Oaths

AN oath is the calling on God to witness to the truth of what we say. This calling on God may be express or tacit; it is express when God is mentioned, as, ‘‘ I swear by God ”’; it is tacit when we swear by some creature which in a special way shows forth the Divinity or has some special relation to him, as, ‘‘ I swear by the Christian Faith,” “‘ by the Gospel,” “by Heaven.”

In an assertory oath we call God to witness to the truth of a present or past event; in a promissory oath we call him to witness to some future event.

A solemn oath is clothed with the ceremonies prescribed by law, such as holding up the right hand or kissing the Bible; a simple oath is devoid of such ceremonies.

An imprecation is sometimes added to an oath by such words as, ‘‘ so help me God ”’; in this case we have an imprecatory oath; otherwise it is an invocatory oath.

There cannot be an oath strictly so called unless there be the intention of swearing and a suitable form of words be used which express that intention. One who uses the colloquialism, “‘ I swear it is so,’ usually has no intention of taking an oath, nor do the words signify an intention of calling on God to witness to the truth of what is said. The same must be said of phrases like ‘‘ on my honour,” “ by my faith,” * God knows ”’; and a fortiori the mention of fabulous gods, as, “‘ by Jupiter,’ etc. However, if there be an intention to take an oath, this will be sufficient to make it binding in conscience whatever the form of words may be, so that perjury will be committed if what is asserted is not true. If the form of words is suitable for an oath, the intention to swear is presumed.

If the requisite conditions be fulfilled, oaths are lawful, and indeed they are an act of divine worship, for they are an acknowledgement of the omniscience and veracity of God, as well as a public profession of belief in him. This has been the constant teaching of the Church, teaching which has ample warrant in both the Old and New Testament, The prophet 1$7 Jeremias lays down the conditions which justify an oath, and many instances of oaths are found in the epistles of the Apostle of the Gentiles. The words of our Lord¹ do not prohibit the taking of oaths if the requisite conditions be present. They give expression to his desire that all Christians should be so truthful and sincere that it will not be necessary for them to use oaths to confirm the truth of what they assert. The conditions which make an oath lawful are given in the words of Jeremias:² ‘‘ And thou shalt swear, As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgement, and in justice.”

We swear in truth when we are morally certain that what we assert under oath is according to fact. We are not justified in asserting that to be true which we do not know to be true and we commit the grave sin of perjury if we swear to what we know to be false.

We swear with judgement when there is a just cause for invoking the testimony of God and it is done with proper consideration and reverence. A just cause will be any matter of some importance for the welfare of either soul or body, whether it be public or private. We are not, therefore, justified in swearing to every assertion which we believe to be true; there must be some special reason for employing the name and authority of God to confirm what we say. However, provided that the other conditions are not wanting, the defect of judgement in swearing will not be more than a venial sin, for it is no more than the idle use of the name of God.

It is an insult to God to invoke his testimony to a sinful act or in furtherance of what is sinful. If this is done, the oath is unlawful on account of the want of justice. Justice, then, in this connection requires that the assertion in an assertory oath should not be sinful, such as a sin of detraction or boasting about past sins. In a promissory oath, that which is promised must be honest and lawful.

There is some difficulty and dispute among theologians about the gravity of the sin which is committed when an oath wants justice. If in an assertory oath the testimony of God is unjustifiably invoked to promote a seriously sinful object, the want of justice in the oath will be gravely sinful. If, on the contrary, the testimony of God does not further the end in view, the want of justice will probably be only venially sinful, because the assertion is true, as is here presumed, and the irreverence committed against God by invoking his testimony even to a gravely sinful act does not seem to many to be more than a venial sin.

An oath, therefore, taken to confirm detraction in a grave matter is mortally sinful; an oath confirming a boast about grave sins committed in the past is probably only venial.

Somewhat similarly in a promissory oath, if the act promised be gravely sinful, the defect of justice makes the oath gravely sinful; for it is a great insult to God to use his testimony to further what is mortally sinful. If the act promised is only a venial sin, a probable opinion holds that the oath is only venially sinful, against a more probable contrary view.

¹ Matt. v 34.

² Jer. iv 2.

The effect of a promissory oath is to bind the person swearing to do what he promises by an additional obligation derived from the virtue of religion, which requires that out of reverence for God we should religiously perform what we promised under oath. If we fail to do this in a matter of moment, grave sin will be committed, as all acknowledge. Moreover, as is obvious, if when the oath is taken there is no intention of keeping it, a grave sin of perjury is committed, for perjury is never venial on account of triviality of matter. If, however, when the oath was taken there was a serious intention of keeping it, but afterwards there was a failure to do so in a matter of small moment, a probable opinion holds that such a want of fidelity in a small matter cannot be more than a venial sin.

The obligation imposed by a promissory oath is of strict interpretation, and follows the nature of the act or contract to which it is annexed, so that it is dependent on all the conditions and limitations with which law, or custom, or the circumstances invest the act or contract. For a promissory oath is accessory and follows the nature of the principal act to which it is annexed. And so an oath to observe the rules or statutes of a corporation is understood to refer only to those that are in force.¹

¹ Can. 1318, 1321.

n. 6.

An oath should conduce to the service and honour of God; it cannot be a bond of iniquity; and so an oath to do what is wrong is sinful and of no effect. Similarly, an oath to do what is useless, or which hinders greater good, is null and void. In case, however, another party has acquired rights under an oath, justice requires that this should be kept, and so the mission oath, by which a sworn promise is given to serve a particular church or mission, binds a missionary priest even though he is persuaded that he has a vocation to the religious state.

In accordance with rules of canon law, an oath extorted by violence or grave fear is valid, but it can be dispensed by an ecclesiastical superior. Moreover, an oath taken without violence or fraud by which one renounces a private advantage or favour granted him by law must be kept as long as it can be kept without sin (Can. 1317, sec. 2, 3).

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. II, § III, Point I. On Religion · Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. I, Pt. I, Sect. II, Chapter II. On the Precept of the External Act, or Profession of Faith · Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Section III. On the Oath · Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. III, Chapter 1. On the Oath Generally · Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. III, Chapter II. On the Promissory Oath Specifically · Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Scholion. On the Fictitious Oath · Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. VIII, Diss. I, Pt. I, Sect. III, Ch. II, Scholion. On Accidental Elements of Betrothals

An oath may cease to bind from intrinsic or from extrinsic causes. If circumstances produce a change in the matter of the oath so that it has become unlawful, or useless, or an obstacle to greater good, or if some condition is not fulfilled, the oath no longer binds. The same must be said when the motive of a promissory oath no longer exists, as if I swore to help a poor person with money who subsequently becomes rich (Can. 1319).

An oath may be annulled, dispensed, commuted, or relaxed, in much the same way as a vow, and it will be more convenient to treat of these extrinsic causes for being released from the obligation of an oath in the next chapter, where the doctrine is applicable to vows and oaths alike (Can. 1320).

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 17 passages

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. II, § III, Point I. On Religion

n. 387.

III. Acts of Religion. The acts of religion are distinguished into internal and external acts. The internal acts are devotion and prayer. External acts are those by which we worship God either through one's own body, and this is adoration; or by offering to God some external thing, and these are sacrifice, oblation, and vow; or by assuming something pertaining to God, namely either the Sacraments or the name of God, which can be assumed either by invocation, or by oath, or by adjuration (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 84, Preface). Concerning each of these, discussion will be had in Book II.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. I, Pt. I, Sect. II, Chapter II. On the Precept of the External Act, or Profession of Faith

n. 490.

I. The external act, or profession of faith, is sometimes prescribed. This is clear: 1. From Sacred Scripture. "If thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God has raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."¹ 2. From the fact that the Church was instituted by her Author as an external, visible society of believers. But such a society carries with it that believers also profess the faith externally. 3. The majesty of God revealing requires this, for external adherence also is owed to Him. How greatly the obligation of sometimes professing the faith presses is clear, for example, from the fact that the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, on May 28, 1635, responded that "a Mohammedan who wishes, on account of danger to life, to be a hidden Christian and to remain such cannot be admitted to baptism, but must transfer himself to places where he can publicly profess the Christian religion."²

II. The external act, or profession of faith, generally obliges the faithful "whenever their silence, evasiveness, or manner of acting would carry with it an implicit denial of faith, contempt of religion, injury to God, or scandal of neighbor" (can. 1325, § 1). Specifically, it obliges:

By reason of the precept of faith itself:

a) When a baptized infant attains the use of reason, or an adult embraces the faith or returns to it after public departure.

b) Several times in life, as is gathered from the arguments adduced under I. Besides, a man who lives Christianly abundantly satisfies this obligation, since hundreds of times he places acts which contain a profession of faith at least in an act exercised.

c) When the honor of God as Author of faith must be defended (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3, a. 2); this has place: 1. if someone is questioned by public authority. Hence proposition 18 was condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone is questioned by public power, I counsel that he frankly confess the faith as glorious to God and the faith; to be silent I do not condemn as sinful per se."³ But "if a prince by a general law orders the faithful to disclose themselves, by wearing a sign, or presenting themselves, or otherwise, they are not bound, since no one is bound to speak the truth unless he has been specially asked" (St. Alphonsus, II, 14, 50), that is, the obligation of professing the faith presses only when someone is summoned before the law. Make exception if civil authority questions someone about the faith contrary to the prescription of law. Nor is the case present if someone is questioned for a merely political end, for example on the occasion of a census of the people. 2. If the faith is treated contemptuously and someone can conveniently defend it, for example by refuting objections that have been brought forward (St. Alphonsus, II, 11). 3. If, considering the circumstances, omission of profession would be taken for denial of the faith, as if, when several persons have been questioned about the faith and others are professing it, you were silent (St. Alphonsus, II, 14, 40); likewise if, when you were questioned about the faith, another, while you were silent, answered for you that you were not a Catholic. I said considering the circumstances, because per se there is no obligation of professing the faith if someone is questioned by a private person (St. Alphonsus, II, 13, 20).

d) When, unless someone professes the faith, there is grave danger that he will deny the faith.

e) When profession of faith has been prescribed by the Church. Now:

alpha) It must be made by an adult to be baptized⁴ and, if an infant is to be baptized, by the sponsors;⁵ likewise by priests in their ordination⁶ and bishops in their consecration;⁷ specifically, by a person past puberty who is to be baptized and who is converted from heresy or schism to the faith.⁸

beta) From can. 1406, those held to the obligation of making profession of faith, according to the formula⁹ approved by the Apostolic See, are:

Before the president or his delegate, those who are present at an Ecumenical or particular Council or at a diocesan Synod with either consultative or deliberative vote; but the president before the same Council or Synod.
Before the Dean of the Sacred College, the first Cardinals in the order of priests and of deacons, and the Camerlengo of the Holy Roman Church, those promoted to the cardinalitial dignity.
Before a delegate from the Apostolic See, those promoted to an episcopal see, even a nonresidential one, or to the governance of an abbey or prelature nullius, an Apostolic Vicariate, or an Apostolic Prefecture.
Before the cathedral Chapter, the Capitular Vicar.
Before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the Chapter, those who have been promoted to a dignity or canonry.
Before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the other consultors, those taken into the office of diocesan consultors.
Before the local Ordinary or his delegate, the Vicar General, parish priests, and those for whom provision has been made concerning any benefices, even manual benefices, having care of souls; the rector and professors of sacred theology, canon law, and philosophy in seminaries, at the beginning of each scholastic year or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; all who are to be promoted to the order of subdiaconate; censors of books, of whom in can. 1393; priests appointed for hearing confessions and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those offices.
Before the Ordinary or his delegate, the Rector of a University or Faculty; but before the Rector of a University or Faculty, or his delegate, all professors in a canonically erected University or Faculty, at the beginning of each scholastic year or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; likewise those who, after examination has been made, are endowed with academic degrees.
Before the Chapter or Superior who appointed them, or their delegate, Superiors in clerical religions (can. 1406, § 1).
Those who, after having left the prior office, benefice, or dignity, obtain another office or benefice or dignity, even of the same species, must again make profession of faith according to the norm of this canon (can. 1406, § 2), that is, can. 1406, § 1.

gamma) From the decree of the Holy Office,¹⁰ the anti-modernist oath, prescribed by Pius X in the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum,¹¹ must be made, until the Apostolic See establishes otherwise on this matter, and indeed according to the formula attached to the Motu Proprio, which, with their name signed, they shall give to their Ordinary:

Clerics to be initiated into major orders; to each of them beforehand let there be handed a copy both of the profession of faith and of the formula for taking the oath, so that they may know them accurately in advance, with the sanction, as below, for violation of the oath added.
Priests appointed for hearing confessions and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those offices.¹² These, however, are not bound when their faculties are prolonged or when they transfer to another diocese.
Parish priests, Canons, and Beneficiaries before entering into possession of the benefice.
Officials in episcopal curias and ecclesiastical tribunals, not excepting the Vicar General and judges.
Those chosen to deliver sermons during the time of Lent.
All officials in Roman Congregations or tribunals before the Cardinal Prefect or Secretary of the same Congregation or tribunal.
Moderators of religious families and Congregations before they enter office.
Doctors both of seminaries and of religious families, before they enter office.¹³

It is disputed whether those designated under 8 are bound to make the oath yearly. Now it seems it must be answered affirmatively; for the Holy Office declared¹⁴ that the prescriptions regarding the anti-modernist oath must remain in their full force until the Apostolic See establishes otherwise on this matter. But, considering the prescriptions regarding the anti-modernist oath, the said oath was to be made yearly by the aforesaid Doctors.¹⁵

Objection 1. The oath is intended as a complement of the profession of faith; and therefore, once the yearly profession of faith has been removed, it should likewise be held as removed. But the profession of faith must be made only at the beginning of the office undertaken (can. 1406, § 1, 7).

Response. The argument adduced seems sufficiently to prove that the reason of complement in the case should not be urged so strongly; in other words, that the anti-modernist oath must be urged even independently of the profession of faith. Besides, there is a special reason for requiring the oath, namely the combating of modernism, and this reason persists and presses, even if the profession of faith is omitted.

Objection 2. The declaration of the Holy Office can regard only the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, which does not prescribe a yearly oath; but not the declaration of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, which extends the sense of the said Motu Proprio to each year.

Response. Apart from the fact that it is in no way clear that the Motu Proprio does not prescribe a yearly oath, the declaration of the Holy Office is considered to regard the Motu Proprio as it had in fact been in force. But in fact it had been in force according to the norm of the declaration of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, whether that declaration is extensive or comprehensive.

Note 1. One does not satisfy the obligation of making profession of faith, established by can. 1406, if he makes it through a procurator or before a layman (can. 1407).

Note 2. Any custom against the canons just cited is reprobated (can. 1408), that is, canons 1406 and 1407.

Note 3. One who, contrary to the prescription of can. 1406, neglects to make profession of faith without a just impediment is to be warned, with a suitable term also fixed beforehand; when this has elapsed, if he is contumacious, he is to be punished even by deprivation of office, benefice, dignity, or function; nor meanwhile does he make his own the fruits of the benefice, office, dignity, or function (can. 2403).

By reason of the precept of another virtue, profession of faith obliges:

a) When by professing the faith someone would have hope of converting others to the faith, or by not professing it would be a scandal to others (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, II, 11).

b) When by neglecting profession of faith someone would expose himself to grave danger of committing some sin other than one against faith itself; which will rarely have place.

¹ Rom. 10:9 sq.; cf. Matt. 10:32 sq.

² May 28, 1635 (Collectanea, n. 84); cf. Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, June 26, 1790 (Collectanea, n. 602).

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1168.

⁴ Roman Ritual, title II, chapter 2, n. 32.

⁵ Roman Ritual, title II, chapter 2, n. 17.

⁶ Roman Pontifical, On the Ordination of a Priest.

⁷ Roman Pontifical, On the Consecration of a Bishop.

⁸ Roman Pontifical, Order for Reconciling an Apostate, Schismatic, or Heretic; cf. Instruction of the Holy Office to the Bishop of Philadelphia, July 20, 1859.

⁹ This formula is found at the beginning of the Code.

¹⁰ March 22, 1918 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1918, p. 136).

¹¹ September 1, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 655).

¹² Thus the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, September 25, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 740).

¹³ Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, September 1, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 655); Sacred Consistorial Congregation, September 25, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 740).

¹⁴ March 22, 1918 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1918, p. 136).

¹⁵ Sacred Consistorial Congregation, September 25, 1910.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Section III. On the Oath

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 4. The Vices Opposed …, Contracts · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 5. The Quasi-integral…, Oaths

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 89; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, bk. III, nn. 133-193; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, nn. 12-20.)

We shall speak first of the oath generally, then of the promissory oath specifically; we shall add a scholion on the fictitious oath.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. III, Chapter 1. On the Oath Generally

n. 682.

I. Notion. An oath is the invocation of God, or of the divine Name, to give assurance concerning some matter. It is called:

An invocation. Therefore it is not enough that someone merely assert, for example, that he speaks before God, or that God knows or testifies to the truth of the matter affirmed by him. If, however, the aforesaid things are uttered not only enunciatively, but invocatively, as the Apostle did,¹ there is a true oath.
Of God; not of a man; nor of an Angel or Saint, if one stops at their testimony. But we swear by God alone, because He, as very truth and very veracity, can neither be deceived nor deceive, and therefore He is able to procure full credibility for what is said.
To give assurance concerning some matter, that is, either concerning the truth of one's assertion, or concerning one's own future action. To give assurance concerning the truth of an assertion, God is invoked as witness of the assertion; and there is an assertory oath. To give assurance concerning one's own future action, God is invoked as witness of the present will to do something, and as patron of the future execution; and there is a promissory oath. I said: that God is invoked as witness, namely so that by His testimony He may confirm what is asserted, not however that He should perform this here and now, but at the time and in the manner which shall have pleased Him, at least "when He will bring to light the hidden things of darkness and will make manifest the counsels of hearts"² (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 89, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 133).

Corollary I. For the essence of an oath there is required the intention or will of invoking the authority of God, so that it is not enough to use only words which signify invocation. For human acts do not operate beyond the will of the agent; wherefore, if the intention or will of invoking God is absent, there is not a true invocation of God, but only the external signification of invocation (St. Alphonsus, III, 133).

Corollary II. For the essence of an oath, according to many, a merely internal invocation suffices. Whatever the case may be, certainly an oath of this kind, merely mental, must be called incomplete, insofar as such an invocation is not apt to give assurance (before men) concerning some matter. In order that this be obtained, the invocation of God must be externally expressed. But as to the said expression, or as to the formulas of an oath, note:

a) It is the same: 1. whether the expression is made by words or by gesture or deed, as if, when asked whether you swear, you nod your head; or you touch the book of the Gospels offered for swearing; or you subscribe to an oath-formula; 2. whether the expression is determined to an invocation of God of itself or from the circumstances (St. Alphonsus, III, 134, 136).

b) Among expressions or formulas, some of themselves are certainly oath-formulas, others are ambiguous, and others are not oath-formulas. Certainly oath-formulas are, for example: "I call God to witness"; "let God be witness for me"; "I swear by God," etc.

Ambiguous are: "I swear"; "I speak before God"; "God is witness for me," etc. To judge whether or not they involve an oath, the circumstances and the intention of the speaker should be inspected. Thus if someone responds to a request for an oath, "I swear," the oath subsists.

Not oath-formulas are, for example: "in truth"; "by my faith"; "by my honor"; "it is as true as God is," etc. (St. Alphonsus, III, 134-138, 143). Nor are formulas oath-formulas which, because of circumstances, lose the signification of an invocation, as if they are uttered in a school or in a theater, for the sake of teaching or representation.

¹ Gal. 1:20: "Behold, before God, that I do not lie."

² 1 Cor. 4:5.

n. 683.

II. Division. An oath is divided chiefly:

Into explicit and implicit, according as God is invoked directly or indirectly, namely through creatures in which His attributes specially shine forth. Such are, for example, the Saints, heaven, the Church, the sacraments, the Cross, the soul; such are not, for example, trees, a beard, etc.
Into assertory and promissory, according as God is invoked to give assurance concerning the truth of an assertion, or concerning one's own future action.
Into execratory and non-execratory. An execratory oath is one by which God is also invoked as avenger of perjury or of broken faith, if these take place.¹
Into solemn and simple, according as it is emitted with a special ceremony or without it (St. Alphonsus, III, 140, 141).

¹ The sense of the formula "So may God help me and these holy Gospels of God" is: If what I swear is true, may God help me; may He not help me, if it is false.

n. 684.

III. Morality. An oath, with the due conditions observed, is an honorable act, and one of religion. It is an honorable act, as is clear from Sacred Scripture, which approves the oath both directly,¹ and indirectly by exhibiting oaths emitted under divine inspiration.² It is an act of religion, because it honors the authority of God, who is invoked to give assurance concerning some matter (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 89, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 144).³

¹ Deut. 6:13; 10:20; Ps. 15:1, 5, etc.

² Rom. 1:9; 2 Cor. 1:23; Gal. 1:20, etc.

³ Objection. Christ in Matt. 5:33 says: "You have heard that it was said to the ancients: You shall not swear falsely, but you shall render your oaths to the Lord. But I say to you: do not swear at all, neither by heaven... nor by earth... But let your speech be: yes, yes; no, no; and whatever is more abundant than these is from evil." The same is in St. James 5:12. Response with St. Augustine: "The Apostle himself swore in his letters, and thus showed how what was said should be understood, I say to you, do not swear at all, namely lest by swearing one come to facility in swearing, from facility to custom, and so from custom fall into perjury. And therefore he is not found to have sworn except while writing, where more cautious consideration does not have a headlong tongue. And this indeed is from evil, as it was said, whatever is more is from evil: not however from his own evil, but from the weakness of those to whom he was striving to give assurance even in this way" (De mendacio, c. 15).

n. 685.

IV. Required conditions. For the liceity of an oath three things are required: truth, judgment, and justice (can. 1316, § 1; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 89, a. 3).²

Truth; by which here is understood the certainty of the one swearing concerning the truth of his own assertion. In court, strict moral certainty is required; for this is intended by the judge. Outside court, moral certainty taken somewhat more broadly suffices (St. Alphonsus, VI, 148). Moreover:

a) Defect of truth is a grave sin from its whole genus; since he inflicts a grave injury upon God who invokes Him as witness of an assertion which he holds as certainly or probably false. There is added proposition 24, condemned by Innocent XI: "To call God as witness of a slight lie is not such great irreverence that on account of it He would wish, or could, damn a man."³ A sin committed in this way is called perjury.

b) An oath emitted with a mental restriction:

a) It is illicit, indeed perjury, if the restriction is purely mental. For a restriction of this kind involves a lie, so that in the given case God is invoked as witness of a matter which is held as false. There is added proposition 26, condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone, either alone or before others, whether questioned or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation or for any other end, swears that he has not done something which he truly has done, understanding within himself something else which he has not done, or even another way than that in which he did it, or any other true addition, he really does not lie and is not perjured";⁴ cf. also proposition 27.⁵

b) It is licit, provided a just cause is present, if the restriction is not purely mental, because a lie is absent, and therefore God is not invoked as witness of what is false. For the same reason it is only venial to swear in this way without a just cause. But it is prohibited under grave obligation to swear, even with a restriction not purely mental: 1. in court, where someone is legitimately questioned; 2. in contracts (St. Alphonsus, III, 151, 152).

Judgment requires that one not swear without necessity or utility. Namely, although an oath is an act of virtue, that is, of religion, nevertheless that act is not the primary end of an oath; the primary end is the confirmation of truth for man's utility; hence for the liceity of an oath necessity or utility is required.

Defect of judgment of itself is only venial, because grave irreverence does not appear in it (St. Alphonsus, III, 144, 145).

Justice requires: 1. in an assertory oath, that the assertion itself be licit; 2. in a promissory oath, that what is proposed or promised be honorable. Hence, for example, justice is lacking in an oath by which someone confirms a sinful detraction, or by which he swears that he is going to commit an injustice (St. Alphonsus, III, 146).

Defect of justice is a grave or light sin according as the assertion, proposal, or promise which is confirmed by oath is gravely or lightly illicit. Hence:

a) He sins gravely who by an assertory oath confirms a gravely evil assertion, and thus promotes a grave evil effect; as if someone were to confirm by oath a gravely injurious detraction: thus, namely, he would promote grave infamy of his neighbor. The reason is that it is grave irreverence to abuse divine authority in order to promote a grave evil effect. Otherwise, it is quite probably only a light sin, namely, if someone were to confirm by oath a lightly evil assertion, or were to confirm an assertion indeed gravely evil - for example, boasting about a sin committed - but by the oath would bring about this one thing, that others would be made more certain about the assertion, without a grave evil effect being promoted from it (St. Alphonsus, III, 146).

b) Likewise he sins gravely who deliberately uses an oath (whether assertory or promissory) as a means to grave sin; as if someone were to swear that the master is absent, in order to induce someone to a grave injustice. But to use an oath as a means to a light sin quite probably does not of itself exceed the venial.

c) Moreover, he sins gravely who emits a promissory oath concerning a gravely illicit matter; if concerning a lightly illicit matter, it is disputed whether it is a grave or a light sin. St. Alphonsus (III, 146) deservedly holds as more probable that it is a grave sin, because grave irreverence seems to be present in the fact that God is constituted patron of a future action, even though only lightly evil. An oath against the evangelical counsels is held by the holy Doctor to be venial (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

d) Finally, the custom of swearing without due attention to truth or justice is gravely sinful, because he who acts in this way exposes himself to the grave danger of oaths destitute of truth and justice. There is added, as to the custom of easily emitting promissory oaths, the danger of not fulfilling them (St. Alphonsus, III, 145).

¹ Cf. Gopfert, Der Eid.

² Jer. 4:2.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1174.

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1176.

⁵ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1177.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. III, Chapter II. On the Promissory Oath Specifically

n. 686.

I. Notion. A promissory oath, as we have said (n. 682), is the invocation of God to give assurance concerning one's own future action. In an oath of this kind, as likewise we have already noted, God is invoked: 1. as witness of the present will to place the action; 2. quite probably as patron of the future execution, that is, God is invoked so that He may give authority and force to the proposal or promise; "which," Suarez says, "I explain by a human example. For men are often accustomed to promise, or to make a compromise, or to enter betrothals, before a king or another man of great authority, not so that he should properly be a surety undergoing an obligation, nor even so that he should be witness of the future execution, but so that he may furnish authority to the contract, and so that the contracting parties may understand that they will do injury to him if they do not fulfill the promises."¹ These things also are held by St. Alphonsus as sufficiently founded (III, 173).

Others judge that God in a promissory oath is invoked as witness of future truth, and they appeal to the natural meaning of the words by which the said oath is expressed. Suarez tries to weaken this opinion with these words: "With respect to a future fact He cannot be brought in as witness, for testimony is not given concerning a thing not yet done. And although future things are present to God, nevertheless, insofar as divine testimony is invoked through an oath, there is not asked from God, so to speak, testimony concerning a future thing as it is present to Him, but as it is in the word of the one promising. But in this way testimony does not fall upon that word except insofar as it is capable of truth when it is spoken; therefore, with respect to a future fact, as to be confirmed by that word, God is not invoked as witness, but as surety, to whose honor and authority it pertains that he who has sworn should effectively accomplish what he has asserted or promised."²

According to others, God is invoked as surety (properly so called), that is, in such a way that He, as it were, promises or proposes together with the one swearing. But that is not proved, so that God, as regards practice or obligation, can be held as only patron of the future execution (n. 689). Nor is a surety properly so called understood by Suarez, as is clear from the words cited.

As to the opinion of St. Thomas, II-II, q. 89, aa. 1, 7, and 9 should be compared.

¹ De iuramento, bk. 3, c. 16, n. 10.

² Cited place.

n. 687.

II. Division. A promissory oath is divided into a simple promissory oath, or one standing by itself, and a confirmatory promissory oath. A simple oath is one which is emitted without a promise (or any obligation), whether previously existing or made together with the oath. A confirmatory oath is one emitted in confirmation of a promise (or of any obligation), whether previously existing or made together with the oath, either to God (a sworn vow), or to man (a sworn promise), or to God and man (a vow sworn together with a promise). Therefore the matter of a simple promissory oath is future action as such; but the matter of a confirmatory oath is the future fulfillment of a promise or of any obligation.

n. 688.

III. Requisites for validity. For validity some things are required on the part of the one swearing, others on the part of the matter.

On the part of the one swearing, almost the same things are required as on the part of the one vowing for the validity of a vow (n. 642). It suffices to add these things:

a) For the validity of a confirmatory oath there is required either a pre-existing obligation, or the intention of actually promising something either to God (a vow) or to man. For the validity of an oath standing by itself these things are not required.

It is disputed whether or not for a promissory oath there is necessarily required an intention of obliging oneself by force of the oath. But it seems this must be denied, because for the substance of a promissory oath there is required only the intention of invoking God to give assurance concerning one's own future action (n. 682), not however the intention of obliging oneself by force of that invocation, although that obligation follows as a necessary effect.

b) Fear does not obstruct validity according to these words of can. 1317, § 2: "An oath extorted by force or grave fear is valid, but can be relaxed by an ecclesiastical superior" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 89, a. 7, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 174).

On the part of the matter it is required that it be honorable, not illicit or idle. The reason is that divine authority cannot be the bond of an inequitable or vain thing (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 89, a. 3, and a. 9, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 176).

Corollary I. Oaths of parents to punish their children are commonly invalid or at least do not oblige, either because they were about a useless matter, or rather about disordered vengeance, or because the delinquents have already been corrected or have promised amendment (St. Alphonsus, III, 186). Likewise oaths of merchants not to sell for less or not to buy for more, even if they are made seriously, commonly do not have force, because ordinarily they are about a useless matter.

Corollary II. An oath of fidelity to a political Constitution which contains some things contrary to divine or ecclesiastical law is valid insofar as it is restricted to licit things. It is licit if that restriction is expressly added (namely by adding these or similar words: "saving divine and ecclesiastical laws"), or, as happens today, is drawn from usage.¹ Likewise valid and licit is an oath of fidelity to a usurping Prince, when he peacefully possesses the kingdom (St. Alphonsus, I, 94; II, 74).

Corollary III. An oath emitted by a cleric to remain in the diocese and not to enter Religion is valid, because it regards a thing owed by force of the promise made together with the oath, and confirmed by the oath itself.

Corollary IV. An oath concerning matter partly impossible or inept has force and obliges as to the other part, if the matter is divisible by its nature and also intended divisively. Hence, for example, a prodigal sworn promise (or not sworn) can have force in part.

¹ Cf. Brief of Pius VI Charitas, April 13, 1791; Sacred Penitentiary, December 1, 1866 (Acta Sanctae Sedis 1866, p. 675).

n. 689.

IV. Effects. 1. An oath added to an invalid act (for example, to a contract, promise, or vow) does not render it valid; nor, added to a rescindable act, does it render it unrescindable; since an oath does not change the nature of the contract, promise, or vow, as that exists of itself or by law. To this refer these words of can. 1318, § 2: "But if an oath is added to an act directly tending to the harm of others, or to the prejudice of the public good or of eternal salvation, the act obtains no firmness from this."

An oath added to an invalid act does not induce an obligation, because an oath added to an act follows the nature and conditions of the act to which it is added (can. 1318, § 1), or because the accessory follows the principal (St. Alphonsus, III, 180).¹
An oath added to a valid act, and likewise an oath standing by itself, induce an obligation, as is clear both from Sacred Scripture,² and from what is soon to be said about the quality of the obligation. Nevertheless, an oath added to a valid act begins and ceases to oblige with the act to which it is added; for, as was said, it follows the nature and conditions of this act. But more must be said about the obligation of a promissory oath. Moreover:

a) A promissory oath induces an obligation of religion (can. 1317, § 1). The reason is that the reverence owed to God demands that the action be placed in the case in which God has been invoked as patron of the execution, as happens in a promissory oath. But the obligation of an oath differs in species from the obligation of a vow, because the former regards God as witness of the present will and patron of the future execution; the latter regards Him as creditor.

