Section I. On the Good Act

We explained in n. 61 wherein the moral goodness of an act exists; here, however, it must be investigated further what is required so that an act may be clothed with moral goodness. Now:

I. In order that an act be morally good, it is not required that it be placed by one baptized or in the state of grace. The doctrine which teaches that all works of unbelievers or sinners are sins has been condemned; namely, the Baian propositions have been proscribed: the 25th, "All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices";¹ and the 35th, "Everything that a sinner or servant of sin does is sin."²

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1025.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1035.

II. In order that an act be morally good, these things are required:

1. The object must be good or at least indifferent (n. 66). If it is indifferent, the act becomes good if it is referred to a good end; in which case the end assumes the character of object.¹

2. The act must be referred to a good end; for "since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the character of evil" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 9).²

3. Goodness must be intended in itself; otherwise it is not contracted subjectively. "In order that the will be good, it is required that it be good under the aspect of good; that is, that it will the good, and on account of the good" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 7, ad 3). But goodness is intended in itself when someone wills the good affected by its goodness, even if he does not reflexively think that he wills the good because it is good.

¹ On circumstances, see n. 69.

² Note, however, that an act good from its object is at least not deprived of goodness by just any bad end (n. 71).

III. Of the conditions assigned, the second must be developed more fully; in other words, it must be explained what kind of end is good, or to what end in the concrete an act must be referred. Now:

1. Every human act must be referred to an honorable end. Nevertheless any honorable end suffices, and it is enough that the honorable end be intended virtually. I said:

a) Every human act must be referred to an honorable end. The proposition is established against the Scotists, who teach that those acts which of themselves are ordered only to some comfort or relief of nature, such as walking, smelling flowers, stroking the beard, those acts, I say, can without sin be directly referred to the lower end alone, namely to comfort or pleasure, provided the ultimate end is not positively excluded.¹ According to the stated authors, one who directly rests in such an end neither sins, because to act for the end of the work alone is not evil, nor acts morally well, because he does not refer the act to an honorable end. Therefore he places an indifferent act. But the contrary opinion is deduced from the fact that every human or deliberated act must be done for that end alone which befits rational nature. But it befits rational nature to act for an honorable end, and not for another (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 4, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XLIV).

Objection. He who acts for the end of the work alone cannot sin. But the works about which there is controversy are, by their nature, ordered to pleasure alone.

Response. The argument proposed by us proves precisely that he sins who acts for the end of the work alone, if there is question of a work which by its nature is ordered to pleasure alone.

Corollary I. It is illicit to act for pleasure alone, so that an act placed for that end alone not only is destitute of goodness, but is also evil. It is, however, only venially evil, if there is question of a thing licit in itself or venially evil, because the disordered relation of an act licit in itself or slightly evil does not import grave disorder. Except the case in which pleasure would be intended as the ultimate end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 912).

Corollary II. It seems illicit to act, even, for pleasure, by resting, even, in it as such, because pleasure as such is not an honorable end. Yet to someone this will seem licit, insofar as the honorable act and its delectability constitute one thing.

Corollary III. It is licit to act for pleasure insofar as, from the intention of the Author of nature, it attracts to an act ordered in itself, for instance to conjugal intercourse; likewise insofar as it conduces to the well-being and operation of the body or soul. The reason is that pleasure, considered as such, has the character of an honorable end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 912; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 34, a. 1; II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 2; II-II, q. 168, a. 2; Contra Gentiles, bk. 3, c. 9, n. 1).

b) Nevertheless any honorable end suffices, whether the end of the work or another intended by the agent, whether conceived in species or in a vague way. The very end of the work, at least to this extent, does not fall under precept, insofar as there is no obligation of intending it, although there can be an obligation of not impeding it. This being posited, the agent is free to set before himself another honorable end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 927; cf. 882 and 883). Nevertheless several think, as we shall soon note, that the end of the work itself, by the very fact that it is not positively excluded, is at least implicitly intended.

c) It is enough that the honorable end be intended virtually, or that the act be virtually referred to an honorable end, or that the act be placed by force of an honorable intention previously had. For it suffices that the act truly be referred to an honorable end; but it is truly referred to an honorable end if it is placed by force of an honorable intention previously had. There is added that the obligation of an actual relation "would be an unbearable weight and a matter entangled with six hundred scruples" (St. Alphonsus, V, XLIV).

d) It is disputed whether one who places an act ordered by its nature to an honorable end, and does not positively exclude that end, by that very fact intends the honorable end, at least implicitly. Most more recent authors affirm this; but it seems it must be denied. For that on account of which an act is distinguished is not implicitly intended by the very fact that the act is performed. But the end of the act is distinguished from the act itself, for example the procreation of offspring from intercourse, as effect from cause; hence in order that it be intended, a new act of the will is required. But the controversy is less practical, because one who places, in the due mode and order, an act ordered by its nature to an honorable end, and does not positively exclude this end, commonly positively includes that end, although only confusedly and weakly.

2. It is disputed whether every human act must, in order to be good, be referred to God, or whether it suffices that it be referable to God.

Some teach that every act must be referred to God, because the dignity of the true ultimate end requires that all acts be referred to him. They add, however, that an implicit relation suffices, and that this is had by the very fact that the act is placed for an honorable end; because every honorable act by its nature is referred to God, the first and fontal honorableness of every particular honorableness.

Others deny that every act must be referred to God, and teach that, for a good act, it suffices that it be referable to God. They think this because acts cannot in any way be referred to God except through charity. But charity is certainly not required in order that a good act be placed; and this is already deduced from the 25th Baian proposition: "All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices."² According to the latter opinion, a good act not referred to God is referred to beatitude in common as to the ultimate end (nn. 12 and 13).

