Duties of Ecclesiastical and Civil Rulers and their Subjects

ALL those to whom the care of souls is committed in the Church of God are bound by divine precept and by the very nature of their office to fulfil the duties of their charge If they fail in their duty, they sin not only against charity and obedience, but also against justice; for everyone who voluntarily undertakes an office implicitly thereby undertakes to discharge the duties annexed to it. In general, therefore, ecclesiastical superiors are bound to love, watch over, and instruct by word and by example those committed to their charge. The special obligations of each one depend on the office which he holds, and are treated of elsewhere.

Subjects also owe to their ecclesiastical superiors love, reverence, obedience in all that belongs to their office, and temporal support. This is obvious from what has already been said, and it is inculcated in several places of Holy Writ.”

It has been the constant teaching of the Catholic Church that all public and legitimate authority is of divine right, in the sense that God is the Author of man’s nature by which he is a social animal, formed to live in society, which necessarily implies a distinction of rulers and ruled. The rulers may, indeed, be designated in various ways, their power may be more or less absolute; this power may be in the hands of one or of many, but it is derived from God, the Author of man’s nature and of human society. This is the teaching of St. Paul: “‘ Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation.”¹ As Leo XIII says in his encyclical letter, Diuturnum, June 29, 1881, this doctrine is taught in many passages of Holy Writ, and has been constantly inculcated by the Catholic Church. ² Rom. xiii 1-2.

In English-speaking countries the people have a large share in the election of their rulers, and such an important duty should be faithfully and religiously fulfilled. There may easily be a moral obligation to vote at elections in order to prevent the election of one who would do grave public harm if elected, or in order to secure the election of one whose election would be a great public benefit. If the only choice lies between candidates who are equally good or equally bad, there will be no moral obligation to vote.

Those who hold any civil office are bound to perform its duties faithfully, not only out of charity, but out of justice.

¹ Trent, sess. 23, c. 1, de Ref.

² x Tim. v 17; Heb. xiii 17.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. III, Section II. On Cessation from Servile Works · Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. IV, Section VII. On the Duties of Civil Rulers and Subjects

For Catholics it is a matter of religious obligation to love, reverence, and obey those who wield civil power. As Leo XIII teaches: ‘‘ We are bound to love dearly the country whence we have received the means of enjoyment this mortal life affords, but we have a much more urgent obligation to love with ardent love the Church to which we owe the life of the soul, a life that will endure for ever. Moreover, if we would judge aright, the supernatural love for the Church and the natural love of our own country proceed from the same eternal principle, since God himself is their Author and originating Cause. ... Law is of its very essence a mandate of right reason, proclaimed by a properly constituted authority, for the common good. But true and legitimate authority is void of sanction, unless it proceed from God, the supreme Ruler and Lord of all. The Almighty alone can commit power to a man over his fellow-men; nor may that be accounted as right reason which is in disaccord with truth and with divine reason; nor that held to be true good which is repugnant to the supreme and unchangeable good, or that wrests aside and draws away the wills of men from the charity of God. Hallowed, therefore, in the minds of Christians is the very idea of public authority, in which they recognize some likeness and symbol, as it were, of the divine Majesty, even when it is exercised by one unworthy. A just and due reverence to the laws abides in them, not from force and threats, but from a consciousness of duty; for God hath not given us the spirit of fear.”’+ 1 Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter, January 10, 1890.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 3 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. III, Section II. On Cessation from Servile Works

n. 707.

III. Excusing causes from the precept are enumerated: one's own or another's necessity, charity, piety, and custom.

One's own or another's necessity, that is, grave spiritual, bodily, or temporal harm to be averted from oneself or from a third party. Especially excused are:

a) The poor, who otherwise cannot provide for themselves and their own as to food or clothing. Likewise female servants, who otherwise lack time for mending or washing clothes (St. Alphonsus, III, 297). Although, if someone is known as poor, scandal ought to be absent, it is nevertheless better, as far as can be done, to work secretly.

b) Subjects who are compelled by a master to work; yet if servants must often work on Sunday, let them seek another service (St. Alphonsus, III, 296).

c) Bakers and butchers, who otherwise cannot satisfy those asking (St. Alphonsus, III, 298, 299). Nevertheless they are not excused, unless perhaps on account of competition, if the law forbids it, for example, to bakers.

d) Tailors and other workmen, if the matter is urgent, for example for impending weddings or funerals. Yet let them take care that, without a special cause, by taking on more work, or by refusing a sufficient number of workmen, they do not place themselves in such necessity (St. Alphonsus, III, 303).

e) Pharmacists providing necessities to the sick, unless they have agreed among themselves - as is done rather often today - that only one or another should sell on feast days.

f) Farmers, if from a storm or a similar cause grave harm is imminent (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 6, n. 21).

g) Barbers are excused partly on account of necessity, partly on account of custom (St. Alphonsus, III, 290).

h) Blacksmiths who shoe "the horses of travelers, or of those who (on the following day) will set out on a journey at very early morning or go out into the field to work.... Likewise the plowshares of those who otherwise would not be able to work on the following day can be repaired. So also roads, bridges, etc., can be repaired" (St. Alphonsus, III, 300).

i) Whoever cannot interrupt works once begun without grave harm, as those who labor in foundries, and sometimes also in butter-making establishments (St. Alphonsus, III, 300).

j) Those who prepare things which are necessary for a public festivity, for example on account of the arrival or birthday of a Prince, and which cannot conveniently be prepared beforehand. "The reason is that such signs of joy are morally necessary for the commonwealth" (St. Alphonsus, III, 304).

k) Those who would miss an occasion of gain extraordinary in view of their condition, as was explained in n. 704.

l) Avoiding idleness does not excuse by reason of itself; yet by reason of avoiding sin it excuses those who, morally speaking, will not abstain from sin unless they work, for example prisoners who cannot occupy themselves with works lawful in themselves (St. Alphonsus, III, 302). - But to those who complain of idleness, it can be permitted that they perform lighter works for the benefit of a poor person or of a needy church. If these things cannot be done less conveniently, by epikeia it can be permitted (at least if otherwise there is danger that they will run about) that for some hours they be occupied with other labors, though lighter ones. Likewise light domestic labor is lawfully conceded to a workman who otherwise would be exposed to the danger of making himself drunk, etc.

Charity permits someone to serve the sick, bury the dead, and generally to do for another what that other could lawfully do for himself.

Question. To what extent is it lawful to work for the poor?

Resp. 1. It is certainly lawful to work to assist either a determined poor person placed in grave necessity, or a community placed in such necessity (St. Alphonsus, III, 293).

Resp. 2. It is certainly unlawful in common necessity to work or make things so that the gain received from the labor or the things may be granted to the poor.

Resp. 3. It is disputed whether in common necessity it is lawful to make things, for example clothes to be distributed to the poor. With St. Alphonsus and others, against some, it seems it must be denied; for, if that opinion were admitted, it would already be lawful for all and always to work; which seems to oppose the sense of the Church (St. Alphonsus, III, 293).

Piety permits servile works as follows:

a) Works which are proximately ordered to divine worship are permitted. Such are: ringing bells, playing organs, blowing them, etc. (St. Alphonsus, III, 291).

b) Works which are ordered to divine worship only remotely or by accident are prohibited unless necessity requires them. Such are, for example, "to cultivate the fields of the church, to carry stones and timber for its building, to whitewash the walls of the temple" (St. Alphonsus, III, 293). Nevertheless, with sufficient probability it is lawful "to labor at making necessary ornaments for a needy church" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

c) Works which are ordered to divine worship neither so proximately nor so remotely are prohibited at most under light sin, indeed according to St. Alphonsus with sufficient probability not at all. Such are: "to sweep the church, to bake hosts, to adorn the altar and church with tapestries, to erect platforms necessary for a festivity or sepulcher, and similar things." Yet "knowingly to prepare platforms on a feast day for viewing a procession is, of itself, a grave sin; but if they were not made the previous day, they are lawfully made on the feast day" (III, 292).

What custom permits has been sufficiently indicated above (n. 705).
Finally, in doubt whether a sufficient excusing cause is present, a dispensation is required, about which see n. 183; note, however, that a sufficient cause is undoubtedly present if grave danger of notable harm is imminent.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. IV, Section VII. On the Duties of Civil Rulers and Subjects

n. 726.

I. Rulers are bound to promote the public good and therefore especially: 1. to entrust public offices to worthy persons; 2. to provide for the rights and security of citizens; 3. to promote public prosperity by just laws and statutes; 4. to preserve the rights of the Church and to be of assistance to her.¹

¹ Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei, November 1, 1885; Council of Trent, sess. 25, chap. 20, De reformatione.

n. 727.

II. Subjects owe civil superiors reverence,¹ and subjection in those things which are justly established for promoting the common good.²

Corollary I. Rebellion is illicit, both because it is opposed to the right which a ruler enjoys, and because very great evils are everywhere joined to rebellion. Hence Pius IX in the Syllabus condemned proposition 63: "It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate rulers, indeed even to rebel."³ And Gregory XVI says: "Both divine and human rights cry out against those who, by most shameful machinations of treason and sedition, strive to fall away from fidelity toward rulers and to hurl them down from authority."⁴

Question 1. Whether it is lawful to eject a usurper.

Resp. It is lawful to eject a usurper in the name of legitimate authority, so long as he has not yet become a legitimate ruler. Now he can become a legitimate ruler either by the just abdication of the legitimate ruler, or by the tacit or express consent of the people to transfer the rights of power to the usurper after the death of the legitimate ruler and of his heirs, or by the public welfare of the commonwealth, if this makes the permanence of the usurper necessary. It is disputed whether long possession of a realm confers a right to authority. It seems it must be denied, especially in the first usurper, and while good faith is lacking and the legitimate ruler still protests, unless that very long possession brings about the necessity that the government of the usurper remain for the public good.⁵ On that supposition, to depose such a ruler already becomes illicit.

Question 2. Whether it is lawful to depose a ruler who is indeed legitimate, but a tyrant.

Resp. 1. It is not lawful to depose a legitimate ruler who is actually abusing power, since an actual injury does not confer the right of dissolving the constituted state.

Resp. 2. If the discussion is about habitual and excessive tyranny, one must distinguish thus:

If the right of electing a ruler belongs to the people, it seems it must per se be affirmed, both because election from the mind of the people seems to be interpreted in this way, and because of the reason to be adduced in the following hypothesis. I said per se, because of the inconveniences often joined to such a manner of acting, about which there will be discussion immediately.

If the principality is hereditary, several more recent authors deny it; but older authors and many more recent ones affirm it, at least per se, because the right of the people to be well governed prevails over the individual good of the ruler that he govern. I said at least per se, because in practice it is difficult to prevent a greater ruin from following from deposition and so forth.

"Tyrannical government," says St. Thomas, "is not just, because it is not ordered to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler, as is clear from the Philosopher in III Politics (chap. 5) and in VIII Ethics (chap. 10); and therefore the disturbance of this government does not have the character of sedition, unless perhaps when the rule of the tyrant is so inordinately disturbed that the subject multitude suffers greater detriment from the consequent disturbance than from the rule of the tyrant" (II-II, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3). And Leo XIII says: "Yet if sometimes it happens that public power is exercised by rulers rashly and beyond measure, the doctrine of the Catholic Church does not allow rising against them on one's own initiative, lest the tranquility of order be disturbed more and more, and lest society receive greater detriment from this. When the matter has come to this, that no other hope of safety shines forth, she teaches that a remedy must be obtained by the merits of Christian patience and by insistent prayers to God."⁶ These words can be understood in such a way that the Supreme Pontiff practically fears that greater evils will arise from rebellion.

Corollary II. Although rebellion is everywhere illicit, nevertheless it is lawful for a nationality, by parliamentary means, as they are called, to tend toward its own commonwealth. It is said by parliamentary means, so that unjust means are excluded, whether with respect to the former commonwealth or with respect to another nationality existing in the same commonwealth. The doctrine stated is drawn from this, that it is lawful, with the rights of others preserved, to tend toward that which is the more suitable means for obtaining human good. But its own commonwealth is per se a more suitable means for a nationality to obtain human good, because citizens of the same morals, culture, and psychological dispositions cooperate more easily toward the common good.

Corollary III. Per se there is no obligation of obeying a usurper who has not yet become a legitimate ruler. The reason is that in reality he lacks authority. Per accidens there can be an obligation, namely lest scandal arise or order be disturbed (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad 3).

Corollary IV. Nor per se is there an obligation of obeying the unjust precepts of a legitimate Ruler. Per accidens there can be an obligation, as was just said about a usurper.

"A man is bound to obey secular rulers," says St. Thomas in the cited place, "insofar as the order of justice requires; and therefore if they do not have a just rule but a usurped one, or if they command unjustly, subjects are not bound to obey them, except perhaps per accidens, on account of avoiding scandal or danger." From these things you may deduce what must be thought about resistance to unjust laws, whether passive or active. Passive resistance, which consists in this, that the law is merely not observed, is per se lawful; per accidens, or because of a greater evil to be avoided, there can be an obligation of fulfilling the law. Yet it is always illicit to observe the law if that which it commands is intrinsically evil. Active resistance, by which someone positively resists observing the law, likewise can per accidens be illicit, and at least as being generally useless is everywhere to be dissuaded.

¹ 1 Pet. 2:17.

² Rom. 13:1, 2, 7.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1763.

⁴ Encyclical Mirari vos, August 15, 1832.

⁵ Aertnys-Damen, I, n. 563.

⁶ Encyclical Quod Apostolici muneris, December 28, 1878.

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 7 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 6. The Remaining Pote…, Piety · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. III, Art. 1. The Duties of Memb…, General Duties of the Faithful · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. III, Art. 1. The Duties of Memb…, Duties of Pastors · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. III, Art. 2. Duties of Members …, The Duties of Subjects · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. III, Art. 2. Duties of Members of Domestic and Civil Society, Voting

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 6. The Remaining Pote…, Piety

n. 2346.

Definition of Piety

Definition of Piety.—Piety in the strictest sense is defined as “a moral virtue that inclines one to pay to father and fatherland the duty of respect and assistance that is owed them as the authors and sustainers of our being.”

(a) It is a moral virtue, one pertaining to justice, and hence it differs from the special duty of charity owed to parents and country (see 1158, 1171 sqq.). Charity loves parents and country out of love for God whose creatures they are; piety honors them in recognition of the benefits received from them and the authority vested in them.

(b) Piety is shown to father and fatherland; that is, just as religion gives worship to God in acknowledgment of His excellence and our dependence upon Him, so does piety show due respect to those who hold the place of God in our respect on earth. Filial piety is owed to the mother as well as to the father, and in a less degree to other relatives, inasmuch as they share or continue the blood of one’s parents and may be regarded as representing them (e.g., brothers and sisters, husband or wife). Patriotism belongs to one’s native land or the country, nation, state, city, etc., of which one is a citizen; and it should include, not only fellow-citizens, but also the friends and allies of one’s country. He who is the adopted citizen of a country should love the place of his birth, but loyalty and obedience are owed to the nation to which he has transferred his allegiance.

(c) Piety offers respect and assistance. The first duty is owed to parents on account of their position of progenitors and superiors; the second is owed to their condition when they are infirm or destitute or otherwise in need. It is more probable that filial piety is violated only when the personal goods (e.g., life, health, body, fame, honor) of parents are injured, and that injury to their real goods pertains to fraud, theft or damage, rather than to impiety. Moreover, on account of the community of goods that exists between parents and children, real injuries between them are not rigorously acts of injustice and require more than the ordinary grave matter for serious sin (see 1902).

(d) Piety is owed to parents and country as the authors and sustainers of our being. Thus, it differs from legal justice, which is the duty owed the State or community, precisely as it is the whole of which one is a part. It differs likewise from commutative justice, which is obligatory in agreements with parents or other superiors, for the duty is then owed them as partners to a free contract. On account of this nobility of the formal object, filial piety and patriotism are very like to religion and rank next after it in the catalogue of virtues.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. III, Art. 1. The Duties of Memb…, General Duties of the Faithful

n. 2574.

The General Duties of the Faithful

The General Duties of the Faithful.—The Church has the power to make laws which will promote the common good of the whole body and the individual good of the members (see 418). Chief among the laws that bind the faithful in general are the six known as the Precepts of the Church, namely, the laws on the observance of Sundays and holydays, on fasting and abstinence, on yearly confession, on Easter Communion, on the support of pastors, and on marriage.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. III, Art. 1. The Duties of Memb…, Duties of Pastors

n. 2607.

Special Duties from Canon Law of Those Who Have Care of Souls

Special Duties from Canon Law of Those Who Have Care of Souls.—(a) Bishops have grave obligations of residing in their see or diocese (Canon 338), of attending to the instruction of their flock (Canons 1327, 336), of applying the Mass pro populo (Canon 339), of making a diocesan report (Canon 340), of confirming and of ordaining worthy candidates (Canon 785), of visiting their dioceses (Canon 343), of making the ad limina visit (Canons 340, 342), and of calling a diocesan synod at least every tenth year (Canon 356).

(b) Pastors must reside generally in their parish (Canon 465), and, if lawfully absent, they must make provision for the sick calls and other spiritual necessities of their flocks. They must preach the word of God on Sundays and holydays, and it would be a serious matter to neglect this duty for a considerable time (e.g., a whole month) without good reason (Canon 1344). It is also a serious obligation to attend to the necessary catechetical instruction of young and old (Canons 1330, 1332), to apply the Mass pro populo (Canon 466), and to administer the Sacraments (at least Baptism, Penance, Extreme Unction) to those in grave spiritual need (see 1167). Pastors are also obliged to know their flock, to visit the sick and dying, to correct abuses, to see that the customary administration of the Sacraments and the usual church functions are attended to, to watch over the schooling of the children, and to direct the temporalities and attend to the reports and records of the parish. The duties of chaplains of hospitals, institutions, soldiers, etc., are similar to those of pastors, but in particular cases the former are subject to special prescriptions or to local usage or to rules made by the Ordinary.

(c) Assistant pastors are subject in the care of souls to the instruction and direction of the parish-priest. Their particular duties are known from the diocesan statutes, the letters of the Ordinary, and the commission of the pastor. Regularly, they are bound to reside in the parish rectory and to assist the pastor or supply for him in all the parish work, the Mass pro populo excepted (Canon 476).

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. III, Art. 2. Duties of Members …, The Duties of Subjects

n. 2636.

Duties of Subjects

Duties of Subjects.—The general duties of subjects to superiors are chiefly honor and obedience (see 2351 sqq.).

(a) Honor.—Honor is owed to superiors on account of their position of authority, which is derived from God, not on account of their personal character, for personally they may be wicked. It is disrespectful even in a democracy to deny them the honorable address, salutation or courtesy which is customary, or to treat them insultingly by word, manner or writing. But it is not disrespectful to disagree with the personal views of a superior or to seek legitimately his removal from office if he is unfit or less fit.

(b) Obedience.—Obedience is owed to superiors and their laws when they strictly command what is not sinful or illegal or outside their authority (see 375 sqq.). Unemancipated children are obliged to obey their parents in all that falls under the parental authority, namely, in what pertains to good morals (e.g., attendance at religious duties, avoidance of bad companions) or the good order of the home (e.g., the hours for meals, the time of retiring, the visitors to be received). But parents have no authority to command fraud or other sin; nor are children under subjection in the matter of taking up a state of life, for this demands liking and fitness, and the command of a superior cannot give liking and fitness. It is a serious sin for parents to force a child to take up religious life or the priesthood, or to marry a certain individual; but a child should yield when his parents are reasonably opposed to his choice of a vocation, as when they need his support, or wish him to test his vocation a little, or know that the person selected for wife will disgrace the family.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. III, Art. 2. Duties of Members of Domestic and Civil Society, Voting

n. 2643.

The Duty of Exercising the Electoral Franchise

The Duty of Exercising the Electoral Franchise.—(a) There is a grave duty of using the privilege granted to citizens of voting in public elections, and especially primaries; for the welfare of the community and the moral, intellectual and physical good of individuals depend on the kind of men who are nominated or chosen to rule, and on the ticket platforms voted for. Hence, those who neglect to vote cooperate negatively with a serious harm (viz., evil in power), or at least with public unconcern about public matters—for example, those who neglect through laziness or indifference to condemn by their vote. A grave inconvenience (e.g., sickness, ostracism, exile, persecution), but not a slight inconvenience (such as loss of time, trouble, ridicule), excuses from the duty; for an affirmative law has exceptions. Neither is there an obligation to vote when an election is a mere formality, as when there is but one candidate or party.

(b) The duty is not one of commutative justice, as the ballot is either a privilege, or a thing commanded by authority, but not a service to which the citizen has bound himself by contract or office. The obligation is, therefore, one of legal justice, arising from the fact that the common weal is everybody’s business and responsibility, especially in a republic. Hence, representatives of the people who by abstention from voting cause a serious damage which they were bound ex officio to prevent, are guilty of commutative injustice and are held to restitution; but a citizen who stays away from the polls sins, and perhaps gravely, against legal justice, though there is no duty of restitution for the damages that result. Moreover, in a general election the vote of one citizen is usually not of decisive influence, and citizens do not make themselves responsible for all the acts of their representatives.

n. 2644.

Manner of Voting

Manner of Voting.—(a) Object.—It is not necessary to vote for the best candidate, provided one votes for a person who is fitted by character, ability, record, experience, etc. for the office, and gives indications, not merely promises, that he will serve the community well. But in certain ecclesiastical elections the voters must take oath beforehand to vote, not only for a worthy candidate, but also for the person whom they honestly think, all things considered, most worthy. In minor offices (such as constable or town clerk) it suffices that the candidate be known as conscientious; but in major offices (such as President, governor, congressman, legislator, or judge) the party principles for which he stands have to be considered chiefly. Per accidens, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate when this is necessary to prevent a greater evil, as when the opposing candidate is much worse, or a good ticket cannot be elected unless some less worthy candidates are included.

(b) Purpose.—The end which the voter should have in mind is the good of the public, and hence it is not right to vote for candidates solely or chiefly because they are personal friends, members of one’s own race, organization or religion, or because one wishes to gain favor or escape enmity.

(c) Circumstances.—The voter must avoid all that is contrary to natural law (e.g., selling of votes, repeating, stuffing ballot boxes) or positive law (e.g., state laws require not only citizenship and a period of previous residence, but also other conditions such as registration and freedom from bribery and other election crimes). The opinion that politics is necessarily corrupt, and that all is fair that helps to win, is a false and pernicious doctrine. The conditions for ecclesiastical elections are given in Canons 160 sqq.

n. 2645.

Obligation to Seek Office

Obligation to Seek Office.—A worthy man should run for office in the following case: (a) when the public good calls for his candidacy (e.g., when his election or candidacy will avert serious evils, and there is no one else so available); and (b) there is no grave impediment to his candidacy (such as supremely important private affairs or ill-health that makes it impossible to run).

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 16 passages

Vol. I, On the Fourth Precept of t…, V. Obligations of Inferiors and Superiors

n. 692.

What is the distinction between slaves and servants? - Servants are distinguished from slaves. Slaves are those who, by the law of nations and civil law against natural liberty, are subject to another master, so that they can be possessed, alienated, and sold after the manner of patrimony. Schmalz., l. 4, t. 9, n. 1 seqq. "The appellation of slaves flowed from this, that our commanders are accustomed to sell captives, and by this to preserve them and not kill them." L. 239, de Verb. sign. But servants are not slaves, but free persons who freely enter contracts of service, by hiring their works for a certain or uncertain time in the service of a master and his family. Hence servants are of the family, and therefore are also called familiars or domestics. Servants are under the governance of the master, and masters have rights and obligations toward servants. Although by servants and those of the family is not properly understood one who furnishes the duties of service only for one or another hour of the day, nevertheless those are sufficiently understood as familiars who have a stable seat for the whole day in the house of the master and serve him, but sleep at night in their own house. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 102, a. 1.

Therefore servants are also distinguished from workers. For these hire their works to some master for a certain time and labor, but are not received into his house and family, nor are they properly subject to his governance. From the contract of works there arises an obligation of commutative justice, for the servant to furnish his works to the master, and for the master to pay the agreed wage. But from the fact that he is taken into part of the master's family, the master has the right and office also of ruling and governing the servant for the common good of the family; but the obligation of observance and obedience falls upon the servant in those things which pertain to domestic order. And thus S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 2, not from some pact or from commutative justice, but from the order of society, although imperfect, recognizes in the master, besides dominion of ownership over the works of the servant, dominion of jurisdiction or power extending itself over the person even to moderate correction of him.

n. 693.

What are the obligations of masters? - Masters are bound toward their servants: 1. To treat them kindly, that is, by addressing and commanding them decently and humanely, by furnishing good and sufficient food, by not burdening them with too many works, by not exposing them to harmful and dangerous works without due precautions, and by conveniently caring for the sick. And generally they are bound to fulfill the offices of charity toward their own servants more than toward others, because servants labor for them, and as it were live for them, and are of the family. This is clear from natural law, and from Sacred Scripture. Ecclus. 33:31: If you have a faithful servant, let him be to you as your soul; treat him as a brother. Eph. 6:9: And you, masters, do the same things to them (servants), forbearing threats; knowing that both their Lord and yours is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with him. C. He. 331, 332.

To govern them conveniently, having due regard for the goods of religion and salvation, to instruct and correct them conveniently; for the master is head of the servant, just as of the whole family; but it belongs to the head to direct, where there is need. It seems also clear from the words of Paul, 1 Tim. 5:8: But if anyone does not have care for his own, and especially for those of his household, he has denied the faith, and is worse than an unbeliever. But the servant is reckoned among domestics. C. He. 332; Elbel n. 950.
To pay a just price; for the matter concerns an obligation of justice and natural equity; and defrauding such a wage is numbered among the sins crying to heaven. 1 Tim. 5:18; 1 Kings 30:13; L. 342; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 102, a. 1.

n. 694.

You will resolve: Masters can sin, and indeed even gravely: If they do not concede time to servants for learning the rudiments of the Christian faith, or do not send them to catechism and sermon; if they do not take care that at the due time they assist at Mass, confess, and communicate. If they hire or retain in the house servants addicted to illicit sects, irreligious, impious, blaspheming, speaking base things; if they do not warn and correct those sinning gravely, or do not dismiss those unwilling to promise amendment, unless perhaps they especially need their works and cannot find others. If they do not watch, as far as lies in them, that servants abstain from sins; if they permit an occasion of sinning to them; if they lead or entice them into sin by bad example or solicitations.

If they do not pay the promised or just stipend, or delay it too much; if they do not care for sick servants, and immediately expel them, or dismiss them before the fixed time without just cause. Catholic Epistle of Blessed James 5:4; C. B. 618; C. He. 331, 332; L. 342. For understanding the gravity of sin as to the aforesaid omitted warning, correction, and vigilance, and the scandal that followed, it is often necessary to open the condition of the master. For as to extraneous persons grave fault is often absent. Almost the same are the obligations of other masters toward workers who labor in their factories.

n. 695.

What are the obligations of servants? - Servants are bound to furnish to masters: 1. Reverence; for thus the Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:1: Let servants judge their masters worthy of all honor. From this, those can sin even gravely who mock masters, spurn them, or manifest their hidden defects. 2. Obedience and compliance in all those things to which they have obligated themselves by force of contract and by force of positive laws, C. A. 1172; C. B. 616, 617, and in those things which regard good morals. For by force of service there arises a relation of superiority and subjection between master and servant. Therefore, if the right of governance belongs to the master, the obligation of obeying corresponds to the servant. Thus Eph. 6:5: Servants, obey your carnal masters with fear and trembling in the simplicity of your heart, as Christ. And 1 Pet. 2:18: Servants, be subject in all fear to masters, not only to the good and modest, but also to the difficult. Hence they sin more or less, by reason of matter, who, when something is prescribed to them, grumble, answer insolently, waste time uselessly, neglect to perform the prescribed labor, or labor for themselves with damage to the master; and in one word, all those who do not furnish the service which ordinarily is usually required and furnished by such persons. 3. Fidelity; according to the words of Paul to Titus 2:9: Servants are to be subject to their masters... not defrauding, but showing good faith in all things. Hence they sin, and often gravely against justice, who do not have care for things entrusted to them, who by their fault allow them to become worse, who steal expensive foodstuffs, or those not usually given to them, whether for eating, or for giving or selling to outsiders, who manifest secrets of the family, especially if harm follows from this. Leo XIII, Enc. Quod Apostolici, 28 Dec. 1878; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103; L. 343.

For understanding the gravity of the sin, by reason of irreverence, disobedience against observance and dulia, and infidelity against justice, the condition of service must be manifested in confession. Otherwise the grave malice which is had is either not declared, or is not sufficiently expressed in its lowest species. Almost the same are the obligations of workers toward their own patrons.

n. 696.

Note: "Wages are owed to servants sick for a brief time, for example, for a few days, because the time of the year for which they are hired is to be taken morally, or no attention is to be given to a defect for a brief time; for a small time with respect to the whole year is to be reputed as nothing. But otherwise, if the servant is sick for several months, because wages are by no means owed for an office not furnished. L. 346. Nor is the master bound to expenses to be made for care, or for remedies and the work of a physician. All agree on this if the expenses are notable; indeed St. Liguori, n. 864, after Lugo, admits this, at least as probable, if the expenses are light. But no wages are owed to workers, even those sick for a brief time, because they are hired by the day... therefore they must be paid only for individual days, indeed for half a day, if they fail for half a day." Gury, Cas. 972; C. B. 616, 617.

A master cannot dismiss a servant before the established time without grave cause. The reason is that a contract of hiring is truly onerous, obligating each party according to the measure of the matter. Therefore, just as a servant cannot desert the master without grave cause if the latter, by defect of the servant, would have to undergo grave harm, so likewise neither can a master without grave cause cast off a servant hired for a year. A master dismissing a servant before the time without sufficient cause is bound to repair the harm arising from this. But if a servant departs before the established time, per se he has a right to salary almost according to the proportion of time served, though somewhat less; but if the master suffers grave detriment from the departure of the servant, he can retain a proportionate part of the stipend. L. 342, 345; C. H. 1584; C. B. 620 seqq.

Servants can rightly receive salary from a master burdened by debts if they have furnished service in good faith. For it is the just wage of labor, and the master gives his own thing. "But whether they are bound to depart if they notice that the master is rendered unable to satisfy debts from such service? Navarrus, etc., affirm. Yet Molina denies, and not improbably, says Laymann. For they do not sin against justice if, asked by the master, they serve and receive wages; nor against charity, if others will not be lacking for serving." L. l. 3, n. 694, and this especially if the master needs the servant.

n. 697.

Are servants bound to restitution when they culpably do not impede harms which are inflicted upon the master? - Either servants are hired to guard and defend the family estate, and to watch and impede lest any harm be inflicted upon it, as administrators, guards, etc., who are usually called by this name rather than by the name of servants; or they are hired for mere labor and furnishing their work in necessary things of the family, who are commonly called servants properly. In the first case they are bound to restitution and compensation of harms. For they are bound to impede the harm of masters from office and contract, and therefore from strict commutative justice.

In the other case, some say that even servants are bound to compensation of harms, whether they are inflicted by outsiders or by other servants. Their reason is that by force of the service itself, the master commits his things into custody to each servant. Others more commonly and more probably say that they are bound if theft and harm is committed by outsiders; but that they are not bound if it is committed by other servants or domestics. The reason is that by the very fact that they are admitted into the family, they are indeed judged to undertake the obligation of defending it against outsiders, but by no means also against other familiars. Finally, others say that servants are not bound to restitution or compensation of harm. For although they are obligated from charity to impede that harm, nevertheless they are not obligated from justice. For they are indeed hired to furnish labor and their work in necessary things of the family, but by no means also to guard and defend the goods of the family. Special servants and ministers are placed over custody and vigilance above domestic things or the family, and specifically over care and custody of the pantry; and to these the keys for guarding things are handed over. Therefore then servants are bound to restitution or compensation of harm, when that care and custody of the family estate has been committed to them by special duty, either explicitly or implicitly, for example, when a key is given to them for taking something from some place, because for then the custody of that place is entrusted to them. Given this variety of opinions, the confessor ought prudently to abstain from urging the obligation of restitution. Lugo, d. 19, nn. 105, 106; L. l. 3, nn. 344, 573.

n. 698.

Can servants, judging that the salary is below the work furnished by them, use hidden compensation? - R. Affirmatively, if masters do not pay the stipend established by agreement, or diminish it. For then they openly injure commutative justice. Ithur., Cas. 1, n. 2.

R. Negatively, at least speaking generally, outside the aforesaid case. This is proved: 1. from prop. 37 condemned by Innocent XI. 2. For although they have agreed about a lower price, nevertheless the contract, as being just in conscience, must be stood by. At least speaking generally, because several except: 1. If the servant is compelled by force or fear to consent to an unequal price. 2. If, compelled by necessity, he consented to it, provided however that the master would not already have justly found other servants at the same low price, or did not receive this one asking from mercy. Indeed, if a servant serves with no wage established, from mere charity of the master, so that he may be fed by him, he can claim none, "just as happens with boys whom nobles or Bishops are asked to admit into their family; for then it suffices if the masters give them food, clothing, and habitation, since such is the custom." L. 348. 3. If he is unwillingly burdened with undue works. 4. If he increases the works from the will of the master, whether express or tacit; for the worker is worthy of his wage; but otherwise if he himself altogether spontaneously increases the works, because then he is judged to remit the works in order to conciliate to himself the favor of the master. L. 522, 523; E. M. 1473.

n. 699.

Note: What has been said of servants is to be said likewise of other workers, and of merchants. What the just compensation is can also be left to the judgment of the servant, if he is prudent and of a timid conscience. But in practice the matter often is not without danger of illusion. The practical danger must also be guarded against, lest, if he is discovered to have taken the master's money secretly, he be denounced as a thief and condemned to prison. L. 524.

n. 700.

What are the obligations of teachers and pupils? Between teachers and pupils there are, in a certain way, the same obligations as between parents and children. The reason is that parents, whose right and obligation properly concerns the education and instruction of children, substitute teachers for themselves, who therefore hold their place in this matter toward the children. Therefore masters and preceptors owe to pupils love, good example, right education, correction, and true doctrine. Hence they are bound to perfect themselves in the science which they teach, in order to instruct others duly; to promote the progress of pupils in letters, as much as lies in them; to turn them away as much as they can from others who are defiled by depraved morals, whom they ought in no way to admit into their schools. They can also sin gravely when they neglect the instruction of pupils, or punish them unjustly or indiscreetly; but especially if they seduce them, by driving them toward sins; if they do not teach good morals; if deliberately they teach false things as true, or things harmful to salvation; if they retain pupils imbued with bad morals, who are pernicious to others, etc.

They can sin gravely, however, both by reason of office and by reason of the stipend which they receive. If the teacher has assumed from quasi-contract a special care for the education of his pupils, by contrary sins, for example of scandal, not only charity but also justice is violated. Hence the condition of teacher is to be explained in those sins. Pupils are bound to show teachers love, reverence, and obedience, because of their superiority and care, while they are instructed by them in good morals and arts. The reason is clear: for this is what the reciprocal obligation of pupils to teachers imports; teachers would plainly be obligated in vain to instruct them, or to imbue them with good morals, unless pupils likewise were obligated to follow the admonitions and precepts of the teachers. Pupils sin, however, gravely or lightly according to the gravity or lightness of the matter itself, and its various circumstances, if they do not obey teachers in things pertaining to studies and good morals; if they do not show honor and reverence to teachers; namely if, far from studying diligently, they waste time in idleness, play, or other follies against the will of their teachers; if they detract from teachers, or ridicule them, jeer at them, afflict them with curses, calumnies, annoyances, etc. C. 1. ult. de Magistr. etc.; Clem. 2. e. t.; L. 361; S. Th. Quodl. 3, a. 9; E. M. The condition of pupil is to be explained in grave sins against due reverence and obedience. Otherwise the grave malice against observance is not declared.

700bis. Schools: By her native right the Church has true authority over schools, whether private or public, in order to her own end. And the Church has in fact always applied care lest schools, even lower schools, be lacking, and for the sake of the poor, as may be seen in the Decrees, title de Magistris, and lest anything be demanded for the license to teach. Parents sending their children to heretical, schismatic, neutral schools generally sin gravely. They can be excused from the gravest necessity, scandal being removed, and the proximate danger of all perversion against faith and morals being removed, and suitable means being used for the right, Christian, and Catholic education of the children. E. M.

Studies: The teaching of Sacred Scripture is to be imparted in each Seminary, according to the prescription made on this matter by Pius X, Litt. Quoniam in re biblica, 27 Mar. 1906.

In the plan of studies, moreover, those things are to be observed which are contained in the Encyclical Letter of Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, section I, "Primo igitur," and following, and are repeated in the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum.

Therefore scholastic Philosophy is to be handed on, especially that which was handed on by Saint Thomas, concerning which whatever was sanctioned by Leo XIII remains in force. Scholastic Theology also is to be handed on. But account is also to be taken of positive theology, and indeed more than before, yet with due moderation. The science of philosophical matters cannot decline from divine and ecclesiastical authority. Profane disciplines also are to be cultivated, especially those of natural things, yet with no harm to sacred studies. As to the directors and teachers to be chosen for Seminaries or Catholic Universities and religious houses of studies, whoever, in any way, shall have been imbued with modernism are to be barred both from the office of governing and from the office of teaching. All books, periodicals, and any reviews which have the savor of modernism are to be permitted neither to adolescents in Seminaries nor to hearers in Universities. Besides this it is prescribed that individual teachers, before beginning lectures at the start of the year, show to their Ordinary the text which each has proposed to himself in teaching, or the questions or theses to be treated; then that during the year itself the method of each one's teaching be examined; and if it should appear to depart from sound doctrine, this will be the reason why the teacher is immediately to be removed. Finally, besides the profession of faith, they are to give an oath to their Ordinary, according to the established formula, and with their name subscribed.

The same thing must be furnished each year to their moderators by teachers or lecturers in religious orders before they begin lectures; namely they are bound also to show to them the text of lectures, and the questions or theses to be treated, and at the beginning of the year to give the oath. For the effect of sacred ordination, years of studies cannot be said to be completed by the feast of Pentecost or of the Most Holy Trinity; rather it is required that the scholastic course of nine months be completed, with the final examination successfully passed. E. M. Ordering of studies: In the Seminaries of Italy the ordering of discipline, and of schools and studies, is to be observed which is contained in the Circular Letter of the S. C. Consist., 16 Jul. 1912, A. A. S. vol. 4, p. 491 seqq. The S. C. Consist., Circular Letters 16 Jul. 1912 and 17 Oct. 1913 to the Ordinaries of Italy, recommends that in the Seminaries of Italy scholastic texts more apt and of safer doctrine be used, with others excluded, which can be dangerous for the formation of clerics. Hence in particular in the aforesaid letters are excluded: Il primo passo alla filosofia of Aloysius Ambrosi, the manual works of ecclesiastical history by F. S. Funk and F. S. Kraus, the manual work of Patrology by Rauschen, works of consultation and erudition, Delehaye's Leggende agiografiche, and similar things. E. M.

Academic Degrees: Regulars can have the habitual faculty from the S. C. to obtain academic degrees from the Biblical Commission. Degrees regularly are necessary for various dignities and ecclesiastical offices, for the Episcopate, for the Archdiaconate, for the penitentiary, theological, and scholastic Canonry, for the office of capitular vicar, Advocate before the Roman Congregations. Assistants in Rome must be distinguished by the laurea of doctor in sacred theology and in canon law. C. Sapienti Consilio, Ord. serv. in R. C., Normae pecul. c. 6, n. 5. E. M. Doctorate: Let no one hereafter be given the laurea of Theology and Canon Law who has not previously completed the established curriculum in scholastic philosophy. But if he should be given it, let him be given it in vain. The precept that no one is to be given the laurea of Theology unless he first has obtained the laurea in philosophical disciplines, or at least has furnished certain testimony concerning the completed curriculum in Scholastic Philosophy, is strictly to be observed. If anyone is enrolled in the same year in the Faculty of Theology and of Canon Law at the same time, even if in different Institutes, let him be deprived of every right to receive degrees. But if he is given some degree, let him be given it in vain. No one can be admitted to the school of the canonical text unless he proves by written document that he has studied for a year in some Institute in the Institutions of Canon Law. Those to be promoted to the doctorate are bound to make the profession of faith, according to the formula prescribed by Pius IV, with the addition prescribed by Pius IX. Academic degrees obtained in Rome or elsewhere at Catholic Universities or Pontifical Institutes are to be judged altogether valid in other places, without new confirmation, or new taxes to be exacted. The laurea of Doctor in Theology or in Canon Law, which is granted through the S. Congregation of Studies, without any examination made, but because of excellent merits, has all the rights and privileges of any other doctoral laurea. The manner of testing the doctrine of candidates for academic degrees in Sacred Scripture is found in Acta Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 3, p. 47 seqq., p. 296 seqq. Teachers, at the beginning of the year in Seminaries, and teachers or lecturers in religious orders, after the profession of faith has been made, are likewise bound to emit the oath, according to the formula prescribed by Pius X, M. P. Sacrorum antistitum. Before anyone is admitted by the superiors of some school, lyceum, or university to academic degrees, it must be evident by document that he was not enrolled in another institute. E. M.

n. 701.

