Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology

Article Third. On the Obligation of Subjection

312.

312. Obligations of citizens. Subject citizens ought to show kings and rulers reverence, obedience, and fidelity; sacred Scripture commemorates these obligations: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers, for there is no power except from God."1

  1. Reverence due to rulers requires that in them there be acknowledged the supreme authority conferred on them by God, and that therefore, on account of the superiority by which they excel, due honor be furnished to them. And what is said of the ruler is valid, proportion having been preserved, also concerning inferior magistrates.

Hence subject citizens can sin even gravely both by internal contempt and by external irreverence, if they inflict insult either upon the ruler himself or upon his publicly displayed image; if from contempt of authority they deny due signs of honor when these must be publicly shown to the ruler; if publicly by mouth or in writing they bring forth contumelious words against him.

  1. Obedience. To the right of commanding, which belongs to the head of society, there corresponds in its members the office of obeying. Therefore the Apostle says: "Be subject of necessity, not only because of wrath, but also because of conscience."2 But a twofold condition is required so that a civil law oblige in conscience: a. that it be just; b. that it be preceptive, not merely penal or merely invalidating.

On the obedience due to a usurper. A usurper is one who by force casts out the legitimate ruler and unjustly arrogates public power to himself. Now:

a. Citizens are bound to obey a usurper who is in quiet possession of the arrogated power in laws which are established for preserving public order; not indeed from a right of making laws, which in the usurper is none, but on account of the common good. This good requires from citizens that they furnish obedience lest the republic be disturbed, and from the legitimate ruler that he consent to the obedience of the citizens, because he cannot will that the republic perish rather than that the citizens subject themselves to the usurper.

b. Citizens ought to abstain from any act by which the usurper is acknowledged as legitimate ruler or by which his usurped power is confirmed and consolidated.3

  1. Fidelity: for it is never licit to rebel, even if the ruler abuses his power; and in like manner it is never licit to kill the ruler, even if his regime is excessively tyrannical; therefore the Church has always condemned rebellion and tyrannicide.4

1 Cf. Rom. 13:1-7.

2 Rom. 13:5.

3 What things in this matter are licit or illicit we learn from several responses of the Sacred Penitentiary given on the occasion of the recent Roman invasion, 6 Oct. 1859; 10 Dec. 1860; 1 Dec. 1866. Cf. Villada, Casus conscientiae^2, I, p. 197 ss.; Pruner, Kath. Moraltheol.^3, p. 355.

4 The Christian doctrine on this matter is contained in the encyclical letters of Gregory XVI, Mirari, 15 Aug. 1832, and of Leo XIII, Diuturnum, 29 Jun. 1881.

313.

313. On fidelity to be furnished to a tyrant. A tyrant is called a legitimate ruler who abuses his power to oppress the people by force. It is asked whether and how the people can legitimately defend themselves against a manifestly tyrannical government.

a. Rebellion is never licit. By the name of rebellion is understood violence inflicted by subjects upon a legitimate ruler to depose him. Therefore rebellion properly so called has the character not of defense, but of aggression; but subjects indeed have the right of defending themselves, but not of making war upon the tyrant, since he is the true lord. Therefore the Apostle says: "He who resists the power resists the ordinance of God";1 and Pius IX proscribes this proposition: "It is licit to refuse obedience to legitimate rulers, indeed even to rebel."2 Therefore by the law of nature and the Christian law tyrannicide is illicit, that is, the killing of a legitimate ruler is illicit, whether it is done by a private man or by the multitude.

b. Passive resistance, by which an oppressed people defends and protects itself against the injury of a tyrannical government, is not only licit but sometimes even prescribed.

Passive resistance consists in this, that subjects constantly deny obedience to the unjust laws of the tyrant. That this is licit is clear, because the obligation of obeying in subjects cannot extend more widely than the right of commanding in the ruler. The same is prescribed as often as those things are demanded which are contrary to the natural or divine law.

In this case it is necessary to obey God rather than men;3 and the punishments which are inflicted on that account must be borne patiently. To passive resistance in this case, officials of the republic are chiefly obligated, since it is not licit for them either to promulgate or to commit to execution unjust laws of the tyrant which are contrary to a higher law.

Note. It can happen that even a government which cannot be called tyrannical establishes unjust laws. In this case also it is licit to oppose passive resistance to them. And laws which cannot be observed without sin, because they are directly opposed to the rights of God or of the Church, it is never licit to obey, even if on that account the gravest temporal evils had to be sustained. But laws which can be observed without sin, because they are directly opposed only to the rights of subjects, which they themselves can renounce, may be obeyed, and sometimes they must be obeyed, namely where greater evils would follow from non-observance. Moreover, the present form of government supplies to citizens certain means by whose use they can obtain the abolition of unjust laws, such as public papers which show that the laws are wicked, the election of deputies who defend the rights of citizens, the right of petition, the right of association, and the right of calling assemblies.

1 Rom. 13:2.

2 Syllabus, n. 63.

3 Acts 5:29.