Corollary. He who violates a promissory oath perpetrates at least two sins: namely, against the obligation of religion induced by the oath, and against the obligation, whether of religion induced by a vow, or of another virtue, induced by a promise made to man. A third is added, if he violates an oath added to a vow with a promise made to man.

b) A promissory oath induces a grave obligation of religion, if it regards a grave matter; for it is grave irreverence to omit a grave act as to which God has been invoked as patron. If it regards a light matter, it is disputed whether the obligation is grave or light. But it is quite probably only light, because grave irreverence does not appear in the fact that an action of lesser moment is omitted, even if God has been invoked as its patron (St. Alphonsus, III).³

Nevertheless note that he sins gravely who, while he swears, does not have the will of standing by the promises; because in a promissory oath God is invoked as witness of the present will. But it is grave irreverence to invoke God as witness of what is false.

c) As to establishing the extension of the obligation, the following rules have force:

a) An oath must be interpreted strictly according to law and according to the intention of the one swearing, or, if he acts with deceit, according to the intention of him to whom it is sworn (can. 1321).

b) A confirmatory oath follows the nature and conditions of the act to which it is added (can. 1318, § 1). Therefore its obligation extends itself to the same things to which the act - for example, a vow or promise - in confirmation of which it is added, extends.

Corollary. An oath which regards matter of law obliges according to the limits of law. Hence, for example, a pastor who has sworn residence can be non-resident insofar as this is conceded by law. An oath of observing statutes or rules does not oblige as to rules abrogated by legitimate desuetude; furthermore, an oath of this kind obliges under grave obligation or under light obligation or to penalty alone, according as the statutes themselves of themselves oblige under grave obligation, or under light obligation, or to penalty alone (St. Alphonsus, III, 181).

¹ Nevertheless, it is not repugnant that an oath added to an invalid act induce an obligation; for strictly speaking someone can oblige himself independently of the value of the act to which the oath is added. But these things are almost hypothetical.

² Matt. 5:33.

³ Those who teach that God in a promissory oath is invoked either as witness or as surety of the future action rightly conclude that the obligation of the aforesaid oath is always grave: for it is grave irreverence to constitute God a false witness or an unfaithful or changeable surety. But the antecedent is not proved.

n. 690.

V. Cessation. From can. 1319, a promissory oath, or the obligation induced by an oath of this kind, ceases:

If it is remitted by him for whose advantage the oath had been emitted (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 89, a. 9, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 193). And that remission quite probably is made validly and licitly even when the oath was emitted principally in honor of God. "The reason is that, although the promise was made to God, it was nevertheless always made dependently on the will of the man to whom it was sworn, namely: if he does not remit the execution" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).
If the thing sworn is changed substantially; or, when the circumstances have changed, becomes either evil or altogether indifferent; or finally impedes a greater good. The former is drawn from the fact that the intention of the one swearing is not judged to have extended itself to matter substantially or notably changed, as was said concerning the intention of the one vowing (n. 653). The other things follow from this: that the thing sworn, if it becomes evil, or indifferent, or an impediment to a greater good, ceases to be matter apt for an oath (n. 688). Notice, however, that honorable matter promised and accepted in favor of a third party, even if perhaps less perfect in itself, nevertheless here and now remains more perfect, indeed is commanded, on account of the right acquired by the third party (n. 688).
If the final cause or the condition under which perhaps the oath was given is lacking. See what was said about a vow, n. 655.
By irritation, dispensation, or commutation, according to the norm of can. 1320. Moreover, from the cited canon:

a) The same persons who can irritate vows can irritate promissory oaths, and for the same reason (n. 662). They can irritate them - equally as vows - even if the irritation tends to the prejudice of others, even though these refuse to remit the obligation.

b) Likewise the same persons who can dispense or commute vows can dispense or commute promissory oaths, and for the same reason (n. 671); but if the dispensation of the oath tends to the prejudice of others, the Apostolic See alone can dispense or commute the oath on account of the necessity or utility of the Church (St. Alphonsus, III, 189, 192).

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Scholion. On the Fictitious Oath

n. 691.

I. Notion. A fictitious oath is an oath emitted merely externally, that is, without the intention of swearing. An oath of this kind is invalid (n. 682).

n. 692.

II. Morality. 1. A fictitious oath is always illicit; for there is irreverence in the fact that God is invoked only externally, and therefore vainly. There is added proposition 25, condemned by Innocent XI,¹ whose condemnation favors the stated opinion (St. Alphonsus, III, 172).

A fictitious oath emitted in confirmation of what is false is a grave sin, because grave irreverence is present in the fact that God, even merely externally, is invoked as witness of what is false. But this obtains in an assertory oath when the asserted matter is false; in a promissory oath, when the will of fulfilling what was sworn is lacking (St. Alphonsus, cited place).
A fictitious oath emitted in confirmation of what is true is quite probably of itself only a light sin, because grave irreverence does not appear in the fact that someone merely externally invokes God as witness of what is true. I said of itself; for it is a grave sin: 1. if the oath is commanded by legitimate authority, because authority commands a true oath; 2. if it is done with unjust and grave deception of one's neighbor (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

¹ "With cause it is licit to swear without the intention of swearing, whether the matter is light or grave" (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1175).

n. 693.

III. Obligation. A fictitious oath of itself does not oblige, because it is invalid; it can, however, oblige, and indeed under grave obligation, by accident, for example if one's neighbor is deceived with grave harm, if neglect of the thing sworn carries grave scandal with it, etc.

n. 694.

IV. Things to be noted concerning oaths which are fictitious in appearance rather than in truth.

A promissory oath emitted without the intention of fulfilling what was sworn is a true oath, but a mortal sin, which is called perjury; moreover it obliges, as being valid (St. Alphonsus, III, 172).
A promissory oath emitted without the intention of obliging oneself seems to be a grave sin, because grave irreverence seems to be present in the fact that someone invokes God, and at the same time does not wish to be bound by His invoked authority.

Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. VIII, Diss. I, Pt. I, Sect. III, Ch. II, Scholion. On Accidental Elements of Betrothals

n. 672.

I. A penalty is added to betrothals if the parties agree that something is to be paid by the one withdrawing. A stipulation of a penalty to be paid by one withdrawing justly is illicit and invalid, as being injurious to the freedom of matrimony. But a penalty established against one withdrawing unjustly is valid and licit (St. Alphonsus VI, 853, q. 1). Appeal can no longer be made to positive law, from which many, while others contradicted, were drawing the contrary, since the Code is silent about it.

II. A mode is a burden added by one party to a perfected betrothal contract and accepted by the other.¹ A mode differs from a suspensive condition. For the latter brings it about that the contract is not perfected before the condition has been fulfilled, while an added mode supposes a perfected contract. Nevertheless the added mode can be intended in such a way that, if the other party does not fulfill it, neither is the prior party bound to sustain the betrothals.

III. Earnest money is a thing given to the other party in pledge of future matrimony. When matrimony follows, the earnest money can be reclaimed, unless the mind of the betrothed was contrary. If matrimony does not follow, it must be restored by the one withdrawing unjustly, but can be kept by the other party. If one withdraws justly from the betrothals, custom has it that each party restore the earnest money received (St. Alphonsus VI, 852).

IV. Iocalia are gifts given to the other party, not as a pledge of future matrimony, but as a sign of love and under the hope of nuptials. When matrimony follows, they can be retained. If matrimony does not follow, they must be restored by the one by whose fault the matrimony is not contracted, except if they are small and are not reclaimed by the other party; but they can be retained by the other party. If through the fault of no one matrimony is omitted, custom has it that each party restore the iocalia received, perhaps excepting smaller ones.

V. An oath added to valid betrothals, or to a valid unilateral promise, adds to the obligation of justice an obligation of religion. When the betrothals fall, the obligation of the oath falls (canon 1318, § 1).

An oath added to invalid betrothals, or to an invalid unilateral promise, for example from defect of legitimate form, is invalid, because the accessory follows the principal (canon 1318, § 1).

¹ "I promise you matrimony; you, however, must do this or that."

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 19 passages

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 4. The Vices Opposed …, Contracts

n. 1886.

The Accidentals of a Contract

The Accidentals of a Contract.—(a) Bond is the agreement by the obligor of a contract to pay a certain forfeit to the obligee, if the former does not perform his contract or does not perform it before a certain date. This agreement obliges in conscience, if the promise was seriously made, if the penalty is not excessive, and if the breach of agreement is culpable.

(b) Oaths added to contracts have moral effects on the contracts themselves and also on acts contrary to them. As regards the contract, an oath adds the obligation of religion to that of justice, if the contract is valid and irrescindable; and the common opinion is that it strengthens a contract extrinsically, that is, it induces an obligation of religion to keep the promise, if the oath is invalid or rescindable by positive law only and in favor of a private privilege; but an oath in no way strengthens a contract that is naturally invalid or rescindable positively on account of the public good. As regards acts that are contrary to an invalid or rescindable contract that was confirmed by a valid oath, they are sinful, as being irreligious, but not invalid nor unjust (see 2260).

(c) Conditions are accidents or circumstances so added to a contract that the consent or dissent is made dependent upon their existence or fulfillment. An immoral condition, if unfulfilled, takes from the contract all obligation, exception being made for separable parts that are not affected by the immoral clause; but if it has been fulfilled, it seems that there is a moral obligation to pay the consideration promised (see 1878 d).

(d) Modes are accidents or circumstances so added to a contract as to qualify the rights or duties of the contractants, or the purpose, matter or time of the contract, but not so as to make the consent dependent on the fulfillment of the thing designated. Thus, if Titus leaves money to Balbus, chiefly because Balbus is his nephew, and secondarily because he imposes on Balbus the obligation of using the money for his education, Balbus in accepting the money accepts also the obligation, but the gift does not lapse if the obligation is not complied with. If a donor adds an immoral mode to his gift (e.g., that the donee use in immoral ways the money left him), this purpose is regarded as non-existent and the gift stands in spite of it. If an agent violates a mode (e.g., he pays $1001 when he was directed to pay $1000) but not a condition (e.g., that he purchase land and not a house), the contract stands.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 5. The Quasi-integral…, Oaths

n. 2245.

Oaths

Oaths.—An oath is the calling upon God to witness the truth of what we say.

(a) It is a calling upon God; that is, it is the selection of God as the witness of what is said. The oath is not merely an address made to others or a declaration that a fact is known to God (e.g., “God knows she has been a good woman”); it is an address or invocation made to God Himself. Neither is it a mere prayer that God will in some way bring out the truthfulness of what is said; it is an appeal to Him to corroborate that truthfulness by His own testimony. Neither does it appeal to testimony already given (e.g., the words of God found in Sacred Scripture), but to testimony to be given about the present matter. A prayer to God to prove one’s innocence or the proof of a theological proposition from the Word of God is not, therefore, an oath.

(b) It is a calling on God, and hence if appeal is made to some creature (e.g., in the expression, “upon my word of honor”) or to some false deity (e.g., “By Jove, I’ll do that”), there is no oath.

(c) It calls on God to bear witness; that is, it confirms the truth of one’s words by God Himself, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. He who swears does not ask that God intervene here and now by some visible or miraculous sign, but that God confirm, where and when it pleases Him, what is said, at least on that day when He will clear up the hidden things of darkness and reveal the secrets of hearts (I Cor., iv. 5). The proving force of the oath is that one who believes in God will not be so wicked or rash as to call upon the All-Holy to defend iniquity and falsehood.

n. 2246.

The Various Kinds of Oaths

The Various Kinds of Oaths.—(a) By reason of the matter, an oath is either assertory or promissory. An assertory oath refers to the past or present (e.g,, “I swear that I saw the accident,” “I swear that I am insolvent”), a promissory oath to the future (e.g., “I swear that I will execute my office faithfully”). The promissory oath is either without a pact made with another (e.g., in the comminatory oath, “I swear that I will prosecute, if you do that”) or with a pact. This latter oath is called confirmatory, and, according as the pact is with God or with man or with both, it is either a sworn vow, or a sworn contract, or a sworn vow and contract.

(b) By reason of its mode, an oath is either contestatory (invocatory) or execratory. The contestatory oath simply calls on God as a witness (e.g., “God is my witness that this is true,” “I swear by God, etc.”). The execratory oath asks God, even though the Divine Name is not expressly mentioned, to punish the swearer in his own person or in the persons or goods that pertain to him, if the statement made is not true (e.g., “May God strike me dead, if this is not true!” “May the devil take my children, if I swear falsely!”). The form commonly used, “So help me God and these holy Gospels!” has an execratory sense, the meaning being “May God help me if I speak truly, may He deny me help if I speak falsely!”

(c) By reason of the person invoked, an oath is either explicit or implicit. The former calls on God by name (e.g., “God is my witness,” “I speak the truth in Christ”); the latter calls on some creature as the reflection of a divine attribute, or in some other way the representative of God (e.g., the oath of Moses in Deut., xxx. 19: “I call upon heaven and earth this day to witness that I have offered you life and death”).

(d) By reason of its legal form, an oath is either solemn or simple, judicial or extra-judicial. The solemn oath is taken with ceremony (e.g., before the altar, with hand placed on the Bible, with upraised hand, etc.); the simple oath is taken privately, without special form of words or ceremony. The judicial oath is taken in court or in reference to the public decision of questions of right, fact or delinquency (e.g., in Canon Law the oaths of calumny, malice, etc., which are treated in canonical works); the extra-judicial oath, solemn or simple, is taken on other occasions (e.g., when two contractants strengthen their compact by oath). Examples of solemn oaths in the Bible are found in Gen., xiv. 22, xxiv. 2, 3; Jeremias, xxxiv. 18.

n. 2247.

Moral Difference between the Various Kinds of Oaths

Moral Difference between the Various Kinds of Oaths.—(a) Essentially, there is no difference, since all the kinds agree in the principal features mentioned in the definition. (b) Accidentally, there is a difference in circumstances of form, solemnity, etc. Moreover, one kind of oath may be more obligatory (e.g., the solemn oath on account of the special deliberation given it and the scandal caused by its non-observance is more sacred than the simple oath), or it may have other species of obligation besides that of religion (e.g., the oath to keep a compact binds in justice as well as religion).

n. 2248.

Lawfulness of Oaths

Lawfulness of Oaths.—(a) It is lawful to take an oath that has the necessary qualities, for in Scripture God Himself is represented as swearing (Gen, xxii. 16; Psalm cix. 4, Heb., vi. 13, vii. 21), holy men swear and are praised for swearing as they should (II Cor., i. 23; Psalm xiv. 4), and the Church has always made use of oaths. The origin of oaths is man’s faith in God, and their purpose is the useful one of lending authority to important assertions. Indeed, an oath is an act of religion, for men swear only by one who is greater (Heb., vi. 13), and hence an oath is a profession of reverence for God’s superior knowledge, truth, and justice.

(b) It is not lawful to take an oath that lacks a necessary quality. Here we should note an important difference between an oath and other acts of religion, such as vows. An oath is not desirable for its own sake, since it is occasioned by human weakness and unreliability; hence, like medicine and other necessities occasioned by evil, it should be used only in serious need and sparingly. A vow or other act of religion, on the contrary, originates from the desire to honor God, even apart from necessity, and hence it may be used oftener. This explains why Scripture forbids the habit of swearing (Ecclus., xxiii. 9; Matt., v. 33; James, v. 12); but it is a wrong interpretation of these texts that sees in them an absolute prohibition of oaths. From the context and other passages it is clear that the Scriptures just cited reprove the Pharisees who taught that promiscuous swearing was lawful, provided only the matter was true or the Divine Name was not used, and also those persons who delighted to swear on all occasions.

n. 2249.

Necessary Qualities of a Lawful Oath

Necessary Qualities of a Lawful Oath.—The necessary qualities that should accompany an oath are expressed in Jeremias, iv. 2: “And thou shalt swear, ‘As the Lord liveth,’ in truth, and in judgment and in justice.” Judgment refers to the good dispositions of the person who swears, truth and justice to the righteousness of the cause for which he swears.

(a) Thus, an oath should have judgment; that is, the person who swears should do so only from serious necessity, with faith and devotion, and in a manner respectful to God whom he invokes. An oath that lacks judgment is called incautious or disrespectful, as when one swears about a trivial matter or swears jokingly.

(b) An oath should have truth; that is, one should not swear except to that which one believes to be true, after reasonable diligence has been used in seeking for the truth. An oath that lacks truth is called false or perjured, as when one swears to what one knows or believes to be false, or promises what one does not intend to fulfill, or swears that one is certain when one has only opinion, or swears with a purely mental reservation, or swears after insufficient investigation of a matter.

(c) An oath should have justice; that is, one should not promise what one has no right to promise (e.g., to tell a lie), and one should not say what one has no right to say (e.g., what is defamatory). The matter of the oath, then, both as to its object and its circumstances, must be good, even though one is swearing truthfully and respectfully. An oath that lacks justice is called a wicked oath, as when one promises under oath to commit murder, or not to follow what is of counsel, or swears about a real fact in such a way as to do unnecessary harm to another person or to boast about one’s own crimes.

n. 2250.

Sinful Oaths

Sinful Oaths.—(a) An incautious or disrespectful oath is from its nature only a venial sin, since its malice consists, not in any direct injury to the divine truth or other attribute, but only in levity of mind; and, moreover, it is not opposed to the purpose of an oath, which is to confirm the truth. But accidentally it may be a serious sin on account of the scandal it gives (e.g., when a person of standing swears without necessity), or on account of the danger to which it exposes the swearer (e.g., when one swears habitually and is thereby put in the occasion of swearing falsely or unjustly). On account of the evils of familiarity, etc., to which habitual swearing leads, Our Lord warn us to be content as a rule to support the truth with simple assertion or denial (Matt., v. 2). At least for ordinary, daily communications the word of a Christian or honest man ought to be sufficient without his oath.

(b) A lying or perjured oath is from the nature of the act always (see 172) a mortal sin, since it consists essentially in contempt for God and disrespect for His attributes. The perjurer dares to ask God to be an accomplice in a lie, or else supposes that God can be deceived. Hence, only by reason of the imperfection of the act can perjury ever escape the guilt of mortal sin, as when one commits perjury without sufficient reflection on or full consent to the oath or to its falsity. Pope Innocent XI condemned the doctrine that perjury is only a light sin (Denzinger, n. 1174). In Canon Law those who perjure themselves are debarred from acting as witnesses or giving expert testimony, and are subject to penalties at the discretion of the Ordinary (see Canons 1757, 1795, 2323). In American civil law perjury is a false oath given before a tribunal and is a crime against public justice, while subornation of perjury and false oaths given on private occasions are also crimes or punishable offenses.

(c) A wicked oath, even though the thing sworn to be true and the oath be given only after consideration and in a respectful manner, is a sin against religion and any other virtue it offends. The sin committed by reason of the oath is from its nature mortal according to some, since the swearer gravely insults God by asking Him to become a partaker in sin and by turning into an instrument of sin what should be an act of religion; others hold that the sin is only venial, since it is not serious disrespect to ask God to witness the truth of what is true; others again make the gravity of the sin depend on the wickedness of the matter or circumstances. This wickedness committed by reason of the statement or promise is venial or mortal according to the case. Thus, there is grave injustice in revealing a fact seriously detrimental to another and which one is bound to keep as confidential; there is venial scandal in swearing in order to lead another person into a slight fault of detraction; there is a grave sin of impurity in promising to commit adultery; there is a light sin of theft in promising to steal a small sum of money. Finally, others hold that the oath is mortally sinful when it furthers a grave sin (e.g., an oath confirming serious detraction), and that it is venial in other cases (e.g., an oath confirming a boast about past mortal sins).

n. 2251.

Mental Reservation in an Oath.-(a) Strict mental reservation (i.e., the internal restriction of one’s words so that the listener cannot gather the true meaning, as when one says one has seen Rome, meaning a picture of Rome) is a lie, and hence cannot be used in an oath without perjury. See propositions condemned by Innocent XI (Denzinger, n. 1176).

(b) Wide mental reservation (i.e., the internal restriction of one’s words that may be gathered by the listener from circumstances, as when a servant says his master is not at home, meaning that he cannot be seen) is lawful only when there is some reason of justice or charity that demands it. Hence, it is a mortal sin to swear with this kind of reservation when the questioner has the right to know the truth; it is no sin at all when the questioner has no right to question and mental reservation is the only escape from a serious evil. If the questioner has no right to demand an oath and the deponent has no right to use mental reservation (e.g., when the oath is only private and not concerned with contract or other important matter), the sinfulness of a mental reservation is a matter of dispute. Some think the oath is mortally sinful, because it is gravely irreverent to God to call on Him to witness testimony meant to deceive. Others think the oath is only venially sinful, because the offense is not against truth or justice, but only against judgment or discretion.

n. 2252.

Cooperation in Sinful Oaths

Cooperation in Sinful Oaths.—(a) Formal cooperation is never lawful, because it makes the cooperator will the guilt of what is done. Thus, he who by command, counsel, promise, etc., induces another to swear falsely is guilty as the principal or accessory to the crime (see 1513, 1778).

(b) Material cooperation is lawful when there is a sufficient reason for it, as when a public official demands the oath according to law from a person who, as he knows, will swear falsely. For the public good demands that in certain cases oaths be administered, notwithstanding that for some persons this will prove an occasion of perjury. But the lawgiver should not multiply temptations by demanding sworn statements unnecessarily; otherwise the oath becomes a mere formality deprived of proving value, and the crime of perjury is made common.

n. 2253.

Sinful Oaths Demanded or Accepted by Private Persons

Sinful Oaths Demanded or Accepted by Private Persons.—(a) Incautious or Disrespectful Oaths.—It is not lawful to ask or receive an oath, when there is no great public or private need for it; otherwise one makes a sacred act cheap and common. Neither is it lawful to ask or receive an oath from those who do not believe in oaths (e.g., the Mennonites, some Quakers); otherwise one compels another to swear against his conscience and indevoutly. Those who believe that oaths are sinful may be required, nevertheless, to bind themselves on their solemn word of honor, and may be punished in the same manner as perjurers if they speak falsely.

(b) Perjured Oaths.—It is not lawful for a private person to ask or receive an oath from another, if he is sure that the latter will commit perjury; but one may ask and receive an oath, even though one does not know whether the other person will swear truly or not, if one has a sufficient reason.

(c) Wicked Oaths.—It is clearly unlawful to ask or receive a wicked oath, in which something sinful is promised or stated; for the thing itself is then desired and there is formal cooperation. But it is not necessarily sinful to ask or receive a wicked oath, in which the sinfulness is found, not in the matter of the oath, but in the dispositions of the swearer, for there may be only material cooperation. Thus, he who exacts a sworn promise of murder agrees to murder, but he who demands a sworn statement against a third party for which there is necessity does not necessarily agree to hatred, if the person taking the oath swears out of hate or revenge.

n. 2254.

Fictitious Oaths

Fictitious Oaths.—A fictitious oath is one in which a person swearing externally has no intention internally to call on God as a witness.

(a) This kind of oath is invalid, for, as was just said, without a real intention to swear there is no oath. Hence, a fictitious oath produces no obligation of religion, but there may be an obligation of justice, as when the oath is the unjust cause of damage to another.

(b) This kind of oath is sinful, for, if it testifies to error, it includes the grave sin of external dishonor to God; if it testifies to truth, it includes the venial sin of taking God’s name in vain. The fictitious oath is a grave sin if the circumstances are such that a sincere oath is gravely obligatory, as when a superior or judge lawfully imposes an oath in a serious matter, or the parties to an important onerous contract bind themselves by oath in order to strengthen their pact.

n. 2255.

Expressions Confused with Oaths

Expressions Confused with Oaths.—Expressions that are sometimes mistakenly confused with sinful swearing are the following: (a) profane or vulgar talk, such as “Hell,” “The devil,” “Doggone it”; (b) cursing, such as “Go to hell,” “God damn you,” “Damn it”, (e) contumely, such as “bastard,” “son of a bitch”; (d) vain use of the name of God, such as “by God,” “Christ,” etc., when used as common exclamations; (e) temptation of God, such as: “If there is a God, may He strike me dead!”; (f) blasphemy, such as: “May God perish, if this is not true!”

The expressions, “This is as true as the Gospel,” “God’s own word is not more truthful,” “I am as innocent as the Blessed Virgin,” etc., if used to confirm the truth, are not meant to assert the speaker’s equality to God and the Saints, and hence they are venial sins of taking the Lord’s name in vain. But, if they are used to confirm error, they are mortal sins of blasphemy.

n. 2256.

Obligation Imposed by Promissory Oath

Obligation Imposed by Promissory Oath.—An assertory oath imposes the obligation of telling the truth and of repairing any damage that results from the falsity or injustice of the declaration. In addition, a promissory oath binds one in virtue of religion to perform one’s promise; for, as said above (2249), an oath must have truth. Hence, Scripture bids those who have sworn to fulfill the promise (Matt., v. 33) not to make the word of no effect (Num, xxxi. 3). But the thing promised must be possible and lawful, or otherwise the oath lacks judgment or justice. (a) Thus, an impossible promise is not binding, for no one can oblige himself to perform what he cannot perform (cfr. 2201); (b) an unlawful promise is not binding, for no one can oblige himself to perform what he is bound not to do. Thus, an oath to revenge murder by murder is null, and sin is committed both in taking and in keeping it.

n. 2257.

Obligation Imposed by Negative Oaths

Obligation Imposed by Negative Oaths.—The obligation of a sworn promise not to do what is better (e.g., not to take a vow), or to do what is vain and useless (e.g., an oath to count the steps one takes), depends on the circumstances. (a) If there are no rights of a third party involved, these oaths do not hold (e.g., he who swears not to vow acts laudably in disregarding the oath). For one may not call God to witness or be guarantee for that which is less pleasing to Him, or which in no way honors Him, and for which there is no claim on the part of a third person. (b) If there are rights of a third party involved, these oaths oblige one to give the third party what he is entitled to from the promise (e.g., a nurse who swears to remain with a sick person may not violate the oath by entering religion).

n. 2258.

Obligation of Oath Is Personal

Obligation of Oath Is Personal.—An oath added to a promise made to man and obligatory in justice is personal, and hence it binds the one who makes the oath, but not his heirs (see 2216).

n. 2259.

Interpretation of Promissory Oaths

Interpretation of Promissory Oaths.—(a) An oath should be interpreted strictly, for the presumption is that the promisor intended to place upon himself the least possible burden. Thus, if a person swears to observe the statutes of a certain Congregation, it should be understood that he pledges himself to present, not to future statutes; if he swears not to gamble, the oath does not forbid games in which money is not played for. But if the promisor acts deceitfully, the oath is to be interpreted according to the intention of him who receives the promise (Canon 1321).

(b) An oath is always subject to the limitations and reservations which the nature of the case, law, or custom demands. Hence, even though an oath is made unconditionally, the following conditions are understood: “If fulfillment will be physically and morally possible,” “saving the rights of superiors,” “unless the other party renounces his right,” “unless the other party fails to keep his part of the agreement,” “unless there comes a notable change in conditions.” If the promisor explains beforehand to the promisee what he understands by the oath, he swears only in the sense thus set forth by him.

(c) An oath follows the nature and conditions of the act (e.g., resolution, promise, vow, contract) that it confirms, for the accessory follows the principal. Hence, if the act to which the oath is attached cannot be obligatory (e.g., an act detrimental to eternal salvation, or the public good, or the rights of a third party), the oath gives no strength to this act (Canon 1318); if the act is naturally invalid (e.g., a promise obtained through substantial fraud), the oath is also invalid; if the act does not become effective (e.g., a promise not accepted), neither does the oath become effective; if the act ceases to oblige (e.g., a promise of secrecy made for a time), the oath also ceases to oblige; if the act is not obligatory under grave sin, the oath is not obligatory under grave sin (e.g., if one swears to observe the statutes of a university, one is not bound to observe those that are commonly neglected, one commits no sin by transgressing those that are merely penal or optional, and one commits no grave sin by violating those that oblige under venial sin).

n. 2260.

Kind of Obligation Produced by a Valid Promissory Oath

Kind of Obligation Produced by a Valid Promissory Oath.—(a) The obligation is one of religion, because the significance of the oath is that it adds the duty of respect owed to God to the duty of fidelity owed to the promise. Men swear in order to make their promises more trustworthy through the sacredness of the oath. The violation of a promissory oath is, therefore, always a sin against religion. There are other sins added in some species of oath, namely, a second sin against religion in case of a sworn vow, a sin against justice and fidelity in case of a sworn contract, a second sin against religion and a sin against justice and fidelity in case of a sworn vow and contract (see 2246 a).

(b) The obligation, other things being equal, is less than that produced by a vow, because the vow binds in virtue of fidelity to God, but the oath only in virtue of respect. The obligation of fidelity seems to be stronger, because unfaithfulness always contains disrespect, but not vice versa. Moreover, in the case of a vow not only the fulfillment of the promise, but the thing promised itself is sacred, which is not true in the case of an oath. An assertory oath, however, seems to be more binding than a vow, because it is a greater injury to God to make Him the witness for falsehood than to break a promise made to Him.

n. 2261.

Degree of the Obligation of a Valid Promissory Oath

Degree of the Obligation of a Valid Promissory Oath.—(a) The obligation is grave, from the nature of an oath, because the virtue of religion is preeminent among the moral virtues (see 2146). There is no doubt that mortal sin is committed when one gives a sworn promise and has no intention to fulfill it, for this is perjury (see 2250 b); and also when one unjustly refuses to live up to an important engagement made under oath, for this is irreligion and injustice in a serious matter. The remarks on grave matter in vows (2211) apply here, but, since the vow obliges more strictly, a somewhat greater amount is needed for serious matter in violation of an oath.

(b) The obligation may be light on account of the smallness of the matter involved. Even a vow, which is more binding than an oath, may be of venial obligation in this way (see 2211). A person who makes a promise under oath, fully intending to keep the promise, but who later changes his mind without sufficient reason, does not show disrespect to God, since when the oath was made he intended to abide by it, and does not seriously injure his neighbor, since, as we suppose, the matter of the oath is small. The sin, therefore, is one of inconstancy or levity, and, if there is disrespect, it is slight. Thus, if a person who had sworn to drink no more wine took a drop now and then, these transgressions would be only venial. Some authors, however, believe that every unfaithfulness to a promissory oath, no matter how small the subject-matter, is a grave sin, because perjury is committed by the breach of promise. This is commonly denied, because the meaning of a promissory oath is that God is called on to witness the truth of a present intention and the obligation (great or small) of a future performance.

n. 2262.

Cessation of Obligation of Promissory Oath

Cessation of Obligation of Promissory Oath.—The obligation of a promissory oath, like that of a vow (see 2226), ceases intrinsically or extrinsically.

(a) Intrinsically, an oath ceases when there is a substantial change in the matter (e.g., it is or has become impossible or unlawful, as in Herod’s oath to Salome), when the principal reason for the oath has ceased (e.g., Titus swore to give an alms to Sempronius because the latter was poor, but before the alms was given Sempronius became rich), or when the time or condition by which the oath was limited terminates the obligation.

(b) Extrinsically, an oath ceases by condonation (e.g., when the State or a private person to whom a sworn promise has been made yields the right and remits the obligation), by annulment (e.g., when a father nullifies the oath of his minor child), by dispensation (e.g., when the Church absolves from an oath taken under grave compulsion), by commutation (e.g., when the Church changes the matter of a sworn vow into something more suitable). Those who can annul, dispense or commute vows have the same power over oaths; but if the dispensation of an oath is detrimental to others who are unwilling to forego the promise, only the Apostolic See can dispense, and then on account of a necessary reason (see Canon 1320).

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 26 passages

Vol. I, On Laws, IX. Privileges of Clerics, Bishops, Regulars · Vol. I, On the Precept of Faith · Vol. I, On the Second Precept of t…, III. On Oath · Vol. II, On the Seventh and Tenth P…, IV. On the Modes of Acquiring Ownership by Private Will

Vol. I, On Laws, IX. Privileges of Clerics, Bishops, Regulars

n. 269.

As regards vows and oaths. - Bishops can dispense: 1. In all simple private vows, except the five reserved to the Pope, namely of perpetual chastity, of Religion, and of pilgrimages to Jerusalem, to the thresholds of the Apostles, and to St. James of Compostella. - 2. In all oaths, if you except oaths accepted by a third party, which were not extorted by fear or fraud. - Hence Bishops cannot dispense in vows, whether perpetual or temporary, of Institutes of simple vows, after the Holy See has commended them at least by Decree of Praise. C. cited Conditae a Christo.