What are the obligations of inferiors as regards ecclesiastical Superiors? Subjects are bound to show to their spiritual Superiors love, honor, and obedience in those things which pertain to their jurisdiction and care; likewise necessary support. Proof: 1. This is clear from many places of Sacred Scripture, 1 Tim. 5:17, 18; Heb. 13:17, etc. 2. As to love, reverence, and obedience, because they are superiors, having true jurisdiction; as to support, because the laborer is worthy of his wage. As to those who serve the common utility, that is, Princes, soldiers, and others of this sort, the stipends of livelihood are owed by the people; so also to those who minister to worship for the salvation of the whole people, the people owe stipends of sustenance. Trid. s. 25, C. 17 de R.; Leo XIII, Enc. Sapientiae christianae, 10 Jan. 1880; S. Th. Quodl. 6, a. 10; Quodl. 10, a. 12; E. M.

n. 702.

You will resolve: Therefore all Christians are bound under grave fault to obey the Supreme Pontiff in matters pertaining to faith, to morals, and to Christian discipline; for in these he is the Vicar of Christ on earth. In the same way, diocesan subjects are bound to obey Bishops, according to the nature of the matter, in those things which pertain to their jurisdiction. They must also depend on the Supreme Pontiff and on the Bishops as regards Catholic social action. For the Supreme Pontiff and the Bishops have the right of directing it. Pius X, 1 Mar. 1905, Ep. to Card. Svampa.

n. 703.

What are the obligations of ecclesiastical superiors? Spiritual Superiors in turn are bound to show to subjects love, care, doctrine, and good example. Proof: 1. This is clear from many places of Sacred Scripture. Cf. Epp. to Timoth. and to Tit., and from Trid. s. 23, C. 1 de R. 2. This is evinced from their very office. Hence neglect of souls as to care and administration of the sacraments, as to doctrine and correction in ecclesiastical superiors, is not only against charity, but also against justice, and for the most part a mortal sin, according to that saying of Ezech. 34:2, 4: Woe to the shepherds of Israel ... that which was weak you have not strengthened, and that which was sick you have not healed, etc. L. 357 seqq.

n. 704.

What are the obligations of subjects toward civil authority?

Subjects are also bound to show love, reverence, and obedience to secular superiors. For in the civil order they are true superiors, bearing toward us in the temporal order the place of God Himself. This is confirmed from Sacred Scripture, Rom. 13:1 seqq.; 1 Pet. 2:13, 17. For this reason the Catechism of the Council of Trent compares and joins an obligation of this sort with that by which we are bound toward paternal and ecclesiastical authority. For, p. 3, on the 4th Commandment, section 15, after it has taught that parents and ecclesiastical superiors are to be honored with due honor, it adds: "The same must be said of Kings, Princes, Magistrates, and the rest, to whose power we are subject. For if we pay them any honor, it is referred to God; for an eminent degree of dignity has the veneration of men, because it is a likeness of divine power; in this also we venerate the providence of God, who has attributed the administration of public office to them, and uses them as ministers of His power." Hence it is clear that reverence is to be shown not only to Princes, but also to their officials according to their office and dignity.

Leo XIII, Enc. Letter Quella lunga, 29 Jun. 1881; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 5, 6; Quodl. 8, a. 7; Quodl. 10, a. 12; E. M. Therefore it is not fitting to speak rashly about those who perform public office, nor maliciously to carp at their deeds; although it is permitted to scrutinize them and to speak and write publicly about them, insofar as the laws permit this, so that right judgment may be made concerning them and public utility may be provided for. Therefore they sin against charity and justice who announce in newspapers the hidden offenses of certain persons, which do not harm others, or publish them in conversations and speeches, so that they may repel them from some office. Those wound the observance due to them who inflict insults upon them, whether by words or writings, and who deny them the signs of honor due to them. Kenrick tr. 8, nn. 164, 165.

n. 705.

What are the obligations of civil superiors? These are bound to show to subjects love, good example as to morals and religion, the administration of justice, and to provide for public happiness by just and suitable means. This is most plainly clear from the very nature of their office. For the end of civil government is the safety of the commonwealth. The Fathers of the Seventh Council of Toledo, chap. 10, explaining the office of kings, present them as "not looking to the rights of their own advantage, but consulting the fatherland." Hence secular superiors sin gravely by negligence, connivance, and omissions, for example if they do not protect subjects from enemies and unjust vexations, and most of all by positive injuries, oppressions, and excessive exactions, or by persecution of the Christian religion; which injustices God certainly will not leave unavenged. For, as is said in Wis. 6:6, 7, a most severe judgment shall be made upon those who preside: for mercy is granted to the little, but the powerful shall powerfully suffer torments. Struggl 28. They likewise sin if, as far as they can, they do not turn away from society crimes which tend to the common harm, if likewise they do not remove from it the sects of Freemasons, socialists, anarchists, etc., if they put over the commonwealth men ignorant and inexperienced. This grave precept of choosing good men, in due proportion, in a Constitutional and Republican Government, also urges all electors of Deputies, from legal justice, and, other circumstances being excluded, not only do those sin who give a vote to bad men, but also those who by not taking part are the cause that bad men are elected by others; for each one, when he can and no legitimate excuse is present, is bound to turn evil away from the commonwealth. Therefore the obligation per se is both to take part in the election and to choose a suitable deputy. No one is ignorant how many evils come from impious deputies both to religion and to civil society, since the sum of all matters has been entrusted to them, and they not only give counsel, but with others make the laws themselves. Make an exception unless somewhere and at some time, because of special reasons, it is better to act otherwise, and a special prescription is had for acting otherwise. Cf. here, on Particular Obligations of Clerics, n. 195.

Leo XIII, Enc. Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885; Trid. s. 25, C. 20 de R.; Suarez, de Leg. l. 1, c. 7, n. 5; E. M. Deputies, however, legitimately elected, and truly suitable, by reason of the common good, from legal justice, are bound to accept the office conferred upon them, unless they are excused by a grave and just cause. Likewise Deputies and Senators, since some part of public government has in fact been committed to them, not only must not consent by passing wicked laws to the harm of religion and to the harm of the public good, but they are also bound to impede them by their presence and by their vote. Therefore it is not lawful for them to vote for wicked laws of this sort, nor is it lawful for them to be absent. And if by culpable absence they themselves are the cause why wicked laws are made to public harm, they are guilty both of violated legal justice, by which they are bound, by special reason of their office, to promote the public good, and of violated commutative justice, from a quasi-pact with their electors. As regards the election of Deputies, those things serve the matter which S. Thomas has from S. Augustine, 1. 2, q. 97, a. 1: "If the people is well moderated and serious, and a most diligent guardian of the common utility, a law is rightly made by which it is lawful for such a people to create for itself magistrates through whom the commonwealth is administered. But if little by little the same people, depraved, has a vote for sale, and commits government to disgraceful and wicked men, rightly is taken away from the people such a power of giving honors." Cf. also 1. 2, q. 105, a. 1. "For the work of Catholic men ... to embrace the very highest affairs of the commonwealth is generally useful and honorable... Generally, to be unwilling to touch any part of public affairs would be as much a fault as to contribute no zeal, no work, to the common utility; and all the more because Catholic men are impelled, by the admonition of the doctrine which they profess, to manage the matter honestly and from faith. On the contrary, if they are idle, those will easily receive the reins whose opinions offer, indeed, no great hope of salvation. And this would also be joined with the ruin of the Christian name, for those who would be ill-disposed toward the Church can do very much, and those who are well-disposed, very little. For this reason it is clear that there is a just cause for Catholics to approach public affairs; for they do not approach, nor ought they approach, for this reason, that they approve what at this time in the ordering of public affairs is not honorable, but so that they may turn these very arrangements, as far as can be done, to the public good, having a sincere and true intention to introduce the wisdom and virtue of the Catholic religion, like most wholesome juice and blood, into all the veins of the commonwealth." Leo XIII, Enc. Letter Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885.

705bis. Note: Ordinary power is that which belongs to someone by force of his dignity or office. Delegated power is that which belongs to someone from the concession of him who has ordinary power. Power of Jurisdiction properly is the power of declaring the law from a public office, and such is the power of ruling subjects and declaring the law in a Society, whether civil or ecclesiastical. One furnished with this power can make laws.

Economic power properly is that which looks to the external order to be preserved in some Community, according to the nature and end of that Community. Such is, for example, the power of a Superiorissa of the Novitiate over Novices. One furnished with this power can make statutes. Power of jurisdiction can be exercised in the internal forum for private utility, and in the external forum for public utility. It is contentious if it is exercised in judgment as regards litigants; voluntary if it is exercised outside judgment concerning affairs in themselves not contentious. Lastly, dominative power properly is that which is exercised over a person as though over something of one's own, as may be seen in a master in relation to a slave, in a father in relation to a son, in a husband in relation to a wife, in a regular Prelate in relation to his subject. Cf. 600; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4; q. 88, aa. 8, 9; q. 189, a. 5.

n. 706.

Is it ever lawful not to obey temporal authority? Is it ever lawful to rebel? Is it ever lawful to kill a Prince? R. To the 1st: As was already said above, n. 171, 4. Laws unjust through contrariety to human good do not oblige in the forum of conscience. Laws unjust through contrariety to divine good are in no way lawful to observe. S. Th. 1. 2, q. 96, a. 4. But in those things which are lawful, and which pertain to civil power, obedience must be given to civil Princes, even to the difficult, and also to those who abuse their authority. From these most pure sources, namely Scripture and Tradition, says Gregory XVI in Br. 9 Jun. 1832, we are most plainly taught that the obedience which men are bound to furnish to powers constituted by God is an absolute precept, which no one can oppose. Pius VI, Br. Pastoralis, 5 Jul. 1796; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 102, a. 1; q. 104, aa. 5, 6.

R. To the 2nd: It is never altogether lawful to rebel. "In this matter," says St. Liguori, "the principle of John Gerson was exceedingly pernicious, who dared to assert that a monarch can lawfully be judged by the whole nation if he rules the kingdom unjustly... a principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious." The reason is that subjects, by the very fact that they are subjects, cannot arrogate to themselves power above the Prince, by judging and punishing him. L. H. A. Tr. 8, n. 13; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 42, a. 2; q. 60, a. 6; q. 64, a. 3; q. 69, a. 4. But it is one thing to make rebellion, or to bring violence against a legitimate prince in order to depose him; another thing to resist unjust laws and their execution. Rebellion is a kind of aggression, not defense. But if a force plainly unjust is brought, resistance is then made not to authority, but to unjust force. "And therefore, just as it is lawful to resist robbers, so it is lawful in such a case to resist bad Princes, unless perhaps because of scandal, when from this some grave disturbance would be feared," S. Th. 2. 2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 42, a. 2, or there were no hope of a good outcome, and greater public evils were to be feared. Cf. also the Letters of Leo XIII, Sapientiae christianae, 10 Jan. 1890, who, speaking of laws openly disagreeing with divine right, injurious to the Church and contrary to Religion, then says, "to resist is a duty, to obey a crime." Therefore it is lawful to oppose passive resistance to unjust laws. For one must obey God rather than men, Acts 5:29. "For this reason to cast off obedience, and by the force of the multitude to call the matter to sedition, is the crime of treason, not only against human majesty, but also against divine." Leo XIII, Enc. Letter Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1895, section Non est magni toward the end. For "whoever have the right of commanding do not receive it from elsewhere, but from that supreme Prince of all, God. There is no power except from God, Rom. 13:1... Nature itself testifies that whatever power there is anywhere proceeds from God." When this is known and persuaded, "those things are understood altogether to pertain to justice: to revere the majesty of Princes, to be subject constantly and faithfully to public power, to do nothing seditiously, to preserve the holy discipline of the city."

Leo XIII, l. c., sections Talis, Eiusmodi; Pius X, Ep. Notre charge, 25 Aug. 1910.

R. To the 3rd: It is never lawful for anyone to kill a Prince, neither for a private man nor for the multitude; for the reason is the same for him and for this. The contrary opinion of the ancients is called by St. Alphonsus, l. c., improbable, false, most false. "I ask," says the Holy Doctor, "is he a man like others? And if he is a man, he cannot be deprived of life or goods by those who do not have the right to expel him from life or goods. The doctrine of the holy Fathers is common, that it is never lawful for any private person to kill a man, however private, and however iniquitous he may be, unless he has public authority, or unless this is necessary for protecting his own life." And the very same holds whether the Prince is good or bad; whether legitimate, or an usurper of the kingdom. Prop. condemned by the Council of Constance, Sess. 15, d. 6 Jul. 1414; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 12, a. 2; q. 42, a. 2; q. 64, a. 3; q. 101, aa. 1, 3; q. 102, aa. 1, 2; q. 104, aa. 1, 2, 5; Aertnys 178; E. M.

n. 707.

Are the more worthy to be chosen for civil offices? - R. Affirmatively, if there is a competition; for then there is an implicit contract about choosing the more worthy. But negatively, if there is no competition. For there is no proof of such an obligation. In order that the public good be sufficiently provided for, it suffices that the unworthy be excluded and removed, and that worthy men be chosen. And not only the supreme Prince himself is held by this obligation, but also all those who, by power received from him, can choose. For they do not receive power except for choosing in the mode in which the Prince ought to choose. Therefore also in the election of deputies, no one indeed is bound to choose the more worthy, but he is bound to choose a worthy man, with the unworthy man excluded, from whom grave harm is foreseen. Sometimes, however, it is lawful even to choose an unworthy man in order to exclude another worse man, or if that unworthy man will be more helpful than harmful, or unless otherwise someone would be exposed to undergoing a most grave evil; for his cooperation in evil is only material. Lugo de Iust. et Iur. d. 33; L. 342; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 63.

707bis. Offices: Civil offices strictly are those which look to the necessities and utilities of citizens. Political offices are those which look to protecting the government itself of the whole nation.

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 38 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Third Commentary: On the F…, XIII. On the Obligations of Inferiors and Ecclesiastical Superiors · Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Third Commentary: On the F…, XIV. On the Obligations As Regards Civil Authority · Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Third Commentary: On the F…, XV. On the Election of Deputies

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Third Commentary: On the F…, XIII. On the Obligations of Inferiors and Ecclesiastical Superiors

n. 179.

What are the obligations of inferiors as regards ecclesiastical superiors? - Subjects are bound to exhibit to their spiritual superiors love, honor, and obedience in those things which look to their jurisdiction and care; likewise necessary support. It is proved: 1. This is clear from many places of Sacred Scripture, 1 Tim. 5:17, 18; Heb. 13:17, etc. 2. As regards love, reverence, and obedience: because they are superiors, having true jurisdiction; as regards support: because the worker is worthy of his wage. As to those who apply their work to the common utility, that is, to Princes, soldiers, and others of this kind, stipends of sustenance are owed by the people, so also to those who minister to worship unto the salvation of the whole people, the people owes stipends of sustenance. - Trent, s. 25, c. 17, de R.; Leo XIII, encyclical Sapientiae christianae, Jan. 10, 1880; St. Thomas, Quodl. 6, a. 10; Quodl. 10, a. 12.

n. 181.

What are the obligations of ecclesiastical superiors? - Spiritual superiors in turn are bound to exhibit to subjects love, spiritual care, doctrine, and good example. It is proved: 1. This is clear from many places of Sacred Scripture; cf. the Epistles to Timothy and to Titus, and the Council of Trent, s. 23, c. 1, de R. - 2. It is evinced from their office itself. - Whence neglect of souls as regards their Christian instruction and administration of the sacraments, as regards their due admonition and correction, in ecclesiastical superiors is not only against charity, but also against justice, and for the most part a mortal sin, according to that saying of Ezek. 34:2, 4: Woe to the shepherds of Israel: that which was weak you have not strengthened, and that which was sick you have not healed, etc. - L. 357 seqq.

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Third Commentary: On the F…, XIV. On the Obligations As Regards Civil Authority

n. 182.

Since domestic society is an imperfect society, and does not furnish sufficiency for the necessities of human life, while nature does not make the imperfect except that it may tend to the perfect, it is clear that, by the very connate sociability of human nature, civil society is born from the natural development of families. Consequently, as the family is an immediately natural society, so also the commonwealth obtains its origin immediately from nature itself; and consequently political principate also, considered absolutely and according to itself, is immediately from God, as from the author of nature. Indeed, by nature itself man is ordained both to imperfect society, or the family, and to perfect society, or the commonwealth, which consequently is something flowing from human nature itself. Suarez, de Legib. 3, c. 1, n. 3. But no human society can be or be conceived without authority ruling and governing it. Suarez, de Legib. l. 3, c. 2, n. 4. Whence the Apostle, Rom. 13:1: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power except from God; but those which are, are ordained by God." Whence, there is no power except from God. Whoever have the right of commanding do not receive it from elsewhere... Whatever power there is anywhere, nature itself testifies that it proceeds from God. Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei.

n. 183.

"But it is of interest to attend in this place that those who are to preside over the commonwealth can in certain cases be chosen by the will and judgment of the multitude, with Catholic doctrine neither opposing nor resisting. By which choice indeed the prince is designated; the rights of principate are not conferred; nor is command mandated, but it is established by whom it is to be carried." Leo XIII, encyclical Diuturnum illud teterrimumque bellum.

n. 184.

Civil society, therefore, is a perfect society of the natural order, which supplies perfect sufficiency of life. Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei; St. Thomas, in 1 Polit., lect. 1. Perfect sufficiency, by supplying the defect of the individual person and of domestic society as regards the perfect cultivation of human life. "For every communication of men is ordered to something necessary for life." St. Thomas, in l. c. Therefore that will be the perfect commonwealth in which are found all things necessary for developing human life; this happens by observance of public order, for the common good of the associates, namely that they live in peace and justice with sufficiency of goods which look to the conservation and convenience of bodily life, and with that probity of morals which is necessary for this external peace and happiness of the commonwealth and the suitable conservation of human nature. Suarez, de Leg., l. 3, c. 11, n. 6. For indeed "a city is not blessed from one source and a man from another, since a city is nothing other than a concordant multitude of men." St. Augustine, Epist. 155. Therefore, just as God is the simply ultimate end of the whole of human life, so God is also the ultimate end of civil society; and consequently the operation of the whole commonwealth ought finally to tend to that end, by ordering the life of men through laws to virtues. St. Thomas, l. c. and 1.2, q. 96, a. 3; Suarez, de Leg., l. 3, c. 12.

Now indeed from the very nature of civil society sketched out, it is easily deduced what in it is the obligation of the prince or public power, and of subjects.

Princes are bound to have diligent care of the common good. Consequently they are bound to avert evils, as far as can be done, from society, evils which arise from wars with foreigners and from internal seditions by the work of sects of Freemasons, socialists, and others of that kind.

"Command must be carried for the utility of citizens, because those who are over the rest are over them for this one cause, that they may protect the utility of the commonwealth. Nor must it in any way be committed that civil authority serve for the advantage of one or of a few, since it has been constituted for the common good of all." Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei; encyclical Diuturnum.

Therefore the most grave obligation of princes is that they rightly perform their own office. And the obligation is the graver, the more sublime their dignity is. "Let princes take examples from God, best and greatest, whence authority is theirs; and proposing to themselves his image in administering the commonwealth, let them be over the people with equity and faith, and to that severity which is necessary let them apply paternal charity." Leo XIII, encyclical Diuturnum.

n. 186.

Therefore princes are bound to make laws that are just and useful to the common good, to administer justice without respect of persons, and to urge the execution of public decrees and sentences, according to the threefold office of political power, legislative, judicial, executive or coercive; and consequently they are bound to inflict due punishments on malefactors, especially as regards those crimes which directly tend to common damage. But since princes cannot exercise by themselves the three listed offices of authority, they ought to entrust them to distinct and fit magistrates, removing the unworthy and inept from public offices of this kind.

Certainly those laws are not just which decline from natural, divine, or human right. The following propositions have been condemned:

"56. The laws of morals have no need of divine sanction, and there is by no means need that human laws be conformed to the natural law, or receive the force of obliging from God." Syllabus.

"57. The science of philosophical matters and morals, and likewise civil laws, can and ought to decline from divine and ecclesiastical authority." Syllabus.

"The will of the people, manifested by what they call public opinion or in another way, constitutes the supreme law, loosed from all divine and human right; and in the political order completed facts, by the very fact that they are completed, have the force of right." Pius IX, encyclical Quanta cura.

n. 188.

On the contrary, from the Angelic Doctor, 1.2, q. 96, a. 4, laws will be just which are ordered to the common good, which do not exceed the power of him who bears them, which impose burdens on subjects according to equality of proportion in order to the common good. It is also necessary that laws be imposed on men according to their condition. "Human law is placed upon the multitude of men, in which there is a greater part of men not perfect in virtue. And therefore by human law not all vices are prohibited, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the graver ones, from which it is possible for the greater part of the multitude to abstain, and especially those which are to the harm of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be conserved; thus by human law homicides, thefts, and things of this kind are prohibited." St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 96, a. 2.

But princes ought especially to have care of religion, and consequently to preserve the rights of the Church. For the common good of society is most greatly promoted, the public order of society is preserved undisturbed, and laws are observed holily, if the offices of religion are observed inviolate. Free-thinkers are in error, and in the greatest error; consequently they are opposed to the true good and progress of society. The good and progress of society cannot be in error. Therefore, by right and merit, the following three propositions were proscribed by Pius IX in the encyclical Quanta cura:

"The best arrangement of public society and civil progress altogether requires that human society be constituted and governed with no respect had to religion, as if it did not exist, or at least with no distinction made between true and false religions."

"The best condition of society is that in which the duty of coercing with established penalties violators of the Catholic religion is not recognized by the Government, except insofar as public peace demands."

"Liberty of conscience and of worship is the proper right of each man, which ought to be proclaimed and asserted by law in every rightly constituted society; and the right belongs to citizens to every kind of liberty, to be confined by no ecclesiastical or civil authority, by which they may be able openly and publicly to manifest their own concepts, whatever they may be, whether by voice, by print, or by another manner."

Aptly Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei: "Nature and reason, which command individuals to worship God holily and religiously, because we are in his power and because, having proceeded from him, we ought to return to the same, bind the civil community by the same law. For men joined in common society are no less in the power of God than individuals, nor does society owe less grace to God than individuals do; by him as author it came together, by his nod it is conserved, by his benefit it received the innumerable abundance of goods with which it abounds. Therefore, just as it is lawful for no one to neglect his duties toward God, and the greatest duty is to embrace in mind and morals religion, not what each one may have preferred, but what God has commanded, and what by certain and by no means doubtful indications it has been established is the one true religion out of all; in the same way commonwealths cannot, without crime, bear themselves as if God did not exist at all, or cast aside care of religion as alien and in no way profitable, or take to themselves indifferently out of the many kinds whatever pleases them. Altogether they ought to use, in worshiping the Divinity, that custom and manner by which God himself has shown that he wills himself to be worshiped. Therefore the name of God ought to be holy among princes; and among their chief duties must be placed to embrace religion with favor, to protect it with benevolence, to shield it by the authority and nod of the laws, and to establish or decree nothing which is contrary to its safety. They owe this also to the citizens over whom they preside. For all we men have been born and received unto a certain supreme and ultimate good, to which all plans are to be referred, placed in the heavens, beyond this fragility and brevity of life. But since the fully completed and perfect happiness of men depends on this, therefore it is of such interest to each individual to attain that end which has been mentioned, that nothing can be of greater interest. Therefore civil society, born for the common utility, in guarding the prosperity of the commonwealth, must so consult citizens that in obtaining and attaining that supreme and unchangeable good which they spontaneously seek, it not only never bring any inconvenience, but bring all opportunities whatsoever that it can. The chief of these is that work be given to religion to be preserved holily and inviolate, whose offices join man to God." Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei.

57. On the Obligations of Masters, Disciples, Subjects · 92. On the Provincial Prefect, on Judges, on the Mayor

Certainly civil society has God as parent and author. Therefore it is necessary that it revere and worship his power and dominion. Wherefore society cannot be atheistic, nor consequently be affected in an equal way toward various religions, toward the true and the false; it cannot lavish the same rights promiscuously on each.

n. 190.

Besides, the prince is bound effectively to protect the rights of citizens and especially of property; otherwise the peace of society is disturbed by dissensions. He is bound to promote agriculture, industries, arts, and commerce of various things, so that citizens not only not lack, but even abound in things necessary for life. And, since the poor are never lacking, he is bound to excite and foster works of public charity and beneficence. Likewise he is bound to advance the sciences, so that perfect material and moral sufficiency of life may truly be found in civil society.

n. 190.

Therefore socialism, which contends that things and advantages are to be divided equally among citizens, "and its proposal concerning reducing possessions into common ownership must be altogether repudiated, because it harms those very persons who are to be helped, is repugnant to the natural rights of individuals, and disturbs the offices of the commonwealth and common tranquillity. Therefore, when relief of the people is sought, this ought to remain and be held first as a kind of foundation, that private possessions are to be preserved inviolate." Leo XIII, encyclical de Conditione opificum.

n. 191.

The explored smallness of his powers impels and exhorts man to wish to join to himself another's help. By this natural propensity man is led to public civil society, and to entering other private societies with citizens; for private society looks only to the utility of those associated. The prince ought to protect and assist all these societies, if they are not contrary to the good of civil society; much more if they are very useful to it, as are all religious associations or religious Congregations. But these, since by common rule and manner of living they profess the perfection of the evangelical counsels, and consequently depend on the authority of the Church, if they are prohibited and expelled by civil society, not only the rights of nature, but also the rights of the Catholic Church are violated. Therefore with right and merit proposition 85 was condemned in the Syllabus:

n. 191.

"The laws are to be abrogated which pertain to protecting the state of religious families and their rights and offices; indeed the civil government can furnish aid to all those who wish to defect from an undertaken institute of religious life and to break solemn vows; and likewise it can utterly extinguish the same religious families, as well as collegiate churches and simple benefices, even of right of patronage, and subject and vindicate their goods and revenues to the administration and judgment of the civil power."

n. 191.

But if associations of this kind pursue anything from their own institute which openly disagrees with probity, justice, and the safety of the commonwealth, they must be opposed by fitting laws. "For these causes the public power will by right impede those associations from coming together; by right it will also dissolve them when they have come together." Leo XIII, encyclical letter de Conditione opificum.

n. 192.

"Then those most salutary and equally most true things which look to civil society and the interchange of rights and duties between sacred and political power. For just as there are two greatest societies on earth, the one civil, whose proximate end is to obtain for the human race a temporal and worldly good, the other religious, whose office it is to lead men to that true happiness for which we were made, heavenly and eternal, so there is a twofold power. Both obey the eternal and natural law, and in those things which are contained by the order and command of either one, each consults for itself. But whenever something of that kind must be constituted concerning which it is right that each power constitute something, although by diverse causes and in a diverse way, nevertheless each must constitute something, a concord of each is necessary and agreeable to public utility; if this is removed, there will altogether follow a certain doubtful and changeable condition, with which the tranquillity neither of the Church nor of the commonwealth can consist. Therefore when something has been constituted by agreements entered, then surely what belongs to justice, the same belongs to the public matter, that concord remain intact; because just as mutual offices are furnished by one to the other, so a certain fruit of utility is received and rendered on both sides." Leo XIII, encyclical epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, Nobilissima Gallorum gens, Feb. 8, 1884.

n. 193.

Now indeed subjects are bound also to exhibit love, reverence, and obedience to secular superiors. For in the civil order they are true superiors, bearing the place of God himself toward us in the temporal order. This is confirmed from Sacred Scripture, Rom. 13:1 seqq.; 1 Pet. 2:13, 17. For this reason the Catechism of the Council of Trent compares and joins an obligation of this kind with that by which we are bound toward paternal and ecclesiastical authority. For, p. 3, on the fourth Commandment, sect. 15, after it taught that parents and ecclesiastical superiors must be honored with due honor, it adds: "The same must be said of Kings, Princes, Magistrates, and the rest to whose power we are subject. For if we give any cult to them, it is referred to God; for the excellent grade of dignity has the veneration of men, because it is after the likeness of divine power; in which also we venerate the providence of God, who has attributed to them the management of public office, and uses them as ministers of his power." Whence it is clear that reverence must be exhibited not only to Princes, but also to their officials according to their office and dignity. - Encyclical letter of Leo XIII Quella lunga, June 29, 1881; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 5, 6; Quodl. 8, a. 7; Quodl. 10, a. 12.

n. 193.

Therefore it is not fitting to speak rashly of those who perform a public office, nor malignly to carp at their deeds; although it is lawful to scrutinize them and to speak and write publicly about them, insofar as the laws permit this, so that they may be judged rightly and the public utility may be provided for. Therefore they sin against charity and justice who announce in public sheets, or publish in conversations and discussions, the hidden crimes of some persons, which do not harm others, in order that they may drive them from some office. They injure due observance who inflict insults on them, whether by words or by writings, and who deny to them the due signs of honor. - Kenrick, tr. 8, n. 164, 165.

n. 194.

"To despise legitimate power," says Leo XIII, "in whatever person it has been established, is no more lawful than to resist the divine will; and if any resist this, they rush into voluntary destruction. He who resists the power resists the ordinance of God; but those who resist acquire damnation for themselves." Encyclical Immortale Dei.

n. 194.

"The order of justice requires that inferiors obey their superiors. For otherwise the state of human things could not be conserved." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 6.

n. 194.

"Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so also human operations proceed from the human will. But it was necessary in natural things that higher things move lower things to their actions by the excellence of natural virtue conferred by God. Whence also in human things it is necessary that superiors move inferiors by their will from the force of authority divinely ordained. But to move through reason and will is to command. And therefore, just as from the natural order itself divinely instituted lower things in natural things necessarily are subject to the motion of higher things, so also in human things by the order of natural and divine right inferiors are bound to obey their superiors." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 1.

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Third Commentary: On the F…, XV. On the Election of Deputies

n. 195.

Since all are bound to love their own fatherland, all are also bound, as far as lies in them, both to promote the common good of the fatherland and to avert common damage from it. Since this, in the present regime of society, depends especially on good deputies elected to national, provincial, and municipal assemblies, all who have such a faculty from the law are bound, by reason of the common good and consequently from legal justice, to concur in the election of these deputies, unless they are legitimately excused, and to elect fit deputies. Unless they are legitimately excused; the matter is per se grave, and consequently only a cause of grave damage to be undergone can per se excuse. Per se; for in practice various circumstances must be attended to, from which the obligation can be grave or light, or even all obligation can be absent. But this obligation, when it is present, is not from commutative justice, but only from legal justice, and consequently, if it is not fulfilled, no obligation of repairing damage arises from it.

n. 196.

Indeed there is an obligation of electing a worthy man, not the more worthy; but a grave obligation is present of electing a worthy man, with an unworthy man passed over, from whose election grave damage of society can be feared. There is indeed no precept of electing the more worthy, but there is a precept of not electing an unworthy man; for by electing him someone cooperates by his own votes in the damage to be brought by him, besides the scandal which by his depraved example he furnishes to others. Yet the election of an unworthy man is not always forbidden. It is lawful if someone otherwise would undergo very grave damage, for that election is not intrinsically evil. For to receive the office of deputy is not something intrinsically evil; and cooperation in the abuse of such an office is material and remote. Likewise it is lawful if an unworthy man is elected in order to remove another worse and worst man from that office. Cooperation is then had to impede a greater evil. And consequently it will also be lawful if a worthy man cannot be elected unless an unworthy man is elected together with him. Likewise it is lawful if it is hoped that the unworthy man will profit more than he will harm.

n. 197.

"It is of interest to public safety to contribute work wisely to the administration of urban matters; and in it especially to study and effect that provision be made publicly for forming adolescents to religion and to upright morals, in that way in which it is fitting for Christians; on these things greatly depends the safety of individual commonwealths. Likewise, for the work of Catholic men to run farther from this narrower field and embrace the very sum of the commonwealth is generally useful and honest. We say generally for this reason, that these our precepts touch all nations. But it can happen somewhere that, for greatest and just causes, it is by no means expedient to undertake the commonwealth and to be occupied in political offices. But generally, as we have said, to will to touch no part of public affairs would be as much in fault as to bring no zeal, no work, to the common utility; and this the more because Catholic men are impelled, by the admonition of the very doctrine which they profess, to conduct the matter integrally and from faith. On the contrary, if they are idle, those will easily receive the reins whose opinions bring by no means a great hope of safety. And this would also be joined with harm to the Christian name, because those who are badly disposed toward the Church would have very much power, and those who are well disposed, very little. Wherefore it is evident that Catholics have a just cause of approaching the commonwealth; for they do not approach, nor ought they to approach, for this cause, that they approve what is not honest at this time in the systems of public affairs, but that they may transfer these very systems, as far as can be done, to the public good, having their mind sincerely and truly destined to introduce the wisdom and virtue of the Catholic religion, as the most healthful juice and blood, into all the veins of the commonwealth." Leo XIII, encyclical letter Immortale Dei, Nov. 1, 1885.

n. 198.

Deputies legitimately elected, and truly fit, by reason of the common good, from legal justice, are bound to accept the office brought to them, unless they are excused by a grave and just cause. But Deputies and Senators, since a certain part of public rule has truly been committed to them, not only ought they not to consent to depraved laws to be borne to the damage of religion and to the damage of the public good, but they are also bound to impede them by their presence and by their vote. Therefore it is not lawful for them to vote for depraved laws of this kind, nor is it lawful for them to be absent. And if by culpable absence they are the cause why depraved laws are made to public damage, they are guilty both of violated legal justice, by which they are bound to promote the public good by the special reason of their office, and of violated commutative justice, from a quasi-pact with their electors.

n. 198.

As regards the election of Deputies, the things which St. Thomas has from St. Augustine, 1.2, q. 97, a. 1, pertain to the matter: "If a people is well moderated and grave, and a most diligent guardian of the common utility, a law is rightly borne by which it is lawful for such a people to create magistrates for itself through whom the commonwealth is administered. But if little by little the same people, depraved, has a saleable vote, and commits rule to disgraceful and criminal men, rightly is taken away from the people such power of giving honors."

n. 199.

Is it ever lawful not to obey temporal authority? - Laws unjust by contrariety to human good do not oblige in the forum of conscience. Laws unjust by contrariety to divine good it is in no way lawful to observe. St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 96, a. 4. But in those things which are lawful and which pertain to civil power, obedience must be given to civil Princes, even difficult ones, and also to those who abuse their authority. From these most pure sources, namely Scripture and Tradition, says Gregory XVI in the Brief of June 9, 1832, we are most openly taught that obedience which men are bound to furnish to powers constituted by God is an absolute precept, which no one can oppose. - Pius VI, Brief Pastoralis, July 5, 1796; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 69, a. 4; q. 102, a. 1; q. 104, a. 5, 6.

Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 37 passages (filed under the subtopics)

57. On the Obligations of Masters, Disciples, Subjects

Vincentius has already rather often detected his male servant with the maidservant, occupied in lascivious intercourse; yet because he adverts that from the dismissal of the male servant, as being especially necessary to the domestic estate, no small detriment threatens him, hence, anxious, he asks whether he can dissimulate with a safe conscience.

Q. 1. What are the obligations of masters? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 693, 694. To the second. Vincentius cannot dissimulate the sins of the servants. For upon him, as superior and father of the family, there rests the obligation from justice of impeding the sins of subjects. And if, correction having been made, they are not amended, he is held under grave obligation to expel them from the house, if from such ejection it is prudently believed that they will return to good conduct. Indeed, even if this is by no means hoped, nevertheless he must altogether eject them, both because, since the servant has the concubine not outside the house but in the very house of the master, and sins with another maidservant, a present and far easier occasion of sinning is had from this; and also because of the grave danger and scandal of the family which is present, as is established by sad experience itself. Parents, retaining depraved servants at home, expose their own children most gravely to corruption. But it is scarcely credible that Vincentius, from the departure of the servant, can fear so great a loss that it would outweigh the most grave obligation of impeding the sins of subjects. And if danger and scandal to the family were present in fact, there certainly is no temporal detriment by which Vincentius could both dissimulate the sins of the servants and retain them at home. Indeed, the sins of subjects can in no way be imputed to a superior when he has tried according to his powers to impede them, by correcting, threatening, etc.; and for that reason only does he dissimulate something, because he cannot impede it without a graver, or certainly rather grave, detriment. But where danger and scandal are present to the family, to retain depraved servants at home is to constitute one's own children in a certain proximate and necessary occasion of sinning; and where servants advert that the masters know and are silent, and fear to expel them, they certainly become more bold for sinning and sin more securely, which is altogether illicit. - Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2106; Elbel 17, 18, 19; Tambur., in Decal., l. 5, c. 1, § 4, n. 21; G. 374, 375.

Mathurinus, a student of Moral Theology, is pressed by grave anguish of conscience. For a disciple, he says, owes love, reverence, and obedience to a master. I have love toward my master; I also have reverence for him; but I cannot have obedience to him. It is impossible for me to admit all the opinions of my master. For there is some opinion on which the master always and much insists, and it seems to me contrary to dogma; but there are also other opinions which seem to me at least equally probable, and even more probable, than those which the master defends as most probable, as uniquely probable, as at least altogether to be held practically.

Q. 1. What are the obligations of disciples toward masters? 2. What is to be held concerning Mathurinus?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 700. - To the second. Mathurinus, before he forms and pronounces judgment against the doctrine of his professor, ought first to understand it well and weigh it with mature consideration, lest perhaps he himself consider and attack as handed down by his professor a doctrine which the professor in no way taught. By acting thus he would both form a rash judgment against his master and, by speaking with others, would harm his reputation. But if, after serious study, and after other learned men have also been consulted, the doctrine of his professor seems erroneous to him, he is certainly not held to follow it. Likewise, if the opinions of others seem to him probable, more probable, or most probable, and are commonly held as such by authors, he is not held to follow the opposed opinions of the master as most probable, or uniquely probable, or altogether to be held. But with due modesty he will be able to think otherwise. Appositely St. Thomas, Quodlibet 3, a. 10: "It must be said that diverse opinions of doctors of Sacred Scripture, if indeed they do not pertain to faith and morals, hearers can follow either opinion without danger; for then what the Apostle says in Rom. 14:5 has place: Let each one abound in his own sense. But in those things which pertain to faith and morals, no one is excused if he follows the erroneous opinion of some master... otherwise those would have been immune from sin who followed the opinions of Arius, Nestorius, and other heresiarchs... Therefore he who assents to the opinion of some master against the manifest testimony of Scripture, or against that which is publicly held according to the authority of the Church, cannot be excused from the vice of error."

Moreover, if the confessor himself cannot impose his probable opinion on the penitent, who wishes to follow another probable opinion, much less will the teacher of moral theology be able to impose his opinion on his hearers when another opinion is truly probable and commonly held by authors as probable. Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 26.

But this is directly confirmed from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, 5 July 1831. For to the question: "Whether a professor of Sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which Blessed Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology?" it responded: "Affirmatively, without nevertheless judging that those are to be reprehended who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors." Therefore both the teacher of moral theology and his hearers can and are held so to defend their own probable opinions that they do not exclude the contrary truly probable opinions of other Catholic doctors. This certainly, especially in moral theology, would not be to build up, but to destroy.

Honoratus, a Catholic, never salutes the Prince, although others commonly salute him in the public streets and halt their step. For he says that the Prince is non-Catholic and by no means virtuous, but honor is owed only to virtue. - What of Honoratus?

R. Honoratus neither reasons rightly nor, of itself, acts rightly. "Honor is a certain testimony concerning the virtue of him who is honored; and therefore virtue alone is the due cause of honor. Nevertheless, it must be known that someone can be honored not only on account of his own virtue, but also on account of the virtue of another, as princes and prelates are honored, even if they are evil, insofar as they bear the person of God and of the community over which they are placed... and by the same reason parents and masters are to be honored on account of participation in the divine dignity, who is the father and master of all. But elders are to be honored on account of the sign of virtue, which is old age, although this sign sometimes fails... But the rich are to be honored on account of this, that they obtain a greater place in communities. But if they are honored with a view to riches, it will be the sin of acceptance of persons." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 63, a. 3; Quodlibet 8, a. 7. "If prelates are evil, they are not honored on account of the excellence of their own virtue, but on account of the excellence of dignity, according to which they are ministers of God; also in them the whole community over which they preside is honored." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 103, a. 3, ad 2; Quodlibet 10, a. 12. Cf. I. M. 701, 704.

"An infidel king lays snares for the Christians subject to him, or wishes to destroy them here and now and to blot out the Christian name in his kingdom. While he is meditating and preparing these things, other wicked men, by conspiring and warring against him, try to cast him out from his kingdom.

It is asked: Whether Christians are held positively to defend him, namely the tyrant who wishes here and now to slaughter them; or rather can behave negatively, neither warring against him nor helping him?

R. As it is set forth, negatively to the first part; affirmatively to the second part." S. O., 27 Jan. 1892; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2099; I. M. 706.

