Merit

In order that an action may be altogether and simply good, the object, the end, and the circumstances must all be good; for good indicates completeness and perfection; there is evil in any defect. If all the sources of morality are evil, the action may have a triple malice; as when a thief steals Church plate in order to be able to indulge his vicious propensities. If only one source or circumstance of an action be mortally sinful, the perpetration of it turns the evil-doer away from God and makes the action wholly bad. An accidental and secondary circumstance, when only venially sinful, does not corrupt the whole action; it only lessens its merit. Thus it is a grievous sacrilege to receive Holy Communion in a state of mortal sin; a state of venial sin only makes the Communion less fruitful.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Ch. IV, Section III. On Merit

It follows from what has been said in the preceding section, that an action will be morally good if the object, end, and circumstances are good, The object, end, and circumstances will be good if they are conformable to man’s rational nature and to the eternal law of God. An opinion was held by some theologians that besides these conditions it is necessary to refer, actually or at least virtually, all our actions to God; otherwise they will at least be venially sinful. These theologians rested their opinion on certain texts of Holy Scripture and on passages from some of the Fathers, especially St Augustine. The principal Scripture text is from St Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians, x 31: “‘ Therefore whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do; do all to the glory of God.” There are various interpretations of the passage, but the meaning seems plain from the context. St Paul is teaching the Corinthians the duty of avoiding scandal to Jews, Gentiles, and to the Church of God. They must so order their actions, even those that are indifferent in themselves, such as eating certain kinds of food, as not to be a cause of offence to others. Then will their actions all tend to the honour and glory of God, then will they do all things in charity (1 Cor. xv 14). There is obviously no word here which can be legitimately construed into a command to direct all our actions to God by an actual or virtual intention of the will. Such a merely internal act would not tend to edify others, and in the text quoted this is what St Paul is urging the Corinthians to do. Other passages which are quoted in support of the opinion are similarly capable of being explained in a sense which affords the opinion no support. It is indeed a truth, which is insisted on by other theologians, that if an action be honest and good and performed because it is conformable to right order, it is thereby implicitly directed to God, who wills the observance of right order, and who is himself the end to which rightly ordered action tends. In this sense it is true that every good action must be referred to God; but every good action is thus referred to him by the very fact that the object, the end, and the circumstances are good.¹

¹ V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 2, n. 290.

Something else is required to make a naturally good action supernaturally meritorious. The question of merit belongs to the dogmatic treatise on grace; here it will be sufficient to give something about the subject in outline, in order to round off our treatment of human acts.

Merit in general is a certain value in an action which gives the agent the right to be rewarded by him in whose behalf the action is performed. Merit, then, with God will bea to be rewarded for one’s actions by God. right Theologians distinguish between condign and congruous merit. The former implies that there is some sort of equality between the value of the action and the reward, so that the reward is due to the agent in justice. If there is not this equality and title in justice, the merit will be only congruous. We can merit condignly an increase of grace, life eternal, and an increase of glory, as the Council of Trent defined.¹ Efficacious graces, by which we receive, preserve, and increase sanctifying grace, and the gift of final perseverance, are the objects of congruous merit.

¹ Trent, sess. 6, can. 32.

In order that an action may be condignly meritorious, two conditions are required on the part of the agent, two on the part of the action, and one on the part of God.

The agent must be still on his probation in this present life; there is no meriting when man’s day is done. He must also be in the state of grace and friendship with God; the actions of one who is out of grace and who is a rebel and an enemy of God cannot deserve any reward from him.

The action itself must be morally good, not bad, as is obvious; and it must be supernatural, elicited by means of grace and from a motive which is rooted in faith. Otherwise it will be merely of the natural order, deserving indeed of a natural reward, but having no proportion to the supernatural end to which we know by faith that man is destined by God.

On the part of God there must be a promise made by him to grant such a reward to such an action. For otherwise, after doing all that we can, we must acknowledge that we are useless servants, who cannot claim anything as due to them in justice from God, their Creator and Lord. He has every claim to our service without our having a strict right to any reward in return. According to the very probable teaching of St Thomas,¹ all the deliberate actions of one who is in a state of grace are either meritorious or sinful. In order to be in a state of grace, such a one must have fulfilled all the duties which bind him under pain of grievous sin, and among these is the obligation of eliciting at the proper times an act of love of God. By such an act the just man refers himself and all he does to God, and thus his good actions are elicited by the help of grace and tend to man’s supernatural end, the beatific vision of God. In any case, if we are careful frequently to renew our intention of pleasing God, and with his grace remain free from mortal sin, we may rest in the assured hope that all our good actions are meritorious of life eternal.

¹ De Malo, q. 2, a. 5, obj. 10; in lib. 2, dist. 40, a. 5, ad 6.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 5 passages

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Section I. On the Good Act

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 4. Acts as Meritorious, Introduction · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 4. Acts as Meritorious, Definition · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 4. Acts as Meritorious, Divisions of Merit · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 4. The Vices Opposed …, The Vice Against Distributive Justice · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. IV, Art. 3. Repentance; Penanc…, The Virtue of Repentance

We explained in n. 61 wherein the moral goodness of an act exists; here, however, it must be investigated further what is required so that an act may be clothed with moral goodness. Now:

n. 241.

I. In order that an act be morally good, it is not required that it be placed by one baptized or in the state of grace. The doctrine which teaches that all works of unbelievers or sinners are sins has been condemned; namely, the Baian propositions have been proscribed: the 25th, "All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices";¹ and the 35th, "Everything that a sinner or servant of sin does is sin."²

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1025.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1035.

n. 242.

II. In order that an act be morally good, these things are required:

The object must be good or at least indifferent (n. 66). If it is indifferent, the act becomes good if it is referred to a good end; in which case the end assumes the character of object.¹
The act must be referred to a good end; for "since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the character of evil" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 9).²
Goodness must be intended in itself; otherwise it is not contracted subjectively. "In order that the will be good, it is required that it be good under the aspect of good; that is, that it will the good, and on account of the good" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 7, ad 3). But goodness is intended in itself when someone wills the good affected by its goodness, even if he does not reflexively think that he wills the good because it is good.

¹ On circumstances, see n. 69.

² Note, however, that an act good from its object is at least not deprived of goodness by just any bad end (n. 71).

n. 243.

III. Of the conditions assigned, the second must be developed more fully; in other words, it must be explained what kind of end is good, or to what end in the concrete an act must be referred. Now:

Every human act must be referred to an honorable end. Nevertheless any honorable end suffices, and it is enough that the honorable end be intended virtually. I said:

a) Every human act must be referred to an honorable end. The proposition is established against the Scotists, who teach that those acts which of themselves are ordered only to some comfort or relief of nature, such as walking, smelling flowers, stroking the beard, those acts, I say, can without sin be directly referred to the lower end alone, namely to comfort or pleasure, provided the ultimate end is not positively excluded.¹ According to the stated authors, one who directly rests in such an end neither sins, because to act for the end of the work alone is not evil, nor acts morally well, because he does not refer the act to an honorable end. Therefore he places an indifferent act. But the contrary opinion is deduced from the fact that every human or deliberated act must be done for that end alone which befits rational nature. But it befits rational nature to act for an honorable end, and not for another (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 4, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XLIV).

Objection. He who acts for the end of the work alone cannot sin. But the works about which there is controversy are, by their nature, ordered to pleasure alone.

Response. The argument proposed by us proves precisely that he sins who acts for the end of the work alone, if there is question of a work which by its nature is ordered to pleasure alone.

Corollary I. It is illicit to act for pleasure alone, so that an act placed for that end alone not only is destitute of goodness, but is also evil. It is, however, only venially evil, if there is question of a thing licit in itself or venially evil, because the disordered relation of an act licit in itself or slightly evil does not import grave disorder. Except the case in which pleasure would be intended as the ultimate end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 912).

Corollary II. It seems illicit to act, even, for pleasure, by resting, even, in it as such, because pleasure as such is not an honorable end. Yet to someone this will seem licit, insofar as the honorable act and its delectability constitute one thing.

Corollary III. It is licit to act for pleasure insofar as, from the intention of the Author of nature, it attracts to an act ordered in itself, for instance to conjugal intercourse; likewise insofar as it conduces to the well-being and operation of the body or soul. The reason is that pleasure, considered as such, has the character of an honorable end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 912; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 34, a. 1; II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 2; II-II, q. 168, a. 2; Contra Gentiles, bk. 3, c. 9, n. 1).

b) Nevertheless any honorable end suffices, whether the end of the work or another intended by the agent, whether conceived in species or in a vague way. The very end of the work, at least to this extent, does not fall under precept, insofar as there is no obligation of intending it, although there can be an obligation of not impeding it. This being posited, the agent is free to set before himself another honorable end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 927; cf. 882 and 883). Nevertheless several think, as we shall soon note, that the end of the work itself, by the very fact that it is not positively excluded, is at least implicitly intended.

c) It is enough that the honorable end be intended virtually, or that the act be virtually referred to an honorable end, or that the act be placed by force of an honorable intention previously had. For it suffices that the act truly be referred to an honorable end; but it is truly referred to an honorable end if it is placed by force of an honorable intention previously had. There is added that the obligation of an actual relation "would be an unbearable weight and a matter entangled with six hundred scruples" (St. Alphonsus, V, XLIV).

d) It is disputed whether one who places an act ordered by its nature to an honorable end, and does not positively exclude that end, by that very fact intends the honorable end, at least implicitly. Most more recent authors affirm this; but it seems it must be denied. For that on account of which an act is distinguished is not implicitly intended by the very fact that the act is performed. But the end of the act is distinguished from the act itself, for example the procreation of offspring from intercourse, as effect from cause; hence in order that it be intended, a new act of the will is required. But the controversy is less practical, because one who places, in the due mode and order, an act ordered by its nature to an honorable end, and does not positively exclude this end, commonly positively includes that end, although only confusedly and weakly.

It is disputed whether every human act must, in order to be good, be referred to God, or whether it suffices that it be referable to God.

Some teach that every act must be referred to God, because the dignity of the true ultimate end requires that all acts be referred to him. They add, however, that an implicit relation suffices, and that this is had by the very fact that the act is placed for an honorable end; because every honorable act by its nature is referred to God, the first and fontal honorableness of every particular honorableness.

Others deny that every act must be referred to God, and teach that, for a good act, it suffices that it be referable to God. They think this because acts cannot in any way be referred to God except through charity. But charity is certainly not required in order that a good act be placed; and this is already deduced from the 25th Baian proposition: "All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices."² According to the latter opinion, a good act not referred to God is referred to beatitude in common as to the ultimate end (nn. 12 and 13).

A human act, in order to be good, does not have to be elicited from the motive of charity, nor from another supernaturally known motive; this again is already deduced from the 25th Baian proposition just cited.
Although a human act, in order to be good, does not have to be elicited from the motive of charity, nevertheless to this extent there is an obligation of referring one's acts through an act of charity to God as to the ultimate end, insofar as it is prescribed to elicit an act of charity at certain times. Another precept besides that which is identified with the precept of charity cannot be proved. Hence St. Thomas says: "If it is asked when one must refer an act to the ultimate end, this is nothing other than to ask when the habit of charity must go out into act, because whenever the habit of charity goes out into act, the ordering of the whole man to the ultimate end takes place, and consequently of all those things which are ordered to him as goods for him" (In II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 6).

Nor does St. Alphonsus contradict these things when he teaches that acts should be offered to God several times in the day, at least in the morning (V, XLIV). For, as is clear from the context, he does not speak about the relation of acts to God as to the ultimate end, but about the care of referring all one's acts, even those which from the object are indifferent, to a good or honorable end. In order that this be done certainly, a good intention should be repeated more often.

Those who think that, for the goodness of an act, it is not required that it be referred to God as to the ultimate end, since according to their opinion this cannot be done without charity, ask what kind of influence must proceed from charity in order that an act be referred to God.³ Now:

Some require only habitual charity, without its influencing the act, since honorable acts are referred to God as if by their own weight.

Others likewise require only habitual charity; but according to them honorable acts which are placed in that state are always placed under the influence of the intention of God as ultimate end. For every agent, they say, acts from the intention of the ultimate end; but this, in one who is ordered to God, that is, in a just person, is God himself.

Others, besides habitual charity, require an act of perfect charity, by force of which good acts are referred to God. Of these, some say that in itself one act suffices for referring all future good acts to God, with the things that must be posited of course having been posited, namely that one not lose charity in the meantime. I said "in itself," because from another source there is the precept of eliciting an act of charity at certain times. Others think that the act of charity must be repeated at least from time to time. Here, however, it is further disputed whether the act of charity, in order to refer human acts to God, must be their causing principle, or whether it suffices that it be an ordering principle.⁴

Van Roey, who embraces the latter opinion, describes the stated ordering thus: "But if you ask how that virtual ordering of works is conceived, which is not virtual causality, we respond that it is a certain determination left behind from the first intention, some dictate arising from the first dictate, by force of which works are exercised in loving service of God and are determined and specified as friendly offerings made to God. This determination, this dictate, must be perceived as something truly persevering in the will, although here and now it does not occur to thought; the sign, indication, and argument of its real persistence is if someone, self-possessed and acting morally, is in such a disposition of mind that, seriously reflecting upon himself or asked why he does this or that work, finally and ultimately, after perhaps giving other particular motives, he answers that he acts on account of God, to please God, or something similar including explicitly or implicitly the motive of charity.

"If the matter is understood thus, it cannot be denied that the ordering of works is virtual; that is, the preceding intention, when it vanishes from the mind as an explicit intention, leaves behind some power, some determination, some disposition, which suffices so that the works, if they are done, are directed to God."

¹ Therefore they do not apply the doctrine to those acts to which the Author of nature has appointed the certain end of some honorable necessity or utility; such are, for example, eating, conjugal intercourse, etc. Besides, Innocent XI condemned proposition 8: "To eat and drink to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts"; and proposition 9: "The act of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from all fault and venial defect" (Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1158 and 1159).

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1025.

³ Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 26 sq.; Ernst, Ueber die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. dogm., VIII, n. 639.

⁴ Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 232 sq.

n. 244.

IV. Conclusion, by which the doctrine handed down is briefly gathered and completed.

In order that an act be morally good, it suffices, with goodness or indifference of the object posited, that it be placed from an honorable end.
In order that an act be supernaturally good, besides the things just assigned, it is also required that it proceed from a supernatural elicitive principle. This is established from the First Council of Orange, can. 7. Whether or not every act must be elicited from a supernaturally known motive is disputed.¹
In order that an act be meritorious de condigno, there is required:

a) On the part of the act: 1. that it be free in the moral genus; 2. that it be done in service of God, more probably from a supernatural motive, and indeed from a virtual influence or, as others say, under the virtual ordering of an act of charity (cf. n. 243).

b) On the part of the agent: 1. that he be in the state of the way; 2. that he be in the state of justice.

c) On the part of the one rewarding: that there exist a promise of reward, not indeed so that the act may acquire the condignity of reward, but so that it may be accepted by God in order to reward. Besides, these things are explained more abundantly by the dogmatic theologians.

Finally, if you ask to what ultimate end a good act is referred if it is not referred to God as to the ultimate end, I respond: it is referred to the indeterminate ultimate end, or to beatitude in common.² For on the one hand it is established that every act is referred to some ultimate end. But the act of which we speak is not referred to God, as we suppose; nor to a creature as to the ultimate end, because then it would be a sin, and indeed mortal. It remains, therefore, that it be referred to an indeterminate end or to beatitude in common. The same must be said of a venially evil act, since it is not referred to God, as is clear, nor to a creature as to the ultimate end, because this is mortal; therefore it is referred to beatitude in common. Others, however, speak otherwise (nn. 12 and 13).