269 bis. Are there also privileges of other Prelates? - The privileges of Protonotaries are many. Four orders of these are had: Apostolic Protonotaries of the Number of Participants, seven, who exclusively constitute the College; supernumerary Apostolic Protonotaries; Apostolic Protonotaries after the likeness of Participants; titular, or honorary, Apostolic Protonotaries outside the City. The privileges of all these are contained in the Motu Proprio of Pius X, 21 Feb. 1905, concerning Apostolic Protonotaries, concerning Urban Prelates, concerning dignities, canons, and others who enjoy some privileges proper to Prelates. Cf. Declar. S. R. C., 14 Mar. 1906, n. 4182. There are also privileges of the Common Chaplains of the Pontifical Chapel, S. R. C., 16 Mar. 1907, Acta S. Sed., vol. 40, p. 311; of the Loreto Chaplains, S. R. C., 11 Dec. 1912; of Apostolic Missionaries, Decr. S. O., 21 Apr. 1909.

269 ter. Note: 1. A canon duly enrolled in a Chapter which collegially enjoys privileges or insignia and rights pertaining to Apostolic Protonotaries, either supernumerary or after the likeness of participants, acquires no right by which he is numbered by the Supreme Pontiff among Domestic Prelates with the expedition of a Brief. S. R. C., 24 May 1911. - 2. To perform sacred rites in pontifical rite belongs to Bishops. From privilege this is also conceded to Protonotaries after the likeness of Participants, and to other inferior Prelates, but with more moderate adornment. The Constitution of Benedict XIV, In throno iustitiae, 28 Feb. 1752, establishes the manner of using the Indult of Pontificals. - 3. Since precedence is a sign of honor, it is to be deduced from the grade of dignity and from the power of jurisdiction and dominion. A collegiate church has precedence over pastors and a college of pastors. S. R. E., 23 Mar. 1619, n. 372; 5 Feb. 1639, n. 664; 6 Apr. 1647, n. 908. Collectan. S. R. C., Ind. v. Praecedentia.

n. 280.

As regards oaths, vows, impediments of marriage, ecclesiastical precepts. Cf. 246. Here it must be noted that it is not improbable to St. Alphonsus what very many affirm, namely, that regulars can in a case of necessity dispense with spouses, as Bishops can, in a vow of chastity for contracting marriage, l. 3, n. 258; l. 6, n. 1128. It must also be noted that there is no privilege of reciting the office only mentally. No regular order has ever used such a privilege, nor do the Friars Minor themselves, to whom such a privilege is said to have been granted, acknowledge it. Custom is the best interpreter and proof of laws. Cf. Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 3, d. 18; Melata, de Recit. mentali div. off. Nevertheless there are many other privileges, especially as regards missionaries, as may be seen in the Compendium of the Privileges of the Society of Jesus.

Vol. I, On the Precept of Faith

n. 369.

Is there also given a precept of the external act of faith? As to the external act of faith, there is given a negative precept, prohibiting the denial of the true faith or the profession of a false one. Likewise there is given an affirmative precept, obliging sometimes to confess the faith even with danger to life. Proof of the first part. To deny the true faith, or to profess a false one, is to deny God and Christ. But Christ says: He who shall deny me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven. Matt. 10:33. Proof of the second part. For ordered charity, which we owe to God and neighbor, requires that, when God's honor and the spiritual utility of the neighbor would be withdrawn privatively or contrarily, for professing the faith we should sometimes spurn temporal goods and even life. - Privatively, as if therefore great honor to God and great utility to neighbor would cease. Contrarily, as if otherwise God would be affected by injury, or the neighbor by grave evil, e.g., if the conversion or perversion of others, contempt of religion, scandal, depended on it. Suarez, d. 4, s. 2; L. 10; Laymann, c. 11, n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 3, aa. 1, 2; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 1647, 1648, 1653, 1657, 1683, 1827.

By positive law all to be baptized are bound to profession of faith, either by themselves or through sponsors; converted heretics; Bishops before consecration, and before the dispatch of letters of their own provision, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R.; Sixtus V, C. Romanus; Gregory XIV, C. Onus Apostolicae; all regular Prelates, Pius IV, C. Iniunctum nobis, id. Nov. 1564; nevertheless this Constitution has not been received in use as to those regular Prelates who are not immediately set over government by the Holy See, but either by chapter or by a higher superior, Thesaurus, de Poenis, c. 1, v. Fides, cf. 550; those about to have ecclesiastical benefices, and those who must assemble in a diocesan synod, Trid. l. c.; likewise those provided with a benefice with care of souls, within two months from possession obtained, before the Bishop himself, or if he is impeded, his vicar general, otherwise they do not make the fruits their own; canons and dignities of a cathedral church, who likewise within two months from begun possession are bound to do this also in chapter; otherwise neither do they make the fruits their own, although they can gain distributions for their choir assistance, S. C. C. 1726; Trid. s. 24, C. 12, de R.; Primates, Archbishops, Bishops in the first provincial synod which they attend, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R.; those to be chosen for the government and chairs of Universities and public gymnasia; and also those to be promoted to scholastic degrees of doctor, master, etc., Pius IV, C. In Sacrosancta, 13 Nov. 1654, § V. But Doctors and Masters of Universities at the beginning of any year must issue a solemn oath by which they are bound to hand down orthodox doctrine, Trid. s. 25, C. 2, de R. It belongs to the Rector or Prefect to see that this is observed. - Profession of faith can be emitted immediately after institution or collation of a benefice, and before possession, S. C. C. 11 May 1782; but cf. here below, paragraph Non manet, and it must altogether be made in the form proposed by Pius IV, C. Iniunctum nobis. But a few things are to be added, so that account may also be taken of the Decrees of the Vatican Council, S. C. C. 20 Jan. 1877. Made otherwise, it will not profit toward avoiding the canonical penalties laid against those who omit this profession. Conc. Rom. Bened. XIII, tit. 1, c. 1; Bened. XIV, Inst. 60; Ferrar., v. Fidei professio; L. 41; Collectan. cit., n. 1670; E. M. 364.

Those who are announced as doctors in Sacred Scripture are bound to furnish an oath according to the prescribed formula approved by the Motu Proprio of Pius X, 29 June 1910. Likewise an oath, according to the prescribed formula, must be furnished by all those who are listed in the Motu Proprio of Pius X, Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910, a profession of faith having been premised; - and also, by reason of office, synodal examiners and parish-priest consultors and those who are listed in C. Sapienti consilio, Order of Service in the Roman Curia, and others, concerning all of whom cf. below n. 550. This obligation of profession of faith seems grave, unless it has been derogated by legitimate custom. The penalty of restoring the fruits probably needs a declaratory sentence of the delict. Sanchez, l. 2, c. 5; Tamburini, l. 2, c. 1, D. 12, n. 4. The faculty made by the Council of Trent no longer remains, by which those provided with any benefices whatever can emit profession of faith within two months from the day of possession obtained; and consequently in the future profession of faith must be emitted before possession of the benefice. S. C. Cons. 1 Mar. 1911.

In external confession of faith and divine worship, the rite of one's own church, Latin or Oriental, is to be observed. Cf. for the Ruthenian rite constituted in the United States of North America, Apostolic Letter of Pius X, 18 Kal. 1907, and for the same rite constituted in the Canadian region, Decr. S. C. de Pr. I., 18 Aug. 1913. E. M. 365.

Blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith. For by it man in heart or mouth, according to intellect or affection, attributes to God things which do not befit him, or denies things which befit him. The vice of blasphemy thus pertains to unbelief. Speech concerning it will occur in the second precept of the Decalogue. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 13.

Vol. I, On the Second Precept of t…, III. On Oath

n. 548.

What is the nature of an oath? - An oath is: the tacit or express invocation of the Name of the Lord, as the first and infallible truth, as witness of some truth. Heb. 6:16; L. 133; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 1. Hence it is clear that an oath is an act of the virtue of religion, or of latria; because "in this very thing, that man swears by God, he professes God to be more powerful, as one whose truth is indefectible and knowledge universal, and thus in some way exhibits reverence to God... But to exhibit reverence to God pertains to religion, or latria." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 4; Bouquillon, de Virt. Rel., l. 2, p. 3.

n. 549.

Of how many kinds is an oath? - An oath is distinguished: 1. as assertory, according as God is invoked as witness of a past or present truth; and promissory, according as "divine testimony is brought in for confirming something future." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 1. The promissory oath is twofold, strictly or broadly such. The first is confirmatory of a promise either toward God, which is a sworn vow, or toward one's neighbor, which adds to the obligation of justice or fidelity arising from the promise an obligation from the virtue of religion. The second contains no promise toward another, but a mere purpose, to which is added an obligation from the virtue of religion, insofar as by oath God is brought forward as witness and as it were guarantor of fulfilling the purpose. But it is comminatory if the one swearing, under the attestation of the divine Name, threatens another with punishment; for example, I swear by God that unless you do this, you will pay the penalties.

Solemn or simple, according as it is made in the form required by law and with solemn ceremonies, for example, with Mass, with preceding Communion, or with these excluded. Laypersons swear in court by touching the Gospels; ecclesiastics swear with the Gospels only placed before them and the hand brought to the breast. C. Cum in 7, de Iur. cal. In court; for outside court, when clerics swear and make profession of faith, the custom is that they do it with the Gospels touched. Holy Office, 6 Aug. 1897, VIII. Clerics, especially priests, cannot interpose a solemn oath except by license of the Bishop, which is granted only for a grave cause, before a judge not their own, even if ecclesiastical; but before a layman they ought not furnish an oath. But Bishops need the license of the Supreme Pontiff. C. Inhaerentes 1, de Iur. cal.; C. Quoties 31, c. 22. But outside court, ecclesiastics do not need the Bishop's permission. C. Ex rescripto 9, de Iurei.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 10. Likewise clerics, unless they are vassals, are prohibited from furnishing an oath of fidelity to Princes. C. Nimis 30, de Iurei. Yet by Concordats it is permitted.
Explicit or implicit, according as God is expressly invoked as witness, or creatures are employed for testimony, in which the divine attributes specially shine forth. 4. There is also added the invocatory oath, by which God is simply invoked as witness; and the imprecatory oath, by which God is invoked at once as witness and as avenger of perjury or of broken faith. To this is referred the formula: So may God help me, and these holy Gospels of God. For just as he who pronounces these words prays good for himself if he speaks the truth, so he imprecates evil upon himself if he lies. Whence he who voluntarily perjures himself in this way, seriously wishing evil for himself, sins not only against religion, but also against charity toward himself. Struggl 3; L. 139-142; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 1 ad 3.

Doctrinal, political, and judicial oaths are also distinguished. Doctrinal oaths are assertory and promissory oaths concerning profession of some doctrine. Such are the oaths prescribed by the Supreme Pontiffs for heretics and schismatics returning to Catholic faith and unity, and most recently prescribed by Supreme Pontiff Pius X against the errors of the modernists. Political oaths are also assertory and promissory oaths concerning the observance of civil laws and the conservation of civil government. The licitness of this oath depends on its matter; if this is not licit, it is often permitted by the Holy See on account of grave causes, with restriction to passive subjection and obedience, and in those things which are not opposed to divine and ecclesiastical laws. S. Penit., 18 Dec. 1860; 1 Dec. 1866; A. S. S., v. 2, p. 676.

Judicial oaths are those which are emitted in a tribunal, so that truth may be known and justice rightly administered. And first there is the decisory oath, which is tendered by one of the litigants to the other, by authority of the judge, and carries with itself the decision of the suit. It is a certain species of transaction. Besides this there is the supplementary oath, which the judge tenders to one of the litigants because of defect of full proof, whence it is called supplementary. Third, there is the estimatory oath, or oath in the suit, when the harm inflicted is established, but because of defect of proofs its quantity cannot be determined; the oath is tendered by the judge, so that by it the value of the thing and the harm inflicted may be established. In addition, the oath of calumny is called the oath by which the litigating parties protest that they proceed not calumniously, but judge that they have a good cause and right. The oath of malice is called the oath by which protestation is made of not maliciously proposing exceptions, seeking delays, etc. Bouquillon, de Virt. Relig., l. 2, p. 3, c. 4; Sebastianelli, Prael. Iur. Can., p. 1, tit. 7, c. 2, a. 5; Schmalzgr., l. 2, tit. 24.

n. 550.

What are the requisites for the essence of an oath? - Two things are required for an oath: 1. the intention of swearing, at least virtual, because without such intention a formal oath cannot exist. 2. an oath-formula, either explicitly through God or implicitly through creatures, because God is given to another as witness, which cannot be done by the mind alone; and since God is invoked as witness, it is necessary that this be expressed in the oath. When there is doubt concerning the intention of the one swearing, judgment is usually made according to the common acceptance of the words which he used. But this intention contributes so much to the value of the oath that if someone uses words in no way importing an oath, yet thinks that they are oaths, he truly swears as to the internal forum; and on the contrary, that intention being lacking, the oath is null as to the internal forum, even if words truly oath-making are employed. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 98, a. 1; L. 134; Struggl 1.

The profession of faith having first been made, the following are bound to furnish the oath according to the prescribed formula: doctors in seminaries, at the beginning of the year; before they enter office, doctors or lecturers, likewise in religious orders; preachers, pastors, beneficiaries before entering possession of the benefice, canons; officials in episcopal curias and tribunals, not excepting the Vicar General and judges; officials in Roman congregations or tribunals; religious superiors; clerics to be initiated into major orders. To each of these an exemplar both of the profession of faith and of the formula of emitting the oath is to be handed over beforehand, so that they may know them accurately beforehand. But the formula of the oath is to be signed and preserved in the archive. Those are to be denounced to the Holy Office not only who violate the oath, but also who refuse to sign it. Pius X, Motu proprio Sacrorum antistitum, 1 Sept. 1910; S. C. Cons., 25 Sept., 25 Oct. 1910. Priests who profess sacred disciplines in civil universities are not bound by this oath. Pius X, Letter to Card. Fischer, 31 Dec. 1910. But the anti-Jansenistic oath was abrogated in Belgium and Holland. S. C. C., 22 Feb. 1912. A Bishop can grant the faculty of hearing Confessions for some more or less long space of time to an extra-diocesan Priest already approved by his own Ordinary, without being compelled to receive from him again the oath prescribed by the Motu proprio Sacrorum Antistitum. And by way of a passing act he can grant the same faculty to a Priest who has never furnished the aforesaid oath. S. C. Cons., 20 June 1913. It suffices that the oath to be furnished before the reception of sacred orders be furnished before entering the sacred order of subdiaconate, preserving the right of the Ordinary to require it again before conferral of each of the sacred orders, if from any cause he judges it necessary or useful. S. C. Cons., 24 March 1911. Alumni of the Urban College of Propaganda Fide, of North America, of Ireland, of Scotland, and of other Colleges according to the decision of S. C. Cons., 12 Nov. 1908, 25 July 1909, are also bound to furnish the oath according to the prescribed formulas; officials of the Roman Curia and ministers of any order in the Roman Curia; Consultors and Cardinals of the S. C. of the Holy Office, of the Index, of Consistorial affairs; Pius X, Const. Sapienti consilio, Ord. serv. in R. C., p. 1, c. 3, p. 2, c. 7, art. 2, n. 4, art. 7; examiners of books and writings of Servants of God; those to be named doctors in Sacred Scripture, Pius X, Motu proprio, 29 June 1910; synodal examiners and parochial consultors, S. C. Cons., 15 Feb. 1912. Missionaries are bound to furnish the oath by force of the Bulls Ex quo and Omnium sollicitudinum of Benedict XIV, not only European priests, but also indigenous presbyters. S. C. de P. F., 21 June 1895; E. M. 550, 551.

n. 551.

You will resolve: A fictitious oath, or one merely external, is not valid on account of defect of will or intention of swearing. But one swearing thus sins, yet only venially, if he says what is true, or has the mind of fulfilling what he promises, because he utters nothing except a lie with vain usurpation of the name of God; but mortally, if he says what is false, or does not have the mind of fulfilling the promise, or there is a precept of a superior, for example in judgments. For grave abuse and irreverence of the name of God for the deception of others would be present. Proposition 25 condemned by Innocent XI.

More probably a promissory oath made indeed with the mind of swearing, but not of obliging oneself from religion, is not valid, because it is nugatory. But an oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obliging oneself from justice or from fidelity, is valid. L. 172; H. A. 17.

A promissory oath made without the mind of fulfilling, but with the mind of swearing and obliging oneself, is valid. But he who swears thus sins mortally, because he invokes God as witness of a fictitious purpose or fictitious promise, and therefore swears against truth. For in a promissory oath God is assumed as witness of a present purpose or promise, and in some way as guarantor of future execution, insofar as this at least depends upon human will.

It is an oath to say: I swear by God; I call God to witness, etc. Likewise it is an oath to say: I swear by the Saints, the Church, the Gospel, the Catholic Faith; because then the very Author of the Faith, of the Gospel, of the Church, and of the Saints is judged to be brought in as witness. Likewise an oath is judged to be made by nobler creatures, since through them their Creator is then taken, who singularly resides and shines forth in them. Thus, for example, when one swears by heaven, its Dweller and Lord is understood; when by earth, He whose footstool it is; when by the temple, He who is worshiped there. Thus likewise several more probably judge it to be an oath if you say, by my soul, because God singularly shines forth in the soul, who then is judged to be brought in as witness. Yet it must be confessed that there is scarcely anyone who, while using these words, thinks of God; and therefore this formula too rarely contains an oath. But otherwise it would be if someone swore by creatures in which divine goodness or power does not specially shine forth, for example, by a beard, etc.

It is not an oath to say: God is truth, God lives, God knows, I speak before God, if these are uttered merely narratively to signify the serious and grave attention of the one speaking; but otherwise if invocatively, for calling God as witness of truth, which is discerned from the circumstances or intention of the speaker. Likewise to say: I swear it is so, is not truly an oath, because then divine testimony is invoked neither explicitly nor implicitly; unless nevertheless an interrogation concerning an oath preceded, because then through the preceding interrogation that "I swear" is sufficiently determined to a true oath. C. I. Proc. Poen. 229. In addition, these words: may I be killed if this is not so, and similar ones, although they are true oaths if they are said by way of execration, because God is considered to intervene specially in that killing, nevertheless commonly they contain only a certain pledge or obligation of penalty, and signify: if it is not so, I pledge my life. The same must be said concerning the other formula: may the devil seize me. But otherwise, if God is expressly named there by saying: may God destroy me if I lie, because then God is invoked as avenger of a lie, if perhaps one is uttered.

It is not an oath to say: truly, certainly, in truth, by the faith of a good man, of a Christian, of a priest, of a soldier, of a Prince, of a King; nor to say: by my conscience, because God is not brought in as witness. He does not swear who says: it is as true as the sun shines, as I sit here, walk, etc.; whence even if the comparison is false, it is only a lie, since no one is invoked as witness. Although to say: it is as true as God is; as Christ is in the venerable Sacrament; as the Gospel is true, etc., commonly seems to contain an oath with blasphemy, nevertheless this does not sufficiently appear, because no one is invoked as witness, nor does it seem to be blasphemy if it is true and the mind of the one uttering it is only to signify a likeness of truth, not equality of certitude. L. 134-143; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 1, 6; Suarez, de Rel., tr. 5, l. 1, c. 13; E. M. 551, 554.

n. 552.

Is an oath licit? - An oath clothed with due conditions is honorable and licit; and, if it is promissory, it obliges in conscience, unless a just cause stands in the way, or its obligation has legitimately ceased. This is established both from the definition of the Council of Constance, sess. 8, against Wyclif, and from proposition 101 condemned by Clement XI in the Bull Unigenitus, and from proposition 75 condemned by Pius VI in the Bull Auctorem fidei, and also from the universal practice of the Church and peoples, and from various places of Sacred Scripture. Deut. 6:13: You shall fear the Lord your God... and by his name you shall swear. And indeed God and his attributes are especially honored from this, that he is brought into the midst and invoked as the highest and infallible Truth in testimony of truth. C. Etsi 26, de Iurei.; L. 144 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 3, 4. From a grave cause, and with a protestation employed, an oath upon Protestant Bibles can be permitted, insofar namely as they contain the true word of God. E. M.

n. 553.

What are the requisites for the licitness of an oath? - A threefold condition is required, according to Jer. 4:2: You shall swear: The Lord lives, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice. The reason is that otherwise it cannot be furnished with due reverence to God.

Truth, that is, conformity of the assertion with the knowledge and intention of the one swearing. Therefore it excludes every lie, but not every error. In an assertory oath, truth regards the existence of the fact according to the mind, not also according to the truth of the thing; in a promissory oath, it regards the existence of the intention of obliging oneself and of furnishing what is promised.

Judgment, that is, that it be done with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence, and not without necessity or a grave cause. For since an oath is a most holy thing, it ought not be made without prudence, consideration, reverence, and rashly without any necessity and cause.

Justice, that is, that the oath be concerning a matter, whether promised or simply proposed, or concerning an assertion, just and honorable. Thus he would swear against justice who would oblige himself by oath to inflict harm unjustly upon a neighbor, or would affirm what he was prohibited from manifesting. Ecclus. 23:9, 12; L. 144; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 3, 5, 10; E. M.

n. 554.

What kind of sin is it to swear without truth, without judgment, without justice? - To swear without truth is always mortal, even in light matter, because to bring God into testimony of falsity is to will to destroy his infinitely perfect truthfulness. This is also established from proposition 24 condemned by Innocent XI; S. Th., Quodl. 1, a. 18. To swear without judgment, from lightness, for example from custom, without grave cause, or if someone swears before he has sufficiently investigated the truth, is venial per se, scandal and danger of perjury nevertheless being excluded, because it is only vain usurpation of the name of God. To swear without judgment from rashness, lest perhaps what is asserted is true, or what is promised can be fulfilled, is grave on account of the danger of perjury. To swear without justice is certainly mortal in a promissory oath if the matter concerns committing a grave sin, as is clear; indeed, according to St. Liguori, even if the matter concerns only a venial sin, at least more probably, because it seems grave irreverence to invoke God as witness or guarantor of any sin whatever to be committed. Yet Suarez with others says that the opposite opinion is common.

But in an assertory oath, more probably it is only venial per se, because the oath per se falls upon the assertion, not as evil but as true. Thus he who boasts by oath about fornication committed, although by this boasting he sins lethally, nevertheless by force of the oath per se he does not confirm the boasting, but only the truth of the fornication. Except unless the oath is assumed as an instrument or means of sinning, for example, for strengthening detraction. And this holds even if someone uses an oath as an instrument or means for consummating venial sin, because one swearing thus, as far as in him lies, makes God an accomplice of his sin. "If someone swears," says S. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 2, "that he will not do some better good which nevertheless he is not bound to do, (for example, not entering religion), he indeed sins by swearing, insofar as he places an obstacle to the Holy Spirit, who is the inspirer of a good purpose; nevertheless he does not sin by keeping the oath, but he would do much better if he did not keep it." But a sin of this sort, since the matter concerns only a counsel not to be embraced, is venial per se. L. 145, 147; Suarez, l. 3, c. 12; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7, a. 9 ad 3; q. 98, aa. 2, 3; Quodl. 1, a. 18; Struggl 5, 7, 9; E. M.; cf. here 582, 583. In public disturbances of civil society, the oath of passive obedience, as it is called, is permitted, namely that one will do nothing against the Government, and with the laws of God and the Church preserved. Pius VII, Instruction, year 1808; S. Penit., 18 Dec. 1860. Cf. here 549.

n. 555.

What is a sufficient cause for swearing? - Any honorable cause of some weight, for example, peace to be confirmed in families, greater security in contracts, etc. L., H. A. 14.

n. 556.

Is it permitted to swear with probability of truth? - "For swearing rightly absolute and altogether infallible certitude is not required, but some moral certitude suffices, or a certain probability which reaches a certain moral certitude. Thus Tamburini. Indeed Sanchez, Suarez, the Salmanticenses, Lessius, Bonacina, Azor, with the common opinion, say more expressly that in an oath, whether assertory or promissory, probability of the truth asserted or of the fulfillment of the promised thing to be executed suffices, provided that there is not a probable reason to the opposite. Hence they say that what has been heard from a person so worthy of faith that he makes us morally certain can indeed be affirmed with oath. Yet this does not run in judgment," L. 148, where the oath which is required is to be emitted from one's own certitude. Struggl 6. Therefore he sins gravely who swears in mere doubt of truth, because God, infallible truth, cannot be invoked except in testimony of a thing which seems at least morally certain. Struggl 6; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 1.

n. 557.

Is it permitted to swear with mental restriction? - R. Negative, if it is purely mental; and here, according to St. Alphonsus, pertain propositions 26, 27, 28 condemned by Innocent XI. Affirmative, if it is broadly mental, from a just cause. "It is certain," says St. Alphonsus, n. 151, "and common among all, that from a just cause it is permitted to use equivocation... and to confirm it by oath...

But a just cause can be any honorable end for preserving goods useful to spirit or body." And again: "For swearing thus, except in judgments and contracts, an absolutely grave cause is not required, but any reasonable cause suffices, for example, to free oneself from the troublesome and unjust interrogation of another." And Busembaum, n. 170, adds: "When there is a just cause of necessity or utility, one can use amphibologies in an oath, even if he spontaneously offers himself to the oath." Finally St. Alphonsus, n. 151, adds that, according to the more probable opinion, it is venial if he furnishes this without cause. "The reason is that in an oath of this sort truth and justice are already present, and only judgment or discretion is lacking; and the deficiency of this is only venial... Yet one must except, with the Salmanticenses and others commonly, unless this is done in judgment or in contracts." The reason of this exception as to the first is that we are bound from obedience to answer a superior legitimately interrogating according to the sense of the one interrogating; but as to the second, because then from justice we are bound to utter words according to the mind of the contracting party, lest he be deceived and suffer harm. Struggl 16 seqq.; Lugo, de Fid., d. 4, n. 67; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 4; E. M.

n. 558.

What is the obligation of a promissory oath? - Every promissory oath concerning a licit and honorable thing, besides the obligation of justice or fidelity which arises from a simple promise, also induces an obligation of religion. The reason is that a promise per se already obliges, and with divine testimony invoked it is confirmed and strengthened. "For someone is bound to make true what he swore; otherwise truth is lacking in the oath." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7. But an oath concerning an illicit or plainly useless thing by no means obliges, because an oath, as an act of religion, cannot be a bond of iniquity or of an idle thing. R. 58, de R. I. in 6. Oaths of this sort do not revive, even if the thing afterwards ceases to be idle or illicit according to R. I. 18 in 6: "That which by law does not subsist from the beginning is not strengthened by lapse of time."

Nor likewise does an oath impeding a greater good oblige, for example, of not entering religion or of marrying, unless someone swore in favor of another. For then, without injury to the other's right, he cannot embrace the evangelical counsels. Thus alumni of the College of the S. C. de P. F. cannot enter religion without permission of the Holy See, because of the oath by which they are bound. Struggl 24 seqq.; L. 172, 176; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 7, 8; Quodl. 5, a. 27; Scavini, ed. 12, Milan, 1874, v. 2, n. 229; v. 4, nn. 243, 244, 245; cf. here 554. Alumni of the Urban College of Propaganda Fide promise by oath the observance of the laws of the College, that they will not enter a religious order without special permission of the Holy See, that they will ascend to sacred orders up to the priesthood, and that they will return to their own diocese and there give perpetual work to the sacred ministry. S. C. Cons., 29 July 1909.

n. 559.

You will resolve: He who swore to an evil thing is never obligated by the oath; indeed he sins in two ways if he fulfills the oath, namely against religion and against the virtue to which the matter of the oath is opposed. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7. He who confirmed a prodigal promise by swearing is not obligated by the oath, because that promise is at least lightly evil. He does not sin against an oath who for the sake of courtesy swore that he would not sit, drink, enter the house, etc., before another, if, compelled by the other, he sits, drinks, or enters first; because for the most part an oath of this sort is null from defect of intention of swearing, or, if it is valid, it is relaxed by the other yielding his right.

Parents who do not fulfill an oath of punishing their children rarely sin, because for the most part the oath concerns a useless thing, or rather inordinate vengeance; add that often those delinquent either have already been corrected, or at least have promised amendment. Likewise merchants for the most part do not seem to be bound by an oath not to sell for less, or many persons not to buy; either because oaths of this sort generally concern a useless thing, or because these men do not have the mind of swearing, or certainly because there is present in the oath a tacit condition, unless things seem likely to turn out better otherwise. L. 176, 180, 185, 186; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7.

n. 560.

How is a promissory oath to be interpreted? - The obligation of an oath is to be interpreted strictly and according to the nature of the act or contract to which it is added, so that it follows all its conditions. The reason is that the one swearing is judged to have wished to oblige himself as little as he could, and otherwise the oath does not change the nature of the act, but superadds to it only the obligation of religion; and therefore it ought to have the same conditions and limitations. Hence he is not bound by oath who under oath promised marriage to a girl rich, healthy, virgin, of good reputation, if she has fallen into poverty, illness, infamy, fornication, because the simple promise then does not oblige. C. Quemadmodum 25, de Iurei. Likewise, if you promised and swore to Titia that you would marry her, you can, leaving her, enter religion, because this tacit condition is present in the promise of marriage: unless I enter religion. And this also holds if betrothals were confirmed by oath, unless the marriage were necessary for legitimating offspring, repairing scandal, or providing for the honor of the betrothed woman, if it could not be met in another way. He who reveals a sworn secret does not sin when the very law of secrecy ceases to oblige, because an oath, as we have said, follows the nature of the act to which it is joined. L. 180, 183, 727; l. 6, n. 870.

n. 561.

What are the tacit conditions included or understood in a promissory oath? - They are: 1. If I shall be able without grave harm, because no one is judged to oblige himself to a thing impossible both physically and morally. 2. If the thing has not been notably changed. 3. If the rights or will of a superior do not stand in the way. 4. If the other has preserved reciprocal fidelity. 5. Unless the other yields concerning his right. L. 180; Struggl 31. Cf. here 566.

n. 562.

Is smallness of matter given in transgression of a promissory oath? - The first opinion denies, because not only a simple promise is violated, but a sworn promise. Therefore in any matter a grave injury is inflicted upon God, whose testimony has been invoked in vain by the one swearing. And indeed God would be called either as guarantor, namely by his authority, or certainly as witness of falsity, if truth were not conformed to the thing promised. For in this oath God is invoked as witness of the present intention, and either as quasi-sponsor or also as witness of future execution. But God can in no way either fail faith or lie in any matter, even the smallest. "Whoever swears that he will do something is obligated to do it, so that truth may be fulfilled," on account of reverence for divine testimony. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 7, 8.

The second opinion affirms, because in a promissory oath God is not properly brought in as witness of the future execution of the thing promised, but only as witness of the actual promise, or of the true intention of executing the promise. Nor indeed is he brought in as guarantor of future execution, but merely as confirming, or furnishing authority to, the obligation which arises from the promise made before him, just as a Prince renders betrothals contracted before him firmer by his authority. Now as to the first, no irreverence is committed against God through transgression of a promissory oath, or God is not made witness of falsity, since we suppose that the promise and the intention of execution were sincere in the one swearing. But as to the other, by infidelity in the matter promised, to be fulfilled under divine authority, irreverence indeed is inflicted upon divine authority, but one which is neither direct and formal, since it is intended only indirectly in the very violation of the promise, nor greater; indeed, with S. Thomas as witness, 2. 2, q. 89, a. 8, per se it is less than the irreverence which is found in transgression of a vow. Since therefore in this, as also in any indirect irreverence against God, lightness of matter is admitted by all, it must also be admitted in that which transgression of a promissory oath inflicts. And indeed if the one swearing, in the act of the oath, had the will of fulfilling, and afterwards does not fulfill it, he does not commit a lie and perjury, but only infidelity, which, since the thing promised is not grave by hypothesis, will not be able to be extended to grave fault. Besides, in this oath God is brought in as witness of the contracted obligation, which consequently cannot be violated without irreverence toward God; but this indeed can be grave or light according to the nature of the matter. St. Liguori, n. 173, says that each opinion is probable; but he adheres more to the second opinion, and in H. A., n. 13, says: "If the thing promised is not grave, infidelity does not reach grave fault." Suarez, l. 3, c. 16, n. 9 seqq.; L. 172, 173, 178, 211.

n. 563.