92. On the Provincial Prefect, on Judges, on the Mayor

To Ferdinandus, a most pious man, prefect of a province, there was committed the execution of the Decree that religious families be expelled from that same province over which he presides. But if he refused to execute it, he himself would have to resign from office, and another prefect, altogether wicked, would be substituted in his place, who certainly will immediately, and more harshly, execute that Decree.

Q. Can Ferdinandus execute the aforesaid Decree, by commanding that even by military force, where there is need, religious be expelled from their own houses?

R. Negatively. For 1. it does not seem that, in circumstances of this sort, the Church yields its right, of the free existence of religious Orders and of ecclesiastical immunity. 2. It indeed does not appear how a most pious man can command the execution of so iniquitous and unjust a Decree without public scandal. 3. If that reason, which is the principal one, of resigning the office, were valid for a prefect on whom the burden of execution of the Decree falls, then it would also have to be said that the supreme minister of the Government himself, issuing such a Decree, would be excused, if otherwise he would have to yield his office. For if that mandate of execution is iniquitous, unjust, and scandalous, much more is the Decree itself iniquitous, unjust, and scandalous. Moreover there is no one who will ever excuse the supreme minister of the Government by that reason, that otherwise he would have to yield his office. Otherwise, now by similar Decrees he could with impunity attack any other right of the Church, which directly yields to public damage of Religion: for any minister who refused to sign Decrees of this sort would certainly be forced to resign his office. But that another is not lacking who would perform this evil and worse cannot render lawful that which is intrinsically illicit, by reason of scandal, by reason of hatred against Religion, by reason of injury against the legitimate liberty of the Church, the Church indeed being reasonably unwilling and contradicting.

Festus, a pastor, on account of a grave and urgent cause of death, joined in marriage Caius and Sempronia, concubinaries, although they had not previously contracted civil marriage before the civil magistrate. Festus is accused, as guilty of a violated law, before a judge, an excellent man and fervent Catholic. Hence the judge, very doubtful, approaches his confessor, asking from him whether he ought to resign his office, or whether he can render a condemnatory sentence against the pastor.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. The judge must first take care in every way to absolve the pastor in the case, and declare him innocent. For the pastor acted legitimately per se. Indeed he acted legitimately even with that law of precedence of civil marriage standing. For a law is subject to legitimate epikeia, and in the Case legitimate epikeia appears. If in no way can the judge render a sentence for the pastor, nor can he himself decline the judgment, he does not then seem to be held to yield his office. For although there is question of a law altogether harsh and unjust, nevertheless the matter is not intrinsically evil, and, where it cannot be done otherwise, it is tolerated; and so neither is it intrinsically evil to commit it to execution. Nor likewise is it intrinsically evil to condemn the pastor to some monetary fine, e.g., in the Case, precisely on account of the law not observed, prescinding from the aforesaid epikeia which civil law and the practice of the forum do not admit. For then one altogether innocent is not condemned, at least according to the appearance and form of the judgment, but one guilty of a violated law, namely according to the presumption of the external forum and according to the things brought forward and proved. But the pastor, on account of a greater harm both of the judge and of the community, if another wicked judge would have to be substituted, is reasonably judged to yield his own right as to the aforesaid fine to be paid. Wherefore in the Case the grave harm of the judge, who otherwise would have to resign office, and at the same time the grave harm of the community, which would certainly be present if a wicked judge were substituted, seems to prevail. But the judge must take care in the Case to decree as small a fine as possible, and in the preliminary considerations of the sentence to remove any insinuation injurious against the pastor, so that both every scandal may be removed, and the sentence itself may sufficiently be understood to yield only to the rigor of the law, which does not admit legitimate epikeia from elsewhere. — I. M. 19.

Augustinus and Dominicus, confessors, without any scruple absolve all judges who render a sentence of divorce, according to the more recent laws, in matrimonial causes. For they say that here there is no question of a thing intrinsically illicit, but only positively prohibited by the Church; and positive laws do not obligate with great inconvenience. Besides, the judge does nothing else except merely declare the law, which is an act indifferent of itself. Wherefore the cooperation of the judge toward the sin of the parties is merely material, which is lawful for a grave cause. Besides, the judge can well admonish the parties either privately, or even in the Considerations of the sentence, concerning the real indissolubility of marriage. Whence the aforesaid sentence will be nothing except a certain mere permission and denial of civil action; and in truth it regards nothing except the civil effects of marriage; and it in no way touches the sacrament of marriage itself, but only the civil contract of marriage.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Augustinus and Dominicus are deceived. For there is question of a thing intrinsically illicit, by natural and divine right, and not only by ecclesiastical right. For divorce from the bond of matrimony, according to the more recent laws, is opposed to natural and divine right. Besides, the judge rendering sentence does not merely declare the law, but declares authoritatively and practically, so that from that sen- tence civil rights and civil obligations flow, which, speaking per se, have force also in the forum of conscience, namely when that sentence is legitimate and just. Therefore the cooperation of the judge toward the aforesaid divorce in the Case is not merely material, but formal; nor remote, but proximate, since it itself is what gives the parties the faculty of divorce. But that the judge admonishes the parties privately, or even in the Considerations of the following sentence, does not change the intrinsic nature of that sentence, but rather shows its illicitness more. A sentence of this sort is not a mere permission and denial of civil action, since that sentence makes a civil right or civil power, namely according to that iniquitous law of divorce, of contracting other marriages, so that he who is bound by this second marriage must be held by the judge himself, not as an adulterer, but as one legitimately bound by civil marriage. Lastly, it is altogether most false that that sentence regards only the civil effects of marriage, since otherwise the law of divorce would have been altogether useless; for those effects were already governed by the law of civil marriage. Therefore, as that law of divorce regards divorce itself from the bond, so consequently does the sentence of divorce delivered by the judge by force of that law. It is one thing indeed that that sentence regards only civil effects, which is false; another, that the civil effects, where that law now prevails, depend on that sentence, so that unless the sentence of divorce is first obtained, there cannot be had separation of bodies and goods. Lastly, it is plain that, since the aforesaid law and sentence touches divorce from the bond itself, in reality they do not touch only the civil contract of marriage, but most truly the sacrament of marriage itself.

And indeed, if what is asserted were true, namely that that sentence of divorce regards only the civil effects of marriage, then either the Holy Office or the Sacred Penitentiary, from whom it has been sought very often, would have permitted at least spouses to invoke that sentence of civil divorce, in the case of avoiding very grave damage; and, on the contrary, the response has always been: It is not lawful. Cf. Ferraris, Supplementum, v. Divortium, Commentary on the Sentence of Divorce to be rendered by a lay judge as to the bond of matrimony.

Armandus and Armanda, spouses, since they could not obtain a sentence of divorce in Italy because of the absence of such a law in Italy, go to France; there they first obtain naturalization, or civil status, and then in court they obtain a sentence of divorce. Having returned to Italy, they ask in court that the judge in Italy confirm the sentence rendered in France. — Can the aforesaid judge in Italy confirm that French sentence?

R. In the negative. In no way can the judge in Italy furnish this, either by natural law or by positive civil law. Concerning natural law, cf. here n. 3.

As regards civil law, it is easily proved, because from C. I. 56, 148, one bound by marriage cannot contract another marriage, and marriage ceases only by the death of the spouse. But one independent State cannot impose upon another State, likewise independent, its own law permitting an act prohibited in that State, when that act regards natural and public honesty, good morals, and public order, as the indissolubility of marriage is. Hence it is that whether Armandus and Armanda are Italians, or are also French, that sentence of divorce pronounced by a French judge cannot be held ratified by an Italian judge. It is added in the Case that there is open fraud against the law, and no one’s own fraud ought to patronize him.

The ship William Brown, directed from the port of Liverpool to Philadelphia, suffered shipwreck in the month of June in the year 1841. Many sailors and many travelers were saved in a small boat. But since the sea was stormy, in order to lighten the boat, which otherwise they feared would sink, the sailors cast the travelers into the sea. The matter then having been brought before a judge, the accused were acquitted in court, since otherwise all would certainly have perished.

It is asked: What must be judged concerning the sentence of the judge in the Case?

R. It was certainly in no way lawful for the sailors to cast the travelers into the sea. For this in fact was nothing else than to kill innocent men by private authority. But the fact that all otherwise would have perished does not make their homicide honorable, since the death of all would then have happened only by a natural misfortune, which certainly they could not prevent by the death of some. Therefore the sentence of the judge, wholly absolving the sailors as not guilty of homicide, was not legitimate. In the Case the judge ought indeed to have condemned the sailors as true homicides, but to a punishment milder than the ordinary one, on account of the grave circumstance of the shipwreck of all, which in the case certainly attenuated the offense. It would certainly have been wholly another thing if, in that danger, lest all should perish, some should have cast themselves into the sea, lest the boat be sunk by the multitude. For this “is not directly to kill oneself, but to expose oneself to danger, so as to be overcome by the weight of the body pressed down by the waves.” Thus Lessius writes about one who permits to another the plank occupied by himself, de Iust. et Iur. l. 2, c. 9, d. 6, n. 31: “In a shipwreck,” he says, “you can permit to another a plank not yet occupied by you, indeed even one occupied, and commit yourself to the waves, even if there is no hope of escaping, as Victoria and Peter Navarrus teach; for this is not directly to kill oneself, but to expose oneself to danger, so as to be overcome by the weight of the body pressed down by the waves. Here note that he who first occupied the thing in such an event is not held to admit another, but can hinder him, unless it is sufficient for both; if they occupied it at the same time, it must be decided by lot, unless one wishes voluntarily to yield to the other.” Kenrick, Theol. Mor., Mechlin, 1890, tr. 3, c. 9, nn. 111, 134.

Gerulfas, a mayor, assists at the civil marriage of two betrothed persons who both are bound by a previous marriage, but have already been separated from their own spouses by sentence of divorce according to the law in force. Gerulfas contends that he himself can licitly do this, because his assistance is merely a certain civil ceremony.

It is asked: What as to the Case?

R. Gerulfas acts wholly illicitly. For his presence is not a merely civil ceremony; but it is a certain solemnity of law, furnishing civil authority, in the particular Case set forth, to legal adultery, or to adultery contracted according to the norm of civil laws. This is further established from the Responses of the S. C. and of the S. Penitentiary. Cf. Enchir. Mor. 19. And, since the mayor, in the aforesaid Case, not only posits an intrinsically illicit act, but also one unjust against the prior legitimate wife and legitimate children, he is held to compensation for damages if the adulterer refuses to compensate them. For by that unjust act the mayor effectively influences those damages.

Nor indeed does it avail to object that civil marriage in the Case is not intrinsically illicit; whence it could at least be permitted in some very grave and very rare case. For civil marriage, since it is not true marriage, of itself does not hinder a man from fulfilling the obligations of the prior legitimate marriage. This is not true; for in order that in fact a man, for example, may return after a civil marriage to his legitimate wife, the consent of the other party is necessary. Therefore that civil marriage is an act of itself and by its nature legally sanctioning adultery against ecclesiastical and legitimate marriage. — Of a mayor of this sort it cannot be said, as is prescribed by the S. Penitentiary on 20 March 1855, that he does nothing against the sanctity of marriage and the necessity of contracting it before the Church. Of a mayor of this sort it cannot be said, as is held from the same S. Penitentiary, that he removes scandal, since on the contrary he confirms it by his own act.

Torquatus, a mayor, a fervent Catholic, assists at the civil marriage of Tullius and Tullia, whom he knows neither to have contracted canonical marriage previously, nor to wish to contract it afterwards. Torquatus cannot deny his assistance; for otherwise he will be liable both to a grave fine and to deposition from office.

It is asked: What as to the Case?

R. Torquatus, in the Case, can assist at the aforesaid marriage. For to the aforesaid case the S. Penitentiary, 20 March 1855, responded: “That it can be tolerated, provided that civil officials in drawing up acts of this sort intend to exercise a merely civil ceremony, and do nothing or advise nothing against the sanctity of marriage and the necessity of contracting it before the Church; rather, that they exhort them to contract it before the Church itself; having before their eyes the most holy laws of our Religion, and the letters of Benedict XIV, Redditae sunt nobis, concerning which, for removing scandal, they should admonish the contracting parties. But as regards cases in which it appears that the faithful, approaching the civil ceremony, are ill-disposed, and will not celebrate before the Church the marriage which regularly ought to have been premised, but will remain in concubinage under the pretext of a civil contract, the officials themselves are to be directed according to the rules handed down by approved authors, and especially by St. Alphonsus, l. 2, tr. 3, c. 2, dub. 5, art. 3, concerning cooperation.” Moreover in the aforesaid letters Benedict XIV teaches that, when Catholics present themselves to the civil magistrate, they exercise a merely civil act, and that marriage must be celebrated before a Catholic minister and two witnesses; otherwise they will never be legitimate spouses, nor ever legitimate offspring.

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Fourth Precept of t…, Ch. IV, Article III. On the Obedience and Reverence of Citizens toward Temporal Authority · Vol. II, Treatise on Particular Sta…, Part Second. On the State …, Ch. II, Article II. On the Obligations of Pastors

Now St. Alphonsus teaches this concerning cooperation in the place cited: “It must be said that that cooperation is formal which concurs with the evil will of another and cannot be without sin; but that is material which concurs only with the evil action of another, apart from the intention of the cooperator. And this is licit when the action of itself is good and indifferent, and when there is present a just cause proportionate to the gravity of the sin of the other and to the proximity of the concurrence which is furnished for the execution of the sin.” Cf. I. M. v. 1, 440. Moreover Torquatus the mayor does not cooperate formally in the case with the depraved will of Tullius and Tullia, either by intention, as is supposed, or by action; for the act of the mayor is, in the Case, a merely civil ceremony, furnishing of itself force to a marriage contracted or to be contracted, as to civil effects. For by civil law those things can be ordered and administered which marriages of themselves bring in the civil order, the marriage itself being left untouched, which among Christians is governed by the laws of the Church. But that Tullius and Tullia have neither previously contracted marriage, nor wish afterwards to contract marriage, is only from their depraved will. The cooperation of the mayor is merely material, by an act, as appears, not only indifferent, but of itself honorable and licit, which the aforesaid betrothed persons abuse only from their own malice. Nor indeed is a just and proportionate cause lacking, such as certainly is both the grave fine to which the mayor would otherwise be subjected, and his deposition from office, which would redound to the grave private harm of the mayor himself and to the common harm of society itself; because otherwise honorable and religious public officials would, to the public harm, be replaced by depraved and unjust officials.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 23 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Fourth Precept of t…, Ch. IV, Article III. On the Obedience and Reverence of Citizens toward Temporal Authority

n. 386.

- From natural law and positive divine law we are bound, under the title of piety, to furnish reverence and obedience to our civil Superiors. For they hold the place of God Himself in the temporal order toward us. For thus the Apostle to the Romans 13. 1 and following: Let every soul be subject to higher powers, FOR THERE IS NO POWER EXCEPT FROM GOD; and those which are, are ordained by God. Therefore he who resists power resists the ordinance of God. But those who resist acquire damnation for themselves... For he (the Prince) is the minister of God, an avenger unto wrath for him who does evil. Therefore be subject by necessity, not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience.

n. 386.

Wherefore the Catechism of the Council of Trent compares and joins an obligation of this sort with that by which we are bound toward paternal and ecclesiastical authority. For in part III, on the fourth commandment, §15, after it taught that parents and ecclesiastical Superiors are to be honored with due honor, it adds: "Likewise the same must be said of Kings, Princes, Magistrates, and the rest to whose power we are subject." But it explains this thus: "For if we render some honor to them, this is referred to God; for the excellent grade of dignity has the veneration of men, because it is in the likeness of divine power: in which also we venerate the providence of God, who attributed to them the administration of public office and uses them as ministers of His power." It is also clear from sacred Scripture, especially 1 Pet. 2. 13, where it is said: Be subject therefore to every human creature on account of God; whether to the King as excelling, or to governors as sent by him... And ibid. 17: Honor the King. - See also St. Justin, Apol. 1. 47. - St. Theophilus of Antioch, ad Autol., lib. 1, c. 11. - St. Clement, Const., c. 12. - Tertullian, ad Scap., c. 2. - St. Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 17. - St. Chrysostom, Hom. 6 ad Ant. - St. Irenaeus, adv. Haeres., l. V. 24. - St. Augustine on Ps. 124, n. 7, and De Civit. Dei, l. V. 10, 11, 14, 15. - Confer also the Encyclical Letters of Gregory XVI and Pius IX.

- Q. Whether it is sometimes lawful not to obey temporal authority, and whether it is sometimes lawful to rebel?

Resp. The doctrine of sacred Scripture, of the Fathers, of Councils, of the Supreme Pontiffs, of the Catechism of the Council of Trent, of St. Liguori, Hom. apost., tr. 8, §13, and also of the Encyclical of Gregory XVI, 15 Aug. 1832, which expresses the whole Catholic tradition, can be resumed in a few words concerning this question thus.

To the first. Just as it is evident that human authority is never to be obeyed in those things which are evidently against the law of God, so in those things which are licit per se, Princes are altogether to be obeyed, EVEN THE FROWARD, and also those who abuse their authority. From these most pure sources, namely Scripture and tradition, Gregory XVI says in the Brief of 9 June 1832, we are most plainly taught that the obedience which men are bound to furnish to the powers constituted by God is an absolute precept which no one can oppose.

To the second. It is never altogether lawful to rebel. "Too pernicious in this matter," says St. Liguori, "was the principle of John Gerson, who dared to assert that a monarch can legitimately be judged by the whole nation if he governs the kingdom unjustly...: a principle, I say, not only false, but most pernicious... But what remedy is present if the governance of the Prince were excessively tyrannical? The remedy which is available," says St. Thomas, "is to recur to God, that He may furnish aid." - Hom. apost., tract. 8, n. 13.

But, says St. Thomas, in order that the people may merit obtaining this benefit from God, they must cease from sins, because in vengeance for sin, by divine permission, the impious receive power. De Reg. princ., lib. 1, c. 6. - See especially the Encyclical Letter of Gregory XVI, 15 Aug. 1832 ¹.

¹ These things are confirmed from article LXIII of the Syllabus of the principal errors of our age, proscribed by our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX, which reads thus: It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate princes, and indeed to rebel.

Vol. II, Treatise on Particular Sta…, Part Second. On the State …, Ch. II, Article II. On the Obligations of Pastors

n. 110.

- A Pastor, once canonically constituted, enjoys ordinary jurisdiction over the people entrusted to him, and without a new approval of the Bishop has the right to undertake all parochial duties. Therefore no Cleric, with the Bishop and his Vicar General and their delegates excepted, can licitly in any way perform any sacred functions in his Church or parish, without his express or reasonably presumed consent ².

¹ On the title above. On this subject, most worthy to be read, indeed to be thumbed day and night, is the little work entitled: Manuale pratico pel Parroco novello, by Giuseppe Frassinetti, Prior of St. Sabina in Genoa: operetta utile anche agli altri Ecclesiastici, specialmente Confessori e Predicatori. For whatever can in any matter pertain to any of the duties of a Pastor -- namely in the administration of the Sacraments, in sacred functions, in administering the goods that belong both to the parochial benefice and to the fabric of the church, in the beauty of the church and the decency to be kept in the parish house as well, in the care of the poor, of the sick, and of schools, in founding or fostering pious Confraternities, in furnishing the people with the food of the divine word both by preaching and by the useful reading of books, in correcting subjects where there is need, in removing scandals whether against faith or against good morals, etc. -- all of it is touched on in this excellent little work. Nor does the Author carry this out by long and, as it were, sermon-like exhortations, much less by the sharper remonstrances, as some are wont, by which he would seem to carp at the vices of ecclesiastics; but briefly and soberly, by certain admonitions full indeed of wisdom and prudence, such as the sweetest and gentlest charity, solid doctrine, long experience, and a most temperate cast of judgment (others would say discretion) are able to furnish. And hence arises this advantage, surely of the greatest moment: that against the errors into which some, either not yet sufficiently taught by experience or less furnished with prudence, are sometimes wont to stumble, they are fortified beforehand, not by trials made with their own or others' damage, at times grave, but by a most safe way shown in advance.

² ** You cannot, therefore, hear confessions in his Church without the consent of such a pastor. If, however, you are permitted to celebrate Mass there, you can then also distribute the Most Holy Eucharist. As regards hearing confessions, however, distinguish the parish from the parochial Church. For you can go to hear the confessions of the sick even without the pastor's knowledge.

n. 110.

Pastors, like Bishops, are chiefly bound: 1º to residence; 2º to prayer; 3º to preaching; 4º to administration of the Sacraments; 5º to correction of the sheep; 6º to visitation of the sick and of the parish.

- I. As to residence. The Pastor is bound to residence; because when he undertook the administration of the parish, he obliged himself to consulting for the salvation of souls, and to procuring it according to his strength. - Council of Trent, sess. 23, ch. 1, De Reform. - St. Ligorius, n. 121. The Pastor must dwell in the presbyteral residence, or, if this is lacking, in the nearer house within the boundaries of the parish, so that he can easily be approached, and he himself not be impeded in fulfilling the duty of residence. But in order that satisfaction be made to the duty of residence, he must not only be present in body, but also by himself he must serve the parish. - St. Ligorius, nn. 124-127.

Yet, if they obtain permission from the Ordinary, they can for a just cause be absent each year for two months, provided they substitute for themselves a suitable Vicar through the Bishop. The permission of the Ordinary is necessary even if they wish to be absent for a week. But for one or another day they can be absent without special license from a cause which seems legitimate to them, provided they commend the parish to a suitable Vicar.

II. As to prayer. The Pastor, like the Bishop, is bound to offer the Sacrifice for the parish on feast days and Sundays, as will be clear from the things to be said in the Treatise on the Eucharist. Likewise he is bound to pray frequently for his sheep, so that he may implore for himself and his subjects the graces necessary for salvation and heavenly blessings.

Moreover the Pastor ought to take care that all learn to pray, that they pray well, and that they teach their own to pray. To this it will contribute greatly if sometimes, especially on feast days and Sundays, and also during Advent and Lent, the faithful publicly perform morning and evening prayers. - St. Ligorius, Hom. apost., tr. 7, n. 35 and following.

- III. As to preaching. Pastors are bound rather often to speak words to the people, to nourish them with saving food, at least on individual Sundays and on individual greater feasts. - Thus Trent, sess. 5, ch. 2, De Reform.

Therefore Pastors sin gravely who for a notable time abstain from preaching. But a notable time is held by many to be if preaching is abandoned for an entire continuous month, or for three months not continuous, or divided in the year. - Thus St. Ligorius, Bk. 3, n. 269 ³. - Nor do those sufficiently fulfill the obligation who do not strive to accommodate preaching to the capacity of the hearers.

³ Thus indeed are the opinions reported there by St. Alphonsus. Nevertheless the words of Trent, from which they infer the gravity of guilt in an omission of three months, seem to regard three continuous months rather than interrupted ones.

By the name of preaching here there do not come sermons perfected and elaborated with much and subtle art, filled with elegances, and committed to memory ⁴; for although these sermons are useful and sometimes necessary, nevertheless for the most part a Pastor giving sermons of this sort would in no way satisfy his duty, because according to Trent he ought to teach those things which are more necessary, and in a more useful way and one more accommodated to the greatest part of the hearers. Nor less are those to be reprehended who, with no preparation employed, babble whatever comes into the mouth, without order, clarity, piety, and zeal. These disfigure the word of God and create nausea and distaste in the hearers. - Thus all.

⁴ The Author had before his eyes the words of the Synod of Trent (sess. 5, De Reform., ch. 2): "Let them feed the flocks committed to themselves, according to their own and their flock's capacity, with saving words, by teaching the things which are necessary for all to know for salvation, and by announcing to them, with brevity and ease of speech, the vices which they must decline, and the virtues which they ought to follow," etc.

Vol. V, Pt. II, Ch. III, Section 1: Nature and Purpose of the State · Vol. V, Pt. II, Ch. III, Section 2: The Duties of Public Officials

But the Pastor who reads pious books to the hearers does not fulfill his duty of preaching, because reading is not preaching; unless someone is of so weak a memory that he cannot do otherwise. But then from time to time he ought to take care that sermons be given to the people through another, or to notify the Bishop about the impediment.

n. 113.

- IV. As to administration of the Sacraments. Pastors are bound by themselves to minister the Sacraments, not only when the time of precept and of grave necessity urges, but also, as regards the Sacraments which can be repeated, as often as the sheep duly, or not unseasonably, ask, unless they are legitimately impeded, or can provide for them through another without inconvenience and offense of those asking. See several other things concerning this obligation in the Treatise on the Sacraments in general.

n. 113.

V. As to correction. The Pastor is bound to correct subjects living in mortal sin or in proximate danger of mortal sin, even if grave danger had to be undergone; if nevertheless some hope of amendment seems to shine forth. He must also, insofar as he can, with due prudence, remove scandals from the midst, or forestall them by himself or through others, directly or indirectly, by command, counsel, exhortation, prayers, etc. - Thus commonly, and indeed more probably from justice, not from charity only. - St. Ligorius, Hom. Apost., tr. 7, n. 30 and following ⁵.

⁵ St. Alphonsus does not hesitate in this place to affirm that pastors, and much more Bishops, are bound to the office of correction even with danger to life. But here the Doctors do not use correction in the strict sense for an admonition about the amendment of offenses, but more broadly for care of warding off or impeding any spiritual ruin of the sheep committed to them. For in reality it sometimes happens that, whatever danger finally must be undergone, the pastor nevertheless must teach and warn his people. Thus, for example, where those rebellious laws against divine law are in force, which with regard to the validity or invalidity of Christian matrimony take no account of canonical laws, the pastor, with any danger whatsoever disregarded, is certainly bound to proclaim that Catholic dogma which is declared in the letters of our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX to the King of Sardinia, given 19 Sept. 1852: that any union whatsoever among Christians, even if sanctioned by civil laws, if it is not a sacrament, is nothing except foul concubinage.

n. 113.

Then Pastors ought solicitously to provide for the spiritual good of their subjects, according to that word of the Apostle, Rom. 12:8: "He who presides, in solicitude." Therefore they ought to investigate the morals of parishioners, correct delinquents, sustain the wavering, and strive that all fulfill their obligations, always holding in memory that they will one day have to render an account for their souls.

n. 114.

- VI. As to visitation of the sick and of the parish. It is an abuse very harmful to the salvation of souls not to visit the sick before the Pastor is summoned by them. But when the Pastor has visited the sick and refreshed them with the Sacraments, let him not think that he has fulfilled his duty; but let him visit them rather often and console them. Let the admonitions of the Roman Ritual concerning the care and visitation of the sick be read and recalled with pious meditation.

n. 114.

As to visitation of parishioners, the Council of Soissons of the year 1849, title 15, ch. 1, has these things:

n. 114.

"Because, as Christ himself says, the good Shepherd knows his sheep and calls them by name, therefore the Pastor ought to know the faithful committed to him. Therefore let him not neglect this so salutary custom of visiting individual families of his parish at certain times; and let him fulfill this duty with gravity and modesty together, and also with singular charity. For although he ought to abstain from every useless roaming through the parish, nevertheless let him not think that he has satisfied his office if, shut up at home, he waits for the parishioners to come to him. Indeed this precept of the Lord has always had force, but especially in these present times has force: Go to the sheep which have perished of the house of Israel."

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 14 passages

Vol. III, Contracts, and the Obligat…, On the Obligations of Stat…, Chapter I: On the Duties of Laymen

n. 989.

Art. II. On The Duties Emanating From Civil Society.

Preliminary remarks concerning the origin and nature of this society.³ To domestic society, already instituted from the beginning, civil society was soon superadded. First indeed there appear patriarchal families, enlarged through several generations, and at the same time aided by outside persons who are joined to the family either as servants furnishing their services, or as associates seeking protection: all these dwell together under the rule of the elder father of the family. A little later other families, weaker for defending themselves against external dangers, attacks of beasts or men, flowed together in constructing towns, and instituted a certain confederation under the rule of a more powerful leader; and thus tribes arose, or associations of several families. Afterward certain tribes joined themselves to others, either for the sake of security, so that they might repel external enemies more efficaciously, or from a certain necessity, because the weaker, conquered by the more powerful, passed under their rule; and thus nations were gradually formed.

³ M. D'Hulst, Careme of 1895, 1st Conf.; Meyer, op. cit., t. II, n. 266 seq.; Castelein, Droit naturel, p. 737-767.

n. 990.

We note only a few things concerning the various forms of civil government. A threefold form was already distinguished by Aristotle: monarchic, when supreme power resides in one man; aristocratic, when authority belongs to some college of the best men; democratic, if authority remains with the whole people organically united. Today, however, among cultivated nations, especially two forms of government prevail: - monarchy, tempered by other elements, aristocratic and democratic; a republic, or representative democracy, in which the people administer public affairs not directly by themselves (which is impossible), but through deputies elected by themselves.

But whatever the form of government may be, some supreme authority is necessary as the public guardian and patron of social order, whether for protecting peace and security against external enemies, or for protecting the rights of citizens against unjust aggressors dwelling in the state itself; and as the provident promoter of institutions which can serve the common good. - Individual citizens, however, especially those who exercise some office, ought, under the rule of the supreme authority, to labor for the good of the republic. - These things being posited, we shall treat: 1. of the duties of superiors and inferiors in general; 2. of certain offices in particular.

n. 991.

§ I. On The Duties Of Superiors And Subjects In General.

Superiors, or princes, are here called not only those who possess supreme power in civil society, such as a King, Emperor, or President of the Republic, but also those who have a part in the Government, as ministers, or also deputies and senators, in regions where supreme power is divided among several. - But subjects are called those who are subject to civil authority.

But love and worship of the fatherland ought to be common to all, not indeed in the sense that foreign peoples are despised or held in hatred, but in the sense that the region where one was born and educated, in which one's fathers are buried, and which has received its mission from God, is specially loved. And indeed this love ought to be generous, so that we are prepared to act rightly, to suffer patiently, and to die for the common good of the fatherland.¹

¹ Card. Gibbons, Patriotism and Politics, in the periodical North Amer. Review, April 1892, p. 385-400.

I. On The Duties Of Superiors, Or Princes.²

² St. Thom., De regimine principum, Opusc. XVI, among the works published at Parma, t. XVI, p. 225-291; Bellarmine, De officio principis christiani; cf. Leo XIII, Encycl. Immortale Dei, 1 Nov. 1885; Noldin, n. 304-306.

n. 992.

Legitimate superiors, whoever they are and in whatever manner they have been elected, act in the place of God, since every power proceeds from God; therefore they do not enjoy unlimited authority, but ought to exercise rule in dependence on the natural and divine law. Their functions and duties, and also the scope of their power, are defined by the Constitution and civil laws of the various Peoples; here we can briefly touch only the more general matters.

n. 993.

1. Superiors are held, by force of their office, primarily to intend and procure the common good, and only secondarily the particular good, whether their own or that of those who are nearer to them. For since society was instituted to promote the common good, those who preside over society were chosen for this, that they might provide for this common good; wherefore they sin against the duty of their state if, administering care of the republic remissly and negligently, they strive to serve the advantage of the few. Hence: -

(A) First, they ought to know in what the common good consists, whether material or spiritual, and by what means it can and ought to be promoted, not only in itself, but also with all circumstances of times, things, and persons attended to; otherwise they will act imprudently, and will inflict many damages on the republic and on private persons. Wherefore they ought diligently to devote themselves to political, economic, and social science; and if they wish to be of more profit to the fatherland, they will try to know in some measure not only the morals and laws of their own people, but also of foreign nations: for, once a comparison has been made between the laws of diverse peoples, it can be better understood how paternal customs may be amended.

(B) The exercise of rule ought to be just, not tyrannical, "but as it were paternal, because God's most just power over men is also joined with paternal goodness."¹ Wherefore respect of persons must be avoided, by force of which favor is shown to one class of citizens rather than to another, or to some private persons rather than to others, without reasonable cause. This is especially to be observed in the distribution of offices and burdens; when injustice is admitted in this matter has already been explained, On Justice, n. 467-468. But, even with justice uninjured, administrators of the republic sin who knowingly and willingly keep the worthier from offices and call the less worthy; for thus they do not provide for the public good, but for their own or for that of a few friends, with detriment to others.

¹ Leo XIII, Encycl. Immortale Dei.

n. 994.

1. They are held to protect and promote the good morals of citizens, not only by laws and judicial power, but also by examples. For all concede that good morals contribute much even to the temporal utility of the republic. Wherefore, when abuses have already begun to prevail, for example, public drunkenness because of the multitude of taverns, the corruption of the young through obscene books or obscene pictures or exhibitions, it is necessary that the supreme authority strive to restrain them either by just laws, or by more efficacious observance of the laws. - From this it follows that those who preside are held by a stricter obligation to provide good example, since subjects tend to imitate superiors, according to that saying: By the king's example the whole world is fashioned.

n. 995.

1. They ought to defend and protect private associations which contribute to the good of citizens, but to restrain those which are evidently opposed to good morals; for the former furnish aid to the republic, but the latter greatly harm it. This was more fully explained where we treated of the right of association, On Justice, n. 183-194. But concerning relations between the civil power and the Church we have disputed elsewhere, On The True Church, n. 227-250.

n. 996.

1. As to deputies specifically, and all those who enjoy the right of suffrage in Assemblies, these things especially are to be noted: -

(A) Only those can seek and accept this office who can exercise it prudently and usefully; otherwise, they expose themselves to the danger of inflicting grave damage on the republic. - But if suitable persons have been elected, they cannot refuse the office without a grave cause: for the public good demands that wise and upright persons should not decline an office and burden useful to the fatherland.

(B) They are held to fulfill their office faithfully and vigorously, caring for the common rather than the private good. Wherefore they ought to acquire the economic and social science necessary for the exercise of their office, not only speculative but also practical, by studying theories and facts together, and especially those questions which are foreseen as to be treated in the Legislative Assembly.

(C) They ought to be present at sessions, as often as they are not impeded by a grave cause; indeed, when they cannot be present, let them take care that, as often as a question of great moment is to be decided, they be immediately summoned by telephone or telegraph, lest perhaps an unjust or inopportune law be enacted while they are absent. - But they ought to cast their vote according to the dictate of conscience, and, if the matter is doubtful, let them have recourse to those who can provide wise counsel. - If by their vote they concur in an unjust law, they sin and sometimes are held to restitution, according to the principles explained above, On Justice, n. 503-505.

II. On The Duties Of Subjects.¹

¹ Meyer, t. II, n. 497-537; Noldin, n. 307-319; Vermeersch, De Justitia, n. 83-131; Ami du Clerge, Le peche electoral, t. XXV, 1903, p. 979, and t. XXVI, 1904, p. 2.

n. 997.

1. In regions in which deputies and senators are elected, who by their votes concur in administering public affairs, the primary duty of those who have the right of electing is prudently and vigorously to labor for procuring the election of a suitable candidate.

For the matter at issue, especially in our days, is of the greatest moment: for, in Legislative Assemblies, questions are often debated not only commercial and industrial, but also moral and religious, on whose solution depends the good not only temporal but also spiritual of many citizens, indeed of the whole People. But the solution of questions of this sort depends chiefly on elections: if prudent and honest men are chosen, endowed with courage of soul, a Catholic spirit, and, insofar as it can be done, eloquence, religion and the fatherland will flourish together; but if foolish, evil, irreligious men are elected, a way is prepared not only for temporal ruin, but also for corruption of morals and innumerable errors against faith. Wherefore upon all electors there lies a grave duty not only of abstaining from selling their vote, but also of concurring vigorously in the election of a suitable candidate; from which they cannot be excused except on account of a proportionately grave cause. Hence: -

n. 998.

(A) Light causes by no means excuse from this duty, insofar as they are loss of time, hunting or honest recreation, or the mockery of malevolent fellow-citizens: for all these things are something light in relation to the public utility. Nor generally does the probable uselessness of casting votes excuse, because, for example, there is scarcely any hope of electing a good candidate; for, even in this case, it is greatly expedient to show by deeds that good citizens do not at all despair, but are prepared to use all licit means until good deputies can at last be elected. - That one may be dispensed from such a duty, an altogether grave cause is required, such as would be the loss of an office necessary for honest support. - Nevertheless, if it is morally certain that one's vote will profit nothing, or that society will suffer no detriment from the election, whichever candidate is elected, because, for example, both are equally good or evil, a lesser cause suffices so that one can abstain from the election. Nonetheless, even in these cases, it is generally expedient to cast a vote for some upright citizen, so that good example may thus be provided; and this indeed more urgently presses those who possess greater authority and can draw others by their example to giving votes.

n. 999.

(B) If the choice is given only between two unworthy candidates, of whom nevertheless one is worse than the other, for example, between a socialist and another imbued with liberal errors, a vote can be cast for the less unworthy, and generally it is expedient; for between two evils it is licit to choose the lesser; but, to forestall the scandal of the little ones, it should be declared publicly that this is done only to impede the evils that would follow from the election of the worse one; besides, good citizens who cast their vote for the less unworthy should warn him that they concur in his election only so that he may vigorously oppose the evil principles advocated by the other candidate and repel unjust laws: for thus he will try to act more cautiously.

(C) That upright citizens may more efficaciously concur in administering public affairs honestly and prosperously, it is necessary that they establish permanent associations among themselves, and hold public meetings, by which electors may be instructed concerning their duties, concerning the importance of questions which will be proposed for decision in Assemblies, concerning the necessity of choosing the best deputies; and this ought to be declared not only speculatively but practically, by setting forth facts, how the deputies of such a province cast their vote for such or such a law, what consequences arose from it, etc., so that electors may be able prudently and freely to choose the worthier among the various candidates.

n. 1000.

1. But in all regions, subjects ought to furnish reverence, obedience, and fidelity to legitimate superiors: -

(A) Reverence indeed, insofar as superiors act in the place of God; and therefore, whatever gifts they shine with or vices they labor under, they have the right of receiving due honor, on account of the authority committed to them, and the excellence which flows from this authority: "Render therefore to all what is due: tribute to whom tribute is due... honor to whom honor."¹ - Therefore those sin who deny due signs of honor to the civil power without just cause, and show it contempt and irreverence. Today indeed the public acts of ministers and officials are deservedly scrutinized and subjected to strict examination, so that abuses which they could favor may thus be forestalled; yet this ought to be done honestly, by avoiding whatever smacks of falsehood and calumny.

¹ Rom., XIII, 7. - How the ancient Christians furnished reverence and obedience to emperors, even persecutors, Guignebert describes, Tertullien, p. 21-128; Adhemar d'Ales, La theologie de Tertullien, p. 397 sq.

n. 1001.

(B) Obedience, insofar, namely, as they ought to obey just laws, and also the equitable sentences of judges: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers: for there is no power except from God... Therefore he who resists the power resists the ordinance of God... Therefore be subject of necessity, not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience."² - In reality no society can subsist for a long time without the faithful observance of laws; for if each one acts as he pleases, and laws are despised, soon the weaker will be oppressed by the more powerful, and dissensions and fights will succeed peace and concord. - How far the obligation of obeying laws extends has been explained in the Treatise on Laws, n. 341-348; concerning the law of taxes in particular it has been said, On Justice, n. 591-598.

² Rom., XIII, 1-5.

But when a law seems unjust or less opportune, it is not only licit, but expedient, to use licit means for abrogating or reforming it, by writing to deputies so that they may propose this change, if they wish to be elected again.

n. 1002.

(C) Let them also furnish fidelity, insofar as it is not licit to stir up rebellion or to kill those who preside, as we have explained, On Justice, n. 362-363; for since today supreme authority is in the hands of a Legislative Assembly, whose members are elected by the votes of citizens, the votes of citizens have greater force for protecting liberty and justice than arms of any kind.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 33 passages

Vol. V, Pt. II, Ch. III, Section 1: Nature and Purpose of the State

As marriage gives rise to the family, so the family is the nursery of the State,¹ which may be defined as a perfect and self-sufficient society, consisting of many families, united together under a common ruler and governed by the same laws, for the attainment of complete life and welfare of all the members. The State owes its existence to the natural needs of men as social beings, which compel them to unite in larger (political) communities. For neither as an individual nor as a family member is a man able to supply even his own urgent needs.

¹ Cicero, De Offic., l. I, c. 17: “Since it is common to living creatures by nature to have the desire to procreate, the first society is in marriage itself, the next in children, then one household, all things in common. And this is the beginning of the city and, as it were, the nursery of the commonwealth. Next come the unions of brothers, afterward those of first cousins and second cousins, who, when they can no longer be contained in one household, go out into other houses as into colonies. Next come marriages and affinities, from which there are yet more relatives. This propagation and offspring will be the origin of commonwealths. Moreover, blood relationship and benevolence bind men by charity.”

Now, as it would be impossible to preserve order in the family without some higher (paternal or parental) authority, so, too, the permanent cohabitation of many families would not be possible without a common leader.² History teaches that in matter of fact there is not and never was a nation or State that wholly lacked political organization, no matter what form of public policy it adopted.

² Prov. XI, 14.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 96, art. 4: “The social life of many could not exist unless someone presided who aimed at the common good. For many of themselves aim at many things, but one at one thing. And therefore the Philosopher says that whenever many things are ordered to one, one is always found as principal and director.”