¹ "Every" is said because with regard to some acts, for example the act of faith, it is established. Cf. Billot, De virtutibus infusis, p. 12 sq.

² I said "if," because others think that every good act is referred in some way to God (nn. 12 and 13).

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 7 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 4. Acts as Meritorious, Introduction

n. 106.

(Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 21.)

When the morality of an act is attributable to one as one’s own, one becomes worthy of praise and reward, if the act is good, but deserving of censure and punishment, if the act is evil.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 4. Acts as Meritorious, Definition

n. 107.

Definitions

Definitions.—Merit is the right to a reward arising from works done for God. Demerit is the debt of punishment incurred on account of works done against God.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. I, Art. 4. Acts as Meritorious, Divisions of Merit

n. 108.

Divisions

Divisions.—According to the difference of the person who confers the reward, there are two kinds of merit: (a) human merit, or the claim which a person has to a reward from his neighbor, or from society, for the benefits he has conferred upon his neighbor or society; (b) divine merit, or the right a person has to receive a reward from God for the fidelity wherewith he has exercised stewardship over his acts, of which God is the Last End, or wherewith he has served society, of which God is the Supreme Ruler. Only divine merit is here considered.

n. 109.

According to the difference of the object of the reward, there are two kinds of merit: (a) natural merit, which makes one worthy of a reward that does not exceed the native powers or exigencies of a created being, such as success, prosperity, or other goods that do not constitute the Last End of man (see 20). Thus, we read in scripture of pagans or sinners who were blest with temporal happiness on account of their natural virtues; (b) supernatural merit, which makes one worthy of the beatitude surpassing mere created power that God has prepared for those who serve Him (see 20). It is only this kind of merit that is being considered here; for, since the Last End of man is a supernatural reward (viz, the Beatific Vision of God), it follows that the acts by which he tends to that End must be not only human and moral, but supernaturally meritorious.

n. 110.

There are four kinds of supernatural merit: (a) condign merit in the stricter sense, that is merit which arises from justice, and which presupposes no favor on the part of the rewarder. In this sense Christ merited, since even the grace which made His merits supernatural was due to Him as the God-Man; (b) condign merit in the less strict sense, that is merit which arises indeed from justice, but presupposes a favor on the part of the rewarder. In this way the righteous merit before God, since their works confer a right to their own reward, while the grace which enables them to perform their works is a divine favor; (c) congruous merit in the stricter sense, that is merit which arises not from justice (since there is no equality between the work and the reward), but from the fitness of things, because the person who merits is a friend of God. In this way all who are in the state of grace can merit spiritual goods for others; (d) congruous merit in the wide sense, that is merit which arises from the liberality of God, who answers a good work as if it were a prayer. In this way the good works done by sinners can be said to merit conversion for them.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 4. The Vices Opposed …, The Vice Against Distributive Justice

n. 1804.

The Vice Opposed to Distributive Justice

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 63-78.)

The Vice Opposed to Distributive Justice.—Favoritism (i.e., acceptance of persons, partiality) is defined as “a species of injustice which moves one to distribute the common goods or burdens of society, not according to merit or fitness, but according to some other and impertinent standard.”

(a) The common goods include offices, honors, functions, while the common burdens include taxes, contributions, and penalties.

(b) The common goods of which we now speak are those that belong to society and that must be portioned out to its members justly. Hence, there is no question of goods that belong to private persons, which the owners are not obliged to give to others unless it be in virtue of charity or liberality. A rich man is not guilty of acceptance of persons, if he bestows his largesses on those who are less in need or less deserving, but more acceptable to himself; and God is not unjust when he gives unequal graces to those who are equally sinners (Matt., xx. 14, 15).

(c) The right standard of just distribution is merit or fitness, as when an applicant is appointed to the post of teacher or superior on account of good character and knowledge. Any other standard which leaves merit and fitness out of consideration is unjust, as when a public official selects for offices or honors, not those who have worked the hardest or who give the most promise, but those who have more money or who are related to himself.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. IV, Art. 3. Repentance; Penanc…, The Virtue of Repentance

n. 2725.

The Fruits of Repentance

The Fruits of Repentance.—(a) Every sin, no matter how grievous, is removed by repentance (Is., i. 18), and hence there is always room for forgiveness. For man is always able to repent and God is always ready to pardon the penitent (Joel, ii. 13). The unpardonable sin is refusal to repent of sin, if one continues in that refusal, but even impenitence is forgiven when laid aside (see 900).

(b) Sin once forgiven does not return, for God does not regret His gifts (Rom, xi. 29), and His pardon means that the guilt of a sin is destroyed and wiped out forever, But he who falls into the same sins after pardon increases his guilt by reason of his ingratitude.

(c) The repentant sinner recovers the infused virtues he lost by sin and also his former merits (Luke, XV. 22; Joel, ii. 25; Ezech., xxxiii. 12; Heb., vi. 10). Virginity of body and innocence of soul are not recovered as to their material elements (i.e., bodily integrity and freedom from all sin), but they are restored as to their formal part, which is the resolve to abstain from all venereal pleasure or to avoid all sin. It seems that former merits are also recovered, not necessarily in their entirety, but in a degree that corresponds with the greater or less excellence of repentance.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 1 passage

Vol. I, On Human Acts, III. On the Morality of Human Acts

n. 75.

Is it necessary for the moral goodness of human acts to direct all actions to the glory of God; and do human acts, insofar as they are good or evil, have the notion of merit or demerit before God? - R. To the 1st: The more common and truer opinion affirms it. The reason is most clearly evident from what has been said; since every moral action, in order that it be good, must tend to the ultimate end and be ordered to it by reason. But if a human action tends and is ordered to the ultimate end, it is already directed to the glory of God. Therefore it is as necessary to direct all actions to the glory of God as it is necessary for them to be morally good. "The goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end: but the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, which is God. Therefore it is required for the goodness of the human will that it be ordered to the highest good." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 9. "The whole that man is, and what he can and has, must be ordered to God." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. a. 4 ad 3. - 1 Cor. 10:31.

Hence it is enough to direct them to God virtually on the part of the work, or by the very act exercised, namely by acting for the end of some virtue, or for what is honorable and consonant with rational nature; for such an act tends to the glory of God from its intrinsic nature. To the point S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3 ad 2: "Whenever someone wills those things which are for the end, he wills the end by the same act; but not conversely." And q. 21. a. 4: "He who does an evil act not referable to God does not preserve the honor of God which is due to the ultimate end." Cajetan on the same q. 8. a. 3: "one who always seeks what is for the end seeks the end, not habitually, but actually, as actually extends itself to virtually. For virtually to use something is within the breadth of actual use; otherwise that precept would never be fulfilled: Do all things for the glory of God; for to do imports to operate actually."

Much more, moreover, is it enough to direct all actions to God virtually on the part of the one operating himself, who by an act of charity has ordered his whole life to God and remains in habitual charity. Cajetan says this on 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3: "Between the movement of the will toward something habitually and actually, there is the middle movement of the will toward it virtually.... For when one having charity sins venially, he indeed habitually loves God, but not actually, as is clear, nor virtually, because sin is not directable to God. But when one having charity walks or preaches, and whatever else he does not do evilly, although he does not actually think of God, nevertheless that act is not only an act of such virtue, but of charity, and the will then is borne virtually toward God, and not only habitually, which belongs to one sleeping and to one sinning venially." S. Th. 2. D. 10. q. 1, a. 5; E. M.

R. To the 2nd: A human act has the notion of laudable or blameworthy, or of fault, from the fact that it is from the power of free will: "For to be praised or blamed is nothing other than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his act." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 21. a. 2. It has the notion of good or evil from the fact that it is suitable or unsuitable to right reason. It has the notion of rectitude from the fact that it has order to the end. It has the notion of honorable or of sin from the fact that it is conformable or deformable to law. Finally it has the notion of merit or demerit according to the retribution of justice toward another, from the fact that it is performed in service of another. Retribution is made to someone from the fact that he acts for the advancement or harm of another. By giving something from those things which are in our dominion, we acquire for ourselves a certain right to receive something from another's. S. Th. De Verit. q. 29. a. 6. Therefore from the fact that a human act is referred to God as to the ultimate end, and consequently promotes his honor and glory, and God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, to whom it belongs to make retribution for those things which are done well or badly in it, human acts have before God the notion of natural merit or demerit. For a human act considered precisely according to its moral goodness, in the present order of divine providence, is not formally meritorious of grace and eternal life; for grace is necessary for supernatural merit, by which it is elevated to a supernatural condition. Materially, however, such an act is capable of becoming meritorious of supernatural reward, presupposing divine ordination and grace being added. For if these are removed, there is had only natural merit toward a merely natural reward, from the fact that good works yield to God's service. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 5. a. 7, q. 21. a. 2. 3. 4, q. 114. a. 1. 2; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 3; E. M. 75. 89.

Bucceroni, Commentaries on Human Acts

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 57 passages

Bucceroni, Commentaries on Human Acts, Commentary XIV: On Merit

A human act, according as it is in the power of the will, has the character of laudable or culpable, according as it is good or evil. According to the order which it has to the end, leading to it or deviating from it, it has the character of rectitude or sin. But according as it is for the profit or harm of another, it has the character of merit or demerit. “To merit first seems to be in services by which men merit wages, in which wages first appears named. But we experience it as extended from services to attentions and benefits, when we call both those who render service and those who confer benefits well-deserving of us or of the republic.” Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 114. a. 1. Consequently merit or demerit is the value of a work, by reason of which there corresponds to it reward or punishment according to the retribution of justice. For retribution according to justice is made to someone from the fact that he acts for the profit or harm of another. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 21. a. 3. Justice then intervenes, whose office is to render to each one his own. For indeed "merit and reward are referred to the same thing. For that is called reward which is recompensed to someone in return for work or labor, as a certain price of that very thing. Hence, just as to render a just price for a thing received from someone is an act of justice, so also to recompense the reward of work or labor is an act of justice." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1. "The presentation of merit and the rendering of reward are acts toward another, according to an equality of thing to thing, namely of merit to reward and conversely. Therefore for the notion of merit the notion of the just is required, although it is not sufficient," because besides this "for the notion of merit the voluntary is required." Cajetan, on I-II, q. 114, a. 1.

Therefore merit or demerit is had from the fact that someone acts unto the good or evil of another, namely of the Community, or of another singular person. "But when someone does that which turns to his own good or evil, retribution is also owed to him, insofar as this too turns to the common good, according as he himself is part of the college; although retribution is not owed to him insofar as it is the good or evil of a singular person, who is the same as the one acting, unless perhaps by himself, according to a certain likeness, as there is justice of a man toward himself." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3.

Merit in general is a property of human acts, by virtue of which some are worthy of retribution. Of itself it is indifferent to good and to evil; but by usage now received, merit, said simply, is taken for merit of reward, and merit of punishment is called demerit, or evil merit, or merit of punishment.

n. 4.

Merit, of which we are treating, namely merit of reward, is generally defined: service rendered to another, able of itself to move him to retribution. It differs from impetration and from satisfaction: for impetration moves after the manner of a submissive petition, satisfaction after the manner of compensation for an injury inflicted, but merit after the manner of service. Under the name of service comes a work yielding to the utility or honor of someone. Hence it is clear that a human act, insofar as it is good or evil, can have the notion of merit or demerit not only before men, but also before God. For although our acts, according to themselves, can bring no utility to God, no advancement or harm to him, since nothing can increase or decrease in God, nevertheless man, insofar as he is in himself, withdraws something from God or presents something to him, when he keeps or does not keep the order which God has instituted; and by keeping the order he renders honor and glory to him. And therefore we merit something only insofar as we work for his glory, namely by manifesting his goodness by our good works. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 4, ad 1.

n. 5.

Merit before God is one thing natural, another supernatural. Natural merit is that which is found in good works of the natural order. For good works are meritorious before God of some reward. Appositely St. Thomas says appositely, I-II, q. 21, a. 4: "It must be said that the act of some man has the notion of merit or demerit according as it is ordered to another, either by reason of him or by reason of the community. But in both ways our good or evil acts have the notion of merit or demerit before God. By reason of God himself, indeed, insofar as he is man's ultimate end; and it is owed that all acts be referred to the ultimate end; hence he who does an evil act, not referable to God, does not preserve the honor of God, which is owed to the ultimate end. But on the part of the whole community of the universe, because in any community he who rules the community chiefly has care of the common good; hence it belongs to him to render retribution for those things which are done well or badly in the community. But God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, and especially of rational creatures. Hence it is manifest that human acts have the notion of merit or demerit by comparison to him; otherwise it would follow that God would not have care of human acts."

n. 6.

Supernatural merit is that which is perfected by supernatural grace, and is worthy of a supernatural reward. The supernatural merit of our human acts is divided into merit de condigno and de congruo. Merit de condigno is that which has a certain equality with the reward, and this is owed to it from some justice, at least with God's promise acceding. Merit de congruo is had when either equality is not present, or a promise is not had, so that only the fittingness, suitability, congruity of the reward is had from the liberality of the one rewarding. St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3.

n. 7.

The equality of merit with reward in a meritorious work de condigno is not an absolute equality of thing to thing; this equality is that which a thing has to a thing from its intrinsic quantity or entity, apart from all other extrinsic circumstances of persons. Hence that equality is invariable, when the utility or honorableness of the thing is unchanged. Such is the equality between price and reward in buying, and likewise between the labor of a hired worker and the reward by which that labor is compensated. For equality is had from the intrinsic quantity of the value of the thing bought or of the reward conferred, compared with the intrinsic quantity of the value of that price, of that labor; insofar as each is so much or so much; apart from every estimation of the dignity of the person selling and buying, of the one working and the one accepting that labor. This equality is also called entitative, quantitative, or arithmetical equality. To merit with someone is not to buy the reward from him. - The equality required for merit de condigno between work and reward is another equality, altogether distinct from this, namely respective equality. For it is equality according to a certain right estimation, by which a thing is not absolutely compared and set with a thing as considered in itself, but merit is respectively set with reward, with attention to the meritorious work itself and the reward, and to the very dignity of the one working, by which that work is dignified, and to the opulence and munificence of the one rewarding, so that to confer such a reward with respect to the one rewarding is not greater or more difficult than to furnish such merit with respect to the one meriting.

n. 8.

Therefore this equality is that which merit and reward obtain from the meritorious work itself and the reward, and with respect to the condition and dignity of the person meriting and of the person rewarding. For since actions are of supposits, hence one and the same thing or operation, according as it is from a person more worthy or less worthy, increases or decreases in its value. And thus a work which, done by the leader of a whole army, would be merit de condigno for obtaining some principality from a king; the same thing done by a simple soldier is at most merit de congruo; and the reward which would be given condignly to the former would be bestowed on the latter only congruously. This respective equality, as is clear, is equality of proportion, insofar, namely, as merit is related equally to the one meriting as reward to the one rewarding; for otherwise either something greater or something less would be repaid. To the point, St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3: "According to equality of proportion we merit eternal life de condigno. For equality of proportion is considered when this is related equally to that, as another thing to another. But it is not a greater thing for God to bestow eternal life than for us to present an act of virtue; but as this is fitting to this one, so that is fitting to that one; and therefore a certain equality of proportion is found between God rewarding and man meriting."

n. 9.

