irreverence toward him.⁷²

⁶⁵ This proposition is found according to its sense in Ep. 130 (otherwise 121), c. 12, ad Probam (Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 503).

⁶⁶ In St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 5.

⁶⁷ Matt. 6:33.

⁶⁸ Cf. St. Thomas, IV, dist. 15, q. 4, a. 4, quaestiunc. 3.

⁶⁹ Cf. 1 Tim. 2:4.

⁷⁰ S. theol., l.c., a. 6.

⁷¹ Cf. Billuart, De orat. a. 5.

⁷² Cf. Noldin, De praeceptis n. 142.

339. Scholion. On the Lord's Prayer. St. Thomas⁷³ demonstrates excellently that in the Lord's Prayer all things whatsoever which we can lawfully ask from God by praying are contained in perfect order. Since the Lord's Prayer is the best and most frequent among all prayers, it is very expedient that pastors of souls diligently instruct the faithful concerning the beauty and suitability of this prayer. Therefore the Roman Catechism,⁷⁴ intended for parish priests, has an ample commentary on the Lord's Prayer.

⁷³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 9. The source prints q. 82, an evident typographical error.

⁷⁴ Part IV, c. 9.

340. General rule. It is lawful to pray not only for ourselves, but also for all and each creatures capable of eternal glory.⁷⁵

The intrinsic and fundamental reason why and how one person can pray efficaciously for another is the dogma of the communion of saints. For all men (the damned alone excepted) are bound together by an intimate union of charity, and therefore one can benefit another. The efficacy of prayer consists chiefly in this, that the obstacles to grace existing in us are removed from the way and consequently we are better disposed to receive graces, as was said above in n. 333. Certainly, from the fact that we pray for another, e.g., for a sinner, he does not thereby remove the obstacles to grace nor become fit to receive graces; but God often bestows actual graces without a special disposition being present in the recipient. Thus, e.g., it is piously believed that, through the prayers of Stephen the protomartyr, God bestowed the grace of conversion upon Saul, who was by no means specially disposed, on the road to Damascus. Moreover, since the whole human race, redeemed by the blood of Christ, is one moral society in which individual men are members, the dignity and operation of one member redound in some measure to another member. Therefore, if one man through prayer becomes better disposed to receive graces, this greater disposition redounds in some measure to other men united with him, so that they also (although sinners) become more capable of receiving graces.

Applications. It is lawful to pray for all men living upon this earth, with no one excepted, whether they are faithful or unbelievers, friends or enemies, excommunicated or not. Likewise it is lawful to pray for the souls in purgatory; indeed, even for the blessed in heaven, who, although they possess essential beatitude and that immutable, can nevertheless still increase in accidental beatitude. But it is not lawful to pray for the damned in hell, because they are no longer capable of eternal glory.

1. Wycliffe taught that prayers were indeed to be poured forth for men in general, but not for men individually. But this doctrine was proscribed by the condemnation of proposition 19: "Special prayers applied to one person by prelates or religious profit that person no more than general prayers, other things being equal."⁷⁶ That prayers can be made for other men in particular is manifest from Sacred Scripture, from the practice of the Church, and from theological reason. First, indeed, from Sacred Scripture, namely from the example of Christ, who prayed for Peter that his faith might not fail;⁷⁷ and for those who crucified him.⁷⁸ In almost every epistle St. Paul solicits the prayers of the faithful for himself.⁷⁹ St. James admonishes: "Pray one for another, that you may be saved."⁸⁰ The practice of the Church shows the same thing; for on Good Friday she prays for all, not only the faithful, but also unbelievers, heretics, and Jews. The theological reason for this doctrine is thus explained by St. Thomas:⁸¹ "We ought to ask in prayer for that which we ought to desire. But we ought to desire goods not only for ourselves, but also for others; for this pertains to the nature of the love which we ought to expend upon our neighbors. And therefore charity requires this, that we pray for others. Hence Chrysostom says: Necessity compels one to pray for oneself; but fraternal charity exhorts one to pray for another. Sweeter before God is the prayer, not which necessity sends forth, but which the charity of brotherhood commends.... As Cyprian says: Therefore we do not say, My Father, but Our Father; nor, Give me, but, Give us, because the teacher of unity did not wish prayer to be made privately, so that anyone would pray for himself alone; for he wished one to pray for all, since he himself bore all in one."

2. We not only can but sometimes ought to pray for enemies. Wherefore the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, admitted by all, is to be noted: "It is necessary that, in our common prayers which we make for others, we not exclude our enemies. But that we pray for them specially is a matter of perfection, not of necessity, except in some special case."⁸² That special case is a) a grave necessity in which the enemy is placed, or b) if scandal would arise without special prayer.

⁷⁵ This rule can also be expressed in this manner: We can and ought to pray for all those for whom our prayer is useful and whom we ought to love from charity.

⁷⁶ Denz. n. 599.

⁷⁷ Cf. Luke 22:32.

⁷⁸ Luke 23:34.

⁷⁹ Cf. Rom. 15:30; 1 Thess. 5:25.

⁸⁰ Jas. 5:16.

⁸¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 7, corp. and ad 1.

⁸² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 8. Cf. above I, n. 575f.

341. 3. We can certainly pour forth private prayers for the excommunicated, because this is nowhere prohibited and because even the excommunicated are still capable of eternal glory. That at times public prayer for the excommunicated is also lawful is evident from the example of the Church herself, who on Good Friday prays publicly for heretics and schismatics, whom she assuredly regards as excommunicated. But whether in other cases also it is lawful to pray publicly, and especially whether it is lawful to offer the sacrifice of the Mass for the excommunicated, depends upon the legislation of the Church or upon legitimate custom.⁸³ But if St. John seems to exclude great sinners from our prayers, saying: "He that knoweth his brother to sin a sin which is not unto death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him who sinneth not unto death. There is a sin unto death: for that I say not that any man ask";⁸⁴ the sense of these words is that prayer for sinners is heard with difficulty and not always; or that this prayer is useless for the sinner's eternal life so long as he wishes to remain in sin. In the same manner are the words of Jeremiah to be understood: "Therefore do not thou pray for this people, neither take to thee praise and supplication for them, and do not withstand me: for I will not hear thee."⁸⁵ But if St. Jerome⁸⁶ asserts, "It is foolish to pray for sinners unto death," he is to be understood on the supposition that someone knew with certainty that another was entirely reprobated by God. Then certainly prayer would be useless. But this certainty cannot be had without a special divine revelation, which is known scarcely ever to have been granted.

⁸³ Cf. below, in the tract on the sacrifice of the Mass, III, 247ff.; Code of Canon Law, c. 2262.

⁸⁴ 1 John 5:16.

⁸⁵ Jer. 7:16.

⁸⁶ Comm. in Jer. (Migne, Patr. lat. 24, 802).

342. 4. That we can and ought to pray for the souls in purgatory follows from the Council of Trent, which teaches that the sacrifice of the Mass can be offered for those who have died in Christ but are not yet fully purged,⁸⁷ and that the souls detained in purgatory are assisted by the suffrages of the faithful, but especially by the acceptable sacrifice of the altar.⁸⁸ The same can easily be proved from all the liturgies both of the Latin and of the Eastern Church, in which there are prayers for the dead.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the obligation of praying for the dead does not seem grave, because it is not certain that any deceased person in fact still needs our prayers. It is lawful and expedient to pray not only for the souls of purgatory in general, but also for a determinate deceased person; for although it is not certain that such a determinate deceased person will receive relief from our prayers, nevertheless it is piously believed that divine mercy does not leave without fruit a prayer made from charity.⁹⁰

5. That we can pray for an increase in the accidental glory of the saints is the common opinion of authors. For that accidental glory can be increased; whence the Church prays in the Mass: "Receive, O Holy Trinity, that it may profit them [the saints] unto honor, but us unto salvation." Essential glory, however, i.e., the vision of God, cannot be increased in the saints; and therefore it is not lawful to pray for that. In this sense also are the words of St. Augustine⁹¹ to be understood: "He does injury to a martyr who prays for a martyr, to whose prayers we ought to be commended." Prayers for the saints, however, are not in frequent use, except insofar as prayers are sometimes made for obtaining the beatification or canonization of some servant of God.

6. It is not lawful to pray for the damned, since they are outside the bond of charity. Moreover, such prayer would be entirely useless, since the punishments of hell are eternal and cannot be diminished. Wherefore the story of the deliverance of the emperor Trajan from hell, as narrated by John the Deacon, namely that St. Gregory the Great by his prayers delivered the emperor Trajan and Falconilla from hell, is to be regarded as a fable.⁹² Likewise, the assertion of the poet Prudentius that on Easter day all the punishments of the damned cease or are interrupted is a fantastic fiction.⁹³

⁸⁷ Sess. 22, c. 2 and can. 3 (Denz. nn. 940, 950).

⁸⁸ Sess. 25, decree on purgatory (Denz. n. 983).

⁸⁹ In the liturgies there occur certain prayers whose sense is not so easily understood, e.g., in the Mass for the dead: "Deliver, O Lord, the souls of all the faithful departed from the punishments of hell and from the deep pit; let not Tartarus swallow them up; deliver them from eternal death," etc. Certain authors, such as Suarez (De poenit. disp. 48, sect. 5, n. 12), Bellarmine (De purgat. l. 2, c. 5), and Chr. Pesch (Prael. dogm., de noviss. n. 617), think that the Church prays by a certain fiction, as though those souls were still at the point of departing from this life. They think it probable, however, that such a prayer, even if in fact made after death, could, in the foreknowledge of God, have profited the soul even before death, so that it might receive greater assistance from God for avoiding the danger of eternal death. This opinion is not very pleasing, because, first, it is a mere hypothesis without any solid foundation drawn from tradition or from theological reason; and, secondly, because it is an excessively involved explanation. For although God can, on account of the foreseen merits of a future prayer and Mass to be said, grant special graces to one who is dying, it is nevertheless very doubtful whether God would in fact do this. Other authors, among whom is Benedict XIV (De sacrif. Missae l. 2, c. 9), rightly teach that all such formulas are to be understood of purgatory and not of hell. The reason is that, according to several most distinguished authors, e.g., St. Thomas, the punishments of sense in purgatory and hell do not differ essentially from one another. Wherefore the words "hell, eternal death, Tartarus" are not incongruously employed also for purgatory.

⁹⁰ Brief mention must be made of the opinion of Dominic Soto concerning the duration of purgatory. He writes: "The clemency of God does not permit his friends to be withheld from his sight for a long time. And therefore it belonged to his most wise providence to institute for purifying them those punishments which could cleanse the souls there in a short time. For since those torments are supernatural and cannot corrupt the subject, he could make up for any length of time by accumulated punishments. Wherefore I would believe that no one has ever remained in purgatory for twenty years; indeed, as my opinion inclines, not even ten.... It is not credible that God would detain by length of time those whom he could release thence more quickly by an accumulation of punishments." Certainly all these things are mere opinion, but they are by no means proscribed, as some have wished, by proposition 43 condemned by Alexander VII: "An annual legacy left for a soul does not last beyond ten years" (Denz. n. 1143). For the duration of a legacy lasts for as long as the testator determined and does not cease even if the soul has already been delivered from purgatory.

⁹¹ Sermon 159 (Migne, Patr. lat. 38, 868).

⁹² Life of St. Gregory the Great l. 2, n. 44 (Migne, Patr. lat. 75, 105). St. Thomas attempts to interpret this little story benignly (Suppl. q. 71, a. 5). Cf. Nat. Alexander, De liberatione commenticia Traiani imperatoris ab infernis.

⁹³ Carmen de novo lumine paschalis sabbati v. 125ff. (Migne, Patr. lat. 59, 828).

343. Proposition. God alone is to be prayed to as he who can of himself furnish the things which we ask; but it is lawful and useful to invoke the saints or angels, that they may intercede for us with God.

This is Catholic doctrine and is thus proved and explained by St. Thomas:⁹⁴ "Prayer is offered to someone in two ways: in one way, as to be fulfilled by him; in another way, as to be obtained through him. In the first way we offer prayer to God alone, because all our prayers (even for obtaining temporal goods) ought to be ordained to the attainment of grace and glory, which God alone gives, according to the words of the Psalm: The Lord will give grace and glory.⁹⁵ But in the second way we offer prayer to the holy angels and men; not so that through them God may know our prayers, but so that through their prayers and merits our prayers may obtain their effect. And therefore it is said that the smoke of the incense, that is, the prayers of the saints, ascended from the hand of the angel before the Lord.⁹⁶ And this is also evident from the very manner which the Church employs in praying; for we ask the Holy Trinity to have mercy upon us, but we ask any of the other saints to pray for us."

⁹⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 4.

⁹⁵ Ps. 83:12.

⁹⁶ Cf. Apoc. 8:4.

344. On the invocation of the saints.

Several heretics, e.g., Eustathius of Sebaste, Vigilantius, Peter of Bruys, the Apostolics, the Cathars, the Wycliffites, the Lutherans, the Calvinists, etc., deny the utility and lawfulness of the invocation of the saints, asserting that Christ is the sole mediator between us and God; that the saints do not know our prayers; and that God is so good that he is ready to hear us even without the intercession of the saints. To these objections a brief response is made: 1. Christ is indeed our sole mediator insofar as, joining in himself at once the divine and human nature, he joins us again to God by his redemption. But the saints are our mediators insofar as they assist our prayers by interceding for us. Or, more briefly: there is one mediator of redemption, but there are many mediators of intercession. 2. It is false that the saints do not know our prayers, because, by seeing the divine essence, they know all those earthly things which specially concern them. Such things are prayers directed to them.⁹⁷ 3. Certainly God is most clement and most merciful; but there is no derogation from his clemency and mercy if, for most fitting reasons, our prayers become more efficacious from the fact that they are assisted by the intercession of the saints; just as a good father of a family more readily grants a favor asked by one son if at the same time the other sons intercede for their brother.