But the State is not only a spontaneous outgrowth of sheer natural necessity, it is at the same time a free and voluntary product of human intelligence. It furnishes a fruitful soil for countless moral relations which are sustained and regulated by the ideas of social order, right, and justice,—ideas implanted by the Creator Himself in the minds and hearts of men. Accordingly the State or civil society is not a purely human invention, but instituted by God; for, as St. Paul says, “there is no power but from God, and those that are, are ordained of God.”³ “Because no society can hold together unless some one be over all,”—writes Leo XIII in his famous encyclical “Immortale Dei,”—“directing all to strive ear- nestly for the common good, every civilized community must have a ruling authority, and this authority, no less than society itself, has its source in nature, and has, consequently, God for its author. Hence it follows that all public power must proceed from God. For God alone is the true and supreme Lord of the world, to whom everything without exception must be subject, and whom everything must serve: so that whosoever holds the right to govern, holds it from one sole and single source, namely, from God, the Sovereign Ruler of all.”⁴

³ Rom. XIII, 1; cfr. Prov. VIII, 15 sq.

⁴ Encycl. “Immortale Dei,” Nov. 1, 1885: “Since no society can hold together unless someone presides over all, moving each person toward the common purpose with an efficacious and simultaneous impulse, it follows that an authority by which it is ruled is necessary to the civil community of men; this authority, no less than society, arises from nature and therefore from God Himself as author. From this it follows that public power in itself is from none but God. For God alone is the truest and supreme Lord of things, to whom all things whatsoever must be subject and must serve; so that whoever possesses the right of command receives it from no other source than from God, that supreme Prince of all.”—Cfr. J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 2 sq., 26 sqq.

n. ¶4.

Yet, though political power is from God, Divine Revelation has not prescribed any particular form of government,⁵ but leaves men free to choose whichever form they prefer, and civil society is a moral entity precisely by the fact that it is based in part upon a free agreement, that it is sustained by the voluntary co-operation of its members, and that the individual finds within it ample scope for free activity. This liberty, however, like human liberty in general, is not merely legal, derived from positive law, but has its root in the divine will, and, ultimately, in the eternal and imperishable ideas of right and justice as they exist in God.

⁵ Rom. XIII, 1–7; 1 Pet. II, 13–19. Cfr. Linsenmann, Moraltheol., pp. 621 sqq.; G. v. Hertling, Kleine Schriften, pp. 41 sqq., 61 sqq., 91 sqq., 470 sqq.; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 557 sqq.; J. A. Ryan, op. cit., p. 28 sq.

n. ¶5.

The influence of Christianity on the development of political life shows itself especially in this that the Church of Christ inculcates a higher conception of justice and goodness. She is the authorized interpreter of the natural law. And since the human race is not intended to work out its destiny exclusively on this earthly planet, but has a truly transcendental aim and purpose,⁶ the State does not contain its ultimate purpose within itself, in other words, it is not absolute, but merely a means to an end. This end is to help humanity reach its temporal and eternal destiny. “Nature did not fashion society with the intent that man should seek in it his last end, but that in it and through it he should find suitable means to attain to his own perfection.”⁷

⁶ Mark VIII, 36 sq.; Luke IX, 25; X, 42.—St. Augustine, Confess., l. I, c. 1: “Thou [Lord] dost stir us, that it may delight us to praise Thee, because Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee.” (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 661).

⁷ Leo XIII, Encycl. “Sapientiae Christianae,” Jan. 10, 1890: “Nature did not beget society for this reason, that man should pursue it as an end, but that in it and through it he should find helps suited to his perfection.”

n. ¶6.

The end or purpose of the State may be briefly described as the promotion of the public welfare (salus sive prosperitas publica). This means that the State must by proper laws and institutions insure the preservation of good morals and the proper government of families, inculcate respect for religion, enforce the demands of justice, secure the prosperity of business, trade, and commerce, etc., because upon the promotion of these things the welfare and happiness of civil society mainly depends.⁸

⁸ Cfr. Rom. XIII, 3 sq.—Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 525 sqq.—Leo XIII, Encycl. “Immortale Dei,” Nov. 1, 1885; IDEM, Encyclical letter “Rerum Novarum,” March 15, 1891.

n. ¶7.

The object of the State, therefore, is the preservation of civil society on the basis of justice and order. Still law and order are not the last and highest purpose, but means for the attainment of a still higher one, which is contained in the very destiny of man himself, namely, culture and civilization in the fullest and most perfect sense of the term. The State must create such conditions of law and order as are suitable to a nation’s state of culture and apt to lead the people to a still higher plane of morality. Law and order must be directed toward good morals. Hence it belongs to the State not only to protect its citizens against external and internal enemies, and to protect private property, but likewise to prevent and punish all public violations of morality and to promote every form of true culture and civilization,—education, religion, science and art.⁹

⁹ J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 195 sqq.; Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, p. 620.

n. ¶8.

The State has its natural basis in nationality. But History shows that a nation (in the strict sense) can very well comprise several States, and that a State may comprise people of different nationalities. Both the undue suppression of national aspirations and the undue exaltation of the principle of nationality are moral defects and therefore illicit.¹⁰

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 615 sqq.—Cfr. Stöckl, Das Christentum, Vol. II, pp. 389 sqq.; W. Frind, Das sprachliche und sprachlich-nationale Recht in polyglotten Staaten und Ländern, Mayence 1899; W. Haidegger, Der nationale Gedanke im Lichte des Christentums, 2nd ed., Brixen, 1902; A. Vermeersch, S. J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, 2nd ed., pp. 6 sqq.

n. ¶9.

READINGS.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 619 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 462 sqq.—IDEM, Die Staatsgewalt und ihre Grenzen, Freiburg i. B. 1882.—G. v. Hertling, Recht, Staat und Gesellschaft, Kempten 1906.—B. Seidel, Die Lehre des hl. Augustinus vom Staate, Breslau 1909.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 461 sqq., 507 sqq.—J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, N. Y. 1922, pp. 62 sqq., 195 sqq., 221 sqq.—Th. Meyer, S.J., Inst. Iuris Nat., Vol. II, pp. 241 sqq., 266 sqq., 303 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 395 sqq., 433.—P. Tischleder, Ursprung und Träger der Staatsgewalt nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas und seiner Schule, M. Gladbach 1923.

Vol. V, Pt. II, Ch. III, Section 2: The Duties of Public Officials

The highest government official in a country, whether his title be emperor, king, or president, is the representative of God, appointed for the purpose of enforcing justice and promoting the common welfare.¹ St. Thomas² describes his duties in a classical passage as threefold: “(1) That he establish a good life among the subject multitude; (2) That he preserve what has been established; (3) That he promote what has been preserved toward better things.” The institutio bonae vitae comprises: (a) that the people live in unity of peace; (b) that, united by the bonds of peace, they be directed in doing good; (c) that by the industry and foresight of their ruler they be provided plentifully with the necessaries of life.³

¹ Rom. XIII, 3 sq.

² De Regimine Principum, l. I, c. 15.

³ Ibid.: “(a) That the multitude be established in the unity of peace; (b) that the multitude, united by the bond of peace, be directed to acting well; (c) that through the ruler’s industry there be a sufficient abundance of the things necessary for living well.”

The conservatio bonae vitae implies: (a) a just administration by, and a proper succession of, officials; (b) proper laws and precepts, re- wards to encourage civic virtue and punishments to deter the people from wrongdoing; (c) safety of the commonwealth against exterior and interior enemies.⁴ The promotio bonae vitae implies: (a) correcting crimes, misdemeanors, and serious faults; (b) supplying the things that are necessary for the welfare of the nation, and (c) introducing indispensable and advisable reforms.⁵ The principal duty of the regent is to dispense justice to all. Hence he must never violate justice, or permit others to violate it; he must render to each what is his due, reward or punish all according to their deserts, combine firmness with paternal kindness and charity, and be ever mindful of the account he will one day have to render to God.⁶

⁴ Ibid.: “(a) Care concerning the succession of men and the substitution of those who preside over the various offices; (b) that by his laws and precepts, punishments and rewards, he restrain the men subject to him from iniquity; (c) that the subject multitude be rendered safe against enemies.”

⁵ Ibid.: “(a) In each of the things set forth above, if anything is disordered, to correct it; (b) if anything is lacking, to supply it; (c) if anything can be done better, to bring it to completion.”—Cfr. Aug. Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., n. 952.

⁶ Ps. II, 10, 12; Wisd. I, 1; VI, 2–4; VI, 7; cfr. Jas. II, 13.

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. III, Chapter VII: On Piety Toward the Fatherland · Vol. II, Bk. II, Tractate IV: On Observance…, Article II: On the Mutual Offices of Princes and Subjects

“The right to rule,” says Leo XIII, “is not necessarily bound up with any special mode of government. It may take this or that form, provided only that it be of a nature to insure the general welfare. But whatever be the nature of the government, rulers must always bear in mind that God is the paramount Ruler of the world, and must set Him before themselves as their exemplar and law in the administration of the State.... They, therefore, who rule, should rule with even-handed justice, not as masters, but rather as fathers, for the rule of God over man is most just, and is tempered always with a father’s kindness. Government should, moreover, be administered for the well-being of the citizens, because they who govern others possess authority solely for the welfare of the State. Furthermore, the civil power must not be subservient to the advantage of any one individual or of some few persons, inasmuch as it was established for the common good of all. But if those who are in authority rule unjustly, if they govern overbearingly or arrogantly, and if their measures prove hurtful to the people, they must remember that the Almighty will one day bring them to account, the more strictly in proportion to the sacredness of their office and the pre-eminence of their dignity.”⁷

⁷ Encyclical “Immortale Dei,” Nov. 1, 1885: “The right of command is not of itself necessarily joined to any form of commonwealth: it can rightly assume this form or that, provided it is in fact effective for the common utility and good. But in every kind of commonwealth princes must altogether look to God, the supreme Governor of the world, and set Him before themselves as an exemplar and law in administering the state.... Government, therefore, ought to be just, not masterly, but as it were paternal, because God’s most just power over men is joined with paternal goodness.... But if those who are in authority slip into unjust domination, if they sin through arrogance or pride, if they take bad counsel for the people, let them know that they will someday have to render an account to God, and that the reckoning will be so much stricter, the more sacred the office in which they have been engaged or the higher the degree of dignity they have obtained.”—Cfr. J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 3, 26 sqq.

n. ¶4.

Least of all is a ruler permitted to employ his power against God, i. e., to the detriment of religion;—on the contrary, it is one of his first and most sacred duties to protect and foster religion, inasmuch as fidelity to God and to His holy law is a necessary condition of the temporal no less than of the spiritual welfare and prosperity of nations as well as individuals.⁸

⁸ Ibid., pp. 4 sqq., 29 sqq. Cfr. Ecclus. XIX, 18; 1 Tim. IV, 8.

n. ¶5.

“All who rule,” says Leo XIII, “should hold in honor the holy name of God, and one of their chief duties must be to favor religion, to protect it, to shield it under the credit and sanction of the laws, and neither to organize nor enact any measure that may compromise its safety. This is the bounden duty of rulers to the people over whom they rule.”⁹

⁹ Encyclical “Immortale Dei”: “The name of God must be holy among princes; and it must be placed among their chief duties to embrace religion with favor, to protect it with benevolence, to cover it with the authority and sanction of the laws, and neither to institute nor decree anything contrary to its safety. They owe this also to the citizens over whom they preside.” (Ryan, op. cit., pp. 4 sq., 29 sqq.)

n. ¶6.

Public officials are the organs of the supreme ruler and entrusted with the duty of promoting the welfare of the people in their respective spheres, whether these be large or small.¹⁰

¹⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 67–71; Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., n. 960–987.

n. ¶7.

The statement is frequently made in the United States that public officials are merely public servants. This, says Dr. Ryan, is incorrect. “They are, indeed, the servants of the people, but they are also something more. Inasmuch as their function is that of public service, they may properly be regarded as public servants; inasmuch as their position gives them the authority to enact laws which are morally binding on the people, they are not servants, but masters. Their character as public servants does not depend upon the fact that they are elected by the people; for hereditary kings are likewise bound to serve the common welfare. In a republic the members of legislatures may in a special sense be regarded as servants of the people, whenever they are instructed by the electors to carry out certain political policies. Their promise to pursue this course creates a particular responsibility to the people, and renders their position analogous to that of servants or agents. Nevertheless, they are masters and rulers when they enact the legislation necessary to carry out the policies to which they have committed themselves.”¹¹

¹¹ The State and the Church, p. 263.

n. ¶8.

One of the primary duties of public officials, according to the same writer, is “to possess an adequate knowledge of what constitutes the common welfare and of the means by which it is best promoted. This obligation is disregarded by a large proportion of those who seek public office. Men who are otherwise conscientious assume that good will and right motives are a sufficient equipment for public service. When we consider the enormously extended functions of the modern State, the numerous and profound ways in which its activities affect the welfare of all the people, and the consequent complexity of legislating and governing wisely, we see that this notion is utterly mistaken. Only in local governments and subordinate official positions is it true that common honesty plus common sense suffice for those who are charged with the duty of caring for the public welfare. In all the more important legislative and executive officers a considerable amount of special and specific knowledge is essential to an adequate discharge of official obligations.”¹²

¹² Ryan, op. cit., p. 262.

n. ¶9.

Other important duties of public officials are: fidelity and conscientiousness in fulfilling the particular obligations of their state and impartiality in the administration of justice.¹³ They should also strive to be models of all other Christian virtues, especially of prudence, mildness, and benevolence. Here, too, what St. Paul says is true, that “love is the fulfilling of the law.”¹⁴ If public officials intentionally or out of culpable ignorance violate the rights of the people, or cause them material damage, they are guilty of sin and must make restitution. Thus, for example, a judge who, in a gravely culpable way, either because of ignorance or carelessness, has pronounced an unjust judgment, must repair the damage that results therefrom, because he is in duty bound to administer his office fairly and justly. If he has erred without grave fault, he is bound to correct his mistake as far as lies within his power.

¹³ Ex. XXIII, 2 sq., 6 sqq.; Lev. XIX, 15, 35; XXIV, 22; Deut. I, 17; XVI, 18 sq.; XXIV, 17; XXV, 1 sq.; Ps. LXXXI, 3 sq.; Is. I, 17; XXXII, 1; LVI, 1; Jer. XXII, 3; Zach. VIII, 16; Wisd. I, 1; Ecclus. XX, 31; Rom. XIII, 3 sq.; Jas. II, 1–9.—St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, l. IV, c. 4: “Justice removed, what are kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves but little kingdoms?” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 115).—Cicero, De Offic., l. II, c. 11: “Such is the power of [justice] that not even those who feed upon wrongdoing and crime can live without some particle of justice.”

¹⁴ Rom. XIII, 10; cfr. Zach. VIII, 19; Eph. IV, 15; Col. III, 14.—Sallust, Iugurth., 10: “By concord small things grow; by discord the greatest things fall apart.”

n. ¶10.

“The man who regards public office as an opportunity for private gain, except incidentally and as a necessary consequence of faithful public service, is false to his trust and violates legal justice. To accept a bribe for aid in the enactment of a bad law, for negligent or oppressive administration of the law, or for unjust judicial conduct, is an evident moral wrong. To obtain some advantage on the occasion of proper official actions, for example, through some form of ‘graft,’ is likewise a violation of legal justice. Such conduct is generally forbidden by the civil law; at any rate, it renders right judgment and adequate performance of official duties extremely difficult. Public officials are not justified in exposing themselves to such a grave temptation. What is true of their own private advantage, applies also to that of their friends. In their enactment or administration of the law they may not extend favors of any sort to any individual or class of individuals. The common good must be preferred to the good of individuals, and all individuals must be treated with exact justice.”¹⁵

¹⁵ J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 260 sq.

n. ¶11.

What would become of a State without justice? It would fall to pieces, for injustice breeds anarchy, and anarchy causes the disruption of all social bonds. When a State departs from the laws of justice, therefore, it courts destruction.

n. ¶12.

Every public official ought to be a vessel and an organ for the manifestation of justice within the sphere of his jurisdiction. He must be incorruptible, because justice cannot coexist with bribery. He must be impartial, for without impartiality his judgments would be unjust. He must be unselfish, for selfishness would render him susceptible to bribery. He must be discreet, for without discretion he cannot acquire and hold the confidence either of his superior or of the public. He must be diligent and punctual in the performance of his duties, else he cannot be a model to others. He must be chaste and temperate in all things, for he who is guilty of immoderate indulgence in the pleasures of the flesh can be neither assiduous nor impartial. Where would a slave of lust find the courage to sacrifice himself for the welfare of his country?¹⁶ He must be a man of superior culture, for without true culture there can be no wisdom, without wisdom no religion, without religion neither justice nor true benevolence.

¹⁶ J. M. Sailer, Handbuch der christl. Moral, Vol. III, p. 51, note 1: “History and philosophy both admit the influence of the current immorality on the conduct of public business.”—Tacitus says: “Nothing honorable resides in a mind corrupted by lust.”—Aristotle asks: “What difference does it make whether women govern, or whether those who govern are governed by women?”—Cfr. Polit., l. II, c. 9 (Op., II, 1269; III, 629).

n. ¶13.

The most indispensable qualities of a true statesman are: justice, wisdom, incorruptibility, and discretion; and the higher his office, the greater is his responsibility, and the more assiduously should he cultivate these virtues.

n. ¶14.

As justice is the very life and foundation of the State, and its administration is formally entrusted to the judges, their duties demand a special treatment.

n. ¶15.

a) A judge can pronounce official judgment only in matters over which the law gives him jurisdiction.

n. ¶16.

b) He must be familiar with the law so that he can apply it correctly to the concrete cases submitted for his decision.

n. ¶17.

c) He must be guided by a firm purpose of administering justice and, therefore, love justice above all things, as the embodiment of the divine will.

n. ¶18.

d) He must render his decisions according to the letter of the law, but never against its spirit, for this would be to disregard its very essence.

n. ¶19.

e) He must examine every case without prejudice, and preserve this impartial attitude until he has rendered judgment.

n. ¶20.

f) He must hear and examine all witnesses who are able and willing to tell the truth, and discount the testi- mony of those who are incompetent or addicted to falsehood.

n. ¶21.

g) He must adhere to the prescribed formalities in pronouncing judgment, for they are of the essence of the law.

n. ¶22.

h) He must protect right and justice against the prejudice and selfishness of minor officials; against interference by unauthorized outsiders; against prevarications on the part of lawyers, and, if necessary, also against usurpation by the rich and by the mob.

n. ¶23.

All this demands courage, wisdom, and fortitude of an altogether exceptional kind.¹⁷

¹⁷ F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, pp. 432 sqq.

n. ¶24.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, De Regimine Principum, l. I, c. 15 sqq.—IDEM, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 67 sqq.—Leo XIII, Encyclical “Immortale Dei,” of Nov. 1, 1885; English translation in The Pope and the People, London 1912, pp. 71 sqq. and in J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, pp. 1 sqq.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. IV, n. 192 sqq. (ed. Gaudé, II, 625 sqq.).—J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 177 sqq.—J. M. Sailer, Handbuch der christl. Moral, Vol. III, pp. 21 sqq., 50 sqq.—J. P. Gury, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 1 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 415 sq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 325 sqq.—Th. Meyer, S.J., Inst. Iuris Nat., Vol. II, pp. 536 sqq., 584 sqq.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 9 passages

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. III, Chapter VII: On Piety Toward the Fatherland

n. 315.

What fatherland is. The fatherland of someone is a legitimately constituted community, which surrounds, helps, and guards his family and person, not from some accidental fact, but of itself, in a universal way, and thus mediately assists his good birth and institution. Today it is usually at the same time bound to a territory, and sufficiently coincides with the political State, while in a tribe which wanders the fatherland can be detached from a territory, and once fatherland was said more of a city, of a town, than of a republic. That we may propose the matter more adequately, municipalities, province, state, a broader Federation which joins various States, can participate in the ratio of fatherland, and that unequally according to their various juridical condition and power. Wherefore, today, because of close civil unity, the proper place of birth is fatherland only in a secondary ratio; and the action and authority of province is usually less than that of place. Concerning Federation something is to be said otherwise elsewhere. Indeed, it can happen that in a broader use fatherland seems to exceed political boundaries. But it is not ours to discuss the notion of fatherland and the connected political questions.

n. 316.

Moreover, to the fatherland, or to that community, all offices of piety are to be exhibited. By love, we shall be impelled to peculiar affective and effective benevolence, and we shall try to foster concord of citizens; by reverence, we shall be led to that manner of acting, especially public, which procures honor and glory for the fatherland; by obedience, we shall become prompt for executing the commands of those who rule in the name of the fatherland.

The offices of piety can be violated by an action whose end is to be reproved, as one which tends toward dissolving the unity of the fatherland; or which pursues a good end by dishonorable means, as if recourse is had to violent and unjust arts, or the subordination of utilities is contemned, by which a political party is below the nation, and a city or province below the republic. And again difficult questions arise. For there are parts even of one republic which by their nature must be reduced into a certain new unity. Thus colonies at first preserve a close bond with the state by which they were founded, but gradually, as if emancipated, they wish to be in their own right. At what moment they can demand autonomy or independence will be defined with difficulty, and usually the knot will be solved by a certain political disturbance. Thus not rarely God converts evil into good. Yet it belongs to those who grieve that these things do not happen without sins.

Finally, when necessity or law urges, the offices of piety are intensified by legal justice, so that to the fatherland, insofar as it is a perfect community, certain things are owed which are never owed to the family, as when, in war, life itself must be exposed to certain danger.

n. 317.

The community itself, or those who rule it, must fulfill the offices of piety toward citizens, families, and lesser societies. And it happens that an imprudent or condemnable action gives cause for just complaints and prepares an excuse for a lesser society why it can legitimately strive toward effecting another unity.

n. 318.

Positive offices toward citizens, as such, seem to add no grave specific obligation to the common offices toward neighbor.

n. 319.

Summary

Someone's fatherland is a legitimately constituted community, which guards and fosters his family and person not by accident but of itself, and thus contributes to his good birth and institution. Today it is usually bound to a territory and coincides with the State. To that community all offices of piety are to be exhibited; indeed these, when necessity or law urges, can oblige more severely, so that certain things, for example the sacrifice of life, which are never owed to the family, cannot be denied to the fatherland. Chiefly to be commemorated here is the office by which citizens are held to exercising political rights for the common good; which office becomes one of justice in those who have assumed the function of deputies.

By the community or its rulers, offices of piety and distributive justice must also be fulfilled toward citizens, families, and lesser societies. But a grave specific obligation of piety does not seem to exist among the citizens themselves.

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tractate IV: On Observance…, Article II: On the Mutual Offices of Princes and Subjects

n. 335.

Office of the prince. Whoever conduct the highest affairs must procure the public good and contain themselves within the limits of their competence.

n. 336.

Office of subjects. Subjects are held by the obligation of subjection and reverence. 1. That subjection commands obedience to just laws, and forbids rebellion. But rebellion is properly had when an unjust overthrow of the existing regime is attempted. But injustice can be absent: a) if unjust vexations are such as give place to exercising the right of prudent defense, prudent, I say, and consequently with certain hope of a successful outcome; b) if the fundamental law itself has introduced a mutable regime. Yet unjust arts must always be avoided. Besides, the oath or sacrament of fidelity which has been made to a legitimate prince must be observed. Finally, piety and charity toward the fatherland also demand that, without manifest public utility, it not be disturbed by pursuits of revolutions even if not unjust.

Reverence imposes honor toward Princes and other officials according to their degree and condition. Against reverence one can sin gravely by interior contempt, if it affects the Superior, or the law as such. If it affects the person of the Superior insofar as he labors under such or such a defect or vice, the sin will depend on rashness of judgment. But by grave insult or detraction, by a denied sign of external honor when the Prince is to be honored publicly, if the denial, from the circumstances, is held as grave contempt, just as by formal contempt of the law, one will sin gravely.

Those offices, which are inculcated not once in Sacred Scripture, e.g. Rom. 13, 1; 1 Pet. 2, 13 ff., are very opportunely recalled to memory today. Yet today there are several, with attention to the form of regime, who, as individuals, possess no authority; to whom consequently, as individuals, much less observance is owed of itself.

n. 337.

The same worship and charity toward the fatherland which impels citizens to exercise piously the offices of observance, and not rarely religion itself also, will move the same citizens to discharge their political rights in due manner. (Cf. what was said, nn. 148, 149.)

And circumstances can be such that a legitimate and innocent Prince, from the same virtues of charity, piety, and legal justice, ought to abdicate power and remit the sacrament of fidelity. For the public good must be placed before personal dignity.

n. 338.

Summary

I. Notion: by the virtue of Observance, through virtue the excellence of another is honored. It helps good governance, according to the various order of which observance itself is distinguished specifically as political and religious.

II. Hired servants owe the faithful execution of promised service; on account of a denied just wage, hidden compensation can be cautiously and prudently permitted to them. Nor can they think themselves immune from every signification of observance.

Household servants besides, if minors by birth, participate in the rights and offices of quasi-piety; if greater by birth, they must at least reverence the domestic power of the master; they must also impede grave damage of the master, yet they are not bound from justice to watch over other servants or denounce those stealing, unless certain things have been expressly or tacitly committed to them. According to laws, usages, and circumstances, the offices of observance can be intensified or remitted.

III. Masters and Superiors are held by negative and positive offices of quasi-piety, besides the obligations of justice flowing from the contract. If they have adolescents or minors as servants, they must supply for parents.

IV. The master of works and the workman must observe justice in making and executing an agreement. Besides, the master from justice must preserve safe the person, or body and soul, as well as the honor and reputation of the workman; this, when there is question of adolescents, can be dispensed by no assent of parents.

Nor can the worker injure the things or reputation of the master. Strikes must be judged from end, from mode, and from effects, although they are to be numbered among social evils, as wars themselves; nor do they bring forward few difficult questions of cooperation.

Although according to various circumstances and customs these offices can be lesser or greater, nevertheless a bond of closer nearness, and a debt of quasi-piety in the one hiring works, and of observance in the hired workman, necessarily follow the contract, since from the agreement itself direction to the end of the work belongs to the master. But in the vows of nature there is a certain imitation of masterly society, by which hired workers approach household members.

V. Offices of princes. Whoever conduct the highest affairs must procure the public good and contain themselves within the limits of their power, even from justice.

Offices of subjects. They are held by subjection, which commands obedience and, excepting just defense, forbids rebellion; and by reverence, which exacts honor, and forbids contempt of the Superior as such, besides insult, detraction, and the denied external signification of honor. The sacrament of fidelity made to a legitimate Prince must also be observed.

Yet because not a few today, as individuals, can do nothing, they have title to much less observance.

Circumstances also can demand that a legitimate Prince, from piety itself toward the fatherland, ought to abdicate office and remit the sacrament of fidelity.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 7 passages

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. II, Q. II, Observance, and Obedience,…, Ch. II, Parents, Etc, Article VI. On the Obligations of Rulers and Subjects

n. ¶69.

Preliminary note. Here we speak only of civil rulers and superiors and civil subjects, for in canon law the obligations of ecclesiastical superiors are customarily treated. The obligations of the faithful toward ecclesiastical superiors are love, reverence, and obedience in spiritual matters. Furthermore, the faithful must provide assistance for the suitable support of the ministers of the Church, as was said above, n. 499, concerning tithes and offerings.

Civil rulers are here called not only emperors, kings, dukes, etc., but all those upon whom the government of the commonwealth is incumbent. Therefore in this sense even a Chamber of Deputies is a civil ruler.

n. 599.

599. a) Obligations of civil governors. All who are placed over some civil community are bound under grave sin to procure the temporal common good, yet in such a manner that the spiritual good is not thereby endangered. This is evident of itself. Hence they are bound according to their ability to avert all temporal evils, such as wars, seditions, famines, contagious diseases of both men and animals, etc. Furthermore, they must foster the true religion, and not only not impede the true Church in her actions, but rather protect her against all invasions of enemies. Besides, they must vigorously exercise both distributive and vindicative justice: distributive justice, namely, insofar as they distribute offices and burdens equitably; and vindicative justice with respect to evildoers, insofar as they inflict just punishments for crimes committed, without any respect of persons.

Leo XIII treated excellently of the obligations of rulers in the Encyclical Immortale Dei of November 1, 1885, saying: "In every form of commonwealth rulers altogether ought to look to the supreme Governor of the world and propose Him to themselves as the exemplar and law in administering the state.... Authority, therefore, must be just, and not that of a master, but in a manner paternal, because the power of God over men is most just and is joined with paternal goodness; but it must be exercised for the advantage of the citizens, because those who preside over others preside for this sole reason, that they may safeguard the advantage of the state.... But if those who preside fall into unjust domination, if they sin by importunity or pride, if they consult badly for the people, let them know that they must someday render an account to God, and this the more severely, the more sacred the office in which they have been engaged or the higher the degree of dignity they have obtained. The mighty shall be mightily tormented."

What has been said concerning the obligations of rulers also holds concerning the obligations of deputies, since according to the constitution of almost all kingdoms legislative power has been entrusted to deputies. Hence it is evident of itself how gravely deputies sin who do not, according to their ability, oppose iniquitous laws; who through negligence do not attend assemblies and thus inflict harm upon the commonwealth. To them the words of Sacred Scripture can be applied: "[The Most High] will examine your works, and search out your thoughts: because being ministers of his kingdom, you have not judged rightly.... Horribly and speedily will he appear to you: for a most severe judgment shall be for them that bear rule.... For God will not except any man's person; neither will he stand in awe of any man's greatness: for he made the little and the great, and he hath equally care of all. But a greater punishment is ready for the more mighty."¹⁰⁴³

Above, n. 105, in the tract on justice, it was said how deputies are bound to restitution or are held by excommunication on account of unjust laws enacted against ecclesiastical goods. In practice the matter is often very intricate and scarcely soluble. For it can be proved only with difficulty how much the vote of one deputy influenced the enactment of an iniquitous law. Hence for greater security it is expedient that a confessor, on behalf of such a penitent deputy, have recourse to the Sacred Penitentiary or to the bishop, who is accustomed to have special faculties concerning the absolution of cases of this kind. Cf. the diverse Instructions given for the bishops of France and Italy.¹⁰⁴⁴

¹⁰⁴³ Wis. 6:4-9; cf. also Leo XIII, Encyclical Diuturnum of June 29, 1881.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Cf. Sacred Penitentiary, August 5, 1907.

n. 600.

600. b) Obligations of subjects. Subjects are bound to show civil rulers: 1. reverence, obedience, and fidelity; 2. to elect good deputies; 3. to pay just taxes; 4. sometimes to perform military service. Enough was already said above in the tract on civil laws concerning the payment of taxes and the performance of military service, I, n. 291ff.

As regards 1. Reverence must be shown to rulers because their power of governing was conferred not by the people but by God. Therefore it is already said in the Old Testament: "By me kings reign, ... and by me princes rule, and the mighty decree justice."¹⁰⁴⁵ And St. Paul says: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers: for there is no power but from God."¹⁰⁴⁶ Subjects sin against the reverence owed to rulers who inflict an insult upon the person or image of the ruler;¹⁰⁴⁷ who mock the ruler by writings, words, or pictures;¹⁰⁴⁸ who deny him the due signs of reverence shown by all, etc.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Prov. 8:15.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Rom. 13:1.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Commonly Majestätsbeleidigung [insulting majesty].

¹⁰⁴⁸ Commonly Karikaturen [caricatures].

n. 601.

601. Obedience must be rendered to civil rulers in all lawful things legitimately commanded. Hence St. Peter says: "Be ye subject therefore to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the king as excelling; or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of the good: for so is the will of God."¹⁰⁴⁹ To establish a true direct obligation in conscience it is required that the ruler truly and justly command. For civil laws are sometimes merely penal or invalidating laws which produce no direct obligation in conscience; at other times civil laws are manifestly unjust and contrary to divine and natural law. Then God certainly must be obeyed more than men. "Nor is there any reason why those who conduct themselves thus should be accused of having cast off obedience; for if the will of rulers conflicts with the will and laws of God, they exceed the measure of their power and pervert justice; nor then can their authority have force, which is nothing where there is no justice."¹⁰⁵⁰

Nevertheless, although iniquitous laws must not be obeyed, it is never lawful to rebel against a legitimate ruler. Hence Pius IX condemned in the Syllabus proposition 63: "It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate rulers, and even to rebel."¹⁰⁵¹ The reason is that such open and offensive rebellion would redound against God Himself, through whom kings reign. Hence we see that in the first centuries, during the dire persecutions of the Church, the Theban Legion, although it could easily have resisted the impious emperor by force, nevertheless preferred to die for religion rather than to oppose public authority through sedition and disturbances. Therefore so-called passive resistance must be opposed to a tyrannical ruler, just as to iniquitous laws; it consists in this, that obedience is constantly denied and the divine precepts are violated in no way. But if the tyrant then urges the observance of laws injuring the right of God and of religion under grave penalties, martyrdom must be endured rather than the law of God violated. But if it is a question of laws which are indeed unjust but can be observed without sin, then it is lawful, and sometimes even necessary, to comply in order to avoid greater evils. It is evident of itself that subjects can defend themselves by lawful means against iniquitous laws, for example, by showing the iniquity of the laws in public newspapers, electing good deputies, organizing public meetings, etc.

¹⁰⁴⁹ 1 Pet. 2:13ff.

¹⁰⁵⁰ The cited Encyclical Diuturnum; cf. also the Encyclical Immortale Dei of the same Leo XIII, November 1, 1885.

¹⁰⁵¹ Denzinger, n. 1763.

n. 602.

602. The fidelity owed to rulers requires that subjects do nothing unjust to withdraw themselves from the jurisdiction of superiors, nor attempt anything to cast the ruler down from his legitimate throne. Today kings and rulers are accustomed at the beginning of their government to take an oath upon the constitution, that is, that they will faithfully observe those things which are established in the constitution of the kingdom. But if a ruler has gravely violated this sworn constitution and broken the faith given, subjects are no longer bound to observe fidelity, according to Rule 75 of Law: "In vain does anyone demand that faith be kept with him by one with whom he refuses to keep the faith pledged by himself." Nevertheless, even in this case neither rebellion nor so-called tyrannicide is lawful.¹⁰⁵² Moreover, this case will be exceedingly rare in civilized regions.

As regards 2.

¹⁰⁵² Cf. Leo XIII, Encyclical Quod apostolici, December 28, 1879. Concerning the celebrated question whether it is lawful to kill a tyrant by private authority, the following points should be noted briefly. A twofold tyrant is customarily distinguished: one is a tyrant of government, who abuses a legitimately obtained government by oppressing the people; the other is a tyrant of usurpation, who has illegitimately usurped the government. A tyrant of government cannot lawfully be killed by private authority; the contrary doctrine was condemned at the Council of Constance (Denzinger, n. 690). But a tyrant of usurpation can lawfully be killed by private authority by the right both of defense and of vindication, provided the following conditions are present: 1. that the sounder part of the commonwealth consent; 2. that the tyranny itself cannot be removed by recourse to a higher superior. Cf. Billuart, De iust. diss. 10, a. 2; Cathrein, Moralphil. 5, II, 692ff.

n. 603.

603. Today in almost all civilized regions deputies are elected by the people, who by their decisive, and not merely consultative, votes take part in conducting public affairs, whether in the kingdom, the province, or the municipality. Hence the good of the whole commonwealth depends in great part upon the votes of the deputies. Therefore it is clearer than light how important it is that good deputies be elected, who are endowed with fortitude of soul, a Christian spirit, skill in conducting affairs, knowledge of political matters, and sufficient eloquence. Accordingly, it is also clearly evident how gravely they fail in their duty and in legal justice who do not rightly use the right of electing deputies and thus permit bad deputies to be elected.

Light causes, for example, some loss of time or the mockery of others, by no means excuse from this obligation of electing good deputies; nor does the probable uselessness of one's vote excuse. For although a good candidate will not be elected because of the multitude of contrary votes, nevertheless it is very expedient at least by the fact of voting to show what the will of good citizens is. Would that all good citizens had always fulfilled the duty of electing good deputies! Certainly there would not now be as many iniquitous laws as there actually are today. Hence, unless truly grave harm arises for the elector, for example, in goods of fortune because of an imminent danger of losing his office, etc., there exists no sufficient cause excusing from casting a vote. In practice it can be determined only with difficulty whether someone has sinned gravely from neglecting the obligation of electing good deputies, since the gravity of the sin thus committed depends upon the gravity of the harm certainly committed or certainly not avoided. The gravity of this harm is often not certainly established.

So that upright citizens may take part more effectively and diligently in the elections of good deputies, priests should exhort them prudently and at the same time urgently; permanent associations should be formed for this end; learned laymen endowed with eloquence and zeal, but not priests, since grave inconveniences could arise therefrom, should deliver addresses to the people in which they instruct electors concerning the manner and duty of electing and discuss the qualities of the candidates. At the time of the election, all good citizens should be invited to vote, and the more sluggish should even be morally compelled.

n. 604.

604. On the election of an unworthy deputy. Although it is much more advisable always to elect the worthier deputy, because in this manner greater provision is made for the common good, nevertheless of itself it suffices to elect one who is worthy and suitable, leaving aside the worthier. The reason is that nowhere is it prescribed that the worthier be elected, but it is required only that one who is worthy be elected. Of itself it is a grave sin to elect a deputy certainly unworthy, since such an election is unlawful cooperation in a grave evil of society. For electors mediately participate in all the evils which are caused by bad deputies. Nevertheless, since such participation is not formal but material, it is sometimes lawful to elect an unworthy deputy.

That this participation is of itself material and not formal is evident from the fact that the election of a deputy is of itself an indifferent action and that the elected deputy by his own fault abuses the right committed to him through election. But for it to be lawful in practice to elect an unworthy deputy, not only an honorable end but also a most grave cause is required. First, indeed, an honorable end is required; therefore one sins gravely who gives his vote to a bad deputy with the end that he may afterward be able to cooperate in bad laws against religion. Next, a grave, indeed a most grave, cause is required; such causes are grave inconveniences to be averted either from the elector himself, from others, or from the commonwealth. Thus, for example, a worker could elect a bad deputy if otherwise he would lose his employment and would be unable to find another employment;¹⁰⁵³ it is lawful to elect a bad candidate in order to prevent the election of a worse one. This can occur not rarely in so-called second elections.¹⁰⁵⁴ For then there is no choice except between two candidates. Usually in this case it is necessary to declare publicly, in order to avoid scandal, that this election is made only to exclude the more unworthy candidate. Sometimes it is also lawful to elect a few bad deputies who have been placed on a list containing many good deputies, if otherwise the whole list will not be elected, with great detriment to religion or the commonwealth.¹⁰⁵⁵

¹⁰⁵³ Thus also Noldin, De praeceptis, n. 325. Almost all modern theologians concede that the election of a bad deputy is not something intrinsically evil and consequently can sometimes be lawful accidentally in order to avert greater evils.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Commonly Stichwahl, ballottage, second ballot.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Vermeersch treats this matter more fully, Quaest. de iust. q. 3, c. 1, De iure suffragii. Cf. also Staatslexikon, s.v. "Wahlrecht."

Merkelbach, Pastoral Questions

Benedict H. Merkelbach, O.P. — 38 passages

Ch. I, Question IV: Concerning Public Officials

n. ¶4320.

I. Who public officials are. - Under the name of officials here come all those who are constituted in a public function or office, such as judges, advocates, notaries, guardians of public order, etc.; who, if they do not discharge their office well, harm the common good and can inflict unjust damage upon private persons. Hence certain things concerning them must be noted.¹

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Praxis conf., nn. 55-56; Aertnijs, Th. P., nn. 44-45; Lehmkuhl in the new edition of Reuter, Neo-conf., n. 167a; Salsmans, Rechtelijke Plichtenleer, that is, juridical deontology.

n. ¶4321.

II. Judges are to be questioned, if they seem of laxer conscience:

n. ¶4322.

Whether they have not shown acceptance of persons.

n. ¶4323.

Whether they have expedited cases.

n. ¶4324.

Whether before sentence they have premised or omitted suitable study.

n. ¶4325.

Whether they have not pronounced sentence from passion: hatred, aversion, affection toward one party.

n. ¶4326.

Whether they have not decreed penalties graver than is just, by not attending to attenuating circumstances, if any were present.

n. ¶4327.

Whether for rendering sentence, whether just or unjust, they have exacted or accepted money or gifts.²

² Several other things can be seen in Summa Theologiae Moralis, II, nn. 632-634.

n. ¶4328.

Let it be noted: a) Judges, if they lack competent knowledge, are bound to leave the office, or to learn juridical knowledge and meanwhile, as far as they can, to abstain from exercising the function, or at least to take counsel from a doctor if they cannot abstain altogether.

n. ¶4329.

b) Jurors, who among certain nations are constituted to judge concerning the guilt of crimes according to the persuasion of their own conscience, sin if they pronounce against the accused either from private knowledge alone, when the crime has not been judicially proven, or from judicial proof while by private knowledge they know that he is innocent.

n. ¶4330.

III. Advocates sin especially:

n. ¶4331.