Now, however, it must be diligently noticed that this respective equality or equality of proportion, which is also called geometrical, presupposes on the part of merit and reward a certain fittingness and connection of both with each other; for merit has a certain intrinsic value of the reward by which that merit is repaid. And thus St. Thomas, in the place cited, immediately continuing, says: "provided, however, that the reward be referred to the same genus in which the merit is; so that if the reward is what exceeds every faculty of human nature, as eternal life does, the merit also must be through such an act in which there shines forth the good of that habit which is divinely infused, consigning us to God." Therefore natural works can in no way condignly merit a supernatural reward. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 2.

n. 10.

Merit is related equally to the one meriting as reward to the one rewarding. For, as St. Thomas says in the place cited, "it is not greater for God to bestow eternal life than for us to present an act of virtue, but as this is fitting to this one so that to that one." And indeed, although eternal life is a good far greater than the merit of a just man, and thus between that and this there is not an arithmetical equality and equality of quantity, nevertheless with respect to God, who loves the just man as his adopted son and friend, it is not a greater thing to communicate to him eternal life, that is, his blessedness and happiness, than, with respect to the just man, the adopted son of God and friend, to render service and honor by supernatural acts. This is related equally to that, as another thing to another; for it is altogether equitable that God also recompense a just man working according to the dignity and excellence of his supernatural virtue, according to the excellence of his own virtue.

n. 11.

The Angelic Doctor again explains the aforesaid proportion, I-II, q. 114, a. 3, by equality in virtue, and he plainly derives it from a twofold head, the dignity of the work and the dignity of the one working, and explains it by a comparison of seed in relation to a tree, of a pledge in relation to a debt, of a fountain in relation to flowing water. "It must be said that the grace of the Holy Spirit, which we have in the present, although it is not equal to glory in act, is nevertheless equal in virtue, as the seed of a tree, in which there is the virtue toward the whole tree. And similarly through grace the Holy Spirit inhabits man, who is the sufficient cause of eternal life; hence he is said to be the pledge of our inheritance, 2 Cor. 1. It must be said that the meritorious work of man can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as it proceeds from free choice; in another way, according as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit. If it is considered according to the substance of the work, and according as it proceeds from free choice, thus there cannot be condignity there because of the greatest inequality; but there is congruity there because of a certain equality of proportion. (Then namely merit de congruo is present.) For it seems congruous that God recompense a man working according to his own virtue according to the excellence of his own virtue. But if we speak of a meritorious work according as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, thus it is meritorious of eternal life de condigno. For thus the value of the merit is considered according to the virtue of the Holy Spirit moving us into eternal life, according to that of John 4:14, there shall be made in him a fountain of water springing up unto eternal life. The price of the work is also considered according to the dignity of grace, through which man, having been made a sharer of the divine nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom an inheritance is owed by the very right of adoption, according to that in Romans 8:17, if sons, then heirs."

n. 12.

Now, however, although in merit de condigno the aforesaid equality of proportion is had, and man can merit something from God de condigno, nevertheless he cannot do this according to the absolute notion of justice, but only in a certain respect. For the absolute notion of justice is in equality, and it belongs to it to render to each one what is his own. "It is manifest that between God and man there is the greatest inequality, for they are infinitely distant, and everything that is man's good is from God. Hence justice of man toward God cannot exist according to absolute equality, but according to a certain proportion, namely insofar as each works according to his own mode." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1.

n. 13.

Merit de congruo, one kind is infallible on account of the divine promise, as the last disposition to first sanctifying grace, which the sinner infallibly merits; but another kind is that which does not have the divine promise joined to it, and to which the reward is owed from a certain fittingness alone, as are the remote dispositions to justification. Suarez, De Gratia, bk. 12, ch. 36, nn. 4-7. Although in infallible merit de congruo a divine promise is had, merit de condigno is not therefore had. For even with the divine promise, there still remains in that merit a defect of the condignity of the work, according to equality of proportion. Suarez, De Grat., bk. 12, ch. 36, n. 4. "To merit ex condigno," says Cajetan on I-II, q. 114, a. 3, "is to merit in such a way that it is owed to him according to justice; so that it would be unjust for the reward not to be rendered to merit ex condigno. Hence also it received its name from the equal dignity of merit to reward."

n. 14.

Merit properly so called is prior in nature and causality to the reward; but it causes the reward because it is, after the manner of a moral efficient cause, and by no means does it cause it after the manner of a final cause, or that it may be. For the remunerator is moved by the merit to bestow the reward in retribution and compensation of that merit. Therefore merit is prior by nature, either as absolutely existing or as absolutely foreseen, so that it can move the remunerator to the retribution of that merit, which consequently it causes because it is, not that it may be. "Merit," says St. Thomas, "is the cause of the reward, not indeed after the manner of a final cause, for in this way the reward is rather the cause of merit; but rather, according to reduction to the efficient cause, insofar as merit makes one worthy of the reward, and through this disposes to the reward." De Veritate, q. 29, a. 6, ad 15.

n. 15.

If merit de congruo is compared with merit de condigno, although each is true merit, nevertheless the notion of merit is principally and perfectly in merit de condigno, secondarily and imperfectly in merit de congruo. Each is true merit; for each obtains the reward by the title of the work itself; in each, in view of the work, the remunerator renders the reward. But merit de condigno is perfect merit, because it brings condignity and equality of the meritorious work with the reward. But merit de congruo is less perfectly merit, because that title of the work does not attain to this condignity and equality; but the defect of this must be supplied by the bounty and liberality of the remunerator. Hence merit de condigno demands the reward from some justice; but merit de congruo demands the reward from the liberality of the giver. Therefore the notion of merit is analogous, not indeed by extrinsic and metaphorical analogy, but intrinsic, through a certain imperfect participation of merit in merit de congruo, but through perfect participation in merit de condigno. Therefore merit de congruo must be known through its relation to merit de condigno, of which it is a certain participation falling short of its perfection.

n. 16.

Since supernatural merit depends intrinsically upon grace, the increase and diminution of merit arise from a threefold head: from greater or lesser voluntariness, because merit is a free act; from greater service of God, because merit is service rendered to another; from the greater grace with which one acts, because merit before God is supernatural. "Since merit," says St. Thomas, "does not consist in a habit, but in an act, nor in any act whatever, but in that which is informed by the habit of grace, and since every meritorious act proceeds from the will, merit must have something from grace, and something from the will, and something also from the object of the act, whence the species of the act is drawn; and therefore from these three the efficacy of meriting can be measured: from grace, will, and object. For by as much as an act is informed by greater charity and grace, by so much is it more meritorious; similarly also, by as much as it is more voluntary, it has more of the notion of merit and of the praiseworthy; similarly also when the object is more arduous, by so much is the act more meritorious... But that some arduous thing increases the notion of merit it does not have from the difficulty of the labor, but from goodness, because by as much as something is better, by so much it is more elevated above the powers of the man working... except accidentally, namely insofar as toward that which is difficult someone rises up with greater attention and with a greater striving of the will." II Sent., dist. 29, q. 1, a. 4.

n. 17.

Now, however, whether it be merit de condigno or merit de congruo, on the part of the meritorious work the following conditions are required:

n. 17.

1. For merit of reward before God there is required a proper and positive act of the will. - For merit properly so called contains an order to retribution because of service rendered to another, i.e., because of a work done for his utility or for his honor and glory. But this service is not done without some positive act. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, a. 5; II-II, q. 79, a. 1; Suarez, De Grat., bk. 12, ch. 2.

n. 18.

1. It belongs to the notion of a meritorious act that it be free from necessity. - For indeed Sacred Scripture and the Fathers ascribe reward only to works freely done. Moreover, from the merit or demerit of human acts the freedom of the human will is deduced. Therefore merit or demerit includes freedom of acting. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3; q. 114, a. 3; Suarez, l. c., ch. 3.

n. 19.

1. A meritorious work must be morally good. - In Sacred Scripture and among the Fathers it is never read that God will remunerate indifferent acts with reward, and much less evil acts, but only good and supernatural acts. Moreover an evil work is not worthy of reward, but of punishment. But an indifferent act either is not given in the individual, or if it is given, by its nature it does not demand reward rather than punishment. Lastly, merit is service rendered to another, of itself apt to obtain something after the manner of retribution or reward. But only a morally good work can redound to the service of God, to his honor and glory. Suarez, l. c., ch. 4.

n. 20.

1. In order to have a meritorious work it is in no way required that it be a work of supererogation, or that the work be done spontaneously without the obligation of a precept. - Sacred Scripture and the Fathers everywhere teach that the reward of eternal life has been promised to the observation of the precepts. Moreover, man does not merit before God from the fact that he does something which is useful to God, but insofar as he works for his glory. But he works for his glory even in things commanded. Finally, a precept neither takes away nor diminishes man's freedom; it neither takes away nor diminishes the honorableness of the work; it neither takes away nor diminishes the notion of service; indeed rather it increases it, since it adds to the virtuous work the circumstance of formal or virtual obedience. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1, ad 1; Suarez, l. c., ch. 5.

n. 21.

1. For theological merit it is required that the act be supernatural, or proceeding from the aid of grace. - For from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, all our merits are gifts of God. St. Augustine, Ep. 194, ch. 5, n. 19: "When God crowns our merits, he crowns nothing other than his own gifts." The reason is that merit and reward must be of the same order, so that if the reward exceeds the powers of nature, the merit also exceeds them; for there must be proportion between merit and reward. St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3; I-II, q. 109, a. 5; Suarez, l. c., ch. 33.

n. 22.

1. That an act be meritorious, it is more probably required that it be from some supernatural motive. - For Sacred Scripture, when it promises eternal life to moral works, adds something which signifies that those works must be done from a supernatural motive. It promises eternal life to works done for Christ, for the name of Christ, in the name of Christ, etc. Moreover, Scripture and the Fathers teach that the just man lives by faith, that faith is the beginning, root, and foundation of justification, and consequently that man does not merit except through works done from faith. But faith proposes a supernatural end to our works. Indeed supernatural merit must have a relation to God, the supernatural end of man. Hence the Apostle at Heb. 11:6: "To those who... seek glory and incorruption and honor, he will render eternal life." Namely, to those who intend by their works glory and honor before God, and incorruptible or supernatural goods, God will repay eternal life. Furthermore those acts are meritorious of eternal life which are elicited by infused virtues. But infused virtues are distinguished in species from acquired virtues according to order to the ultimate end and according to their proper objects. "Intention makes the work good; faith directs the intention." St. Augustine, on Psalm 31, n. 4. "But, because what does not proceed from the fountain of faith does not arrive at eternal rewards, the condition of heavenly works is one thing, that of earthly works another." St. Leo the Great, Sermon 7 on Lent, ch. 3;

n. 22.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 63, a. 4; Suarez, l. c., ch. 10; Maur., bk. 6, q. 92; Struggl, part 8. Cf. here n. 6 ff.

n. 23.

1. Finally, for theological merit there is required an act absolutely existing in some difference of time. - The words of Christ, Luke 10:13, clearly prove this: "If in Tyre and Sidon the mighty works had been done which have been done in you, they would long ago have done penance, sitting in sackcloth and ashes." Here merits are had as conditionally existing, but nevertheless without reward; for in the following verse the same judgment is asserted as going to be upon these cities as upon Sodom. And indeed an efficient cause, although morally, as merit is, must be presupposed to its effect according to real existence, at least in the order of nature. But what would be future under a condition never existing, neither is, nor is future, nor was. And hence it does not have real existence.

n. 24.

On the part of the person meriting, in order that an act be meritorious, the state of a wayfarer is required. - The state of the way, positively, is the state of this mortal life, which according to the common and ordinary law is spent in this world; negatively, it is the state in which one has not yet obtained the vision and fruition of God, but tends to it through faith. - For indeed Sacred Scripture plainly teaches that the time of life alone is the time of merit, and that the time of death is the time of retribution. The Fathers also teach the same. The a priori reason is the will of God alone; the reason of fittingness is that merit has the notion of the way, reward the notion of the terminus. But the present life, in which we walk by faith, is the state of the way with respect to the future life, in which we shall see God face to face, and which has the notion of terminus with respect to the former. Hence the Blessed in heaven do not merit; likewise neither do the souls being purified merit, but they only satisfy by suffering. St. Thomas, I, q. 62, a. 9; III, q. 19, a. 3; Suarez, chs. 15, 34. - The Blessed "are not in a state of acquiring according to anything of themselves; and therefore they merit neither for themselves nor for others, because what they now impetrate for us happens from this, that previously, while they were living, they merited that they should impetrate this." St. Thomas, III Sent., dist. 18, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; I, q. 62, a. 9.

n. 25.

On the part of God rewarding, for theological merit it is required that there be present a divine ordination of merit to reward, at least consequent, or such by which the work is accepted unto actual and efficacious merit of a determinate reward. - Such-and-such an ordination of merit to such-and-such a reward from the divine will is to be distinguished from a rigorous promise, by which God has obligated himself to giving such a reward to one so working. Theologians scarcely distinguish between the two; but it seems better that the distinction be made with Suarez, "for there could be ordination without promise, by establishing conditions sufficient for merit, and nevertheless not obligating himself to giving the reward, but reserving this to his own liberality; although, on the contrary, there cannot be a promise of reward without a previous ordination of merit." Suarez, l. c., ch. 17, n. 1. That ordination in two ways can be understood first antecedently, and it is the will anteceding the work itself, of accepting it, if it is done, for such a reward; secondly consequently, and it is the will following upon the work itself, accepting it, now actually posited, for such a reward. Merit is compared to this divine institution and ordination in such a way that from it it has that it is efficacious and actual, so to speak. For although before that divine ordination and acceptance an act can be called meritorious of itself, or in first act and aptitude, nevertheless in the being of actual merit and in its efficacy it is consummated through that ordination and acceptance. Therefore merit must be distinguished in first act and in aptitude for obtaining a reward; and thus merit is nothing other than a work condign and equal to the reward, or suitable and merely congruous for obtaining the same; and merit in second act and in efficacy of reward, and this is the exigency which merit has for reward, which is not present to it except from positive ordination and promise. Hence for merit in first act ordination and promise are not required, but these are required for merit in second act. Some ordination of God is necessary for theological merit, because God, who disposes all things sweetly and wisely, and does not add anything superfluous, has in fact disposed it so, as that well-known sentence indicates: "So great is the mercy of God, that he has willed those things to be our merits which are his gifts." Celestine Pope, Ep. to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 9. Moreover the proportion of dignity or congruity which is in the work itself, unless either law or pact or certainly some positive ordination is had, is not sufficient for having a perfect relation between merit and reward, as is evident from human affairs themselves. That dignity or congruity of the work can be only its foundation. Suarez, l. c., ch. 17.

n. 26.

As regards merit de condigno, on the part of the meritorious work itself, in order that the supernatural act of a just man be condignly meritorious of the substantial reward, it is not required that it be elicited or commanded by charity. - For the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 16, indiscriminately attributes merit of eternal life to all good works done in God. "The principal place of meriting," says St. Thomas, III Sent., dist. 30, a. 5, "is in charity; but in the others, according as they are informed by charity." Therefore the root of charity is required, since works must be done in God, but it is not required that they be elicited by charity or formally commanded by charity. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 8; II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3; Suarez, De Grat., bk. 12, l. c., chs. 8, 9, 10, 12; Struggl, q. 2, a. 4.

n. 27.

To have merit de condigno, as has already been said, cf. n. 9, there is required in the work a foundation of condignity and of proportion with the reward. - For "merit and demerit are spoken of in order to retribution, which is made according to justice." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3. But the notion of justice imports a certain equality of things with one another. St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, a. 3; Suarez, l. c., ch. 17.

n. 28.