Does a promissory oath emitted through error or deceit oblige? - R. Negative, if the error or deceit concerns the substance of the thing; but otherwise if it affects only its accidental adjuncts, because a simple contract would be invalid in the former case, but not in the latter. L. 175. Yet the same St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 187, warns that the opposite opinion is probable when the error or deceit concerns those circumstances which, although accidental, if they had been known from the beginning, would have deterred one from the oath and promise. Those things entering the quasi-substance of the contract are as a condition without which not. This warning of St. Alphonsus indeed ought to hold, as in vows, so in gratuitous contracts, but not in onerous contracts. Cf. 575.

n. 564.

Does a promissory oath extorted by grave and unjust fear oblige? - The first probable opinion affirms. For the general rule is that any oath is to be kept when it can be done without sin, lest God be brought in as witness of the false. The second opinion, also sufficiently probable, denies, because an oath follows the nature of the act to which it is added. But that promise by natural law is void, or at least rescindable by the very one who suffered fear, according as the promise is gratuitous or onerous, on account of the grave injury which it contains, which is not to be confirmed and continued by oath. Whence even the patrons of the first opinion warn that he who suffered fear can ask relaxation of the oath, so that he may be excused from the obligation of paying; but if he has already paid, he can seek in judgment what he gave, or secretly compensate himself. L. 174; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 3; q. 98, a. 3 ad 1; Ithur., Cas. 15, nn. 11, 18; Struggl 23, 29.

n. 565.

Must a promissory oath in favor of a third party always be fulfilled, as long as it can be fulfilled without sin? - R. Affirmative, if that third party already has a right acquired through an accepted promise, even if it is against the evangelical counsels, and even if the promise made is void by law in hatred of the creditor, as a promise of paying usuries and a promise of money made to a prostitute, although such an oath was illicit. Understand this if the prostitute, for example, has already furnished her work; otherwise, if not. Yet it must be said otherwise if the promise is void by law because it would be against the common good and concerning a prohibited thing. The reason is that in this second case the fulfillment itself would be illicit. Therefore an oath extorted by fear concerning religious profession, marriage, betrothals, etc., does not oblige. On the contrary, as to the first case, on account of reverence for the divine Name, the oath is to be observed whenever it can be observed licitly. Cf. 554, 558, 560, 566, 970; L. l. 6, n. 870.

n. 566.

How does the obligation of a promissory oath cease from within? - The obligation of an oath, namely a promissory oath, can cease both from within and from without. It ceases from within: 1. If what was good at the time of the oath afterwards becomes illicit on account of circumstances, or impedes a greater good, or is better omitted than fulfilled. For an oath is an act of religion, and God is not worshiped by an illicit thing, or by one which rather detracts from divine worship. 2. If you change the oath into some work plainly better and more pleasing to God; for each person can do this per se. Yet always except if you have sworn something for the advantage of a man; for God does not wish him to be defrauded. Cf. 568. 3.

If the state of the thing is notably changed, for such a change makes another object to which the intention of the one swearing does not extend. 4. If the thing sworn has become useless for the intent, especially if it is more destructive of it; for example, if correction of an impenitent son would be wholly useless, indeed he would become worse from it. 5. If those conditions so bear, which nature and the doctors teach are tacitly understood in any promissory oath. Cf. 561. 6. If its final cause ceases, for without the final cause the effect does not subsist; for example, you promised alms to a poor man, but he afterwards becomes rich. But otherwise, if only an impulsive cause ceases. L. 180, 187, 188; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 7, 9.

n. 567.

Is that change sufficient of itself, even if not notable, which nevertheless, if foreseen, one would not have emitted the oath? - The first opinion affirms from S. Thomas, 4 D. 38, q. 1 ad 1. The reason is that the intention of obliging oneself then is either lacking, or is so understood. The second opinion holds that it does not suffice, because the obligation is not to be taken from a promise which would not be made in the future, but from that which has already been made. Thus Suarez, Sanchez, Cajetan, etc. "Yet deservedly they say that the probability of the first opinion cannot be denied. Indeed they themselves, with the Salmanticenses, judge that change to be notable which, if it had been known from the beginning, the one swearing would not have promised, which certainly agrees with the first opinion." L. 187, 226; cf. 563, 564, 575, 597, 598.

n. 568.

How does the obligation of a promissory oath cease from without? - It ceases by annulment, dispensation, commutation, remission. Annulment is the nullification of an oath. Annulment is made by any superior having dominative power over the one swearing, concerning those things which are subject to his power, even if the matter concerns promises and contracts. For these oaths have an implicit condition: if the superior consents, if they are not revoked by him. The Supreme Pontiff has this dominative power as to ecclesiastical matters; a superior as to matters subject to his own power; a father, husband, tutor, master; and these can annul and nullify the oaths of their own in plainly the same way in which they can annul the vows of their own. Num. 30:4 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 3. Cf. 599 seqq.

Dispensation is given by one having jurisdiction in the external forum; understand spiritual jurisdiction. Whoever has ordinary power of dispensing in vows can dispense in oaths and in vows, even if these are sworn. L. 189. "Dispensation which is made in an oath does not extend to this, that something be done against the oath; for this is impossible, since observance of an oath falls under a divine precept, which is indispensable. But dispensation of an oath extends to this, that what fell under the oath no longer falls under the oath, as though not existing as due matter of an oath; just as we said above concerning a vow, q. preceding, a. 10 ad 2... The matter of a promissory oath is something future, which can vary, namely in such a way that in some event it can be illicit or harmful, and consequently not be due matter of an oath; and therefore dispensation can be made in a promissory oath, because such dispensation regards the matter of the oath, and is not contrary to the divine precept concerning observance of an oath." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 1. "Sometimes something is promised under oath concerning which it is doubtful whether it is licit or illicit, profitable or harmful, either simply or in some case; and in this any Bishop can dispense. But sometimes something is promised under oath which is manifestly licit and useful; and in such an oath dispensation or commutation does not seem to have place, unless something better occurs to be done for the common utility, which seems especially to pertain to the power of the Pope, who has care of the universal Church; or also absolute relaxation, which also pertains to the Pope generally in all things which pertain to the dispensation of ecclesiastical affairs, over which he has fullness of power." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 3.

Commutation is reduced to dispensation, and is made, like it, by one having spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum. L. 191. Cf. here 566.

Remission is the relaxation of an oath made in favor of a man, by the same man, or by him to whom the one promising and the promised matter is subject. It must be noted: 1. That if a promise in favor of a man, confirmed by oath, has not yet been accepted, there is no obligation of fulfilling it, and it can be revoked; because the oath is then accessory and follows the nature of the promise. But otherwise, if the promise was principally made to God. 2. If such a promise has been accepted by the third party to whom it was made, and a right has been absolutely acquired by him, then without his consent it cannot be relaxed, not even by the Pontiff. But this latter is limited in three cases. The first is if the one swearing is a subject, and the oath concerns those things which are subject to the power of superiors. The other is if the oath cannot be kept without common harm, or is upon a contract forbidden by law. Such oaths more truly do not need relaxation, since of themselves they are null. The third is if the oath was extorted by deceit or fear; for then, even if it is valid, it can be relaxed. And this holds even if the promise is not undue, say concerning paying a true debt, but the oath was unjustly extorted; and even if the oath is extorted by light fear, at least for the internal forum, from C. Sollicite 2 and from C. Accepta 3, de Restit. spol., where only an altogether spontaneous oath cannot be relaxed. But not only the Pontiff can relax it, but also Bishops, chapters when Sees are vacant, and others having episcopal jurisdiction, and also Confessors having delegated faculty of dispensing in oaths.

It is certain that an oath in favor of a third party can be freely remitted by him, without relaxation of the Church, because each person can yield concerning his own right. For "from such a promise he to whom the promise was made can absolve; for it is understood that he has already paid the promise when he does concerning it according to his will." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 2. L. 189-193.

n. 569.

Can one who has delegated faculty of dispensing in vows dispense in oaths? - These words are from Suarez, de Voto, l. 6, c. 14, n. 6: "It is sufficiently probable that power delegated simply for dispensing in vows extends to dispensing in pious oaths concerning the same matter, when they stand per se and produce their own sole obligation. This is the common opinion, and without doubt can be observed in practice." And n. 19: "Even if vow and oath immediately fall upon the same matter, and each obliges per se to the honor of God, by an absolute faculty of dispensing in vows, either the vow, or the oath, or both can be removed, at the judgment of the one dispensing. For this assertion we can allege all the authors of the first, namely the preceding, assertion..., and other moderns and learned men hold it." The intrinsic reason of this opinion is that oath and vow, on account of the affinity of obligation, are equated with each other.

But others deny, because the bond of a vow and of an oath is diverse. Thus Lessius, l. 2, c. 42, n. 60, who nevertheless admits the prior opinion when the oath is accessory to the vow. For indeed, when the vow is dispensed, the oath vanishes. But an oath by its nature is accessory to the promise to which it is added. St. Alphonsus, n. 160, holds each opinion as probable; nevertheless he says that the second must altogether be held: "for the obligation of an oath already contracted, since it is certain and possesses, cannot be removed by a dispensation that is only probably valid." But if the opposite opinion is probable, it is altogether safe in practice, since, that probability standing, the superior granting the first faculty is rightly judged also to grant the latter, unless he expressly limits it. Yet S. C. de P. F., 19 May 1845, decreed: "the faculty of dispensing from vows does not per se include the faculty of dispensing from an oath." And as to sworn vows the same S. C., 3 May 1828, left the matter doubtful. L. 189, 190, 192, 254; D'Annibale, ed. 4, p. 2, n. 431, note 36; Monitore Ecclesiastico, vol. 18, pp. 139, 140; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 2085, 2087; E. M. Regulars, from special privilege, can commute oaths and also dispense in them, unless they were in favor of a third party and accepted by him. L. de Privil., 108.

Vol. II, On the Seventh and Tenth P…, IV. On the Modes of Acquiring Ownership by Private Will

n. 968.

What is the force of an oath added to a contract? A promissory oath is added to contracts in order to confirm them because of reverence for the divine Name. Hence besides the obligation from justice by force of the contract, there is also an obligation from religion by force of the oath. The obligation of an oath affects only the person swearing. For by it we are obligated to God to do what we promised. Therefore, although the obligation of a contract passes to the heirs, as one which affects the goods of the contracting party himself, nevertheless the obligation of the oath does not pass to them. As to the obligation of an oath, the general rule is: An oath follows the nature of the act. For the accessory follows the principal. L. 1. 6. nn. 870, 873.

In Roman Law several contracts, otherwise invalid, became valid and firm by oath. This could well be done by force of the law itself, restoring the natural obligation taken away, or removing the action introduced for seeking restitution in full, because of reverence for the oath added to the contract. By more recent law, contracts otherwise invalid or rescindable become neither valid nor firm. C. H. 1260: an oath is not admitted in contracts, and if it is made it is held as not added. This nevertheless does not prevent someone in conscience from having to stand by the promise and oath by which he freely renounced a favor conceded through the laws, if this renunciation is not illicit and prohibited, and there is question of a favor of a merely private person; for example if someone confirms by oath some simple promise, to which civil law neither assists with an action conceded in the external forum, nor resists, by taking away its natural validity.

Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 29 passages

49. On an Oath

Rusticus, a rude man, often swears from anger, saying: By my soul; may God punish me. At Easter time he confesses, and the confessor vehemently reproves him, saying: Do you not know that this is grave perjury and grave sin? Rusticus, terrified, on that day of confession indeed abstains from that perjury, but afterward goes on swearing as he did before.

Q. 1. What concerning the custom of swearing? - 2. What concerning an oath uttered in anger? - 3. What as to the case?

R. To the first: the custom of swearing in itself seems to wound only the judgment required in an oath, and therefore regularly and in itself must be called a light sin, insofar as it is voluntary. But by reason of the danger which it contains of perjuring, it is not without grave sin. Perrone § 253. Hence in Ecclus. 23:9 it is said: Let not your mouth become accustomed to swearing; for there are many falls in it.

To the second. An oath uttered in anger is often free from grave fault. Thus Busemb. and St. Alph., l. 3, n. 146: "Those uttering words from anger, namely, by God, by Christ, I will kill you, commonly do not sin gravely, because for the most part they are excused by ignorance or indeliberation."

To the third. The proposed case can easily be resolved by the very words of St. Alph., l. 3, n. 150: "Some simple persons seem sometimes able to be excused from mortal perjury by reason of inconsideration, when they use certain sworn formulas, such as by my soul; may God punish me. For although they know that this is called an oath, nevertheless they do not apprehend that to swear and to invoke God as witness is something grave; but only apprehend some confused notion of an evil not of so great moment. Indeed it must be noted that commonly rustics do not apprehend the gravity of perjury; while, confessing themselves about oaths, they little or not at all distinguish true oaths from false; and this I have long since understood from practice in Missions. Wherefore for those who have the custom thus of perjuring, I judge that confessors rather ought to abstain from instructing such persons about the grave sin which in fact is in perjury, lest material sins in them, on account of the bad habit which they have, become formal; from the general rule.... Nevertheless such habitual persons are to be strongly warned that thereafter they cease swearing falsely. For the rest, it is not always expedient to warn a rude penitent of this sort concerning the gravity of perjury, if the admonition is foreseen not easily to be profitable." G. 296; I. M. 549, 551.

Candidus, a priest, since, by applying himself to a game of cards, on a certain day he had inadvertently prolonged it beyond midnight, and consequently had omitted on that day to recite vespers and compline, noticing this on the following day, emitted an oath of no longer playing, lest he again be exposed to a similar danger. But it is very difficult for Candidus to keep his oath; since his two brothers and two other priest friends, who come together toward nightfall, are accustomed to play cards together for the sake of recreation, a moderate quantity of money having been exposed. And since Candidus no longer appears and remains alone in his own separate room, pretending that he must prepare Lenten sermons, both his brothers and the priest friends strongly urge him that at least sometimes, or for a shorter time, by his presence he be willing to make the conversation of brothers and friends more cheerful, and to be present at the game as before. So that he may do this more willingly, his brothers propose to him that they themselves will pay for him that moderate quantity of money, if he himself is defeated in the game, and that they themselves will give him all the money which as victors in the game they obtain.

Q. 1. What concerning an oath of not playing? - 2. What concerning the oath of Candidus?

R. To the first: "If an oath has been made of not playing in general, all agree that it does not oblige one to abstain from an honest and moderate game." For an oath of this sort is understood to have been made lest someone spend notable time, expose a grave sum of money in a game, squander goods, etc.; unless something else must be judged from particular circumstances, for example, "if the one swearing expressly intended a greater good in abstaining from play, as that he might be free for God, mortify himself, etc." For then he is held to abstain even from licit and small-quantity play. "But in this play there can well be smallness of matter, which is to be measured according to the end intended by the one swearing. Such a one swearing can also give money to another for playing, and watch him, and also assist him; because this properly is not to play." Lig. 178; I. M. 562.

To the second. If Candidus, asked by his brothers and friends, merely assists at the game without playing, he does not break the oath of not playing. If Candidus recites all the canonical hours in the morning and evening; nay indeed, if in the evening he also anticipates matins and lauds of the following day, neither, by playing late with friends and brothers for the sake of urbanity, does he violate the oath. For in cases of this sort, for defining sin and grave sin, attention must be paid both to the quantity of matter and especially to the end which someone proposed to himself in swearing. - I. M. 562, 566; G. 298.

Thomas, leader of an army, in a war altogether unjust on the opposite side, captured by enemies and cast into prison, is then sent as an envoy to his own people, so that he may negotiate concerning concluding peace, with an oath nevertheless that, whatever may be the outcome of the negotiation, he return to the city and prison of the enemies.

Q. Is Thomas held to return?

R. "He who promises with an oath to return to prison, according to others, is not held to return with probable danger of most grave unjust harm; for it would be to offer himself to it spontaneously. But much more probably he can, because, the promise having been placed, to return is an act of virtue." Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 229.

Ambrosius, a servant, having known the fornication of the son of the household, swears to him that he will manifest it to no one.

Q. Does such an oath bind?

R. "The oath binds; unless silence gives occasion of another fornication; or unless there is present the necessity of correction, or the just interrogation of a superior intervenes." Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 4, n. 229.

Minantius often swears, saying in a rather raised voice: I swear by this Cross, and showing with his hand whatever object first occurs to him. Nay indeed, he often swears, saying: By God, by Christ, I will kill you, I will cut off your head. At other times also he swears, saying: May as many Angels take my soul as the times I have done this; So may God favor me, as I....

Q. What is to be thought concerning formulas of this sort?

R. It is not a true oath, "regularly speaking, to say: May as many Angels take my soul as the times I have done this.... Nor is it an oath to say: I swear by this Cross, the Cross nevertheless not having been shown or signed." Lig. 143. But, speaking in itself, it is a comminatory oath to say: By God, by Christ, I will kill you, I will cut off your head; and it is a grave sin. For God is expressly named there, and invocation of him is added to confirm a grave and unjust threat. Lig. 143, 146; I. M. 554.

n. 6.

Sisinius in court affirmed by oath that the one hundred gold pieces which Caius owed to Sempronius had already been restored by the former to the latter. Yet Sisinius had known this only from the assertion of Caius himself, his friend, of whose truthfulness he was firmly persuaded, and could have no suspicion of falsity.

The same Sisinius in court affirmed a falsehood by oath. But he swore according to the form introduced into the courts on account of those who refuse to invoke the holy name of God, namely: I swear to tell the whole truth, and nothing other than the truth.

Q. Was Sisinius perjured in either case?

R. Affirmatively, in the first case. The reason is that for an oath in judgment, knowledge of the matter is required, which he does not have who hears the matter from others related to him, and all the more related by one having an interest in that cause himself. To the point, St. Alph., l. 3, n. 148: "They say that what has been heard from a person so worthy of trust that he makes us morally certain can indeed be affirmed with an oath. Yet this does not run in judgment." - I. M. 556.

Affirmatively also in the second case. The reason is that that formula contains a true oath. "To say," says St. Alph., l. 3, n. 136, "I swear it is so, is not truly an oath, because then divine testimony is invoked neither explicitly nor implicitly.... Unless an interrogation concerning an oath preceded, because then, through the preceding interrogation, that I swear is sufficiently determined to a true oath." Now that formula, from the very interrogation and admonition of the judge, is determined to a true oath. For in the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, after in art. 297 that form has been established in art. 299 it is said: "The oath shall be furnished by witnesses or experts, standing on their feet, in the presence of the judges, after a serious admonition which will be made to them by the president or by the praetor concerning the moral importance of such an act, concerning the religious bond which believers contract by it before God, and concerning the penalties established against those guilty of false testimony or expert opinion," etc. - I. M. 550, 551.

When a ship had come to the port of Marseilles from the Canary Islands, the captain of the ship was asked by the harbor master whether he had touched at those islands, which were altogether falsely asserted in the public newspapers to be infected by plague. The captain of the ship immediately responded negatively, since those islands in fact were infected by no contagious disease.

Q. 1. Is it licit in an oath to use mental restriction? - Who regularly can use mental restriction? What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. n. 557. To the second: "Regularly public persons can use broadly mental restriction when asked about matters committed to their faith, such as secretaries, parish priests, captains, magistrates, advocates, physicians, midwives, etc. For if things committed to persons of this sort were violated, most grave inconveniences would certainly follow. For the rest, we do not deny that the present question is difficult, in which we can be deceived, both in assigning a legitimate cause and in using legitimate formulas of speaking; for easily a broadly mental restriction can be a purely mental one. Wherefore one must proceed cautiously, lest we harm human society, lest we introduce confusion, lest we derogate from Christian simplicity." Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 231.

To the third: "He who comes from a place which is falsely thought to be infected by disease can deny that he comes from there, namely, as infected with pestilence, such as is and ought to be the mind of those asking." Scav., l. c.

And thus also "he who was compelled to marriage can assert that he did not contract it, namely freely. He who is not held to customs duties can say that he bears nothing, so that he is held to pay." Scav., ibid.

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Chapter II. On Oath · Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. II, Article II. On the Obligation of a Promissory Oath · Vol. I, Treatise On Contracts, First Part. On Contracts i…, Ch. III, Article I. On the Oath Added to a Contract

"Invited to table, and asked whether the food is good, he can affirm that it is such, although in fact it is tasteless, understanding, for mortification and penance; and otherwise all know that from urbanity, in that case, it is customary to respond thus, however the food may have been prepared." Scav., l. c.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 39 passages

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Chapter II. On Oath

Definition. An oath is an invocation ¹ of the divine Name as testimony of the truth ².

¹ By this chiefly an oath differs from a vow, whose essence consists in the promise alone.

² Others, in order to explain better the twofold end of an oath, say that an oath is an invocation of the divine Name as testimony, either for giving credibility to words, or for confirming a promise.

Division. An oath is distinguished:

Into assertory or promissory, according as the truth ³ alone is asserted, or a promise or agreement is confirmed.

³ Others, in order to include both a true and a false oath, define an assertory oath as that by which present or past things are affirmed or denied; for a promissory oath, as is clear, extends itself only to future things. Although not every oath concerning the future is promissory. For a twofold oath concerning the future is distinguished by the doctors: one bare and simple, which contains no promise toward another, for example if you swear that you will not enter this house or tavern, etc.; another truly promissory, which is confirmatory of a promise either toward God, which is a sworn vow, or toward one's neighbor, which adds to the obligation of justice or fidelity arising from the promise an obligation from the virtue of religion.

Into solemn or simple, according as it is made with the form required by law, or with solemn ceremonies, or with these set aside ⁴.

⁴ Clerics, especially priests, cannot interpose a solemn oath except by permission of the Bishop, which is granted only for a grave cause.

Into explicit or implicit, according as God is expressly invoked as witness, or creatures are employed as testimony, in which the divine attributes shine forth in a special way ⁵.

⁵ The doctors warn that an oath by creatures, by heaven, for example by earth, etc., should be used only by more perfect and spiritual persons, for whom it is easy to apply the due reverence by which we honor God in creatures. Besides, among us that custom is not in force; and if someone, for example, swears by the sun, he is judged to be jesting.

There is added also an imprecatory oath, by which God is invoked at the same time as witness and as avenger of perjury ⁶.

⁶ This distinction of an oath into contestatory and execratory or imprecatory is also common. But it is disputed whether, when someone confirms a falsehood by an imprecatory oath, by which he obliges himself or something pertaining to himself (as St. Thomas says, 2. 2, q. 89, art. 1 ad 3) to punishment, another species of malice is added, namely against charity toward oneself or one's neighbor. The doctors more commonly deny this, because a person is not accustomed to imprecate such an evil upon himself or his own from his heart, but rather thinks that God will not do it. Thus St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 140), who soon after (n. 142) notes that, according to the common opinion, all oaths are of the same species.

An oath clothed with due conditions is honorable and lawful, and if it is promissory, it obliges in conscience, unless a just cause prevents it, or its obligation has lawfully ceased. - Thus all, and it is clear both from the definition of the Council of Constance, sess. 8, against Wyclif, and from the universal practice of the Church and of peoples, and also from various places of Sacred Scripture. Deuteronomy 6. 13: "You shall fear the Lord your God... and by His name you shall swear." - St. Alphonsus, n. 133, 439 and following.

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Second Precept of t…, Ch. II, Article II. On the Obligation of a Promissory Oath

n. 312.

Principles. I. Every promissory oath concerning a lawful and honorable matter, besides the obligation of justice or of fidelity which arises from the simple promise, also induces an obligation of religion. The reason is that the promise by itself already obliges, and is confirmed and strengthened by the divine testimony invoked. - But an oath concerning an unlawful or entirely useless matter does not oblige in the least; because an oath, as an act of religion, cannot be the bond of iniquity or of an idle matter ¹.

¹ Oaths of this sort do not revive, even if the matter afterward ceases to be idle or unlawful, according to Rule of Law 18 in VI: "That which by law does not subsist from the beginning is not strengthened by lapse of time." Thus he who, contrary to the fidelity of prior betrothals, has contracted a second betrothal under oath, if the prior betrothed woman dies before the wedding, is not to be compelled to the second betrothal, since both the promise and the oath contained an unlawful matter, and therefore were void from the beginning; just as, namely, if a spouse, with the other spouse unwilling or ignorant, professed religion and afterward was brought back from the monastery, when the other spouse has died, he is not to be compelled to the profession of religion, since it had been void from the beginning. For that rule is applied to an oath: "A vow" (and the same reason holds for an oath) "made at an unsuitable time does not oblige at a suitable time." See other examples in Laymann (lib. 4, tr. 3, c. 6, n. 4).

n. 312.

II. The obligation of an oath must be interpreted strictly; and it follows the nature of the act or contract to which it is added, and all its conditions. The reason for the first is that one swearing is judged to have willed to bind himself as little as he could; but the reason for the second is that an oath does not change the nature of the act, but adds to it only the obligation of religion, and therefore it ought to have the same conditions and limitations.

n. 312.

III. The obligation of an oath must also be interpreted according to the tacit conditions included in it or understood under it, which are: 1. if I can without grave harm; 2. if the matter has not been notably changed; 3. if the rights or will of the superior do not stand in the way; 4. if the other party has preserved reciprocal fidelity; 5. unless the other party yields from his right. - St. Alphonsus, n. 180.

Questions. Q. 1. Whether smallness of matter is given in the transgression of a promissory oath?

Resp. The first opinion denies it, because not only a simple promise is violated, but a sworn promise. Therefore in any matter whatever grave injury is inflicted on God, whose testimony has been invoked in vain by the one swearing. - Bonacina, Lessius, Toledo.

The second opinion affirms it, because in a promissory oath God is not properly brought in as witness of the future execution of the promised thing, but only of the actual promise, or of the true intention of executing the promise ². Suarez, Navarrus, Laymann, etc. - St. Alphonsus in the Work, n. 173, says that each opinion is probable; but in the Homo apostolicus, n. 13, he adheres more to the second opinion and says: "If the thing promised is not grave, infidelity does not reach grave fault."

² This reason, from what was just said (note a, p. 307), seems less firm; for the obligation of religion, of which the author speaks at n. 312, I, does not consist merely in not lying when the promise is made (in which, certainly, there would never be light fault), but also in fulfilling the promise. Therefore one must rather have recourse to the nature of the obligation from religion, which admits smallness of matter. And indeed, if this is admitted in the violation of a promise made to God by vow, it does not appear why it cannot be admitted in a promise for which God has in some way been summoned as surety.

Q. 2. Whether a promissory oath emitted by error or deceit obliges?

Resp. It is denied, if the error or deceit concerns the substance of the matter; but otherwise, if it affects only its accidental adjuncts; because a simple contract would be invalid in the former case, but not in the latter. - St. Alphonsus, n. 175 ³.

³ Nevertheless the same St. Alphonsus observes (lib. 3, n. 187) that the opposite opinion is probable when the error or deceit concerns those circumstances, even if accidental, which, if they had been known from the beginning, would have deterred from the oath and promise. And this observation of St. Alphonsus ought to hold just as in vows, so in gratuitous contracts, but not in onerous contracts; otherwise, as we shall see in the tract on contracts, contracts would have to be dissolved too often, since errors of this sort occur everywhere, or can be alleged as a pretext.

Q. 3. Whether a promissory oath extorted by grave and unjust fear obliges?

Resp. It is disputed. The first and more common opinion affirms it, because although the simple contract perhaps would be void when viewed according to natural law, yet it is made firm by the oath acceding to it, which must be kept from religion whenever it can be kept without sin. - St. Alphonsus, n. 174, and lib. 3, n. 716. Nevertheless the patrons of this opinion hold with St. Alphonsus that he who has suffered fear can ask relaxation of the oath, so that he may be excused from the obligation of paying; but if he has already paid, he can seek in court what he gave, or compensate himself secretly ⁴. - St. Alphonsus, n. 174, and lib. 3, n. 717.

⁴ If secret compensation is lawful, the obligation of giving even on account of the oath seems futile. For will religion impose a ridiculous obligation, that I place the material act of giving that which by my own authority I can afterward take away and recover, and which the other cannot lawfully receive?

But when the texts of canon law are inspected, by which this obligation from religion is customarily proved, it appears not obscurely that the Roman Pontiffs required that dispensation be sought, not so much because they judged these oaths per se obligatory, as that by this precaution the dangers of illusion and perjury might be met, as also the reasons for this economy adduced by Reiffenstuel (lib. 1, tit. 40, n. 59) insinuate.

The second opinion, which seems sufficiently probable, denies it; because an oath cannot confirm a promise void by natural law. For an oath follows the nature of the act to which it is added. See what is to be said in the tract On Contracts in General.

Q. 4. How does the obligation of an oath cease?

Resp. 1. It ceases from within ⁵, just as law does, by cessation of the motive cause, etc.

⁵ This happens 1. because of a notable change of matter; concerning which St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 187) admits the rule handed down by the Salamancans (tr. 17, c. 3, n. 22), that what, if it had been known from the beginning, would have prevented the vow or oath from being made, liberates from the obligation of the vow or oath; you have examples below in the third resolution; 2. because of the cessation of the final cause, for example if by oath you promised alms to Paul as poor, and he becomes rich (St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 188).

Resp. 2. It ceases from without by irritation, commutation, and dispensation, just as a vow does, of which we shall speak in the following chapter ⁶. It ceases also by relaxation or remission of the obligation made by him in whose favor the sworn promise was emitted, because anyone can yield his own right.

⁶ These words of Suarez (De Voto, lib. 6, c. 14, n. 6) are to be noted: "It is sufficiently probable that delegated power simply to dispense in vows extends to dispensing in pious oaths concerning the same matter, when they stand by themselves and produce only their own obligation. This is the common opinion, and without doubt it can be observed in practice." To this doctrine the Salamancans (tr. 17, c. 3, n. 3), whom St. Alphonsus followed (lib. 3, n. 190), incautiously oppose certain authors, as, for example, Sanchez, who in reality were not treating of an oath alone, nor even of sworn vows, but of an oath which does not depend on a vow emitted concerning the same matter.

But concerning this case the same Suarez says (l.c., n. 19): "Even if the vow and the oath immediately fall upon the same matter, and each obliges by itself to the honor of God, by an absolute faculty of dispensing in vows either the vow, or the oath, or both can be removed at the discretion of the one dispensing. For this assertion we can allege all the authors of the first," that is, the preceding, "assertion... and other modern and learned men hold it."

*Against this note the VV. fight through twelve columns (pp. 269-275), and directly establish against it this thesis (p. 270): "The authors cited by St. Alphonsus with the Salamancans for the negative opinion are rightly alleged by them." - Resp. In the Note it is written that certain authors are alleged without cause, not all. With this premised, it must be added that the thesis proposed by the VV. would have to be called false if anyone should detect even one writer wrongly alleged. But the VV. themselves concede (p. 272) that Sanchez stands not for the negative opinion with St. Alphonsus, but for the affirmative. Therefore. And in reality Sanchez (Decal., lib. 4, c. 53, n. 8-9) writes: "The third opinion says that delegated faculty for the dispensation or commutation of vows extends to the dispensation and commutation of oaths which are made to God alone... And this opinion has truth, although the oath does not have a promise included, but is made without it to God alone."

But next Bonacina too must be added to Sanchez. The reason is that one question is that of which Bonacina treats, while another is that of which the Salamancans treat, and after them St. Alphonsus. Among the Salamancans the question is (tr. 17, c. 3, n. 3): "Whether if to someone faculty is granted of dispensing or commuting vows, by this very fact faculty is judged granted of dispensing or commuting whatever oaths have been furnished to God alone." But St. Alphonsus says (lib. 3, n. 189): "It is asked whether he who has delegated faculty of dispensing in vows can dispense in oaths"; and that the sense of each question is the same is clear both from the context of St. Alphonsus and from the allegations which the holy Doctor transcribes from them. But Bonacina has it otherwise (De 2 Praec., disp. 4, q. 1, punct. 17, n. 12): "There is doubt whether those commuting vows from faculty delegated to them can also commute oaths annexed to such vows." But this latter question, by the consent of all the doctors, is plainly diverse from the former. Therefore. And indeed it was to be wished that in reporting Bonacina's opinion on this question the VV. had not omitted the final words. "Each opinion," Bonacina writes, "is probable; but the first seems more probable to me." Here the VV. stop. But Bonacina adds: "especially in a promissory oath; for this is not a vow, since it is not made to God, but to man." These words show that Bonacina affirmed this from an entirely different reason.

