Chapter IV. On the Supernatural Merit of Human Acts

Preliminary Note. As was said above n. 20 sqq., in the present disposition of the human race introduced by God there does not exist a purely natural order of human acts, but man is bound to order all his actions (at least implicitly) to a supernatural end, namely, to eternal beatitude. But this supernatural end - as is plain of itself - cannot be obtained by merely natural powers; and this all the more because by adult men it must be acquired by merit properly so called.¹ For this reason man needs supernatural assistance for attaining his proper supernatural end. This assistance indeed is supplied to all men through truly sufficient graces, which Christ merited for us by His passion. - Since the treatise on supernatural grace and on merit, according to modern practice, is usually had in Dogmatics, here we touch only briefly upon those things which pertain to supernatural and meritorious acts.

Notions of Diverse Graces. The grace which man needs for perfecting truly supernatural and meritorious acts is twofold: habitual and actual. For although man existing in the state of mortal sin can without supernatural grace by his own natural powers both know some moral truth and will and perform something ethically good,² nevertheless he cannot prepare himself for grace nor merit eternal life.³

Actual grace is the supernatural assistance of God or a divine motion, by which man is helped transiently toward some supernatural act. This grace either illuminates the intellect or moves the will or generally helps in works to be performed; but it is always a gratuitous and supernatural gift and therefore distinct from the divine concurrence, which is necessary also for the natural, indeed even for the evil, operation of secondary causes.

Actual grace is subdivided a) into operating and cooperating. Grace is called operating with respect to that effect in which our mind is moved and not moving, while God alone is moving;⁴ but cooperating in relation to those effects in which our mind is both moved and moves. Operating grace is also called prevenient or exciting; but cooperating grace is sometimes called subsequent or assisting. This division of grace into operating and cooperating properly pertains to actual grace, yet in some way it can be accommodated also to habitual grace, as St. Thomas teaches.⁵ Habitual grace is called operating insofar as it formally sanctifies the soul; but it is called cooperating insofar as it is the principle of meritorious work, since this is produced by grace and free will together; b) into sufficient and efficacious. Sufficient grace is that which gives the power to operate; efficacious grace is that which causes the operation itself. - We leave to Dogmatic Theology that most sharp controversy whence the efficacy of grace comes, whether namely from itself and intrinsically, or from the consent of the free will.

Habitual grace is a supernatural quality inhering in the essence of the soul, through which not only are all sins remitted, but we are also truly made adoptive sons of God and sharers of the divine nature. Together with this habitual grace all virtues and all gifts of the Holy Spirit are infused; without it man can merit nothing de condigno.

¹ For baptized infants who have died before obtaining the use of reason, the ultimate end or eternal beatitude comes not as merit, but as an inheritance liberally granted to them on account of the merits of Christ.

² S. theol. I-II, q. 109, a. 1-3.

³ Ibid. a. 5 and 6.

⁴ S. theol. I-II, q. 111, a. 2.

⁵ L. c.

136. Notion of Merit. Merit taken more broadly signifies a certain dignity of a thing, on account of which something belongs to it. Thus, for example, it is customary to say of an elegant painting that it deserves to be seen. But merit properly so called belongs only to human acts, of which it is a certain property rendering them worthy of retribution. And indeed a good act merits reward; but an evil act merits punishment. Yet merit is said rather of good acts than of evil acts; for evil acts have demerit. Therefore merit in the strictest sense is defined: the property of a good act by which it is worthy of reward; or in concrete: it is the good act itself worthy of reward. And so the cause of merit is the goodness of the act; but the effect of merit is reward. Theological merit, of which there is discussion here, is a good work before God worthy of reward.

137. Divisions. 1. First of all a twofold merit is distinguished: one de condigno, the other de congruo.⁶

Merit de condigno is a good work to which reward is owed from justice or at least from a promise made. Only this merit de condigno is properly and simply merit; and therefore, unless some clause is added, merit de condigno is always understood whenever theologians speak simply of merit. - Merit de congruo is a good work to which reward is owed neither from strict justice nor from a promise made, but from a certain congruity or fittingness, or from the friendship and liberality of the one rewarding.^6a An example of each merit is had in a faithful servant, who not only fulfills his due office, but also freely performs certain supererogatory works. This servant merits de condigno the wage determined by contract; but de congruo he merits certain special gifts of his master.

2. Merit both de condigno and de congruo is subdivided into that strictly and less strictly so called.

Strict merit de condigno or merit from strict justice is an act which wholly equals the reward obtained, which therefore cannot be refused without manifest injury of justice. Such merit de condigno strictly so called is the congruous and stipulated wage for a faithful servant. In the supernatural order the acts of Christ alone had merit strictly so called de condigno. For the actions of Christ, who was God and man, were wholly worthy of an infinite reward. - Merit de condigno more broadly so called belongs to good works done in the state of sanctifying grace. In this way, for example, a just man merits eternal life, because there is a certain condignity and parity (but not every kind of parity) between works done from grace and eternal life.