From all these things it is evident how rightly the Council of Trent⁹⁸ commanded bishops diligently to instruct the faithful "that the saints reigning together with Christ offer their prayers to God for men; that it is good and useful suppliantly to invoke them, and, for obtaining benefits from God through his Son Jesus Christ our Lord, who alone is our redeemer and savior, to have recourse to their prayers, aid, and assistance; but that those who deny that the saints enjoying eternal happiness in heaven are to be invoked, or who assert either that they do not pray for men, or that the invocation of them, that they may pray also for each one of us, is idolatry, or that it conflicts with the word of God and is opposed to the honor of the one mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ, or that it is foolish to supplicate by voice or mind those reigning in heaven, think impiously." The intrinsic reasons why we can invoke the saints especially to our own profit are: 1. Divine goodness, which, although it can most easily act in all things directly through itself, nevertheless employs secondary causes to produce many effects and thus to increase the happiness of creatures. Thus also divine goodness employs the intercession of the saints to grant the grace of being heard to our prayers, so that in this way the accidental happiness of the saints may be increased and our confidence may grow. 2. The communion of saints existing among the Church militant, suffering, and triumphant. For it is most fitting that the members of the same Church not only love one another but also assist one another efficaciously. From all these things it is abundantly evident that the invocation of the saints is lawful, very useful, and indeed sometimes necessary. He who desires more on this matter should consult the apologists.⁹⁹

Saints and just men existing not only in heaven but still upon earth can be invoked. Hence St. Paul, writing to the Romans (who are called saints), says: "I beseech you therefore, brethren, through our Lord Jesus Christ and through the charity of the Holy Spirit, that you help me in your prayers for me to God."¹⁰⁰ Likewise nothing prevents baptized infants who departed from this life before the use of reason from being invoked privately. For such persons are certainly in heaven. Then it is also lawful to invoke the souls existing in purgatory, since they are friends of God. But whether such invocation is in fact efficacious, and especially whether the souls in purgatory know the prayers directed to them, is not certain.¹⁰¹ There are some who say that guardian angels manifest prayers of this kind to the souls in purgatory, or that God grants them a revelation in a special manner; but these things are very uncertain and cannot be sufficiently proved. Wherefore nothing indeed prevents a man from directing his prayers privately to the souls in purgatory, as many of the faithful in fact do; but nevertheless the invocation of the souls in purgatory does not seem to be something to be preached publicly from the pulpit so long as the Church has determined nothing concerning this matter.

⁹⁷ Cf. S. theol., l.c., ad 2. Theologians do not agree concerning the manner in which the saints know prayers directed to them. Cf. Billuart, De orat. a. 4, obj. 2.

⁹⁸ Sess. 25, on the invocation of the saints (Denz. n. 984).

⁹⁹ Cf. Billuart, l.c., a. 4, where many objections of the heretics are also found resolved; Mausbach, Kathol. Moraltheol. II, § 30.

¹⁰⁰ Rom. 15:30.

¹⁰¹ Cf. above n. 334 (3).

345. You ask: Is the invocation of the saints not only useful and lawful, but also necessary, so that he who refused to invoke the saints, and especially the Blessed Virgin, would sin?

No explicit precept of invoking the saints is indeed found, and therefore he who, apart from contempt or scandal, never invoked the saints or the Blessed Virgin would not sin gravely; yet he would certainly deprive himself of many graces and would act against the order willed by God. Hence, in practice, he who obstinately refused to invoke the saints, and especially the Blessed Virgin,¹⁰² who even in liturgical worship is acknowledged as mediatrix of our grace, would not be excused at least from venial sin.

¹⁰² Francis Sylvius in the seventeenth century seems first to have asserted the necessity of invoking the saints (Comm. in 2, 2, q. 83, a. 4, concl. 2). Placidus Boeckhn, O.S.B., also attempted to demonstrate that a precept of invoking the saints exists. At that time sharp disputes arose concerning this matter. Concina treats this controversy broadly and profoundly, In Decal. l. 2, diss. 1, c. 8, n. 6.

346. Proposition. Prayer is not only useful and fitting for all adults, but is also necessary by a necessity of precept, and indeed commonly also by a necessity of means.

That prayer is useful and fitting is evident a) from the fact that it is so excellent an act of religion, and b) from the fact that it procures such signal benefits.

The necessity of prayer has indeed been exaggerated too much by some, namely by the Euchites,¹⁰³ who taught that nothing else is required, but prayer alone suffices for eternal salvation; but it has been diminished too much by many, especially by those who deny divine providence (the Deists), or who assert that all things are ruled by a rigid fate (the Fatalists).

1. That prayer is necessary for all adults by a necessity of precept is evident from many texts of Sacred Scripture. Thus, e.g., Christ admonishes: "Watch ye, and pray."¹⁰⁴ "We ought always to pray, and not to faint."¹⁰⁵ "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you. For every one that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened."¹⁰⁶ The Apostles likewise inculcate prayer: "Pray without ceasing."¹⁰⁷ "Be instant in prayer; watching in it."¹⁰⁸ "Be prudent therefore, and watch in prayers."¹⁰⁹ The Holy Fathers and theologians hand down the same thing with unanimous opinion. Hence the Church also manifests this necessity in the Mass, where the Lord's Prayer is introduced: "Admonished by saving precepts and formed by divine instruction, we dare to say: Our Father," etc.

2. That prayer is also necessary for all adults by a necessity of means (at least commonly and by ordinary law) is the far more common and more probable opinion. Nevertheless, the sense of this proposition is not that God bestows no graces unless he is first entreated by us; for it is manifest that God confers upon us many actual graces without any preceding prayer. Thus, e.g., the grace of conversion was bestowed upon Saul, certainly not praying but persecuting the Church. Therefore the absolute necessity of prayer is asserted only in this sense: that God, in view of the order of present providence and considering the infirmity and indigence of human nature, does not confer final perseverance in grace unless an adult man has at some time poured forth pious prayers. The proposition thus understood is easily proved both a) by authority and b) by reason.

a) By authorities. The author of the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas¹¹⁰ writes: "We believe that no one comes to salvation unless God invites him; that no one merits assistance unless he prays." St. Augustine¹¹¹ teaches the same thing, asserting that God does not command impossible things, and consequently that you, a man, ought "to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot." The Council of Trent¹¹² made these words its own: "God does not command impossible things, but by commanding he admonishes you both to do what you can and to ask for what you cannot." The Commented Rule of St. Benedict¹¹³ beautifully expresses this necessity of praying: "As breath is always necessary to us for the life of the flesh, so continual prayer is altogether necessary for the health of the mind"; and: "I would more easily believe that a man could subsist without a soul than that a perfect religious could subsist without prayer." The same St. Thomas¹¹⁴ teaches: "Every [adult] man is bound to prayer from the very fact that he is bound to procure spiritual goods for himself, which are given only by God; whence they cannot be procured in any other way than that they be asked from him." The Roman Catechism¹¹⁵ also upholds the same doctrine: "Since God owes nothing to anyone, it assuredly remains that we ask of him by prayers the things which we need; which prayers he has given us as a necessary instrument for obtaining that which we desire, especially since it is certain that there are some things which it is not possible to obtain without his assistance." John of St. Thomas,¹¹⁶ Sylvius,¹¹⁷ Sporer,¹¹⁸ St. Alphonsus,¹¹⁹ and almost all theologians teach the same opinion.

b) By theological reasons. 1. Acts of faith and charity are necessary for an adult by a necessity of means, as was proved above in I, nn. 496 and 561. But prayer on the part of man is necessarily joined with these acts, especially when he is placed in necessity. For he who believes in God omnipotent and merciful; who truly loves this God above all things; and who, finally, intimately senses his own necessities and miseries, necessarily raises his mind to God with pious affection, asking assistance. But such a pious affection is prayer. 2. It is necessary to worship the divine majesty. But it is impossible to worship God without a pious affection of the mind toward God; and this is prayer, at least in the broad sense. 3. No nation has ever existed without religion. But the principal act of religion is prayer. Hence no nation has existed which did not pour forth prayers to the Deity. This, moreover, is a sign that the act of prayer arises from the very condition of human nature and consequently that it is absolutely necessary. Yet it does not follow from this that God cannot save an adult man who has not prayed. For this would be false. Nothing prevents God from conferring sanctifying grace upon an adult pagan and then causing him to die at once, without time for praying being present.¹²⁰ This alone is asserted with St. Alphonsus:¹²¹ according to the ordinary course of things, no adult is in fact saved who has not prayed.

¹⁰³ On the Euchites and Messalians cf. Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlex. II, 1309, s.v. "Messalianer."

¹⁰⁴ Matt. 26:41.

¹⁰⁵ Luke 18:1.

¹⁰⁶ Matt. 7:7f.

¹⁰⁷ 1 Thess. 5:17.

¹⁰⁸ Col. 4:2.

¹⁰⁹ 1 Pet. 4:7.

¹¹⁰ More probably this author is Gennadius of Marseilles, about the year 495 (Migne, Patr. lat. 58, 995). Several other texts of the Holy Fathers are adduced by Concina, l.c., c. 5, where the reasons of the few authors who do not admit that prayer is necessary by a necessity of means are also refuted.

¹¹¹ De natura et gratia c. 43 (Migne, Patr. lat. 44, 271).

¹¹² Sess. 6, c. 11 (Denz. n. 804).

¹¹³ In Migne, Patr. lat. 66, 329.

¹¹⁴ IV Sent., dist. 15, q. 4, a. 1, sol. 3.

¹¹⁵ Part IV, c. 1, q. 3f.

¹¹⁶ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 83, disp. 36, a. 3.

¹¹⁷ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 83, a. 2.

¹¹⁸ De praec. Decal. tr. 2, c. 7.

¹¹⁹ Theol. mor. l. 3 at the beginning; Gran mezzo della preghiera Part II, c. 4 at the end, where the Holy Doctor says according to the German translation: "I assert and repeat it, and I shall continue to repeat it until my last breath, that our salvation depends entirely upon prayer. Therefore all writers in their books, all preachers in their sermons, and all confessors in the administration of the sacrament of penance ought to impress nothing upon the faithful so emphatically as praying without ceasing. Unceasingly they ought to admonish them and cry out to them: 'Pray, pray, and do not cease to pray! For if you pray, your salvation is secure; but if you cease to pray, your perdition is equally certain.' ... From all that we have said, the conclusion is to be drawn that he who prays will certainly be saved, and that he who does not pray will certainly be damned." Cf. also Tillmann, Das Gebet nach der Lehre der Heiligen, 136ff.

¹²⁰ Cf. Billuart, De gratia diss. 6, a. 3.

¹²¹ L.c.

347. The time of obligation. Once the necessity of prayer has been established, the question immediately arises: When does this precept of praying oblige?

The response is: The precept of praying obliges (just as also the precept of eliciting faith, hope, and charity) per se and per accidens.

This precept obliges per se several times in life; but it cannot be determined precisely how often we ought to pray by divine law.

Theologians commonly teach that this precept obliges per se: 1. At the beginning of the moral life, namely when a man, having attained the full use of reason, ought to turn himself to God.¹²² For this turning to God is already prayer. 2. In danger of death. For then also a man ought to turn himself with pious affection to God, asking his assistance for having a happy death. 3. Several times in life. There are some who say that the precept of praying obliges per se every week; others, with St. Alphonsus,¹²³ every month or certainly every two months; others think that this precept (at least under grave sin) does not oblige except every year. All these opinions cannot be strictly proved; hence let it suffice to say that the precept of praying obliges per se several times in life. Meanwhile, however, the faithful are most earnestly to be admonished to pour forth at least some pious prayers every day. For the rest, good Catholics ought not to be anxious about the fulfillment of this divine precept, since it is already sufficiently observed by hearing Mass on Sundays and feast days.

Note. Since the divine precept of praying obliges per se several times in life, penitents who for a long time have neither received the sacraments nor heard Mass are to be asked in confession whether throughout that time they also neglected prayer. The reason is that negligence of this kind is a special sin (at least objectively speaking).

¹²² Cf. above I, nn. 502 and 563.

¹²³ Gran mezzo della preghiera Part I, c. 3, § 3.

348. The precept of praying obliges per accidens: 1. whenever another precept presses which cannot be fulfilled without prayer, e.g., hearing Sunday Mass; 2. when a grave temptation to sin arises, especially a temptation against the virtue of chastity. For it is certain from experience that some temptations cannot be conquered without prayer; 3. in grave calamities, especially public ones. For charity demands that we then have recourse to the most efficacious assistance of prayer.

No common law is found anywhere prescribing morning and evening prayers or prayers before and after a meal; and therefore the omission of such prayers is not of itself a sin, either mortal or venial, and consequently is not even sufficient matter for absolution.¹²⁴ In practice, however, to omit these prayers without sufficient reason is almost always a venial sin, because it manifests sloth and deprives one of graces necessary for daily life. Hence the faithful are to be exhorted not to omit these prayers (which were already customary among Christians from the first centuries of the Church). Not praying before and after a meal in public inns is indeed not a sin of itself; nevertheless it is usually much better if the faithful also make brief prayers in such places as a sign of religion.

¹²⁴ Thus the Salmanticenses, Curs. theol. mor. tr. 21, c. 9, n. 17. Concina treats this matter well, In Decal. l. 2, diss. 1, c. 5.

The efficacy of prayer is very great; for it produces three primary effects and several other secondary effects. The three primary effects of prayer are merit, satisfaction, and impetration; while the secondary effects are many: for prayer disposes one for grace, enlightens the intellect, nourishes faith, confirms hope and confidence, inflames charity, increases humility, produces ineffable consolations, fosters the exercise of all the virtues, etc. A few things are to be said concerning each.

349. a) The primary effects.

1. Prayer is meritorious when it is poured forth as it ought to be by a just man who is a wayfarer.¹²⁵ For prayer is a good work. Moreover, every good work of a just man who is a wayfarer, proceeding from the root of charity, is meritorious, and indeed de condigno. Such prayer merits an increase of grace and glory. Christ seems to speak of this merit when he says: "But thou when thou shalt pray, enter into thy chamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret: and thy Father who seeth in secret will repay thee."¹²⁶ But although only a man endowed with sanctifying grace can merit de condigno, nevertheless the prayer of a sinner made with actual grace also merits de congruo (in the broad sense) a threefold good, because a) it disposes him for sanctifying grace; b) it obtains temporal goods; c) it accustoms him to good works.¹²⁷

2. Prayer is satisfactory; for it has all the conditions required for satisfaction, since it is a good and arduous work proceeding from grace. That prayer is a good work and proceeds from grace (at least if a man is constituted in the state of sanctifying grace) is evident of itself. Daily experience proves that good prayer is an arduous work, since it is not easy to perform a good prayer. Hence the Council of Trent¹²⁸ places prayer among satisfactory works, and confessors are accustomed to impose certain prayers for sins as a salutary penance or satisfaction.