Those who undertake to defend civil causes openly unjust, or, after they have known them to be unjust, continue to defend them: but if they have been victorious in the cause, they are bound to the defeated party as to damage; if they have been defeated, they can be bound as to the expenses of the client, if he was ignorant of the injustice and pursued the cause from ignorance.

n. ¶4332.

If they do not faithfully teach their clients the conditions of the cause.

n. ¶4333.

If they do not preserve fidelity and secrecy for their clients.

n. ¶4334.

If in defending a just cause they commit negligence, or employ bad arts.

n. ¶4335.

If by their negligence they are at fault that clients have fallen from the cause, when otherwise, all things being duly and aptly brought forward, they would have prevailed.

n. ¶4336.

If they demand a salary too exaggerated.

n. ¶4337.

In all these things, if the advocate has inflicted unjust damage, he is bound to repair it.

n. ¶4338.

IV. Notaries and public scribes are suitably to be questioned:

n. ¶4339.

Whether through negligence they have been the cause of grave damage.

n. ¶4340.

Whether they have committed infidelity or injustice in noting depositions of witnesses or in drawing up instruments.

n. ¶4341.

Whether they have violated secrecy.

n. ¶4342.

V. Ministers and guardians of public order are to be questioned according to opportunity:

n. ¶4343.

Whether they have watched over public morality.

n. ¶4344.

Whether they have not abused their office for sinning.

n. ¶4345.

Whether, while inspecting brothels, they have had depraved desires.

n. ¶4346.

Whether they have reported delinquents within the determined time.

n. ¶4347.

Whether they have not accepted gifts in order not to report.

n. ¶4348.

Whether they have not reported innocent persons from hatred or vengeance.

n. ¶4349.

Whether they have denounced someone for a merely casual damaging.

n. ¶4350.

VI. Observation. - Public officials of whatever kind are bound by office, and therefore from justice:

n. ¶4351.

to employ ordinary diligence and diligence proportioned to the gravity of matters in fulfilling their function;

n. ¶4352.

to act conformably to those things which are explicitly stated in their contract or special statute;

n. ¶4353.

not to abuse their office or knowledge acquired by force of their office, in favor of blood relatives or friends, for example by revealing a matter to them sooner than to other citizens, or, on the contrary, by deliberately delaying a public manifestation which ought to be made. But merely to use such knowledge for one's own advantage is held by many as not unjust: this indeed we do not wish to approve, but neither do we dare condemn it, unless nevertheless it were positively prohibited by law.

n. ¶4354.

Therefore officials must especially attend to these things; likewise their confessor. But if they have not satisfied their function, or have even permitted themselves to be corrupted by others with money or gifts, they can be bound to restitution:

n. ¶4355.

a) by reason of salary unduly accepted. He who does not do, or does badly, what he ought, is the same as if he stole a stipend, and he ought to restore in proportion to his defect;

n. ¶4356.

b) also by reason of damage inflicted from grave negligence or depraved will, whether public, which comes upon the community, or private, by burdening someone unjustly or violating his strict right;

n. ¶4357.

c) moreover, by reason of money or a gift accepted from private persons: for if they accepted it for faithfully fulfilling the office, they are bound to restore to those who gave it, since a stipend is given to them for fulfilling the office, and therefore they have no right to obtain anything else; but if they accepted it for fulfilling the office unjustly, they are bound to restore to him upon whom they inflicted unjust damage, and indeed for the whole damage inflicted.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 16 passages

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section D: On Piety and Ob…, Ch. II, Question Four: On the Offices of Rulers and Subjects

n. 846.

846. Offices of rulers and subjects in general. - By rulers here are understood not only those who in society hold supreme power, as emperors, kings, dukes, presidents of a republic, but all those upon whom the governance of the republic rests, as ministers, governors, magistrates, judges, even deputies who in modern societies partly enjoy legislative power. But subjects are those who are subjected to their governance. To all these there ought to be common love of country and of the community with its members; to rulers especially there belongs special love, governance, providence, and protection of subjects; but these owe to rulers fidelity, reverence, obedience, and the support of taxes.

n. 846.

These things hold not only concerning civil superiors, but also concerning ecclesiastical superiors, to whom likewise the faithful owe fidelity, reverence, obedience in spiritual matters, and support, as was said in n. 708; but ecclesiastical superiors have special obligations for governing the faithful in order to eternal life, but concerning this it is customary to speak where particular states are treated, or in canon law.

847. Special offices of superiors and rulers. - Legitimate civil rulers and superiors, in the governance of subjects, bear the place of God, whose power they participate in (Prov. VIII, 15; Rom. XIII, 1 sq.); whence they ought to exercise it conformably to natural and divine law. By force of their office, under grave obligation they are bound primarily to intend and procure the temporal common good, in subordination to the good of eternal life, as legal justice prescribes (n. 265); hence they ought:

To know in what the material and spiritual common good consists, and diligently to investigate by what means it can be promoted, all circumstances of persons, things, and times being considered.

According to their powers, to avert temporal evils, such as wars, seditions, famines, contagious diseases, want, etc.

To protect justice: both commutative, by carefully protecting the rights of all citizens and legitimate associations and of society itself; and distributive, in the distribution of offices and burdens, every acceptance of persons being excluded (n. 616 sq.); and vindicative with respect to evildoers in inflicting punishments.

To protect and promote honesty of morals and religion, because the exercise of virtue pertains principally to temporal happiness. But since the Catholic religion is the only true one, they cannot impede it; indeed per se they ought positively to protect it.

To procure sufficient abundance of temporal goods and economic prosperity, which is required instrumentally for common happiness.

848. Special offices of subjects. - Subjects owe to legitimate superiors and rulers:

Fidelity, by which they acknowledge them as legitimate superiors and will to adhere and be subject to them.

They can do nothing unjust to withdraw themselves from the jurisdiction of superiors, nor unjustly contrive anything for thrusting a legitimate ruler down from power, nor excite rebellion or sedition against him, nor a fortiori kill him. Hence proposition 63 of the Syllabus was condemned: "It is licit to refuse obedience to legitimate rulers, indeed even to rebel."

Internal and external reverence, insofar as they participate in the authority and excellence of God, to whom honor is to be rendered (Rom. XIII, 7).

Subjects sin against due reverence who bring contumely upon the person or image of the ruler, who mock him by writings, words, pictures, who deny without just cause the signs of reverence due and exhibited by all, or exhibit contempt to him.

Obedience in all licit things which regard their governance (I Pet. II, 13 sq.), whether they command by laws, or by judicial sentences, or by administrative decrees, unless the precepts are certainly unjust.

In practice, the obedience due can be diverse. It must be considered which laws are merely penal, which preceptive; when an unjust law cannot be observed, and when it can, or even must, be observed to avoid a greater evil. Here those things which we said concerning civil law (I, n. 286-287) come to be applied.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. III, § 1. On Liberty of Worships · Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Article III: On The Obligations Of Pastors · Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 1. On Residence · Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 2. On Preaching And Instruction · Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 3. On The Administration Of The Sacrament · Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 4. On The Obligation Of Praying For The People · Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 5. On The Care Of The Sick And The Poor · Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 6. On The Correction Of Sheep · Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 7. On Solicitude For Promoting Good · Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. III, Chapter I: On The Offices Of Those Who Are Over The Republic · Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article I: On The Offices Of Those In Whose Hands Is Supreme Power · Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article II: On The Offices Of Those In Whose Hands Is Legislative Power · Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article III: On The Offices Of Those In Whose Hands Is Executive Power

The support of taxes, under which name military service can also come; these things were already declared above (n. 624 sq.).

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 32 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. III, § 1. On Liberty of Worships

n. ¶444.

Note beforehand. That liberty or equality of worships lies greatly in ambush against the Catholic faith, nothing is more evident than this. For through it there is brought into Catholic kingdoms that horrible system, most repugnant even to the natural light of reason itself, "of the indifference of any religion whatsoever, which, after every distinction of truth and error has been taken away, boldly asserts that men can attain eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever," and thus it casts peoples down into the abyss of incredulity (Pius IX, Enc., November 9, 1846).

n. ¶445.

PRINCIPLES. I. Liberty of worships, considered as doctrine, is a false principle of liberalism, which a Catholic legislator ought to impede by all the ways in which he can. Reason: he who cannot favor lesser vices, how much more ought he to resist those things which tear out the foundations of the commonwealth (St. Alph., de Prohib. lib., c. 1, n. 4; opusc. Fedelta dei vassalli).

Liberalism is a politico-religious system which professes an independence of the State from the Church so complete that the State rules itself, no respect being had to Religion, as if this did not exist, and all religions were in reality equal in themselves.

Moreover, the Supreme Pontiffs have always reprobated this liberty and equality of worships: "What more insane can be devised?" exclaims Pius VI in the Letter to Cardinal La Rochefoucauld (on March 10, 1791). Gregory XVI, in the Encyclical Mirari vos; Pius IX, in the Encyclical Quanta cura (December 8, 1864) and in the Syllabus (propositions 77, 78, and 79); Leo XIII, in the Encyclical Libertas (June 20, 1888), condemned this system by their supreme authority. The same Pontiff spoke thus concerning this doctrine in the Encyclical Immortale Dei: "If it differs from Atheism in name, in reality it differs not at all."

Note. But what kind of sin against faith he commits who professes liberalism was said above at n. 441.

II. Liberty of worships and of conscience can sometimes be tolerated where the prince cannot impede it without graver detriment to the true religion and commonwealth. Thus the Angelic Doctor teaches (2.2, q. 10, a. 11): Human rule is derived from divine rule, and ought to imitate it. But God, although he is omnipotent and supremely good, nevertheless permits some evils to be done in the universe which he could prohibit, lest, by their being removed, greater goods be taken away, or even worse evils follow. St. Alphonsus is plainly consonant with the Angelic Doctor (II, 18). Cf. Zigliara, Summa Phil., p. 247.

III. Liberty of worships, existing in fact, creates a twofold danger for the faithful, both of embracing the theoretical error concerning the equal value of religions, and of confusing political tolerance with dogmatic tolerance (Villada, Casus Consc., I, p. 59).

The matter is clear. From this twofold danger it must always be discerned whether someone in reality has fallen into a sin opposed to faith, or has only undergone the danger of falling into it, and whether the matter is one of doctrinal liberalism, or only of political parties.

n. ¶446.

From these things you will resolve: A. As regards liberalism, as it is doctrine:

In order to determine what sin against faith he commits who professes this liberalism, one must carefully inspect (as Genicot says) what he understands by the sentence to which he gives assent, since among those who have not completely turned aside to atheism or rationalism and who wish to remain Catholics, this word liberalism is taken with manifold variety; then one must see how far, by reason of ignorance and good faith, each one is excused from formal sin.

Hence: 1. He is a heretic who: a) fully embraces the doctrine of liberalism, that is, the full independence of the State from the Church, or (what is worse) the subjection of the Church to the authority of the State. For some subordination of the State to the Church is manifestly contained in the full power with which Christ furnished Peter and his successors; b) the same must be said of those liberals who pertinaciously hold certain particular doctrines which are also adverse to divine faith, for example, that by force of a merely civil contract there is given among Christians a true marriage. Cf. Sarda y Salvani, Le liberalisme est un peche.

They are excused from heresy, but expose themselves to danger, who defend these errors on account of ignorance for the most part culpable, and yet do not bear the mind of retaining them when they shall have known them to be reprobated by the Church. Likewise, by defect of religious assent, they sin gravely against prudence or reverence owed to the Church who hold only some secondary error, but one by no means contrary to divine faith, for example the 76th proposition of the Syllabus, concerning progress going to follow for the Church from the abrogation of the civil empire. But here some good faith can easily be admitted.

B. As regards liberalism, as it denotes political parties.

Before all things one must examine whether those who adhere to such parties nevertheless otherwise seem to fulfill the offices of good Catholics. Then it must prudently be explored whether they themselves admit something evil in doctrine or manner of acting, or without sufficient reason cooperate in the evil counsels of others; and according to these things let them be judged.

Concerning cooperation of this kind a question often occurs when there is question of schools, assemblies, and other social works.

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Article III: On The Obligations Of Pastors

n. ¶2265.

- Besides the obligations common to clerics and beneficiaries, PASTORS are bound by several others.¹⁸ These can be reduced to SEVEN heads, and are the following: 1. Residence; 2. Preaching and Instruction; 3. Administration of Sacraments; 4. Celebration of Mass for the people; 5. Care of the sick and the poor; 6. Correction of sheep; 7. Solicitude of promoting good.

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 1. On Residence

n. ¶2266.

- I. PASTORS, and others having a curative benefice, are held by divine law TO RESIDE both materially and formally in their Churches, unless a legitimate cause excuses. This is established from Trent sess. 6, cap. 1, de Ref., and sess. 23, c. 1, de Ref.

We said 1. pastors and others, etc., i.e. all upon whom the actual care of souls is incumbent: such are coadjutors of a united parish, curative Vicars, parochial Vicars of a vacant parish, or of an absent pastor. This is established from Trent, l. c., sess. 23, c. 1, and from the declaration of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, 6 November 1620.¹⁹

We said 2. by divine law, according to the common opinion and the express declaration made by Benedict XIV in his Bull Ubi primum, published 3 December 1740. And hence it is inferred that "the Pontiff cannot dispense in this, but only in some case can declare that divine law does not oblige, just causes intervening."²⁰

We said 3. both materially, i.e. in the presbyteral house, if such exists, or within the boundaries of the parish, so that thus he can easily be approached; and formally, i.e. usefully, as was said concerning Bishops (n. 2251). "Hence the Doctors commonly say... that a pastor is not reputed to reside if he does not exercise through himself the more principal duties, namely the administration of the divine word, of the Sacraments, etc."²¹

We said 4. unless a legitimate cause excuses, concerning which these things must be said:

n. ¶2267.

- II. Three things are required so that a pastor can licitly BE ABSENT, namely: 1. a just cause; 2. substitution of a suitable Vicar; 3. permission of the Bishop (Trent, l. c., sess. 23, c. 1, de Ref.).

There is required 1. a just cause, i.e. a grave cause, if he ought to be absent BEYOND TWO MONTHS, whether continuously or interruptedly; but a reasonable or honorable cause, e.g. of visiting relatives by blood, or of suitably recreating himself, if he wishes to be absent within two months, without any detriment of the flock. But from the Constitution Ad universae of Benedict XIV, "levity of spirit, desire for amusements, and other futile causes are utterly excluded."²²

There is required 2. substitution of a suitable Vicar, even if he is absent only for a few days; nor can the nearer pastor serve (without the permission of the Ordinary). Yet otherwise, if the case were urgent, and a Vicar could not be found.

There is required 3. permission of the Bishop, who approves both the cause of departure and the substitution of the Vicar; and this in writing, if it is a question of absence to be prolonged beyond two months. In a case of urgent necessity, the pastor will be able licitly, without permission, to be absent for a brief time, provided he leaves a suitable Vicar (from the decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, 7 October 1604): but unless he is about to return within a brief interval of time,

he ought to make the Bishop more certain concerning his departure and concerning the cause of the departure. "Likewise, from smallness of matter, he can be excused, at least from mortal sin, if he departs for a modest time, as the Doctors commonly say, provided he does not leave sick persons in the article of death."¹

n. ¶2268.

- It is ASKED. What PENALTIES do non-resident Pastors incur?

Resp. From natural law and from Trent, according to the common interpretation, non-resident Pastors (among whom are to be numbered those residing uselessly), in proportion to the time of absence or negligence, do not make their fruits their own, and are held, before every sentence or declaration, to apply them to the fabric of the church, or to expend them upon the poor of the place; nor can this obligation be remitted to them by any composition.

Yet they are not held to restore all the fruits corresponding to the time of absence, but only that part which corresponds to the burdens of residence.... The reason is because according to an absolutely probable opinion, fruits are given to Pastors not only for the burdens of residence, but also for the recitation of the divine Office, application of the Sacrifice, and other duties.²

Note. Nor can priests, to whom the removable care of succursal churches has been committed, renounce their duty without the permission of the Bishop, under the pretext that they do not possess benefices properly so called (S. C. C., 9 May 1884).³

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 2. On Preaching And Instruction

n. ¶2269.

- I. PASTORS are held to have SACRED SERMONS to the people committed to them, and this on Sundays and more principal Feasts. This is established from Trent, of which (in sess. 5, cap. 2, de Ref.) these are the words: "Whoever obtain the care of souls, by themselves, or by others suitable if they have been legitimately impeded, at least on Sundays and solemn feasts, shall feed the people committed to them, according to their own and the people's capacity, with salutary words; by teaching the things which it is necessary for all to know for salvation, and by announcing to them with brevity and facility of speech the vices which they ought to avoid, and the virtues which they ought to follow." Moreover (from sess. 24, cap. 4, de Ref.) the Bishop can decree that during the time of Lent and Advent, in any parish, daily, or at least on three days in the week, if he shall judge it opportune, preaching be made, and at other times, whenever he shall judge this expedient.

Hence, they commonly teach that pastors are not excused from mortal sin: - 1. who for one continuous month, or for three discontinuous months, have not preached either by themselves or through another;⁴ - 2. who are accustomed to make preaching by no means accommodated to the capacity of the hearers, namely by using a kind of eloquence more profane than sacred, arguments empty of Christian doctrine, and that manner of speaking which plainly exceeds the grasp of most hearers. Speaking of preachers of this sort, St. Alphonsus gravely testifies that they are open enemies of the Church of God, for the reason that by preaching thus they are the cause why many souls perish, who certainly, if they heard apostolic preaching, would be saved.⁵

But if profane eloquence must be removed from the sacred pulpit, rusticity and carelessness must no less be removed; for it is not right to announce the word of God without preparation, in a disorderly and inconsiderate manner. Likewise untimely zeal must be warded off, lest the people be offended by the incautious words of the preacher; lest sins which are not certainly lethal be affirmed as lethal; lest matters which pertain to daily, civil, or political events be mixed with sacred doctrines; lest sacred preaching serve for avenging a private injury; lest speech easily be made concerning stipends which are owed to sacred Ministers, etc.⁶

It is expedient that the Pastor in sacred sermons very often inculcate to the people the frequency of prayer and of the Sacraments; flight from taverns and filthy speech; the enormity of sacrilege; the necessity of sorrow and purpose for Confession; the means of overcoming temptations, especially temptations of impurity; devotion toward the Blessed Virgin Mary, etc.⁷

n. ¶2270.

- II. Pastors are held TO CATECHIZE children and others rude and ignorant in Christian doctrine. - For Trent⁸ admonishes Bishops that "at least on Sundays and other festive days, they take care that children, in individual parishes, be diligently taught the rudiments of faith, and obedience toward God and parents, by those to whom it will pertain; and if there is need, let them compel them even through ecclesiastical censures, privileges and customs notwithstanding."

But in a special manner the Pastor is held, and indeed under grave obligation, to teach the people committed to himself the MYSTERIES OF FAITH which must be known and believed, and which are necessary for salvation, according to what was said n. 427. - Hence, when he notices that parents or masters do not take care that children or servants be present at Christian doctrine, he is held to warn them, or to have recourse to the Bishop, that he may be taught the remedies to be applied opportunely. "It is also expedient that he examine male and female teachers, whether they can rightly teach boys and girls Christian doctrine, and the means conducive to living in the fear of God."⁹ - As regards midwives, see n. 1459, fin.

Note. "When notable dissolutions of morals are found in a region, which no remedy meets, the Pastor is held to take care that a Mission come to it. That pastor who does not take care of a mission casts suspicion upon his morals; for good pastors do not omit to summon a mission every fourth or fifth year." Thus St. Alphonsus.¹⁰

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 3. On The Administration Of The Sacrament

n. ¶2271.

- PASTORS are held THROUGH THEMSELVES TO MINISTER SACRAMENTS to all parishioners needing them, or asking for them, from a reasonable cause. This is clear from what was said concerning Residence (n. 2266).

Hence "the Pastor sins who renders himself morose or difficult to his subjects. And therefore St. Charles Borromeo rightly warned: 'At whatever hour of day or night the pastor will be called for administering the Sacraments to the sick, let him interpose no delay; indeed let him forewarn the people that when there is need of parochial administration, they freely summon him, no account being taken of time or of distance of place, etc.' Yet he will be excused from mortal sin (St. Alphonsus continues) if once, or again, outside necessity, he denies the Sacraments; because he does not seem to have bound himself so strictly."¹¹

Recall what was said n. 1415 and sqq., and several other things which were noted in their places, as regards the individual Sacraments: concerning Baptism, n. 1461; concerning the Eucharist, n. 1536, 1538, q. 2; concerning Penance, n. 1802; concerning Extreme Unction, n. 1880; concerning Matrimony, n. 2057 sqq., 2067 sqq. and 2073 sqq.

n. ¶2272.

- It is ASKED. Whether Pastors are held to minister Sacraments WITH DANGER OF LIFE, e.g. in time of plague?

Resp. Dist. 1. They are held, even with evident danger of life, to minister by themselves, or through other suitable persons, the necessary Sacraments, namely Baptism and Penance; indeed also the Eucharist or Extreme Unction, if someone dying, probably constituted in the state of sin and deprived of the senses, could not be absolved except under condition: for perhaps afterward, being attrite, he will be saved through this or that Sacrament, without it to be damned (cf. n. 1397, 1873, q. 3). Thus all.

Very probably they are held with the same danger to minister the Eucharist and Extreme Unction, even in the case in which these Sacraments were not of extreme necessity; because the dying, although they are not in absolute necessity, must not be deprived of so great a good (especially holy Viaticum); unless otherwise some sick persons would be about to die without confession, or there were danger for the whole parish of remaining without a priest. Thus many grave Authors, whom however others contradict. Whence, such an obligation does not seem to be urged so much, unless otherwise scandal would be given to the people.¹²

Moreover danger of life must not easily, nor immediately, be feared beforehand. For it is established by experience in contagious or epidemic diseases, e.g. in the Asiatic disease called cholera, that physicians, nuns, and priests, who are assigned to the care of the sick, are protected by the special providence of God, and that they, provided they do not omit due precautions, for the most part escape safe and unharmed.¹³ But if they should succumb from the exercise of charity, what can be more desirable? For they prepare for themselves in eternity the most splendid crown of martyrdom (cf. n. 1452, q. 2).

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 4. On The Obligation Of Praying For The People

n. ¶2273.

- The Pastor, not only secular, but also regular, is held by force of divine law TO PRAY and to apply the SACRIFICE OF THE MASS for the people. - This is established from these words of the Apostle (Heb. 5:1): "For every Pontiff is constituted for men in those things which are toward God, that he may offer gifts and sacrifices for sins."¹⁴

Recall what was said in the Treatise on the Eucharist n. 1604 and following.

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 5. On The Care Of The Sick And The Poor

n. ¶2274.

- I. The Pastor "ought diligently TO ASSIST THE DYING, and especially habituated sinners, who greatly need special assistance. But it is true that the pastor can commit this assistance to other priests; yet he ought not trust any priest whatever; for in this occasion of assisting the dying, scandals of no mediocre harm can happen."¹⁵ - Recall what was said n. 473, 3, 1854, and 1880.¹⁶

n. ¶2275.

- II. The Pastor is held, by force of his duty, TO ASSIST THE POOR AND MISERABLE, as the Council of Trent admonishes (sess. 23, cap. 1, de Ref.) - Therefore let him relieve the poverty of the needy according to the condition of the revenues; let him soothe the unfortunate by all offices of kindness, and by opportune consolation. - Let him inquire especially concerning the hidden needy; and let him consider how many souls live in sin because they do not have the means of living honorably, or of educating children (cf. n. 2247 and sqq.).

Note. The Roman Ritual warns that the pastor, besides the books of the baptized, of those joined in matrimony, and of the dead, should compose another book ON THE STATE OF SOULS, in which are consigned the names and condition of the individual inhabitants of the parish.

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 6. On The Correction Of Sheep

n. ¶2276.

- I. The PASTOR is held, both from the office which he bears, and from the stipend which he receives, TO CORRECT, even with danger of life, his SUBJECTS who are in mortal sin, or in its proximate danger; and to this he is held not only in their extreme necessity, but also in their GRAVE necessity, whenever hope of amendment shines forth.¹⁷ - But how gravely this obligation of correction urges can be gathered from the following threat of the Lord (Ezek. 33:8): "If you have not spoken, so that the wicked man may keep himself from his way, that wicked man shall die in his iniquity; but I will require his blood from your hand" (cf. n. 496, 3).

Hence, the Pastor is held to inquire and prudently correct those who live in sin: such as concubinaries, blasphemers, drunkards, those reading forbidden books or evil journals, those eating prohibited foods, those despising feasts, and especially those who do not satisfy the paschal precept. - Likewise, let him inquire concerning enmities and scandals which creep, especially between spouses, so that thus, as far as he can, he may meet them opportunely.¹⁸

Nor indeed for removing scandals and extirpating abuses do public corrections in church and salutary admonitions in the tribunal of Penance suffice: sometimes it is necessary that the pastor meet those sheep of his who follow a deviant life, and impel them by salutary admonitions to amendment of morals, as zeal and prudence shall suggest. Nor let him ever neglect to perform this office, because of human respect, before magnates; for someday he himself will render an account to the Supreme Judge for all the sheep committed to his care. - Recall what was said (n. 492 and sqq.) concerning fraternal correction.

n. ¶2277.

- II. The Pastor is held not only to take away sins and scandals from the midst, but also TO PREVENT those which afterward are foreseen as easily about to arise. - (Recall what was said n. 451; 824; 2256).

"If, all things having been weighed, both from the character of men, from the custom of the inhabitants, from the frequency of outsiders, and from other circumstances, the pious Pastor has known in the Lord that amendment cannot be hoped for even from repeated correction: rather than by voice, let him correct by his example and by his sufficiently open displeasure; lest at least he himself be heard badly by the other faithful, when they see the scandal continue, and the pastors, vexed by no trouble, no solicitude, but as if all things were prospering, live cheerfully, rejoicing as if by conniving."¹⁹

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. II, Ch. III, Art. III, § 7. On Solicitude For Promoting Good

n. ¶2278.

- The PASTOR ought not only to avert evil, but also TO PROMOTE good. To the point thus St. Alphonsus: "Good pastors," he says, "do not cease to exhort to frequency of the Sacraments and Congregations, to visits of the Most Holy Sacrament and of the divine Mother, to Novenas, to accompanying the Venerable One when Viaticum is carried about," and to other things of this kind.²⁰

Now, that the good may be PROMOTED more efficaciously: 1. "Let him very often take care that the people pursue with singular zeal devotion to Most Holy Mary, suggesting how great is her power and mercy toward her devoted ones.... Happy is that

pastor who keeps his sheep fervent toward devotion to Mary! for they, with the Virgin helping, will live rightly, and he himself at the end of life will have a powerful advocate."¹

"Let him especially suggest the use of petition: namely that they often commend themselves to God, especially by asking from him holy perseverance on account of the love of Jesus and Mary; explaining more often that divine graces, and especially the gift of perseverance, are not obtained unless they are asked: Ask and you shall receive. And let him often publish that great promise of Jesus Christ, that whatever we ask the Father in his name, the Father will give us (John 16:23). Let him also insistently suggest the use of mental prayer, and take care that it be made in church together with the people on any day, or at least on any feast-day; also teaching the manner in which it can be done at home."²
That the people may be enticed to sacred functions, let him especially TAKE CARE of these THREE things, namely: in the church, decency of furnishings; in singing, religious observance; in all ceremonies, diligence. For by these duly performed, as by signs, says Cardinal Bona, "the soul is stirred up to veneration of sacred things, the mind is elevated to heavenly things, piety is nourished, charity is fostered, faith increases, devotion is strengthened, the simpler are instructed."³
Let him bring much care to the sacred Sodalities of laymen, by stirring up their zeal, fostering their concord, and patiently sustaining them. For through Sodalities the worship of God is wonderfully increased and propagated⁴ (cf. n. 2254, 1, fin.).
Let him take altogether special care concerning schools, so that they be instituted and governed according to the Catholic norm, as far as can be done. Wherever he detects schools in which the faith or good morals of youth are endangered, he ought to warn parents that these cannot be frequented by their children, and that they themselves are stained with the guilt of true prevarication if they send their offspring into gymnasia infected with a plague of this sort. - Recall what was said n. 712.
"Before the rest, let him be of good example to his subjects. For the Pastor is that shining and burning lamp which is described in the Gospel, burning with holy zeal inwardly, and shining by good example outwardly. Otherwise let him preach, and warn others with all his strength, as much as he wishes, to walk through the paths of virtues; unless he himself goes before by example, his subjects will not even furnish faith to the things which he himself says: for men believe more by eyes than by ears."⁵

"Finally, on good pastors depend the good morals and salvation of peoples. If a good pastor is present in regions, there devotion, frequency of the Sacraments, mental prayer, and good example will be seen to flourish; but if the pastor is depraved, the whole region will overflow with vices and scandals."⁶

n. ¶2279.

- It is ASKED. What are the principal RIGHTS of the Pastor?

Resp. They are the following: 1. The right of administering the Sacraments, namely of baptizing, of hearing the confessions of his parishioners everywhere, of giving paschal Communion, of assisting at matrimony, and also of ministering Viaticum and Extreme Unction. - 2. Honorific rights: namely, the pastor in his own church precedes others even constituted in dignity; outside his own church pastors sit after the Clergy of the Cathedral Church; among themselves they precede by priority of assumption, but a perpetual pastor precedes one removable. - 3. Useful rights are the right of burying or of taking part in funerals, stole-rights, the right of receiving offerings.⁷ Concerning these, see the Canonists.

Scholium.

Pt. III, Ch. VIII, Section I. Of the Monstrosities called Leviathan and Social Contract · Pt. III, Ch. VIII, Section II. Of the theory that Civil Power is an aggregate formed by subscription of the powers of individuals · Pt. III, Ch. VIII, Section III. Of the true state of Nature, which is the state of civil society; and consequently of the Divine origin of Power · Pt. III, Ch. VIII, Section IV. Of the Variety of Polities

On Vicars And Vice-Pastors.

n. ¶2280.

- Of these some are perpetual curative Vicars, and these are equated with pastors: but others are temporary Vicars.

I. A CURATIVE Vicar is he who is canonically instituted by the Bishop in a parochial church, whose actual care he receives, independent from the primitive and habitual pastor, e.g. from a Chapter. - To him generally belong the very rights and offices of pastors, concerning which we have just spoken.⁸

n. ¶2281.

- II. TEMPORARY Vicars, who perform the duties of an absent or deceased pastor, are called stewards, vice-pastors, administrators, or substitutes, and are bound by the same obligations as the pastor himself; but if they help a present pastor, they are called coadjutors or vicars properly so called.⁹

Concerning these we NOTE: - 1. From the law of Trent (sess. 21, cap. 4, de Ref.) the pastor ought to join to himself as many Vicars or Coadjutors as suffice, after they have been approved or confirmed by the Bishop for this duty. - But at present, on account of the necessities of the times, the deputation and removal of vicars pertain in many places to the Bishop alone.

A Vicar, whether constituted by the pastor or by the Bishop, exercises care in the name of the pastor, and after his likeness. But he enjoys those faculties which the express will of the Bishop or pastor, or at least the usage and practice of places, determine.
The mutual relations between pastor and vicars ought to be ordered not so much by law as by charity. - There are especially two OFFICES of Vicars. One is diligent help in the care of souls: which is so understood that the pastor can always, if he wishes, perform by himself any ministerial acts whatever. - The other is obedience, by which they exercise the care of souls not separately, but conjointly with the pastor. But let Vicars always remember that they are inferiors and disciples of the pastors.

Note. Concerning Chaplains and Almoners, see the Canonists: e.g. Craisson, n. 1530 and sqq. - Ferraris, v. Capellanus.

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. III, Chapter I: On The Offices Of Those Who Are Over The Republic

n. ¶2283.

- Those who are over others, these Divine Wisdom itself gravely admonishes in this manner: "Give ear, you who contain multitudes, and please yourselves in the crowds of nations: because power has been given to you by the Lord, and strength by the Most High, who will interrogate your works, and search out your thoughts: because when you were ministers of his kingdom, you did not judge rightly, nor keep the law of justice, nor walk according to the will of God. Horribly and quickly he will appear to you: because a most hard judgment will be made for those who are over others. For mercy is conceded to the little one: but the powerful shall powerfully suffer torments" (Wis. 6:3-7).

This most grave admonition having been premised, behold what things seem to have to be said summarily both concerning the offices of PRINCES and of those who possess supreme power; and concerning the offices of LEGISLATORS and of those who are over some multitude.¹⁰

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article I: On The Offices Of Those In Whose Hands Is Supreme Power

n. ¶2284.

- A PRINCE and anyone marked with supreme power, according to the doctrine of the Apostle, "is the minister of God unto good." But since the good of human society is DOUBLE, namely spiritual or moral, and temporal, the following things must be established.

Principles. I. A PRINCE, and anyone ruling, is held TO FOSTER in those subject to him the sense of religion, and good morals. The reason is because, religion and fidelity toward God having been taken away, fidelity itself toward the prince collapses, and supreme power, without which no order in society can subsist, is necessarily brought into contempt. For civil life is defended by religion alone, and no force or human law can efficaciously impel an irreligious multitude to an honorable and truly upright tenor of life.¹¹

Therefore the Prince and whoever acts in his PLACE ought:

To furnish a good example in all those things which regard religion and honesty of morals; and since "the whole world is formed according to the example of the King," the leader of the people would stain himself with the enormous crime of prevarication if by his own evil example he induced those subject to him into contempt of religion and corruption of morals.
He ought to choose suitable counselors and ministers, whom doctrine and goodness of life make truly commendable, and first of all (if he possesses the right of election from the Holy See) good Bishops, and upright instructors of studious youth (cf. n. 2244 and 712).
He ought to use his power for the protection of religion and of the Church, not because he boldly arrogates ecclesiastical authority to himself, or decrees those things which regard faith and religion; but because he strives to be a help to the sacred Ministers to whom the care of the Church has been committed by Christ: by taking care that reverence be exhibited to the divine precepts and to men enrolled in the sacred militia, that public violations of divine law be prevented, that sowers of new religions be warded off, as also those evil books and journals by which damage is brought upon holy Faith and good morals. "For evil books," says St. Alphonsus, "plot ruin for kingdoms."¹² (cf. n. 451).

n. ¶2285.

- II. A PRINCE and anyone ruling is held TO PROVIDE for public felicity and security by just and opportune means. The reason is because public felicity or prosperity is the end of government, not indeed the primary end, but the secondary, according to that of Matthew: "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added to you." - Whence, a prince would sin if he placed over the republic ignorant and unskilled ministers, if he burdened subjects more than is equitable, if he did not protect them from enemies or unjust vexations¹³ (Recall what was said nn. 138, 147-150, 653, 729, 749, 873, 922, 965, 978, 983, 1188).

Note. Since St. Alphonsus depicts in few words the form of a good prince, it is helpful to transcribe his words here, especially because ALL who PRESIDE over a multitude or community to be ruled can take from it an example for imitating. - Behold the salutary words of the holy Doctor:¹⁴

A good Prince, for the exercise of good government, has God always present to himself, and he sets those things which regard the divine glory before all political reasons.
He abhors flatterers, and loves truthful men, and desires that this horror and love of his become known to all.
He uses equity toward all, every passion and party-zeal being removed.
He does not decree matters of greater moment except after a prior and serious inquiry.
In doubtful matters, he has recourse to the counsel of the prudent.
He is most cautious in selecting for himself wise and upright counselors.
Once counsel has been accepted which he judges to be good, he is wholly intent on this, that he execute the matter strongly, unless clear reasons supervene which persuade the contrary; for to change counsel with a just reason is not weakness of mind, but laudable prudence.
If he hears someone praised or accused, he is slow to believe, and weighs whether the reporter, moved by some advantage of his own, is incited to speak thus.

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article II: On The Offices Of Those In Whose Hands Is Legislative Power

n. ¶2286.

- Besides supreme governors, there concur for making laws or Decrees both Senators and Deputies (or Counselors) elected by the Prince or by the people in a representative Government, and the electors themselves. Wherefore we establish the following:

Principles. I. Those ELECTED to the office of MAKING LAWS are held to attend, not to what here and now pleases the prince or the multitude, but to what is just, and congruous with the common good of all. For civil law is not just because it is a fugitive decree of the will of the prince or of the people (as pleased certain innovators); but because it is a stable prescription, by which the supreme Power reasonably commands, prohibits, or establishes something, for the common temporal good of the citizens without detriment to spiritual good. - And what we say here concerning laws is valid, by a like reason, for Decrees and any Statutes whatsoever. (Recall what was said n. 153 sqq.) - Sometimes, however, Senators, Deputies, and Counselors can admit certain things less right (which are not intrinsically evil) and strengthen them by their vote, that worse things may be excluded; provided that they do this with a protestation of their right intention¹ (cf. n. 202).

Hence: - 1. Participants in legislative power SIN (for the most part gravely), if they do not bring due knowledge and diligence to so great an office; and most gravely indeed, if knowingly they lend their effort or assent to unjust laws or decrees. - Whence, it can happen that they are held to the reparation of damages. Indeed, theological fault and effective influence being supposed, whoever abstains from casting a vote is liable to restitution, when he ought to cast it by reason of the office which he freely accepted by quasi-contract, and by which he bound himself to protecting the public or private good. - Recall what was said n. 983 sqq. - Concerning excommunication, see n. 1320 sqq.

Those elected, or to be elected, if they are suitable for so great an office, and no other suitable persons are found, are held to subject themselves to election. And indeed, if someone is sometimes held to consult the good of private persons, how much more the good and safety of the whole community.²

n. ¶2287.

- II. Upon ELECTORS, in a legitimate government, there lies the grave office of ELECTING UPRIGHT Deputies, whether communal, or provincial, or political. - Whence, other circumstances being set aside, not only do positive cooperators sin, namely those who vote for evil men; but also negative cooperators, who by not concurring knowingly are the cause why evil men are elected; for from legal justice each one is held, insofar as he can, to avert evil from the republic, if any hope of averting it shines forth. But no one is ignorant how many and how great evils are brought into both religious and civil society by wicked Deputies, especially by those who are enrolled in the Masonic sect³ (cf. n. 989).

We have said in a legitimate government; for, if it is asked whether it is lawful, in a usurped kingdom, to vote in elections and to sit in an assembly of legislators, authors disagree. Some indeed affirm, especially if society is in extremities, and ruin threatens religion. - But others deny that it is right, because such concurrence cannot be furnished without scandal, nor without injustice, since to elect DEPUTIES and to exercise PUBLIC OFFICES is the same as to sustain the person of the usurper, to make laws with him, and to share the government. And hence it was that PIUS IX wholly disapproved a concurrence of this kind, especially for the Pontifical Dominion, in a Brief issued 29 January 1877, and already before in a Declaration made on 18 June 1874... Otherwise, however, if the question is only of electing municipal and provincial COUNSELORS; for these protect only the affairs of the Community, or the good of the Province, nor do they make laws, but they undergo them, not otherwise than the other citizens. - Finally others proceed by a middle way and teach more truly that account must be taken of places, persons, times, and circumstances, which, since they can be diverse, can also lead to diverse conclusions. Therefore with these we say: If, with the right of the legitimate prince preserved, grave damages can be averted from society, citizens have the right and the office of electing upright men, who may keep watch over the common good; if probable hope of promoting a greater good is lacking, it will be better to abstain from political concurrence; especially if the right of the legitimate prince would thereby be injured. But to define the matter belongs to the prince himself⁴ (cf. n. 150, q. 2).

n. ¶2288.

- IT IS ASKED. Whether it is lawful to elect an UNWORTHY man in order to exclude a MOST UNWORTHY man?

Resp. Some with Hurtado deny; for it is evil to will and to choose evil; and if evils are not to be done that goods may come about, a fortiori evils are not to be done that lesser evils may come about; for that is intrinsically evil, and prohibited by the law of nature. To this belongs that saying: "Let the world perish, but let justice be done." - Others with Lugo affirm; for it is lawful to take counsel for a lesser evil, that a greater may be avoided. And then an evil man is not properly chosen because he is evil or for evil; but he is chosen for this, that he may impede greater damages, which is good. And this cannot be said to be evil intrinsically and per se, since in the present case it has the character of good; for it is a diminution of evil. - Finally, others readily concede this, if not only is evil diminished by such an election, but some good is intended and hoped from the one to be elected, as if through him Catholics are able to obtain that liberty by which the evil enjoy themselves.⁵

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article III: On The Offices Of Those In Whose Hands Is Executive Power

n. ¶2289.

- To the present order chiefly pertain: 1. Ministers of princes, and Prefects of provinces; 2. Leaders of the military; 3. Syndics or rectors of communities. - Concerning each, a few things.

I. Concerning Ministers. - Standing between the prince and the people, MINISTERS owe to the prince truth and service in all things which look to good government; but to the people they owe the faithful and equitable execution of the common law. Whence they make themselves guilty of infidelity: 1) if they conceal from the prince, whose eyes and hands they are, those things the knowledge of which right administration requires for itself; 2) if they bring contempt or hatred of the government upon the people by vicious administration, whether by too great negligence or severity, or by injury to distributive justice in the application of the law, or in the distribution of burdens or favors; 3) if they execute commands certainly unjust. For where the injustice of the command is certain and grave, execution ought to be deferred, until the prince or Superior, having been reverently admonished, corrects the error. But if, admonished, he refuses to correct it, or if admonition is impossible, surely God must be obeyed, and not men.