Besides, not all will easily concede what the VV. hold as certain, namely that the reason is invincible on account of which St. Alphonsus, after he had said concerning the question proposed by himself that each opinion was probable, that is, both the negative and the affirmative, then concludes that the first, negative opinion must altogether be held, because the obligation of an oath already contracted, since it is certain and possesses, cannot be removed by a dispensation only probably valid. Someone, arguing ad hominem, could say that both sins and censures are certain, but remission or absolution uncertain when the jurisdiction of the confessor is only probable; therefore etc., etc.; which conclusion St. Alphonsus, as is known, does not admit.

Resolves. 1. He who has sworn an evil matter is never obligated by the oath; indeed he sins in two ways if he fulfills the oath, namely against religion and against the virtue to which the matter of the oath is opposed. - St. Alphonsus, n. 176.

He is not obligated by an oath who has confirmed a prodigal promise by swearing, because that promise is at least lightly evil. - Thus Suarez, the Salamancans, and others commonly with St. Alphonsus, who admits this as more probable, n. 185 ⁷.

⁷ Yet do not conclude from this that he is not bound to that in which no prodigality appears. Make an exception, unless the promised thing is indivisible.

He is not obligated by an oath who, under oath, promised marriage to a girl who was rich, healthy, a virgin, and of good reputation, if she falls into poverty, infirmity, infamy, or fornication; because the simple promise then does not oblige. - St. Alphonsus, n. 180.

He does not sin against an oath who for the sake of courtesy swore that he would not sit, drink, enter the house, etc., before another, if, compelled by the other, he first sits, drinks, or enters; because for the most part an oath of this sort is null from defect of intention of swearing; or, if it is valid, it is relaxed by the other. - St. Alphonsus, n. 180.

He does not sin who reveals a sworn secret when the law itself of the secret ceases to oblige; because an oath, as we have said, follows the nature of the act to which it is joined ⁸.

⁸ Hence St. Alphonsus says (lib. 3, n. 183): "Oaths about keeping a secret, which are furnished in congregations concerning elections or other things, oblige gravely or lightly according to the harm which they can bring." Moreover those things must be observed which the same St. Alphonsus (ibid., n. 180-181) has concerning an oath by which someone obliges himself to observe the decrees and rules or statutes of some congregation, university, chapter, etc. Namely he proposes these rules after the doctors: 1. The oath is understood of statutes already published, but not of those to be published; 2. It is judged to oblige under grave or light obligation, or under penalty only, or only under counsel, according as, namely, the statute obliges; 3. It does not oblige to those things whose obligation is not in force because of impossibility or desuetude; and this holds even if an oath is furnished concerning some particular statute of that sort; 4. Finally, it does not oblige when some statute is not observed by the greater part of the community or college.

Parents rarely sin when they do not fulfill an oath of punishing children; because for the most part the oath concerns a useless thing, or rather disordered vengeance; there is added the fact that the delinquents either have already been amended, or at least have promised amendment. - St. Alphonsus, n. 180.

Merchants also, for the most part, do not seem to be bound by an oath not to sell for less, or not to buy for more; either because oaths of this sort are for the most part about a useless thing, or because these men do not have the mind of swearing, or certainly because there is in the oath a tacit condition: unless matters seem to turn out better otherwise. - Thus more commonly. - See Cases, n. 296 and following.

Vol. I, Treatise On Contracts, First Part. On Contracts i…, Ch. III, Article I. On the Oath Added to a Contract

n. 790.

- An oath, as it is taken here, is the calling of God as witness of those things which are promised through a contract. The obligation of an oath also differs from the obligation of a contract in this, that the obligation of an oath affects and binds immediately the person of the one swearing, whence it does not pass to heirs; but the obligation of a contract confers on another a strict right, or right of property, affecting the goods of the contracting person, and therefore the obligation passes entire to the heirs.

n. 791.

Principles. - I. Contracts void by natural law are not strengthened by an oath. The reason is that an oath is an act wholly extrinsic to the contract, and therefore can in no way supply its force. Hence the axiom: An oath follows the nature of the act. - Billuart. - Reuter, etc.

n. 791.

II. Nor are contracts ipso facto void by positive law strengthened by an oath. The reason is that the invalidating law rests on a motive of the common good and public order; therefore the oath would be against the common good, and therefore an immoral bond, which God, author of society, cannot sanction. - Thus more commonly with Billuart.

n. 791.

III. An oath is always invalid whenever it cannot be observed without the sin of the one swearing. The reason is that an oath cannot be a bond of iniquity, nor can it oblige against good morals. - Thus all Theologians.

n. 792.

Questions. - It is asked, 1. Whether an oath strengthens contracts which are not indeed void by positive law, but only rescindable?

n. 792.

I reply, 1. More probably negatively, when rescindability is introduced with a view to the public good. The reason is clear from what has been said. Hence the oaths of minors, wives, and the like do not avail for strengthening contracts void by law, although the law has been established for their utility; indeed perverse men would always exact an oath from them, which would tend to the detriment of society.

n. 792.

I reply, 2. But more probably an oath is valid if the rescindability has been introduced for the private utility of the contracting persons; because each one can renounce a benefit established in his favor; but the interposition of an oath in that case is a certain renunciation of the benefit of rescission introduced in favor of the contracting person. Hence the oath seems to stand by which someone freely promises another that he will not revoke a testament or legacy made in his favor, because the one swearing can cede from his own right. - Thus more commonly. - Lugo, etc.

- It is asked, 2. Whether oaths extorted by fear are valid for strengthening contracts invalid of themselves because of fear?

I reply. A twofold probable sentence is given:

The first, more common sentence affirms, because from the motive of Religion the oath must be observed whenever it can be observed without sin. - St. Lig., De Iuram., n. 174. - Lugo, Billuart.

Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. V, Section 1: Definition and Division of Oaths · Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. V, Section 2: Lawfulness of Oaths · Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. V, Section 3: Conditions of Validity and Licitness

The second probable sentence denies, because the oath ought to follow the nature of the act; for an oath cannot confirm an act null by nature. Besides, the oath would be an act wholly useless, indeed ridiculous. For, e.g., after the handing over of money made by you to a robber by force of the oath, you could immediately recover the same money from the robber, even by employing force; which would be wholly illusory. - St. Antoninus. - Sanchez, etc.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 12 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. II, On the Virtue of Religion …, Chapter II: On Oaths and Vows

n. 946.

II. Concerning the Honesty of Oath.

Certain heretics contended that oath is prohibited under the new law, among whom were the Waldenses and certain Protestants, such as the Quakers, relying on these words of the Lord: "Again you have heard that it was said to them of old: Thou shalt not forswear thyself... But I say to you not to swear at all, neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God; nor by the earth, for it is His footstool; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King; neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your speech be: yea, yea; no, no; and that which is over and above these is of evil."² Nevertheless not only Catholics, but most Protestants, hold that an oath is licit, certain conditions being posited.

² Matt. 5:33-37.

n. 947.

1. Thesis: An oath, clothed with the due conditions, is honest and laudable.

(A) That oath was in use under the old Law and approved by God Himself is clear from many texts:³ "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and shalt swear by His name." In the new law likewise oath is often exhibited as something honest, used by the apostles; thus Paul writes:⁴ "For God is my witness, whom I serve in my spirit in the Gospel of His Son, that without ceasing I make a commemoration of you... But I call God to witness... For God is my witness, how I long after you all in the bowels of Jesus Christ." Wherefore, unless a contradiction is admitted between the words of Christ and the words of Paul, it must be said that the passage cited above is to be understood of the prohibition of swearing without cause, without necessity; for in common circumstances it is not necessary to confirm by oath the truth of the things which are said; for Christians ought to be so sincere that, even without any oath, their words are believed confidently.

³ Deut. 6:13; cf. Josh. 9:15; Judg. 21:5; Ps. 14:4 and 62:18, etc.

⁴ Rom. 1:9; 2 Cor. 1:23; Phil. 1:8.

(B) The practice of the Church has approved this interpretation; for in judgments, whether ecclesiastical or secular, oath is frequently used, either so that witnesses may be induced by religion to manifest the truth completely, or to strengthen an argument otherwise incomplete. And deservedly; for, provided God is invoked as witness of the truth brought forth not frequently, but only in a matter of great moment, no irreverence is committed against Him, but on the contrary His supreme veracity is acknowledged, and His justice, which strictly pursues and chastises perjury. Wherefore in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is read:⁵ "For men swear by one greater than themselves, and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy."

⁵ Heb. 6:16.

n. 948.

1. Conditions, moreover, are required for the liceity of an oath. Three are deduced from this text of Jeremiah,⁶ namely truth, judgment, and justice: "And thou shalt swear: As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice."

⁶ Jer. 4:2.

(A) Truth, that is, conformity of words with the knowledge and intention of the one swearing. Therefore it excludes a lie in asserting or promising, and fiction, or an oath uttered without the mind of swearing or obliging oneself.

(a) He who by oath confirms that which he knows to be false commits the mortal sin of perjury, because he commits grave irreverence against God, bringing Him in as witness of falsity. Nor does lightness of matter excuse here; for, even in light or joking matter, it is gravely repugnant to invoke God as witness of falsity. Therefore this proposition 24 was deservedly reproved by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "To call God as witness of a light lie is not such irreverence on account of which He wills or can damn a man."⁷

⁷ Apud Denzinger, n. 1041; Viva, on this proposition.

(b) It is not licit to swear with only probable knowledge of the matter, but moral certainty is required, namely that against which no prudent doubt fights; one swearing with prudent doubt concerning the truth sins mortally, because he inflicts grave irreverence upon God, by invoking Him as witness of something about which he doubts.

n. 949.

(c) Nor is it licit to swear with a mental restriction whose sense cannot be detected; indeed not even with a mental restriction whose sense can be detected, except from a most grave cause: for the former restriction is a lie; the latter is a distorted mode of speaking, which, when an oath accedes to it, can be used only in a case of true necessity, namely when there is no other means of protecting oneself or others against unjust aggression or a most grave evil.⁸ - Therefore these propositions were deservedly condemned by Innocent XI:

⁸ For understanding this, see what we wrote concerning lying, De Justitia, n. 408-417. - If the theory of equivocations and restrictions is rejected, and with moderns it is admitted that false speech is licit in a case of necessity, it must be said that false speech cannot be confirmed by oath, unless when there is no other means of averting a most grave harm, for example the death of an innocent person.

"If someone, either alone or before others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other end, swears that he has not done something which in reality he has done, understanding within himself something which he did not do, or another way than that in which he did it, or any other true addition, he in reality does not lie, nor is he perjured."⁹

⁹ Here there is question, from the context, of a purely mental restriction, whose sense cannot be detected by a prudent man.

"A just cause of using these amphibologies is whenever this is necessary or useful for the health of the body, honor, preserving family goods, or for any other act of virtue, so that the hiding of truth is then judged expedient and studious."
"He who, by means of custom or gift, has been promoted to a magistracy or public office, will be able with mental restriction to take the oath which, by command of the king, is customarily exacted from similar persons, no regard being had to the intention of the one exacting it: because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime."¹⁰

¹⁰ As Viva testifies (on this proposition), thus is condemned the practice of those who use equivocation whenever, by command of legitimate authority, they swear that they were not promoted because of recommendations or gifts.

n. 950.

(d) He who promises something by oath without the intention of swearing or obliging himself, and therefore simulates an oath, commits a grave sin from its genus; for although he does not emit an oath, he uses the name of God in vain, and deceives others. Wherefore if this is done before a judge, or in contracts, the sin is grave. But in other matters of slight moment, the sin is probably light, according to many theologians, because it is nothing other than the vain use of the name of God. But all fictions of this kind, as unworthy of an honorable man and easily drawing one to perjury, are altogether to be avoided. - But he who with the mind of swearing promises something, yet without the intention of fulfilling it, sins mortally, since he brings God in as guarantor of a false promise.

n. 951.

(B) Justice, in an assertory oath, requires that the one swearing have the right of asserting what he says, and, in a promissory oath, that the thing promised be honest.

(a) Thus, in an assertory oath, he sins who manifests another's hidden crime without cause, or boasts of a sin committed: for he does not have the right of saying these things, nor, a fortiori, of confirming them by oath. Moreover, the gravity of the sin depends both on the intention of the agent and on the gravity of the things which are said.

(b) In a promissory oath, he certainly sins mortally who swears that he will commit some grave thing: for he inflicts a grave injury upon God by making Him witness and, as it were, guarantor of this iniquity. But if the act which is promised under the faith of an oath is only venially evil, the malice against religion is probably only venial, although, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 146) and others, it is more probably mortal, on account of the injury inflicted upon God. Whatever the case, oaths of this kind are carefully to be avoided, not only because of the reverence due to God, but because they savor of foolishness: for who of sound mind can invoke God as witness of the promise of a thing less honest?

n. 952.

(C) Judgment, or discretion, requires two things, namely, that there be a just cause for swearing, and besides that the oath be furnished with that reverence, internal and external, which the divine majesty requires.

(a) Therefore they sin who frequently swear, without sufficient reason, that is, without necessity or great utility: "Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing; for in it there are many falls... A man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity, and a scourge shall not depart from his house. And if he make it void, his sin shall be upon him; and if he dissemble, he offendeth doubly; and if he swear in vain, he shall not be justified."¹ Moreover, the gravity of the sin depends both on the frequency of the acts and on the intention of the agent; to swear once or twice without sufficient cause does not exceed venial sin, unless contempt of the divine majesty is present.

¹ Ecclus. 23:9-14.

(b) They also sin who utter oaths jokingly or in a manner little becoming. This happens by no means rarely when they are taken too frequently.² - Civil authority can indeed, from a just cause, exact an oath to be taken upon a book of Scripture; but it ought to permit Catholics to swear upon Catholic Bibles.³

² In the United States of America oaths are perhaps required too often in the matter of tributes and taxes; whence it happens that perjuries are easily committed in this matter. By a very excellent counsel all Christians ought to join their forces, so that they might obtain a change of the civil laws in this matter.

³ To the point, S. Cong. de Prop. Fide, Sept. 8, 1869 (Collectanea, n. 1664): "It has been reported that, in several regions of India, Catholics have been accustomed, if an oath occurs, to swear upon Bibles corrupted by Protestants and presented by the government... Therefore let all Apostolic Vicars, in whose missions use of this kind has been accustomed to be employed, diligently take care that the Anglo-Indian government leave to the faithful the liberty of swearing upon Sacred Scripture received by the Catholic Church. But until they shall have obtained this from the civil authority, let them prudently be silent, if they see the faithful take an oath upon the Bibles of heretics, provided that there is question of a lawful oath."

n. 953.

III. Concerning the Obligation Induced by an Oath.

Here there is question only of a promissory oath; for an assertory oath produces no obligation for the future, since it consists in the mere affirmation of some thing. - Every promise induces an obligation of justice or fidelity, according to the principles set forth in the Treatise on Justice, n. 677; when an oath accedes to this, it produces a new obligation of religion: of which we must now speak.

n. 954.

1. The existence and gravity of this obligation: A promissory oath, concerning an honest thing, induces an obligation of religion, grave from its genus, for the one swearing. For the one swearing invokes God not only as witness of the promise, but also as guarantor of its execution; and therefore, from reverence toward God, he is bound to execute what was promised. - Nevertheless, he who utters the formula of an oath without the intention of swearing, whether from inadvertence or from deliberation, does not contract an obligation: say the same of him who does not have the intention of obliging himself; for in both cases one of the elements necessary either for an oath or for contracting an obligation is lacking.⁴

⁴ But what obligation is incumbent on him who emitted a promissory oath in favor of a third party can be inferred from what was said in the Treatise on Justice, n. 621.

(a) Moreover, the gravity of the obligation depends on the gravity of the thing promised; for since the one swearing is judged to have had a sincere will of fulfilling what was promised, he sins only insofar as he does not put the same into execution; but if the thing promised is of slight moment, its non-execution cannot be grave; for an oath does not change the nature of the act, but only adds to it an obligation of religion.

(b) The obligation of a personal oath belongs to the one swearing, and therefore does not pass to heirs, while the obligation of justice or fidelity arising from the promise itself can be real and can pass to heirs (De Justitia, n. 679).

n. 955.

(c) An oath concerning an impossible, illicit, or plainly useless thing induces no obligation. For no one is held to the impossible; besides, an oath cannot be the bond of iniquity, or even of a vain thing, which in no way turns to the honor of God. If the thing afterward becomes licit or useful, an oath which was null from the beginning does not revive: for that which by law does not subsist from the beginning is not made firm by the passage of time.⁵

⁵ Rule of law 18 in the Sext.

(d) From the Code, can. 1317, "an oath extorted by force or grave fear is valid, but can be relaxed by an ecclesiastical Superior." Nevertheless, from can. 1318, "a promissory oath follows the nature and conditions of the act to which it is added. If an oath is added to an act directly tending to the harm of others or to the prejudice of the public good or of eternal salvation, the act consequently obtains no firmness."

n. 956.

1. Concerning the extension and interpretation of this obligation.⁶ (A) The general principle is that the obligation of an oath does not extend more widely than the promise itself to which it accedes; for an oath is something accessory to the promise itself, which it confirms; but it is fitting that the accessory follow the nature of the principal.⁷ - Except if the one swearing intended the matter otherwise; for the extension of the obligation, like its existence, depends chiefly on the intention of the one swearing.

⁶ In the Treatise on Justice, n. 662-664, there is weighed what sort of obligation an oath adds to a contract.

⁷ Rule of law 42 in the Sext.

(B) Moreover, two particular rules are to be noted: (a) The obligation ought not be extended beyond the sense of the words strictly accepted. For hateful things are to be restricted; but an obligation which arises from an oath is judged hateful, as restricting liberty. Besides, an oath depends on the intention of the one swearing; but he is not judged to will to oblige himself beyond the expressed and strict sense of the words.

(b) A promissory oath is to be interpreted according to the conditions and restrictions which are understood from the nature of the matter, or from the principles of law, or from the common sense of prudent men. Moreover, the chief restrictions of this kind are the following: - if I am able, physically and morally; - without prejudice to the right of superiors, who from a just cause can invalidate the obligation or dispense in it; - if the matter has not been notably changed: for if it is notably changed, the intention of the one swearing did not extend to it; - if the other has kept faith: for in vain does someone ask that faith be kept toward himself by him toward whom he himself refuses to keep the faith pledged;⁸ - unless the other cedes his right: for since a promissory oath is made in favor of another, and this other can renounce his right, it is in some way subjected to his will; - unless there is a grave reason for changing the proposal: for if execution cannot take place without a grave danger of death, infamy, etc., not foreseen before, the one swearing is not judged to have willed to oblige himself.

⁸ Rule of law 75 in the Sext.

n. 957.

Corollaries. (a) An oath of observing the statutes of some college, congregation, office, etc., ought to be understood of statutes already issued, not of those to be issued, - of those which then are in force, not of those which have fallen into desuetude or are not observed by the greater part of the community, - and indeed in that manner in which the statutes oblige, that is, under grave sin, under light sin, or only to a penalty, according to the statutes themselves: for an oath does not change the nature of the obligation, but only adds to it the bond of religion.

(b) An oath of observing a secret does not oblige when the obligation of the secret itself ceases (De Justitia, n. 421-425).

(c) An oath of fidelity and obedience to some Prince or Government, or of observing a Constitution, does not oblige except according to the common sense of honorable men; accordingly it does not oblige one to embrace in mind all things which are contained in the Constitution, but only to undertake nothing illegitimately against the same.⁹

⁹ Bouquillon, op. cit., n. 660-714, discusses learnedly the various political oaths.

(d) An obligation induced by oath ceases: by the cessation of the end, - by condonation made by him in whose favor the oath was uttered, - by invalidation, or dispensation, or commutation, according to the principles set forth below, n. 990 sq.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 54 passages

Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. V, Section 1: Definition and Division of Oaths

An oath (iuramentum, iusiurandum) is the act of calling on God to witness that a statement is true, or to make the fulfilment of a promise binding under a more solemn obligation*.¹

¹ H. Busembaum, S.J., Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 2, dub. 1: “This invocation consists in this: that one who swears, so far as lies in him, desires or wills God to attest and manifest that which he swears (if and when, of course, it shall please Him, whether in this life or in the other), as something known by God Himself and true.”

The invocation of the divine name means that he who takes an oath calls upon God to testify to the truth of his statement or the sincerity of his promise, under penalty of forfeiting the divine help and grace if he swears falsely. For this reason an oath is an act of extraordinary divine worship (actus religionis secundarius.)

In taking an oath we may call on God expressly or tacitly. We do so expressly (iuramentum explicitum) if we mention Him by name; we do so tacitly (iuramentum implicitum) when we swear by some creature which stands in a special relation to God, such as the angels and saints, the cross of Christ, the Gospels or the Sacraments.

With regard to its purpose an oath is either assertory or promissory. a) In an assertory oath (iuramentum assertorium) we call upon God to witness that what we say is true and not otherwise. This kind of oath is employed chiefly in law courts. In its more solemn form (adiuratio) it differs from a simple oath in this that the taker does not call upon God as a witness, but merely uses His name in order to ascertain the truth by an appeal to the reverence due to His Divine Majesty and to sacred persons and things.² b) A promissory oath (iuramentum promissorium) is one in which God is called upon as a witness to the fulfilment of a future promise or event. Such an oath is, e. g., that taken at a solemn betrothal or by a soldier on the flag.

² Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 295: “An oath is to be distinguished: 1. as assertory or promissory, according as truth alone is asserted by it, or a promise or agreement is confirmed; 2. as solemn or simple, according as it is made in a form required by law or with solemn ceremonies, or privately with those excluded; 3. as explicit or implicit, according as God is expressly invoked as witness of the truth, or creatures in whom divine attributes especially shine forth are employed in testimony. There is also an imprecatory oath, by which God is invoked at once as witness and avenger of perjury.”—Ibid., n. 305: “Adjuration is an authoritative and entreating demand, made by interposing the name of God or of the saints or of a sacred thing, in order that another may be induced to do or omit something. It differs, therefore, from an oath in this, that it does not introduce God as witness but only interposes His name in order to obtain the desired thing more efficaciously because of the reverence due to the divinity or to sacred things.”

A subspecies of the promissory oath is that called iuramentum comminatorium, when God is called upon as a witness that the person who takes the oath has the present intention of injuring his neighbor and as a guaranty that this purpose will be carried out some time in the future.

With regard to form an oath may be (a) verbal, real, or mixed; (b) solemn or simple. a) A verbal oath (iuramentum verbale) is one clothed in words. A real oath (iuramentum reale) takes the form of an action, e. g., raising the right hand. A mixed oath (iuramentum mixtum) is one in which words are combined with actions, as in touching the book of the Gospels while pronouncing the usual formula.

In the Middle Ages persons when swearing often touched the Blessed Sacrament, relics of the Saints, sacred vessels, etc. Such an oath was called corporal (iuramentum corporale), a term which has nothing to do with the corporal or linen cloth on which the Sacred Host is laid, but simply refers to corporal or bodily contact with the sacred object.³

³ Catholic Dictionary, 9th ed., p. 617, London 1917.

b) A simple oath (iuramentum simplex) is one taken without ceremonies. A solemn oath (iuramentum solemne) is one clothed with the ceremonies prescribed by law, such as holding up the right hand or kissing the Bible.

These differences are all formal and do not affect the substance of an oath nor do they pro- duce various degrees of obligation. A simple oath is just as binding as a solemn oath, and one made interiorly is as valid as if it were clothed in words or manifested by actions. But the use of symbols and ceremonies is calculated to emphasize the sacredness of the act and consequently has a salutary effect on the minds of men.

Sometimes an imprecation is added to an oath, as, e. g., “So help me God.” In this case we have an imprecatory oath; others are called invocatory.⁴

⁴ Thos, Slater, S.J., 4 Manual of Moral Theology, I, 240.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 89–90.—IDEM, Comment. in Sent., III, dist. 39.—St. Bonaventure, Comment. in Sent., III, dist. 39 (Opera Omnia, III, 861 sqq.).—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 133–193 (ed. Gaudé, I, 460).—F. Suarez, De Religione, tract. V.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 445 sqq.—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 380 sqq.—F. A. Göpfert, Der Eid, Mayence 1883.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 240 sqq.—Thos. Bouquillon, De Virtute Religionis, Part III, Bruges 1880.—Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 3rd ed., n. 532–601.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 253 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 308 sqq.

Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. V, Section 2: Lawfulness of Oaths

1. the Teaching of Sacred Scripture

That oaths are lawful cannot simply be deduced from the fact that they are acts of divine worship, for they are not usually taken for the purpose of honoring God. The lawfulness of oaths was denied by some of the Church Fathers and ecclesiastical writers, by certain ancient and medieval sects which pretended to restore Christianity to its pristine purity, and by sundry Protestant denominations. All of them maintain that oaths are forbidden by the Bible. The principal texts which they cite in support of their contention are the following: a) Christ says: ‘You have heard that it was said to them of old, Thou shalt not forswear thyself: but thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord. But I say to you not to swear at all, neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God: nor by the earth, for it is his footstool: nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great king. Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black.

But let your speech be yea, yea: no, no: and that which is over and above these, is of evil (from evil).”¹ b) St. James writes: ‘Above all things, my brethren, swear not, neither by heaven, nor by earth, nor by any other oath. But let your speech be, yea, yea: no, no: that you fall not under judgment.”²

¹ Matt. V, 33–37.

² Jas. V, 12; cfr. Ex. XX, 7; Lev. XIX, 12; Numb. XXX, 3.

These texts, it is asserted, not only forbid wanton, false, and unjust swearing, or swearing by creatures instead of by the Creator, or cursing (which is not really swearing at all, rather a mere profanation of the divine name),³ but oaths as such (non iurare omnino). However, the prohibition contained in our Lord’s utterance and in that of St. James is plainly not absolute. If it were, Sacred Scripture would contradict itself, for not only has God repeatedly guaranteed His veracity by an oath, but oaths were an acknowledged part of the legal system of the Old Testament.⁴ Christ acknowledged the adjuration addressed to Him by the high priest, for He replied to his query.⁵ St. Paul repeatedly calls God to witness in a most solemn manner to the truth and sincerity of his preaching,⁶ and in his Epistle to the Hebrews expressly declares that “an oath for confirmation is the end of all controversy.”⁷

³ Cfr. St. Jerome, In Evangelium Matth., l. I, c. 5: “The Jews are known always to have this very bad custom of swearing by the elements. . . . Consider that here the Saviour did not forbid swearing by God, but by heaven and earth and Jerusalem and your head.” (Migne, P. L., XXVI, 39).—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 89, art. 2, ad 1.

⁴ Deut. VI, 13; Ps. CIX, 4; Luke I, 73.

⁵ Matt. XXVI, 63 sq.

⁶ Rom. I, 9; 2 Cor. I, 23; XI, 31; Gal. I, 20; Phil. I, 8.

⁷ Heb. VI, 16.

The apparent contradiction between the two series of texts which we have cited can be easily solved. Both our Lord and St. James state it as a moral principle that in the kingdom of God oaths are not necessary, since all men would be honest and veracious if they lived up to His teaching. The disciples are forbidden to swear because oaths are incompatible with the perfect constitution of Christian society. In matter of fact, however, men are not perfect. They lie, they mistrust and cheat one another in consequence of the Fall, and whenever important interests are at stake, demand that God be called as a witness, “to whose eyes all things are naked and open” and to whom all men are responsible.⁸ By being asked to swear, a man is reminded of Him who is the author and avenger of the law, and his sense of duty is thereby sharpened.

⁸ Heb. IV, 13; Gen. XXV, 33; Matt. XXVI, 63.

An oath, therefore, is the highest and securest guarantee of human veracity, but it is at the same time a necessary evil, the last resource of society in sustaining law and order. It is, as the Ro- man Catechism truly says, “a remedy of human frailty and a necessary means of proving the truth of what we advance,” and “has been instituted on account of human weakness and really proceeds from evil” (i. e., from the depravation of human nature), as “‘it indicates either the inconstancy of him by whom, or the contumacy of him for whom it is taken, because he cannot otherwise be induced to believe.”⁹

⁹ Cat. Rom., P. III, c. 3, qu. 7, 19.

If taken under the conditions set forth in our next section, an oath is good and lawful because it presupposes, both in him who demands and in him who takes it, belief in an omniscient, truthful, and just God, and in this sense may be regarded as a solemn profession of faith.¹⁰ This explains why the Church has condemned it as erroneous to deny the lawfulness of oaths.¹¹

¹⁰ Profession of Faith Prescribed to the Waldenses by Innocent III: “We do not condemn an oath; rather, we believe with a pure heart that it is lawful to swear with truth, judgment, and justice.” (Denz.-Bannwart, n. 425).—St. Augustine, De Serm. Dom. in Monte, l. I, c. 17, n. 51: “If you are compelled to swear, know that this comes from the necessity of the weakness of those whom you are persuading of something; and that weakness is certainly an evil. . . . Accordingly He did not say, ‘Whatsoever is more is an evil,’ but ‘is of evil.’ For you do no evil when you make good use of an oath, which, though not good, is nevertheless necessary, so that you may persuade another of what you usefully advise; but it is from the evil of him by whose weakness you are compelled to swear.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 1255).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 89, art. 2: “An oath in itself is lawful and honorable. This is plain from its origin and its end: from its origin, because an oath was introduced from faith, by which men believe that God possesses infallible truth and knowledge and providence concerning all things; from its end, because an oath is introduced to justify men and to end controversies, as is said in Heb. VI, 16. But an oath turns to evil for someone from the fact that he uses it badly, that is, without necessity and due caution. For he seems to have little reverence for God who introduces Him as witness for a slight cause, something he would not presume to do even concerning an honorable man. There is also imminent danger of perjury, because man easily offends in word (Ecclus. XXIII, 9, 12; Jas. III, 2).”—Cat. Rom., P. III, c. 3, qu. 6, 7, 15, 16,

¹¹ Errors of John Wyclif condemned by Martin V, n. 43; Questions to Be Proposed to Wyclifites and Hussites, n. 12 sq.; proposition of Quesnel condemned by Clement XI, n. 101: “Nothing is more opposed to the spirit of God and the teaching of Jesus Christ than to make oaths common in the Church, because this is to multiply occasions of perjury, to spread snares for the weak and simple, and to cause the name and truth of God sometimes to serve the counsel of the impious.”—Cfr. proposition of the Diocesan Synod of Pistoia condemned by Pius VI, n. 75 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 623, 662 sq., 1451, 1575).

Oaths being justified only as a necessary means of human intercourse, as an antidote to untruth and dishonesty, and as a corrective of the unreliability of human testimony, their very nature demands that they be administered only in important cases, such as legal proceedings and trials, that no individual take an oath except at the demand of legitimate authority, and that the occasions on which it is demanded be restricted as much as possible, in order that what is in itself a sacred function be not cheapened to the detriment of society and sink to the level of an empty ceremony.¹² The too frequent swearing of oaths diminishes their value and the respect in which they are held by the people.

¹² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 89, art. 5.—Cat. Rom., P. III, c. 3, qu. 19.—F. A. Göpfert, Der Eid, pp. 221 sqq.

An oath should be demanded only when it can be made with proper regard to truth and the reverence due to God. No man should be compelled to swear to the truth of a complicated or obscure statement.

It is entirely just and consistent to debar per- sons who are notoriously unreliable or immoral, such as profligates, drunkards, usurers, and those convicted of perjury, from taking oaths. But it would be unjust, on the other hand, to demand an oath of the members of religious sects who in good faith reject swearing as immoral. American legislation generally allows such persons to “affirm” the truth of their statements and accepts this affirmation in lieu of an oath. If they “affirm” what is false they are liable to be prosecuted for perjury.