3. A human act, in order to be good, does not have to be elicited from the motive of charity, nor from another supernaturally known motive; this again is already deduced from the 25th Baian proposition just cited.

4. Although a human act, in order to be good, does not have to be elicited from the motive of charity, nevertheless to this extent there is an obligation of referring one's acts through an act of charity to God as to the ultimate end, insofar as it is prescribed to elicit an act of charity at certain times. Another precept besides that which is identified with the precept of charity cannot be proved. Hence St. Thomas says: "If it is asked when one must refer an act to the ultimate end, this is nothing other than to ask when the habit of charity must go out into act, because whenever the habit of charity goes out into act, the ordering of the whole man to the ultimate end takes place, and consequently of all those things which are ordered to him as goods for him" (In II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 6).

Nor does St. Alphonsus contradict these things when he teaches that acts should be offered to God several times in the day, at least in the morning (V, XLIV). For, as is clear from the context, he does not speak about the relation of acts to God as to the ultimate end, but about the care of referring all one's acts, even those which from the object are indifferent, to a good or honorable end. In order that this be done certainly, a good intention should be repeated more often.

5. Those who think that, for the goodness of an act, it is not required that it be referred to God as to the ultimate end, since according to their opinion this cannot be done without charity, ask what kind of influence must proceed from charity in order that an act be referred to God.³ Now:

Some require only habitual charity, without its influencing the act, since honorable acts are referred to God as if by their own weight.

Others likewise require only habitual charity; but according to them honorable acts which are placed in that state are always placed under the influence of the intention of God as ultimate end. For every agent, they say, acts from the intention of the ultimate end; but this, in one who is ordered to God, that is, in a just person, is God himself.

Others, besides habitual charity, require an act of perfect charity, by force of which good acts are referred to God. Of these, some say that in itself one act suffices for referring all future good acts to God, with the things that must be posited of course having been posited, namely that one not lose charity in the meantime. I said "in itself," because from another source there is the precept of eliciting an act of charity at certain times. Others think that the act of charity must be repeated at least from time to time. Here, however, it is further disputed whether the act of charity, in order to refer human acts to God, must be their causing principle, or whether it suffices that it be an ordering principle.⁴

Van Roey, who embraces the latter opinion, describes the stated ordering thus: "But if you ask how that virtual ordering of works is conceived, which is not virtual causality, we respond that it is a certain determination left behind from the first intention, some dictate arising from the first dictate, by force of which works are exercised in loving service of God and are determined and specified as friendly offerings made to God. This determination, this dictate, must be perceived as something truly persevering in the will, although here and now it does not occur to thought; the sign, indication, and argument of its real persistence is if someone, self-possessed and acting morally, is in such a disposition of mind that, seriously reflecting upon himself or asked why he does this or that work, finally and ultimately, after perhaps giving other particular motives, he answers that he acts on account of God, to please God, or something similar including explicitly or implicitly the motive of charity.

"If the matter is understood thus, it cannot be denied that the ordering of works is virtual; that is, the preceding intention, when it vanishes from the mind as an explicit intention, leaves behind some power, some determination, some disposition, which suffices so that the works, if they are done, are directed to God."

¹ Therefore they do not apply the doctrine to those acts to which the Author of nature has appointed the certain end of some honorable necessity or utility; such are, for example, eating, conjugal intercourse, etc. Besides, Innocent XI condemned proposition 8: "To eat and drink to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts"; and proposition 9: "The act of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from all fault and venial defect" (Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1158 and 1159).

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1025.

³ Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 26 sq.; Ernst, Ueber die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. dogm., VIII, n. 639.

⁴ Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 232 sq.

IV. Conclusion, by which the doctrine handed down is briefly gathered and completed.

1. In order that an act be morally good, it suffices, with goodness or indifference of the object posited, that it be placed from an honorable end.

2. In order that an act be supernaturally good, besides the things just assigned, it is also required that it proceed from a supernatural elicitive principle. This is established from the First Council of Orange, can. 7. Whether or not every act must be elicited from a supernaturally known motive is disputed.¹

3. In order that an act be meritorious de condigno, there is required:

a) On the part of the act: 1. that it be free in the moral genus; 2. that it be done in service of God, more probably from a supernatural motive, and indeed from a virtual influence or, as others say, under the virtual ordering of an act of charity (cf. n. 243).

b) On the part of the agent: 1. that he be in the state of the way; 2. that he be in the state of justice.

c) On the part of the one rewarding: that there exist a promise of reward, not indeed so that the act may acquire the condignity of reward, but so that it may be accepted by God in order to reward. Besides, these things are explained more abundantly by the dogmatic theologians.

4. Finally, if you ask to what ultimate end a good act is referred if it is not referred to God as to the ultimate end, I respond: it is referred to the indeterminate ultimate end, or to beatitude in common.² For on the one hand it is established that every act is referred to some ultimate end. But the act of which we speak is not referred to God, as we suppose; nor to a creature as to the ultimate end, because then it would be a sin, and indeed mortal. It remains, therefore, that it be referred to an indeterminate end or to beatitude in common. The same must be said of a venially evil act, since it is not referred to God, as is clear, nor to a creature as to the ultimate end, because this is mortal; therefore it is referred to beatitude in common. Others, however, speak otherwise (nn. 12 and 13).

¹ "Every" is said because with regard to some acts, for example the act of faith, it is established. Cf. Billot, De virtutibus infusis, p. 12 sq.

² I said "if," because others think that every good act is referred in some way to God (nn. 12 and 13).