For merit de condigno, on the part of the person meriting, the state of grace is necessary. - This is clearly proved from Sacred Scripture, which promises eternal life only to the adopted sons of God. And the reason is clear, for then a sinful man, if it were otherwise, could before the remission of sin merit eternal life by a special help of God, while at the same time he merits eternal death, because he is a sinner. Therefore merit de condigno is founded not only in the excellence of the work, but also in the dignity of the person and friendship with God. Moreover, he who has merit de condigno has a right to eternal life. But this right belongs only to sons and friends by virtue of sanctifying grace. Therefore only those who are in the state of grace can have merit de condigno of eternal life. And the same is consequently evident concerning merit de condigno of habitual grace, which is the pledge of glory. Finally the dignity of the work is especially drawn from the dignity of the person working; for operations are of supposits. But without the state of grace there is not had the dignity of the person working with respect to eternal life; for a person without grace remains in the natural order, most distant from supernatural beatitude. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 2; Suarez, l. c., ch. 14; Bellarmine, De Iustif., bk. 5, ch. 12.

n. 29.

Therefore acts which are elicited with supernatural help of grace have of themselves only suitability to some supernatural reward. But condignity is not had in them except from the very dignity of the person. Indeed the condignity of merit according to the Angelic Doctor is considered both according to the virtue of the Holy Spirit, who is the principal principle of the supernatural meritorious act, and according to the dignity of grace, by which man becomes a sharer of the divine nature, and consequently can work worthily of God. Then it plainly appears how the reward of eternal life, which is the proper inheritance of the sons of God, not of servants, is given as a condign reward not to servants, but to sons, namely to those who are endowed with sanctifying grace, through which they are constituted sons of God. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 3. Cf. here nn. 11, 35.

n. 30.

Even if dignity and proportion are supposed in the works, nevertheless, in order that they be actually meritorious de condigno of such a reward, on the part of God rewarding there is necessary a divine ordination, through which glory, for example, has been proposed as a reward to be obtained through such works, and by which God has decreed to accept such works unto the merit of such glory. "The mode and measure of human virtue is from God. And therefore the merit of man before God cannot exist except according to the presupposition of the divine ordination; namely, that man should obtain from God through his own operation, as a reward, that to which God has deputed for him the power of operating; just as also natural things obtain through their proper motions and operations that to which they have been ordered by God; yet differently, because the rational creature moves itself to acting through free choice, whence its action has the notion of merit, which is not found in other creatures." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1. Now, however, besides the intrinsic ordination of grace itself, some extrinsic ordination is needed, already explained above at the beginning of this number. For merit de condigno is certainly spoken of in order to retribution, which is made according to justice. But retribution according to justice cannot be had if the other does not accept that merit. For retribution according to justice restores equality. But unless the other accepts that merit, no inequality can arise between the one meriting and the remunerator; this inequality arises only then, when the remunerator accepts the merit. Therefore for merit de condigno there is required a divine ordination by which God accepts such merit, and by which he proposes such a reward to be obtained. Suarez, l. c., ch. 17.

n. 31.

Once divine ordination alone is admitted, insofar as this is distinguished from any promise and convention, the meritorious act is ordered by the seed of grace by God to causing eternal life, just as other natural acts are ordered to their own termini. Besides this ordination Cajetan denies another pact, or promise, or, as he says against Scotus, another superadded ordination. Therefore an act through grace is meritorious from this alone, that it is from grace, that it is of such a nature, and God cannot deny reward to it, since God, who ordered it, cannot act against himself. And this, says Cajetan, is founded on the words of the Apostle, if sons, heirs. "Because to an obedient son and one working as a son, the paternal inheritance is owed by the very strict right alone, so that he cannot be deprived except unjustly. But grace alone constitutes sons of God, with any ordination whatsoever excluded. Therefore." And it is confirmed because "a human act, from the fact that it is morally good or evil, has the notion of merit or demerit even before God. For from this it follows that, from this very fact that the act is good, it is ordered by God to reward." On I-II, q. 114, a. 3. But if the discussion is of the intrinsic ordination of grace, insofar as by the force of grace alone the just man is an adopted son of God, having a right to eternal life, and his works are worthy of eternal life, without another promise, this indeed is most true, but merit and reward are not yet had properly and formally. For a distinction must be made. "For it is one thing for a work to be worthy of some wage or reward, but another for such a wage or reward to be owed to the work from justice. For it can happen that someone labors a whole day in another's vineyard, and his labor is worthy of a day's stipend, and nevertheless the other is not bound from justice to pay him that stipend, unless he has made an agreement with him. So the matter stands in the proposed case. The works of a just man existing in the state of grace are worthy in themselves and have proportion with eternal life, because they proceed from grace, which is the seed of glory; nevertheless God is not bound from justice to compensate those works, with pact and promise excluded. Hence it can rightly and briefly be said that works of this sort, with promise excluded, are worthy of eternal life, not by dignity of justice, but of proportion of means to end. But once the promise is posited, they merit eternal life from justice." Becanus, Tr. 4, De Mer. Cath., ch. 5, q. 1, n. 12. "The sixth condition (of merit)," says Billuart, De Grat., diss. 6, art. 1, "is the ordination or promise and pact of God ordering a good work to a prize or reward: not that the good work has its intrinsic value or condignity from that promise, but because beyond the dignity, which it has wholly from grace, there is necessary a promise concerning the reward to be rendered, in order that he who has worked well from grace may have a right to the reward, and God may be obligated to render it to him. Thus commonly."

n. 32.

Merit de condigno before God is in reality preceded by the divine promise made to such a work, or, what is the same, to a man under the condition of such a work. For this is positively evident from Sacred Scripture and the tradition of the Fathers, and agrees better with reason. For merit de condigno in second act, besides condignity and equality, imports an actual right to the reward on the part of the one meriting, and a debt on the part of the one rewarding. But God cannot be obligated by another, except by himself and by his own promise. Hence the Council of Mainz, ch. 8, says: The works of the just are worthy of the remuneration of eternal life, because God has mercifully promised reward to those working well. Bellarmine, De Iustific., bk. 5, ch. 14. And if St. Thomas says that God is not simply a debtor to others, but to himself, the Angelic Doctor attends to the first root of that debt, which cannot be other than God himself, interposing his own promise. Therefore because "our action does not have the notion of merit except from the presupposition of the divine ordination, it does not follow that God becomes simply debtor to us, but to himself, insofar as it is owed that his ordination be fulfilled." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1, ad 3. - Therefore the merit of a just man before God is certainly not from the rigor of justice. The rigor of justice requires such a contract that between the contracting parties no grace and liberality intervene in which the merit is founded. But this does not occur between God and man, because the whole merit of man is founded in the grace and liberality of God, especially in justifying grace, which is given to him gratuitously, and in the liberal promise of God, by which he willed to repay reward to our merits, which by many titles are owed to him. There is added also, according to the common opinion of the Scholastics, that God remunerates the works of the just above the condign. - Nevertheless, to render a reward condign to merits certainly belongs to justice, according to equality or proportion to be preserved between reward and merit. But this justice or equality to be preserved can rest only on the wise Governance of the Community, as is drawn from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 4, and therefore on legal justice; it can rest on a promise wholly gratuitous, and therefore on fidelity; and it can also rest on some convention and pact, and therefore on justice at least in some way commutative. Hence to render a reward condign to merits will be a work of justice also, if the debt and the obligation of the same are considered. There are those who in theological merit deny every debt of justice in God, even with God's promise supposed, and admit only an obligation of fidelity, namely insofar as God would be unfaithful if he did not keep what was promised, but would do injury to no one. But there are also those who admit a debt of justice from the divine promise, by which God is bound to render the promised remuneration not only by a debt of fidelity, but also by a debt of justice. - Lugo, De Incarn., disp. 3, sect. 1, 2; Suarez, l. c., ch. 18; Bellarmine, De Iustif., bk. 5, ch. 17.

This liberal promise of God being supposed, of eternal life "which God has promised to those loving him," Jas. 1:12, it follows that God owes to us, or to our merits, the reward of eternal life from some justice, and that he does not owe it to himself alone from his mere liberality and fidelity, as is the most common opinion. "The impetration of prayer," says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 6, ad 2, "rests on mercy; but merit of condignity rests on justice; and therefore by praying man impetrates many things from divine mercy which nevertheless he does not merit according to justice." Cf. also ibid., next article, ad 1. Hence the same St. Thomas in II Sent., dist. 27, a. 3, in the earlier response to 4, saying that "God is not made debtor to us," adds: "Unless perhaps from a promise, because he himself has promised reward to those working good things, and therefore it is not unfitting if someone can merit from him, from which he is in some way a debtor." And Sacred Scripture plainly says that eternal life is a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render, 2 Tim. 4:7-8; that it is rendered according to debt, Rom. 4:4; that it is a reward, Wis. 5:16; Matt. 5:12; retribution, Col. 3:23-24; remuneration, Heb. 10:35; retribution, which is owed from convention, Matt. 20. Therefore eternal life is owed by more than simple fidelity, but from some true justice. "God is not unjust, who defrauds the just of the reward of justice." St. Augustine, Contra Julianum, bk. 4, ch. 3; Bellarmine, De Iustif., bk. 5, chs. 14, 18. The reason is clear. For, as Sylvius rightly argues on I-II, q. 114, a. 3, question 5, conclusion 1, "a promise under the condition of a condign work induces an obligation from justice, if it has been accepted and that work is furnished; but God promised eternal life under the condition of a good work, which, when it proceeds from grace in a just man, has condignity; and there is no doubt that the just man has accepted that promise either explicitly or implicitly. Therefore from this an obligation of justice arises. But God is he who made that promise. Therefore God is he who owes. For he is the debtor of the wage who hired the laborer and promised the wage."

n. 34.

This justice participates in commutative and distributive justice at once. For the formal notion of commutative justice is situated in the exchange of what is given and what is received, preserving equality of thing to thing, and assigning to each his own right. Now then, between merit and retribution a true exchange of what is given and what is received intervenes; for one thing is really given for another. But God, remunerating meritorious works, preserves that equality. For he who "renders to each according to his works," Matt. 16:27; Rom. 2:6; who "makes a place for each according to the merit of his works," Ecclus. 16:15; who "gives to each his reward according to his labor," 1 Cor. 3:8, plainly repays reward equal to merits. Moreover the lord of the vineyard "agreed with his workers for a denarius," Matt. 20:14, and assigns to each what is his own. "Take," he says, "what is yours and go." And the Apostle demands "his deposit" from the most just judge by the equity of justice. "I am certain, because the just judge is able to keep my deposit unto that day." 2 Tim. 1:12. Indeed the right of reward, acquired by one's own labors and equal works, and founded in the pact of the remunerator, "I will give if you do," is a proper right, which in moral estimation is equated to possession itself, or to a right in the thing. Therefore, if in the justice of God repaying reward to merits there is present a true exchange of what is given and received, if equality of reward and merit is not lacking, if a proper right of man with respect to God, even though built upon the pact of God as upon a solid and most firm foundation, is abundantly found, assuredly that justice contains the true and formal notion of commutative justice. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 16, after it had said that eternal life must be faithfully rendered to the good works and merits of the just, according as fidelity is general to every promise, immediately specifying it adds: "For this is that crown of justice which the Apostle said was laid up for him after his combat and course, to be rendered to him by the just judge, and not only to him, but also to all who love his coming." Suarez, De Grat., bk. 12, ch. 30.

n. 35.

The Angelic Doctor acknowledges the equality of condign merit to reward in II Sent., dist. 27, a. 3, and I-II, q. 114, a. 3, where at the third objection he says: "It must be said that the grace of the Holy Spirit, which we have in the present, although it is not equal to glory in act, is nevertheless equal in virtue, as the seed of a tree, in which there is the virtue toward the whole tree. And similarly through grace the Holy Spirit inhabits man, who is the sufficient cause of eternal life; hence he is also said to be the pledge of our inheritance, 2 Cor. 1." St. Thomas acknowledges a right in man in the body of the same article, saying: The price of the work is also considered according to the dignity of grace, through which man, having been made a sharer of the divine nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the inheritance is owed by the very right of adoption, according to that in Rom. 8:17: if sons, then heirs." Likewise the same Angelic Doctor explicitly acknowledges an exchange of what is given and received, and therefore commutative justice: "The form of divine judgment is considered according to the notion of commutative justice, according as rewards are recompensed to merits and punishments to sins." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 61, a. 4, ad 1. "Proportional retribution belongs to commutative justice when it is considered according to a legal debt, as if it is confirmed by pact that so much be repaid for so much." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 106, a. 1, ad 2; III, q. 85, a. 3.

n. 36.

But the Angelic Doctor does not remove every commutative justice from God, but only commutative justice properly so called, which includes equality of quantity, or perfect equality; not commutative justice less properly such, which consists in respective equality and equality of proportion. "But this pertains," says St. Thomas, "to the mode of commutative justice, not indeed according to equality of quantity preserved, according as is required in commutative justice properly so called, but preserved according to equality of proportion; because namely God is related to that which he does superabundantly as the creature is to that in which it is deficient... Between master and servant there cannot be commutative justice properly so called; for no equality according to quantity can be constituted between them, since everything that belongs to the servant belongs to the master; nevertheless some mode of commutative justice is preserved, insofar as equality of proportion is found between them. Hence also the Philosopher distinguishes dominative justice from political justice, which is justice properly so called; and in this way also there can be justice of God toward creatures." IV Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, c., ad 4.

n. 37.

But the retribution of eternal life participates in distributive justice by the very fact that each one receives a reward equal to his merits. For according as the merits will be greater or lesser, the reward will be greater or lesser, preserving due proportion with them, not from insufficiency of the reward, but from the very nature of the thing, because from one equality another necessarily results, with a multitude of persons and a variety of rewards supposed. Suarez, De Grat., bk. 12, ch. 32. "In the rendering of reward to merits, the form of distribution is preserved more than of commutation, since he renders to each according to his works, whereas God receives nothing from us." St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3. Indeed God receives nothing from us, and nevertheless God has been made debtor to us, as has already been said, by his promise. Hence Augustine, Sermon 16 on the Words of the Lord, says: "God has been made debtor to us, not by receiving something, but by promising what pleased him." And St. Bernard, at the end of the book On Grace and Free Choice: "Promised indeed from mercy, but nevertheless to be paid from justice." And God preserves the form and proportion of justice between work and reward, as is indicated in Matt. 7:2; 10:41, and 1 Cor. 3:8. "Each shall receive his proper reward according to his labor." Therefore in the retribution of eternal life the form of commutative and distributive justice is preserved. For God not only gives to each as much reward as he has merited, which is the form of commutative justice, in which equality of thing to thing, or of what is given and what is received, is preserved; but he also preserves this proportion between merits and rewards, that the greater merits each one has, the greater rewards he receives. Becanus, Tr. 4, De Merito Cathol., ch. 5, q. 8, n. 6.

n. 38.