3. Prayer is impetratory, and indeed in two ways, namely insofar as it is a good work, and formally insofar as it is prayer. We do not speak of the first impetratory effect, which prayer has in common with all good works. The discussion here will presently concern only the other effect.

¹²⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 15.

¹²⁶ Matt. 6:6.

¹²⁷ Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 14, a. 4.

¹²⁸ Sess. 14, can. 13.

350. b) The secondary effects.

1. Prayer enlightens the intellect, according to the words: "Come ye to him, and be enlightened."¹²⁹ Wherefore St. Thomas always had recourse to prayer whenever he was unable to understand some difficult truth.

2. Prayer nourishes faith. For faith and prayer foster one another. Firm faith in the omnipotence, goodness, and mercy of God induces a man to pray; and fervent prayer increases faith, both because it increases grace and because it is itself an exercise of faith.

3. Prayer confirms hope and confidence on account of the salutary effects often gathered from prayer.

4. Prayer inflames charity. For "as lovers are more inflamed to love by conversation and meeting, so pious men, the more often by making prayers to God they converse, as it were, with him, are impelled with greater joy at each prayer to love and worship him more ardently."¹³⁰

5. Prayer increases humility. For one who prays, conscious of his own indigence, approaches God as a beggar.

6. Prayer produces ineffable consolations. For if conversation with a faithful friend is pleasant, what at last is to be said concerning sweet conversation with God in prayer? Hence Christ admonishes: "Ask, and you shall receive; that your joy may be full."¹³¹

7. Prayer fosters the exercise of all the virtues, according to the saying: "He who knows how to pray rightly truly knows how to live rightly." The intrinsic reason is that by prayer man approaches God. By frequent and true approach to God, man becomes like God; he flees dangerous earthly things; he restrains disordered passions; and at length he is adorned with the crown of all the virtues.

¹²⁹ Ps. 33:6.

¹³⁰ Roman Catechism, Part IV, c. 2, q. 7 (8).

¹³¹ John 16:24.

351. Proposition. Prayer furnished with the requisite conditions has, from the promise of God, an infallible efficacy for impetrating the things which are asked.

This proposition seems to be of Catholic faith on account of the manifest testimonies of Sacred Scripture: "The prayer of him that humbleth himself shall pierce the clouds; and till it come nigh he will not be comforted; and he will not depart till the Most High behold."¹³² Christ repeatedly promised the hearing of prayer: "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you. For every one that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened."¹³³ "Amen, amen I say to you: if you ask the Father any thing in my name, he will give it you."¹³⁴ The Holy Fathers also proclaim the efficacy of prayer very frequently. Thus St. Hilary¹³⁵ says: "It is the doctrine of our hope that God, when prayed to, both has mercy and saves." Tertullian¹³⁶ writes: "Prayer alone is that which conquers God; ... it washes away sins; repels temptations; extinguishes persecutions; consoles the fainthearted; delights the magnanimous; ... feeds the poor; governs the rich; raises the fallen; supports those falling; sustains those standing." A certain ancient author embraces the efficacy of prayer in this brief and very well-known proposition: "He who knows how to pray rightly truly knows how to live rightly."¹³⁷ Several Holy Fathers wrote entire treatises on prayer and its efficacy, which you will find enumerated in Migne, Patr. lat. 220 (Indexes), 959-960.

¹³² Ecclus. 35:21.

¹³³ Matt. 7:7f.

¹³⁴ John 16:23. Similar passages are found in Matt. 21:22; Mark 11:24; Luke 11:9; John 14:13; Jas. 1:6.

¹³⁵ Tract. in Ps. 118 (Migne, Patr. lat. 9, 544).

¹³⁶ De orat. c. 29 (ibid. 1, 1303).

¹³⁷ Sermon 55 among the spurious sermons of St. Augustine (Migne, ibid. 39, 1849).

352. The conditions required for prayer to be infallibly efficacious are considered: 1. on the part of the object which is asked; 2. on the part of him for whom it is asked; 3. on the part of the one praying.

1. On the part of the object which is asked, it is required for the infallible efficacy of prayer that it conduce to eternal salvation.

For if a man were to ask for something harmful to his eternal salvation, then the hearing of such prayer would not be a reward but a punishment. Since temporal and material goods do not always conduce to eternal salvation, but rather lead away from it, a man asking for goods of this kind is not always heard; indeed, a man cannot ask for goods of this kind in prayer except under the condition that they not be obstacles to eternal salvation, as was said above in n. 338 (c).

2. On the part of him for whom it is asked, it is necessary that he be disposed to receive the grace asked.

Hence, e.g., someone praying for the eternal salvation of another man is not always heard, namely when that man pertinaciously resists grace. Wherefore the Angelic Doctor posits as a condition of the infallible efficacy of prayer that someone pray for himself and not for another. "That one pray for oneself is posited as a condition of prayer, not indeed as necessary for the effect of meriting, but as necessary for indefectibility in impetrating. For it sometimes happens that prayer made for another does not impetrate, even if it is made piously and perseveringly and concerns things pertaining to salvation, on account of the impediment which is on the part of him for whom one prays, according to the words: 'If Moses and Samuel shall stand before me, my soul is not toward this people.'¹³⁸ Nevertheless, the prayer will be meritorious for him who prays from charity, according to the words: 'My prayer shall be turned into my bosom';¹³⁹ that is, although it does not profit them, I nevertheless am not deprived of my reward."¹⁴⁰ Therefore, although according to the opinion of St. Thomas (whom Suarez¹⁴¹ and some others contradict) prayer for the eternal salvation of another man is not infallibly efficacious, it is nevertheless often heard; whence St. James admonishes: "Pray one for another, that you may be saved; for the continual prayer of a just man availeth much."¹⁴² Such prayer is always a most excellent work of charity and very meritorious for the one praying himself.

¹³⁸ Jer. 15:1.

¹³⁹ Ps. 34:13.

¹⁴⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 7, ad 2.

¹⁴¹ De relig. tr. 4, l. 1, c. 27.

¹⁴² Jas. 5:16.

353. 3. On the part of the subject praying, the conditions required for infallible hearing are: a) the state of grace, b) humility, c) confidence, d) perseverance, e) attention.

a) The state of grace is indeed required primarily. For although God sometimes hears the prayers of sinners, as is evident from the examples of the publican, the thief, etc., nevertheless sin often greatly prevents prayers from being heard, since it makes a man an enemy of and hateful to God. On the contrary, a just man is a friend of God, by whom he is loved and from whom he receives many benefits. Hence it is said: "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just: and his ears unto their prayers."¹⁴³ "If you abide in me, and my words abide in you, you shall ask what you will, and it shall be done unto you."¹⁴⁴ "If our heart do not reprehend us, we have confidence toward God: and whatsoever we shall ask, we shall receive of him, because we keep his commandments, and do those things which are pleasing in his sight."¹⁴⁵

b) That humility is required for efficacious prayer is evident from the very nature of prayer, since it is an act of religion by which we acknowledge our infirmity and the excellence of God, subjecting ourselves to the majesty of God. The same is evident from Sacred Scripture: God hears the humble publican, but spurns the proud Pharisee. "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble."¹⁴⁶ Abraham, praying, professed his humility, saying: "I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes."¹⁴⁷

c) Firm confidence, which entirely trusts in the promises of Christ and in divine mercy, is likewise necessary for the efficacy of prayer. Hence St. James admonishes: "But let him ask in faith [confidence], nothing wavering. For he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea, which is moved and carried about by the wind. Therefore let not that man think that he shall receive any thing of the Lord."¹⁴⁸ St. Paul exhorts: "Let us go therefore with confidence to the throne of grace."¹⁴⁹ Wherefore Christ often performed miracles upon seeing the great faith or confidence of those asking, e.g., of the ruler, the Canaanite woman, the woman suffering from an issue of blood, etc.

d) Perseverance is very necessary in prayer. For although God is ready to hear the one praying at once, man himself is not at once sufficiently prepared to receive graces (but by praying perseveringly he becomes better disposed). For thus, by waiting, he perceives his own unworthiness and indigence more vividly; he esteems more highly the grace finally obtained; and after being heard he is more incited to love and thanksgiving. Christ teaches the necessity of perseverance by various parables and miracles. Thus the importunate friend asking for three loaves finally obtains that which he desires;¹⁵⁰ the Canaanite woman, not deterred by repeated repulses, finally obtains the miraculous healing of her daughter, etc.¹⁵¹ Similar to perseverance is assiduity or duration in prayer. This assiduity of prayer also is commended, although it is not altogether necessary. Of Christ himself it is said: "He passed the whole night in the prayer of God,"¹⁵² i.e., he prayed through the whole night; and: "Being in an agony, he prayed the longer."¹⁵³ Concerning the duration of prayer, the Angelic Doctor says:¹⁵⁴ "It is fitting that prayer last so long as is useful for stirring up the fervor of interior desire. But when it exceeds this measure, so that it cannot continue without weariness, prayer is not to be prolonged further."

¹⁴³ Ps. 33:16.

¹⁴⁴ John 15:7.

¹⁴⁵ 1 John 3:21f.

¹⁴⁶ Jas. 4:6.

¹⁴⁷ Gen. 18:27.

¹⁴⁸ Jas. 1:6f.

¹⁴⁹ Heb. 4:16.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Luke 11:5ff.

¹⁵¹ Cf. Matt. 15:22ff.

¹⁵² Luke 6:12.

¹⁵³ Luke 22:43.

¹⁵⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 14.

354. e) Attention is the last condition required, and indeed not only for the efficacy of prayer but for its very essence. Attention is twofold: one external, the other internal. Since attention is opposed to distraction, external attention is that which excludes external distraction, namely all those external acts which occupy a man in such a way that the mind is no longer able to attend to the sense of the prayer. Thus, e.g., external attention is lacking if someone during vocal prayer reads a book or paints or performs some other work requiring keen advertence; but external attention is not impeded if someone during vocal prayer takes a walk or performs some other light work not requiring much consideration. External attention can be called attention in the true sense, since by it a man attends lest prayer be disturbed by external occupations. For just as a guard who attends lest wild beasts break into a flowering garden is rightly said to have attention concerning the garden, so likewise one who prays and drives away external occupations has attention concerning prayer. Internal attention excludes internal distraction or the wandering of the mind to things entirely foreign to prayer.

Internal attention is distinguished a) by reason of its object; for it can be directed to three objects,¹⁵⁵ namely: 1) to the words of the prayer taken materially, so that those words are pronounced completely and in their order; this attention is called material or superficial; 2) to the sense of the words, and then it is called literal or also intellectual; 3) to the end of prayer, namely to worshipping God himself, or to the mystery for the worship of which the prayer was instituted, etc. This third attention (which is usually called spiritual or mystical) is more perfect than the others; the second is more perfect than the first.

Internal attention is distinguished b) by reason of state into actual, virtual, and habitual. Actual attention is present if someone actually attends to the sense of the words, to the end of prayer, etc. Virtual attention exists when actual attention was previously present and was never revoked, but now is no longer present because of involuntary distractions. Habitual attention is abusively called attention, because in fact it is not true attention but only a certain inclination to attend. A man devoted to prayers has this habitual attention even in his sleep. St. Alphonsus¹⁵⁶ and others confess that they do not understand what virtual attention is. And yet the matter can be explained in a sound sense: if someone, after an actual intention and attention possessed at the beginning of prayer, is then involuntarily distracted, the attention previously possessed is not revoked; therefore it perseveres virtually in the moral sense. Certainly, in the physical sense, every distraction, even an involuntary one, destroys attention, just as cold destroys heat; but since involuntary distractions are not human acts and consequently are not even moral, no influence and no change is caused by them in the previously existing and morally persevering moral act. But at the beginning of prayer there was attention. Therefore this attention perseveres in the moral sense, notwithstanding involuntary distractions. But if voluntary distractions should supervene, then certainly the attention to prayer previously possessed is destroyed even in the moral sense, because voluntary attention and voluntary distraction are directly opposed and contrary.

The older authors of the Middle Ages are not accustomed to speak of the distinction between external and internal attention in prayer taken generally. And in fact this distinction is rather superfluous for prayer itself in the genus of morals. For, at least in the genus of morals, there is no difference whether one praying voluntarily distracts his mind by reading, writing, etc., or by deliberately thinking of something else. For in either case the one praying expressly wills to distract his mind from the object of prayer, although he perseveres in uttering the words of the prayer. The means employed for obtaining this end are of themselves indifferent. But since the canonical Hours are prescribed by the Church, which in the external forum cannot judge purely internal acts, the distinction between external and internal attention is of some moment in the recitation of the Divine Office. For the Church can judge and punish a violation of external attention, but not a defect of internal attention.

Concerning attention, two things are certain among all; but one thing is disputed.

It is certain, 1. that at least some attention, whether external or internal, is required for the essence of prayer. And indeed that which is done without any attention is not even a human act. But how can such an act performed without any attention still be called prayer, which proceeds from reason as from its subject, as was proved above in n. 335?

It is certain, 2. that some internal attention also is required for mental prayer, since mental prayer is essentially an act of the mind. Hence he who voluntarily thinks about other matters during meditation no longer meditates.

It is disputed what kind of attention is required for vocal prayer.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., a. 13; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 4, n. 177.

¹⁵⁶ Gran mezzo della preghiera Part I, c. 3, § 3.