Merit de congruo strictly so called includes a true congruity between work and reward; for example, de congruo some just man can merit conversion for a sinner; "for since a man constituted in grace fulfills the will of God, it is congruous according to the proportion of friendship that God fulfill the man's will in the salvation of another."⁷ - Merit de congruo broadly so called belongs to all works and is almost nothing other than a certain impetration.⁸ Thus a sinful man, from good works done with actual grace, can merit the state of sanctifying grace de congruo broadly so called.⁹

⁶ In German merit de condigno can be called: Verdienst nach Recht; merit de congruo: Verdienst nach Billigkeit.

^6a Cf. St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3 sol.

⁷ S. theol. I-II, q. 114, a. 6.

⁸ Cf. Billuart, l. c. a. 5 in the beginning.

⁹ S. theol. q. 114, a. 9.

138. Scholion. On Reward in Heaven. To the merit of supernatural acts there corresponds reward in heaven, which reward is usually divided into essential, consisting in the beatific vision, and accidental, containing all goods which secondarily come to the blessed besides the beatific vision, for example, the three aureoles (of martyrs, doctors, virgins), joy concerning the company of angels, of the other blessed, concerning veneration received from men still living on earth, etc.

139. Conditions Required for Supernatural Merit. Six conditions required for supernatural merit are customarily enumerated, namely, three on the part of the work, two on the part of the one meriting, and one on the part of God rewarding. For it is required:

1. That the work be free. This is of faith. Wherefore the third proposition of Jansenius was condemned as heretical: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature there is not required in man freedom from necessity, but freedom from coercion suffices."

2. That the work be good. It is plain of itself, since neither an evil nor an indifferent work is worthy of eternal reward. Not just any goodness suffices, but supernatural goodness is required, which, namely, proceeds from supernatural grace; indeed according to some authors, which proceeds from a motive of supernatural faith. In this sense the Angelic Doctor seems to say:¹⁰ "Faith is necessary as the principle of spiritual life." And we are said to be saved through faith.¹¹ Nevertheless there are other authors¹² who require nothing else for a supernatural act than that the act be ethically good and from grace or from a supernatural principle. For practice this controversy is of little moment, since that motive is most easily present, at least virtually, in any good work of a justified man.

3. That the work be done in homage to the one rewarding, that is, to God.¹³ It is plain of itself. For God will not give reward except for works completed in His homage; and this homage indeed is already sufficiently had if someone observes the commandments of God from filial fear or at least initial fear. For some influence of charity seems to be necessary, that works may be rendered meritorious. For this reason the Angelic Doctor¹⁴ teaches: "Eternal life consists in the fruition of God. But the motion of the human mind toward the fruition of the divine good is the proper act of charity, through which all acts of the other virtues are ordered to this end, according as the other virtues are commanded by charity. And therefore the merit of eternal life first belongs to charity, but to the other virtues secondarily, according as their acts are commanded by charity." But even the least influence suffices; hence in practice the controversy of theologians concerning the quality and degree of that influence is almost useless.¹⁵ And therefore St. Thomas says:¹⁶ "When someone orders himself to God as to the end in all things which he does on account of himself, there remains virtually the intention of the ultimate end, who is God: whence he can merit in all things, if he has charity"; and: "there cannot be any act proceeding from a deliberate will in one having grace which is not meritorious."¹⁷ Wherefore briefly and truly it can be said: Whoever, existing in the state of sanctifying grace and eliciting an act of charity at the due time, merits by any good work freely performed.

4. The state of the wayfarer. For after death man can no longer merit, God so willing, according to the words of Christ¹⁸ understood in the spiritual sense: "The night cometh [that is, death], when no man can work [namely, meritoriously]."

5. The state of sanctifying grace. This follows from the words of Christ:¹⁹ "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine; so neither can you, unless you abide in me." But man is joined with Christ through sanctifying grace, which renders him a sharer of the divine nature.²⁰ - The same is plain from condemned propositions:²¹ "The reason of merit does not consist in this, that he who works well has grace and the indwelling Holy Spirit, but only in this, that he obeys the divine law" (prop. 15 of Baius). - "It is the opinion of Pelagius: a good work done short of the grace of adoption is not meritorious of the kingdom of heaven" (prop. 12 of Baius). - The necessity of sanctifying grace for every work truly meritorious de condigno can easily be proved also by theological reasons: a) It is impossible that a man who is an enemy and hateful to God, such as a sinner is, should do works pleasing and meritorious, since God first regards the one offering rather than the gifts offered. - b) For merit de condigno there is required a certain proportional equality between the work done and the reward proposed. But there is no proportional equality between works done by a man in the state of mortal sin and sanctifying grace or eternal glory, since those works are of the natural order, while grace and glory are of the supernatural order. Therefore a man in the state of mortal sin cannot merit grace and glory.²²

6. The ordination or promise of God.²³ The reason is that through merit de condigno we acquire a true right to a supernatural wage. But a creature can acquire no right toward God unless a special promise of God is present. For man, as a creature and having his whole being and acting from God, is bound to serve God with all his powers, without having any strict right of retribution. Hence Christ²⁴ warns: "When you shall have done all the things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do." Therefore God from justice is not bound to give reward for our works, since they are owed to Him under so many titles. Therefore it is necessary that the promise of God accede to this, that a work performed by man merit a supernatural wage de condigno. For this reason it is proposed by the Council of Trent:²⁵ "Eternal life ... as a recompense to be faithfully rendered, from the promise of God Himself, to their [namely, the just] good works and merits."