And these same things, proportion being preserved, are valid concerning Prefects of provinces, concerning delegates to foreign princes, and concerning all other ministers of the executive Power.

n. ¶2290.

- II. Concerning leaders of the military. Leaders of the military, besides suitable KNOWLEDGE and SKILL, which they are held to acquire and to have, are bound by several other obligations, both toward the prince and toward the soldiers.⁶

Toward the Prince (and the nation), they ought to preserve inviolate FIDELITY and JUSTICE. - Whence, they cannot desert military service, especially in time of war, except by the consent of the prince. They are held to fight strongly; they would be perjured if they fled over to the enemies, or entered clandestine counsels with them. - They would sin against justice by pretending absent soldiers to be present, or by retaining the pay of dead soldiers.
Toward soldiers, as good fathers of families they ought to keep watch that nothing be lacking to them, whether as to soul, or as to body: let them impede, as far as it can be done, single combats, drunkennesses, quarrels, impurities, thefts. They sin gravely if, without necessity, they prescribe military exercises on Sundays and feast days, especially at the hour of Mass; for they impede the soldiers from performing the principal duty of religion. - Likewise, they sin gravely if they rashly enter battle, or expose the life of soldiers without a just cause. Recall what was said concerning Duel and War (n. 745 sqq.).

n. ¶2291.

- III. Concerning Syndics. "The Syndics of Communities, and their assistants, have their obligations, and indeed most grave ones; since they have been deputed by law as rectors and guardians of Communities, namely that they may protect their goods and rights and the observance of laws, if these are just. - Therefore, they sin gravely and are held concerning damages, if, acceptors of persons, they choose unsuitable men for public offices; if they do not restrain the wicked; if, when able, they do not impede scandals; if they squander the goods of the Community; if they hold the things which belong to religion as almost nothing; and coerce its free exercise, pervert rights, or furnish assistance to those who usurp them.

Concerning these things, sometimes, though prudently, public administrators are to be questioned by the confessor; for not rarely such men confess, as it is said, the sins of Charles, and are silent about the sins of Caesar: that is, they confess the things which they committed as private persons, not those which they perpetrated as deputed to public offices.⁷ - This the Most Holy Lord, Our Lord Pope LEO XIII specifically reproves, solemnly declaring:⁸ "it is not lawful to follow one form of duty privately, another publicly, namely so that the authority of the Church is observed in private life, and rejected in public. For this would be to join honorable and base things, and to make a man fight with himself, whereas, on the contrary, he ought always to be consistent with himself, and in no matter nor in any kind of life to fall away from Christian virtue."

But here the more general question, and one especially useful for practice, comes to be treated:

n. ¶2292.

- QUESTION. WHETHER A PRAETOR, or another PREFECT of the republic, can sometimes commit an UNJUST LAW to execution?

Resp. By reason of obtaining a greater good, or avoiding a greater evil, the execution of an unjust law sometimes becomes lawful. But for this it is required: 1) that the object of the law not be intrinsically evil; 2) that the one injured in his own right, because an unjust law is observed, can and wishes to assent to the injury of his right, or at least that, with the order of charity so commanding, he is not reasonably unwilling.

Wherefore: 1. It is not lawful for the praetor or judge to urge the application of an unjust law, if its execution has been committed to their discretion.

If any law is opposed to the rights and liberty of the Church, its execution, when the Church contradicts in the particular case, can in no way whatever be urged, not even under the pretext of obtaining a greater good, or avoiding a greater evil, since the Church alone is judge of those things which are more fitting for herself.
If the execution of an unjust law becomes a little harmful to some third party, but its neglected application very harmful to the praetor or judge, the law can be urged: especially if the damage to the third party cannot be avoided, because, one praetor failing, another will not be lacking who will furnish his effort (cf. n. 526).

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 5 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART SECOND: ON THE STATE …, Ch. II, ARTICLE II: ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF PASTORS

n. ¶1138.

- A Pastor, once canonically constituted, enjoys ordinary jurisdiction over the people entrusted to him, and without a new approbation of the Bishop has the right to perform all parochial duties. Therefore no Cleric, except the Bishop and his Vicar general and their delegates, can licitly perform any sacred functions at all, at least in his church, without his express or reasonably presumed consent.

On account of the various statutes which are in force in our ecclesiastical Provinces or even in the diverse dioceses of the same Province, it is not easy to say precisely how far the rights of those who among us are placed over districts divided after the likeness of parishes extend. Wherefore let it suffice here to note those things which until now have been held as the almost common opinion concerning all dioceses. - The jurisdiction of absolutely all priests laboring among us in the Sacred Ministry has been held as delegated, not ordinary. - To Rectors of Congregations divided as above are attributed parochial or quasi-parochial rights.¹ - But what obligations correspond to those rights, both in the Rectors of other Congregations and in either priests cooperating in the same Congregation or the faithful, will have to be judged partly from the Plenary Council of Baltimore II,² partly from Provincial and Diocesan statutes. - As to the Province of San Francisco, see (f) p. 471.

Moreover, if you except the obligation of offering the Sacrifice for the sheep, concerning which n. 1139. II, it is certain that they are bound toward their Congregation by the same obligations by which Pastors are bound toward their parish. - Moreover:

Pastors, like Bishops, are chiefly held to residence; prayer; preaching; administration of the Sacraments; correction of the sheep; visitation of the sick and of the parish.

n. ¶1139.

- I. As to residence. The Pastor is bound to residence, because when he accepted the administration of the Congregation, he obligated himself to consult the salvation of souls and to procure it according to his strength. - Council of Trent.³ - St. Alphonsus.⁴

The Pastor must dwell in the presbyteral domicile, or, if this is lacking, in his own house within the boundaries of the Congregation, so that he can easily be approached, and he himself not be impeded in fulfilling the duty of residence. But that the duty of residence may be satisfied, he must not only be present in body, but also serve the Congregation himself personally, or through coadjutors.

Yet they can, if they obtain leave from the Ordinary, be absent for a just cause for that space of time and under those conditions which are determined by diocesan statutes or by the judgment of the Bishop. But for one or another day they will be able to be absent without special permission for a cause which seems legitimate to them, provided they have, or know, to whom the sheep committed to them can have recourse in necessity.

II. As to prayer. The Pastor is held, as the Bishop is, to offer the Sacrifice for the parish on feast days and Sundays, as will be clear from things to be said concerning the Eucharist, n. 1322. But this obligation does not exist as to our quasi-pastors or Missionaries (unless they are truly over parishes), although it befits them to show this office of charity to the sheep.¹ Likewise he is held to pray frequently for his sheep, that he may implore for himself and for his subjects the graces necessary for salvation and heavenly blessings. (f) p. 471.

Besides, the Pastor must take care that all learn to pray, that they pray well, and teach their own to pray.³

Moreover let our priests note the following statute of our Plenary Council of Baltimore I. "If ... sometime on account of public calamities or necessities it should seem good that prayers be recited in the vernacular language in assemblies of the faithful, let this be done only when the Ordinary so establishes, and let only that formula of praying be used which he himself has prescribed. The same we establish also concerning days designated by the civil Magistrate for giving thanks. For on these days we wish ecclesiastical ceremonies to be had only when the Ordinary commands; but if they are celebrated, let them be performed according to the norm established by the rubrics."⁴

n. ¶1140.

- III. As to preaching. Pastors are held rather often to speak words to the people, to nourish it with salutary food, at least on each Sunday and on each greater Feast.

Therefore Pastors who abstain from preaching for a notable time sin gravely. But by many a notable time is held to be if through one whole and continuous month, or through three months not continuous, or divided in the year, they do not preach by themselves or by another.¹ Nor do those satisfy the obligation who do not strive to accommodate preaching to the capacity of the hearers.

Under the name of preaching here do not come sermons perfected and elaborated by much and subtle art, filled with elegances, and committed to memory; for although these sermons are useful and sometimes necessary, nevertheless for the most part a Pastor giving sermons of this kind would in no way satisfy his duty, because according to Trent he must teach those things which are more necessary, and in a manner more useful and more accommodated to the greatest part of the hearers. Nor are those less to be reproved who, with no preparation applied, pour out whatever comes into the mouth, without order, clarity, piety, and zeal. These disfigure the word of God and create nausea and disgust in the hearers. - Thus all.

But the Pastor who reads pious books to the hearers does not fulfill his duty of preaching, because reading is not preaching; unless someone is so weak of memory that he cannot do otherwise: but then from time to time he must take care that sermons be had for the people through another, or he must notify the Bishop of the impediment.

Moreover let the preacher consider those most wise admonitions which the Plenary Council of Baltimore II hands down concerning his office, and of which this is the summary.

1° Let him teach, a) "the motives and frequent practice of acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition; the dispositions required for receiving the Sacraments usefully; the vices which it is necessary to avoid, and the virtues which it is proper to follow";² b) "those heads of Catholic doctrine ... which heretics and unbelievers, especially of this region and time, either obstinately deny, or call into doubt, or, according to the most inept genius of this age, attack by jokes and mockery rather than by arguments."³

2° In relating miracles and prodigies let him use the greatest prudence, and avoid foolish fables, although it is proper to mix examples with precepts.⁴

3° Let him not abuse sacred place and time for avenging a private injury.⁵

4° Let him mix nothing of daily, civil, or political events with sacred doctrine.¹

5° On the occasion of funerals let him not extol the dead person with immoderate praises, nor speak of all indiscriminately as already received into heaven or soon to be received.²

6° Concerning his stipends, of whatever kind, on the occasion of a sermon or under any other pretext, from the pulpit or from the place of the altar, let him not make words too often.³

7° Let him not easily condemn certain things as lethal sins which are not certainly such.⁴

n. ¶1141.

- IV. As to the administration of the Sacraments. Pastors are held to minister the Sacraments personally, not only when the time of precept and of grave necessity is pressing, but also, as regards the Sacraments which can be repeated, as often as the sheep duly, or not inopportunely, ask, unless they are legitimately impeded, or can provide for those asking through another without inconvenience and offense. See several other things on this obligation in the Treatise de Sacram. in genere, n. 1225 sq.

V. As to correction. The Pastor is held to correct subjects living in mortal sin or in proximate danger of mortal sin, even with danger of life, if nevertheless some hope of amendment seems to shine forth and it is a question of their grave spiritual necessity. He must also, insofar as he can, remove or prevent scandals with due prudence, by himself or through others, directly or indirectly, by command, counsel, exhortation, prayers, etc. - Thus commonly, and indeed more probably from justice, namely by reason of the stipend which they receive from the Congregation, not from charity only.⁵

Then Pastors must solicitously provide for the spiritual good of subjects, according to that saying of the Apostle:⁶ He who rules, in solicitude. Therefore they must investigate the morals of parishioners, correct delinquents, sustain those who are wavering, and strive that all fulfill their obligations, always keeping in memory that they at some time will have to render an account for their souls. But especially, according to the admonitions of the Plenary Council of Baltimore II, let them most sharply and often reprove the sluggishness of Catholic parents who do not take care that infants be immediately fortified by the Sacrament of Baptism; let them restrain the reading of wicked newspapers; with ardent and gentle zeal let them lead back to truth those wandering from the Church; let them take care by every means to commend the observance of Sundays and feast days; let them put every effort into eliminating the vice of drunkenness; let them turn the faithful away from theaters and stage-plays; let them attack and condemn immodest dances; let them procure missions for their sheep; let them turn the faithful away from secret societies.¹ - They are also held to provide for deaf-mutes in the better way in which they can, by taking care that they be instructed at least in those things which must be known by necessity of means, in the precepts of the Decalogue, etc. Those most unhappy persons are exposed to the greatest peril in non-Catholic institutes. - On the office of the Pastor as to schools and catechesis, see n. 440. 3°. - As to visitation of the sick, see the things to be said at the end of the Treatise on Extreme Unction.

n. ¶1142.

- As to the visitation of Parishioners, a certain more recent Council has these things.

"Because, as Christ Himself says, the good Pastor knows his sheep and calls them by name, therefore the Pastor must know the faithful committed to him. Therefore let him not neglect this custom, so salutary, of visiting at certain times the individual families of his parish; and let him fulfill this duty with gravity and modesty together, and also with singular charity. For although he must abstain from every useless running about through the parish, nevertheless let him not judge that he has satisfied his office if, shut up at home, he waits for the parishioners to come to him. Indeed always, but especially in these times, this precept of the Lord has force: Go to the sheep which have perished of the house of Israel."

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 2 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the Fourth Precept of t…, Ch. III, Article IV. On the Obedience and Reverence of Citizens toward Temporal Authority

n. 261.

From natural law and positive divine law we are held by the title of piety to render reverence and obedience to our civil superiors. For they bear the place of God himself in the temporal order toward us. Thus indeed the Apostle to the Romans xiii, 1 and following: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers. For there is no power except from God, and those which are, have been ordained by God. Therefore he who resists the power, resists the ordinance of God. But those who resist acquire damnation for themselves. For he (the Prince) is the minister of God, an avenger unto wrath to him who does evil. Therefore be subject of necessity, not only on account of wrath, but also on account of conscience."

For this reason the Catechism of the Council of Trent compares and joins this obligation with that by which we are bound toward paternal and ecclesiastical authority. For in part III, on the fourth commandment, § 15, after it has taught that parents and ecclesiastical superiors are to be honored, it adds: "Likewise concerning Kings, Princes, Magistrates, and the rest to whose power we are subject. For if we attribute any honor to them, it is referred to God; for an excellent degree of dignity has the veneration of men, because it is like divine power: in which also we venerate the providence of God, who attributed to them the administration of public office, and uses them as ministers of his power." - I Pet. ii, 15. - St. Justin, Apol. I, 17. - St. Augustine, on Ps. 124, n. 7; de Civitate Dei, lib. V, 10, 11, 14, 15.

"But now a society can neither exist nor be understood in which someone does not moderate the wills of individuals, so that one thing may be made, as it were, out of many, and impel them rightly and in order toward the common good; therefore God willed that in civil society there should be those who would command the multitude. And that also has great force, that those by whose authority the republic is administered ought to be able to compel citizens to obey in such a way that it is plainly a sin for them not to obey. But no man has in himself or from himself that by which he can constrain the free will of others with bonds of this kind of command. That power belongs only to God, creator and legislator of all things: those who exercise it must necessarily exercise it as communicated to them by God. ... From which it will be necessary for citizens to be subject and obedient to princes as to God, not so much from fear of punishments as from reverence for majesty, nor for the sake of flattery, but from conscience of duty." - Leo XIII, Diuturnum illud.

Hence the response is also clear to the question: Can there ever be for citizens a cause for not obeying? "That one cause exists for men not to obey, if something is demanded by them which openly conflicts with natural or divine right: for in all things in which the law of nature or the will of God is violated, it is equally wicked to command and to do. Therefore if it should happen to someone that he is compelled to choose one of the two, namely either to neglect the commands of God or those of princes, Jesus Christ must be obeyed, who commands rendering the things that are Caesar's to Caesar, and the things that are God's to God." - Nor are citizens therefore to be accused of having cast off authority: "for if the will of princes fights with the will of God and his laws, they exceed the measure of their power, and pervert justice, nor then can their authority have force, since, where justice is not present, it is null." Diuturnum illud.

Legislation is the work of men who are clothed with power and who in fact govern the state. Whence it follows in practice that the character of laws depends on the character of these men more than on the virtue of that power. Laws, namely, will be either good or evil according as the legislators themselves are imbued with good or evil principles, and allow themselves to be led by prudence or passion. Therefore one must resist by any legal and honorable means the abuse of legislation: laws hostile to God and religion are in no way to be approved; indeed they are to be disapproved by all prudent men.

n. 262.

Generally citizens enjoying the right of suffrage are held to use that right duly. The reason is that each one according to his strength is held to impede evils and to promote good things. The Sacred Penitentiary, December 1, 1866, responded that nothing stands in the way of Bishops and Ordinaries, on the occasion of elections, whenever they shall have been required for this, recalling to the mind of the people that each one of the faithful according to his strength is held to impede evils and to promote good things. "Is it not the duty of each Catholic to use the political arms which are in his hand for defending [the Church], for containing political systems within their own dominion and compelling them, after they have rendered to the Church what is owed to her, for the rest to leave her quiet?" - Pius X, Encycl. Letter Notre Charge Apostolique - cf. Scavini. The precept of electing upright deputies, whether municipal or political, presses upon all electors in every legitimate government and, other circumstances being excluded, not only do those sin who give suffrage to bad men, but also those who by not taking part are the cause that bad men are elected by others: each one is held to avert evil from the republic, if there is hope.

But how great evils and how great good things come to the state when laws are made by enemies of the Church, or by her friends, history testifies. Besides, the present condition of things, to be lamented in many regions, is derived from the fact that Catholics remained idle in political action. Now this obligation of using one's right in many cases can be grave, namely if on one side the danger of grave harm is imminent and on the other side suffrage seems likely to be efficacious. It must be noted that political leaders greatly fear votes; and they desire that these be given for themselves. And although it is not of itself a grave sin not to vote, if the bad party undoubtedly has the greater number, certainly one must not therefore abstain from voting: for the action and voting of good men gradually takes away the security of bad men, and instills anxiety in them; and thus they will not always perpetrate the same graver evils by making iniquitous laws. Yet if it is certain that the evil to come from the influence of this candidate is grave, and it is doubtful whether even my action and voting can decide the matter, it seems that in such a case it must be said that I sin gravely by omitting suffrage. Namely individual good men in this hypothesis are held to bring help and procure the election of good men. "An obligation," says Palmieri, "is present: but unless it affects individuals, in reality there will be none." - Op. Th. Mor., tract. IX, n. 640, v. 4, ed. III.

Therefore, whenever citizens give their votes in public assemblies: "favor is to be given to men of proved virtue, who will merit well of the Christian name." - Leo XIII, Sapientiae Christianae.

But if someone gives votes to an unworthy man about to act against the Church or good morals, precisely for this end, that an iniquitous law may be made, he sins gravely. In general, when my cooperation directly and certainly has influence upon such evils so that without it these things would not occur, my cooperation is formal. Yet this case will be rare, but must not be called impossible.

But if an election is to be made between a notable enemy of the Church and another who is at least less unworthy, suffrage must be given to this one, since he is going to do less evil, and so by your action you avoid the greater evil; indeed you can also act publicly to obtain his election.

It must especially be taken care that the leaders themselves of the district, of the city, as they are called, are ruled by true principles. For these exercise the greatest influence and not rarely by their work decide the election. Therefore just as these can much more easily sin gravely than ordinary electors, so also they can more easily promote the good.

The law concerning not buying or selling votes seems to be penal, for there is no proportion between penalty and fault. This notwithstanding, he who sells his vote not rarely incurs a sufficiently great danger of infamy, which renders him and his own people wretched. Voluntarily to undergo such a danger appears to us to be a grave fault. But if one political party simply and obstinately buys votes, certainly those introducing this abuse sin gravely; nor is it remarkable if the other party, as if compelled, does the same, otherwise one and the same worse party will always occupy the highest magistracies. It matters much that the electorate be pure, and all things are to be done for obtaining this end; nevertheless it is wicked to say that justice is gravely violated by the fact that here and there an elector holds his vote for sale. Therefore he would not be compelled to restore the price.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 7 passages

Tr. VII, Disputation I: On States, …, Question I: What a state is, and of how many kinds

n. 62.

I ASSERT fifth, that there ought also to be in the Church the power of spiritual governance, to which even secular Princes obey. This I treated more broadly p. p. tract. 1. in the proemial disputations, and I shall treat again part 3 of the Tract. on Penance, in the disputation on the power of the keys.

n. 63.

Of this Anacletus treats epist. 1., Alexand. I. epist. 1., Pope Gelas. epist. 4. ad Anastasium, Imperatorem, and it is reported 96. dist. can.: There are indeed two, Emperor Augustus, by which this world is ruled, the royal authority, and the authority of Pontiffs.

n. 64.

YOU OBJECT first. The Apostle 1 Cor. 14. wishes all to prophesy, and to speak with tongues: and 2. Cor. 6. he speaks to all in the same sense.

n. 65.

It is answered, that he wishes all indeed to be made fit, yet not without approbation. So D. Bonavent. ad 9. Lucae: but the approbation resides with the Roman Pontiff, and the Bishops, as the Council of Trent also declares.

n. 66.

YOU OBJECT second. In the primitive Church Bishops, and Priests were not distinguished, as D. Hieron. asserts in cap. 3. epist. ad Titum, where he says: this difference was introduced not so much by the dispensation of divine truth, as by the custom of the Church.

n. 67.

I SUPPOSE D. Jerome acknowledged the difference between Bishops, and Priests, as is clear from epist. ad Evagrium, and Francis Turrianus proves lib. 1. de Hierarchicis ordinationibus, who observes that D. Jerome in the place cited said only that the same person was Bishop, and priest, because they were few; therefore the Bishop fulfilled the office also of a Parish priest, etc. But afterward Bishops, and priests were constituted separately, and the other orders dispersed variously, as the Saintly Doctor also answers in 4. dist. 24. q. 1. ad 3. art. 2.

n. 68.

CASTRO verb. Episcopus admits no exposition of this, but makes D. Jerome err. This is altogether absurd to me, since D. Jerome was counsellor to Pope Damasus, at the time when all the ancient statutes of the Church were best known in that court, as the Saintly Doctor observes serm. 16. Hexaëmer. For who will tell me that Jerome did not know that Timothy was declared Bishop above the priests by Paul 1. cap. 5., and that from that Aërius was condemned, because he denied this pre-eminence, as is had in D. Augustine lib. de haeres. cap. 53.? Or who will say that Jerome, most skilled in the Greek tongue, did not know the etymology of Episcopus from Epi, which is above? as D. Bonavent. teaches 4. dist. 24. part. 2. art. 2. quaest. 3.

Rickaby, Moral Philosophy

Joseph Rickaby, S.J. — 99 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Thomas Hobbes, than whom never was greater genius for riding an idea, right or wrong, to the full length that it will go, was born in 1588: and notwithstanding his twelve pipes of tobacco daily, his vigorous constitution endured to his ninety-second year. The first half of his life fell in with the age of the greatest predominance of Calvinism. In religion he was scarcely a Calvinist, indeed he laboured under a suspicion of atheism: but his philosophy is accurately cast in the mould of the grim theology of Geneva. We may call it the philosophy of Calvinism. It has for its central tenet, that human nature either was from the first, or is become, bad, "desperately wicked," depraved, corrupt, and utterly abominable, so that whatever is natural to man, in so far forth as it is natural, is simply evil. The remedy for our evil nature Hobbes finds in no imputed merits of a Redeemer, no irresistible victorious grace, but in the masterful coercion of a despotic civil power. But, lest any one should suspect that there was at least this good in man, a propensity to civil society and obedience to the rulers of cities, Hobbes insists that man is by nature wholly averse to society with his kind: that the type of the race is an Ishmael, "a wild man, his hand against all men, and all men's hands against him:" in fact that the state of nature is a state of war all round. He writes (Leviathan, c. xiii.): "Men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets on himself; and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which among them that have no common power to keep them quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners by damage, and from others by the example…. Hereby it is manifest, that during the time that men live without a power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man…. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth: no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea: no commodious building: no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force: no knowledge of the face of the earth: no account of time: no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short…. To this war of every man against every man this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power there is no law: where no law, no injustice…. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct, but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it."

Such is what Hobbes is pleased to call "the natural condition of mankind," a condition which man would have every natural reason for getting out of with all speed, were he ever so unhappy as to fall into it. It is true that, apart from civil government, violence would reign on earth. But it is not true that to live apart from civil government is the natural condition of mankind. It is not true that the only motive which draws men into civil society is the fear of violence, as though there were no such facts and exigencies of human nature as sympathy, friendship, intellectual curiosity, art, religion. It is not true that the one reason for the existence of the civil power consists in this, that without the restraining hand of the magistrate men would bite and devour one another. Lastly, it is not true that all rights, notably rights of property, are the creation of the State. A man is a man first and a citizen afterwards. As a man, he has certain rights actual and potential (c. v., s. i., p. 244): these the State exists, not to create, for they are prior to it in the order of nature, but to determine them, where indeterminate, to sanction and to safeguard them.

Natural rights go before legal rights, and are presupposed to them, as the law of nature before that law which is civil and positive. It is an "idol of the tribe" of lawyers to ignore all law but that upon which their own professional action takes its stand.

"In considering man as he must have come from the hands of nature," writes Jean Jacques Rousseau, "I behold an animal less strong than some, less active than others, but upon the whole in organism having the advantage of them all. I behold him appeasing his hunger under an oak, slaking his thirst in the first brook, finding a bed at the foot of the same tree that furnished his repast, and there you have all his cravings satisfied." (Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité.) This noble savage—quite a contrast to Hobbes's ruffian primeval, "nasty, brutish," and short-lived—observes and imitates the industry, and gradually raises himself to the instinct, of the beasts among whom he lives. His constitution is robust, and almost inaccessible to malady. He attains to old age, free from gout and rheumatism. He surpasses the fiercest wild beasts in address as much as they surpass him in strength, and so arrives to dwell among them without fear. Yet withal he is distinguished from brutes by freewill and perfectibility, qualities which gradually draw him out of his primeval condition of tranquil innocence, lead him through a long course of splendours and errors, of vices and virtues, and end by making him a tyrant at once over nature and over himself.

Rousseau's life, 1715-1778, was a continual protest against the formalism, affectation, pedantry and despotism of the age of the Bourbons. His ideal of man was the unconventional, unconstrained, solitary, but harmless and easy-going savage. Hobbes was the growth of a sterner and more serious age. The only reality to him in heaven and on earth was force: his one idea in philosophy was coercion. Human nature to him was an embodiment of brute violence ever in need of violent restraint. Rousseau, an optimist, saw nothing but good in man's original nature: to the pessimist mind of Hobbes all was evil there. Neither of them saw any natural adaptation to social life in the human constitution. To live in society was, in both their views, an artificial arrangement, an arbitrary convention. But Hobbes found in the intolerable evils of a state of nature an excellent reason why men should quit it for the unnatural condition of citizens. Rousseau found no reason except, as he says, quelque funeste hasard. The problem for Hobbes stood thus: how men, entering society, might be "cribbed, cabined, and confined" to the utmost in order to keep down their native badness. Rousseau's concern was, how one might so become a citizen as yet to retain to the full the delightful liberty of a tropical savage. Hobbes's solution is the Leviathan, Rousseau's the Social Contract. The prize, we think, rests with the Englishman: but the reader shall judge.

And first of the Social Contract. Rousseau proposes "to find a form of association which shall defend and protect with all the strength of the community the person and the goods of each associate, and whereby each one, uniting himself to all, may nevertheless obey none but himself and remain as free as before." (Contrat Social, i. 6.) This proposal is hopeless, it is a contradiction in terms. No man can contract and remain as free as before, but he binds himself either under a wider obligation to do or abstain, where he was not bound before, or under a stronger obligation where he was bound already. Nevertheless Rousseau finds a means of accomplishing the impossible and the self-contradictory. "Each of us puts into a common stock his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general will; and we receive in our turn the offering of the rest, each member as an inseparable part of the whole. Instantly, instead of the private person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly has voices, which body receives by this same act its unity, its common Ego, its life and its will." (ib.) This awful signing away of all your rights, so that your very personality is merged in that of the community—a self-renunciation going far beyond that of profession in any religious order—ought certainly, as Rousseau says, to be "the most voluntary act in the world;" and he adds the characteristic reason: "every man being born free and master of himself, none can, under any pretence whatsoever, subject him without his own consent." (Contrat Social, iv. 2.) Then you ask: When have I made this large contract by the most voluntary act in the world? Rousseau replies: "When the State is instituted, consent is in residing." (ib.) But, you reply, my residence is anything but the most voluntary act in the world: it would be awkward for me to emigrate; and if I did emigrate, it would only be to some other State: I cannot possibly camp out and be independent in the woods, nor appease my hunger under an oak. To this plea Rousseau quite gives in, remarking that "family, goods, the want of an asylum, necessity, violence, may keep an inhabitant in the country in spite of himself; and in that case his mere sojourn no longer supposes his consent to the contract." (ib.) Then none of us have made the contract, for we have never had the option of living anywhere except in some State.

Hobbes, after laying down the necessity of men combining for protection against mutual injustice, observes that a mere promise or agreement not to injure any one will not suffice: "for the agreement of men is by covenant only, which is artificial; and therefore no wonder if there be something else required besides covenant to make their agreement constant and lasting, which is a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit." He continues: "The only way to erect such a common power … is to confer all their power and strength upon one man or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person; and every one to own, and to acknowledge himself to be the author of, whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act or cause to be acted in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent or concord,—it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise, and give up my right of governing myself to this man or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a commonwealth, in Latin civitas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god, to whom we owe under the immortal God our peace and defence." (Leviathan, c. xvii.) This idea of all the rights and personalities of the individuals who contract to live socially being fused and welded together into the one resultant personality and power of the State, has evidently been borrowed by Rousseau from Hobbes. We shall deal with the idea presently. Meanwhile several points claim our notice.

The hideous piece of cynicism whereby Rousseau (Contrat Social, iv. 2), after promising you that, if you join his commonwealth, you shall obey none but yourself, then goes on to tell you that you obey yourself in obeying the will of the majority, even when it puts you in irons or leads you to death—because as a citizen you have once for all renounced your own will, and can only wish what the majority wishes,—has its root in the position of Hobbes, that "every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth." (Leviathan, c. xxi.)

n. 8.

A real and important difference between the Leviathan and the Social Contract, is that Hobbes (c. xix.) allows various distributions of sovereign power, but prefers monarchy: Rousseau (l. ii., c. i.) will have it that sovereignty is vested inalienably in the people: of which doctrine more to follow.

n. 9.

Men are by nature equal, say Rousseau and Hobbes and many more respectable authors. Yes, in their specific nature, that is, they are all equally men. Similarly you have it that all triangles are equal, if that is a proposition of any value. But men as individuals are not all equal. One is stronger in body, another more able in mind: one predisposed to virtue, another to vice: one born in affluence and honour, another in squalor. Not men in the abstract, but living men, start at different points of vantage, and the distance between them widens as they run the race of life. We may lay it down as an axiom, in diametric opposition to Rousseau, that inequalities are natural, equalities artificial.

n. 10.

Man is born free: so opens the first chapter of the Contrat Social. If free of all duties, then void of all rights (c. v., s. i., nn. 5, 7, pp. 246, 247): let him then be promptly knocked on the head as a sacrifice to Malthas; and with the misformed children born in Plato's Republic, "they will bury him in a secret and unseen spot, as is befitting."

n. 11.

Hobbes and Rousseau go upon this maxim, which has overrun the modern world, that no man can be bound to obedience to another without his own consent. The maxim would be an excellent one, were men framed like the categories of Aristotle—substance, quantity, quality, relation, and the rest—each peering out of his own pigeon-hole, an independent, self-sufficient entity. But men are dependent, naturally dependent whether they will or no, every human being on certain definite others,—the child on the parent, the citizen on the State whose protection he enjoys, and all alike on God. These natural dependences carry with them natural uncovenanted obediences,—to parents, filial duty—to country, loyalty—to God, piety: all which are embraced in the Latin term pietas. (See St. Thomas, 2a 2æ, q. 101, art. 1, in corp.) The fatal maxim before us is the annihilation of pietas. In lieu of loyal submission we get a contract, a transaction of reasoned commercial selfishness between equal and equal. This perverse substitution has called forth Leo XIII.'s remark on the men of our time, "Nothing comes so amiss to them as subjection and obedience," Nihil tam moleste ferunt quam subesse et parere. (Encyclical on Christian Marriage.)

n. 12.

The common extravagance of the Leviathan and the Social Contract is the suppression of the individual, with his rights and his very personality, which is all blended in the State. (See Rousseau's words above quoted, n. 5, and those of Hobbes, n. 6.) The reservations in favour of the individual made by Hobbes, Leviathan, c. xxi., and by Rousseau, Contrat Social, l. ii., c. iv., are either trifles or self-contradictions. But it is not in man's power by any contract thus to change his nature, so as to become from autocentric heterocentric (c. ii., s. i., n. 2, p. 203; c. v., s. i., n. 1, p. 244), from a person a thing, from a man a chattel, void of rights and consequently of duties, and bound to serve this Collective Monster, this Aggregated Idol, with the absolute devotedness that is due to God alone. The worship of the new Moloch goes well with the dark misanthropism of Hobbes: but in Rousseau, the believer in the perfect goodness of unrestrained humanity, it is about the most glaring of his many inconsistencies. It is of course eagerly taken up by the Socialists, as carrying all their conclusions. It is the political aspect of Socialism.

Reading.—Burke, Warren Hastings, Fourth Day, the passage beginning, "He have arbitrary power!"

Pt. III, Ch. VIII, Section II. Of the theory that Civil Power is an aggregate formed by subscription of the powers of individuals

The Greeks had a name [Greek: eranos], which meant a feast where the viands were supplied by each guest contributing in kind. If, in a party of four, one man brought a ham, another a rabbit, a third a dish of truffles, and a fourth a salmon, no one would expect that, when the cover was raised, there should appear a pigeon-pie. That would not be in the nature of an [Greek: eranos]. Now not only Hobbes and Rousseau, but Locke and a great multitude of modern Englishmen with him, hold that the power of the State is an aggregate, the algebraic sum of the powers whereof the component members would have stood possessed, had they lived in what is called, by a misleading phrase, "the state of nature," that is, the condition of men not subject to civil authority. These powers,—either, as Hobbes and Rousseau virtually say, all of them, or, as Locke and the common opinion has it, only some of them, —men are supposed to resign as they enter into the State. If therefore there appears in the City, Nation, State, or Commonwealth, a certain new and peculiar power, which belongs to no individual in the "state of nature," or, as I prefer to call it, the extra-civil state, then what we may designate as the Aggregation Theory breaks down, and another origin must be sought of civil principality. But there is such a power in the State, new and peculiar, and not found in any of the component individuals: it is the power and authority to punish on civil grounds. It is the right of the rods and axes, that were borne before the Roman magistrate. It is, in its most crucial form, the right to punish with death.

We are not here concerned with proving the existence of this right. It is generally admitted: we assume it accordingly, and shall prove it later on. Nor are we concerned with domestic punishment, inflicted by the head of a family within his own household, for the good of that household, stopping short of any irreparable harm to the sufferer. (St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 65, art. 2, ad. 2.) Leaving this aside, we say, and have proved already, that one private individual has no right to punish another, neither medicinally for the amendment of the delinquent, nor by way of deterrent for the good of the community, nor in the way of retribution for his own satisfaction. He has the right of self-defence, but not of punishment: the two things are quite different. He may also exact restitution, where restitution is due: but that again is not punishing. If he is in the extra-civil state, he may use force, where prudence allows it, to recover what he has lost. This right of private war really is surrendered by the individual, when the State is established: but war and punishment are two totally different ideas. Subjects are punished: war is levied on independent powers. (Ethics, c. ix., s. iii., nn. 4-6, pp. 171-174; Natural Law, c. ii., s. ii., n. 6, p. 212.)

Opposite is the opinion of Locke, who writes:

"The execution of the law of nature is in that state [of nature] put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain, if there were nobody that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law." We observe that the punishment of offenders against the law of nature, as such, belongs to the Legislator, who is God alone. Certainly it is well, nay necessary, that there should be human law to bear out the law of nature: but human law is the creation of human society in its perfection, which is the State. Man is punished by man for breaking the laws of man, not—except remotely—for breaking the laws of God. Nor would it be any inconvenience, if the law of nature were in vain in a state wherein nature never intended men to live, wherein no multitude of men ever for any notable time have lived, a state which is neither actual fact nor ideal perfection, but a mere property of the philosophic stage, a broken article, an outworn speculation. Such is "the state of nature," as identified with the extra-civil state by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.

Pt. III, Ch. VIII, Section III. Of the true state of Nature, which is the state of civil society; and consequently of the Divine origin of Power

The State is deemed by Aristotle (Politics, III., ix., 14): "the union of septs and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life." The first and most elementary community is the family, [Greek: oikia]. A knot of families associating together, claiming blood-relationship and descent, real or fictitious, from a common ancestor, whose name they bear, constitute a [Greek: genos], called in Ireland a sept, in Scotland a clan, nameless in England. When the sept come to cluster their habitations, or encampments, in one or more spots, and to admit strangers in blood to dwell among them, these hamlets, or camps, gradually reach the magnitude of a village. When a number of these villages, belonging to different septs, come to be contiguous to one another, this mere juxtaposition does not make of them a State. Nor does interchange of commodities, nor intermarriage, nor an offensive and defensive alliance: these are the mutual relations of a confederacy, [Greek: xymmaxia], but all these and more are needed for a State, [Greek: polis]. To be a State, it is requisite that these septs and villages should agree to regulate the conduct of their individual members by a common standard of social virtue, sufficient for their well-being as one community. This common standard is fixed by common consent, or by the decision of some power competent to act for all and to punish delinquents. The name of this common standard is law. (Ethics, c. vii., n. 1, p. 126.) The community thus formed leads a life complete and self-sufficient, not being a member of another, but a body by itself,—not part of any ulterior community, but complete in the fulness of social good and social authority.

Among the ancient Greeks and Italians, and to some extent also in mediæval Italy and Germany, the city or municipality, with the small country district attached, was the State. With us the nation is the State; and accordingly we say my country where the Greek said my city. Bearing this difference in mind, as also the fact that the sept is not known amongst us except to antiquarians, and likewise that the village with us coincides with the parish, and that there are town as well as country parishes,—upon these modern data we may amend Aristotle's definition thus: The State is the union of parishes and municipalities in a perfect and self-sufficient community.

The City State is well illustrated in the following narrative of Thucydides (ii., 15):

"In the time of Cecrops and the early kings as far as Theseus, Attica was always divided among several independent cities, with their own town-halls and magistrates; and when there was no alarm of an enemy, the inhabitants did not resort for common deliberation to the King, but severally managed their own affairs and took their own counsel, and some of them even went to war. But when Theseus came to the throne, he abolished the council-chambers and magistracies of the other cities, and centralised all the people in what is now the city [of Athens], where he appointed their one council-chamber and town-hall; and while they continued to occupy their own properties as before, he forced them to recognise this as their one city and State." Attica before Theseus was a confederacy, [Greek: xymmaxia], not a State, [Greek: polis].

A citizen is defined: "one who has access to a share in deliberative and judicial functions." (Ar., Pol. III., i., 12.) It is not necessary that he actually should share these functions, but the way to them should lie open to him: he should be a person qualified to share in them. There are various degrees of citizenship. Under a parliamentary government, we distinguish the member of parliament, the elector, and him who will be an elector as soon as he gets a house of his own; and again, the judge, and him who is liable to serve on juries. In an absolute monarchy there are no citizens, only subjects.

"The distribution of power in the State, and especially of the sovereign power, is called the polity" ([Greek: politeia], Ar., Pol., III., vi., 1),—a word immortalised by the judicious Hooker, and happily recovered recently to the English language. The polity then is the distribution of the sovereignty. The person, singular or collective, in whose hands the full sovereignty rests, is called the ruler. Be it observed that what we call the ruler is never one man, except in absolute monarchy. By the theory of the British Constitution, the ruler is King, Lords, and Commons, together.

Nature requires that men generally live in society, domestic and civil, so that the individual be of the family, and families form associations, which again conspire to form one perfect community, which is the State. The requirement of nature may be gathered from the universal practice of mankind. "If it (the word savage) means people without a settled form of government, without laws and without a religion, then, go where you like, you will not find such a race." (Max Müller, in Nineteenth Century, Jan. 1885, p. 114.) The same may be gathered from a consideration of what the State is, and of the ends which it serves. The State, as we have seen (n. 2), is a union of septs and villages, or of parishes and municipalities. The individual is born and nurtured in the family, and ordinarily becomes in time the parent of a new family. Families must combine to form septs by blood, or villages (or parishes) by locality. Municipalities we may leave aside, for a municipality is a potential State. But we must consider the sept, village, or parish, which is the community intermediate between family and State. Among the cogent reasons which require families to enter into this association, we may mention friendship, intermarriage, the interchange of services and commodities, the cultivation of the arts, the preservation of traditions and inventions.

But it is further necessary that these septs, villages, or parishes, should band together and combine to form a higher community, self-sufficient and perfect,—for the determining of rights which Natural Law leaves undetermined,—for the punishing of disturbers of the peace, if need be, even with death,—for defence against a common enemy,—for a union of counsels and resources to the execution of magnificent works. This self-sufficient and perfect community, which is not part of any higher community, is the State.

n. 8.