355. Controversy concerning the necessity of internal attention.

Since this question concerning the attention required for prayer is so practical for the recitation of the Divine Office, theologians dispute sharply whether external attention suffices or whether at least some internal attention also is required in order that a cleric reciting the Divine Office satisfy his obligation. Cajetan,¹⁵⁷ Dominic Soto,¹⁵⁸ Wigandt,¹⁵⁹ and especially Concina,¹⁶⁰ who, according to the testimony of St. Alphonsus, maintains this opinion at length and with great learning, teach that external attention alone does not suffice; likewise Reiffenstuel,¹⁶¹ Valentia,¹⁶² Suarez,¹⁶³ Peter Ledesma,¹⁶⁴ Bartholomew de Medina,¹⁶⁵ Billuart,¹⁶⁶ who calls it certain, and St. Alphonsus,¹⁶⁷ who calls it more common and more probable. On the contrary, Durandus¹⁶⁸ seems first to have taught that external attention alone suffices for the essence of prayer and for the recitation of the Divine Office; he was followed by Lugo,¹⁶⁹ Silvester Prierias,¹⁷⁰ Tamburini,¹⁷¹ Gobat,¹⁷² Elbel,¹⁷³ Noldin,¹⁷⁴ and many modern authors. The older authors dispute this matter at great length. Especially St. Alphonsus, Lugo, Billuart, and Concina are to be consulted. Some think, not without reason, that in practice there is not so great a difference between these two opinions when rightly understood. For all require for vocal prayer (and notably for the Divine Office) material attention for pronouncing the words properly. But this material attention is already a certain internal attention. Therefore all require a certain internal attention for vocal prayer. The following things seem to be true concerning the necessity of attention both in private prayer and in the recitation of the Divine Office:

1. Without external attention, neither prayer nor a sufficient recitation of the Divine Office can subsist. Thus all teach, as was already said. Wherefore he who, during prayer or the Divine Office, performs other works requiring grave consideration no longer satisfies the obligation of reciting the Divine Office. But what works are of this kind depends not only upon the nature of the work but also upon the disposition of the one praying. For one person more easily than another loses the attention necessary for prayer.

Authors commonly teach, however, that those who during the choral Office perform works necessary for the choir, such as playing the organ, lighting candles, finding antiphons, etc., satisfy the Divine Office if, in the best manner they can, they attend and recite alternate verses of the psalms. The reason is that they labor more than the others for the choral Office, and it would be excessively harsh if, nevertheless, after completing the choral Office, they were bound to repeat the Divine Office privately. Hence for them the common maxim, "The choir supplies," holds if they cannot attend so well to the words of the Office, or even if they are compelled to omit some verses of the psalms.

2. All voluntary distractions during prayer are more or less sinful. For they violate the reverence due to God. Thus likewise all teach, if perhaps you except Caramuel,¹⁷⁵ who thinks that voluntary distractions in prayer are not even a venial sin, provided external attention is preserved.

3. In order that someone be said not to have satisfied his obligation of reciting the Divine Office because of a defect of internal attention, it is required not only that he have had voluntary distractions, but also that he noticed that he was voluntarily distracted and did nothing to eliminate the distractions. Almost all (even the authors of the first opinion) teach thus. "Therefore, so long as," Cajetan concludes, "it is not clearly established for them that they changed their purpose, or that, while noticing and knowing it, they wandered about other matters, they can believe that they satisfied their obligation."¹⁷⁶

4. No certain argument can be adduced for either the affirmative or the negative opinion from definitions or decrees of the Church. Even Concina himself, who vigorously defends the affirmative opinion, concedes that the decretal Dolentes of Innocent III,¹⁷⁷ which is often cited for the affirmative opinion, proves nothing, since it intended nothing other than to restrain the external excesses of certain clerics.

¹⁵⁷ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 83, a. 13. But Cajetan's mind is not so clearly established.

¹⁵⁸ De iure et iust. l. 10, q. 5, concl. 6.

¹⁵⁹ Tribunal confessar. tr. 10, exam. 5, nn. 82 and 83.

¹⁶⁰ In Decal. l. 2, diss. 2, c. 9.

¹⁶¹ Theol. mor. tr. 6, dist. 1, n. 43.

¹⁶² Comm. in 2, 2, disp. 6, q. 2, punct. 10.

¹⁶³ De relig. l. 4, c. 26, n. 3.

¹⁶⁴ Summa Part II, tr. 9, c. 4, concl. 20.

¹⁶⁵ Summa l. 1, c. 4, § 14.

¹⁶⁶ De relig. diss. 2, a. 8, § 8.

¹⁶⁷ Theol. mor. l. 4, n. 177.

¹⁶⁸ In IV, dist. 15, q. 12.

¹⁶⁹ De euchar. disp. 22, n. 25ff.

¹⁷⁰ Summa Summ., s.v. "Hora."

¹⁷¹ Decal. l. 4, c. 2, § 1, n. 19. This author, l.c., c. 6, n. 5, says: "Therefore, he who, while hearing Mass from a precept or performing the Divine Office, would voluntarily revolve a philosophical question in his mind, or think about his affairs, provided he had external attention, ... according to the said probable opinion would sufficiently fulfill the precept."

¹⁷² Tract. theol. iur. tr. 5, n. 821. The author, however, does not seem always to be consistent with himself.

¹⁷³ Theol. mor. Part V, conf. 123, n. 404.

¹⁷⁴ De praeceptis n. 139.

¹⁷⁵ In Theol. fund. n. 442 the author writes: "I am a man more frail than you yourself, endowed with an acute and fiery disposition. In one moment I turn toward the heavens, in another I pass to things below. No fly is moved in the oratory which is not an impediment to me; ... I do not avoid distractions, involuntary ones a thousand times, sometimes even voluntary ones; and nevertheless I am troubled by no scruple, ... because I prudently suppose that I am not bound to internal action; that to possess it is good, and to lack it is not even a light fault." But that voluntary distractions are not even a light fault is certainly a heap of laxity.

¹⁷⁶ In St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 4, n. 177.

¹⁷⁷ c. 9, X 3, 41. Concina's explanation of this decretal is worthy of being read.

356. 5. Since the opinion denying the necessity of internal attention is certainly extrinsically probable on account of the great number of authors who maintain it, no one can be accused of not having satisfied the ecclesiastical obligation of reciting the Divine Office, or of being bound to restore benefice revenues,¹⁷⁸ provided that a) he observed external attention and b) he had the intention of satisfying. For it is not certain that the Church wished to impose in the recitation of the Hours anything other than external attention. For the recitation of the Divine Office with the exclusion of external distraction and with the inclusion of the intention of satisfying the ecclesiastical precept seems to be not only an act of religion but also prayer in some measure. For those who are bound to the Divine Office do not pray in their own name, but in the name of the Church. Therefore, if they truly pronounce the words of the Office with the due intention and at least external attention, the Church seems to supply the internal attention otherwise necessary for true prayer. Therefore such a recitation of the Divine Office with external attention alone and with voluntary internal distraction has a twofold morality: the one good, because the one reciting wills to obey the precept of the Church; the other evil, because he wills to be voluntarily distracted during prayer.

¹⁷⁸ Cf. St. Alphonsus, l.c., l. 3, n. 669.

357. 6. It seems to me that the essence of private prayer cannot subsist with external attention alone and with voluntary internal distraction.¹⁷⁹ For prayer is an act of practical reason, as was said above from St. Thomas. Moreover, it seems to be an absurd contradiction that the same practical reason should at once elicit an act concerning God (prayer) and an entirely different act, for example concerning the devil (e.g., a voluntary thought about obscene things). Moreover, every prayer is an ascent of the mind to God, actual or at least virtual. Therefore, if through voluntary distraction the mind is knowingly called away from God, how can prayer then still persist? Can the human mind be at once elevated to God and at once knowingly not elevated?

¹⁷⁹ The Angelic Doctor teaches (IV, dist. 15, q. 4, a. 2, quaestiunc. 4): "Attention in prayer must always remain virtually.... But it remains virtually when someone approaches prayer with the intention of impetrating something or of rendering due worship to God, even if in the continuation of the prayer the mind is carried away to other things; unless the wandering becomes so great that the force of the first intention entirely perishes, and therefore it is necessary that a man frequently recall his heart to himself." The Angelic Doctor has similar words in S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 13, ad 3: "If someone deliberately wanders in mind during prayer, this is a sin and impedes the fruit of prayer." Therefore, if the recalling of the heart is necessary, voluntary distraction also destroys virtual attention and consequently prayer itself. Concerning the mind of St. Antoninus see St. Alphonsus, l.c., l. 4, n. 177, and Concina, In Decal. l. 2, diss. 2, c. 9.

358. Objections. The reasons which are usually brought forward for the opposite opinion are not convincing. They say: 1. Prayer is a petition to God for fitting things. But it is not repugnant that our petitions can be represented before God even with an actual wandering of the mind. Just as, if someone were to recite before a king a speech composed for obtaining some favor, he would certainly pray by reciting it before the king, even if his mind were then distracted to other things; so also one reciting a prayer, notwithstanding internal and voluntary distraction, can still pray to God. This argument is repeated by all modern authors after Lugo, but in truth it seems to be very weak. For a king hearing the speech of such a voluntarily distracted man perceives nothing except the external words, which certainly bear the appearance of a petition, and consequently perhaps they are heard by the king; on the contrary, God, hearing the words of someone praying while voluntarily distracted, is not deceived by external words, but beholds his vain heart, and therefore not only will he not hear such a voluntarily distracted prayer, but rather will punish it. Therefore the comparison between a king and God limps and proves nothing. Nevertheless, something can be conceded to this argument. If one praying reads before the king not his own petition but that of another while voluntarily distracted, the king, knowing this voluntary distraction, is indeed offended by the irreverence of the one praying, but nevertheless perhaps will hear the petition on account of the other in whose name it was presented. Thus likewise a cleric reciting the Divine Office with voluntary distraction indeed sins and will be punished on account of the irreverence committed; but since he prays not in his own name but in the name of the Church, God can accept and even hear this prayer thus distracted. Hence such a cleric satisfies his obligation of reciting the Divine Office, provided, however, that he has the intention of satisfying, as was said above.

They say: 2. Internal attention cannot belong to the essence of vocal prayer, because otherwise a priest voluntarily distracted in the administration of Extreme Unction, whose essential form is deprecatory or a true prayer, would administer this sacrament invalidly; which authors nevertheless very commonly do not admit. The response to this argument is that the sacrament of Extreme Unction is not invalidated through the voluntary distractions of the priest administering it; but this proceeds from the fact that the priest prays not in his own name but in the name of the Church, and that the form of the sacraments externally pronounced seriously with the intention of doing what the Church does always produces its effect ex opere operato. Or, more briefly: the form of the sacrament of Extreme Unction pronounced by a voluntarily distracted priest is a true physical prayer and consequently produces the effect of the sacrament, but it is not a moral prayer (of the minister himself) or an act of the virtue of religion. He who desires more concerning this controversy should consult Concina, l.c.

359. The doctrine of St. Thomas concerning the necessity of attention.

Concerning the influence of attention upon the efficacy of prayer, the Angelic Doctor notes the following:¹⁸⁰ "Concerning [vocal prayer] it must be known that something is called necessary in two ways: in one way, as that through which the end is better attained; and thus attention is absolutely necessary for prayer. In another way something is called necessary without which a thing cannot attain its effect. Now there is a threefold effect of prayer: the first is common to all acts informed by charity, which is to merit; and for this effect it is not required of necessity that attention be present to prayer throughout, but the force of the first intention with which someone approaches prayer renders the whole prayer meritorious, just as happens in other meritorious acts. The second effect of prayer is proper to it, which is to impetrate; and for this effect also the first intention, which God principally regards, suffices. But if the first intention is lacking, prayer is neither meritorious nor impetratory; for God does not hear that prayer to which he who prays does not attend. The third effect of prayer is that which it effects presently, namely a certain spiritual refreshment of the mind; and for this, attention in prayer is required of necessity." For it is established by experience that refreshment or affective devotion in prayer is not granted except to those who pray with actual attention.

¹⁸⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 13.

501. Notion. Superstition⁷³⁸ is "a vice rendering divine worship either to one to whom it ought not, or in a manner in which it ought not." Thus St. Thomas.⁷³⁹ This definition indeed becomes clearer if one attends to the diverse species of superstition.

There are two species of superstition, which, however, again admit several subdivisions.

1. The first species of superstition is the undue worship of the true Divinity, or God. In this superstition, therefore, the true God is indeed worshiped, but with a worship and in a manner unsuitable and contrary to the custom and law of the Church. This species of superstition is carried out in two ways, namely, a) through false or pernicious worship; b) through superfluous worship.

a) False worship of the true God can be carried out in diverse ways, for example, if someone wishes to worship God with Jewish ceremonies which signify Christ as still to come, such as by eating the paschal lamb, circumcision, etc.; if someone who is not a priest presumes to celebrate Mass or absolve from sins; if someone proposes false miracles or false revelations to confirm the faith; if someone exhibits false relics for the veneration of the faithful. This superstition of false worship is from its genus a grave sin, because it inflicts a grave injury and irreverence upon God, the First Truth; but it admits slightness of matter. Thus, for example, a preacher who knowingly narrates certain exaggerations in a miraculous story, or even one who invents an entire story in order to move the people more strongly toward a good work, sins only venially, both because this does not greatly prejudice true religion, at least if the falsity is not discovered, and because the falsity itself is not employed immediately for worshiping God.⁷⁴⁰ Nevertheless, such narratives (which are sometimes called pious lies) are to be avoided altogether, since it is utterly unbecoming that a preacher of truth should lie even in a small matter.

b) Superfluous worship of the true God is that which is not suited to the end of religion. Now the end of religion is that man give glory to God, to whom he subjects himself in mind and body. Hence, "if there is something which, so far as it is in itself, does not pertain to the glory of God, nor to this, that the mind of man be borne toward God, or that the concupiscence of the flesh be moderately restrained; or even if it is outside the institution of God and the Church, or contrary to common custom, ... all this is to be accounted superfluous and superstitious, because, consisting only in externals, it does not pertain to the interior worship of God."⁷⁴¹ Such superfluous worship is, for example, to wish to pray with a fixed number, arrangement, or color of candles; to wish to hear the Mass of a certain priest who is named Peter; and six hundred other modes of vain worship.⁷⁴² The superstition of superfluous worship is from its genus a venial sin, because the matter is light and the action is not evil in itself. The good faith and simplicity of the agent sometimes excuse altogether from every sin; on the contrary, because of scandal, contempt of the Church, or the agent's evil intention, this superstition can become a mortal sin. Those modes of worshiping God which are approved by the Church, however, such as novena devotions, tridua, Gregorian Masses, etc., are free from every stain of superstition.