It goes without saying that atheists are incapable of taking an oath; to admit or, a fortiori, to compel them to take an oath would be contrary to the very nature of the oath as a religious act.¹³

¹³ Wisd. XIV, 28.—Göpfert, Der Eid, pp. 158 sqq.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 89, art. 2.—V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, 4th ed., Vol. I, pp. 39 sqq.—E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 195 sqq.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 265 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 254 sqq.—E. Hubrich, Konfessioneller Eid oder religionslose Beteuerung, Leipsic 1900.—N. Cecchini, Del Carattere Religioso del Giuramento e della Soppressione, Pistoia 1903.

Vol. IV, Pt. II, Ch. V, Section 3: Conditions of Validity and Licitness

St. Jerome, basing on a passage in the prophecies of Jeremias, lays down three conditions which make an oath lawful. These conditions are often called “the companions of an oath.” They are: (1) truth, (2) judgment, (3) justice.¹ “And thou shalt swear,” the prophet says, “As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice.”²

¹ In Ierem. Proph., l. I, c. 4: “At the same time it must be observed that an oath should have these companions: truth, judgment, and justice; if these are lacking, it will by no means be an oath but perjury.” (Migne, P. L., XXIV, 706).

² Jer. IV, 2: “And you shall swear: The Lord lives, in truth and in judgment and in justice.”

Truth in an oath is the agreement of the assertion made with the mind and conviction of him who swears; or, in other words, an honest intention to state what is so (when the oath is assertory) or to keep the promise made (when the oath is promissory). Conformity of the statement or promise made with the intention of him who makes it is the essential thing, not the actual correctness of the statement itself.³

³ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 298: “Truth, that is, conformity of the assertion with the intention and knowledge of the one swearing. It therefore excludes every lie, but not every error. In an assertory oath truth regards the existence of the fact; in a promissory oath, the existence of the intention.”

Truth requires also that he who swears should use words in the sense in which they are understood by others, or in which others have a right to understand them.⁴ This rule excludes intentional equivocation and secret reservation or mental restriction, as these subterfuges would contravene the purpose of an oath, which is to offer a guaranty of truth to others.⁵

⁴ “The oath must be understood according to the mind of the judge who imposes it.”

⁵ Ps. XIV, 1–4; XXIII, 3–6; Heb. VI, 16.—Proposition condemned under Innocent XI, n. 25: “With a cause it is lawful to swear without the intention of swearing, whether the matter is light or grave.”—Ibid., n. 26: “If anyone, either alone or before others, whether questioned or of his own accord, whether for recreation or for any other end, swears that he did not do something which in fact he did, understanding within himself some other thing which he did not do, or another way than that in which he did it, or any other true addition, he does not in fact lie nor is he perjured.”—Ibid., n. 27: “A just cause for using these amphibologies exists whenever it is necessary or useful for the health of the body, the protection of honor or family goods, or for any other act of virtue, so that concealment of the truth is then deemed expedient and deliberate.”—Ibid., n. 28: “One who through a recommendation or gift has been promoted to a magistracy or public office can with a mental restriction take the oath which by the king’s command is customarily required of such persons, without regard to the intention of the one requiring it, because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1175 sqq.). All these propositions were condemned. Cfr. further on this subject, H. Busembaum, S.J., Medulla, l. III, tr. 3, c. 2, dub. 4: “To swear with equivocation, when there is a just cause and the equivocation itself is lawful, is not evil, because where there is a right to conceal the truth and it is concealed without a lie, no irreverence is done to the oath.”—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 151 sq., 170.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 299: “Question: Is it lawful to swear with a mental restriction? Answer: No, if it is purely mental; but yes, if it is broadly mental and there is a grave cause.”—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., n. 918, 4: “When I lawfully employ a restriction that is not purely mental, it is generally also lawful, in proportion to the gravity of the cause, to swear with such a restriction. But if the questioner has a right to the full truth, to swear with a restriction is altogether perjury; if the other has no right, but the speaker swears with a restriction for a slighter cause, it must be judged from the circumstances of the harms whether it ought to be regarded as perjury or whether he should be said merely to have sworn rashly.”—According to Lehmkuhl the theses quoted at the beginning of this note were condemned by the Holy See for two reasons: first, because not everything contained therein constitutes a legitimate cause, and, secondly, because not everything is understood of mental reservation in the broad sense of the term (de restrictione late mentali). St. Alphonsus and other moralists take also prop. 28 to refer to the restrictio pure mentalis, and others say that it applies to the restrictio non pure mentalis, because there is question here of one of those cases in which mental reservation is absolutely excluded. Cfr. F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, 6th ed., p. 332; IDEM, Der Eid, pp. 211 sqq.; F. Kössing, Über die Wahrheitsliebe, Paderborn 1893, pp. 145 sq.; Jos. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and Its Antagonists, pp. 113 sqq., New York 1914; Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, pp. 215 sqq., London 1902.

An attempt has been made to apply the doctrine of mental restriction to oaths by distinguishing between the animus iurandi and the animus se obligandi. “The many points of view,” says Dr. Mausbach, “which oaths, and especially promises confirmed by oath, permitted, appealed to the Scholastic desire of making distinctions and admitted of much logical analysis. It was sought to distinguish the interests of truth, religion, loyalty, and justice, which are all interwoven in such an oath, and the question was asked, how far they belonged to the essence of the oath or were separable from it. The larger works on casuistry contain investigations into the relation of the intentio iurandi, the intentio se obligandi (ex religione, ex iustitia, etc.), and the intentio implendi, which are marvels of ingenuity and almost bewilder an ordinary reader, yet are specially designed to avert all misunderstanding. The short summaries of them, however, given in compendia of casuistry, are more open to criticism.

One of the most dangerous of these statements is said to be the assertion that an oath is not valid if the man taking it has an inward intention not to take an oath before God. In this way, we are told, the trustworthiness of the oath is undermined and public confidence deeply shattered.”⁶

⁶ Jos. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching, pp. 108 sq.

Dr. Mausbach proceeds to show at some length that this objection is not justified by the actual teaching of Catholic moralists, who all agree that such a fictio or simulatio is sinful, because it involves a misuse of the name of God, and a lie, since the spoken words contradict the inward thought. We are never allowed to commit even a venial sin. If it is said that the horror of venial sin is not nearly so deterrent in its effect as the dread of committing perjury, and the moralists, by questioning the validity of an oath when it has apparently been taken in all seriousness, favor a distortion of the truth and imperil public confidence, the answer is that the same moralists regard simulation as a very grievous sin when the declaration apparently made under oath is false, no matter whether it concerns an important or a trivial matter, and they do the same whenever the declaration, even if true, is received in a court of law or in any legal proceeding as made upon oath.

The case is similar when, in a promissory oath, the intention of fulfilling the promise is defective. Here the question of the venial nature of the sin committed refers only to the simulation as such. It affects a statement that is true and a promise that is seriously meant, and it does so under circumstances in which neither the State nor the individual has any right to require an oath. “As soon as there is any violation of the truth, the invocation of the name of God, made apparently in earnest, becomes, in spite of the reservation, a grievous insult to God’s honor, about equivalent to perjury. Moreover, just as soon as public or private rights require a declaration to be made under oath, even a true declaration failing to be under oath is to be regarded as a grievous sin. This guards against all abuse of the principle. According to this exposition, a man with an honest intention had better take an oath seriously, for thus he is free from sin; whereas simulatio is in any case a venial sin, and in cases where an oath can legally be required, it is a mortal sin. A man who intends to lie, need not hope to escape grievous sin by means of simulatio; whether he is guilty of perjury in the strict sense of the word is, after all, only a matter of words.”⁷

⁷ Ibid., p. 110 sq. Dr. Mausbach adds in a note (l. c.): “Lugo describes the sin simply as periurium. He says: ‘Nor would he be excused from perjury who, without the intention of swearing, outwardly swore to something false by words which here and now determinately and altogether signify the intention of swearing and of invoking God as witness.’ (De Iust. et Iure, disp. 23, n. 12). The non-fulfilment of a promise made sub ficto iuramento must also be considered equivalent to perjury. For if contempt of God is shown by apparently calling upon Him to witness a lie, it is certainly a great insult to Him to be false to a pledge placed under His authority. There are some moralists who have not made this latter point sufficiently clear.”

To the question, why the moralists did not simply admit that an oath was really an oath, unless some external circumstances plainly showed it to be fictitious or taken in jest, the same writer replies that they did not do so because, according to their ideas of religion and justice, it would have injured the true character and value of an oath. “They recognized the fact that an oath devoid of inward intention must still be treated as a real oath, but that an oath unaccompanied by a serious act of the will should be called a true oath seemed to them as inadmissible as to call a corpse a human being; the soul is wanting in both cases. It was not a lax, but rather a profound, appreciation of the dignity of an oath that caused this view to be adopted. An oath was regarded as an act of the religious life or cultus. Now it was well known that the performance of sacramental rites, though externally perfect, was null and void without the inward intention. Absence of consent in the Sacrament of Matrimony nullifies the mutual pledge and destroys the validity of a marriage, even though the external forum may maintain its validity until evidence to the contrary is supplied. If, in a case like this, where one human being directly confronts another, it is the interior intention that decides the question of validity, this appeared to be still more true in the case of an oath, where a human being stands up before God and invokes Him as a witness and a surety. The specific character of an oath and its quasi-sacramental dignity could not, it was thought, exist if the will did not consent to this specific moral obligation.”⁸

⁸ Ibid., pp. 110 sqq. Cfr. F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 450 sq.

By the omission of several essential remarks from statements made by St. Alphonsus, Gury, and other moralists, their teaching on the subject of oaths and contracts has been seriously distorted. When they deny the “validity” of a fictitious promise, they do so on the strength of the principle so forcibly pointed out by Dr. Mausbach, and, as a rule, with all the reservations demanded both by a sense of justice and by regard for public security.⁹

⁹ J. Mausbach, ibid., p. 112.

St. Alphonsus, who has been criticized with particular severity for his teaching, on account of a brief reference to the question, says in another place, to which he expressly refers the reader: “In order that human intercourse may remain duly regulated, the natural law requires for the public welfare that there should be no deception with regard to contracts, and therefore it binds those who have recourse to simulatio, in punishment for their deception, to indemnify the deceived party exactly as if no deception had taken place.”¹⁰

¹⁰ Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 709; cfr. Mausbach, op. cit., pp. 112 sq.

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. II, Ch. II, Art. I, Division, and Morality of an Oath · Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. II, Ch. II, Article II: On a Promissory Oath

A man swears with judgment (iudicium in iurante, iudicium discretionis ex parte iurantis) when he has a just cause for invoking the testimony of God, and performs the act with due attention and reverence.¹¹ Judgment presupposes maturity of mind, understanding, and careful consideration of the statement or promise made, together with the full use of reason and will-power and calmness at the time the oath is taken. For this reason minors, weak-minded persons, and those who are insane or under the influence of liquor or drugs, are unable to take an oath. Physical compulsion, essential error, and violent fear which excludes deliberation, make an oath invalid, whereas purely moral compulsion or ordinary fear do not entail invalidity, but merely constitute a ground for dispensation.

¹¹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 298: “Judgment, that is, discretion or a reasonable cause for swearing; for an oath, since it is a most holy thing, ought not to be employed indiscriminately, but with piety and great reverence.”—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 89, art. 3, ad 1: “Judgment is not taken here for the execution of justice, but for a judgment of discretion. Nor is truth taken here as it is a part of justice, but as it is a certain condition of speech.”—IDEM, Comment. in Sent., III, dist. 39, art. 2, qu. 3, ad 1–2.

n. ¶12.

Since an oath can be taken only with due care and deliberation, a man who wishes to swear, or is compelled to do so, is strictly obliged to consider the matter and the circumstances of the case, and must not allow himself to be moved by love, hatred or any other emotion, but solely by the importance and necessity of the oath he is taking, for without careful consideration an oath will nearly always be hasty or indiscreet.¹²

¹² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 89, art. 3, ad 2: “Devotion and faith and all things of this kind which are required for the due manner of swearing are understood in judgment.”—Ibid., art. 7: “If the thing is such that it was not in his power, the judgment of discretion is lacking to the oath, unless perhaps that which was possible when he swore is rendered impossible for him by some event.”—IDEM, Comment. in Sent., III, dist. 39, art. 2, qu. 3, ad 4: “In judgment, which is the discretion of the one swearing, are included the due form, event, and time, and all the things which occur for consideration on the part of the one swearing.”—Cfr. Cat. Rom., P. III, c. 3, qu. 13.—F. A. Göpfert, Der Eid, pp. 219 sqq.

n. ¶13.

“A just cause [iusta causa iurandi] will be any matter of some importance for the welfare of either soul or body, whether it be public or private. We are not, therefore, justified in swearing to every assertion which we believe to be true; there must be some special reason for employing the name and authority of God to confirm what we say. However, provided that the other conditions are not wanting, the defect of judgment in swearing will not be more than a venial sin, for it is no more than the idle use of the name of God.”¹³

¹³ Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology, I, 242.—Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 299: “Question: What is a sufficient cause for swearing? Answer: Any honorable cause of some weight, for example, peace to be confirmed in families, greater security in contracts, etc.”—St. Thomas, Comment. in Hebr., c. VI, lect. 3: “The causes in which it is lawful to swear are these: to confirm peace, as Laban swore (Gen. XXXI, 48); secondly, to preserve one’s reputation; thirdly, to keep fidelity, as feudatories swear to their lords; fourthly, to fulfil obedience, if something honorable is commanded by a superior; fifthly, to provide security; sixthly, to attest the truth.”

n. ¶14.

By justice in swearing (iustitia in obiecto) is meant the moral permissibility or becomingness (honestas) of the matter concerning which an oath is taken.¹⁴ Justice requires that the matter of an oath should be in conformity with the moral law and Christian duty. Thus in an assertory oath the assertion should not be sinful, and in a promissory oath that which is promised must be morally good and lawful.¹⁵ Therefore an obligation assumed by oath to commit an act of injustice or a sin is always null and void.¹⁶ An oath so taken would, of course, be doubly sinful. To this class of invalid and unlawful oaths belong those taken by conspirators in crime, members of forbidden societies, such as anarchists, Freemasons, etc.

¹⁴ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 298: “Justice, that is, that the oath concern a lawful and honorable thing; thus he would swear against justice who by an oath bound himself to something harmful to his neighbor or forbidden from another source, or who detracted from his neighbor.”—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 89, art. 3, ad 2: “The other two [justice and truth] pertain to the thing about which the oath is made, although it could be said that justice pertains to the cause for which the oath is made.”

¹⁵ Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology, I, 242.

¹⁶ Cfr. Matt. XIV, 7; Mark VI, 22 sqq.; Acts XXIII, 12.—Reg. Iuris in Sexto Decr. Bonifat. VIII, n. 58: “An oath made against good morals is not binding.”—St. Ambrose, De Offic., l. III, c. 12, n. 76: “Let [a Christian] promise nothing dishonorable; and if he has promised it, it is more tolerable not to do what was promised than to do what is shameful.”—Ibid., n. 77: “Herod shamefully promised the dancer a reward and cruelly paid it. It is shameful that a kingdom is promised for dancing; it is cruel that the death of a prophet is bestowed for the sanctity of an oath. How much more tolerable in such a case would perjury have been than fulfilment of the oath? If, nevertheless, it could be called perjury that he swore when drunk amid wine and promised when emasculated amid the dancers’ choruses. The prophet’s head is brought in on a platter, and this was judged to be a matter of fidelity which was a matter of madness.” (Migne, P. L., XVI, 167).

n. ¶15.

Of the formulas employed in swearing some certainly involve an oath, either explicitly or implicitly, whereas others are doubtful, while still others signify no oath at all. a) Explicit forms of swearing are the following: “God be my witness,” “I swear by God or Christ,” “May God punish me if I do not tell the truth,” etc. Even the simple phrase: “I swear,” suffices to constitute an oath if the intention of calling upon God as witness is manifest. b) Implicit forms of swearing are the following: “I swear by the Blessed Virgin,” “by the cross,” or “by the Sacraments,” etc. He who swears thus may justly be supposed to invoke God as a witness to the truth of what he affirms. Ordinarily, however, those who habitually use such expressions as “by God,” “by heavens,” etc., do not think of God, and therefore these phrases as a rule do not imply an oath because the intention is lacking. c) Ambiguous formulas are: “Upon my word,” “Upon my oath,” “Upon my faith,” “As God lives,” “God knows that...,” etc. These phrases indicate a real oath when there is an evident intention to swear, or when they are uttered in court in lieu of an oath. But if there is no intention of taking an oath, such words may be taken simply enuntiative, i. e., as a means of creating confidence, not invocative, i. e., as calling God to witness. Hence, in ordinary conversation, the phrase “I swear that I will do this or that,” or “Upon my oath I will do so and so,” does not, as a rule, indicate the intention of taking a real oath, but merely that of making a solemn affirmation. d) Such expressions as “truly,” “surely,” “certainly,”

¹⁷ H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 258 sq.

n. ¶16.

“As surely as I live,” “I will die on the spot,” “Let my ears be cut off,” “May the devil get me if this is not true,” etc., are mere exaggerations and imply no invocation of God. Therefore if an untruth is affirmed by means of these and similar phrases, this manner of affirmation in itself constitutes merely a venial sin, though the lie may be mortal. Only when the formula contains mention of a punishment to be inflicted by God, as, “May lightning strike me if this be false,” can there be question of a genuine oath.

n. ¶17.

If a priest asserts something upon his honor as a priest, he does not swear an oath, but simply affirms in a solemn manner.

n. ¶18.

Certain expressions in which the truth of an assertion is compared to the dogmas of religion, e. g., “It is as true as that there is a God in Heaven,” “I am as innocent as the Blessed Virgin Mary,” etc., are held by some theologians to be genuine oaths involving blasphemy; but we prefer to hold with Noldin that they neither constitute an oath, because God is not invoked as a witness, nor involve blasphemy (provided the assertion made is true), because the person who uses such an expression intends merely to assert a similarity between the certainty of his assertion and that of the revealed truth, not their equality. However, those who employ such phrases sin venially by taking the name of God in vain, and if the assertion made is false, they also commit objective blasphemy.

…and 14 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 16 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. II, Ch. II, Art. I, Division, and Morality of an Oath

n. 190.

Notion and essence. 1. An oath is "the invocation of the divine Name as witness of truth" (c. 1316). It can be explicit, which is expressed in set words, or tacit, as if, as a sign of an oath, you touch the Gospel, or sign a formula. He who of his own accord signs such a formula by which he is judged both to declare certain things and to confirm them by oath, in reality lies or swears feignedly, unless he has the intention of swearing; but he who is compelled by law or by public authority will then lie only if he is lawfully commanded. One who unlawfully commands formal adherence to his intention or order cannot reasonably hope for it for himself, and therefore cannot consider such a subscription as sworn.

The intention alone of swearing suffices that you swear before God; but that you swear before men, suitable signs of the intention are further required. Doubts will of themselves be solved from the common acceptance of the words. The common use of words also begets a certain presumption in the internal forum. Here, however, in doubt one will answer in favor of liberty.

Suitable formulas are: I call God to witness; I invoke God as witness; so may God help me.

The word alone, "I swear," would indeed of itself suffice, but from common usage it does not signify an oath unless it answers to an oath that has been requested. Often also, although by accident, he is not judged to swear who says: by the Catholic faith, by the holy Gospel.

Unsuitable formulas are of themselves: God knows, - God will testify in His own time, - I speak before God, - God knows all things, - God sees my conscience, - God knows that I do not lie; because these are judged to be uttered only narratively, without invocation of God, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances.

More absolutely unsuitable are the formulas: Truly, certainly, in truth, on the faith of a good man, by my faith, on the faith of an honest man, of a good Christian, of a priest, of a king, by my conscience, upon my conscience; by these one merely declares that he speaks from the dictate of conscience and from knowledge of the truth.

From usage, these express only a strong affirmation: I expose my head, let my ears be cut off, unless.... Other sayings in the manner of imprecation will more easily be an oath, at least when the event is designated in which we are accustomed to recognize the hand of God. Therefore an invocation is quite easily had: may I be struck by lightning; may I fall dead unless.... But if an execration or choice of evil were had, a new species would be added.

The same must be said of comparative words: it is as true as the sun shines, as God is, as Christ is in the sacrament, as the Gospel is true; he is as innocent as the Blessed Virgin, etc.; these would be blasphemous if anyone wished to insist upon equality. If at the same time they affirm false things, they contain a lie, and where the name of God is pronounced, a vain usurpation of that Name.

Nor today is he judged to swear who says "by my soul." Although one can swear by the nobler creatures, if He is understood who is peculiarly present in them, for example by heaven, by the angels of God, etc.; today the use of such formulas is rather rare. - Since the Gospels represent Christ, to touch the Gospels is to touch Christ; to swear by the Gospels is to swear by Christ.

The invocation of God, which pertains to the essence of an oath, consists in this: that the one swearing, so far as is in him, desires and wills that God testify or confirm as true that which he swears (if at any time it shall please Him), and at the same time accepts divine punishments or divine vengeance if he lies, as the words prove: So may God help me....

Wherefore the philosophy of an oath is this: he who calls upon God in confirmation of falsity gravely derogates from the reverence of God and exposes himself to divine punishments; a religious man is not judged to will to do these things; wherefore, by such interposition of divine authority, he himself confirms his own statements.

n. 191.

Division. 1. From the exterior form, they distinguish a verbal oath, which is contained in words; a real oath, which is contained in an action, for example of raising the fingers, touching the cross, the Gospels; and a mixed oath, which is composed of both signs.

From the very force of the formula, it is invocatory or contestatory, and execratory or imprecatory. By the former God is simply invoked as witness; by the latter He is expressly at the same time called upon as avenger of falsity, whether one exposes himself or another beloved person, for example a son, to punishments. Since no one is accustomed seriously to imprecate evils from the heart upon himself or a friend, and every oath exposes the one swearing to divine punishments, that false oath does not seem, at least practically, to differ in species from a simple false oath.
From the object, it is distinguished as assertory and promissory. By an assertory oath past or present things are affirmed or denied; by a promissory oath at the same time a present intention is affirmed, and a future deed is promised.

To the promissory oath is referred the comminatory oath, by which someone swears thus, for example: by God, I shall strike you unless....

A promissory oath can be absolute and conditioned.

Finally, from the rite, an oath is distinguished as simple and solemn; the latter is made by a definite rite before a Prelate, judge, notary, etc. - It pertains to the canonical rite that it be made personally: "An oath which the canons require or admit cannot validly be furnished through a procurator" (c. 1316 § 2).

n. 192.

Judges sometimes are ignorant of the proper force of an oath, so that they do not formally swear when they seem to swear; or sometimes they think a certain rite essential, for example really raising the fingers, so that if they do not raise the fingers rightly they think themselves immune from perjury. These things are to be observed by a judge; but by a priest they must be untaught.

n. 193.

Moral judgment. 1. An oath, furnished with due conditions, is honorable and praiseworthy. For it is an act of religion, since it contains a profession of divine truth, authority, and providence. But the words by which the Lord seems to condemn every oath are understood by tradition as concerning the reprobation of the evil custom of mixing oaths into every hour and occasion. That honesty is of defined faith.

The conditions of an honorable oath, moreover, are customarily expressed in the three words which the Code itself used, when c. 1316 § 1 says: "It cannot be furnished except in truth, in judgment, and in justice." a) Truth demands that you utter those things which you think to be true with that certitude which the solemnity of the thing manifests. Wherefore it is not licit to affirm as certain or simply that about which you doubt. Quite commonly, with St. Alphonsus, L. 4, n. 148, they say that moral certitude is enough for you to confirm a matter by oath. But, since moral certitude is not indivisible, that must be accepted cautiously. Let us rather say that such certitude is required as, for the circumstances, with the oath also considered, is reasonably expected by the hearers; or such as is tacitly affirmed with the thing itself, in these circumstances. For an oath is furnished more as a sign of veracity than of the truth of the thing; it properly confirms things as they are said, not as they are (2. 2, q. 89 art. 1). Hence a stricter certitude is required in the judicial forum, because of the gravity of the consequence. Wherefore what you know from another's report must be testified as received from another. Likewise, where you swear in particular that something is true, the thing must truly be established for you. In a prolix discourse, on the contrary, it is less necessary that you be so certain about the individual narrated points, even secondary ones; then by the oath you rather confirm the sincerity of your mind. But certitude of a future deed, in a promise, is of itself less established. It is enough that you think what you promise to be placed in your power.

Insofar as equivocation itself or defensive words are licit, it will be licit, if there is a just cause, to confirm the same by oath. Where they are prohibited under grave sin, one will sin gravely by such an oath.

This condition of truth is required under grave sin in an oath insofar as it is assertory, nor does lightness of matter excuse from grave sin.

b) Judgment requires that an oath be made with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence, and with sufficient utility. By every serious cause this condition is fulfilled, and its defect is only venial, like a vain usurpation of the name of God.

c) Justice is understood differently in an assertory oath and in a promissory oath. - In an assertory oath, a narration of a thing which you cannot licitly report, at least under oath, is said to be opposed to justice. Of itself that defect is venial. It would be mortal if you wished thereby to conciliate belief for grave detraction, or, as we may say more generally, to use divine authority as a means of iniquity. - In a promissory oath, where it has its proper seat, the condition of justice forbids you to swear that you will do what is not licit. And when grave sin is in question, there is committed a mortal irreverence of abusing divine authority for evil. This malice seems to remain even if the question is of committing a venial sin. Yet the benign opinion, which is that of several distinguished doctors, Lessius, Sanchez, Suarez, is probable. It will more easily be admitted not to be grave when the matter is opposed merely to evangelical counsel, as if you swear that you will not enter religion, that you will not give alms.

N. B. Concerning an oath requested from one who is going to perjure himself, cf. what was said at n. 124, 2; concerning a feigned oath, cf. here immediately, where we treat of a promissory oath.

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. II, Ch. II, Article II: On a Promissory Oath

n. 194.

What is contained in that oath. As is proved by the very notion, a promissory oath regards the truth both of the present intention and of the future fulfillment. God is called as witness of the present intention; wherefore, under this respect, a promissory oath does not differ from an assertory oath. As to future fulfillment, the interposition of divine authority has this effect, that from reverence toward God, and therefore from the virtue of religion, the one swearing must fulfill what he promises or proposes. Thus the ratio is shown to be akin to a vow; yet because the promise itself is not made directly to God, it recedes from the nature of a vow, and its violation is less grave than the violation of a vow (2, 2, q. 89 art. 8). At the same time the notion of an oath carries this with it, that God is called upon as witness, not indeed of future truth - for, since impediments can arise, that, at least absolutely, cannot be done - but that He is called upon as witness of constancy. But because constancy is not desired in him who is lawfully impeded or dispensed, nothing is done against the oath by one whom either excuse assists. And because God is the avenger of perjury, both notions composed together, i.e., of constancy owed from reverence toward God, and of the invocation of God as witness of that constancy, have the effect that a certain security concerning the execution itself is obtained through a promissory oath. This security can be called a divine quasi-suretyship.

Thus we seem able to reconcile the three modes by which a promissory oath as such is conceived: a) God is invoked as witness of future truth (cf. 2, 2, q. 89 art. 7); b) the faith itself is bound to God, so that you are bound almost from a vow (d'Annibale, II, 25); c) God is called metaphorically a quasi-surety, insofar as the intention of doing can no longer be changed without irreverence offered to God, and that invocation of God supplies a certain security of execution (most authors after Suarez, Rel., Tr. 5, Lib. 3, c. 16, n. 10-13).

The Code, c. 1317, simply has these words: "He who freely swears that he will do something is held by a peculiar obligation of religion to fulfill what he has confirmed by oath."

That oath can accede to a simple purpose, which then must be observed from reverence toward God; or to a promise obliging from fidelity, which then, from the same reverence, must be observed more carefully; or to a vow, so that a double obligation of religion has arisen; or to a contract already of itself obliging from justice: in which case a right has been acquired by the third party and fortified by the protection of religion.

n. 195.

The sworn fulfillment of a contract. The parties can be moved by a twofold intention to swear to the fulfillment of a contractual promise, or a promise obliging of itself from justice. Either, thinking the promise valid, they intend merely to increase the obligation already undertaken by the obligation of religion; then, from the very intention of the parties, the oath must follow the nature of the act; or, conscious of a defect or vice, they will to substitute an obligation of religion in the place of an obligation of justice; and then, unless from the nature of the thing or from the prohibition of law the object of the oath is illicit, an obligation of religion arises from the oath; and, unless positive law or harmful circumstances have introduced more, this alone binds the parties.

N. B. Formerly, an oath having been added, agreements had to be judged in the ecclesiastical forum; and acts which otherwise would have been destitute of action were confirmed civilly.

n. 196.

"An oath extorted by force or grave fear is valid, but it can be relaxed by a Superior" (can. 1317 § 2). For the Church did not will to invalidate such an oath, lest, by alleging the excuse of fear, too frequent an occasion of perjuring be given (Keiffenstuel in L. 1, t. 40, n. 58. 59). - An oath extorted by error or fraud will be valid or not, according as the error affected only circumstances of lesser moment or was substantial.

n. 197.

An oath of doing a bad thing, or a vain thing, or a useless thing, or a thing directly contrary to the evangelical counsels, or something so indifferent that it is made honest neither by the end nor by circumstances, produces no obligation. For an oath cannot be a bond of iniquity, or bind us to vain and idle things, since obligations of this kind impede greater goods.

Wherefore, canon 1318, § 2 warns us that acts which tend directly to the harm of others or to the prejudice of the public good or of eternal salvation acquire no force from an oath.

Yet a valid promise or agreement can be confirmed by oath, by which someone is prohibited from taking, or rather professing, the way of the evangelical counsels, at least for a time or without Pontifical dispensation. Cf. n. 200.

n. 198.

The oath of a minor. Although, from c. 1317, an oath furnished neither by force nor by fraud, by which someone renounces a private good or favor conceded to him by law, must be observed as often as it can be observed without sin, that must be understood insofar as the one swearing is capable of such renunciation. Wherefore, if a minor, still a minor, has sworn that he would not rescind a void or rescindable agreement made by him, since our law, in view of the common good itself, renders that confirmation void, he seems strictly to need no dispensation. And indeed a dispensation, if it seems to have to be given, removes no acquired right, so that it can be granted by any suitable priest. If, I say, it seems to have to be given, because any priest can declare the emptiness of the act.

n. 199.

He swears feignedly or simulatedly who either inwardly dissents in mind from the words which he utters, or does not will to undertake the obligation of religion. Concerning this matter there is proposition 25 condemned by Innocent XI: "with cause it is lawful to swear without the intention of swearing, whether the matter is light or grave."

And in reality that fiction contains a lie with vain usurpation of the name of God. This is of itself venial; but it would become grave: a) in contracts about a grave matter, because of fraudulent deception; b) when from a grave precept, as in a legitimate judgment, an oath is imposed: then one would be pressed at least by the obligation of religion; c) when one thus swears feignedly without the intention of fulfilling: because, since the name of God is invoked exteriorly, this character of exterior perjury is injurious to God almost as exterior blasphemy is. So rather with Suarez, Rel., tr. 5, L. 3, c. 17, n. 3. 4, than from the subtle reason of Sanchez, Decal. L. 3, c. 6, n. 8-11.

But when the stain of lying is absent from the fiction, as when it is requested unlawfully in circumstances which exclude a serious and sincere action, a feigned oath seems able to be excused by a grave cause. Cf. Lugo, Paen. d. 16, n. 211; Lehmk. I, 556.

A feigned and invalid oath introduces no obligation of religion as such. Yet easily, to prevent scandal or harm, it will have to be executed.

n. 200.

He who, terrified by the threats of a robber, has sworn that he will give him a sum of money, although, because of the rescindable contract, he is held by no obligation of justice, must and can be dispensed from the oath (c. 1317 § 2): which was controverted before the Code ¹; but he could also pronounce the words without the intention of swearing, so that the oath itself is null. But if the contract is null, for example because it is invalidated by civil law, then relaxation of the oath seems superfluous.