A meritorious work proceeding from grace and the Holy Spirit can be compared to God as retributor. And thus only the notion of dominative or paternal justice is had. For between God and any creature whatever, much less than between father and son, there can be justice simply. For man in grace is a pure creature, and an adoptive son obtains no more justice before the father than a son simply. And it is confirmed from that saying of the Apostle, 2 Tim. 4: which the Lord, the just judge, will render. But if it is referred to the reward, namely to eternal life, thus there is the notion of justice simply and equality, yet equality not in act, but in virtue, as is the seed of a tree, in which there is the virtue toward the whole tree, a fountain toward springing water, a pledge toward a debt. "Concerning the notion of justice," says Cajetan on I-II, q. 114, a. 1, "found in the merit of man before God, note that such merit, beyond the relations which it has to the man meriting and to God as preordaining, has two others: one to the reward, another to the renderer of the reward. And indeed, if the merit of man is compared to God, justice simply will never be found. But if the merit of man is compared to the reward owed according to itself, thus it is not unfitting that the merit should be equivalent to the reward to be rendered, and that an act of so great a value be ordered by God to an equivalent reward. And since the reward to be rendered by God, however much according to itself it may be equivalent to the merit, nevertheless as it is rendered by God, exceeds the merit of man, for whom there cannot be equality simply to God in anything; therefore simply there cannot be merit simply of man toward God, but according to proportion, although absolutely there can be merit simply and justice of man toward the reward itself."

…and 17 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 5 passages

Vol. I, Treatise on Human Acts, Ch. III, Art. II, Appendix. On the Merit of Human Acts

- A meritorious act is a good work, posited with grace, and worthy of a reward or retribution.

Merit is distinguished as twofold: 1. merit de condigno, to which reward is due from justice, that is, from the promise of God; 2. merit de congruo, to which reward is not due from justice, but from a certain becomingness and liberality of God.

I say 1. A just man operating through grace can truly and properly merit de condigno. - It is clear from Matt. 5. 12: Your reward is abundant in heaven; and 2 Tim. 4. 8: There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me on that day. It is also clear from Trent, session 6, ch. 15, where eternal life is declared to be a reward to be rendered, from the promise of God, to the merits of those working well.

I say 2. Man, even a sinner and unbeliever, can by acts posited with grace merit de congruo. - It is clear from various places of Sacred Scripture in which are related examples of sinners and gentiles to whom God granted abundant graces in consideration of their good works. Thus in Acts of the Apostles 10 Cornelius is said to have obtained conversion to the true Faith by his alms and prayers ¹.

¹ The example of Cornelius perhaps is less to the point. For he must not be held as an unbeliever, who in the sacred letters (Acts 10. 2) is called religious and fearing God, nor as a sinner, who (ibid., v. 22) is called just and fearing God. But he can be considered justified through charity. For before the Gospel was promulgated to him, faith in Christ was not necessary for him in order to have charity.

YOU WILL ASK 2. What can man merit de condigno?

Vol. II, Fundamental Moral Theology…, On Human Acts — Chapter I: On Free Acts · Vol. II, Fundamental Moral Theology…, On Human Acts — Chapter III: On the Merit of the Human Act

Hence good works done from grace are of a threefold genus, namely 1. Living works, or good works done in the state of sanctifying grace. - 2. Mortified works, or good works which indeed were performed in the state of grace, but lost all merit through subsequent mortal sin, yet with sanctifying grace recovered, they revive. - 3. Dead works, which are done in the state of mortal sin. But these, although they do not have the reward of eternal life, can nevertheless be profitable for merit de congruo.

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 2 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On Human Acts

n. 89.

Merit of Human Acts

"2. Just as an evil work by its nature is meritorious of eternal death, so a good work by its nature is meritorious of eternal life. - 4. Eternal life was promised to man in his integrity and to the angel in view of good works, and good works by the law of nature suffice of themselves for attaining it. - 15. The reason of merit does not consist in this, that those who act well have grace and the indwelling Holy Spirit, but in this alone, that they obey the divine law." Condemned propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by St. Pius V.

n. 89.

"1. If anyone shall say that man can be justified before God by his works, whether done through human nature or through the teaching of the law, without divine grace through Jesus Christ: let him be anathema. - 2. If anyone shall say that divine grace through Christ Jesus is given only for this, that man may more easily live justly and merit eternal life, as though through free will without grace he could do both, though with hardship and difficulty: let him be anathema." Council of Trent, sess. 6, canons.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 11 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. II, Fundamental Moral Theology…, On Human Acts — Chapter I: On Free Acts

n. 85.

§ II. Concerning the Supernatural Principles Concurring Toward a Meritorious Act.

Natural faculties, aided by divine concurrence, indeed suffice for eliciting an act naturally good, provided it is not too arduous;¹ but, since in fact we have been ordered to a supernatural end, it is useful to say certain things in passing concerning those principles which are superadded to our nature for making a meritorious act.

¹ What fallen man can and cannot do, without grace, as to ethically good works, was declared in the treatise concerning Grace, n. 33-48. - In the same treatise all those things which concur toward a meritorious act are set forth more fully.

The Christian, by receiving baptism, is constituted an adoptive son of God and heir of the heavenly kingdom, and receives a certain participation of the divine nature, namely habitual grace, by force of which human nature is elevated to the supernatural state, and radically becomes capable of acting meritoriously; at the same time virtues are infused into the powers of the soul, which perfect them and render them proximately apt for eliciting supernatural acts; to these are added the gifts of the Holy Spirit, for performing more perfect and more arduous works by a certain divine instinct. Finally, that our faculties, already adorned with supernatural virtues and gifts, may break forth into act and in fact elicit supernatural works, undeserved helps are provided to them, which are called actual graces. Thus in Christians nature is perfected by grace; faculties are completed by infused virtues and gifts; the concurrence by which God cooperates with our acts is supernatural; thus we are able to act not only honorably, but also supernaturally and meritoriously.

But when habitual grace and charity are lost by mortal sin, faith and hope remain in the soul, provided someone has not sinned gravely against these virtues; nor are actual graces denied to him, by whose aid he is able to elicit supernatural acts¹ of fear of God, hope, penance, and love, and to recover sanctifying grace.

¹ These acts of the sinner are indeed supernatural, but not meritorious de condigno, as is declared in the treatise concerning Grace.

n. 86.

1. But infidels, who have not been justified by baptismal regeneration, receive at the opportune time undeserved helps, by whose aid they can fulfill the natural law. When for some time they have observed this law, God, according to the common opinion, kindly bestows on them, not from justice, but from mercy, certain actual graces of illumination; if they consent to these, they will be led step by step to faith, hope, charity, and justification; but once justified, they are equated with Christians, and can truly merit. - All these things indeed are set forth at length in the treatise concerning Grace.²

² Since in the present Treatise we are able to touch these things only in passing, the professor, according to various circumstances, will explain the same things more or less to his students.

Vol. II, Fundamental Moral Theology…, On Human Acts — Chapter III: On the Merit of the Human Act

n. 197.

I. The Nature of Supernatural Merit.

1. Notion. Meritorious acts are distinguished from supernatural acts in this, that more conditions are required for merit properly so called than for the supernatural.

All honorable acts are called supernatural which proceed from a supernatural principle (i.e. from a faculty elevated by grace, whether habitual or actual), and at the same time are elicited from a motive known through revelation;¹ hence certain acts of unbelievers, by which they prepare themselves for justification, are supernatural, although they are not properly meritorious, from what is to be said.

¹ Certain theologians, with Noldin (n. 79-80), assert that the former condition suffices, and that it is not required that the motive be supernatural; for, when the root and principle of the act is something supernatural, the fruit or effect must also be supernatural. Yet others more commonly reject that opinion; for since acts are specified by the formal object, supernatural works differ from natural works by reason of the formal object, or motive. - To compose the dispute, perhaps it could be said that an act elicited under the influence of actual grace is already supernatural inchoatively, but does not become totally supernatural unless there is added a motive known by faith.

But a meritorious act is a good and supernatural work done on account of God, from which, divine ordination being posited, there arises a right to supernatural retribution.

It is called (a) a good and supernatural work, so that thus it may be distinguished from natural merit by which someone can obtain a merely natural reward; thus an unbeliever, by acting honorably, can obtain some natural recompense. But a meritorious work ought to be supernatural both by reason of the principle, insofar as it is done under the influence of grace, and more probably by reason of the end, insofar as it is done at least implicitly on account of a supernatural end, as will be declared below. (b) On account of God; for if some work is not done on account of God, there is no reason why retribution should be expected from Him. (c) From which there arises a right...; in this consists the essence of merit, and it is distinguished from impetration; for merit gives a certain right to retribution, while impetration gives no right, but obtains favor from mere mercy. (d) Yet there is added, divine ordination being posited; for unless God had willed to give us supernatural retribution on account of our good works, we would have no right to it: all that we have or do is from God and is owed to God, and therefore we can have no strict right relative to God, unless He Himself confers such a right upon us. (e) To supernatural retribution; in this merit is distinguished from satisfaction; for satisfaction compensates for the injury brought against God, while merit is ordered to obtaining reward.¹

¹ Therefore a threefold value can be present in our works: impetratory, which arises from petition clothed with due conditions, and is founded partly on the mercy of God, partly on His promises; meritorious, which arises from the supernatural work itself done on account of God, and is founded partly on justice, partly on the divine promise; satisfactory, insofar as it is a penal work which is accepted by God as compensation for the injury brought against Him. In the prayer of the just this threefold value can be found: insofar as it fittingly asks from God, it can impetrate; insofar as it performs a supernatural work acceptable to God, it can merit grace; but insofar as it performs a difficult and laborious work, it makes satisfaction for its sins.

n. 198.

1. Species. A twofold merit is usually distinguished:

(a) Merit de condigno is that to which a reward is owed from justice, or at least from fidelity: from justice, when the work of itself equals the reward; from fidelity, when a promise is present, by force of which the reward, although exceeding the work, is nevertheless infallibly granted. Merit de condigno is true merit, or merit simply and properly so called, and therefore theologians intend to speak of it as often as they do not expressly signify otherwise.

(b) Merit de congruo is that to which reward is owed not from justice or fidelity, but from mere fittingness. - To explain the difference between each, certain theologians use this comparison: a soldier who conducted himself very strenuously in war has a twofold merit: he merits de condigno the stipend promised to soldiers; but he merits de congruo, besides the ordinary stipend, to be promoted to some dignity.

In the Treatise De Gratia (n. 193-204), it is proved that a justified man, that is, one placed in the state of grace, can truly merit an increase of grace and eternal life; here therefore it will suffice to set forth the conditions required for merit, especially the conditions required for merit de condigno; for the conditions for merit de congruo are the same, with two exceptions, namely the state of grace and the promise of God, which are not required for merit de congruo. - Conditions of this kind are taken: 1. on the part of the one operating; 2. on the part of the work; 3. on the part of God.

n. 199.

II. Conditions for Merit on the Part of the One Operating.

For merit de condigno, two things are required: the state of wayfarer and the state of grace.

The state of wayfarer. (A) For God willed that man merit eternal life while he was dwelling on earth, or in the state of probation. (a) This is certainly proved by those texts of Scripture in which the Prophets, Christ, and the Apostles exhort the faithful that, while they live, they operate good, and thus prepare themselves for judgment, or for the coming of Christ; since, as St. Paul says,¹ "we must all be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may receive the proper things of the body," that is, those things which were done in the body, or during mortal life. For these suppose that after death there is not given a place for penance or merit. (b) This indeed is confirmed not only from the unanimous consent of the Fathers and theologians of all schools, who taught and teach this as one of the primary Christian truths; but also from the intimate persuasion of all the faithful, who therefore wish to act well in the present life or to be reconciled with God before death, because they believe that after death there is no redemption. Wherefore it can be said that this truth was implicitly defined by the ordinary and infallible magisterium of the Church.

¹ II Cor., V, 10.

(B) Reason shows that this is fitting. For it is necessary that the time of probation, through which man can merit or demerit, receive an end; but it altogether befits that this time receive its end at the point of death: for as long as the soul is joined to the corruptible body, on the one hand it is not capable of the beatific vision, and on the other it is in a state most apt for meriting, because it can use the body for acquiring perfection, and in the miseries of this life can find ampler opportunities for meriting. Therefore. Yet we admit that that argument is only an argument of fittingness, because the time of probation depends on the will of God alone.

n. 200.

Moreover, the state of sanctifying grace is required. It is certain: (a) From Scripture. For Christ says: "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it remain in the vine; so neither can you, unless you remain in Me";¹ but no one remains in Christ except through habitual grace; therefore. Likewise St. Paul:² "And if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor... but have not charity" (and consequently habitual grace), "it profits me nothing."

¹ John, XV, 4.

² I Cor., XIII, 3.

(b) From Tradition. From the decree of Trent, in which it is declared that the works of a justified man truly merit;³ for a justified man is said to be one who is adorned with habitual grace; and from the condemnation of the proposition of Baius denying that sanctifying grace is necessary for merit.⁴

³ "If anyone shall say that the good works of a justified man... do not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself... and also increase of glory; A. S." (Trent, sess. VI, can. 32).

⁴ Apud Denzinger, n. 895; cf. nn. 882, 892.

(c) From theological reason. It is certainly repugnant that someone merit de condigno with God, when otherwise he is an enemy of God and worthy of eternal punishment; but a sinner, not yet justified, is hateful to God and worthy of eternal punishment; therefore he cannot at the same time merit eternal life. - Moreover, there ought to be some proportion between work and reward; but the reward concerning which we are treating is within the order of supernatural filiation; therefore we can be heirs of eternal life insofar as we are adoptive sons of God: "if sons, also heirs";⁵ but only through habitual grace are we made adoptive sons of God; therefore only through this grace do we merit.⁶

⁵ Rom., VIII, 17.

⁶ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 3.

n. 201.

III. Conditions on the Part of the Work.

There are three: namely, the work must be free, honorable, and supernatural. 1. A meritorious work must be free, both from coercion and from necessity. It is of faith against the Jansenists.

For the following proposition was condemned as heretical: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices."¹ And in reality no one is rewarded or punished unless he is master of his acts; but man is not master of his acts unless he is truly and intrinsically free. - This, however, does not prevent prescribed works from being meritorious; for God, by His goodness, has promised recompense even to prescribed works; thus, for example, love of enemies is prescribed, and yet it is a very meritorious work, according to that saying: "Love your enemies... and your reward shall be great";² indeed, a precept, other things being equal, increases merit, by adding to the work the merit of obedience.

¹ Apud Denzinger, n. 968. - The state of fallen nature is that in which man is placed after original sin; cf. De Deo Creante, n. 197-200.

² Luke, VI, 35.

n. 202.

1. Moreover it must be honorable, or naturally good, on the part of the object, end, and circumstances; for an evil work evidently cannot be rewarded, but on the contrary is worthy of punishment; but an indifferent work, if there is any in the individual case, of itself neither merits nor demerits; therefore only a good work can be rewarded. Yet a work indifferent of itself can be made good through a supernatural intention; indeed a work materially evil can, according to the common opinion, become good and meritorious, if it is honorable in the mind of the agent: for God looks upon the heart.

n. 203.

1. Supernatural (a) by reason of the principle, in the sense that it must be done under the influence of grace; this is admitted by all. But what grace is required? Certain theologians, ancient and modern,³ said that habitual grace suffices, without actual grace, because an act elicited under the influence of habitual grace and the infused virtues is already sufficiently supernatural by reason of the principle. - Yet the common opinion is that actual grace is required; for Christ said to the Apostles, already adorned with sanctifying grace: "Without Me you can do nothing";⁴ these words indeed are interpreted by the Fathers not only of habitual grace, but also of actual grace. Here also come all the texts brought forward in the Treatise De Gratia (n. 50-60), from which it is evident that even a just man can do nothing in the supernatural order without actual grace. Likewise Trent declares that the works of the just are not meritorious without the virtue of Christ which precedes, accompanies, and follows them; but grace preceding, accompanying, etc., is actual grace.¹ - Besides, that grace is never lacking to men of good will.

³ Thus D. Soto, De nat. et grat., l. III, c. 4; Terrien, La Grâce et la Gloire, Paris, 1897, t. II, p. 56-62.