2. The second species of superstition is the worship of a false divinity, or divine worship rendered to some creature and especially to the devil. It is subdivided into three species, namely, idolatry, divination, and vain observance, to which magic and malefice are reduced. Each of these must now be treated individually.

⁷³⁸ Aberglaube, δεισιδαιμονία. Authors do not agree concerning the etymology of the word superstition. Some derive this name from superstare, because superstition stands above or outside true worship; others think that this name is taken from the word superstes, because superstition is a surviving part of paganism. Cf. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion § 87.

⁷³⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 92, a. 1.

⁷⁴⁰ Thus Noldin, De praeceptis n. 149.

⁷⁴¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 93, a. 2.

⁷⁴² Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 22, De observandis et evitandis in celebratione Missae; cf. also the constitution Officiorum ac munerum of Leo XIII, n. 13.

502. Notion. Idolatry is latria, or the adoration of an idol. An idol, as it is taken here, is the image of a false divinity. Thus, for example, we speak of an idol of Jupiter, Mercury, the Sun, or the Moon, and of the diverse modes of fetishism, etc. As is evident of itself, divine worship is not attributed to the image itself, but to the person or thing represented through the image. Hence idolatry is nothing other than the adoration of some creature, whether animate or inanimate.⁷⁴³

Idolatry is sometimes taken in a metaphorical sense for every mortal sin, because in every mortal sin man renders as it were divine worship to a creature, since he prefers it to God, the Best and Greatest. In this sense St. Paul says: "For many walk, of whom I have told you often (and now tell you weeping), that they are enemies of the cross of Christ; ... whose God is their belly."⁷⁴⁴ This metaphorical idolatry is not under discussion here.

⁷⁴³ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 94, a. 1.

⁷⁴⁴ Phil. 3:18ff.

503. Divisions. 1. Idolatry is either material (simulated, external) or formal (internal).

The former is done only externally, from fear, command, or other motives, without a man inwardly willing to adore the creature; for example, when a Christian, from horror of torture and death, burns incense before a pagan idol, but inwardly despises the idol. The latter is done with the true internal intention of adoring a creature, for example, if someone with full deliberation adores the devil.

2. Formal idolatry is divided into perfect and imperfect.

The former is the adoration of a creature rendered by one who truly thinks that this creature is God. Such idolatry is always joined with infidelity, and even today exists among many pagans. Perfect and formal idolatry is also committed by those who, from hatred of God or from obstinate infidelity, worship the demon through so-called "black or diabolical Masses" or through other wholly wicked modes. Likewise, all who deny the existence of a personal God and nevertheless perform diverse acts of worshiping a fictitious divinity. The latter idolatry, namely, imperfect idolatry, is committed by one who, clearly knowing that no divinity is present in the idol, nevertheless renders divine worship to it from a depraved affection (for example, from hatred of God or from a desire to obtain something from the demon). This imperfect idolatry in one sense is a graver sin than perfect idolatry, since the latter is joined with ignorance that is more or less invincible, whereas imperfect idolatry proceeds from the mere malice of the will.

504. Moral malice. Every idolatry, whether material or formal, whether perfect or imperfect, is a most grave sin.

For a) it is most strictly prohibited in the first precept of the Decalogue: "Thou shalt not have strange gods before me, ... thou shalt not adore them [idols], nor serve them." Therefore it was always punished most gravely both by God among the Jewish people⁷⁴⁵ and by the Church, which was accustomed to impose the severest penance upon those who had fallen into idolatry.⁷⁴⁶ b) Idolatry is open rebellion against God. Concerning the gravity of this sin St. Thomas writes:⁷⁴⁷ "The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways: in one way, on the part of the sin itself; and thus the sin of idolatry is most grave. For just as in an earthly commonwealth it seems to be most grave that someone should render royal honor to another than the true king, because, so far as lies in him, he disturbs the whole order of the commonwealth; so in sins which are committed against God, and which are indeed the greatest, it seems most grave that someone should render divine honor to a creature, because, so far as lies in him, he makes another God in the world, diminishing the divine sovereignty. In another way the gravity of a sin can be considered on the part of the sinner himself; as the sin of one who sins knowingly is said to be graver than that of one who sins through ignorance. And according to this, nothing prevents heretics, who knowingly corrupt the faith which they received, from sinning more gravely than idolaters who sin through ignorance. And similarly certain other sins can also be greater because of the greater contempt of the sinner."

Material and simulated idolatry also has always been held to be a grave sin; for a) it injures the virtue of religion by externally rendering to a creature an honor which must be judged divine by other men; b) it is the fullest lie in the worship of religion and is often joined with grave scandal of the people; c) it is contrary to the grave precept of professing the faith. Hence it is never lawful externally and by simulation to adore an idol, even in order to avoid death.⁷⁴⁸

Also reduced to material idolatry, and therefore gravely unlawful, is knowingly exposing for veneration or giving for Communion an unconsecrated host. Hence that pastor acted wrongly who had forgotten to consecrate the larger host and, in order to avoid the astonishment of the people, exposed an unconsecrated larger host in the monstrance, to which, however, he secretly joined a small consecrated host.⁷⁴⁹ Likewise another pastor acted wrongly who, while distributing Holy Communion, gave an unconsecrated host to a bridegroom who was not fasting, lest the bride and the others standing nearby suspect something unfavorable on the part of the bridegroom.

⁷⁴⁵ Cf. Ex. 32:8-35.

⁷⁴⁶ Thus, for example, the First Council of Nicaea, can. 12, imposed seven years of the severest penance upon those who had fallen into idolatry (Mansi, Ampliss. coll. Conc. II, 703).

⁷⁴⁷ S. theol., l.c., a. 3.

⁷⁴⁸ Hence also the so-called Libellatici were gravely punished in the ancient Church.

⁷⁴⁹ Cf. Casus conscientiae of Prosper Lambertini, afterward Benedict XIV, I, 380 (Liège ed., 1853).

505. Scholion. On penalties against idolaters. Under present ecclesiastical law there is no latae sententiae penalty against idolatry. Since, however, it is almost always joined with heresy, at least in those who have been validly baptized, the penalties enacted against heretics are to be applied. Moreover, the sins and penalties of Freemasons and of other similar societies are often joined with the vice of idolatry.

I am the Lord thy God ... thou shalt not have strange gods. - Exod. xx, 2.

This precept, as affirmative, prescribes in the first place acts of religion, by which due worship is given to God; as negative, it prohibits vices opposed to religion.

Prayer taken more broadly is the elevation of the mind to God, or any pious affection of the soul toward God and supernatural things. But in the stricter sense it is the petition of fitting things from God. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 83, art. 1.

I Say 1st. Prayer is certainly necessary for all adults by necessity of precept, as is proved from many places of Scripture, for example, Matt. xiv, 38: "Watch and pray": and Luke xviii, 1: "It is necessary always to pray and not to fail." Moreover, according to many, prayer is also necessary by necessity of means, because it is the ordinary means established by God for obtaining necessary graces. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 1.

I Say 2nd. The precept of praying obliges frequently, as is clear from the cited texts, yet not without interruption, which is impossible to human weakness. Therefore the words, it is necessary always to pray, by the common interpretation of the Doctors, signify that one must pray frequently at an opportune time, and never cease from weariness, torpor, or dejection of soul; or also that our actions generally are to be directed toward God.

Question 1. When does the precept of prayer press?

Response. It is certain that it often presses by accident, namely whenever some end is to be obtained, for the attainment of which prayer is required as a means. It is also certain that the precept of prayer presses of itself several times in life, or, as was said, frequently; but what the force of these particles may be, nothing is more uncertain among the Doctors. Yet in practice the opinion can be held which teaches that those who pray to God at least once a year are not to be condemned of grave sin, both because it is not disapproved by St. Alphonsus, and because it is more conformable to those things which we said concerning acts of faith, hope, and charity. For the rest, the confessor ought to be more solicitous in inculcating the necessity of frequent prayer than in determining the grave fault of omitted prayer. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 228.

Question 2. Does he sin, at least venially, who omits morning or evening prayers?

Response. Negatively, of itself, because there is given no law which prescribes determinate prayers for single days and at certain hours. - I said of itself, because in practice some fault of negligence or sloth is rarely absent.

Superstition, according to St. Thomas, is a vice opposed to religion according to excess, not because it exhibits more for divine worship than true religion, but because it exhibits divine worship either to one to whom it is not owed, or in a manner in which it is not owed. Wherefore a twofold superstition must be distinguished: one by reason of mode, and the other by reason of object. Again by reason of mode it is distinguished according as the worship which is furnished to the true God is either false, as it would be to observe ceremonies of the old law which signified Christ to come, or superfluous, as it would be, for example, to hear Mass before sunrise with a certain number, position, or order of candles, or of a priest who has the age of Christ dying. Yet the Doctors attend more to superstition by reason of object, which can be committed in many ways, as will be clear from the following. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 92, art. 1. - St. Alphonsus, n. 3.

Idolatry is an action by which worship due to God alone is given to a creature; but this is done not only by sacrifice, but also by any sign of honor by which someone intends to submit himself to a creature as to God, for example, by genuflection. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 12.

A twofold idolatry is distinguished: one is material and the other formal. The first is inculpable, and has place when from ignorance of every kind divine honor is rendered to some creature, for example, if a priest from invincible error should exhibit for adoration a host not consecrated. The other is 1st, perfect, when someone, reckoning in his mind that an idol is the true God, adores it; 2nd, imperfect, when someone, knowing certainly that the idol does not deserve worship, nevertheless renders this to it from hatred toward God or from some other evil end; 3rd, simulated, when from fear of some harm someone exhibits only external worship. Although each of these three is a most grave sin, nevertheless the worst of all is imperfect idolatry, which is so called not by reason of malice, which certainly is greatest, so that by some it is called simply malicious, but because it honors the idol only by will, not by intellect. - Cf. Scavini, lib. 2, tract. 5, n. 138. - Baller., note (a), p. 231.

Vain observance is superstition which employs means neither proportioned nor instituted by God for obtaining a certain effect. But it is of three kinds, namely: 1st, notory art, or the art of acquiring knowledge without labor; 2nd, the art of healings, or the art of healing by various signs or sacred things; 3rd, the observance of events, by which from consideration of some fortuitous event someone conjectures what is going to be favorable or unfavorable, and thence moderates his actions. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 14.

I Say 1st. Vain observance is a grave sin, because it attributes divine honor to a creature, while it expects from it what is to be expected from God alone, and because it rests on an implicit pact with the demon. Yet it can often be venial from imperfection of the act, from simplicity, from some ignorance, or from timidity, as happens especially among the rude in the observance of events. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

I Say 2nd. Vain observance is discerned especially: 1st, from the insufficiency of the cause for producing the effect naturally; 2nd, from the addition of a vain or false circumstance as if necessarily required; 3rd, from the infallibility which is attributed to means in no way infallible.

I Say 3rd. In doubt whether effects proceed from a natural cause or from the demon, they can be attributed to the powers of nature; and therefore it is licit to procure them, because it is not established that the thing is evil; yet advisedly a protestation against the intervention of the demon is premised. But in doubt whether effects are produced by the demon or by God, if it is certainly established that they cannot proceed from a natural cause, they are to be attributed to the demon, unless the holiness of the one operating or other clear indications persuade the contrary, because it is rash to think that miracles are always being done. Hence it is not licit then to test whether the effect is going to follow or not. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20. - St. Thom. 2-2, q. 96, art. 1, and others commonly. - Hence:

1st. Those are guilty of superstition who wear amulets marked with certain characters; who invoke certain unknown names, or employ a certain number of crosses or prayers for healing wounds, for making themselves invulnerable, etc.

2nd. Likewise those who carry certain prayers to St. Bridget or other prayers, expecting an altogether infallible effect from them. - Yet those are not to be blamed, indeed are very much to be praised, who carry pious medals, sacred images, or relics of Saints, hoping that they will specially obtain divine help for themselves.

3rd. Likewise those are guilty of superstition who hold some days as favorable, but others as unfavorable, so that they direct their actions from this, or who for expelling diseases require herbs collected on such a feast, etc.

4th. But it is not superstitious to observe the moon or times more suitable for gathering herbs, cutting trees, etc., nor to carry sacred things or words of Sacred Scripture for the honor of God or the Saints, and for imploring their help. Likewise neither to recite a certain number of prayers, nor to do all those things which can increase devotion, provided an infallible force is not attributed to them. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 16 and 17.

5th. Provided every vain observance and the danger of falling into it is removed, it is licit to swallow small paper images of the Blessed Virgin Mary dissolved in water or rolled up after the manner of a pill for obtaining health. Holy Office, Aug. 3, 1903.

Divination is inquiry into hidden things by the help of the demon. Hence it agrees with vain observance, insofar as each rests on an express or at least implicit pact with the demon; but it differs insofar as divination is ordered only to knowledge of hidden things, and vain observance, taken generally, extends itself to any effect, even external. Moreover it differs from notory art, because this directly seeks an infusion of knowledge without labor; but divination employs certain means, although disproportionate. Finally it differs from the observance of events, because this uses observations without reason and art, and for arranging one's own acts; but that uses them artfully, and for speculative knowledge of hidden things. - Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 231.

Various kinds of divination are distinguished; of this kind especially are: 1st, judicial astrology from the stars; 2nd, augury from the chattering of birds; 3rd, auspice from their flight; 4th, haruspicy from the entrails of animals; 5th, chiromancy from the lines of the hand; 6th, geomancy from signs in the earth; 7th, omen from a fortuitous event; 8th, necromancy from invocation of the dead; 9th, oneiromancy from dreams; 10th, sortilege from lots; 11th, oracle from idols; 12th, vaticination from seers or cards. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 5 and 6.

I Say 1st. Express divination, namely that which is made through express invocation of the demon, can never be excused from mortal sin. This is clear both from many places of Sacred Scripture, for example, Deut. xviii, 10, Lev. xx, 6, etc.; and because expressly to invoke the demon and to bargain with him is the same as to acknowledge his dominion and authority, which is intrinsically evil.