We may observe that the whole reason for the being of the State is not mutual need, nor the repression of violence. Main reasons these are, no doubt, but not the whole main reason. Even if men had no need of one another for the supply of their animal wants, they would still desire to converse for the satisfaction of their intellectual curiosity and their social affections. And even if we had all remained as void of guile, and as full of light and love, as our first parents were at their creation, we should still have needed the erection of States. In a State there are not only criminal but civil courts, where it is not wicked men alone who come to be litigants. From sundry passages of Scripture it would appear that even angels may disagree as to what is best and proper: angelic men certainly may and do. It is a mistake to look upon civil government, with its apparatus of laws and judgments, simply as a necessary evil, and remedy of the perverseness of mankind. On the contrary, were all men virtuous, States would still be formed, towering in magnificence above the States known to history, as the cedars of Lebanon above the scanty growths of a fell-side in our north country.

n. 9.

There can be no State without a power to guide and govern it. It has indeed become the fashion to repeat, as the latest discovery in politics, that what a State needs is not government but administration. This saying comes of a theory, to be examined presently, that sovereign power abides permanently with the people at large, and that the sole function of princes, cabinets, and parliaments, is to provide means of giving effect to the popular will. This however is not quite a repudiation of government, but a peculiar view as to the seat and centre of government. Those who hold it, vigorously maintain the right of the Many to govern, control, and command the Few. The need of some governing authority in a State can be denied by none but an Anarchist, a gentleman who lives two doors beyond Rousseau on the side of unreason.

n. 10.

Every State is autonomous, self-governing, independent. Either the whole people taken collectively must rule the same whole taken distributively, or a part must rule the rest. The ruler is either the whole commonwealth, or more frequently a part of the commonwealth. An autocrat is part of the State which he governs. Sovereignty whole and entire is intrinsic to the State. A community that is to any extent governed from without, like British India or London, is not a State, but part of a State, for it is not a perfect community.

n. 11.

We have it therefore that man is a social animal. Naturally he is a member of a family. Nature requires that families should coalesce into higher communities, which again naturally converge and culminate in the State. Nature further requires that in every State there should be an authority to govern. But authority to govern and duty to obey are correlatives. Nature therefore requires submission to the governing authority in the State. In other words, Nature abhors anarchy as being the destruction of civil society, and as cutting the ground from under the feet of civilised man. The genuine state of nature, that state and condition, which nature allows and approves as proper for the evolution of the human faculties, is the state of man in civil society. That is lost where there is no judge in the land.

n. 12.

There are men full of a sentimental deference to authority and professions of obedience, who yet will not obey any of the authorities that actually are over them. These are disobedient men. He is an anarchist in practice, who meditates treason and rebellion against the "powers that be" actually over him in the State wherein he lives. To obey no actual power is to obey no power, as to wear no actual clothes is to go naked. To keep up the comparison,—as a man may change his clothes upon occasion, and thus go through a brief interval of unclothedness without injury to health or violation of decency, notwithstanding the requirement of nature to wear clothes: so it may be or it may not be consonant with the exigency of our nature at times to subvert by insurrection the existing government in order to the substitution of a new authority; that does not concern us here. We are stating the general rule under ordinary circumstances. The submission to civil authority, which nature requires of us, must be paid in the coin of obedience to the actual established "powers that be."

n. 13.

Any one who understands how morality comes from God (Ethics, c. vi., s. ii. nn. 6-9, 13, pp. 119-125), can have no difficulty in seeing how civil power is of God also. The one point covers the other. We need no mention of God to show that disobedience, lying, and the seven deadly sins, are bad things for human nature, things to be avoided even if they were not forbidden. All the things that God forbids are against the good of man. Their being evil is distinguishable from their being prohibited, and antecedent to it. Now as drunkenness and unchastity are evil for man, so too is anarchy. The one remedy for anarchy is civil government. Even if there were no God, it would be still imperatively necessary, as we have seen, for mankind to erect political institutions, and to abide by the laws and ordinances of constitutional power. But there would be no formal obligation of submission to these laws and ordinances; and resistance to this power would be no more than philosophic sin. (Ethics, c. vi., s. ii., n. 6, p. 119.) What makes anarchy truly sinful and wrong is the prohibition of it contained in the Eternal Law, that law whereby God commands every creature, and particularly every man, to act in accordance with his own proper being and nature taken as a whole, and to avoid what is repugnant to the same. (Ethics, c. vi., s. ii., n. 9, p. 120.)

Therefore, as man is naturally social, and anarchy is the dissolution of society, God forbids anarchy, and enjoins obedience to the civil power, under pain of sin and damnation. "They that resist, purchase to themselves damnation" (Rom. xiii. 2): where the theological student, having the Greek text before him, will observe that the same phrase is used as in 1 Cor. xi. 29 of the unworthy communicant, as though it were the like sin to rend our Lord's mystical Body by civil discord as to profane His natural Body by sacrilege. But to enjoin obedience and to bestow authority are the obverse and reverse of one and the same act. God therefore gives the civil ruler power and authority to command. This is the meaning of St. Paul's teaching that there is no power but from God, and that the powers that be are ordained of God. (Rom. xiii. 1.)

n. 14.

The argument is summed up in these seven consequent propositions:

(a) Civil society is necessary to human nature. (b) Civil power is necessary to civil society. (c) Civil power is naught without civil obedience. (d) Civil obedience is necessary to human nature. (e) God commands whatever is necessary to human nature. (f) God commands obedience to the civil power. (g) God commissions the civil power to rule.

n. 15.

If any one asks how the State and the civil power is of God any otherwise than the railway company with its power, or even the fever with its virulence, a moment's reflection will reveal the answer in the facts, that railway communication, however convenient, is not an essential feature of human life, as the State is: while diseases are not requirements in order to good, but incidental defects and evils of nature, permitted by God. Why God leaves man to cope with such evils, is not the question here.

Readings.—Ar., Pol., I., ii.; III., i.; III., ix.: nn. 5-15.

Pt. III, Ch. VIII, Section IV. Of the Variety of Polities

One polity alone is against the natural law; that is every polity which proves itself unworkable and inefficient: for the rest, various States exhibit various polities workable and lawful, partly from the circumstances, partly from the choice, of the citizens: but the sum total of civil power is a constant quantity, the same for all States. We proceed to establish the clauses of this statement in succession.

If a watch be necessary to a railway guard, and he is bound to have one accordingly, it is also necessary, and he is bound to procure it, that the watch shall go and keep time. A watch that will not keep time is an unlawful article for him to depend upon, being tantamount to no watch, whereas he is bound to have a watch. Otherwise, be his watch large or small, gold, silver, or pinchbeck, all this is indifferent, so long as it be a reliable timekeeper. In like manner, we must have a State, we must have a government, and we must have a government that can govern. Monarchy, aristocracy, parliaments, wide or narrow franchise, centralisation, decentralisation, any one of these and countless other forms—apart from the means whereby it is set up—is a lawful government, where it is a workable one; unlawful, and forbidden by God and nature, where it cannot work. A form of government that from its own intrinsic defects could nowhere work, would be everywhere and always unlawful.

You cannot argue from the accomplished fact the lawfulness of the means whereby it was accomplished. Nor do we say that every form of government, which succeeds in governing, was originally set up in justice; nor again that the success of its rule is necessarily due to the use of just means. The Committee of Public Safety in Paris in 1794 did manage to govern, but it was erected in blood, and it governed by an unscrupulous disregard of everybody's rights. All that we say is, that no distribution of civil power as a distribution, or no polity as a polity (s. iii., n. 5, p. 312), is unlawful, if by it the government can be carried on. And the reason is plain. For all that nature requires is that there should be an efficient civil authority, not that this man should have it, or that one man or other should have it all, or that a certain class in council assembled should engross it, or that all the inhabitants of the country should participate in it. Any one of these arrangements that will work, satisfies the exigency of nature for civil rule, and is therefore in itself a lawful polity.

Working, and therefore, as explained, lawful polities are as multitudinous as the species of animals. Besides those that actually are, there is a variety without end, as of animals, so of polities, that might be and are not. We can classify only the main types. We ground our classification upon Ar., Pol., III., vii., modernising it so as to take in forms of representative government, whereof Aristotle had no conception.

(1) Monarchy, or the rule of the Single Person, in whose hands the whole power of the State is concentrated, e.g., Constantine the Great.

(2) Aristocracy, or the rule of the Few, which will be either direct or representative, according as either they themselves by their own votes at first hand, or representatives whom they elect, make the laws.

(3) Democracy, or the rule of the Many, that is, of the whole community. Democracy, again, is either direct (commonly called pure) or representative. The most famous approach in history to pure democracy is the government of Athens, B.C. 438-338.

(4) Limited Monarchy.

(a) Monarchy with Aristocracy, the government of England from 1688 to 1830.

(b) Monarchy with Democracy.

All civil government is for the governed, that is, for the community at large. The perversion of a polity is the losing sight of this principle, and the conducting of the polity in the interest of the governing body alone. By such perversion monarchy passes into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and democracy into ochlocracy or mob-rule. It might appear strange that, where the power rests with the whole people collectively, government should ever be carried on otherwise than in the interest of the entire community, did we not remember that the majority, with whom the power rests in a democracy, may employ it to trample on and crush the minority. Thus the Many may worry and harass the Few, the mean and poor the wealthy and noble: though commonly perhaps the worrying has been the other way about. Anyhow it is important to observe that there is no polity which of itself, and apart from the spirit in which it is worked, is an adequate safeguard and rock of defence against oppression.

The wide range of polities that history presents is not drawn out by the caprice of nations. The very fact of a certain nation choosing a certain polity, where they are free to choose, is an indication of the bent of the national character, and character is not a caprice. No North American population are ever likely to elect an absolute monarch to govern them. That polity which thrives on the shores of the Caspian, can strike no root on the banks of the Potomac. The choice of a polity is limited by the character of the electors and by the circumstances in which the election is made. Not every generation in a nation is free to choose its polity: but the choice and institution of the fathers binds the children. Up to a certain point ancestral settlements must be respected, or instability ensues, and anarchy is not far off. Thus the spirit of freedom should always act as Burke says, "as if in the presence of canonized forefathers."

Part II: Tolerance in Public Life · Pt. II, First Section: Ecclesiastical

The smallest State in the world is the little republic of Andorra in the Pyrenees. Though it be a paradox to say it, there is as much political power in Andorra as in Russia,—one and the same measure of it in every State. In every State there is power for civil good to the full height of the emergencies that may arise. The same emergencies may arise everywhere, and everywhere there is full power to see that the commonwealth take no harm by them. What a great empire can do for this purpose, e.g., proclaim martial law, search houses, lay an embargo on the means of transport, impress soldiers, the same can the tiniest commonwealth do in the like need. And the ordinary functions of government are the same in both.

n. 8.

This seems at variance with the theory of some constitutions, according to which there are certain so-called fundamental laws, which the legislature cannot call in question, nor deal with in any way, but must take them in all its deliberations for positions established and uncontrovertible. The British Constitution recognizes no fundamental laws. There is no reform that may not legally be broached in Parliament and enacted there. Parliament is said to be "omnipotent," "able to do everything, except to make a man a woman." But in many legislatures it is not so. At Athens of old there were certain measures which no one could introduce for discussion in the Sovereign Assembly without rendering himself liable to a prosecution [Greek: graphae paranomon]. And there have been many monarchs termed absolute, who yet were bound by their coronation-oath, or by some other agreement with their people, to preserve inviolate certain institutions and to maintain certain laws. It may be contended that such a government as we have in England, which is theoretically competent to pass any law within the limits of the natural law, has a greater range of power than a government whose operation is limited by a barrier of fundamental positive law. But this contention vanishes when we observe that there must remain in the State, which has fundamental laws, a power somewhere to reverse them. They can be reversed at least by the consent of the whole people. Thus at Athens the [Greek: graphae paranomon] could be suspended by a vote of the Assembly. A people can release their monarch from his coronation-oath in such portions of it as are not binding absolutely by divine law. Where fundamental law obtains, a portion of the civil power becomes latent, and only a diminished remainder is left free in the hands of the person or persons who are there said to rule. Such person or persons are not the adequate ruler of the State, as they have not the full power, but the people, with whom rests the latent authority to cancel certain laws, are to that extent partakers in the sovereignty. Where there is agreement of the whole people, great and small, no part of the power remains latent, but all is set free. With us, it may be observed, the omnipotence of parliament has become a mere lawyer's theory. On every great issue, other than that on which the sitting parliament has been elected, it is the practice of ministers to "go to the country" by a new General Election. Thus only a certain measure of available authority is free at the disposal of parliament: the rest remaining latent in the general body of the electorate. Such is our constitution in practice.

n. 9.

If in any State the whole power were free in the hands of one man, there we might look to see made good the dictum of the judicious Hooker (Ecclesiastical Polity, bk. i., s. x., n. 5): "To live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery." In a monarchy untrammelled by senate or popular assembly, it were well that some of the sovereign power should remain latent, and that His Majesty should rule in accordance with certain laws, not within his royal pleasure to revoke.

n. 10.

The State and the power of the State, apart from the polity, is of God. (s. iii., n. 14, p. 318.) The State under this or that polity and this or that ruler, is also of God. But, apart from the polity, the State is of God antecedently to any determination of any human will: because, willy nilly, man must live in civil society and God commands him so to do. But the State under this polity and this ruler is of God consequently to some determination of human volition. In this consequent sense we write Victoria Dei gratia.

…and 59 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Vermeersch, Tolerance

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 606 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Part II: Tolerance in Public Life

n. ¶129.

General View and Divisions.

n. ¶130.

Summary : Unlike tolerance in private life, public tolerance is divided according to the matter, according to the reasons for its exercise ; dogmatic and practical tolerance; and according to the authority which tolerates, religious or civil authority.—Range of ecclesiastical tolerance.

n. ¶131.

The tolerance of private life is practised principally among equals, and is summed up in the respect which one person is bound to pay to the rights of another. This right forbids me to regulate the thoughts and speech of another by my own, or to disturb him in the liberty of opinion or worship which is granted to him by Divine or human law. Undoubtedly, when sanctioned by man, liberties may be wisely or unwisely granted, and they extend to all the circumstances of life ; but one private individual is not allowed to restrict the liberty of another, whatever be its origin or the circumstances to which it extends. So far we have treated of private tolerance, without discussing the merits of the liberties which put it to the test, and have not confined ourselves to tolerance in matters of religion, with which we are chiefly concerned.

n. ¶132.

The Sovereign, on the other hand, must concern himself with all the titles which every liberty can show to justify its existence. There are superior or necessary liberties, which even he is bound to respect; useful liberties, which he sanctions or restricts according to circumstances ; and dangerous liberties, which he grants reluctantly, because he cannot do otherwise. While the other liberties are granted as rights, the last-named are only impunities, and they alone, strictly speaking, are the object of the laws of tolerance.

n. ¶133.

Intolerance is twofold in character : it may refuse to recognize an inviolable liberty, or to grant a reasonable indulgence. Oppression or tyranny may be an abuse of power, or only an excess of severity. But tolerance is one : it permits a thing which is disapproved, or is at least looked upon unfavourably. The official grant of any liberty leads naturally to a discussion as to the nature and cause of the concession : is it a right which is intended to be permanent, or is it a necessity of fact to which the authorities think it advisable to bow ? And different questions arise according as the liberty belongs to the political, moral, or religious order.

n. ¶134.

Hence arise distinctions in respect of the source of the tolerance, its purpose, and its object.

n. ¶135.

According to its object, public tolerance is divided into as many branches as there are matters for discussion. We shall be concerned only with tolerance in religious matters.

n. ¶136.

According to the reasons on which it is founded, tolerance is dogmatic or practical. Dogmatic tolerance is a principle ; practical tolerance is an ex-pedient. The one claims liberty of opinions and worship as a right which must be respected ; the other yields to circumstances so far as is required by social conditions or the common good. To the advocates of dogmatic tolerance, the word “ tolerance ” seems improper; they would abolish it, and only use it as consecrated by ancient custom. Religious liberty signifies for them the liberty of profession of individual belief or unbelief, and sometimes also the liberty of organization granted to religious bodies. The professors of practical tolerance give the word its proper value, and, being accustomed to consider liberty as a function of truth, they define religious liberty as the liberty of the true religion.

n. ¶137.

Lastly, according to the authority which tolerates, toleration is ecclesiastical or civil. Ecclesiastical tolerance is that of religious authority or the Church ; civil tolerance is the act of the civil power or the State. We have already had occasion to state this, and also to draw attention to the following difference in the field of the two kinds of public tolerance :

n. ¶138.

Many independent States exist simultaneously, and no one questions the lawfulness of their coexistence. From this independence each State derives its sovereign right of internal administration, for which it is not obliged to give an account to any neighbouring State. Civil tolerance, therefore, is only understood as existing within the State, shown by the Sovereign to his subjects. Having no directly religious mission, the State, as such, does not enter into conflict with another State which professes another religion. But the religious society may be one, and obligatory for all : it has therefore a mission of propagation and conquest which puts it in opposition with other religions and false creeds. Hence we have to consider its possible tolerance in a new light, in the attitude which it adopts towards other religions and their adherents.

Pt. II, First Section: Ecclesiastical

n. ¶139.

I. The Fact of Religious Society.

n. ¶140.

Summary : Social organization of religions.—Hierarchical constitution of the Catholic Church.—The place and mission assigned by Catholic teaching to the Church in the world.

n. ¶141.

Ecclesiastical tolerance or intolerance presupposes a religious authority. The existence of such an authority is a fact which is necessarily recognizable by the senses. Religions, Divine or human, unlike systems of philosophy, are socially organized ; for it may be said that there is hardly any religious system elaborated by a single individual, and all social organization requires the constitution of a hierarchy.

n. ¶142.

But if the different religions spread over the globe have a priesthood and principle of authority in common with Christian bodies, nowhere does the hierarchy form such a compact and united assembly, nowhere is authority so strong and active, as in the Catholic Church. We know the famous expression of Guizot: “ The Catholic Church is the great school of reverence ; ” and Proudhon remarks : “ The Catholic Church is the one whose dogmatism, disci-pline, hierarchy, and progress, best realize the theoretical principle and type of religious society —the one, in consequence, which has the best right to the government of souls.”¹

¹ De la Justice dans la Révolution et dans l’Église, Preliminary Discourse, sec. 3, p. 24.

n. ¶143.

It is with regard to this Church that we have almost exclusively to consider the different aspects of ecclesiastical tolerance.

n. ¶144.

Now, what place, according to Catholic doctrine, has God assigned to His Church in the world ? What is the mission she has to accomplish ?

n. ¶145.

If men consent to leave us really free, if they do not wish by an odious ostracism to practise towards the millions of Catholics the same intolerance that they lay to our charge, and so make us victims and accused at the same time, how can they deny us the right to profess this doctrine, and to regulate our judgments and our acts by our own conception of the Church rather than by that of unbelievers ? And is not every impartial judge bound to consider the arguments by which she explains and justifies her action, if he wishes to form a just estimate of her conduct ?

n. ¶146.

By the side of the States which are formed and prosper or disappear according to political changes, and of those civil societies which the Author of Nature has created and sanctioned in creating the human race—or, rather, above all these—though their independence in their proper sphere is duly recognized, God has instituted, to last as long as the world shall last, a religious society which traces its origin to Jesus Christ. To that society belong the faithful custody, the infallible teaching, and the zealous propagation, of those truths which are the light and salvation of the human race. As guardian of the inviolable deposit of truth, she is bound to preserve it pure and entire at the price of her blood, and to oppose an unchanging [we cannot] to all attempts at corruption.

n. ¶148.

Constituted as a perfect society,¹ she has subjects, loyal or rebellious, to lead to a common end, and she possesses all the rights and duties necessary for that end. Called by the express will of her Founder to make spiritual conquests, she acts in constant obedience to the command, “ Going therefore, teach ye all nations.”²

¹ Juridically, a society is called “ perfect ” when, being independent of any other of the same order, it is not bound to submit to any other for the attainment of its own end, but possesses in itself, in its resources and its rights, all means necessary for that purpose. A family, a city, a parish, a religious Order, are imperfect societies. The Church and the State are perfect societies.

² St. Matt, xxviii. 19.

n. ¶149.

The Church, therefore, has an exterior policy towards the religions she wishes to supplant, or the unbelievers she desires to convert; and an interior policy in regard to those who are placed under her rule by faith and baptism. She may show herself tolerant or intolerant in her threefold mission of teaching, administering, and conquering—that is, in her magisterium, her government, and her expansion or apostolate.

n. ¶152.

II. Doctrinal Intolerance.

n. ¶153.

Summary : Definition.—The uncompromising attitude of the Church in respect of doctrine.—Why it extends to every point of faith.—What liberty of discussion exists in religious matters.

n. ¶154.

Doctrinal intolerance consists in the rigour with which a Church imposes upon its members the inward acceptance and outward profession of its Credo, or its dogmatic and moral teaching.

n. ¶155.

The Catholic Church, from its very foundation, has presented to the world an unprecedented spectacle, on the austere beauty of which Jules Simon has commented in terms of appreciative admiration.¹ In Greece and Rome there had long been an official religion, without dogma and without morality, which required only an external rite of participation. All that was necessary was to offer incense to the gods of the State, and everyone was in consequence at liberty to believe in the gods or despise them. Peace was offered to all on very easy conditions. To all ? Yes, except those who could neither lie nor sell their consciences. Christianity proclaims the inviolable sacredness of the conscience, and offers for its acceptance a positive faith ; that faith creates an uncompromising attitude, which is only a claim of liberty. The outward act of adoration which great and learned men of the world offer without scruple and without conviction is, by the authority of the Church, unlawful for those who follow Christ. The incense is refused, and the victim pays for his refusal with his blood. “ For three centuries the executioners did not cease to strike, nor the victims to suffer ; Christianity received its baptism of blood ; it gave testimony to liberty of conscience : that was its heroic age.” But to what did it owe this heroism and this glory ? To its intolerance, to the intolerance which the Church practises as guardian of the faith, in virtue of which she demands of her subjects a persevering constancy in the faith, admitting no alliance or compromise with error.

¹ See his First Lesson on Liberty of Conscience.

n. ¶157.

On the same grounds the Church requires the acceptance of all that God has revealed ; the obstinate denial of a single dogma is equivalent to heresy, and produces apostasy. Many persons profess to be astonished at the severity of laws or ecclesiastical decrees which treat the denial of a single point of faith as severely as positive infidelity. This surprise is intelligible in unbelievers, who are excusable because they discuss the faith as they would discuss some system of philosophy ; but how can we account for the same astonishment in certain Catholic writers ? They seem to forget the very nature of the act of faith, and its difference from a simply rational assent. So long as we are concerned with certainties of the same order, springing from the same principles, there may be differences of opinion on every proposition enunciated. But the certainty of reason and the certainty of faith are derived from different sources. By coming to a wrong conclusion on a question of secondary importance, reason does not give up the principles which assist it in the discovery of the more important truths. It is not so with heresy. Without in any way denying the unequal dignity of the truths which God through His Church proposes for our belief, we ought nevertheless to make the value, the merit, the very essence of the act of faith, consist in the fact of believing them all on the Word of God, and in relying more on the Divine truthfulness than on our own lights. We fail to show this confidence if we pick and choose between dogmas, admitting some and refusing to accept others, or if we obstinately reject a single one ; for by so doing we cease to take the Word of God for our guide, and rely simply on our reason. The agreement between my opinions and the dogmas that I accept is only accidental, and almost a matter of chance, like the meeting of two travellers who happen to make part of their journey together, though they are not bound for the same goal; and, because fortuitous, the agreement loses all consistency. The Protestant Churches were scarcely a year old when Bossuet found materials for writing a history of their variations. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as partial heresy, for faith is not a thing of shreds and patches.

n. ¶158.

It is only outside defined dogmas that the Church, according to the gravity and delicacy of the matter, the quality of the authors, and the circumstances of time and place, allows on sacred subjects a greater or less discussion, by reason of what might be called her tolerance ; and even then she reserves to herself the right to close the controversy by a final judgment, to which her children always willingly submit. III. Disciplinary Intolerance.

n. ¶159.

Summary : Excommunication of heretics.—In what spirit is it effected ?—Other penalties incurred by them.— Power of the Church.

n. ¶160.

The magisterium of the Church condemns all heresy. The government of the Church is concerned with heretics—that is to say, with those who, belonging to her by baptism, openly contradict her teaching ; we say openly because the secrets of the conscience are necessarily beyond the cognizance of an authority entrusted to the hands of men.¹

¹ Thus a Christian may be guilty of heresy in the sight of God without having violated any law of the Church. We do not dwell on another difference which seems to exist between guilt before God and guilt before the forum externum of the Church. Simple abstention—that is, refusal to give assent to any Divine revelation—is enough to constitute an infidelity which is insulting to God. But would a man who simply confesses his want of faith, without judging of dogmas or contradicting the Church, be liable to outward penalties ? According to some modern writers, we ought to answer in the affirmative. But such persons seem to speak of a man who lays down the law for himself, or at least follows those who do so ; we know of no case where proceedings have been taken against mere sceptics or freethinkers, so long as they have refrained from open blasphemy. We shall have occasion later to return to this subject, but we can understand how in the age of faith a heretic was considered inexcusable. By a heretic we mean a man who makes public and obstinate profession of an error contrary to faith, and rejects the teaching of the most imposing hierarchy that has ever existed. If simple doubt may seem excusable, it is the grossest presumption for any private individual to set up his own opinion against the teaching of the Church.

n. ¶161.

It is the duty of the Church to bring back her erring children first by the gentle ways of persuasion ; but if they are obstinate, she must treat them as rebellious subjects, whom, for their own good and the edification of others, she will endeavour to bring back by all the means in her power. This effort shows us a second aspect of ecclesiastical intolerance. The Church, which is the custodian and dispenser of spiritual blessings, will deprive the obstinate of those blessings, and will, in the end, exclude them from her communion. This deprivation involves spiritual penalties, which, in canonical language, are called “ censures,” and the gravest of all censures is exclusion from the Church, or excommunication, which, when solemnly pronounced, becomes an anathema. What is more natural or legitimate than to refuse the advantages of Christian unity to one who rejects its very principle, to cut off from the vine a branch which refuses to be nourished by the vine ? This expulsion, terrible in itself,¹ must have filled the souls of men with holy horror, when the Church, in the solemn assembly of her pastors, uttered those awful anathemas which defined the truth and denounced error.

¹ We know in what emphatic terms St. Paul described the effects of this penalty when he had occasion to inflict it: “I have already judged ... to deliver such a one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of Our Lord Jesus Christ ” (1 Cor. v. 3, 5). For having quoted these words, St. Jerome is accused by Lea (History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages, vol. i., p. 214) of having advocated capital punishment. It is unnecessary to remark how impossible it is for authors like Lea to present in their true light many facts whose real meaning is necessarily not understood by non-Catholics.

n. ¶163.

There are numerous canonical texts which enjoin that obstinate heretics should be cut off from the Church. The integrity of the faith and the preservation of the faithful require this ; and it is the most effective means of bringing back to his senses an unhappy person who is hurrying to destruction. “ It is said,” says Pope Urban,¹ “ that excommunication is the plucking up of the cockle, in opposition to the parable in the Gospel; but it is not so. The Apostle tells us that the sentence of excommunication is passed in order that the guilty person may have his soul saved in the day of the Lord. Excommunication is not intended for the destruction of the offender, but for his repentance and amendment.”

¹ Or, rather, the unknown author of the Canon Notandum, 37, C. xxiv., Q. 3.

n. ¶165.

The use of spiritual sanctions, as practised² and enjoined3 by St. Paul, in order to maintain the purity of Christian faith and morals, has found favour even with liberals. “ Religious intolerance,” says Jules Simon, “ is not only reasonable, but necessary ... a religion which did not profess it would be condemned by the very fact.”⁴ And more recently Ruffini writes : “It is impossible to condemn religious intolerance when it employs its purely spiritual weapons to combat and banish all opposition to the fundamental dogmas of a religion, and all persons who contradict them.5 Moreover, in acting in this manner, the Church only does what the State is constantly doing ; she deprives the delinquents of the benefits of religious society, exactly as the State deprives of the privileges of civil life those who offend against its laws.

² In the case of the incestuous Corinthian, mentioned above. 3 Titus iii. 10.

⁴ Op. cit., p. 68. 5 La Libertà Religiosa, p. 8.

n. ¶166.

But besides these spiritual penalties, we find that heretics incur temporal penalties also, though the Church has been slow in inflicting them; for, although she legalized temporal punishments as early as the seventh century, she waited until the twelfth before inflicting them on heretics.

n. ¶171.

The twelfth century gives us an instance of a heretic condemned to suffer temporal punishment. The case was that of the notorious Eon de la Stella, who appeared in 1148 before the Council of Rheims, in which 1,600 Bishops, Abbots, and Prelates were assembled. The case was a very grave one, and Eon, a fanatical disturber of the public peace, might have expected to be treated with the utmost rigour ; but, more fortunate than some of his associates, whom the secular arm delivered to the flames, he received the benefit of episcopal clemency. The Bishop who had brought him before the Council interceded for him, and his life and limbs were spared.¹ Thus the first ecclesiastical sentence of temporal punishment inflicted for heresy was the beginning of a series of those effective intercessions which the Church recommends all her judges to make in favour of unhappy persons sentenced to death or mutilation.²

¹ See Harduin’s Concilia, vii. 308.

² Long before this (in 385) St. Martin of Tours had entreated the tyrant Maximus not to shed the blood of the Priscillianists. Unfortunately, his efforts were not successful. See Sulpicius Severus, Chronica, 1. 2, n. 50 (Corpus Scriptorum eccl. latin., t. 1, p. 103).

n. ¶172.

In the thirteenth century Innocent III. prescribed confiscation of goods as the punishment for heresy, which was denounced as an infamous crime.³ Alexander IV. extended this confiscation to the goods of a deceased heretic.⁴ The penalties pre-scribed by Boniface VIII.¹ were confiscation and legal disability for public office. The Clementine legislation² forbade excessive severity on the part of Inquisitors, and directed that prisoners should be reasonably treated. The Extravagantes Communes provided against other abuses.³ Such has been the penal legislation of the Church in the matter of heresy, and it does not go beyond the penalties we have mentioned. In the next section we shall speak of the condemnations to death and the stake, and we shall define the part of the responsibility which may have been incurred by the Church in these capital executions.

³ Notably at the Fourth Council of the Lateran, from whence comes chap. xiii., De Hæreticis (v. 7).

⁴ Chap. viii., De Hæreticis in 6°.

¹ Chaps. xv. and xix., De Hæreticis in 6°.

² Chaps. i. and ii., De Hæreticis, Clem. V. 3.

³ L. 5, t. 3, c. 1 and 3.

n. ¶177.

The excommunication of the heretic furnishes a probable explanation of the Church’s slowness in inflicting temporal punishments. As a member cut off from the Church, he ceased to be subject to her, as he ceased to receive life from her. In early times—i.e., during the first three or four centuries— the Church, so to speak, forgot the baptism of those whom she had anathematized ; she did not concern herself with them any more than with pagans.⁴ Even in the time of Bellarmine and Suarez the objection was still made that heretics were outside the Church, and that, therefore, she had no right to punish them.⁵

⁴ See Hinschius, System des Katholischen Kirchenrechts, t. 4, p. 749. St. Augustine found it necessary to show the power of the Church over baptized persons. Ep. 185, n. 23 (M.P.L., t. 33, col. 803).

⁵ Bellarmine, Controv. I., Cont. 2., De Membris Ecclesiæ, l. 3 ; De Laicis, c. 22, Art. 15. Suarez, De Fide, d. 20, s. 3, n. 20.

n. ¶183.

These temporal punishments inflicted for an offence of a spiritual nature astonish us at the present day, though they appeared very natural at a time when the social power was actually divided, according to causes and persons, between the Church and the Sovereign. And what, in fact, is more logical ? The heretic committed against the Church, to which he belonged, an offence which might lead to disastrous consequences, and the Church applied to this serious offence the penalties then in her power.¹ No one denied her the right to inflict temporal penalties, and these often had the good effect of making the condemned person understand the gravity of the anathema with which he was threatened, and of leading the way to his conversion. This result was always kept in view in the penal legislation of the Church.

¹ As to the coercive power of the Church, see the digression to which a special chapter is devoted. We reserve the discussion of the criminal character of heresy to Part III.

n. ¶184.

IV. Apostolic Tolerance or Intolerance.

n. ¶185.

Summary : Nationalism of ancient religions.—Ancient and Modern syncretism.—Lethargy of many religions.— Catholic exclusiveness.—No salvation outside the Church.—Conquest by persuasion.—Respect for the liberty of adults and fathers of families.—Merits of ecclesiastical tolerance.

n. ¶186.

We have now to consider ecclesiastical tolerance or intolerance in preaching religion and making converts. This missionary propaganda, its energy and its methods, show the attitude which every religion and every Church adopts towards other religions and their adherents.

n. ¶188.

National gods were known in ancient times, conquering or conquered with the nations whose quarrels they espoused, and there was a time when the Israelites themselves gloried in the possession of Jehovah as a national God, more powerful than the deities to which rival nations paid homage. This conception represents gods as well as nations at war with one another.

…and 566 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Coppens, Moral Philosophy

Charles Coppens, S.J. — 44 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Chapter III: Civil Society

n. 221.

221. Civil society may be defined as a union of many such persons as are their own masters, sui juris, joined together for the purpose of protecting their rights and securing their temporal happiness. In the present chapter we shall consider the nature and the origin of civil society, and the exercise of civil functions.

n. 222.

Article I. The Nature and the Origin of Civil Society.

222. The nature of civil society can be best understood from a detailed examination into its constituent notes, namely: 1. Its end or purpose, 2. The units composing it, 3. The authority governing it, 4. The means employed to obtain its end.

n. ¶461.

§ 1. The End of Civil Society.

n. 223.

223. 1. We have seen in a preceding chapter (No. 199) that society, or association of some kind, is natural to man, and, consequently, that it is an institution of God. The society first in the order of nature is the family, or domestic society, and next in order comes civil society, or the State.

n. ¶463.

The necessity of civil society is obvious: when many families live in proximity, they are forced to have intercourse of some sort with one another. In the course of time it will come to pass, as each family has chiefly its own interests at heart, that many of these families will not be moderate in their aspirations, their claims, and their efforts at aggrandizement. Hence, unless they be united for the purpose of securing public peace and the protection of personal rights, they will be frequently at variance, and even in deadly strife with one another.

n. 224.

224. The preservation of peace among its members is the primary end of civil society. United by a common bond, men can render great assistance to one another in securing, with comparative ease, the comfort and happiness of all; and opportunities for the development and exercise of the human faculties are thus afforded which would be impossible without such an association. The complex end of civil society is clearly stated in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States, which reads thus: "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

n. 225.

225. Civil society, we repeat, is natural to man, and, consequently, owes its institution to the Creator. It is natural, because it is the outcome of man's natural tendencies and is necessary for the development and application of his highest powers. Without civil society, men could not lead lives worthy of their rational nature and their ultimate destiny. The theory of Hobbes and of Rousseau, that man is naturally a savage, perpetually at war with his fellow-men, and that society is an afterthought, something artificial superadded to his nature, is as opposed to historical facts as it is degrading to the human race.

n. ¶466.

§ 2. The units of which civil society is composed.

n. 226.

226. When certain families have entered into association for mutual aid and protection, the domestic relations in each family are manifestly not altered thereby: the family continues to be a natural society; each family is a moral person, the father acting for all the members. Hence the units composing civil society are not individual men, women, and children, but the families, or the heads of families. The wives and children are indeed members of the State, though not directly; they are members of the families that make up the State, and they are represented in the State by the heads of the families to which they severally belong. It is neither necessary nor desirable for the common good that the State should deal directly with them, ignoring the natural organization of the domestic society. Unmarried men, who are properly qualified by age and civil condition, i. e., who have attained their majority and are their own masters, sui juris, share with heads of families in the enjoyment of civil rights.

n. ¶468.

§ 3. Civil Authority.

n. 227.

227. That the common good may be attained, the members of which civil society is made up often stand in need of direction, and sometimes of compulsion. The power thus to direct and compel is called civil authority; it is, as it were, the soul or animating principle of the body politic. What rights should belong to this authority must be inferred from its purpose, which is the attainment of the end of civil society. Civil authority, therefore, is to possess all those rights which are necessary to direct, and even compel, the citizens to tend towards the end of the State, i. e., public peace, the protection of rights, the more perfect attainment of happiness for all, provided the means employed be consistent with individual rights.

n. 228.

228. But may not the common good require the sacrifice of individual or private rights? As the common good consists principally in the defense of the private rights of individuals and families, it cannot require such a sacrifice. Exceptions in this matter are more apparent than real. Yet, aside from the forfeiture of personal rights or privileges for certain misdeeds, cases may arise in which individuals or families have to forego private advantages in order to serve the common good: as when a citizen is called upon to expose his life for the defense of his country. In this case his right is not violated; the State does not take away his life, but it obliges him to expose himself to danger for a greater good, in accordance with the demands of duty.

n. 229.

229. In levying taxes, the State distributes the common burden of expenses incurred for the public good. The right of eminent domain (No. 177) suspends a private right according to the principles explained in a preceding book (No. 121). The tendency of certain agitators in politics and political economy is to extend the powers of the State beyond all just limits, to the prejudice of private rights. This tendency, whether it is manifested in the advocacy of unjust taxation, in special class legislation, or in meddling with parental rights of education, is directly at variance with the purposes of civil government, and opposed to the spirit of our Constitution. Civil government exists for the welfare of the people and the protection of private rights. When, therefore, the government usurps the rights of individuals, it becomes a form of tyranny, quiet submission to which is not patriotism, but slavery.

n. 230.

230. Whence comes the authority of the State? The question may refer to civil authority in the abstract or in the concrete. Civil authority in the concrete regards the particular form of government which a particular State or nation has come to assume. It is evidently a matter of historical fact: certain events have brought about the assumption of that manner of government.

n. ¶473.

Supposing now that a State or government exists, we may inquire whence it derives authority; i. e., the right to govern its subjects. This latter is a consideration of authority in the abstract and is an ethical question.

n. 231.

231. Thesis VI. Civil authority is derived from God, and can impose conscientious obligations.

n. ¶475.

Proof. As in every society (No. 196), so in civil society, authority is necessary; it is the very form or animating principle of civil society (No. 227). Now, God is the founder of civil society, since it is natural to man; and God necessarily wills that everything He makes shall possess all powers necessary for the purposes for which He made it. But authority is necessary for the purpose of civil society; therefore, it possesses this authority from God.

n. ¶476.

From this principle, it follows that civil government can impose obligations in conscience. Authority means the moral right to govern. Now, such a right implies on the part of the governed the moral obligation to obey. Nevertheless, the authority thus bestowed is limited to those purposes for which it was intrusted to the State — namely, to procure the end of civil government by just means. Hence, an unlawful use of authority imposes no moral obligation.

n. 232.

232. It has been much debated whether civil authority comes immediately from God to the ruler, or through the medium of the people, by whom it is intrusted to the rulers. Certainly, it can hardly be said that such authority resides with an unorganized multitude; yet, as soon as the community has become an organized body, it has the moral power of civil government. It may intrust this power to one or more persons, and it may place restrictions upon these both with regard to the time and the manner of exercising the authority thus bestowed.

n. 233.

233. One thing is certain — namely, that civil authority is not a mere collection of private rights intrusted by all the individuals of a community to the management of one or more chosen members. The civil power has the right to inflict the death penalty (No. 249) in punishment of enormous crimes. But such a right could not belong to a merely voluntary association of individuals, since they cannot give to any person or persons a right which they do not possess. Therefore, civil authority is not a mere collection of private rights. This principle is further explained in the following thesis:

n. 234.

234. Thesis VII. The doctrine of the social contract maintained by Rousseau is illogical.

n. ¶480.

Explanation. According to the fanciful theory of the "social contract" devised by Jean Jacques Rousseau, the citizens, when they obey the authority of the State, obey themselves or fulfill their own commands; for civil authority he declared to be nothing else than the free union of individual wills. He supposed that the members of a community have agreed to intrust the exercise of their individual rights to one or more men, who thus become their agents for the administration of these associated rights, just like the agents of a business firm, and who may be, like such agents, dismissed at the pleasure of their employers. As forms of government have existed from time immemorial, the supposed contract must have been entered into by our remote ancestors.

n. ¶481.

Proof 1. Either the citizens are bound by the agreement of their ancestors to a civil compact or they are not so bound. If such an obligation exists, they do not render obedience to themselves, as Rousseau would have it, but to their ancestors; hence, they would be bound by a will not their own. If, however, no such obligation exists, then there is no civil authority at all; for that is no authority which every one is free at any moment to set aside. There can be no true right to command where there is no corresponding duty to obey.

n. ¶482.

Proof 2. This theory could never explain the right, admitted by all nations, of inflicting capital punishment; for no one can give to another what he does not himself possess — the right to take away his life.

n. ¶483.

§ 4. The Means Employed by Civil Authority.

n. 235.

235. The means employed to obtain the end of civil government are of three kinds:

n. ¶485.

1. Acts commanded as necessary for this end, such as the payment of taxes, or the raising and equipment of armies in time of war.

n. ¶486.

