Third Part: On Human Acts According to Supernatural and Meritorious Being

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 109, a. 5 and 6; q. 114, a. 2.

188. Necessity of supernatural acts. - Since in the present order we are destined not to a natural end but to a supernatural divine end, it is not sufficient that we place acts morally honorable and proportioned to a natural end; rather it is necessary that we place acts conformable to the supernatural end, which are supernatural and of the divine order:

a) From the principle or subjective element; for eternal life, namely, the intuitive and beatific vision of God, exceeds the proportion of our nature; but acts cannot exceed the proportion of their principle; therefore from his nature man cannot produce acts proportioned to eternal life, but for this there is required a higher principle elevating him, which is grace.

b) Also from the formal object or motive, which is the objective element. Here the principle has force: Acts are specified from the object. For just as an act is not morally good unless the object is conformable to the honorable end and is known and intended as such, so an act will not be supernaturally good unless the object is considered as conformable to the supernatural end and is intended from a supernatural motive; in other words, no one can tend to a supernatural end unless by willing it; no one contracts supernatural goodness unless he wills it; otherwise he would not direct himself to the end in a human mode, but would merely be inclined to it.

Hence in human acts there can be had a twofold goodness or moral being:

1. natural, which is the intrinsic tendency of the act to the object as simply honorable, and consequently as conformable to God as natural end, to be contemplated, namely, by our powers as much as we are able;

2. supernatural, which is the intrinsic tendency of the act to the object as conformable to God the supernatural end, to be seen in Himself; indeed the intrinsic dignity of the act toward divine eternal life, to be lived in the heavens with God.

Therefore in supernatural acts the material element is moral goodness itself; the supernaturalness of the act, both on the part of the object and on the part of the principle, is the formal element.

189. State of the question. - In a supernatural act there can be considered:

a) the subjective element or principle, namely, grace; and this pertains to dogmatic theology, namely, to the treatise on grace;

b) the objective element or object, which is something particular, and therefore pertains to special moral theology, and concerning it there is discussion in the treatises on the individual virtues in species;

c) the very tendency to the end. For every thing attains its end through its own operation, which is the perfectly efficient cause of the end itself when this end does not exceed the power of the one operating; otherwise it is a dispositive cause, or even a moral cause, insofar as it furnishes something on account of which the obtaining of the end is expected from the gift of another. But eternal life exceeds the nature of man. Therefore the human act is only a dispositive and moral cause of eternal life, both meritorious, and satisfactory, and impetratory.

Now satisfactory and impetratory causality belongs to human acts from the particular virtue of penance or of religion, and therefore in special moral theology this is discussed where there is discussion of those virtues; but the causality of merit belongs to all supernatural acts as such, if they are placed under the due conditions.

It indeed pertains to the treatise on grace insofar as it is considered as an effect of cooperating grace, but it also pertains to general moral theology and the treatise on human acts, insofar as it is a property of the human act and it is due and obligatory for our acts to merit eternal life. And therefore we are bound to know the required conditions, so that we may be able to fulfill the said obligation.