I Say 2nd. Tacit divination, by which namely the demon is invoked by employing means in no way proportioned to attaining the effect, even if someone openly protests that he intends no commerce with the demon, is also of itself a grave sin; yet sometimes it can be excused from mortal sin because of simplicity or ignorance or defect of certain faith. The reason of the first is that recourse to the demon, in whatever way it is made, contains in itself a grave offense of God. But the reason of the second is taken from the imperfection of the act. I said even if someone, etc., because he acts against his protestation, and action is more efficacious than words. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 7 and 8. - Voit, n. 416.

Every knowledge useful and necessary to us which you cannot obtain by natural power is to be sought by you from God. It is also superstitious to ask from the demon what by natural power you can know or do; thus you leave God and ask help from his and your enemy, who always uniquely desires to obtain from man the worship due to God alone. The faithful are to be kept away altogether from every divination, even from games which are instituted for the sake of jest without any credence applied. For these are always dangerous, and the devil always holds himself ready to obtain by these means the evil which he hopes for. But especially care must be taken lest boys and girls become accustomed to these things, even if they are led only by reason of curiosity or levity. ... Bal. Palmieri, Opus Morale, vol. 2, pp. 226 and following.

Question 1. Are those to be condemned of divination who from the song and flight of birds, or the appearance of stars, conjecture a future storm?

Response. Negatively, and the reason is that often there is present, or can be present, a natural nexus between signs of this kind and the predicted effect proceeding from a necessary cause. Likewise they are not to be condemned, for the same reason, who conjecture a character or state of soul from the color of the face or other external signs, although in practice one must for the most part abstain from conjectures of this kind on account of the danger of rash judgment.

Question 2. Do those sin gravely who inquire from diviners (fortune tellers) concerning their fortune or future life?

Response. Negatively, generally speaking, because firmness of belief is lacking; for just as seers are ordinarily moved by the promise of money, so those who inquire for the most part act from simplicity, jest, or curiosity. Wherefore penitents are to be questioned concerning the credence which they furnished, unless it is known from elsewhere. But if they indeed acted jokingly, yet the diviners conducted themselves seriously, they can with difficulty be excused from gravely culpable cooperation. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 10. - Reuter, n. 43. - Kenrick, tract. 12, n. 43.

Question 3. Is the use of lots sometimes licit?

Response. Divisory lots, by which it is discerned what is to be attributed to each person in settling lawsuits, or in distributing things, are certainly licit, since indeed they are wholly free from every superstition. But consultory lots, by which the divine will is investigated so that it may be known what is to be done, are not licit unless they are done by a special impulse of God, or it is a question of a grave matter in which other counsel is lacking. The reason is that from ordinary providence God does not will that inquiry be made in this way concerning his will, but that recourse be made to prudent men or ecclesiastical superiors. Finally divinatory lots, by which the manifestation of a hidden thing is sought, for example, from the casting of dice, etc., are always gravely illicit, as containing at least tacit invocation of the demon. Superstition of this kind is properly called sortilege, although by this name other kinds of superstitions also commonly come. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 11.

Question 4. Is it licit to conjecture future things from dreams?

Response. Negatively, ordinarily speaking, because dreams almost always proceed from natural causes, for example, from disturbance of the humors, etc. From another source, dreams sent by God are conjoined with signs by which they can certainly be discerned from natural or diabolical dreams. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 9.

Question 5. Is the use of a divining rod licit?

Response. It is certainly to be condemned whenever the rod is moved or is not moved at the mere intention of him who presses it with his hand; and when it is employed for detecting those things with which the movement of the rod has no connection. But the use of the rod does not seem to be condemned for detecting waters or metals, if the rod is moved over these equally in every case, whether they are sought or are not sought, provided that by protestation against diabolical operation which perhaps could be present, every superstitious intention is excluded. - Thus the more recent writers more commonly, although St. Alphonsus reproves the use of the divining rod in every case.

Question 6. What is to be said concerning rotating tables, concerning the use of magnetism, concerning spiritism, and concerning hypnotism?

Response 1st. A twofold effect of rotating tables is usually assigned, namely their simple movement, and the returning of responses either by striking the floor, or by writing with the help of an attached pen. This last is certainly illicit on account of at least the implicit invocation of the demon; for so great an effect cannot be attributed either to a natural cause, because it would not be proportioned, or to God, because the indecency and levity of the act would be reflected back upon him. - But whether simple movement is illicit for this same reason is controverted; yet certainly it is not to be permitted by reason of scandal, danger, etc., which can easily be present.

Response 2nd. Especially a threefold effect or degree of magnetism is exhibited. The first effect is a state of sleep, by which the senses are wholly lulled, so that often not even the greatest crash stirred up by art at the very ears of the sleeper, or any force of glowing iron, is able to wake him. The second is the state of somnambulism, by which someone, wholly deprived of the use of the senses, nevertheless sees, hears, speaks, and responds to all things which are asked of him. Finally the third effect is clear intuition, or wondrous knowledge of himself and of remedies for driving away diseases; and also the vision of actions of other men, even far distant. Now to use magnetism for obtaining the second or third effect is certainly illicit, both because the demon evidently has his part there, and because it was thus declared by the Sacred Penitentiary, July 1, 1841. - But the use of magnetism for causing the first effect, namely sleep, does not seem to be illicit by virtue of the same reasons; because that sleep could at length proceed from a merely natural cause; nor do the words of the declaration of the Sacred Penitentiary of themselves extend to it. Yet certainly it is illicit from another head, namely on account of the violent privation of the use of reason, danger of injuring chastity, scandal, and other circumstances. - Cf. Baller., several notes, pp. 238 and following. - Conc. Plen. Balt. II, nn. 33 and following.

Response 3rd. Spiritism, or evocation of the dead, is truly diabolical and divination properly so called, condemned by Sacred Scripture itself. "Let there not be found in thee one who ... seeks truth from the dead. For all these things the Lord abominates." Deut. xviii, 12, 13.

"For it is established by faith," says Palmieri, Opus Morale, 2, p. 250, "that God does not will the souls of the dead to be evoked by men, nor does he will that by some art or by the nod or will of men commerce be instituted by these with those; and he does not will these things in such a way that such evocation is not only illicit, but altogether ineffective. This is the certain doctrine of the Church. Therefore when such evocations are made, neither the souls called respond, nor a good angel, who cannot contradict the decree of God, and nevertheless some spirit responds. It remains therefore that this is he who is the prince of this world, who is the tempter, who is permitted to deceive those acting against God, that is, Satan or some angel of his. Therefore spiritism is commerce with the devil, to whom men hand themselves over to be taught and ruled."

Hence modern spiritism differs very little indeed from the primitive. We know that very many assemblies exist which follow this superstition. To give one's name to these assemblies is prohibited by natural and divine law. "To publish, read, or retain books in which sortileges, divination, magic, evocation of spirits, and other superstitions of this kind are taught or recommended" is unlawful. - Const. Officiorum ac Munerum, sec. 12. - The Americana, vol. 14, Spiritualism. - Conc. Plen. Balt. II, nn. 36 and following. Cf. Can. 1399, 7th.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Titius, excluding every pact with the malign spirit, is accustomed to evoke the souls of the dead. He is accustomed to act thus. Alone and doing nothing else, he directs a prayer to the prince of the heavenly host, that contact with the spirit of a determined person may be permitted to him. A few moments pass, and he notices that the hand which he holds prepared for writing begins to move, and thus he becomes conscious of the presence of the spirit. All things which he wishes to know are manifested, and the hand writes responses to the things asked. These responses agree with the faith and doctrine of the Church concerning the future life. For the most part the responses concern the state of the soul of the dead person, the necessity under which it labors for suffrages, and its sorrow arising from the ingratitude of relatives.

To this case the Holy Office on March 30, 1898 responded: "As it is set forth, it is not licit." Leo XIII approved the response.

The Holy Office, to the proposed doubt: "Whether it is licit through a Medium, as they call it, or without a Medium, with hypnotism employed or not, to be present at any spiritistic conversations or manifestations whatsoever, even those displaying an appearance of honesty or piety, whether by questioning souls or spirits, or by hearing responses, or only by looking on, even with a tacit or express protestation that one does not wish to have any part with malign spirits?" on April 24, 1917 responded: "Negatively in all things."

2nd. He is not free of fault who, using disproportionate means for receiving some knowledge, protests that he intends no commerce with the demon.

Response 4th. Concerning hypnotism it seems that they act imprudently and against the truth who either deny all the phenomena which are related concerning it, or, when these have been admitted, seek a certain and complete explanation of them from diabolical intervention. But the faithful are diligently to be deterred from its use and practice, because the matter is full of dangers; nor, independently of a particular case in which a dishonorable end is sought, does there seem to be another malice of it. But because what is called dangerous is not always and absolutely illicit, otherwise we could never use either weapons or poison, it follows that not all and absolutely are to be condemned who would wish, with cautions employed, to test hypnotism for a good end, for example, for curing diseases not otherwise curable. But whenever it is brought into use, cautions are to be employed: that the hypnotizer be upright and experienced, that there be a trustworthy witness, that the consent of the hypnotized person be had, that a protestation be made. - Cf. Amer. Eccl. Review, vol. 3, pp. 257 and following, and vol. 12, pp. 120 and following. - Lehmkuhl, vol. 1, n. 994 note. - Genicot, vol. 1, n. 275. - Berardi, Praxis Confessar., vol. 1, n. 484.

It will be helpful to relate the following case and Response of the Sacred Roman and Universal Inquisition given on July 26, 1899:

"Most Blessed Father,

"N. N., Doctor in the medical art, prostrate at the feet of Your Holiness, in order to consult the tranquillity of his conscience, humbly asks whether he can have a part in the discussions which are now being held at the Society of Medical Sciences N. concerning hypnotic suggestions in curing sick children. It is a question not only of discussing experiments already made, but of making new ones, whether they admit a natural explanation or not. Wherefore, lest he expose himself to the danger of erring, the orator with docile soul awaits the oracle of the Holy See." This case, proposed in Italian, the Congregation of the Sacred Inquisition resolved thus on July 26, 1899:

"As regards experiments already made, that they can be permitted, provided danger of superstition and scandal is absent; and moreover that the Orator be prepared to stand by the mandates of the Holy See and not act the part of a theologian. - As regards new experiments, if it is a question of facts which certainly exceed the powers of nature, they are not licit; but if this is doubted, with a protestation premised that he wishes to have no part in preternatural facts, it is to be tolerated, provided danger of scandal is absent."

It Must Be Noted. - § 1. Let Ordinaries of places watch that the prescriptions of the sacred canons concerning divine worship are diligently observed, and especially lest any superstitious practice be introduced into divine worship, whether public or private, or into the daily life of the faithful, or anything be admitted foreign to faith or discordant from ecclesiastical tradition or displaying the appearance of base gain.

§ 2. If the Ordinary of the place has issued laws for his territory in this matter, all religious also, even exempt, are held by the obligation of observing the same; and the Ordinary can visit their churches or public oratories for this purpose (Can. 1261).

Tempting God is a saying or deed by which someone explores whether God is powerful, wise, merciful, or endowed with another perfection. - But it proceeds from a twofold vice, namely either from infidelity, when someone, doubting concerning some perfection of God, says or does something with the intention of obtaining from God a manifestation of that perfection; or from mere presumption, when someone, doubting nothing concerning the perfections of God, without necessity wishes to obtain either a manifestation of the divine will or special help of God through prodigies. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 97, art. 1.

The temptation of God is distinguished into formal or express, and virtual or interpretative. The former is had when the manifestation of divine perfections is directly intended, and this for the most part arises from infidelity, although it can also proceed from mere curiosity or presumption. But the latter is that by which a manifestation or exploration of this kind is not properly intended, but something is said or done which, with the circumstances considered, of its own nature seems to be referred to it. Thus he interpretatively tempts God who in a dangerous illness rejects all remedies, wishing to be healed by God alone.

I Say. Express temptation of God, if it proceeds from infidelity, is a mortal sin from its whole genus; but if it proceeds from curiosity or imprudent confidence, it is indeed mortal, but not from its whole genus. The reason of the first is that then there are properly two sins, one against the virtue of religion, and the other against faith, which does not admit smallness of matter. But the reason of the second is taken not only from the general doctrine that sins against religion alone are indeed mortal, but can become light by reason of matter, but also from this, that in that case properly there is not had an exploration of some divine perfection, but rather a presumptuous imploration of divine help, which certainly admits smallness of matter. But a fortiori smallness of matter must be admitted in interpretative temptation of God. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 29 and following. - Baller., note (a) and (b), p. 255. - Hence:

1st. He sins gravely against religion who demands that his innocence be proved by duel, glowing iron, etc., or who offers himself spontaneously for martyrdom, unless he is excused by good faith or divine inspiration. Yet it is licit to ask a miracle from God under condition, if it shall have pleased him, whenever a grave cause is present for our salvation or that of others, or for fulfilling the divine will; for then it is not to tempt God, but to demand the help of God at an opportune time. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 97, art. 2.

2nd. Likewise he sins gravely who without just cause exposes himself to danger of death because he expects divine help; but if he acts only rashly, without trusting certainly in divine Providence, he does not sin against religion, but only against the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

3rd. He sins only lightly who in a light illness, having rejected remedies, hopes for health from God; because there is not a grave disorder there. Indeed he is excused from every fault if he hopes to be freed naturally from such an illness, with God's help. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 30.

Sacrilege is the violation or unworthy handling of a sacred thing. A threefold kind is distinguished, namely personal, local, and real.

Here sacred is said of whatever is deputed to divine worship by public rite from divine or ecclesiastical institution, and therefore merits special reverence. Hence:

1st. Sacred persons are those who are deputed to divine worship by sacred tonsure or by religious vows.

2nd. Sacred places are those which are deputed to divine worship or the burial of the faithful by the consecration or blessing which approved liturgical books prescribe for this (Can. 1154).

3rd. Goods are called sacred which by consecration or blessing are destined for divine worship, as sacraments, consecrated vessels, relics or images of Saints; likewise those which pertain to the adornment of the Church or of ministers; finally ecclesiastical goods, even movable ones. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 99, art. 3. - Can. 1497.