2. Acts forbidden as injurious to private rights or to the common good. On both these points there is need of great care that, by the promotion of certain lawful objects or the protection of certain rights, other rights be not violated, especially those of a more sacred character; this would defeat the very purpose for which civil government exists.

n. ¶487.

3. The organization of the government, or the civil polity which is to direct the means to the end.

n. 236.

236. There are various forms of organization:

n. ¶489.

1. The monarchical, in which all civil power is vested in one man, whether he be called king or emperor or by any other title.

n. ¶490.

2. The aristocratic, in which power is vested in a few individuals or families.

n. ¶491.

3. The democratic, in which the people hold the power; it is then usually administered by representatives whom the people have chosen. These are the simple forms of government organization. Mixed forms are those in which the simple forms are variously combined. In the British Government, for instance, the supreme power is vested in the crown — king or queen — and in Parliament, which consists of the House of Lords, as the aristocratic element, and the House of Commons, as the democratic element, the members of the latter House being elected by the people.

n. 237.

237. Practically, that form of government is the best for any people which is best adapted to obtain for them the end or purpose of civil power; that form, namely, which, account being taken of the character, traditions, and various circumstances of the people, is best suited for the defense of their private rights, for the maintenance of peace at home and abroad, and for the development of the country's resources; which will thus contribute to the common happiness on earth, and enable every member of the community to attain his last end.

n. 238.

Article II. The Functions of Civil Government.

238. To fulfill its purposes, civil government must exercise three functions, namely: the legislative, in the making of laws; the judiciary, in the application of the laws to particular cases; the executive, in carrying laws and judgments into effect. All three functions may be exercised by one person or body of men; but in this country they are intrusted to three distinct departments: the legislative to Congress, the judiciary to the law courts, the executive to the President.

n. ¶529.

§ 3. The Executive.

n. 251.

251. In addition to the legislative and judicial departments, a country requires for its government executive officers, an armed force, and a treasury for the remuneration of public services. Those officials whose duty it is to carry the laws into effect form the executive department, which is in some respects dependent upon the two other departments. The President of the United States is the chief executive officer of the nation; at the same time he is at the head of the legislative department, holding the power of veto and giving validity to the enactments of Congress by affixing his signature thereto. The President is also the official embodiment of the majesty and authority of the nation.

n. 252.

252. The public officers ought to be chosen or appointed from those who, by their knowledge, ability, fidelity, and integrity, are well qualified to procure the common good. The practice of distributing offices as the spoils of party victory among the unworthy and incompetent, is a gross violation of distributive justice and a serious injury to the State.

n. 253.

253. The treasury is supplied either by direct taxation, i. e., by taxes imposed on the property of the individual citizens, or by indirect taxation, i. e., revenues and duties paid for manufactured and imported goods. The right of taxation is based upon the need of the government to defray public expenses incurred for the common good; hence, the taxes levied should not exceed these expenses. The assessment of taxes for each class of the citizens ought, as far as is practicable, to be proportioned to the benefits received therefrom. Thus, each citizen receives from the State an equivalent for the taxes he pays, and no one is forced to labor for another without just compensation. This rule does not prevent the taxation of the rich to supply assistance to the needy poor. The honest poor have a right, as human beings, to live in decent comfort, and, if they cannot succeed in doing so by their own exertions, they must be aided by the wealthy members of the community. It is even necessary for the common good that no class of the people should be driven by want to discontent and desperation.

n. 254.

254. The armed force required by civil society consists usually of:

…and 4 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Slater, Religion & Human Interests

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 2 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Chapter VII: Religion and Liberty

n. ¶46.

WE say, and say truly, that we are fighting for the liberties of Europe. The brave Belgian people chose rather to see their country overrun and its fairest cities destroyed than be deprived of their freedom. But the enemy also asserts that he is fighting for freedom. He wants room to expand, to grow to the full stature that nature intended him to reach. He asserts that he is fighting for the freedom of the seas which are held in bondage by the naval predominance of England. The country seems to have made up its mind to abandon its long-cherished idol of free trade. Even freedom may be bought at too dear a rate. If we are determined to conquer and to crush militarism we see the necessity of greater organisation. But organisation means restraint of individual initiative, it means some curtailment of freedom. Everybody, except the anarchist, sees that some sort of government is absolutely necessary, that people cannot be allowed to act and to speak just as they like, that some restriction of liberty is necessary to prevent society from lapsing into barbarism. On the other hand the philosophers who are most in vogue tell us that freedom is a dream, a shadow without substance. According to them, everything that happens in the universe is the necessary outcome of antecedent necessary causes. It is almost beyond dispute, says Mr. Bertrand Russell, that Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms. In action, in desire, we must submit perpetually to a tyranny of outside forces. It is only in imagination that we can indulge in dreams of freedom. In thought, in aspiration, we are free, free from our fellow-men, free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, free even while we live from the tyranny of death.* Some time ago I attended a lecture given by a man of science on a subject connected with eugenics. After the lecture I remarked to him that he seemed to me to have treated the matter from too mechanical a point of view and had not allowed for free will. He answered that the question of free will was undoubtedly at the root of the whole subject, that at one time he had studied the question and had tried to write something about it. But he honestly confessed that as he thought and wrote free will seemed to vanish into thin air, there was simply no room for it in his materialistic conception of the universe. It will be worth while to try to make two or three points as clear as possible in so important and intricate a question. And first of all we must recognise that the freedom of the individual will is ultimately the question at issue. Poets may indulge their fancy and write beautiful things about political and civil liberty, but if man's individual will is not free political and civil liberty is a mere pretence. Political and civil action whether called free or unfree is simply what it must be given the antecedent circumstances. Patriots who thought they were dying for their country's freedom simply could not do otherwise. It is as far from the truth to call their actions heroic and celebrate them in song as it would be to talk of the heroism of the moon and her bold flights through the realms of space. If the individual human will is not free then there is no such thing as freedom in the visible universe. Every slightest event is the necessary result of blind and necessary antecedent conditions. Mr. Bertrand Russell seems to claim exemption of thought from this iron law of necessity. Thought is indeed, as he says, free from our fellow-men, in the sense that our fellow-men cannot put fetters on our thoughts. They can fetter our limbs, they can cast the whole body into prison, but the mind can still wander unfettered abroad. Our minds are free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, in the sense that we can in thought travel to Mars and bear its inhabitants company. But if the individual will is not free it is clear that thought is not free either. Like everything else it is but the resultant of antecedent and necessary conditions. It is but the flash which accompanies some change in the substance of the brain, and we might as well talk of the liberty of the flame that rises from heated coal, as of the freedom of thought. In discussing questions of freedom we must focus our attention on the freedom of the human will, which lies at the root of all other liberties. In the question of free will every person of sound mind has within himself the main factors required for a solution of the problem. What a man of sound mind is directly conscious of must be true if the human mind is really capable of attaining to truth. Let us then examine the working of our own minds. At the very outset we are struck with a phenomenon which is quite different from the phenomena exhibited by the world of matter and force. Material forces may be reduced to those of attraction and repulsion. Water falling under the action of gravitation is an instance of the one, steam expanding under the application of heat is an instance of the other. In both cases one particle of matter acts on another, it influences something outside itself, either drawing it towards itself or repelling it from itself. The action of mind is altogether different. Thought turns back upon itself, the mind reflects upon itself, and becomes self-conscious. Mind, then, is not made up of material particles which mutually attract or repel each other. It is not extended in space. It is a simple, unextended substance, a spiritual substance, which is indeed intimately connected and united with matter, but which for all that is quite different from it. My thought can represent to me something which I apprehend as good and desirable. I have a friend who lives twenty miles off and I always derive pleasure and advantage from visiting him. The thought of paying him a visit comes into my mind this morning. The presence of the thought at once calls into action that other faculty of my spiritual nature which I call my will. The will is a faculty which is always more or less attracted by what is presented to it as something good. It cannot initiate an action of itself. Thought must always go before, and the thought must be of something apprehended as good if the will is to be attracted by it. The will shrinks from what is apprehended as evil. But as the sense of sight is necessarily attracted by what is pleasant to look upon, as the sense of taste is necessarily gratified by what is agreeable to it, so the will is necessarily attracted more or less by what is apprehended in thought as good. If the object is represented as so exceedingly good that there is no admixture of evil in it, and its possession would give unlimited and unadulterated happiness, the will is necessarily and overwhelmingly attracted by it. The human will is not free when such an object is presented to it. The human will necessarily desires complete happiness. But out of Heaven there is no object whose possession can render man completely and perfectly happy. All created goods are limited, they all have some imperfection or evil mixed with them, and when they are presented to the mind in thought, the mind can turn away from the contemplation of the good which they contain to the contemplation of the evil which is mingled with them. That power is the rational foundation of the freedom of the will. Man is endowed with the power of stopping and deliberating about the pursuit of a finite good which has been presented to the will by thought. Although probably there is always some indeliberate movement of the will towards an object which thought presents to it as good and desirable, yet when that object is finite and mingled with imperfection, thought can step in and keep the will in suspense by presenting to it the disadvantages which its pursuit and possession would entail. And so when the thought of visiting my friend who lives twenty miles off occurs to me, although at first I feel my will attracted by the prospect I do not necessarily set off on my visit. If my will was a material force the whole mechanism of my being would at once be set in motion towards my friend when the attraction was felt. But being a spiritual substance I can say to my will—Stay, let us consider the proposal. If I visit my friend to-day, I shall lose a day's work; I shall not be able to keep the appointment I made with another friend who is coming to visit me this afternoon. No, I cannot go to-day, and so the first movement of the will is checked, it does not put the rest of the machinery, which I call myself, in motion. If, on the contrary, on deliberation, I find no great obstacle in the way of paying a visit to my friend, I have nothing to do but to allow the movement of the will, which was started by the thought of my friend, free play. I simply allow it free scope for execution. Mind and will work in harmony, together they quickly settle to go by motor not by train, and to take my child Mary with me, because my friend always likes to see his godchild. And in all this I feel and know that I could have determined otherwise if I had chosen to do so. Not all the learned treatises of all the mechanical philosophers who ever lived could ever persuade me to the contrary. I am convinced that I chose freely to visit my friend, nothing without or within constrained me to it. I am certain that I chose freely to go by car, and that I could have taken the train by preference if I had chosen. I am certain, too, that I was not under compulsion when I elected to take little Mary with me. If I acted freely here, my will is free in large spheres of human life. Nor am I acquainted with anything in the theory of causation, or in that of the conservation of energy, which gainsays my brief exposition of an important doctrine of the Church.

n. ¶47.

* Philosophical Essays, p. 63.

Slater, Back to Morality

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 13 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Chapter XIII: Christian Patriotism

n. ¶222.

AFTER more than a century of struggle and revolution the principle of Nationalism has prevailed—at least, to a great extent. Oppressed nationalities have succeeded to a great extent in securing the freedom and the home rule which they demanded. And yet peace and contentment do not seem to have come together with the realization of the nations’ hopes. Far-seeing men are beginning to fear that a new element of discord and war has been introduced into Europe. Some nations find themselves cooped up within the limits of the lands of their ancestors with frontiers that have no pretension to be scientific. On the other side of their frontiers are hostile and aggressive peoples who seriously threaten their security. In pure self-defence they must make their security more certain. Others find themselves cut off from easy access to the sea, and their commerce with the outside world controlled by jealous neighbours. The more powerful nations are fully conscious of their own superiority. They show little disposition to adopt a self-denying ordinance, and refrain from using their economic and political advantages for their own benefit. On the contrary, they seem determined to take advantage of their opportunities to the full. The watchword of “Germany above all” has not been silenced even though it is uttered in less boisterous tone than was usual before the Great War. National pride and ambition is one of the strongest passions of human nature, and it has not been exorcised by any means as yet.

n. ¶223.

On the contrary, the old spirit of imperial Rome seems to be as strong as ever in some modern peoples. According to the national poet it was the proud mission of Rome to rule the subject nations with imperial sway, to spare those who submitted, and to war down those who obstinately resisted. This, of course, was for the benefit of less cultured nations. Roman culture and Roman peace were blessings which the outer barbarian should be compelled to accept for his own good.

n. ¶224.

The fervour and the absolute character of pagan patriotism added strength to this imperial temper. In his work on Duties, Cicero tells us what pagan patriotism was. “When we have gone over,” he says, “all the relations that are in the world, and thoroughly considered the nature of each, we shall find that there is no one of greater obligation, no one that is dearer and nearer to us than that which all of us bear to the commonwealth. We have a tender regard and concern for our parents, for our children, our kindred and acquaintance, but the love which we have for our native country swallows up all other loves whatsoever.” The ancients deified and worshipped their country, and the ancient state domineered with absolute power over both soul and body. There is not much tendency nowadays to pay religious worship to the state, but in other respects in many quarters a recrudescence of the pagan doctrine of patriotism may be observed.

n. ¶225.

This recrudescence of pagan patriotism is all the more dangerous because it is untrammelled by any laws of morality. The ancient state professed to be scrupulously observant of the laws of justice and fidelity. The modern state adopts the principles of Machiavelli; it acknowledges only one law, the law of success. The watchword, ‘ Germany over all,” is not confined to Germany; some in England change it to “England over all,” and they add another to it, “England, right or wrong.” A powerful state, fettered by no laws, human or divine, treating its pledged word as only a scrap of paper, commanding the blind obedience of its subjects, becomes a menace to the world.

n. ¶226.

While some exaggerate the duty of patriotism, there are others who minimize or deny it altogether. They profess to be cosmopolitans, citizens of the world, or they are Internationals. The Red International of Communism fosters loyalty to class rather than to country. The yellow International of high finance pursues its object of gain irrespective of country; it is prepared to assist the fatherland in difficulties, but on strictly business principles. Many people who belong neither to the red nor to the yellow International deny that patriotism is a virtue. In their opinion it is a mere prejudice, a provincialism, a sort of extended selfishness. The true attitude according to them is to cultivate esteem and friendship for all mankind, and to recognize the good points in all men. Some Catholics even regard patriotism as rather a pagan virtue. The true Catholic, they think, considers heaven as his true fatherland, and looks upon his home on earth as a place of exile and a vale of tears. Are we not exhorted to conduct ourselves here below as strangers and pilgrims? Is not human life a journey through the desert of this world towards the promised land? All this suggests that patriotism is a matter of practical importance, and that it is not without its ambiguities and difficulties. It will be worth while to try to state the Catholic doctrine on the subject as clearly and concisely as possible. We shall find that patriotism is recognized as a virtue by Catholic theology, and that, like all moral virtues, it occupies a mean position between two vicious extremes.

n. ¶227.

Although it may be said that patriotism is nowhere explicitly inculcated as a virtue in Holy Scripture, yet there are many passages and incidents where it is implied. The book of Esther and the books of the Machabees abound in such passages. One of the tenderest and most touching of the Psalms is the hundred and thirty-sixth: “How shall we sing the song of the Lord in a strange land? If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand be forgotten. Let my tongue cleave to my jaws if I do not remember thee.” One of the most pathetic incidents in the Gospels is our Lord’s weeping over Jerusalem. So that if we are taught that heaven is our true spiritual country, and are bidden to conduct ourselves on earth as exiles, this does not mean that we have no duties to our earthly country while we live here.

n. ¶228.

St Ambrose, St Augustine, and St Thomas, in the name of the Church, expressly teach that patriotism is a virtue implanted in us by Nature herself and inculcated by the religion of Christ. It is a part of the two fundamental virtues of justice and charity. Justice requires that we should give everyone his due, that we should pay to all what we owe them. There is no one to whom we owe more than to God, our Creator and Lord. To him we owe all that we have, all that we are, and all that we hope to be. We depend upon him every moment of our existence. We cannot repay him the immense debt that we owe him, but justice compels us to do what we can. We strive to do this by practising the virtue of religion, by giving God the love, honour, and worship which pleases him and which is his due.

n. ¶229.

Under God we owe most to our parents. They brought us into the world, and gave us the first and most important part of our education. We inherited from our parents a certain habit of body, certain tendencies, and certain dispositions, and those dispositions were developed and stereotyped during our early years, when we were under the more immediate control of our parents. Our characters for good or evil were moulded to a great extent before we began to think, and they were moulded largely by our parents and by the home which they provided for us. To our parents we owe the education which was intended to fit us for the battle of life. It is our duty to strive to repay all the debt which we owe to our parents by honouring them, by loving, reverencing, and obeying them as long as we are not emancipated from their control. Our duty towards them of love and reverence lasts as long as life.

n. ¶230.

Under God and our parents we owe most to the country in which we were born and bred. Our country gave us the food, drink, clothing, air, and exercise which our bodies required. Our characters, ideas, feelings, sentiments, aims, and ambitions are to a great extent inherited from the race to which we belong, and are the product of its character, its history, and its traditions. The very hills and valleys, the woods and the rivers of our native land, have left their mark upon us. We should have been quite different beings if we had been born and brought up in Spain or in India.

n. ¶231.

That immense debt which we owe to our country we pay by practising the virtue of patriotism. We are bound to esteem and love our country and to serve it to the best of our ability in its needs. This does not mean that we are to hate other countries. Just as the love of our parents does not imply that we should hate the parents of other people, so the duty of loving our country does not imply that we should hate other countries. We fully recognize that other people have their obligations towards their parents; we prefer our own. In the same way we recognize the duty and the right of other people to love their country; we prefer our own.

n. ¶232.

In the second place, patriotism is based on the great virtue of charity. Our Lord was only announcing what the natural law prescribes when he said that all morality hangs on the two fundamental precepts of the love of God and the love of our neighbour as ourselves. The duty of loving our neighbour as ourselves, of doing as we would be done by, does not mean that we are to entertain the same evenly balanced affection for all men. We must love other men inasmuch as they are our neighbours. We must wish well to the Chinese and the Japanese whom we do not know and shall never see. Our fellow-countrymen are much nearer to us than the Chinese and Japanese; they are our neighbours in a stricter sense, and well-ordered charity takes note of the fact. Their interests and welfare are intimately bound up with ours. We need their help, protection, and good will in a thousand different ways. We are members of the same organized body politic, of the same community, and St Paul tells us that one member cannot say to another: “I need you not.”

n. ¶233.

There is, then, an obligation made known to us by right reason, and enforced by Christian charity, of loving our fellow-countrymen and fellow-citizens with a special degree of affection. The instructed Catholic will not be exposed to the danger of exaggerating this obligation and making it supreme and absolute over all other duties. He knows that he is a member of a still greater communion of saints, to whom also he is bound by special ties in this life and in life everlasting. He must do nothing to imperil his claim to life everlasting, even under the excuse of patriotism. Such a maxim as ‘ England, right or wrong ” is self-condemned in his eyes. And so the true Catholic’s patriotism is real and genuine, but it is not exaggerated. It occupies the golden mean between two vicious extremes. The country which, as true patriots, we are bound to esteem, love, and serve is in general our native land, the country in which we were born and bred. That is clear from what has just been said about justice and charity, the foundations of patriotism.

n. ¶234.

But in these days of emigration the case frequently arises of a man leaving his native land and making a home for himself and his children elsewhere. An Englishman, for example, emigrates to America, with a view to settling there. He will preserve a warm affection for the old country, he may visit it occasionally, but he has made his home in America, and henceforth he will regard America with a true patriot’s esteem and love. That, too, is a conclusion drawn from justice and charity.

Müller, Public School Education

Michael Müller, C.SS.R. — 70 passages (filed under the subtopics)

CHAPTER IX. The State.—Its Usurpation of the Individual Rights.—Its Incompetency to Educate · CHAPTER X. The State a Robber.—Violation of Our Constitution and Common Law

CHAPTER IX. The State.—Its Usurpation of the Individual Rights.—Its Incompetency to Educate

It is certain and undeniable that two orders of things actually exist in this world, the natural order and the supernatural—nature and grace. These two orders have the same ultimate end, though, in themselves, they are distinct. Nature is, and must be, always subordinate to grace; the natural must be always subservient to the supernatural. This is God's immutable decree. Hence religion must always hold the first place in everything. A system of education that places the natural and the supernatural on the same level is absurd, and must be condemned; but a system of education that ignores the supernatural altogether, is, if possible, even more wicked and detestable. Yet this wicked, detestable, irreligious system, diabolical in its origin, and subversive of all political, social, and religious order, is imposed by the State upon all Christian denominations, whether they approve of it or not. Now the State has no right whatever to force such a godless system upon its subjects.

For the right understanding of this most important point, I attach great importance to a clear understanding of what is commonly called the State.

What is the State?

People in general have a vague and confused conception of this matter. You will hear the people talk of the "sovereignty of the State," "the life of the State," "the power of the State," "the absolute authority of the State," "the paramount allegiance due to the State," etc., etc. Not only the Public at large, but even those who assume to lead and direct public opinion, are constantly blundering on this subject.

n. ¶4.

There is nothing so fertile as an idea; it will, like every other germ or seed, bring forth in time according to its kind. If it be a good one, it will bring forth good fruit; if it be a false or bad one, it will spread its evil fruits over society. Be it one or the other, it is never barren; sooner or later, the idea or maxim takes form and substance in an Institution; then it operates, in a material manner, for good or evil.

n. ¶5.

To illustrate: a false conception of the nature and authority, of the legitimate functions, rights and duties of what is called the "State," has led, and will, if not corrected, ever lead to the most deplorable political, social, and religious disorder and oppression. As diverging lines in mathematics can never approximate, but must continue to widen as they are extended, so a false departure from a political "standpoint" can never be rectified unless by a return to correct first principles. This is what is meant by the democratic maxim, "that a frequent return to first principles is necessary to secure the ends of public liberty."

n. ¶6.

Indeed, this error, this diverging point in constitutional interpretation, has been the real cause—the "causa causarum"—of the late war; and not the "negro," or "cotton," or the "spirit of domination," or "difference of race," or what not, might serve as the "proximate cause," but the real cause lay far back of them. I am willing to admit that political events do not always proceed on a strictly logical order, but nevertheless there is a sequence, indeed an inevitable chain of cause and effect in the progress of public affairs, such as we see in individual conduct, but only on a broader scale.

n. ¶7.

Now what is the civil power, or State; what its origin, its authority, its legitimate functions, its rights and duties? Here I must, of necessity, be very brief. The State originated from the natural desire which men experience to obtain certain goods, such as peace, security of life and property, of personal rights and privileges, etc., etc. These are goods which neither individuals, nor families, nor private corporations can procure for themselves satisfactorily. People therefore unite to establish a State, in order to attain, through the State, what they cannot do by their own private exertions. The State, then, is made by the people and for the people. In our form of government it is a mere corporate agency. Its duty is to see that justice is administered, and personal rights and property protected. It holds the sword of justice not for itself, but for others; it is the servant, and not the master. The people were not made for the State, or given to the State, but the State is posterior to the people; it was, as I said before, established by the people and for the people. In them, under God, resides the sovereignty and ultimate permanent authority. The right of the State is to discharge the duties assigned it within the sphere of its delegated authority—that is all.

n. ¶8.

That sphere of action of the State in this country is clearly defined in the written Constitution. The State, then, must scrupulously abstain from violating any of the rights it was organized to protect.

n. ¶9.

There never has been, and never will be, but two forms of government—one seeking to restrain, the other to enlarge, the liberties of the people. To the former belong the centralized and despotic governments of the past and present; to the latter, the limited and representative ones.

n. ¶10.

Russia, without doubt, is the highest type of that despotism so common among Pagan nations. The Czar is the successor of the Gentile Cæsar; he unites in himself the civil and spiritual power; the inevitable result is social oppression, denial of the rights of conscience, of the family, and of the political society. Our government has already made gigantic steps in the same direction. Many of the political minds of this country have been drawn within the circle of monarchial ideas. They are unconsciously, as it were, adopting their forms of thought, and applying their forms of expression to our government, and claiming for it the prerogatives and supremacy appertaining to the feudal institutions of Asia and Europe. Our simple democratic form of government seems to be getting ashamed of its plebeian origin, and ambitious to ape the language and pretensions of its former masters. This decadence was made apparent not long ago, in the discussions "for the removal of the United States Capitol." In a two-hours' discussion, the word "Republic," or "Federal Government," or "United States," was not once mentioned!! It was "Nation," "Empire," etc., etc., usque ad nauseam, from beginning to end. To a reflecting mind, this language has an ominous significance. It smacks strongly of monarchy.

n. ¶11.

But some one will perhaps say, "Sir, what has all this dissertation to do with your subject? You commence by disclaiming against the Public School System, and here you are giving a grave lecture on the nation relapsing into imperialism or monarchy."

n. ¶12.

It has a great deal to do; it is an attempt to trace effects to their causes. This government of ours, both in its Federal and State capacity, is growing ambitious to play the King. It is setting itself up as master. It is using the language of all tyrants: "Sic volo, sic jubeo," etc., etc. It claims, after the example of Prussia or Russia, or some other despotism, to direct the education of the children of the people. It even claims them as belonging to itself. It is the great feudal master. It takes upon itself the old duty of providing instruction for the sons and daughters of its dependents. It takes upon itself the discharge of duties imposed on parents by Divine Law, just as if fathers and mothers had lost their natural instincts as well as sense of duty; just as if the State had all the intelligence, virtue, and forethought of the public in her keeping. It dispenses parents from a duty from which God will never dispense them. It has usurped the office of teacher; it will, if not checked, set itself up as preacher. It makes Sunday laws, temperance laws; it places marriage on the footing of simple contracts, facilitates divorce; it is constantly, in all these things and many others, repeating the "mot" ascribed to a King of France: "L'état c'est moi." In fine, it makes, as it has been aptly, but not very reverently, said, God a little man, and itself and the State a little god, not in love and charity, indeed, but in power and authority.

n. ¶13.

Here is where the danger comes from, and it is against this that the people must provide. The people must see to it that the State, or those who are charged with its authority, keep within their proper place. The people can never be too vigilant or jealous of their constituted authority, never permit themselves to be the victims of misplaced confidence. The State is not seldom the usurper—the rebel that should be watched. The allegiance is not to it, but from it to the people—its master. "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."

n. ¶14.

The people have been greatly deceived and wronged by the State on the establishment of the Public School system. The better to understand this, let us see again, in a few words, what are the principles on which the establishment of public schools is based. How did men arrive at the idea that the State should be a school-master? If we consult history, we shall find that this idea rests upon most objectionable grounds. In Europe—in Protestant countries—the education of youth was held to belong to the church. But as the Protestant prince was also the chief bishop of his church, he had the care of schools, as well as the administration of other religious matters. According to this principle of the State-church, all the schools were State-schools. At the present day, Protestant princes and princesses are not looked upon as chief bishops, but the consequence of this objectionable system does still remain, and has gained a foothold even in this free country.

n. ¶15.

The French Revolution, among other things, diffused communistic and socialistic theories. Nay, communism and socialism seemed to have, for a moment, the fullest sway in those revolutionary proceedings. It is from such socialistic revolutionists that came the idea, or rather principle, which was made a law, that the State should educate the children of its subjects. Accordingly the school-system was arranged, which Napoleon I. highly welcomed and retained, as he saw in it a welcome instrument of his despotism. In fact, nothing pleases State-absolutism or despotism so much as the complete control of education through the system of State-schools. As the result of impartial history, then, we see that the foundation of the State-school system is nothing else than the objectionable Protestant State-church, and especially revolutionary socialism.

n. ¶16.

But most absurd did the State-school system appear after it had been transplanted into free America. Here this "State system of education" was at first applied to the poor, and other unprovided-for "waifs of society." But not long after, the State claimed to have a paramount interest in the children of all classes; it made no distinction, it knew not the rich from the poor, but opened its scholastic treasures alike, and it was thought to be all right.

n. ¶17.

What an absurdity! The State, as I have remarked, must scrupulously abstain from violating any of those rights which it was organized to protect. It must not paralyze or take away the industry of the individual, family, or private institutions by substituting for it its own industry. The State should rather protect and promote the industry of its subjects, as well as other rights and liberties. Let me speak more plainly: the State, for instance, should protect trade, but it should not be itself a tradesman; the State should encourage agriculture, but it should not be itself a farmer; the State should sustain honest handicraft, but it should not work at shoe-making or tailoring, and bread-baking. So, in the same manner, the State should promote and protect education, but it should not be itself a school-master, and give instruction.

n. ¶18.

What a cry would be raised if the State erected State workshops, and thereby ruined all other similar trades! Now the State does the same thing, as far as possible, in regard to education. What an absurdity! In our free country, State education has no more foundation in good sense than the old sumptuary laws, that regulated the length of a boot or the dimensions of a skirt.

n. ¶19.

If the State claims the right to educate our children, why does it not just as well claim the right to nurse, feed, clothe, doctor, and lodge them? Indeed these necessities are more indispensable, and must be supplied to a considerable extent before education can be given at all. Why should the State throw all these burdens on the parents, and assume that of instruction? It cannot claim to know more of grammar than of the art of nursing and cooking. It is even said that the tailor and barber have more to do in fashioning the man than the school-master.

n. ¶20.

Again, how absurd is it not for the State to undertake to teach all alike, without regard to their circumstances or prospects in life, the same business. This scholastic equality soon ends, if it ever had a reality. They cannot all expect to be Newtons, Humboldts, or La Places. They cannot be all, nay, not one in ten thousand, "professors," or "editors," or what not. We cannot, if we would, escape the sentence imposed on our forefather in the garden: "Thou shalt eat thy bread in the sweat of thy face." As well might the State claim that all the children from seven to seventeen years of age should sit at the same table, provided at public expense, and be served with the same food and the same number of dishes. If the State (in order to prepare the rising generation to make citizens, which must be its reason, if any) thinks it necessary to prescribe a State education, it is equally important that their food, and even their clothing, should be of the approved State quality and pattern!!! All know that this was the old Lacædemonian plan, and how it ended history tells;—in ferocity, avarice, dishonesty and disruption. All admit the folly and wickedness of forcing a people into uniformity in matter of religion. Now it is just as unreasonable, just as absurd, just as wicked to force the people into uniformity in the matter of education. One species of tyranny as well as the other disregards the just claims of conscience, tramples on the most vital rights of individuals, and usurps the most sacred right of the family.

n. ¶21.

The State may, indeed, require that the children should be educated, in order that they may one day become worthy members of society, and fit subjects for the State; but claim, and give, and control their education, the State cannot. There is in all this matter a feature not always clearly represented. It is this: any provision made by the "State" for education, must refer to the poor and otherwise unprovided, and be justified on the grounds of the State standing to these classes in loco parentis; beyond this, though the State, as to "charitable uses," may be defined parens patria, yet, as to the people at large, it has nothing to do with their education whatever. If this simple though undeniable fact were properly understood, it would save a world of trouble and confusion.

n. ¶22.

I am speaking of a "Christian State," and the State in America is Christian. The very graves, if necessary, would open and give up their dead to bear testimony to its Christian origin. Its civilization is Christian, and is the product of the principles of the "New Law" as taught and promulgated by the Church. The distinguishing feature of this civilization is, that it has asserted the dignity of freedom of the individual man, while the ancient, or Gentile, civilization, sunk the individual man in the composite society called the State. In that case it was but reasonable that the State should, as owner, take upon itself the burden of providing, not only for his government, but also for the education of his offspring. These, too, belonged to it, on the maxim of Roman or Pagan law, that partus sequitur ventrem, or the offspring follows the parent. This is the origin of the Pagan doctrine, "the children of the State"—a miserable relic of barbarism. It is important to keep this fact in mind, when we deny the supremacy of the State in the matter of education.

n. ¶23.

Our children, then, are not the children of the State. The State has no children, and never had, nor will. The State does not own them, nor their fathers nor mothers, nor anybody else in this country, thank God! We have not got that far yet on the road to civil slavery, and I hope we never shall. We are not Pagans, nor Mahometans, nor Russians. We have not sold out, and don't intend to! We are free, for with a great price our forefathers have bought this freedom; and better still, we are made, through the mercy of our Divine Author, Christians, and heirs to a heavenly kingdom. Our children, too, are free; they belong by the order of nature to their parents, and by the order of grace to our Lord Jesus Christ. They are children of God and heirs to His heavenly kingdom. It is not on the State, but on parents, that God imposed the duty to educate their children, a duty from which no State can dispense, nor can fathers and mothers relieve themselves of this duty by the vicarious assumption of the State. They have to give a severe account of their children on the Day of Judgment, and they cannot allow any power to disturb them in insisting upon their rights and making free use of them. The State has no more authority or control rightfully over our children, than over a man's wife. The right to educate our children is a right of conscience, and a right of the family. Now these rights do not belong to the temporal order at all; and outside of this the State has no claim, no right, no authority. When the State has children, it will be time enough to teach them. How long will it take our enlightened age to learn this simple but important truth?

n. ¶24.

Nothing shows better the absurdity of the State in claiming the right of education, than its incompetency for the task. The State is forbidden any interference with religion.

n. ¶25.

I have shown that the whole system is infidel in principle. The State says we want no religion taught in the Public Schools, because, as we cannot teach you religion without inculcating some form or other professed by some sect or other, and as we do not wish to give offence, we will teach you none. Let the child believe anything or nothing, so as it is not some form of "sectarianism." I worship in the "Pantheon;" all are alike to me, of course. In all this the State is perfectly consistent, and cannot do otherwise. It has undertaken a part it is not competent to perform. The State, as State, professes no form of belief. Its gods, its worships, its altars, its victims, its rewards, its punishments, its heaven, its hell—are here. It teaches no religion, because it don't profess any. It was not born, it will not die, it has no soul, it was not created, it will not be judged in the world to come, like men.

n. ¶26.

But let me not be misunderstood as concluding that states, nations, or kingdoms are not moral persons, and are not responsible for their acts and conduct to Almighty God. They have no right to do wrong more than an individual. "States" have their lives, their mission, their destiny; they have their sphere here below. They represent the temporal, or the things which belong to Cæsar.

n. ¶27.

The State, then, is a moral person, and a fortiori, a religious person, for there can be no morality without religion. But though religion, in a general sense, be recognized by the State, it has no authority to control or direct it. It must respect the conscience of an individual. This is his birthright, and cannot be voted away, whether to support Public Schools or Public Churches.

n. ¶28.

If there be amongst us any number, great or small, who deny the common faith, it is the duty of the State to tolerate them. A greater power—God—does this. But the State itself cannot profess or play infidel, or, under pretence of avoiding sectarian partiality, strike at the root of all Christianity. I admit the State is of the "temporal order," and cannot discriminate between the various modes of belief; but not for that can it place itself outside of them. It is distinguishable, but not separable, from the spiritual order. It is simply a means to a greater end. It is a mischievous error to say that the State has nothing to do with religion, and may act outside of its obligations. If by this it is meant that the State cannot establish or maintain any special form of religion, or interfere with its profession, or even denial by others, I admit the proposition; but if, on the other hand, it is meant that it regards Christianity and infidelity, God or no God, truth and error, either as equal or unimportant, then I utterly deny and condemn it. To bear with and tolerate error is its duty; to foster or provide for its support or propagation, or place it on the same footing with revealed truth, is another and very different thing.

n. ¶29.

The constitutions of the State guarantee to every citizen the right to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience; but this is not guaranteeing to every one the liberty of not worshipping God at all, to deny His existence, His revelation, or to worship a false god. The freedom guaranteed is the freedom of religion, not the freedom of infidelity. The American Constitution grants to the infidel the right of protection in his civil and political equality, but it grants him no right to protection and support in his infidelity; for infidelity is not a religion, but the denial of all religion. The American State is Christian, and under the Christian law, and is based upon Christian principles. It is bound to protect and enforce Christian morals and its laws, whether assailed by Mormonism, Spiritism, Freelovism, Pantheism, or Atheism. But the State does the contrary. For, I ask, is not the State indirectly prohibiting the profession of Christianity by establishing a system of education which prohibits all religious instruction? The State forbids the teacher to speak a word on the subject of religion.

n. ¶30.

The State says that "it is an admitted axiom that our form of government, more than all others, depends on the virtue and intelligence of the people. The State proposes to furnish this virtue and intelligence through the Public Schools." That is, the safety of the State depends on the virtue and intelligence of the people, and the latter is derived from the virtue and intelligence of the "State." But where does the virtue and intelligence of the State come from? The only answer on this theory is, from the people. So the "State" enlightens and purifies the people, and the people enlighten and purify the "State." The people support the State, the State supports the Public Schools, and they support the State. If this is not what logicians call a "vicious circle," it looks very much like it. It puts me in mind of the Brahmin's theory of the support of the earth. The Hindoo says, "The world rests on the back of an elephant—the elephant rests on the back of a turtle." But what does the turtle rest on? So it is with our "Public School Brahmins." They will tell you, with all the coolness of Hindoo hypocrisy and pretension, that the "State depends on the schools—the schools on the State or people," but they do not say what the turtle stands on. This is the dilemma that all who rest society on the State, or on an atheistical basis, get into. They would cut the world loose from its assigned order of dependence on Divine Law, and "set it a-going on its own hook." But the trouble is, they have no support for this turtle; they have an earth without axis. The Public School savans would have a self-supporting, a self-adjusting, and a self-created State, balanced on nothing, resting on nothing, responsible to nothing, and believing in nothing but in its own perfection and immortality. They pretend, "through godless schools," to give virtue without morality, morality without religion, and religion without God; thereby sinking below the level of the poor Indian, whose untutored mind sees God in the clouds, and hears Him in the wind.

n. ¶31.

The nameless abominations of the Communists, Fourrierists, and other such vile and degraded fraternities; the cold-blooded murders and frightful suicides that fill so many domestic hearths with grief and shame; the scarcely-concealed corruption of public and professional men; the adroit peculation and wilful embezzlement of the public money; those monopolizing speculations and voluntary insolvencies so ruinous to the community at large; and, above all, those shocking atrocities so common in our country of unbelief—the legal dissolution of the matrimonial tie, and the wanton tampering with life in its very bud; all these are humiliating facts sufficient to convince any impartial mind that there can be no social virtue, no morality, no true and lasting greatness, without religion.

n. ¶32.

"Religion," says Lord Derby, "is not a thing apart from education, but is interwoven with its whole system; it is a principle which controls and regulates the whole mind and happiness of the people." And, "Popular education," says Guizot, "to be truly good and socially useful, must be fundamentally religious."

n. ¶33.

The essential element of education—its pith and marrow, so to speak—is the religious element. By excluding it from the school-room the State has committed a crying injustice to the rising generation, and one of the worst—if not the very worst—of crimes against society. It is not one portion of the "triple man," but the whole—the physical, intellectual, and moral being—the body, the mind, the head, as stated in a previous chapter—that must be cultivated and "brought up." Neglect any one part of man's nature, and you at once disturb the equilibrium of the whole, and produce disorder; educate the body at the expense of the mind and soul, and you will have only animated clay; educate the intelligence at the expense of the moral and religious feelings, and you but fearfully increase a man's power to effect evil. You store the arsenal of his mind with weapons to sap alike the altar and the throne, to carry on a war of extermination against every holy principle, against the welfare and the very existence of society.

n. ¶34.

Science, without religion, is more destructive than the sword in the hands of unprincipled men; it will prove more of a demon than a god. It is these upholders of the present Public School system that arrest the progress of true happiness in our country, and prepare terrible catastrophes, which may deluge the land with blood.

n. ¶35.

Who were the leaders in the work of destruction and wholesale butchery in the Reign of Terror? The nurslings of lyceums in which the chaotic principles of the "philosophers" were proclaimed as oracles of truth.

n. ¶36.

Who are those turbulent revolutionists who now long to erect the guillotine by the Tuilleries? And who are those secret conspirators and their myrmidon partisans who have sworn to unify Italy or lay it in ruins? Men who were taught to scout the idea of a God and rail at religion, to consider Christianity as a thing of the past; men who revel in wild chimeras by night, and seek to realize their mad dreams by day.

n. ¶37.

Let us, then, dear American fellow-citizens, rest assured that intellectual discipline, without the coöperation of any religious element, will not, and cannot, produce the greatness of a nation, nor can it maintain its life and splendor and prevent its decay; let us, on the contrary, be persuaded that the only safety for a commonwealth, the only source of greatness and prosperity for a nation, as well as of tranquillity and happiness for the individual, is the true religion of Jesus Christ; it is this religion alone that is the safeguard of morality, and morality is the best security of law, as well as the surest pledge of freedom.

CHAPTER X. The State a Robber.—Violation of Our Constitution and Common Law

We have seen, so far, that the irreligious, godless system of the Public Schools tends directly to turn the youth of both sexes into the worst kind of infidels; to make them disregard good principles, and hold iniquity in veneration; to do away, not only with all revealed religion, but even with the law of nature; to make them practise fraud, theft, and robbery almost as a common trade; to make them regardless of their parents and of all divinely constituted authority; we have seen that this godless system of education is the most powerful means to create confusion, not only in religion, but also in government and in the family circle; to increase the number of apostates, and make of these apostates members of such secret societies as aim at the overthrow of governments and all good order, and Christian religion itself.

Truly, this godless system of education, if carried out to its logical consequences, will disrupt society, destroy the right of the Christian family entirely, bring back on the world the barbarism, tyranny and brutality of Pagan antiquity, and make slaves and victims of its children and their posterity forever!