¹⁰ Ibid. II-II, q. 16, a. 1 ad 1.

¹¹ Rom. 5:1.

¹² For example, Noldin, Princ. Theol. mor. n. 97. Cf. on this matter Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund. n. 396.

¹³ S. theol. I-II, q. 21, a. 4.

¹⁴ Ibid. q. 114, a. 4.

¹⁵ Cf. Billuart, Dissert. de merito a. 4; Noldin, De princ. n. 103 sq. and below n. 559, Schol. 2.

¹⁶ De caritate q. unic., a. 11 ad 2; cf. De malo q. 2, a. 5 ad 7 and ad 11.

¹⁷ 2 dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5.

¹⁸ John 9:4. - In the Catena aurea St. Thomas cites for this place the words of St. Augustine: "There will be night, where no one can work, but receive what he has worked. While you live, do if you are going to do anything: for beyond there is neither faith nor labors nor penance."

¹⁹ John 15:4.

²⁰ Cf. 2 Pet. 1:4.

²¹ Denz. n. 1012 and 1013.

²² For a fuller explanation of this condition see Billuart, Dissert. de merito iusti a. 1.

²³ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 114, a. 1 ad 3.

²⁴ Luke 17:10.

²⁵ Sess. 6, cap. 16 (Denz. n. 809).

140. Object of Merit can be called that which man can merit before God by his acts. A longer dissertation on this matter we leave to Dogmatic Theology, indicating only the following:

1. De condigno a just man can merit: a) increase of sanctifying grace; b) eternal life; c) increase of glory. - All these things indeed are clearly deduced from the Council of Trent:²⁶ "If anyone says that the good works of a justified man ... do not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life and the attainment of that eternal life, if nevertheless he has departed in grace, and also increase of glory, let him be anathema." Certainly the Council did not define that these three fall under merit de condigno; nevertheless, since it says that man truly merits those three, and only merit de condigno is true merit, it seems to be certain by faith that these three also fall under merit de condigno. - A man existing in the state of mortal sin can merit nothing de condigno, because he lacks sanctifying grace, which is the principle of all merit de condigno, as has already been said.

2. De congruo (broadly so called) a just man can merit: a) final perseverance. Some theologians nevertheless teach that the gift of perseverance can in no way be merited, but only obtained by prayer.²⁷ It is a dispute about words. - b) Reparation after mortal sin, if it shall occur, according to that: "When my strength shall fail, do not forsake me."²⁸ - De congruo strictly so called a just man can merit: a) temporal goods; but insofar as they are helps conducive to eternal life, they fall simply under merit.²⁹ - b) Actual graces for himself and other men, indeed also conversion for a sinner.³⁰ Thus St. Stephen is said to have obtained the conversion of Saul; St. Monica the conversion of her son Augustine.

A man existing in the state of mortal sin can merit de congruo, not indeed the first actual grace,³¹ but with actual grace mercifully received from God he can merit further actual graces, indeed also sanctifying grace.³² In this sense is to be understood the adage often employed by theologians: "To one doing what is in him, God does not deny grace." For man from purely natural powers, without the help of supernatural grace, is not able to overcome all the obstacles of grace. For if a sinful man from purely natural powers, by doing what is in him, could merit de congruo the first actual grace, a fortiori he would merit the second and third grace and finally at some time sanctifying grace. Therefore man could by his own powers perform at least the beginning of his supernatural salvation; which is the Semipelagian heresy. Hence it seems certain, not to say of faith, that a sinful man can in no way, not even de congruo broadly so called, merit the first actual grace.³³

²⁶ Sess. 6, can. 32 de Iustif. (Denz. n. 842).

²⁷ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 114, a. 9.

²⁸ Ps. 70:9. St. Thomas, speaking of merit of congruity strictly so called, teaches: "No one can merit for himself reparation after a future fall, neither by merit of condignity nor by merit of congruity" (S. theol. I-II, q. 114, a. 7).

²⁹ S. theol. I-II, q. 114, a. 10.

³⁰ Ibid. a. 6.

³¹ Cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 7 and Billuart, De gratia diss. B, a. 5.

³² In this sense it is said: "Redeem thy sins with alms" (Dan. 4:24).

³³ Conc. Trid. sess. 6, cap. 5 and 8.