⁴ John, XV, 5.

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16.

(b) By reason of the end or motive, according to the common opinion, in the sense that it must be done not from a human motive, but with at least implicit relation to God or to eternal life, according to that saying: "Whatever you do, do from the heart, as to the Lord and not to men, knowing that from the Lord you shall receive the retribution";² all the places where it is said that we ought to act on account of God prove the same.

² Coloss., III, 23.

Indeed, according to Thomists, it is required that that work be done under the influence of charity; yet the virtual influence suffices, which remains as long as the act of charity toward God, once elicited, has not been retracted. For they argue thus:³ in order that an act of some virtue be meritorious of eternal life, it ought to proceed from habitual grace; but from grace no act proceeds except through the mediation of charity: for every movement and influence of grace tends toward God, the supernatural ultimate end; therefore no act can be meritorious of eternal life unless it is referred to God, the supernatural ultimate end, at least virtually by charity. - Yet this is denied by not a few theologians, especially Suarez and Vasquez;⁴ for, Scripture being witness, eternal life is promised not only to acts of charity, but also to other supernatural works, namely obedience, poverty, meekness, and the rest of good works in general.⁵ Besides, any supernatural work performed in the state of grace has sufficient proportion with eternal life. And this seems to be the mind of St. Thomas, who often teaches that every honorable act performed by him who is placed in the state of grace and elicits an act of charity as often as this is prescribed, is meritorious, because it is habitually and implicitly referred to God (above, n. 191).⁶ - The controversy is more in the mode of conceiving than in the matter itself; for Thomists hold that all acts elicited by him who has charity, or is in the state of grace, are done virtually under the influence of charity and are meritorious, unless this is impeded by some disordering of the act. Besides, according to all, it is better often to offer our actions to God from the motive of charity: for thus merit is greatly increased.

³ Salmanticenses, disp. IV, n. 7.

⁴ Suarez, lib. XII, c. 9-10; Vasquez, Ia IIae, disp. 127.

⁵ Mark, III, 35; Matt., V, 3-6; Rom., II, 6; I Tim., VI, 17.

⁶ St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 2, a. 5; De Carit., q. un., a. 11, ad 2.

n. 204.

IV. Conditions on the Part of God.

In order that our works be truly meritorious, a positive ordination of God is required. For through merit de condigno we acquire a true right to reward; but a creature cannot acquire any strict right toward God unless some positive ordination of God is supposed: for all our acts are already owed to God by the manifold title of dependence, gratitude, etc.; hence, according to Trent, eternal life is "as a reward, from the promise of God Himself, to be rendered to the good works of the just."¹ Besides, our works, even supernatural ones, do not of themselves equal the reward granted to us, namely the beatific vision; and therefore our merit is not from mere justice, but partly from justice and partly from fidelity.

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16.

This can indeed be illustrated by a comparison: if some worker should labor of his own accord in the field of another person, without having been hired by him, he will not have a strict right to payment; but if he has done this from a pact, he will have a strict right to reward. Thus also we, while we labor in the vineyard of the Lord, cannot have a right to supernatural reward, unless God first has sent us into His vineyard and has declared a recompense to be annexed to such labor. Nevertheless it befits God so to act, because the worker is worthy of his pay, and it is fitting that happiness follow virtue.

n. 205.

Corollary. From this it is given to understand what circumstances can increase merit: 1. the greater excellence of the act itself, which is taken both from the object formally taken; for example, an act of charity is objectively better than an act of humility; and from the quantity of the work, for example in the case of alms; and from its difficulty: thus it is more meritorious to resist a grave temptation than a light one; 2. the end, or intention of the one operating; thus he merits more who acts from the motive of charity than he who acts from the motive of hope or fear; 3. greater intensity, or fervor, consisting in this, that we act with all our powers, with a great heart and a willing soul; likewise constancy in operating, which supposes a greater and more assiduous effort; 4. more intimate conjunction with Christ; for he who keeps himself more intimately united with Him derives from Him a greater power of meriting; for He Himself is the fountain and origin of all merits; and those who are joined to Him bring forth much fruit, according to the words of Christ Himself:¹ "He who remains in Me, and I in him, he bears much fruit."

¹ John, XV, 5.

Therefore let us act freely, honorably, and meritoriously, through Christ, and with Christ, and in Christ; and our works will truly be seeds of eternal life.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 14 passages

Vol. I, Tr. II, Title V: On the Human Act as Imputable and Meritorious · Vol. I, Tr. II, Tit. V, Art. II, § 1. On Merit

Vol. I, Tr. II, Title V: On the Human Act as Imputable and Meritorious

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Human Acts in…, Third Part: On Human Acts According to Supernatural and Meritorious Being · Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Human Acts in…, Third Part: On Human Acts …, First Question: On Merit, Especially Supernatural Merit

Usefulness. Human and moral acts tend to this, that they perfect man. The perfection of man depends upon imputability unto merit. Hence is evident the importance of this inquiry; and it is also clear from this, that there comes before us the explanation of a principle which has perpetual use in moral theology: the principle concerning the permission of evil and concerning the double effect.

n. 127.

Notions and division. Imputation is the attribution of some action, or of some effect, to someone as to its true free author. He who imputes, according to the varied case, praises, blames, rewards, chastises. But in him to whom something is imputed, there is had a title of honor, of glory, of ignominy, a right of obtaining some good, or a necessity, physical or moral, of bearing disagreeable consequences.

Both God and public power, ecclesiastical or civil, demand an account of actions. Hence there is distinguished moral imputation, in the forum of God and in the opinion of men ¹, and forensic imputation, or imputation in the human forum, to which the judge attends.

For the present condition of man, besides the general question of moral imputation, a special question is posited concerning supernatural imputation, in order to the merit of divine life.

¹ Why is imputation among men called moral? Because, as God does, so men consult no other norm in their opinion than the objective norm of honesty, by which conscience itself is regulated. In the human forum law and delict are considered.

Vol. I, Tr. II, Tit. V, Art. II, § 1. On Merit

n. 136.

Notion and general conditions. 1. Merit is the retribution, or quasi-price, of a good work ¹. For after it has been done, a good work is, as good, worthy of fitting retribution, or wages, before him to whom it is useful and acceptable in some way, or to whom it is ordered ²; and the action in which this title is present is called meritorious.

The common conditions of every merit are seen to be these: peace between the agent and the one making retribution, for a work done in the state of offense cannot be acceptable to the offended person ¹; a work freely done; a relation of the work to another's service; proportion between the work and the price; acceptance by him in whose service the work is offered.

Moreover the relation to another's good can either be innate in the work, or connatural, or it must be completed by a certain intention. Thus works by which a servant serves his master, indeed whatever things are nobly done by a son, are naturally referred to the master, to the father who is thereby honored; on the contrary, a literary work is indeed apt of itself to please readers, but it will bring honor or other utility only to those for whose sake the labor has been undertaken, or to whom it is offered to be read; and so a certain dedication or new intention must be added. Yet this intention, which accedes to a work complete in itself, must be carefully distinguished from the intention which constitutes and specifies the act.

¹ 1, 2, q. 114, art. 1; and q. 21, art. 4.

² 1, 2, q. 114, art. 2, ad 3.

¹ 1, 2, q. 114, art. 2, ad 3; and q. 21, art. 4.

n. 137.

Division. Merit can be human, before men, or theological, before God. The latter is said broadly of any divine remuneration, even temporal; strictly, of the retribution of eternal life.

Theological merit understood strictly in this way is customarily distinguished into merit de condigno and merit de congruo. Merit de condigno means the title of some justice or equality of proportion between the action and eternal life, insofar as the work truly becomes worthy of eternal life from divine ordination and the quality of the work. But in the dignity of the work, the dignity of the one working is included. Merit de congruo means a partial or inadequate title, to which nevertheless retribution is to be connected by some equity. Just as merit de condigno itself depends both upon divine ordination and upon man's free action, so there seems to us to be a twofold root of merit de congruo: one, the grace of God inviting, to which it is consonant that what He has begun He bring to its end; the other, the good effort of man: for it is fitting "that to a man working according to his own virtue God should recompense according to the excellence of His own virtue" ¹. Merit de condigno infallibly brings an increase of sanctifying grace or glory; merit de congruo gives actual aids, but is not infallibly joined with sanctifying grace, because man does not necessarily furnish the required cooperation. But for both kinds of merit the state of a wayfarer is required, since both immediately or mediately regard the retribution of eternal life.

Natural merit would befit the works of a man not elevated; supernatural merit is the merit of the present order; it befits the works which elevated man effects from grace.

¹ 1, 2, q. 114, art. 3.

n. 138.

Note concerning theological merit. From elsewhere we already know that nothing can be offered to God by a rational creature except external glory, which God wills as wise and holy, but does not seek as needy. Besides, these things must be well noted concerning the reward of eternal life. The reward of eternal life cannot be compared with those extrinsic and accidental rewards which men are accustomed to confer. But it must be called essential, insofar as man himself as a whole is ordered to it; insofar as, under the respect of beatitude, he is called by the intimate inclination of the will; insofar as it is loved and sought by every moral action. And it is intrinsic, insofar as it is the complement or perfection of man, such as he now is. Wherefore he who wills to act well is understood in reality to intend this, as he wills the harvest who sows it.

Nor is the reward only future: already now it is conferred on us inchoatively in sanctifying grace, although not yet in an inamissible mode.

Wherefore, even under this respect, a good action is a way to beatitude already present. Nor did Christ promise only future beatitude to His disciples through the repeated words: "Blessed are they who..." "Blessed shall you be when..."

n. 139.

Conditions of supernatural merit de condigno. These conditions are certainly required, the necessity of which the expositors of dogma demonstrate: 1. the state of grace; 2. the moral goodness of the work; 3. a supernatural principle, or the concurrence of actual supernatural grace.

n. 140.

On the universality of this merit. But it is controverted whether or not, besides these, a special intention, either of charity or of exercising a supernatural virtue, ought to move the agent to the act; not because, such an intention being excluded, an act done from supernatural grace would be thrust down to the natural order, but because the concurrence of that grace is bound together with such a motive by an individual nexus, so that either you have the supernatural motive with actual grace, or both are lacking together.

Those who require a motive of this sort admit, even in just men, acts which will be only naturally good.

The opinion which St. Thomas taught as certain is more pleasing to us: "Every act of one having charity either is meritorious or is sin, and none is indifferent" (in 2. S., d. 40, q. 1, art. 5).

This is already persuaded to us by the very silence of the Sacred Scriptures. For to merit eternal life is altogether principal in the Christian life. Therefore if a special intention is required for meriting, that condition will be read clearly in the revealed sources. But in fact the Sacred Scriptures nowhere expressly mention a moral honesty which in a just man does not pertain to salvation; rather, with no mention made of a supernatural motive, they simply commend various morally good works, for example where they are said to proclaim pure religion ¹, so that Christ Himself said in express words: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments" ². They exclude from reward merely a work done from the not right end of vanity and hypocrisy (St. Matthew 6, 1. 5. 16).

Besides the sufficiently open texts of many Fathers, for example of St. Augustine ¹, what do the Holy Fathers commonly do? They promise eternal life to those who act from faith; that is, as they themselves explain, to those who are in the state of grace and pursue honesty in acting.

This is also persuaded to us by that continual influx of grace into the works of the just, which, having been insinuated by Christ in the figure where He said that He was the vine and the apostles the branches, is formally handed down by the Council of Trent (Sess. 6, c. 16, De iustificat.).

And we are confirmed by reason.

As Lehmkuhl himself (I, 365) admits: "All good acts are referred to the honor and praise of God." On account of this religious respect, every good act has order to God; then the habit of grace and charity effects that the act is the act of a friend of God, that is, of one sanctified by grace and habitually disposed by charity to doing acts of friendship ².

Consequently, according to that love, the just man acts as often as he observes a commandment, or does a good act; for every good act is a mode of loving God: "he who hath my commandments and keepeth them," said the Lord, "he it is who loveth me" ³; and the Apostle reduces all precepts to the precept of loving (4). Therefore as often as a good act is elicited or commanded by a will informed by charity, just as it is referred to the free will as agent, and so is moral, so it is imputed to the will friendly to God, and thus is meritorious. Therefore this is the proper force of that habit in the will: that it requires all good acts to be accepted by God as acts of a friend of God, or of a man supernaturally related to God, and hence to be meritorious.

To use other words, concerning the true condition of man, which is that of elevated man, and not merely concerning the natural state in which he could have been but has not been constituted, these words written by St. Thomas are valid: "Wherever there is some due order to an end, it is necessary that that order lead to the end, but departure from the order exclude the end... But God imposed upon the acts of men some order in respect to the end of good... Therefore it is necessary that if that order has been rightly placed, those walking by that order attain the good end, which is to be rewarded; but those departing from that order by sin be excluded from the end of good, which is to be punished" ¹. But the man who acts well walks by the order established by God. Therefore he ought to arrive at the end of the order, unless there stand in the way the state of enmity by which he is turned away from God. For divine Providence will not omit to give opportune, or supernatural, aids.

Those who think otherwise seem gratuitously to ascribe to the agent a positive intention of the natural end. But the matter is not so. The agent acting morally well, while he serves a right appetite, implicitly wills the merit of that act, or the end to which his good action tends, even if he is ignorant of another respect besides the respect of moral goodness.

The same authors seem also to give too much force to the intention of the agent for elevating acts, a force which we ought to refer as received from the gift of grace. You would say that man, as they imagine him, is substantially in the natural order and accidentally in the supernatural order, so that only by a special effort does he act supernaturally; whereas man has been so changed by the gratuitous benefit of God that he is wholly directed to the supernatural end ². Cf. also Noldin, Princ., n. 104.

¹ St. James 1, 27.

² St. Matthew 19, 17.

¹ On Psalm 30, sermon 2, n. 10 (P.L. 30, 341).

² For charity has a more immediate order to operation than grace. It is in the will and renders it apt for loving God by the love of friendship and for acting consequently to that love.

³ St. John 14, 21. - (4) Rom. 13, 9.

¹ Summa contra Gentiles, c. 140.

² These things will be treated more fully in the future volume I of the Moral Questions.

n. 141.

In the sinner, there cannot be salutary acts, or acts meritorious de condigno. On account of the reasons taken from the present state of man, we think that not even in them are found merely natural acts which are morally good, but that all are done from supernatural grace as principles of penance and conversion. Cf. St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 2, art. 5, ad 7; in 2 1. S., d. 38, q. 1, art. 2, ad 4.

n. 142.

Going beyond these advances, Ripalda (De ente supern., l. 1, d. 20, s. 2) holds that there is no morally good effort of nature which some supernatural grace does not forestall. Most theologians, however, admit in unbelievers acts morally good and at the same time supernaturally indifferent. The opinion of Ripalda is not opposed by Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, t. 2, nn. 153-158. To us it seems more consonant with the present condition of the human race, with the unity of the counsels of divine Providence, and with the universal salvific will; and it is confirmed by a certain common sense of the faithful, who acknowledge in the good works of any man whatever a certain preparation and positive disposition for grace. Nor does that received statement, "the first grace is the beginning of faith," stand in the way of our admitting it; we shall say that this supernatural aid for acting honestly is given so that unbelievers may be led to faith, and consequently that it can come under the name of the beginning of faith. Nor do the condemned propositions make difficulty, which denied that there are any acts besides meritorious acts or sins, or rejected the distinction between morally honest acts and meritorious acts of the eternal kingdom ¹. For we exclude merit de condigno from the acts of those who are not just; nor do we deny the utility of distinguishing natural honesty from supernatural honesty. Unbelievers preserve the natural capacity of doing honest acts: this must be firmly held; but the concurring grace of God effects that the same acts are supernatural and at least meritorious de congruo.