¹ Cf. e.g. Lehmk., I, 564. St. Thomas follows the severe opinion, 2, 2, q. 89 art. 7 ad 3.

n. 201.

He who, in favor of someone or of certain persons, has absolutely sworn that he will furnish something, so that, for example, from their consent a right has been acquired by them, is held to fulfill it as long as it is honorable, even if it impedes a better good, for example entrance into religion. Nor can he himself commute that oath into something better, but he must seek a dispensation. Hence is also explained c. 542, § 1, which declares invalid the reception into the novitiate of a candidate who is bound by an oath by which, for a definite time, he is held, by institution of the Holy See, to a mission or diocese. But in similar oaths there is easily understood the condition, "unless I shall have been called to the state of perfection." Cf. Lugo, Iust. d. 21, n. 67. 73; Nilles, De libertate clericorum religionem ingrediendi, n. 43. 44 and p. 120. 121. Wherefore, in the oath of a mission, an express promise is made of not entering religion without dispensation of the Holy See.

n. 202.

A promissory oath must be interpreted in the same way in which a promise not sworn would be explained. Wherefore, one who swears that he will observe the decrees and rules or statutes of some congregation, university, or chapter, is judged to have sworn not so much the statutes themselves as due subjection to those laws. Wherefore that oath is understood: a) of statutes already issued, not to be issued; b) as long as and insofar as they are in force by use; c) under grave sin, under light sin, under counsel, under penalty, according as the thing itself or the law in force demands it.

Concerning interpretation c. 1321 has this: "An oath must be strictly interpreted according to law and according to the intention of the one swearing, or, if he acts fraudulently, according to the intention of him to whom the oath is sworn." This is a most apt rule of the external forum (1). The intention of him to whom the oath is sworn will have to be gathered from the circumstances or from another demonstration. In the internal forum, the obligation of the oath does not exceed the intention of the one swearing. Yet the one swearing will have to repair the harms of harmful fraud.

n. 203.

An oath concerning civil constitutions does not affect laws contrary to divine or ecclesiastical law. If laws of this kind are brought forward or urged, a clause excluding them must be added to the oath. But if they lie as though buried, the oath is now of itself judged reasonably circumscribed by laws properly in force. Cf. Lehmk. I, 568.

n. 204.

The obligation of fulfilling a promissory oath is certainly grave if the object itself of the promise must be considered grave. But if it is light, grave authors, such as Lessius, Iust. etc. b. II, c. 42, dub. 5, judge the obligation to be under mortal sin, because God is invoked as witness of falsity. Lessius, however, concedes the probability of the more benign opinion, which Suarez then confirmed by his authority, Rel. tr. 5, Lib. 3, c. 16, n. 15-19; because a lie would be lacking if, when it was sworn, the intention of fulfilling the promise had been had, so that God was merely the surety of a light obligation. Yet we confess that, for the reasoning of the Excellent Doctor to be apodictic, it is necessary that you wholly omit that which seems sufficiently to cohere with the nature of an oath: that God was invoked as witness of constancy. More easily, although Suarez does not admit this, l. c. n. 8, we shall concede with most authors that one sins lightly who has omitted a moderate part of a grave object promised, because God was assumed as witness of substantial constancy, not of perfect constancy. But practically, in no light matter will the obligation of a sworn promise have to be urged under grave sin.

n. 205.

From c. 1319 itself, the obligation introduced by a promissory oath ceases: by remission proceeding from him for whose advantage it was sworn; - by substantial change of the thing, or if, the circumstances having been changed, the thing becomes bad, wholly indifferent, or impedes a greater good (here, however, as was said above, acquired rights must be attended to); - when the final cause, or the condition under which perhaps the oath was given, is lacking: for example, when the poverty of him to whom you had promised alms ceases, or when he dies for whose health you had promised a pilgrimage; - by irritation, dispensation, commutation. Moreover, all who can relax vows are permitted by canon 1320 to remove oaths also, by the same reason and in the same way.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 71 passages

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, TREATISE II: On the Second Precept of the Decalogue

Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.
(Exod., 20, 7).

n. ¶593.

As through the first precept fidelity toward God is chiefly prescribed, or proper submission to him, so through the second precept reverence is chiefly prescribed, or that other part of worship by which we are commanded to commit nothing injurious against God, and to honor the name, that is, the excellent power, of God (St. Thomas, Op. de praec. Decal., c. 13).

Now the divine name is honored: 1. by confession and praise; the contrary of which is vain assumption, and much more blasphemy; 2. by oath, for by swearing we profess God to be the first truth, likewise by adjuration, for by this we profess the power of the divine name; the opposite of these is a false, unjust, and indiscreet oath, as also indiscreet adjuration; 3. by vow, for by vowing we profess God to be most worthy of every service; to this is opposed an indiscreet vow and violation of a vow.

Hence there must be treated of three things, namely: 1. of the praise of God, and of irreverence toward his holy name; 2. of oath and adjuration; 3. of vow.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, CHAPTER I: On the Praise of God and on Irreverence Against His Most Holy Name

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 13, and 97-100; St. Alphonsus, III, 121 ff.; ed. G., I, p. 439; Suarez, de Virt. Relig., tr. III, l. I, III; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 506; Genicot, I, n. 291 ff.; Gury-Ferreres, I, n. 299 ff.; Vermeersch, Quaest. de Virt. Relig., n. 159.

Preliminary note. "Of God," says the Angelic Doctor, "we can speak in two ways. In one way, as regards his essence; and thus, since he is incomprehensible and ineffable, 'he is greater than every praise'; and under this respect reverence and the honor of latria are due to him. In another way, according to his effects which are ordered to our utility; and under this respect praise is due to him; whence it is said (Isai., 63, 7): I will remember the mercies of the Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things which the Lord hath rendered to us" (2.2, q. 91, a. 1 ad 1).

n. ¶594.

PRINCIPLES. I. For honoring God praise of the heart is not sufficient, but praise of the mouth is also required. Praise of the heart is honor furnished to God by the internal senses, or by reason and will. But this praise does not suffice, on account of the one praising himself, whose affection toward God ought to be excited from the praise itself, according to that (Ps. 49, 23): The sacrifice of praise shall glorify me; there is the way by which I will show him the salvation of God. Praise of the mouth also profits for this, that the affection of others toward God may be stirred.

Moreover, to the praise of God it pertains confidently to confess God in the sight of all, and to proclaim Christ the author of our salvation. For the Lord says (Luke, 9, 26): He that shall be ashamed of me, and of my words: of him the Son of man shall be ashamed when he shall come in his majesty. Likewise, it pertains to acknowledge and celebrate divine Providence in all events, both prosperous and adverse, saying with Job (1, 21): Blessed be the name of the Lord.

II. Praise of the mouth is imposed upon all negatively, but upon certain persons positively. It is said negatively, insofar as all must abstain from those things which inflict irreverence upon God. - The office of positively praising God is imposed upon religious and clerics, as will be seen n. 2203 ff.

Since irreverence against the MOST HOLY NAME OF GOD is committed: 1. through vain usurpation of it; 2. through blasphemy, therefore concerning these we shall now treat in a twofold article.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. I, ARTICLE I: On the Vain Usurpation of the Divine Name

n. ¶595.

DEFINITION. Vain usurpation of the divine name is every appellation of the name either of God or of Our Lord Jesus Christ, made without just cause, or without due reverence.

But this is accustomed to happen from a threefold cause: from impatience, from admiration, from a superfluous manner or custom of speaking. But if with due reverence, and by way of invocation, the name of God is usurped, it is a good and meritorious act.

PRINCIPLES. I. Vain usurpation of the name of God is a sin against religion. For in it the holy and terrible name of God is held like a profane thing. Whence (Exod., 20, 7) it is commanded: Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.

II. Nevertheless, appellation of this sort, of itself, does not exceed venial fault. For in it grave offense of the divine majesty does not appear. But often it is free of fault, on account of inadvertence.

Hence: 1. The vain usurpation of the names of the Saints, or of the words of Sacred Scripture, is a sin of the same species against religion, because the irreverence brought upon the Saints redounds upon God.

In anger to usurp the demon without imprecation is not of itself a sin against religion, because no reverence is due to him. Yet assiduous naming of him does not befit a Christian, and by reason of scandal can be grave, if namely clerics or religious do this (III, 131, 11).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. I, ARTICLE II: On Blasphemy

n. ¶596.

DEFINITION. Blasphemy is contumelious speech against God.

It is said: 1. speech, because ordinarily it is done by words, although it can also be done by thought alone, or by writings, or even by deeds, for example by spitting toward heaven. It is also called speech because, as for infidelity, assent of the mind is not required for blasphemy; but it suffices that something be said of God after the manner of reproach. 2. Contumelious, namely by which something is detracted from the excellence of the divine majesty: whether this is done by attributing false things to him, or by denying true things; or by attributing to creatures things which are due to God; or even by saying true things, but things which tend to his dishonoring, as happens after the manner of one indignant against him, despising him, etc. 3. Against God; because reproach against the Saints, sacred things, etc., insofar as they have a special relation to God, is ultimately referred to God himself (III, 121; H. Ap., V, 1). Cf. n. 546.¹

DIVISION. 1. By reason of object, one blasphemy is immediate, which dishonors God in himself; another mediate, which dishonors God in the Saints, or in other nobler creatures, which connote a peculiar relation to him.

Immediate blasphemy probably does not differ in species from mediate blasphemy; for "those who blaspheme the Saints, more truly, commonly speaking, intend to affect them with injury, not on account of their precise and proper excellence, but insofar as they are referred mediately to God; therefore ... they sin not against dulia but against latria; and on that account they are not held to explain in confession whether they blasphemed God or the Saints" (III, 132; cf. Viva, Decal., q. 6, a. 2, n. 6).

By reason of intention, one is direct, namely that which directly and formally attacks God, from the intention of dishonoring him; this is also called diabolical. Another is indirect, which indeed is uttered advertently, for example in a movement of anger, but without a direct intention of dishonoring God.

Direct blasphemy very often proceeds from hatred of God: which circumstance, as is evident, is to be expressed in confession (III, 126; Vind. Alph., VI, c. 1, § 1, n. 1). - Indirect blasphemy, although specifically it is the same sin against latria as direct blasphemy, nevertheless is lower in degree.

By reason of words, blasphemy is either heretical, or imprecative, or dishonoring. This distinction is specific, because besides religion, the first mode of blaspheming also wounds faith, and the second charity.

HERETICAL blasphemy is that which contains heresy or falsity against faith. Blasphemy of this sort is to say, for example: God does not exist; God does not will or cannot help us; he does not have care of men; he is a tyrant; he does not dispose human affairs well; the Blessed Virgin is a woman like the rest, if namely it is understood that she is not a virgin or the Mother of God; likewise to attribute to a creature what belongs to God alone, for example to call the devil "holy, omnipotent" (III, 122; cf. Togni, Instr., II, c. 1, § 5). - But if one uttering these things by mouth or in writing also believes them pertinaciously in heart, there is the malice of heresy externalized, on account of which a specially reserved excommunication is incurred (cf. n. 1314).

IMPRECATIVE blasphemy is that by which someone wishes evil to God, for example if someone says: May God perish! Would that God did not exist! Cursed be God! etc. - If such imprecation proceeds from hatred of God, then it is properly called imprecative blasphemy; otherwise it is reduced to dishonoring blasphemy (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 2, n. 1).

DISHONORING blasphemy, or simple blasphemy, is that by which someone pronounces something about God after the manner of contumely and mockery. Such was that saying of Julian the Apostate: Thou hast conquered, Galilean, and that of those mocking Christ: Hail, King of the Jews. Likewise, if the death, head, blood, entrails of Christ are named contumeliously from anger or jest. Likewise, to wish to do something against God's will, to spit toward heaven, to trample sacred images, rosaries, etc. (III, 124, 125).

n. ¶597.

PRINCIPLES. I. Blasphemy is a mortal sin from its whole genus, and indeed most grave. It is proved: 1. from the word of God (Levit., 24, 16): He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die; 2. from reason: for the blasphemer, as if by open war, attacks God himself. Whence St. Jerome says (in Isai., l. VIII, 18): "Nothing is more horrible than blasphemy, which sets its mouth on high." And St. Chrysostom (Hom. to the people of Antioch, n. 12) exhorted the faithful that they should restrain blasphemers even with blows, lest the city perish. Cf. St. Thom., 2.2, q. 13, a. 2 and 5.

We said from its whole genus; and thus those blasphemies against the Saints which redound upon God do not admit smallness of matter. But if the Saints, as men, are affected with contumely, for example if someone jokingly calls Saints Crispin and Crispinian cobblers, John and Paul eunuchs, etc., this indeed would be venial, against dulia; "but it will be grave if you say these things contemptuously, or from hatred or indignation against the Saints" (III, 125).

Blasphemy can also become VENIAL from imperfection of the act. Thus, for example, he who says: "God is forgetful of me; ... why did God create me?" sins only venially, if he speaks thus from an impulse of grief. Indeed, he does not blaspheme formally, if in uttering such things he only intends to say: I am wretched, as if God had forgotten me.

II. For blasphemy a virtual and implicit intention of dishonoring God suffices. Such an intention is had in him who from jest "or anger against creatures" advertently, in the act or in the cause, utters truly blasphemous expressions (III, 124; cf. Reuter, n. 442). For thus grave irreverence against God is committed. - Except, unless the jest takes away altogether the notion or signification of contumely against God, for example by swearing, for the sake of mockery, by false gods. Cf. Ami du Cl. (1913, p. 729), where it treats of him who teaches blasphemies to a parrot.

n. ¶598.

The following RULES can be given for discerning among various expressions which ones have the character of true blasphemy:

If any expression, either from its proper signification, or from common estimation, or from the manner of uttering, has a CONTUMELIOUS SENSE against God, it will always be blasphemy.

Hence he blasphemes who says: may the blood, wounds, death, head, passion, sacraments, chrism of God, and similar sacred things, destroy you. For the rest, in these things men commonly apprehend that a great contempt of God and of those things is contained (III, 126).

Whether this French expression, too much usurped: Sacre nom de Dieu, is blasphemy has very recently been much disputed.² For, according to some, in an acceptance of this sort the word sacre, according to common apprehension, sounds the same as execrable, to be despised, worthy of contempt.³ Wherefore, if this word is usurped in the same acceptance for expressing contempt against sacred things or persons as such, it will also be blasphemy (Jaugey, de Relig., n. 456). Yet there are others, such as Gousset, Scavini, Valentini, Frassinetti (translation of Fourez), Gridel, Tanquerey, and others (apud L. Manise), who excuse the word sacre joined with the Most Holy Name of God from blasphemy, being led by this reason, that that word does not signify the same as accursed, inasmuch as it is derived from ancient oaths in which it signifies the Holy Name of God. - We think, therefore, since the expression of itself and from erroneous acceptance is ambiguous, that there is place for the principle enunciated by St. Alphonsus, where he treats of malediction of the dead (Theol. mor., III, tr. II; ed. G., I, p. 456), and that with Bucceroni it must be said: "In practice, all those who utter words of this sort are not easily to be accused of mortal sin, unless it is done with anger against God" (Inst. mor., I, n. 456). - In the same way one must reason concerning the Flemish formula: G. V. D., God damn me, which of itself seems to be nothing except a dire imprecation.⁴ Likewise, but from defect of signification, concerning the German formula: Tausend Sakrament, Tausend Herr Gott (Noldin, II, n. 206, b).

If the expression does not have a COMPLETE sense, it is not blasphemy, unless the indignation is directed against God (III, 124).

Whence these expressions are free from grave fault: Nom de Dieu! Sacre nom! without addition, etc. Yet they are not free from light fault, both because of impatience and because of vain usurpation of the divine Name; indeed, because of the danger of falling into blasphemy the fault could become grave (III, 128). Similarly, it is only vain usurpation of the divine Name nakedly to utter sacred words, for example death of God, wounds, sacrament, etc., if the anger tends only against a man or beast; which indeed must be gathered from the adjuncts. Nor is it blasphemy to utter half-spoken or corrupted words, as for example jourdedie, mordie, ventredie, morbleu; nego Di ... Santo Di ... (Diana); or to say against men: Sangue di Dio, Corpo di Dio, unless the indignation is directed against God (III, 124, 128). - The German word Auchen often sounds the same as uttering holy names in anger, for example Himmel, Herrgott, without imprecation or contumely.

To curse CREATURES is not blasphemy, except insofar as they have a special relation to God.

Hence: a) it is blasphemy to curse the Saints, the sacraments, sacred days or things, the Catholic faith, the Church of God, or even priests, insofar as they are ministers of God; b) but to curse creatures, insofar as they are creatures, is not blasphemy, unless the word of God is added, for example cursed rain of God; or unless the divine power shines forth in a peculiar way in them, as they are soul, heaven, the whole world, etc.; in which case God would be indirectly despised in them; c) to curse a man, living or dead, without uttering the word soul, is not blasphemy, unless the intention of the speaker refers the malediction to souls; wherefore to say: may God damn me, may God damn you, is not of itself blasphemy, but a dire imprecation; d) to curse the demon, as author of evils, is not blasphemy; e) in anger to imprecate upon oneself or others the demon, lightning, etc., is likewise a dire IMPRECATION, which very often, because of defect of a serious will, is only venial fault. Yet it is grave irreverence if subjects thus curse superiors, or children parents, even if only materially, especially to the face (III, 129, 131).

IN DOUBT whether some expression is blasphemous, it is not, of itself, to be held as such; but attention must be given to the conscience of the one uttering it.

Note. Expressions of swearing, even if vain, are generally not numbered among blasphemies; for example by God, by Christ, by the Saints, by the sacraments, etc. Nor is it blasphemy to swear by the honorable members of Christ. Otherwise, if one swears mockingly, or by his dishonorable members. Similarly, it is not blasphemy to say: I deny God, if I shall not strike you; "nor to say: this is true as God; because then only a certain similarity is indicated, mixed with some hyperbole."⁵

n. ¶599.

PRACTICAL RULES. I. Penitents are diligently to be questioned: 1. What sort of words they uttered, at least in general; and besides, it must be clear to the confessor whether the blasphemy proceeded from infidelity, despair, or anger against God or the Saints. 2. How often, and on what occasion, they blasphemed, whether in gaming, in a tavern, etc., and how long they have been engaged in this vice. 3. Whether they blasphemed in the presence of children, servants, or others; for then scandal is present (Praxis, n. 27-31).

II. Faith is not easily to be given to HABITUAL blasphemers who, while they have not retracted the habit, say that they burst forth into blasphemies inadvertently; because these evil habituated persons, although they have cognition less vivid than others who have not contracted the practice of blaspheming, nevertheless always have that actual cognition sufficient for the act to be deliberate (V, 4; Praxis, l. c.). Cf. n. 319, 3. Otherwise one must speak of those who have already retracted the habit and fall back because of a natural impulse, for example of anger (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 2, n. 7-14).

III. Let the confessor prescribe REMEDIES, both by showing the enormity of blasphemy and its horrible effects, and by persuading the penitent to impose penance upon himself for individual acts of blasphemy perhaps to come. Finally, ejaculatory prayers are to be urged, or certain other harmless words, by whose use blasphemies may be excluded.

IV. Let the PREACHER beware lest he condemn as a certain sin what in itself is doubtful. Let him take care that those who are placed in a state of erroneous conscience are not left in their error. It is better to permit innumerable venial sins than one mortal sin.⁶

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, CHAPTER II: On Oath and Adjuration

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 89; St. Alphonsus, III, 133; ed. G., I, p. 460; H. Ap., V, 12; Billuart, de Relig., Diss. V; Suarez, de Relig., Diss. V; Aertnys, l. III, n. 68; Gopfert, der Eid; Schindler, II, p. 158; Genicot, I, n. 298; Koch, Moraltheol., § 109; Waffelaert, Etude sur le serment (1884).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. II, ARTICLE I: On Oath

n. ¶600.

DEFINITION. An oath comes from right, because attestation under oath founds right, and it is defined: the invocation of God as witness of truth.

It is said: INVOCATION, that is, a calling to aid, that it may be distinguished from a vow, which is a promise; OF GOD: God, the first Truth, is invoked as a witness greater than every exception, and he is asked that by his infallible testimony he manifest the assertion as known by him and true, when and how it shall please him, whether in this life or in the other; AS WITNESS, so that oath may thus be distinguished from other acts by which God is invoked for help, for example from adjuration (n. 618); OF TRUTH, under which name also comes a promise, for which God is employed as a sort of surety (III, 133; St. Thom., 2.2, q. 89, a. 1).

DIVISION. Oath is distinguished in many ways:

By reason of manner, one is implicit, when through creatures in which the attributes of God shine forth in a special way God is invoked, for example by heaven, by the Gospels. Another is explicit, when God is directly invoked.
By reason of form, one is CONTESTATORY, or invocatory, by which God is simply invoked as witness; another EXECRATORY, or imprecatory, by which God is invoked not only as witness, but also as avenger.

Thus there is an execratory oath when the one swearing subjects himself, or something of his or of his own, to God to be punished, if he speaks falsely, for example: If I do not speak the truth, may God punish me; may I behold neither spouse nor children alive today, etc. To this also pertains the invocation of God as giver of goods, for example: So may God help me and his holy Gospels. For in these formulas the contrary

execration is understood, as if the one swearing said: for the truth of the assertion and fidelity in promises, may God help me, and may he deprive me of his help if I lie or am unfaithful (III, 140, 143).

By reason of matter, it is divided into ASSERTORY, by which past or present things are affirmed or denied, and PROMISSORY, by which something future is promised.

This again is twofold: one simple and standing of itself, by which someone swears that he will do or omit something, without a promise toward another, for example: I swear that I will fast; the other confirmatory of a promise, by which namely a promise made to God or to man is confirmed (III, 141; Bill., de Relig., Diss. 5, a. 2).

By reason of circumstances, one is JUDICIAL, another EXTRAJUDICIAL; another is SOLEMN, which is made with a certain solemnity, as before a notary, witnesses, the Gospels; another SIMPLE, which lacks ceremonies of this sort.

Note. All these oaths are of the same species, because in all God is brought forward as witness of truth.

n. ¶601.

PRINCIPLE. Oath of itself is licit and laudable. For it is an act of religion by which we profess God to be the more powerful witness and confirmer of things. The proposition is established besides both from the definition of the Council of Constance, Sess. 8, against Wycliffe, and from the Bull Auctorem fidei, n. 75; and from the universal practice of the Church and of peoples, as well as from various places of Sacred Scripture, for example (Deut., 6, 13): Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God ... and shalt swear by his name (III, 114).

n. ¶602.

Yet the PRIMARY END of an oath does not regard the worship of God, but the making of faith and correcting the vice of incredulity and infidelity among men. And therefore St. Thomas says (2.2, q. 89, a. 5): "An oath is to be held not among those things which are to be sought of themselves, but among those things which are necessary for this life," just as medicine, which is to be used not habitually, but rarely and cautiously. Thus we can say: Whatsoever is more than this, namely than simple affirmation or denial, is of evil (Matt., 5, 33).

These things having been set down, there now comes to be discussed: 1. the validity of an oath; 2. the licitness of an oath; 3. the promissory oath.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. II, Art. I, § 1. On the Validity of an Oath

n. ¶603.

PRINCIPLE. For a valid oath there are required: the intention of swearing and a swear-formula. These two are essential; nevertheless the first parts are held by intention, so that, although God is invoked as witness only internally, an oath is present.

I. The INTENTION OF SWEARING is required, at least virtual; because without such an intention an oath, as an invocation of God, is not a human act (III, 134).

Hence: 1. If the mind of swearing is lacking, whether from inadvertence, as in him who does not know or does not notice that the words which he uses are sworn words, or who does not intend to usurp them as sworn words but only wishes to affirm more expressly the things which he says; or from malice, as in him who swears fictitiously, by positively excluding the intention of invoking God as witness, there is no oath. 2. The same must more probably be said concerning a promissory oath, if the mind of obliging oneself from oath, or from religion, is lacking; because it is contradictory to will to promise by swearing and to be unwilling to contract an obligation of religion. 3. If only the mind of fulfilling the promise is lacking, the oath is valid, since the intention of truly swearing is present; but perjury is committed, on account of defect of truth, as will be said n. 606. Cf. St. Alph., III, 172.

II. A SWEAR-FORMULA is required, by which it is expressly or tacitly manifested that God is invoked as witness. Otherwise how could God be employed in a sensible way as witness before others? (III, 134).

Moreover: 1. The invocation is EXPRESS whenever God or his attributes are brought into the midst for making faith. Of this sort are the following formulas: I attest God, I call God to witness; let God be witness to me; I swear by God, by Christ, by the truth of God, by the faith of God, by his mercy, justice; may God destroy me, if, etc. (III, 140-143).

The invocation of God is TACIT when it is done through nobler creatures, insofar as divine perfections shine forth in them, for example: I swear by the Blessed Virgin, by the Saints, by heaven, etc.; likewise when signs alone are employed, for example hands are raised, the Gospel is touched, if from a preceding determination those signs are held as a swear-formula (III, 135-138). Indeed, this determination being presupposed, the contact of hands alone suffices, which officials of the State, priests, or even those who are enrolled in the sect of Mennonites, use in some regions, so that they assert the truth of the matter before a judge.

n. ¶604.

Hence it is inferred: a) If the divine persons or perfections, or the aforesaid creatures, are simply remembered for the sake of affirming and merely by way of narration or similitude, formulas of this sort are not reputed sworn formulas, unless something else is established or argued from the circumstances. Thus he is not considered to swear who says: "I speak before God, the angels, the blessed; God knows; God knows all things; God sees my conscience; hold me as innocent of this evil as the angels of God; it is as true as God exists; God lives before whom I stand, etc." (III, 134-138).

b) Execratory formulas, as for example, "may I be killed if this is not so," are commonly not considered a true oath, unless God is expressly named, for example: May God destroy me, if I lie. Otherwise they contain only a certain sponsoring or obligation of penalty (III, 143; l. El. qq. ref., n. 19).

c) Of itself, the invocation of one's own conscience, faith, life, body, one's own affairs, or a common creature does not suffice for an oath: for example, "I swear from conscience, by conscience, by my faith, probity, by priestly honor, military honor, by my head, by honor, by house, by children, etc." But otherwise, if one swears by the faith of Christ or the Catholic faith (III, 134-135). Nevertheless a promise made by invoking priestly honor is altogether serious and obliges.

d) Similarly, he does not swear who says: "I swear that it is so; I swear that I am going to do this"; unless from the previous declaration of the one swearing or of the one asking, the intention of furnishing a true oath is manifest (III, 136).

e) A lay oath, as they call it, is not an oath, since invocation of God is lacking (Ami du Cl., 1908, p. 870).

PRACTICAL RULES. 1. In the INTERNAL forum, the matter is to be judged from intention. He who has the mind of swearing truly swears, whatever words or signs he uses. Indeed he truly swears, even if he uses words which do not import an oath, if he believes it to be an oath. In doubt concerning the intention of the one swearing, one is accustomed to judge according to the common acceptance of the words which he used (III, 134; Lehmkuhl, I, 554).

In the EXTERNAL forum, one must stand by the formula which the one swearing usurped. For, although perhaps the oath is null before God because of defect of intention, nevertheless, in the external forum he is judged to have sworn who usurped such a word or such a sign which either of itself or because of circumstances attests a true oath.

Note. Concerning the oath in the declaration of revenues, see n. 967.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. II, Art. I, § 2. On the Licitness of an Oath

For a licit oath three things are required: truth, justice, and judgment.

First Condition: TRUTH

n. ¶605.

TRUTH in an oath is conformity of the words with the cognition and intention of the one swearing. A TWO-FOLD truth is required: one, by which a lie in asserting or promising is excluded; another, by which fiction in swearing is excluded. If the first truth is lacking, the oath is false, or perjury strictly so called; if the second is lacking, there is a fictitious oath.

n. ¶606.

PRINCIPLES. I. Perjury is a mortal sin from its whole genus. The reason: grave irreverence against God is committed, since he is brought forward as witness of falsity, as if either he did not know the truth, or wished or could deceive. Nor is lightness of matter given here, because it is always equally repugnant to God to testify to what is false (III, 147). - Hence this 24th proposition was condemned by Innocent XI: "To call God as witness of a light lie is not such great irreverence on account of which he would will or be able to damn a man."

n. ¶607.

II. A fictitious oath is a grave sin from its genus. This is established from the 25th proposition condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: "With cause, it is licit to swear without the mind of swearing, whether the matter is light or grave." The reason for the condemnation is that one swearing thus mocks divine testimony and utters a lie, since he says that he invokes God as witness, and nevertheless does not invoke him. Cf. Viva, on this proposition, against Tamburini.

Hence: 1. To swear fictitiously, in confirmation of what is false, in matter whether grave or light, is a mortal sin. For thus externally it is said that God either does not know the truth, or wishes to testify to falsity; in either of which there is grave injury to God, even if someone acts fictitiously. And hence also is why he sins gravely who swears fictitiously without the mind of fulfilling a promise (Billuart, de Relig., Diss. 5, a. 6, § 2).

To swear fictitiously in confirmation of the truth, for example with the mind of fulfilling what is promised, is only a venial sin. "But the Doctors rightly except if the oath is made in contracts or before a judge: because then, although it is not perjury, nevertheless it is a grave deception against justice," since the other has a right that the one swearing be held by the bond of religion. The same must be said concerning him who swears without the mind of obliging himself, yet with the mind of fulfilling, that is, who conceives a mere purpose of fulfilling the matter; because this man in reality does not swear, as was said n. 603 (cf. III, 172).

Note. If there is established a just cause of the fiction, it can also happen that every sin is absent (Lehmkuhl, I, 556).

n. ¶608.

Questions. QUES. 1. Whether it is licit to swear with PROBABILITY of truth?

Resp. For swearing licitly, in common human commerce some moral certitude suffices, or probability, which, at least because of the absence of contrary reason, reaches a certain moral certitude; while in a judicial matter, as regards things personally known, full certitude is required, for warding off the danger of harming. Yet if someone knows a thing with probability, from the testimony of an honest man, he will be able to swear that this is held only as probable (III, 148; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 558; Genicot, I, n. 302).

QUES. 2. Whether it is licit to swear with a MENTAL RESTRICTION?

Preliminary note. Mental restriction is an act of the mind by which someone, by checking or determining the signification of words, turns his speech aside to another sense than to the natural and obvious one. One is purely mental, which can in no way be perceived by others; another is not purely mental, which can become known from the adjunct circumstances (H. Ap., V, 15).

Resp. 1. It is never licit to swear with a PURELY MENTAL restriction. Such a restriction cannot be excused from a lie; whence, if it is confirmed by oath, it is true perjury. This is established from the 26th, 27th, and 28th propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

It is not licit to swear with a NON-PURELY MENTAL restriction before a judge legitimately interrogating, or in onerous contracts, where reticence would be harmful to the public good or to the contracting party; and it is a mortal sin.
But it is licit in common speech, whenever a just cause of hiding the truth is had, namely utility or necessity of swearing thus, for preserving goods of soul or body, or of freeing oneself from importunate interrogations.

Nevertheless, on account of reverence for the oath, a graver cause is needed for sworn equivocation than for common equivocation, and the less obvious the equivocation is, the graver the cause must be. But to swear with a restriction not purely mental without just cause, more probably, is only venial: because in an oath of this sort only judgment or discretion is lacking, the defect of which is only venial (III, 151). See the other things at n. 1181. Cf. Junglas, Der rechtsgeschichtliche Hintergrund fur Liguori's Lehre vom Gerichtseid (Festschrift zum 75 Geburtst. Freih. v. Hertling, 1913). There the opinion of the Holy Doctor is vigorously defended.

Second Condition: JUSTICE

Justice must be understood differently in an assertory oath and in a promissory oath. In an assertory oath justice requires that the one swearing have a right of asserting that which he says; but in a promissory oath, that the thing promised be just and honorable.

n. ¶609.