Things consecrated, or blessed with a constitutive blessing, are to be treated reverently and not employed for profane or non-proper use, even if they are in the ownership of private persons (Can. 1150).

I Say. Sacrilege, which indeed differs in species according as it affects a person, place, or sacred thing, because the sanctity itself of the person, place, or sacred thing morally differs one from another, is indeed a mortal sin from its genus, but not from its whole genus. The reason of the first is that it is opposed to the most excellent virtue, namely religion; and the reason of the second is that through sacrilege no injury is inflicted on God directly and immediately, and therefore smallness of matter is admitted in it.

Question 1. How are the diverse species of sacrilege committed?

Response 1st. Personal sacrilege is committed: 1st, by inflicting violent hands upon a Cleric or Religious; 2nd, by acting lustfully with persons dedicated to God by major orders or religious profession of vows, even by touches alone; 3rd, by subjecting ecclesiastical persons to the judgment of a forum, excepting cases foreseen by common law or a particular concordat, or even determined by special law, as among us was done by the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 84. - But it will not be sacrilege to detract from a priest, because only his person is sacred, but not his reputation. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 35.

Response 2nd. Local sacrilege is committed by all sins by which a church is violated, namely homicide, injurious and grave shedding of blood, impious or sordid uses, burial of an infidel or of one excommunicated after sentence, provided the acts are certain, notorious, and posited in the church itself. From a church having been violated it does not thence follow that the cemetery has been violated. - Cf. Can. 1172. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 36.

It must be noted that there is a general decree, issued by command of Pius X on Dec. 10, 1912 by the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, by which any projections and cinematographic representations whatsoever are altogether prohibited from being done in a Church. - Acta Apos. Sedis, v. 4, p. 724.¹

Response 3rd. Real sacrilege is committed: 1st, by unworthy administration or reception of the sacraments; 2nd, by unworthy handling of sacred relics, images, etc.; 3rd, by profanation of sacred vessels, instruments, and ornaments; 4th, by theft of a thing pertaining to divine worship or to the church; 5th, by abuse of Scripture, for example, by twisting its words to vain things, etc.; 6th, by neglect of sacred vessels, corporals, etc., by those who ought religiously to care for these. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 40 and 48.

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1087, n. 3.

Question 2. Is it sacrilege to violate a person bound by a simple vow of chastity outside religion?

Response. There is controversy; for some affirm, because, they say, a man is consecrated to God by any vow whatsoever of chastity; but others probably deny, because for rendering some person sacred, private will does not suffice, but public authority of the Church is required. - For the rest, all hold that violation of that vow contains a twofold malice, one against chastity, and the other against religion, and the whole controversy is whether the sin against religion is to be called true and strictly said sacrilege, or rather a sin of irreligiosity, or of perfidy toward God, or even sacrilege, but said in a broad sense. - Cf. Suarez, de Relig., tract. 3, lib. 3, chap. 1. Laymann, lib. 4, tr. 10, chap. 7, n. 2. - Baller., note (a), p. 259.

Question 3. Are all sins of luxury committed in a church sacrileges?

Response. Merely internal sins, namely morose delectation and desires of sinning externally outside the church, are not to be held as sacrileges, because they do not seem specially to affect the sacred place; but one must speak otherwise of desires of sinning externally in the church, whether these were conceived in it or outside it. But as to external sins, it is certain that sacrilege is committed by consummated acts, namely by voluntary pollution, fornication, etc., because by those acts the church is polluted. But whether it is committed also by other grave external sins, for example, gravely shameful touches, is controverted among the Doctors, and the negative opinion seems probable. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 43; and de sexto praec. Decal., n. 459.

Question 4. Is every theft in a church sacrilege?

Response. It is established that every theft of a sacred thing is sacrilege, and also of a thing not sacred but committed to the custody of a sacred place, as is clear from canon law, cap. Quisquis, 21, § 2, causa 17, question 4, where it is read: "Likewise sacrilege is committed by removing the sacred from a sacred place, or the non-sacred from a sacred place, or the sacred from a non-sacred place." - But as regards things which by chance or by accident are found in a church, as purses, a watch, etc., there is controversy; but the negative opinion is certainly probable. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 39.

Question 5. Can sacred vessels and vestments be converted into profane use?

Response. Affirmatively, if the thing is totally changed in such a way that it is reduced to common use, for example, if a chalice by fire or iron is made a mass of silver. But otherwise, if it is not totally changed. Hence it is not licit to mend profane garments from an old chasuble, nor to apply ornaments of priests to profane uses. But otherwise concerning those things which are not blessed, as carpets, candelabra. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 41.

Sacred things are not to be lent for a use which is repugnant to their nature (Can. 1537).

§ 1. Sacred furnishings blessed or consecrated lose blessing or consecration:

1st. If they have undergone such injuries or changes that they have lost their former form, and are no longer held suitable for their uses;

2nd. If they have been employed for indecorous uses or exposed for public sale (Can. 1305).

Question 6. Is it sacrilege to touch sacred vessels?

Response. Negatively, if it were done by clerics, or by lay regular sacristans, and also by nun sacristans. But if it were done by other lay persons, sacrilege would indeed be present, but would not exceed venial sin, and this too would cease when a reasonable cause intervenes. - But if the sacred vessels actually contain the most holy Eucharist, no one can touch them without grave sacrilege, except priests and deacons, excluding however the case of necessity and danger of profanation.

§ 1. Care must be taken lest the chalice with the paten and, before washing, the purificators, palls, and corporals which were employed in the sacrifice of the Mass, be touched except by clerics or by those who have their custody.

§ 2. Purificators, palls, and corporals employed in the sacrifice of the Mass are not to be handed over to be washed by lay persons, even religious, unless they have first been washed by a cleric constituted in major orders; but the water of the first washing is to be poured into the sacrarium, or, if this is lacking, into the fire (Can. 1306). Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 48; and de Euchar., nn. 382 and following.

Simony, so called from Simon Magus, is the studious will of selling or buying for a temporal price something spiritual, or something temporal annexed to the spiritual. It is called studious will not only because, not otherwise than other sins, it requires deliberation, but also because for its essential malice it is not required that a pact be completed by mutual consent, or in reality, but an interior or one-sided simoniacal affection suffices, namely the will of bargaining or of obliging.

Question 1. What is simony of divine law?

Response. § 1. The studious will of buying or selling for a temporal price a thing intrinsically spiritual, for example, Sacraments, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, consecration, indulgences, etc., or a temporal thing annexed to a spiritual thing in such a way that the temporal thing can in no way exist without the spiritual, for example, an ecclesiastical benefice, etc., or that the spiritual thing is the object, even partial, of the contract, for example, consecration in the sale of a consecrated chalice, is simony of divine law (Can. 727).

Question 2. What is simony of ecclesiastical law?

Response. § 2. But to give temporal things annexed to the spiritual for temporal things annexed to the spiritual, or spiritual things for spiritual things, or even temporal things for temporal things, if this is prohibited by the Church on account of the danger of irreverence toward spiritual things, is simony of ecclesiastical law (Can. 727).

A temporal price is distinguished in canon law as of three kinds, namely: 1st, a gift from the hand, or recompense of any temporal thing estimable by price; 2nd, a gift from the tongue, or patronage, under which name come praises, recommendations, prayers, etc., to be interposed from a pact in favor of the one conferring the spiritual thing; 3rd, a gift from service, or any service or duties furnished to another, for example, service as a servant or any similar office.

Likewise there is a threefold temporal thing annexed to the spiritual: 1st, antecedently, as are sacred vessels, blessed oil, a prayer crown; 2nd, consequently, what depends on the spiritual as on a cause or root, as the right of receiving tithes; 3rd, concomitantly, as labor in sacred functions.

When simony is treated, buying-selling, exchange, etc., are to be taken broadly for any convention, although not brought to effect, even tacit, in which namely the simoniacal intention is not expressly manifested, but is gathered from the circumstances (Can. 728).

A threefold simony is distinguished: 1st, mental, if, with no pact intervening, the temporal or spiritual is conferred with simoniacal intention, that is, with the intention of obliging the other to return a spiritual or temporal thing; 2nd, conventional, if a pact indeed intervenes, but has been commanded to execution either in no way or only on one side. If the first, it is called pure conventional; if the other, mixed; 3rd, real, if the pact is fulfilled on both sides, at least inchoatively.

There is added confidential simony, whose matter is only ecclesiastical benefices. This is then had when someone, in election or presentation to benefices, or in the resignation of these, from confidence, or from an express or tacit pact and by his own authority, reserves something for himself or for another concerning the fruits of the benefice, or concerning the benefice itself.

I Say 1st. For simony there is required that the temporal be given or received, whether expressly and formally or virtually, for the spiritual thing itself and in exchange for it, so that an equalization of the spiritual thing with the temporal, or an exchange from the primary motive of having one for the other as price or just compensation, is made. The reason is clear from the very definition of simony. Hence if some honorable motive intervenes, by virtue of which the temporal thing and in turn the spiritual thing is bestowed, one would no longer be the motive of the other, but only its impulsive cause, and therefore there would not be simony.

I Say 2nd. Simony is not had when the temporal is given not for the spiritual thing, but on its occasion from a just title recognized by the sacred canons or by legitimate custom; likewise when a temporal thing is given for a temporal thing which as a subject has something spiritual annexed, for example, a consecrated chalice, provided the price is not increased because of the annexed spiritual thing (Can. 730).

Something can licitly be received for a sacred ministry by reason of stipend or support, as is clear from the practice of the Church. For natural equity demands that honorable support be conceded to those who are occupied for the utility of others. Hence Christ says, Luke x, 7: "The workman is worthy of his wage." - And the Apostle, I Cor. ix, 13: "Know you not that they who work in the sanctuary eat the things that are of the sanctuary; and they who serve the altar partake with the altar? So also the Lord ordained for those who announce the Gospel, to live from the Gospel."

I Say 3rd. Simony is a most grave sin; and if it is of divine and natural law, it does not admit smallness of matter. But if the simony is of ecclesiastical law, it can admit smallness of matter, according to St. Alphonsus. The reason is that any spiritual thing whatsoever, from comparison with a temporal thing, is vilified with great injury to God himself. This is clear also from the words of St. Peter to Simon Magus, Acts viii, 20: "Let thy money be with thee unto perdition, because thou hast thought that the gift of God is possessed with money." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 50.

I Say 4th. Renunciation of an ecclesiastical office made simoniacally is invalid by the law itself. - Cf. Can. 185.

§ 2. Presentation infected by a simoniacal stain is invalid by the law itself, and even renders a subsequent institution perhaps invalid (Can. 1465). - Cf. Can. 1441.

Question 1. Is it simony to give a temporal thing principally indeed on account of a spiritual thing, but not uniquely?

Response. Affirmatively, and the reason is that then comparison of the temporal thing with the spiritual thing is also present. For the added motive, however honorable it may be, does not destroy the malice and impiety of the prior motive, because a temporal thing is principally given. This is clear also from proposition 45 condemned by Innocent XI, which is as follows: "To give a temporal thing for a spiritual thing is not simony, if the temporal is not given as a price, but as a motive for conferring or effecting the spiritual." - Cf. Viva on this proposition. - St. Alphonsus, n. 54.

Question 2. Is it simony to redeem oneself with money from unjust vexation concerning benefices, or another spiritual good, for example, sacraments, etc.?

Response. Negatively, at least more probably, because liberation from vexation, which alone is directly intended, is something temporal. - Hence you can give money to your enemy if he attempts by fraud to impede the electors lest they favor you. The Doctors agree in the same, even if he should wish to impede only by prayers. But you cannot give money to those who can harm or benefit by electing or presenting to a benefice; for to offer money to them lest they harm would be the same as to offer it so that they benefit, namely so that they do not deny consent. Nor is it licit for you to give money to your competitor so that he desist from competing for the benefice, because there is no unjust vexation to be redeemed by you, and you would directly prepare for yourself the way to the benefice through money, which is simoniacal. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 99 and following.

Not every condition added to the conferral of a spiritual thing induces simony, but only that which brings a new burden or a new obligation of justice by way of exchange. Therefore it is not simony if I give the spiritual thing in order that I may obtain a temporal thing which is owed to me by title of justice but is denied by injustice alone. Baller., note (a), p. 284.

Question 3. Is it simony to give or receive something for entrance into Religion?

Response. § 1. Unless it is provided in the constitutions or by express agreement that something is to be paid for food and religious habit upon entering postulancy or novitiate, nothing can be exacted for the expenses of postulancy or novitiate (Can. 570).

Finally, it is certain that it is licit for Nuns to exact a dowry from those about to enter, as is clear from the usage received everywhere and from several decisions of the Sacred Congregation of the Council in Benedict XIV, de Synodo, lib. 11, chap. 6. Yet they must take care not to receive unsuitable persons solely on account of the dowry or some other temporal emolument; for that would be simoniacal. Cf. Can. 547.

Question 4. Does a priest commit simony who exacts for a Mass a stipend above the customary tax or the tax established by the Bishop?

Response. Negatively, as regards the internal forum and before God, unless he acts with a simoniacal mind; because, since he has a title for exacting remuneration, comparison between the spiritual and the temporal is lacking. He would indeed sin against obedience or justice by exacting more than is fair, but not at all against religion. Nevertheless in the external forum he would be held as simoniacal, because an increase of this kind would be presumed to be exacted not for support, but as the price of a spiritual thing; for this reason several theologians and canonists affirm absolutely that in that case true simony is committed. - Cf. Voit, n. 497. - Baller., note (a), p. 276.

Question 5. What is especially to be said concerning the tax of Masses for this our region?

Response. Concerning this matter the Baltimore Fathers speak thus: "... The quantity of a just stipend can scarcely be determined universally. The Sacred Congregation of the Council, having been asked, 'how great the alms of manual Masses ought to be,' on Nov. 15, 1698 responded: 'the custom of the place, or the synodal law insofar as it is present, is to be attended to; but if not, a competent alms is to be established by the Bishop according to his judgment.' But in that which pertains to the quantity of the alms to be determined by the Bishop, the same and universal rule cannot be established for all places in these provinces so extended far and wide, since, regard having been had to the circumstances of places and times, in diverse places it ought to be lesser or greater. Whence, leaving it to the individual Ordinaries, that with the circumstances of things well considered, they determine for their clergy the quantity of stipend which seems just to them, we establish this only, that no one exact more nor regularly less than shall have seemed opportune and just to his Bishop." - Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, n. 369.