¹ Cf. article 16 of John Hus, from the thirty condemned at the Council of Constance and by Martin V, March 25, 1418; and proposition 62 of Baius condemned by St. Pius V, October 1, 1567. (D.B. nn. 642 and 1062).

n. 143.

N.B. Our conclusion concerning the just rests not at all upon the permanent virtue of some first act of charity, but upon habitual sanctifying grace and charity, by which it comes about that the good acts of the just are acts of sons and friends of God. Nevertheless they are bound by the precept of charity to be fulfilled. Cf. 188.

n. 144.

Concerning the object of merit. these things are usefully recalled from dogmatic theology.

We can merit de condigno only for ourselves. But we merit an increase of sanctifying grace and eternal life. In what way, by what measure grace increases, does not agree among theologians: we more cautiously abstain from offering mathematical or quantitative reasons.

We do not merit other things de condigno, because man, through his good works, from divine ordination, is ordered to obtain these things, not others.

For ourselves we can merit de congruo actual graces, or richer aids: as sufficient, however, not as efficacious, because, since they are efficacious through our free consent, we cannot merit this consent. But we can merit graces which will be efficacious. Even having been made sinners, we can thus merit aids for rising again. Among these aids temporal goods also are found. These, as such, can be given by God even to a work of merely human goodness. Cf. 1, 2, q. 114, art. 10.

For others we can merit the same aids, indeed even first grace itself, de congruo.

For ourselves we cannot merit first grace, or the first supernatural aid: all proportion fails between our action without supernatural grace and the supernatural object. Nor, while we are just, do we seem to be able to merit, not even de congruo, the restitution of justice after a future fall. St. Thomas teaches this, 1, 2, q. 111, art. 7. Yet there are some who think otherwise.

Neither for ourselves nor for others can we merit, not even de congruo, final perseverance, insofar as it is a gift distinct both from sanctifying grace and from actual grace. But aids for persevering, or perseverance materially taken, we can both impetrate and merit de congruo, for ourselves and for others.

Other things being equal, we merit more easily for ourselves than for others.

n. 145.

The quantity of merit depends both upon the dignity of the agent and upon the value or magnitude of the work. Upon the dignity of the agent: therefore the more he has been joined to God through sanctifying grace and charity, the more, other things being equal, he will merit. Hence already the infinite merit which was in each of Christ's actions is evident. Moreover the value of the work is considered both in itself and in the intention from which it flows: according as this has been higher and more intense, so much the more merit increases. But the noblest intention is that of charity. Therefore the more effectively an action has flowed from a will which has been made one with the divine will (charity effects one thing), the more excellent is the action.

Therefore an action will not have greater formal merit insofar as it is more difficult or laborious, but insofar as the difficulty or labor denotes a great work ¹. You may say the same of the rejection of pleasure: that rejection is not good and meritorious for its own sake, but only insofar as it gives place to a higher good.

¹ 1, 2, q. 114, art. 4, ad 3.

n. 146.

Usefulness of asking for special things. Merit de condigno is not diminished by the fact that we direct an action to impetrating various graces for others or for ourselves. Indeed from the good endeavors which are thus fostered at the same time, the merit of the action can increase. Therefore, although already of itself God, who beholds our heart, accepts our good works not only as meritorious de condigno, but also as meritorious de congruo and impetratory, nevertheless it is consonant with human nature to express particular vows distinctly and thus to join good works with formal prayer ². This is to be done at least insofar as we are thereby helped to pray and act better, but not insofar as by a certain scrupulous anxiety it could become harmful to the fervor of charity: in a spiritual matter that fervor is always the chief thing.

² Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 375.

n. 147.

Concerning the satisfactory fruit. Besides the fruit of merit and of impetration, there is also in our good actions, insofar as all are laborious, a satisfactory fruit. We can neither abdicate all the former fruits, nor is it expedient; the latter we can laudably cede to others out of charity, especially to souls existing in purgatory. The Supreme Pontiffs have approved the act called heroic toward the purifying souls. Cf. concerning indulgences.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 6 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tr. II, Chapter IV. On the Supernatural Merit of Human Acts

n. ¶36.

Preliminary Note. As was said above n. 20 sqq., in the present disposition of the human race introduced by God there does not exist a purely natural order of human acts, but man is bound to order all his actions (at least implicitly) to a supernatural end, namely, to eternal beatitude. But this supernatural end - as is plain of itself - cannot be obtained by merely natural powers; and this all the more because by adult men it must be acquired by merit properly so called.¹ For this reason man needs supernatural assistance for attaining his proper supernatural end. This assistance indeed is supplied to all men through truly sufficient graces, which Christ merited for us by His passion. - Since the treatise on supernatural grace and on merit, according to modern practice, is usually had in Dogmatics, here we touch only briefly upon those things which pertain to supernatural and meritorious acts.

Notions of Diverse Graces. The grace which man needs for perfecting truly supernatural and meritorious acts is twofold: habitual and actual. For although man existing in the state of mortal sin can without supernatural grace by his own natural powers both know some moral truth and will and perform something ethically good,² nevertheless he cannot prepare himself for grace nor merit eternal life.³

Actual grace is the supernatural assistance of God or a divine motion, by which man is helped transiently toward some supernatural act. This grace either illuminates the intellect or moves the will or generally helps in works to be performed; but it is always a gratuitous and supernatural gift and therefore distinct from the divine concurrence, which is necessary also for the natural, indeed even for the evil, operation of secondary causes.

Actual grace is subdivided a) into operating and cooperating. Grace is called operating with respect to that effect in which our mind is moved and not moving, while God alone is moving;⁴ but cooperating in relation to those effects in which our mind is both moved and moves. Operating grace is also called prevenient or exciting; but cooperating grace is sometimes called subsequent or assisting. This division of grace into operating and cooperating properly pertains to actual grace, yet in some way it can be accommodated also to habitual grace, as St. Thomas teaches.⁵ Habitual grace is called operating insofar as it formally sanctifies the soul; but it is called cooperating insofar as it is the principle of meritorious work, since this is produced by grace and free will together; b) into sufficient and efficacious. Sufficient grace is that which gives the power to operate; efficacious grace is that which causes the operation itself. - We leave to Dogmatic Theology that most sharp controversy whence the efficacy of grace comes, whether namely from itself and intrinsically, or from the consent of the free will.

Habitual grace is a supernatural quality inhering in the essence of the soul, through which not only are all sins remitted, but we are also truly made adoptive sons of God and sharers of the divine nature. Together with this habitual grace all virtues and all gifts of the Holy Spirit are infused; without it man can merit nothing de condigno.

¹ For baptized infants who have died before obtaining the use of reason, the ultimate end or eternal beatitude comes not as merit, but as an inheritance liberally granted to them on account of the merits of Christ.

² S. theol. I-II, q. 109, a. 1-3.

³ Ibid. a. 5 and 6.

⁴ S. theol. I-II, q. 111, a. 2.

⁵ L. c.

n. 136.

136. Notion of Merit. Merit taken more broadly signifies a certain dignity of a thing, on account of which something belongs to it. Thus, for example, it is customary to say of an elegant painting that it deserves to be seen. But merit properly so called belongs only to human acts, of which it is a certain property rendering them worthy of retribution. And indeed a good act merits reward; but an evil act merits punishment. Yet merit is said rather of good acts than of evil acts; for evil acts have demerit. Therefore merit in the strictest sense is defined: the property of a good act by which it is worthy of reward; or in concrete: it is the good act itself worthy of reward. And so the cause of merit is the goodness of the act; but the effect of merit is reward. Theological merit, of which there is discussion here, is a good work before God worthy of reward.

n. 137.

137. Divisions. 1. First of all a twofold merit is distinguished: one de condigno, the other de congruo.⁶

Merit de condigno is a good work to which reward is owed from justice or at least from a promise made. Only this merit de condigno is properly and simply merit; and therefore, unless some clause is added, merit de condigno is always understood whenever theologians speak simply of merit. - Merit de congruo is a good work to which reward is owed neither from strict justice nor from a promise made, but from a certain congruity or fittingness, or from the friendship and liberality of the one rewarding.^6a An example of each merit is had in a faithful servant, who not only fulfills his due office, but also freely performs certain supererogatory works. This servant merits de condigno the wage determined by contract; but de congruo he merits certain special gifts of his master.

2. Merit both de condigno and de congruo is subdivided into that strictly and less strictly so called.

Strict merit de condigno or merit from strict justice is an act which wholly equals the reward obtained, which therefore cannot be refused without manifest injury of justice. Such merit de condigno strictly so called is the congruous and stipulated wage for a faithful servant. In the supernatural order the acts of Christ alone had merit strictly so called de condigno. For the actions of Christ, who was God and man, were wholly worthy of an infinite reward. - Merit de condigno more broadly so called belongs to good works done in the state of sanctifying grace. In this way, for example, a just man merits eternal life, because there is a certain condignity and parity (but not every kind of parity) between works done from grace and eternal life.

Merit de congruo strictly so called includes a true congruity between work and reward; for example, de congruo some just man can merit conversion for a sinner; "for since a man constituted in grace fulfills the will of God, it is congruous according to the proportion of friendship that God fulfill the man's will in the salvation of another."⁷ - Merit de congruo broadly so called belongs to all works and is almost nothing other than a certain impetration.⁸ Thus a sinful man, from good works done with actual grace, can merit the state of sanctifying grace de congruo broadly so called.⁹

⁶ In German merit de condigno can be called: Verdienst nach Recht; merit de congruo: Verdienst nach Billigkeit.

^6a Cf. St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3 sol.

⁷ S. theol. I-II, q. 114, a. 6.

⁸ Cf. Billuart, l. c. a. 5 in the beginning.

⁹ S. theol. q. 114, a. 9.

n. 138.

138. Scholion. On Reward in Heaven. To the merit of supernatural acts there corresponds reward in heaven, which reward is usually divided into essential, consisting in the beatific vision, and accidental, containing all goods which secondarily come to the blessed besides the beatific vision, for example, the three aureoles (of martyrs, doctors, virgins), joy concerning the company of angels, of the other blessed, concerning veneration received from men still living on earth, etc.

n. 139.

139. Conditions Required for Supernatural Merit. Six conditions required for supernatural merit are customarily enumerated, namely, three on the part of the work, two on the part of the one meriting, and one on the part of God rewarding. For it is required:

1. That the work be free. This is of faith. Wherefore the third proposition of Jansenius was condemned as heretical: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature there is not required in man freedom from necessity, but freedom from coercion suffices."

2. That the work be good. It is plain of itself, since neither an evil nor an indifferent work is worthy of eternal reward. Not just any goodness suffices, but supernatural goodness is required, which, namely, proceeds from supernatural grace; indeed according to some authors, which proceeds from a motive of supernatural faith. In this sense the Angelic Doctor seems to say:¹⁰ "Faith is necessary as the principle of spiritual life." And we are said to be saved through faith.¹¹ Nevertheless there are other authors¹² who require nothing else for a supernatural act than that the act be ethically good and from grace or from a supernatural principle. For practice this controversy is of little moment, since that motive is most easily present, at least virtually, in any good work of a justified man.

3. That the work be done in homage to the one rewarding, that is, to God.¹³ It is plain of itself. For God will not give reward except for works completed in His homage; and this homage indeed is already sufficiently had if someone observes the commandments of God from filial fear or at least initial fear. For some influence of charity seems to be necessary, that works may be rendered meritorious. For this reason the Angelic Doctor¹⁴ teaches: "Eternal life consists in the fruition of God. But the motion of the human mind toward the fruition of the divine good is the proper act of charity, through which all acts of the other virtues are ordered to this end, according as the other virtues are commanded by charity. And therefore the merit of eternal life first belongs to charity, but to the other virtues secondarily, according as their acts are commanded by charity." But even the least influence suffices; hence in practice the controversy of theologians concerning the quality and degree of that influence is almost useless.¹⁵ And therefore St. Thomas says:¹⁶ "When someone orders himself to God as to the end in all things which he does on account of himself, there remains virtually the intention of the ultimate end, who is God: whence he can merit in all things, if he has charity"; and: "there cannot be any act proceeding from a deliberate will in one having grace which is not meritorious."¹⁷ Wherefore briefly and truly it can be said: Whoever, existing in the state of sanctifying grace and eliciting an act of charity at the due time, merits by any good work freely performed.

4. The state of the wayfarer. For after death man can no longer merit, God so willing, according to the words of Christ¹⁸ understood in the spiritual sense: "The night cometh [that is, death], when no man can work [namely, meritoriously]."

5. The state of sanctifying grace. This follows from the words of Christ:¹⁹ "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine; so neither can you, unless you abide in me." But man is joined with Christ through sanctifying grace, which renders him a sharer of the divine nature.²⁰ - The same is plain from condemned propositions:²¹ "The reason of merit does not consist in this, that he who works well has grace and the indwelling Holy Spirit, but only in this, that he obeys the divine law" (prop. 15 of Baius). - "It is the opinion of Pelagius: a good work done short of the grace of adoption is not meritorious of the kingdom of heaven" (prop. 12 of Baius). - The necessity of sanctifying grace for every work truly meritorious de condigno can easily be proved also by theological reasons: a) It is impossible that a man who is an enemy and hateful to God, such as a sinner is, should do works pleasing and meritorious, since God first regards the one offering rather than the gifts offered. - b) For merit de condigno there is required a certain proportional equality between the work done and the reward proposed. But there is no proportional equality between works done by a man in the state of mortal sin and sanctifying grace or eternal glory, since those works are of the natural order, while grace and glory are of the supernatural order. Therefore a man in the state of mortal sin cannot merit grace and glory.²²

6. The ordination or promise of God.²³ The reason is that through merit de condigno we acquire a true right to a supernatural wage. But a creature can acquire no right toward God unless a special promise of God is present. For man, as a creature and having his whole being and acting from God, is bound to serve God with all his powers, without having any strict right of retribution. Hence Christ²⁴ warns: "When you shall have done all the things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do." Therefore God from justice is not bound to give reward for our works, since they are owed to Him under so many titles. Therefore it is necessary that the promise of God accede to this, that a work performed by man merit a supernatural wage de condigno. For this reason it is proposed by the Council of Trent:²⁵ "Eternal life ... as a recompense to be faithfully rendered, from the promise of God Himself, to their [namely, the just] good works and merits."

¹⁰ Ibid. II-II, q. 16, a. 1 ad 1.

¹¹ Rom. 5:1.

¹² For example, Noldin, Princ. Theol. mor. n. 97. Cf. on this matter Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 396.

¹³ S. theol. I-II, q. 21, a. 4.

¹⁴ Ibid. q. 114, a. 4.

¹⁵ Cf. Billuart, Dissert. de merito a. 4; Noldin, De princ. n. 103 sq. and below n. 559, Schol. 2.

¹⁶ De caritate q. unic., a. 11 ad 2; cf. De malo q. 2, a. 5 ad 7 and ad 11.

¹⁷ 2 dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5.

¹⁸ John 9:4. - In the Catena aurea St. Thomas cites for this place the words of St. Augustine: "There will be night, where no one can work, but receive what he has worked. While you live, do if you are going to do anything: for beyond there is neither faith nor labors nor penance."

¹⁹ John 15:4.

²⁰ Cf. 2 Pet. 1:4.

²¹ Denz. n. 1012 and 1013.