Question 6. Whether and what can be received, without stain of simony, for the administration of sacraments and for other ecclesiastical functions, especially in this region?

Response 1st. For the administration of Sacraments let the minister exact or ask nothing for any cause or occasion, whether directly or indirectly, except the offerings concerning which in can. 1507, §1 (Can. 736).

§ 1. With the prescription of can. 1056 and can. 1234 saved, to fix beforehand taxes to be paid in the whole ecclesiastical province for various acts of voluntary jurisdiction, or for the execution of rescripts of the Apostolic See, or on the occasion of the ministration of Sacraments or Sacramentals, belongs to the provincial Council or the meeting of the Bishops of the province; but no such prefixed determination has force unless it has first been approved by the Apostolic See (Can. 1507). - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 55. - Reiff., lib. 5, tit. 3, nn. 186 and following.

Therefore in this region the following statute of the Baltimore Fathers must be attended to: "Since, by command of Christ the Lord, spiritual gifts received freely are to be given freely, and since, according to the witness of the Apostle, avarice is a certain service of idols, which indeed in a Christian man is a grave harm, but in a minister of the Sacred Things of the true God is a most shameful crime, we declare that no one should dare to exact, ask, or bargain for anything for the administration of the sacraments." - Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, n. 221.

Response 2nd. For which sacraments and functions in particular, according to the custom received among us, some alms can be received, we add in the following:

1st. For Baptism and Matrimony, if anything is offered, it is received with impunity. "Those things which from the zeal of piety," say the Baltimore Fathers, n. 221, "after Baptism or Matrimony has been conferred, are spontaneously offered by the faithful in the name of alms, the priest, if he wishes, may receive; for custom tolerates this among us, nor does the Church disapprove."

2nd. For Confirmation, Kenrick, tract. 12, n. 63, has these things: "On the occasion of administering Confirmation nothing is accustomed to be given; but provisions are to be furnished to a Bishop making visitation of his diocese. ... In the Mexican Provinces the individual faithful who have been confirmed are accustomed to contribute a half silver coin for the expenses of the Bishop; which custom displays an evil appearance. Among us the pastor supplies food."

3rd. For the Eucharist, nothing at all is accustomed or able to be received.

4th. For Penance, it is strictly forbidden that anything be received under any title whatsoever; indeed confessors should not permit even the Mass alms to be offered to themselves in the sacred tribunal of penance. - Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, n. 289.

5th. For Extreme Unction, if the priest has made a long journey, nothing forbids the necessary expenses of the journey to be received. Cf. Kenrick, tract. 12, n. 66.

6th. For Order, according to the Council of Trent, sess. 21, c. 1, "let Bishops receive nothing even spontaneously offered, under any pretext whatsoever." - But those who must undertake a journey are not held by this prohibition, because then they can receive its expenses. - Cf. Kenrick, n. 67.

7th. For ecclesiastical burial the Baltimore Fathers have the following:

"We earnestly exhort and beseech Ordinaries of places in the Lord that they take care that the discipline concerning burials be exacted as soon as possible, and as much as can be done, according to the norm established by the Most Holy Canons. 'The poor, to whom when dead nothing or so little remains that they cannot be buried at their own expense, are to be buried altogether gratis.' But if someone wishes some place in a cemetery reserved for himself and his heirs in perpetuity, so that no one else, if they are unwilling, can ever be buried there, a price can be paid for a right of this kind, as they say, exclusive. From moneys procured in this way there is no doubt that a sum is had which suffices for preserving, restoring, and adorning cemeteries. If anything remains over, let it be applied, by judgment of the Ordinary, for promoting works of charity or religion. But we strictly forbid that ecclesiastical men should ever dare, under any pretext whatsoever, without permission of the Ordinary, to make their own the moneys which are derived from cemeteries; but if they attempt this, let them be struck with most severe penalties." - Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, n. 393. - Kenrick, n. 69.

Question 7. What penalties are laid upon simoniacs?

Response. All, even those increased with episcopal dignity, who knowingly have promoted through simony to orders, or have been promoted, or have ministered or received other Sacraments, are suspected of heresy; clerics moreover incur suspension reserved to the Apostolic See (Can. 2371).

With the prescription of can. 729 remaining firm, those perpetrating the delict of simony in any ecclesiastical offices, benefices, or dignities whatsoever:

1st. Incur excommunication latae sententiae simply reserved to the Apostolic See;

2nd. By the fact itself remain deprived in perpetuity of the right of electing, presenting, or nominating, if they have any;

3rd. If they are clerics, moreover let them be suspended (Can. 2392).

Question 8. What is the value of a simoniacal contract?

Response. The penalties established by law against simoniacs remaining firm, the simoniacal contract itself, and, if simony is committed concerning benefices, offices, or dignities, the subsequent provision lacks every force, although the simony was committed by a third person, even without the knowledge of the one provided, provided this is not done in fraud of the same provided person or with him contradicting it. Wherefore:

1st. Before any sentence of a judge, the thing simoniacally given and accepted, if it is capable of restitution and reverence owed to the spiritual thing does not stand in the way, must be restored, and the benefice, office, or dignity given up;

2nd. One simoniacally provided does not make the fruits his own; but if he has perceived them in good faith, it is permitted to the prudence of the judge or Ordinary to condone the fruits perceived in whole or in part to the same (Can. 729).

Question 9. Is it licit to sell sacred things?

Response. What is annexed to the spiritual in such a way that it is presupposed to the spiritual and to which the spiritual afterward comes, if a special prohibition of the Church is absent, can be sold by reason of the material or workmanship, even if the consecration or blessing is inseparable from it, provided it is not therefore sold more dearly, but only according to the value which it has independently of those things. - Lacroix, l. III, p. 1, n. 153. - And therefore chalices, Agnus Dei, sacred vestments can of themselves be sold, provided they are sold at the price of the material.

§ 1. In the sale or exchange of sacred things, no account of consecration or blessing is to be had in the estimation of the price (Can. 1539).

Nevertheless sacred furnishings blessed or consecrated lose blessing or consecration ... if they have been exposed for public sale. Cf. Can. 1305.

Thus far we have disputed concerning the acts of faith, hope, and charity, by which God is chiefly worshipped, and concerning prayer, which is a peculiar office of religion. At present, discourse must be undertaken concerning another office of religion, which is called adoration. Many things will occur to be examined, not only for the forming of Catholic morals, but also for the refuting of the errors of heretics. But I shall fix my step within the bounds of my own undertaking, and shall touch only in passing, and cursorily, on those matters which regard the vain fabrications, or rather deliria (to speak more truly), of the heretics. I shall apply myself more seriously to this: that I may set forth our Catholic doctrine concerning the worship of the Saints, of images, and of relics, more closely, and more clearly. This perspicuous explanation is indeed sufficient to overthrow the novators' sophisms, which are almost all impostures, and calumnies, fabricated from a false exposition of Catholic doctrine. I would be doing a useless work, if I wished to repeat what innumerable Catholic Theologians have already strenuously accomplished, and I would depart altogether from the goal I have set for myself. Let us come, then, to the matter.

I. Two things the first commandment of the Decalogue prescribes. As affirmative, it prescribes the worship of God: The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve: Matthew 4. As negative, it forbids that worship be shown to other gods: Thou shalt not have strange gods before me. Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing; thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them: Exodus 20.

II. Question I. What is Religion? Answer. The common definition of Religion is this: Religion is a virtue which renders to God the worship due to him as the first principle of all things. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 81, art. 1, derives the etymology of Religion from re-reading [relegendo] those things that pertain to divine worship, because such things must frequently be turned over again in the heart. Religion is not a theological virtue, because it does not regard God proximately, but a moral virtue — and indeed the chief among these virtues, whose object is the worship to be shown to God, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, II-II, q. 81, art. 5.

III. Question II. How many are the acts of Religion? Answer. There are two kinds of the acts of Religion: one of interior acts, such as devotion and prayer; the other of exterior acts, which are divided into three classes. Some subject the very body to God, as adoration; others immolate exterior things to God, as sacrifices, oblations, tithes, first-fruits, and the rest of that kind, which are commonly comprehended under the one name of oblation; the last are those by which something is applied in protestation of the divine honor, such as oaths, by which the name of God is invoked, and vows, by which something is promised to God. Of all these there must be discourse.

IV. Question III. What is devotion? Answer. St. Thomas hands down this definition, II-II, q. 82, art. 1: A certain will of promptly delivering oneself to those things which pertain...

to the service of God. The word will placed in the definition expresses not a power, but an act. The remaining words betray the peculiar nature of devotion. For this promptitude, which renders the soul ready in the divine service and swift in the execution of the things that redound to God's honor, is the singular token of devotion.

V. Question IV. What are the effects of devotion? Answer. They are gladness of heart, an interior sweetness of soul, savor, and delight. It is not necessary, however, that devotion always bring forth these effects, since pious and holy men are often, not rarely, deprived of all these, and are not for that reason less fervent and ready in the offices of Religion. The more mature fruit of devotion is the exact observance of the commandments, which frequently produces the effects just recounted.

VI. There is a twofold cause of devotion. The first and chief is God, who breathes where he wills, and pours out a more abundant supply of graces. The other is the interior meditation of the divine goodness, clemency, and the other attributes of the divine nature, and, at the same time, of our own need and weakness. From the former meditation follow gladness, cheerfulness, and joy. From the latter, humility, lowliness of soul, and contempt of vanity and pride. Of the time at which the precept of devotion presses, I shall speak presently.

The FIRST act of Religion is Devotion, by which the will devotes itself, prompt, to the divine services; whence also it takes its name; it is taken, however, not rarely for that taste which results from attention during meditation, or prayer; yet properly it is promptitude, and the universal will to carry out whatever pleases God; whence it is clear that it does not pertain to the Intellect, although it presupposes its act, as I shall indicate below; at times, however, before every consideration of the mind the will is anticipated by a sweet and savory affection, by which it is gently stirred toward mental Prayers; and this affection, poured in by the Holy Spirit, can deservedly be called the grace of Devotion, or the seed of the virtue: In this matter almost no logical difficulty occurs; for with Devotion there is rare agreement of syllogisms, or arguments; wherefore all that is to be said here I shall dispatch with a single question.

DEVOTION is an act of the Will, by which one promptly wills to carry out all things that pertain to the service of God, and thus hands himself over entirely to the divine cult. Devotion therefore looks to the means fit for obtaining the ultimate end.

The Saintly Doctor expounds its sweet nature in the eight Collationes, Coll. 6. That one refuse to be consoled, and to take delight in things of others; That one delight in the love of God, as D. Bernard says sermone 4. super Qui habitat. Let him withdraw from affection for all things delightful. Let the soul be alone, alone seeking those things which lead to God, as S. Bernard runs on serm. 40. in Cant. where he says: Let the soul be alone, that she may keep herself for Him alone, whom she has chosen to herself from all. Flee the crowd, flee the household, withdraw from friends and intimates. Forget your own people, and your father's house, and the King will desire your beauty. Withdraw therefore, but in mind, not in body, but in intensity, but in Devotion, but in Spirit.

AT LENGTH, with him, in serm. 3. de Annunc. Domini, D. Bonaventure concludes: The food of the soul is the grace of God, most sweet indeed, having all sweetness and delightfulness of savor; it not only delights, but refreshes, and heals. There are four signs that show the presence of the grace of God. First, if the heart is pacified in itself and quiet, because the heart rests, or is filled, in nothing except in God alone. Second, when the mind and spirit feel themselves inclined to devotion. Third, in the presence of grace, then the countenance of a man brightens more than usual, and shows itself benign. Fourth, when in outward movements a man is more composed and ordered.

THEREFORE he concludes that he is devout who devotes, or gives, his whole self to God; for in ancient times they were called devoted who devoted themselves to Idols unto death, as is related of the two Decii by Pliny lib. 10. Decad. 1.

The Saintly Doctor distinguishes, however, a THREEFOLD devotion opusc. de sex alis Seraphim, cap. 8. The first is common, or in the common works of the divine service, as in the divine offices. The second is special in prayers. The third is promptitude in whatsoever holy works.

AROUND the common divine offices a threefold condition is required for devotion: First, that all be done in order without error, that each perform his own office, as is said prima Cor. 4. Let all things be done honestly, and according to order among you. Thus King David, primo Paral. 25. He separated to the ministry of the Lord those who prophesied with harps, psalteries, and cymbals, according to their number, serving in the office dedicated to them. Second, that the work of the Lord, that is, the office of the divine cult, be carried out vigorously and not sluggishly or slothfully: For He says Hierem. 48. Cursed is he who does the work of God fraudulently. The LXX read, negligently. Third, that the divine offices be paid reverently, without dissoluteness and noise, distinctly and attentively, as the Psalmist said: In the sight of the Angels. Hebrew: Neghed, over against, Coeli, and Eccles. 39. With all your heart, and mouth praise and bless the name of the Lord.

For the Divine Office the Holy Spirit instituted it for five reasons.

¶ FIRST, that the Church militant might be like her sister triumphant in hymnody: To those singing we are joined, zealous rivals of nurturing Sion. Thus John saw that city descending.

SECOND, that mindful of the benefits of God we might give thanks to God at every hour, especially by recalling the passions of the Savior; at midnight the Incarnation and Nativity: at morning his being dragged before the Judges: at the first hour scourged: at the third pierced with thorns: at the sixth Crucified: at the ninth having died: in the evening taken down; late in the day buried, let us remember. Whence Isaias 63. I will remember the mercies of the Lord.

THIRD, that we stir ourselves to devotion: For He commanded a perpetual fire upon the altar, Leuit. 6. This is the perpetual fire, which shall never fail, upon the Altar.

FOURTH, that at fixed hours the people flow to the Church, at the times of the offices, to the glory of God; for thus John, and Peter went up at the hour of prayer, the ninth, with the people, and in Luke, first, All the multitude of the people was without at the hour of incense.