²² For a fuller explanation of this condition see Billuart, Dissert. de merito iusti a. 1.

²³ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 114, a. 1 ad 3.

²⁴ Luke 17:10.

²⁵ Sess. 6, cap. 16 (Denz. n. 809).

n. 140.

140. Object of Merit can be called that which man can merit before God by his acts. A longer dissertation on this matter we leave to Dogmatic Theology, indicating only the following:

1. De condigno a just man can merit: a) increase of sanctifying grace; b) eternal life; c) increase of glory. - All these things indeed are clearly deduced from the Council of Trent:²⁶ "If anyone says that the good works of a justified man ... do not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life and the attainment of that eternal life, if nevertheless he has departed in grace, and also increase of glory, let him be anathema." Certainly the Council did not define that these three fall under merit de condigno; nevertheless, since it says that man truly merits those three, and only merit de condigno is true merit, it seems to be certain by faith that these three also fall under merit de condigno. - A man existing in the state of mortal sin can merit nothing de condigno, because he lacks sanctifying grace, which is the principle of all merit de condigno, as has already been said.

2. De congruo (broadly so called) a just man can merit: a) final perseverance. Some theologians nevertheless teach that the gift of perseverance can in no way be merited, but only obtained by prayer.²⁷ It is a dispute about words. - b) Reparation after mortal sin, if it shall occur, according to that: "When my strength shall fail, do not forsake me."²⁸ - De congruo strictly so called a just man can merit: a) temporal goods; but insofar as they are helps conducive to eternal life, they fall simply under merit.²⁹ - b) Actual graces for himself and other men, indeed also conversion for a sinner.³⁰ Thus St. Stephen is said to have obtained the conversion of Saul; St. Monica the conversion of her son Augustine.

A man existing in the state of mortal sin can merit de congruo, not indeed the first actual grace,³¹ but with actual grace mercifully received from God he can merit further actual graces, indeed also sanctifying grace.³² In this sense is to be understood the adage often employed by theologians: "To one doing what is in him, God does not deny grace." For man from purely natural powers, without the help of supernatural grace, is not able to overcome all the obstacles of grace. For if a sinful man from purely natural powers, by doing what is in him, could merit de congruo the first actual grace, a fortiori he would merit the second and third grace and finally at some time sanctifying grace. Therefore man could by his own powers perform at least the beginning of his supernatural salvation; which is the Semipelagian heresy. Hence it seems certain, not to say of faith, that a sinful man can in no way, not even de congruo broadly so called, merit the first actual grace.³³

²⁶ Sess. 6, can. 32 de Iustif. (Denz. n. 842).

²⁷ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 114, a. 9.

²⁸ Ps. 70:9. St. Thomas, speaking of merit of congruity strictly so called, teaches: "No one can merit for himself reparation after a future fall, neither by merit of condignity nor by merit of congruity" (S. theol. I-II, q. 114, a. 7).

²⁹ S. theol. I-II, q. 114, a. 10.

³⁰ Ibid. a. 6.

³¹ Cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 7 and Billuart, De gratia diss. B, a. 5.

³² In this sense it is said: "Redeem thy sins with alms" (Dan. 4:24).

³³ Conc. Trid. sess. 6, cap. 5 and 8.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 35 passages

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Human Acts in…, Third Part: On Human Acts According to Supernatural and Meritorious Being

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 109, a. 5 and 6; q. 114, a. 2.

188. Necessity of supernatural acts. - Since in the present order we are destined not to a natural end but to a supernatural divine end, it is not sufficient that we place acts morally honorable and proportioned to a natural end; rather it is necessary that we place acts conformable to the supernatural end, which are supernatural and of the divine order:

a) From the principle or subjective element; for eternal life, namely, the intuitive and beatific vision of God, exceeds the proportion of our nature; but acts cannot exceed the proportion of their principle; therefore from his nature man cannot produce acts proportioned to eternal life, but for this there is required a higher principle elevating him, which is grace.

b) Also from the formal object or motive, which is the objective element. Here the principle has force: Acts are specified from the object. For just as an act is not morally good unless the object is conformable to the honorable end and is known and intended as such, so an act will not be supernaturally good unless the object is considered as conformable to the supernatural end and is intended from a supernatural motive; in other words, no one can tend to a supernatural end unless by willing it; no one contracts supernatural goodness unless he wills it; otherwise he would not direct himself to the end in a human mode, but would merely be inclined to it.

Hence in human acts there can be had a twofold goodness or moral being:

natural, which is the intrinsic tendency of the act to the object as simply honorable, and consequently as conformable to God as natural end, to be contemplated, namely, by our powers as much as we are able;

supernatural, which is the intrinsic tendency of the act to the object as conformable to God the supernatural end, to be seen in Himself; indeed the intrinsic dignity of the act toward divine eternal life, to be lived in the heavens with God.

Therefore in supernatural acts the material element is moral goodness itself; the supernaturalness of the act, both on the part of the object and on the part of the principle, is the formal element.

189. State of the question. - In a supernatural act there can be considered:

a) the subjective element or principle, namely, grace; and this pertains to dogmatic theology, namely, to the treatise on grace;

b) the objective element or object, which is something particular, and therefore pertains to special moral theology, and concerning it there is discussion in the treatises on the individual virtues in species;

c) the very tendency to the end. For every thing attains its end through its own operation, which is the perfectly efficient cause of the end itself when this end does not exceed the power of the one operating; otherwise it is a dispositive cause, or even a moral cause, insofar as it furnishes something on account of which the obtaining of the end is expected from the gift of another. But eternal life exceeds the nature of man. Therefore the human act is only a dispositive and moral cause of eternal life, both meritorious, and satisfactory, and impetratory.

Now satisfactory and impetratory causality belongs to human acts from the particular virtue of penance or of religion, and therefore in special moral theology this is discussed where there is discussion of those virtues; but the causality of merit belongs to all supernatural acts as such, if they are placed under the due conditions.

It indeed pertains to the treatise on grace insofar as it is considered as an effect of cooperating grace, but it also pertains to general moral theology and the treatise on human acts, insofar as it is a property of the human act and it is due and obligatory for our acts to merit eternal life. And therefore we are bound to know the required conditions, so that we may be able to fulfill the said obligation.

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Human Acts in…, Third Part: On Human Acts …, First Question: On Merit, Especially Supernatural Merit

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3 and 4; q. 114, a. 1, 2, 5-10.

n. 190.

190. Merit is etymologically derived from the word merces, and accordingly designates a service or laborious work done for the utility of another, which is not usually done except by hired workers for a stipend or wage. In the broadest sense it signifies whatever is sufficient, suitable, worthy for obtaining something, or that which demands something, and thus it is said even of inanimate things, for example, of a painting; more properly it is a human work to which retribution is due from some justice strictly or broadly so called, and thus it is also said of an evil work (Mt. XVI, 26; Job VI, 2; Heb. X, 29; Eccli. XVI, 14, 15); but in the strict sense it is a good work done in the service or benefit of another and therefore worthy of reward and retribution.

n. 190.

It can be regarded in the abstract and in the concrete: in the concrete it is a work of virtue to which a wage is due, a work worthy of retribution; in the abstract it is a property of the human act, namely, the moral value of the work by virtue of which it is worthy that something be repaid to the one operating, a goodness existing in the human act on account of which it is worthy of praise and reward, or the dignity of the work and therefore a right or title in the one operating to retribution.

n. 191.

191. The philosophical foundation of merit is in the exigency of the order of nature, or in the natural law by force of which the activity proper to a being belongs to it and therefore ought to profit it, since it has the perfection of the being itself as its end. Hence when a person acting freely has chosen an act in service or utility of another person, that person has furnished something which is his own; hence it is equitable and just that the other render some good, by compensating the good furnished (II-II, q. 106, a. 3; I, q. 65, a. 2). But if it is demanded and rendered according to equality, the merit is from justice properly so called; otherwise from equity and decency, friendship, and liberality, which in some way pertain to justice.

n. 191.

On the contrary, since every man, in order to his ultimate end, is of the same dignity, as being his own right, and consequently is not a mere means subordinated to others but exists for his own good, therefore he cannot be deprived of his order to his proper good without justice demanding recompense of punishment. Hence St. Thomas (q. 21, a. 3): he who "acts to the advantage or harm of another" "acquires merit or demerit in order to the retribution which is made according to justice."

192. Division of merit. - A. By reason of the one rewarding, merit is civil when the work is done for the utility or service either of an individual or of society; and moral when it is done in the service of God.

a) As to civil merit:

An act directed to the good (or evil) of an individual person has merit (or demerit) directly before the person, indirectly before society, into which the good of the person redounds, who in some way is its part and member.

An act directed to the good (or evil) of society has merit primarily before society, secondarily before the individual members insofar as they are members.

An act directed to the good (or evil) of the agent himself does not have merit before the agent himself (because justice is toward another), but can indirectly have the character of merit before society (q. 21, a. 3).

b) Every human act has moral merit before God (or demerit), insofar as it tends to the profit (or detriment), not of God Himself, but of His honor and the order established by Him; and indeed:

By reason of God Himself: for God is the ultimate end of man. But it is due to the ultimate end that all acts be referred to it. Therefore one who does an evil act not referable to God does not preserve the honor which is due to the ultimate end, and conversely.

By reason of the society of which God is ruler and guardian: God is governor and ruler of the whole universe. But he who rules a community has care of the common good and ought to render retribution for those things which are done well or badly in society. Therefore human acts have merit or demerit before God; otherwise one would have to say that He does not care about human acts (a. 4).

B. By reason of the reward, merit is one thing natural, which proceeds from the powers of nature and expects only a natural reward; whence if it is done in the service of God, it is done in order to God as natural end; another thing supernatural, which is done from the powers of grace in order to God as supernatural end, and merits a supernatural reward, namely, the good of eternal life. It is also called theological.

They differ in this, that the first follows every good act by reason of its goodness, according to some relation of justice to God, from whom, at least from fittingness, it merits at least a temporal good, and therefore imports a wage from the very notion of the act; the other imports a wage to be rendered not only from the very notion of the act but also from the state of the person operating, and therefore belongs only to supernatural acts and indeed only to the just man, to whom the wage due is eternal life itself or some other good in order to eternal life. We are treating here only of supernatural merit.

Del Prado well notes, De Gratia et libero arbitrio, I, p. 534: "It must be noted beforehand that merit can be taken broadly, insofar as it imports any wage whatever, whether due from justice properly so called, or from a certain proportion or fittingness, insofar as only the very notion of human acts is considered, and under this relation the Angelic Doctor treated of merit above, I-II, q. 21, and then merit is something consequent upon all and single human acts, that is, free acts, by reason of their goodness (cf. ib. a. 3, and a. 4, ad 3). The notion of merit can also be taken in a strict mode, insofar as it imports a wage to be rendered to free acts, not only from the very notion of the act, but also from the state of the person acting; and then merit is taken by order to eternal life; and the wage due is either eternal glory, or any other good whatever, whether spiritual or temporal, reduplicatively as it is a means for attaining the glory itself of eternal life. And under this higher consideration St. Thomas treats of merit in the whole of q. 114."

C. By reason of dignity, merit is: either merit simply so called, or merit de condigno, to which from justice a reward is due, for which it has equal value and equal dignity, or condignity. It is a work whose value equals the value of the reward, because there is found an equality between merit and reward according to right estimation: an equality, therefore, not always material or quantitative, but moral, which is called equality of power and proportion, as there is between seed and the fruit which is born from it (q. 114, a. 3, ad 3). Or it is merit de congruo and in a certain respect, to which in no way is retribution made from justice, but only from a certain fittingness and equity and friendship or liberality of the giver is a gift bestowed which befits the one giving; and therefore it does not infallibly obtain the reward, unless the one repaying has promised, nor then from justice but from fidelity. It is a work whose value does not equal the value of the reward, because equality between reward and merit is lacking.

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Grace, On the Merit of the Just, Whether man can merit anything from God? · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Grace, On the Merit of the Just, Whether the works of the just done from grace merit eternal life in strict desert (de condigno)?

In the former merit there is an exigency toward reward; in the latter, only fittingness. The former can be compared to the stipend which is due to a soldier and to the wage which is due to a servant; the latter to an honorary distinction (for example, an equestrian order) which a prince bestows upon a soldier for brave deeds, not from justice nor altogether gratuitously, or to a gratuity or gift which inferiors or servants receive on account of occupations more or less supererogatory. This division is not univocal but analogous.

n. 193.

193. What can man merit? - De condigno the just man can merit for himself an increase of habitual grace, the remission of venial sin, heavenly glory and its increase. De congruo he can merit for himself infallibly actual graces, the first excepted.

n. 193.

Christ alone could merit de condigno for others, as being the head of all men. De congruo a man can merit for others, but not infallibly: actual graces, even the first, habitual grace and its increase, the remission of sin, and eternal life.

n. 193.

These things are proved in the treatise on grace. Cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114.

Billuart, Summa Summae

Charles-René Billuart, O.P. — 13 passages

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Grace, On the Merit of the Just, Whether man can merit anything from God?

I say : Justified man can truly and properly merit something from God, even eternal life itself.

This is of faith, decided in various councils: Arausican II, can. 18 ; Lateranense IV, under Innocent III, cap. Firmiter ; and lastly in Trid., session VI, cap. 16 and can. 32, against the Lutherans and Calvinists, who, since they contend that all works are evil, acknowledge in him no work that is meritorious at least of eternal life.

It is proved 1°. By merit we understand nothing else than a good work compared to a reward. Now Scripture everywhere proposes to us eternal life as to be rendered to the good works of the just. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. Matth., V, 12, it is said : Rejoice and exult, because your reward is great in heaven. Ibid., cap. XIX, 27-29, to Peter asking what reward there will be for one who leaves earthly things for Christ, answers

n. 4.

Christ : You shall receive a hundredfold, and shall possess life everlasting. And chapter XX explains this by the example of the householder who gives the laborers a daily denarius as the reward of slight toil. Hebr., XIII, 16 : Do not forget beneficence and communication ; for by such sacrifices God is merited. II Tim., IV, 8 : As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day. Hebr., VI, 10 : For God is not unjust, that he should forget your work. And so elsewhere passim. Therefore, according to Scripture, there is promised to the good works of the just, not a reward of whatever kind, as the sectaries say, but life eternal itself ; not from mere liberality and mercy, as others say, but from justice, and therefore as merit properly so called.

n. 5.

It is proved 2°. God confers on man through grace the virtue of acting well, and promises to his works done through grace a certain reward, indeed glory itself, as has been said ; all the other conditions required for merit can concur, for none is repugnant. Therefore man can merit even glory itself.

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Grace, On the Merit of the Just, Whether the works of the just done from grace merit eternal life in strict desert (de condigno)?

We do not understand here merit de condigno to which reward is owed out of justice. For since to the works of the just, howsoever good and wrought from grace, recompense is owed only out of ordination and acceptation of God — who could not ordain nor accept them to reward, as we said — the consequence is that the works of the just are not, in this sense, properly and intrinsically meritorious de condigno, but only extrinsically, out of divine ordination and acceptation.

True, because condignity, as the very word sounds, denotes equal dignity between two things, condign merit denotes equal dignity of the act to the reward. Merit de condigno therefore, as here understood with the Author, is that between which and the reward there is equality of value, or that which is of so great value under the ratio of merit as the reward is under the ratio of reward. And in this sense we ask whether the good works of the just are meritorious de condigno of glory, or whether the value of the act from grace equals the excellence of glory, although elsewhere, that it be owed by God out of justice, his ordination and acceptation be required. In this sense therefore,