PRINCIPLES. I. In an assertory oath defect of justice, insofar as it is against religion, regularly is a venial sin. Thus Suarez (tr. V, l. 1, c. 2, a. 6) with the common opinion. "For this defect does not directly evacuate the end of the oath, nor make God witness of a lie; but at most it makes him witness of a depraved and unbecoming thing, which of itself is not a grave injury." If someone therefore should boast with an oath about some sin, even grave, he sins only venially by reason of the oath or religion; for the oath is pronounced for this end alone, that he may render others more certain about his sin; in which there is nothing except a certain venial lightness of mind (III, 146, 4).

It was said: regularly; for "there seems to be an exception," says the same Suarez (l. c.), "unless the oath itself is assumed as an instrument of sinning, that is, unless the malice of the depraved narration is increased through the oath: as if someone, for example, should defame his neighbor against justice by narrating a hidden truth, and, that the infamy may become more probable, should add an oath." For thus the one swearing makes God in some way a cooperator of iniquity: which is a grave sin (cf. l. El. qq. ref., n. 20; Vind. Alph., P. III, q. 9).

n. ¶610.

II. In a promissory oath, if the promise is about a thing gravely evil, defect of justice is a mortal sin. For it is a grave irreverence by divine authority to quasi-oblige oneself to mortal sin, so that here two malices concur: one, that the one swearing wills evil; the other, that for this he abuses the authority of God, who has hatred for every evil (III, 146). - Therefore oaths customarily furnished by those to be received into secret societies involve the greatest guilt of fault; because, at least implicitly, they oblige themselves to all crimes.

If the thing promised is venially evil, many hold that there is only light irreverence there. But "the opposite opinion pleases me more," says St. Alphonsus (ibid., 5), "because it seems not a light but a grave irreverence to invoke God as witness and surety of sin, although light"; in other words, it is grave to assume such an obligation by oath, as if wishing thus to honor God. But he sins venially who swears something against the evangelical counsels, as, for example, that he will not enter Religion, that he will not give alms. The reason is that here he rather affirms that he is so disposed.

n. ¶611.

From these things conclude: 1. "He sins gravely who exacts an oath from another, knowing that he is going to perjure himself. Except, unless a just cause and necessity demand it; because then the perjury follows from the malice alone of the one perjuring himself" (III, 149).

Rustics who do not understand the malice of perjury, and have the custom of perjuring themselves, are not immediately to be admonished concerning the gravity of the sin, lest they pass from material

sins to formal sins; but they themselves are to be strongly admonished, so that they may be called away from the bad custom (III, 150).

It is not licit to furnish an oath of fidelity proposed by a government hostile to the Roman Church, in words by which unlimited obedience is promised; but an oath of merely passive obedience can be tolerated, in all those things which are not opposed to divine and ecclesiastical laws, according to the form approved by the Supreme Pontiff Pius VII. Therefore if any laws of the government are opposed to the rights of God or of the Church, let a restrictive clause be added, and, that scandal may be avoided, let it be declared that the Holy See permits such an oath. Cf. S. Poenit., Dec. 10, 1860 and Dec. 14, 1866 (A. S. S., I, p. 562; II, p. 676).¹

Indeed, neither then will it be necessary to add clauses, if, whether from the character of the one swearing or from the public declaration of the prince, it is known that the oath implicitly contains the clauses. Noldin, II, 252.

Note. To this second condition of an oath can be referred the question: Whether it is licit to swear upon Protestant Bibles? It is certain that this is not licit if the government does not absolutely require such an oath. If it is imposed, a Catholic will be able, a protestation having been premised, to swear upon a heretical Bible. Let him at least premise the clause: insofar as it contains the word of God. Let confessors, as regards admonition, observe the approved rules. Those are not excusable who, a faculty having been given of asking for or bringing with themselves a Catholic version, use corrupted Bibles (Lehmkuhl, I, 552, note).

Third Condition: JUDGMENT

Preliminary note. Judgment demands that an oath be emitted with discretion, that is, with prudence and reverence, and not without a grave or reasonable cause (III, 144).

Therefore the one swearing must weigh: 1. whether the oath is required either by reason of his office, or for this, that faith may be given to his words; 2. whether a notable hope shines forth that he will make faith; 3. whether at its time he can furnish the thing promised by oath.

n. ¶612.

PRINCIPLES. I. To swear without sufficient cause of itself is a venial sin. One swearing thus, by affirming a true thing or promising that which he has the intention of fulfilling, does not seem to invoke the name of God with grave disorder.

We said of itself; because per accidens it can be mortal, if scandal or danger of perjury is present. This danger is commonly incurred by those who are accustomed to swear, without attention whether the things which they are accustomed to swear are true or false (III, 145).

n. ¶613.

II. For swearing licitly notable utility suffices. This is evident from the nature of an oath (cf. n. 602).

Hence, by excellent right, an oath is exacted from those who are received into some community, for example a college, that they diligently devote themselves to observing the statutes; and likewise from those who are placed over some public office or ministry, such as Bishops, canons, beneficiaries, witnesses, etc. - Wherefore, the 101st proposition of Quesnel, by which oaths customarily made in the Church are said to be contrary to the spirit of God and the doctrine of Christ, was condemned by Clement XI in the Bull Unigenitus.

Note. As Schindler rightly observes (II, p. 164), great prudence is required in officials of the State, judges, etc., when they ask that the sanctity of an oath be added to assertions. Let oath remain, for investigating truth, an extraordinary means, which they should not use too often. From atheists or perjurers who are known as such, let sworn assertion rarely be sought.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. II, Art. I, § 3. On the Promissory Oath

Preliminary note. The promissory oath must be treated specially, because it differs from the assertory in this, that it not only asserts something concerning the present, but besides affirms something concerning the future, namely accurate execution of the thing promised.

n. ¶614.

PRINCIPLES. I. A promissory oath concerning a licit and useful thing induces an obligation of religion. For through an oath God is invoked not only as witness of truth in promising, but also as surety for faithful execution of the thing promised. Therefore oath truly induces an obligation of executing what was promised, on account of reverence for the divine name, or an obligation of religion (cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 562, note; Schindler, II, p. 165).

It was said: 1. An oath concerning a licit thing, etc.; because if it is concerning an illicit thing, or a thing of no utility, it induces no obligation. For an oath, as being an act of religion, cannot be a bond of iniquity, or of an idle thing which does not fall to the honor of God. Indeed, he sins gravely who promises illicit things by swearing. But neither does an oath become valid, even if such an illicit and vain thing, the circumstances afterward being changed, becomes honorable; since that is not strengthened by lapse of time which did not subsist in the beginning (III, 176).

But if the thing promised is less good and against the evangelical counsels, one must distinguish: either the promise was made to God alone, or for the utility of a man. In the first case there is no obligation, because the thing promised to God ought not to be impeditive of a greater good: thus, for example, he who had sworn that he would never fast outside the days established by the Church can nevertheless fast. - In the second case, if the promise was accepted and can be kept without sin, the oath must be stood by. The reason is that any promise concerning a licit and possible thing, and useful to a third party, must be fulfilled at least from fidelity (cf. n. 1062). Thus, for example, he who swore to a girl that he would enter matrimony with her is held to accept her as wife, unless he wishes to enter Religion: which is conceded to him from a special disposition of law (III, 173; H. Ap., V, 13). Thus also a priest who swore that he would not leave the diocese cannot, without dispensation, enter Religion (III, 177).²

It induces an obligation of religion. Here it must be noted: a) He who violates this obligation by not fulfilling what he swore does not indeed commit perjury strictly so called, but sins by irreverence toward God, by despising his authority, which had been brought forward for strengthening the promise. b) The obligation which arises from an oath, since it is an obligation of religion, is altogether personal and does not pass to heirs. Wherefore these persons, indeed by force of the oath and from religion, are not held to fulfill it, even if perhaps they are held by another title, for example from pact and justice. c) A fictitious oath does not induce an obligation of religion, since it is null; nevertheless it can well oblige so that scandal or harm to another may be avoided (III, 172, 177).

II. A promissory oath obliges under grave or under light matter, according to the gravity of the thing promised. The obligation of an oath is ordinarily less than the obligation of a vow; but a vow, in light matter, obliges only under light matter. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 89, a. 8; Lehmkuhl, I, 562. See St. Alph., III, 173; Vind. Alph., I, p. 227.

III. A promissory oath has the same condition and the same mode of interpreting as the promise or purpose to which it is annexed. The accessory follows the principal; and therefore when the promise does not oblige, neither does the oath attached to it oblige (III, 180).

n. ¶615.

Since therefore an oath claims for itself the same conditions and mode of interpreting as the promise to which it is added, this TWO-FOLD RULE can be established:

RULE 1. The obligation of an oath is of strict interpretation, namely so that the one swearing is considered to have wished to oblige himself as little as he could. For thus promises and contracts must be interpreted.

Therefore, if some act or contract does not subsist from the beginning, whether because it is invalid by its nature, for example because of equivocation employed in promising or in contracting, or because it is void from positive law on account of the common good, it follows that no obligation comes from the oath either. Thus an oath extorted by fear does not oblige concerning profession, matrimony, espousals, renunciation of the ecclesiastical forum, donation made by a cleric to a concubine (III, 177).

RULE 2. Every oath must be interpreted according to the CONDITIONS which, by fiction of law, are tacitly understood.

But they are the following: a) If I shall be able, that is, if the promise can be fulfilled without grave harm. b) Saving the right of the Superior, that is, if the Superior does not prohibit execution. c) If the state of things has not been notably changed. d) If the other part also has kept faith in a mutual obligation. e) If the promisee does not yield his right. f) If the final cause, on account of which the promise was made, does not cease (III, 180, 187; H. Ap., V, 18).

n. ¶616.

From these things you will deduce: 1. An oath of observing the statutes of some congregation, college, etc., is to be interpreted thus: a) that it is understood concerning statutes published, not to be published; b) that it is understood to oblige under grave or light matter, or only to penalty, or only under counsel, just as the statute itself obliges; c) that it does not oblige to statutes which have lost the force of obliging, on account of impossibility, or desuetude, or because they have thus been received in use; d) that it also does not oblige if some statute is not observed by the greater part of the community (III, 181). - Religious profession also, if it is invalid, is not strengthened through an annexed oath.

"He who swore that he would preserve a secret does not sin against the oath by revealing it when he cannot conceal it without grave harm to himself or another; because the very promise of secrecy does not seem to oblige except with this condition: if it does no harm. Similarly, the obligation of the oath ceases if the matter has become known from elsewhere" (III, 183).
He who swore to a judge that he would say the things which he knows is not held to reveal hidden things, because at least half-full proof of the crime must precede. Yet except cases which commonly do not admit except single witnesses, as, for example, the case of solicitation to shameful things (ibid., 5).
He who promised with an oath that he would return to prison, much more probably is held to return with probable fear of death or of most grave unjust harm; because, the promise having been posited, to return is a work of virtue. Yet others deny, because it would be an evil action voluntarily to offer oneself to death (cf. III, 186).
"Parents or masters swearing that they will punish children or servants rarely sin if they do not fulfill the oath; either because the delinquents have already been corrected, or because the oath was concerning a useless thing, or rather concerning disordered vengeance; or because such oaths are very often made without an intention of swearing, but only of frightening" (ibid.).
Generally, the oath not to sell for less or not to buy for more does not bind merchants; either because oaths of this sort are for the most part concerning a useless thing; or because these men do not have the intention of swearing; or certainly because there is in the oath a tacit condition, unless things seem to go better otherwise.
An oath of fidelity and obedience regards only those things which are comprehended in the office of the one swearing. Whence, by force of such an oath, an inferior cannot be held either to illicit things, or to impossible things, or to things too grave, or to things extrinsic to his office. See Lehmkuhl, I, 568. Cf. what was said n. 611, 4.

n. ¶617.

Questions. QUES. 1. Whether an oath ever obliges by which a promise void by law or to be voided at the discretion of the one promising is confirmed?

Resp. 1. It obliges if the promise is made void in favor of the one promising, and he, conscious of the matter, nevertheless swears. For one acting thus renounces his right and binds himself with the bond of religion, which, although it confers no right upon the promisee, ought to be kept on account of reverence for God. 2. It does not oblige if the promise is made void on account of the public good, because the thing promised then becomes illicit; nor does it oblige if the one swearing intends only to bind himself, by the bond of religion, to the proper and connatural obligation of the promise (III, 172, 3; 177). Cf. below n. 1059.

QUES. 2. Whether an oath emitted from deceit or ERROR obliges in conscience?

Resp. 1. It does not oblige, if the error or deceit turns upon the substance of the thing, or essential circumstances, or other circumstances sufficiently notable, which, if they had been foreknown, would have impeded the promissory oath; because then the thing promised is not considered sufficiently known for consent to be free. 2. But it obliges if the error or deceit turns upon circumstances altogether accidental (III, 175). - See n. 1061 ff.

QUES. 3. Whether an oath extorted by GRAVE and UNJUST FEAR obliges?

Resp. 1. In the EXTERNAL forum, where the mind of swearing is presumed to have been lacking, it certainly does not oblige. - 2. As regards the INTERNAL forum, it is disputed; but the more common and far more probable opinion, which also D. Thomas embraces with Suarez and Lugo, says that it obliges. Thus, for example, the oath of giving money or usury to a robber or usurer obliges. And the reason is that from religion we are held to effect that what we swear be true, lest we make God witness of falsity. The rule of law is consonant, according to which any oath whatsoever must be kept which can be kept without sin.³

Nevertheless: a) One suffering fear can swear with mental restriction, so that he contracts no obligation (n. 608, q. 2 and 615, Rule 1). b) If he truly promised, he can seek relaxation of the oath from the Bishop, or from another having faculty, so that he may be excused from the obligation of paying. c) If he has already paid, he can seek again in judgment what he gave, or compensate himself secretly (cf. n. 1059, q. 2). See St. Alph., III, 174; ed. G., I, 480.

The adversaries indeed say that a payment which can be sought again or secretly taken back is something ridiculous. But St. Alphonsus responds that the payment is not illusory, because there is always danger lest the thing handed over to the thief from fear cannot afterwards be sought again.

Note. 1. The obligation of an oath ceases intrinsically by cessation of the motive cause, that is, when the matter of the oath becomes either impossible, or useless, or harmful, or when a notable change or circumstance supervenes, which, if foreseen, the oath would not have been made (cf. n. 615, Rule 2; 625, 4).

It ceases extrinsically by irritation, dispensation, and commutation, just as a vow, because the same reason runs. It also ceases by remission of the obligation made by him in whose favor the sworn promise was emitted, because each one can yield his own right (III, 187-193).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. II, Ch. II, ARTICLE II: On Adjuration

n. ¶618.

DEFINITION. Adjuration is an entreaty under invocation of God, or of sacred things, or of the Saints, for inducing someone, by asking or by commanding, to do or omit something (III, 193, App., n. 1).

It differs a) from prayer, which is petition to God, while here something is asked from another through God; b) from oath, because God is invoked not as witness, but because he is to be revered and feared.

DIVISION. Adjuration is distinguished: 1. By reason of authority, it is solemn or private, according as it is done either by the ministers and modes instituted by the Church, or

without solemnities of this sort. 2. By reason of manner, it is deprecative or imperative, according as it is done by prayers or by command. Sometimes it is deprecative and imperative at the same time.

n. ¶619.

PRINCIPLES. I. For licit adjuration three things are required: truth, justice, and judgment. 1. TRUTH, that is, that the one adjuring truly intend to attain what he asks, and that the cause on account of which he asks be true. But the lack of this truth will rarely be more than venial fault, as if a feigned poor man asks alms by God. 2. JUSTICE, from the lack of which he certainly sins gravely who asks a gravely evil thing; indeed, according to the more probable opinion, he sins gravely who asks a thing only lightly evil, because it seems a sufficiently grave irreverence to induce another to an evil thing by the help of divine authority. 3. JUDGMENT, that is, due discretion, the lack of which certainly is only venial (III, 193, 2).

n. ¶620.

II. The direct object of adjuration is every intellectual being; the indirect object is also an irrational creature. 1. God is adjured only deprecatively, either by himself, by his goodness, mercy, etc.; or by the merits of Christ; or by the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary and the Saints, whose merits we exhibit to him. 2. The Blessed Virgin Mary, the angels, and the Saints of God are also adjured deprecatively when we beseech them to help us on account of God. 3. Men who are wayfarers are adjured, whether deprecatively, for instance if a subject adjures a Superior, a friend adjures a friend, that by the love of God, or of the Blessed Virgin Mary, or of some Saint, they furnish something, thus St. Paul, II Cor., 10, 1; or imperatively, when the one adjuring has some power over the one adjured.

We can likewise adjure demons, but only imperatively, namely by repelling and restraining them through the power of the divine name, lest they harm us spiritually or corporally. This adjuration comes under the name of EXORCISM (Muller, l. II, § 62).

We adjure irrational creatures indirectly, by adjuring either God, that their use may help us, or demons, that through them they cease to harm. In these ways water, salt, a new house, locusts, clouds, tempest, etc., are commonly exorcised (III, 193, 3).

n. ¶621.

III. Adjuration does not induce an obligation of furnishing what is asked. The reason is that it has not been instituted except for exciting in the one adjured fear or love of the divine name, by which he may be moved to furnish what is asked (Noldin, n. 239).

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, CHAPTER II: ON OATH · Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, ARTICLE I: ON THE CONDITIONS OF AN OATH · Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, ARTICLE II: ON THE OBLIGATION OF A PROMISSORY OATH · Vol. I, TREATISE ON CONTRACTS, FIRST PART: ON CONTRACTS I…, Ch. III, ARTICLE I: ON AN OATH ADJOINED TO A CONTRACT

On the Rules of Exorcism

n. ¶622.

I. SOLEMN adjuration against a demon can be done by the ministers of the Church alone, and not without the permission of the Bishop. The Bishop can permit it even in doubt concerning diabolical possession, provided a grave cause is present, all scandal is guarded against, and the matter does not redound to contempt of the Church. Concerning the mode of proceeding, see the Roman Ritual, and St. Alph., l. III, 193, App. See also the formula issued by command of the Supreme Pontiff Leo XIII on Jan. 17, 1902 (App. Rit. Rom.).

We note only two things here: 1. Exorcism is to be employed only for removing harms and the vexation of the possessed person. The demon can be questioned only about those things which conduce to his expulsion, for example about the time and cause of possession. Hence he would sin gravely who should have many useless conversations with the possessing demon; but venially, if he should ask one or another curious question in an imperative mode. 2. Exorcisms obtain an infallible effect, and as if from the work worked. But if they do not always obtain the perfect effect, they obtain at least an imperfect effect, namely by weakening the powers of demons (III, 193, end).

II. PRIVATE adjuration of a demon is licit to all, and especially to ministers of the Church; nor is the special permission of the Bishop required for it. - As regards the FORMULA of exorcism, behold what kind St. Alphonsus advises to be recited (Prax. Conf., n. 113) over those whom the demon harasses with extraordinary temptations: I, as a minister of God, command thee, or you, unclean spirits, that ye depart from this creature of God. - The venerable Servant of God Vincent Pallotti used even private exorcism when he noticed that penitents were not sorry for sins, or were concealing some sin; and he also commended its use to confessors, adding that exorcism is to be employed with great confidence and humility (Muller, § 62, n. 5).

As regards the SIGNS of true possession, cf. Rit. Rom., tit. X. They are: to speak an unknown tongue in many words, or to understand one speaking; to disclose distant and hidden things; to show strength above the nature of age or condition; and other things of that kind, which, when very many concur, are greater indications.

…and 31 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 1 passage

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. II, Q. I, Ch. II, Article V. On the Oath

n. 436.

436. Preliminary. Among the ways of worshiping God there is also the invocation of the divine name. The divine name is invoked in three ways: 1. by way of an oath, for confirming the speaker's own words; 2. by way of adjuration, for inducing others to do or omit something; 3. by way of invocation, for praying and especially for praising God. In this article we treat of the invocation of the divine name through an oath; in the following article, however, adjuration and the invocation of the divine name will be treated. But concerning prayer enough has already been said above.

This article is divided into four paragraphs: 1. on the notion and division of an oath; 2. on the lawfulness of an oath and its requisite conditions; 3. on the obligation of an oath; 4. on the violation of an oath, or perjury.

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 14 passages

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, CHAPTER II: ON OATH

n. ¶365.

- Definition. An oath is an invocation of the divine Name in testimony of truth.

Division. An oath is distinguished:

1° Assertory, by which present or past things are affirmed or denied, or promissory, which extends itself only to future things. Although not every oath concerning the future is promissory. For a twofold oath concerning the future is distinguished by Doctors: one bare and simple, which contains no promise toward another, for example if you swear that you will not enter this house or tavern, etc.; but another is promissory, which is confirmatory of a promise either toward God, which is a sworn vow, or toward one's neighbor, which adds to the obligation of justice or fidelity arising from the promise an obligation from the virtue of religion.

2° Solemn, or simple, according as it is done in the form required by law, or with solemn ceremonies, or with these excluded.

3° Explicit, or implicit, according as God is expressly invoked as witness, or creatures are employed as testimony in which the divine attributes especially shine forth.

4° Contestatory, or execratory or imprecatory, according as God is invoked as witness alone, or as witness and at the same time avenger of perjury.

Yet according to the common opinion all oaths are of the same species.¹

An oath clothed with due conditions is honorable and licit, and, if it is promissory, obligates in conscience, unless a just cause stands in the way, or its obligation has legitimately ceased. - Thus all;² and it is established both from the definition of the Council of Constance, session 8, against Wycliffe (p. IX), and from the universal practice of the Church and of peoples, and also from various places of Sacred Scripture. Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God... and shalt swear by His name.³

The obligation of swearing presses as often as an oath is either necessary for helping one's neighbor, or is legitimately exacted by a Superior.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, ARTICLE I: ON THE CONDITIONS OF AN OATH

n. ¶366.

I. On the requisites for the essence of an oath. - 366. - Two things are required for an oath, namely: 1° The intention of swearing, at least virtual; because without such intention there cannot exist a formal oath. 2° An oath-formula, either by God explicitly, or implicitly by creatures, or an oath-sign; because, since God is invoked as witness, it is necessary that this be expressed in the oath.⁴

n. ¶367.

You will resolve. - 1° A fictitious promissory oath, or one merely external, is not valid, because of defect of will or intention. Yet he who thus swears sins; but more probably, speaking of itself, only venially, because it is nothing but a lie with vain usurpation of the name of God.⁵ - Nevertheless it is mortal in contracts, or before a judge (because of grave deception against justice), or if the one swearing fictitiously does not have the mind of fulfilling the promises.⁶

2° An oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obligating oneself from religion, more probably is not valid, because this is nugatory. But an oath made with the mind indeed of swearing, but not of obligating oneself from justice or from fidelity, is valid.

3° It is an oath to say: I swear by God, by the Saints, the temple, the cross, the altar, the Gospel, the Catholic Faith, the Church, heaven, earth. - Likewise to say: I call God to witness.... Let God be witness to me.... I invoke God as witness. Otherwise, if someone swore by creatures in which the divine goodness or power does not shine forth, for example by a beard, etc.¹

4° It is not an oath to say: God knows.... I speak before God, etc.... if these are uttered narratively; but otherwise, if invocatively, which is discerned from the circumstances or the intention of the speaker. Nor is it an oath to say: This is as true as God exists,... as I exist,... as I am in this place,... on the faith of an honest man (upon my word and honor), by my faith,... by my conscience,... by priestly faith,... may I die, or may the devil destroy me, unless it be so.... Except when these last two are uttered by way of execration, and not rather, as is customary, by way of pledge. Indeed it is not even an oath to say: I swear or I swear that it is so, unless a question about giving an oath has preceded. - St. Alphonsus,² and many others.

II. On the requisites for the liceity of an oath.

n. ¶368.

- A threefold condition is required for the liceity of an oath according to that saying of Jeremiah:¹ Thou shalt swear: The Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice.

I. Therefore Truth is required, that is: conformity of the assertion with intention and not with the fact. For an oath excludes only lying, not every error. In an assertory oath truth regards the existence of the fact; in a promissory oath the existence of the intention.

II. Judgment, that is, that it be done with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence, and not without necessity or a just cause.

III. Justice, that is, that the oath be about a just, licit, and honorable thing. Thus he would swear against justice who by oath would obligate himself to inflict damage unjustly on his neighbor, or to furnish something else prohibited.

n. ¶369.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° What is a sufficient cause for swearing?

Resp. Any honorable cause of some weight, for example peace to be confirmed in families, greater security in contracts, etc.¹

Quaer. 2° Is it licit to swear with probability of truth?

Resp. Negatively, because God cannot be invoked except in testimony of a certain thing; nevertheless a certain moral certainty, or sole probability, suffices.²

Quaer. 3° Is it licit to swear with mental restriction?

Resp. Negatively, if it is purely mental; but otherwise, if it is broadly mental, and a just cause is present, which nevertheless ought to be greater than that which is required for an unsworn restriction, and greater in proportion as the words furnish greater occasion of erring.⁴ See what is to be said n. 513-515.

Quaer. 4° Is it licit to swear, touching and kissing Protestant Bibles, when they have been presented to us by magistrates?

Resp. Negatively, of itself, as is plain; hence one about to swear is accustomed to bring Catholic Bibles or a prayerbook in which some part of Sacred Scripture is contained. For the rest, solemn affirmation among us suffices. I said: Negatively, of itself, because ignorance often excuses. Collect. p. 630 n. 1180.

Quaer. 5° Is it licit to give an oath in public disturbances of the commonwealth?

Resp. This generally depends on the circumstances. Weigh what justice or the common good postulates, and what the obligations required by the oath are, whether positive or negative. - But especially it is expedient to consult ecclesiastical Superiors, to whom it belongs to define what, according to the various circumstances, is to be done.

n. ¶370.

- Quaer. 6° What kind of sin is it to swear without truth, judgment, and justice?

Resp. to the first. It is mortal, because to bring God forward in testimony of falsity is to will to destroy His veracity. It is established also from Proposition 24 condemned by Innocent XI (see p. XV). L. IV. 147.

Resp. to the second. It is venial of itself, that is, with the danger of perjury excluded;⁵ because it is only vain usurpation of the name of God. - Thus almost all, even the stricter authors.

Resp. to the third. An assertory oath must be distinguished from a promissory one. In the former, for instance if someone boasts with an oath about some sin, more probably there is only a venial sin against religion, because it is not done to confirm complacency in sin, but only to make others more certain about it, which is only a certain venial levity of soul. Except, however, an oath for confirming detraction; for it is employed as a means for making another's infamy more certain. In the latter oath it is certainly mortal, if there is question of a grave matter, as is plain; if of a light matter, St. Alphonsus¹ is more pleased by the opinion which affirms that even in this case one sins mortally, because it seems to be a grave irreverence to invoke God as witness and surety of sin, even light sin.

You will resolve. - 1° Among prohibited oaths are listed those which are customarily emitted in secret societies, and by which members obligate themselves to obey those things which perhaps will be ordered by certain superiors, or to keep secrecy even against legitimate power.² See n. 1721. 1°. d).

Yet there are certain societies of workers in which an oath is emitted, or is judged to be emitted, with a restriction, that it is licit to reveal its object to the Ordinary or to a priest; and these, indeed, if the oath contains nothing else which is opposed to justice, and the society is not illicit from elsewhere, are not to be disturbed. See n. 1721. 1).

2° The oath of preserving the Constitution of the United States is to be understood in the popular sense, which, namely, is received among all; for each person is not judged to embrace with judgment of mind whatever is contained in it, nor does the Constitution obligate to this.³ Nor is a law to be called evil, but good, which permits a lesser evil that it may prevent a greater one. Moulart, L'Eglise et L'Etat.

3° The oath of foreigners seeking the right of citizenship here is licit, even for him who shall have given an oath of fidelity to the prince from whom he departed. For that oath of fidelity was exacted for confirming the natural obligation of citizens, rather than for inducing a new one, and therefore it must be explained according to the nature of that obligation, by which no one, unless a public and grave cause presses, is bound to remain in his fatherland, and which he satisfies who obeys the prince while he dwells in his domain. But as regards the oath which is given here by foreigners seeking the right of citizenship, and by which every foreign prince is abjured, and consequently also that one from whom someone departed, it is understood of that natural obligation being abjured which, by departing from his domain, has already ceased; and therefore it cannot be called illicit.

4° He who, while war is raging among some nations, brings goods under a neutral flag and documents either fictitious or purposely made into a neutral port, so that thence they may be carried to one or the other of the nations which wage war between themselves, is sometimes compelled to swear that the documents are true. Such an oath cannot be given in the case. (o) p. 473.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. II, ARTICLE II: ON THE OBLIGATION OF A PROMISSORY OATH

n. ¶371.

Principles. - I. Every promissory oath concerning a licit and honorable thing, besides the obligation of justice or fidelity which arises from a simple promise, also induces an obligation of Religion. The reason is that the promise already obligates of itself, and it is confirmed and strengthened by divine testimony invoked. - But an oath concerning an illicit or wholly useless thing does not obligate at all, because an oath, as an act of Religion, cannot be a bond of iniquity or of an idle thing.

II. The obligation of an oath is to be interpreted strictly, and follows the nature of the act or contract to which it is added, and all its conditions. The reason for the first is that the one swearing is judged to have willed to obligate himself as little as he could; but the reason for the other is that the oath does not change the nature of the act, but adds to it only the obligation of Religion, and hence ought to have the same conditions and limitations.

III. The obligation of an oath is moreover to be interpreted according to the tacit conditions included or understood in it, which are: 1° if I shall be able without grave damage; 2° if the matter shall not have been notably changed; 3° if the rights or will of the Superior do not stand in the way; 4° if the other shall have preserved reciprocal faith; 5° unless the other cedes from his right.¹

n. ¶372.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is smallness of matter given in the transgression of a promissory oath?

Resp. The FIRST OPINION denies, because not only a simple promise is violated, but a sworn promise. Therefore in any matter whatsoever grave injury is inflicted on God, whose testimony has been invoked in vain by the one swearing. - Bonacina, Lessius, Toletus.

The SECOND OPINION affirms, because in a promissory oath God is not properly brought forward as witness of the future execution of the thing promised, but only of the actual promise, or of the true intention of executing the promise. - Suarez, Navarrus, Laymann, etc. - St. Alphonsus in the Work² says each opinion is probable; but in the Homo apostolicus³ he adheres more to the second opinion.

Quaer. 2° Does a promissory oath emitted by error or deceit obligate?

Resp. Negatively, if the error or deceit concerns the substance of the thing; but otherwise if it affects only its accidental adjuncts; because a simple contract would be invalid in the former case, but not in the latter. St. Alphonsus.⁴ Yet the same St. Alphonsus⁵ notes that the opposite opinion is probable when the error or deceit concerns those circumstances which, although accidental, if they had been known from the beginning, would have deterred from the oath and promise.

n. ¶373.

- Quaer. 3° Does a promissory oath extorted by grave and unjust fear obligate?

Resp. It is disputed. The more common OPINION, and in St. Alphonsus⁶ by far the more probable, affirms, because an oath, acceding to a contract not invalid of itself, must be preserved from Religion as often as it can be preserved without sin. But the one who has suffered fear can either rescind the contract by force of laws, or seek relaxation of the oath, that he may be excused from the obligation of paying; but if he has already paid, he can demand back in court what he gave, or compensate himself secretly.⁷ Cf. n. 867.

Quaer. 4° How does the obligation of an oath cease?

Resp. 1° It ceases intrinsically, as a law does, by cessation of the motive cause (n. 165).

Resp. 2° It ceases extrinsically by irritation, commutation, and dispensation, as a vow does, concerning which we shall speak in the following chapter. It also ceases by relaxation or remission of the obligation made by him in whose favor the sworn promise was emitted, because anyone can yield from his own right.

n. ¶374.

You will resolve. - 1° He who swore an evil thing is never obligated by the oath; indeed he sins doubly if he fulfills the oath, namely against Religion and against the virtue to which the matter of the oath is opposed.¹

2° He who confirmed a prodigal promise by swearing is not obligated by the oath, because that promise is at least lightly evil. - Thus Suarez, the Salmanticenses, and others commonly with St. Alphonsus, who admits this as more probable.²

3° He who swore that he promised marriage to a rich, healthy, virgin girl of good reputation is not obligated if she falls into poverty, infirmity, infamy, or fornication, because then the simple promise does not obligate.³

4° He does not sin against the oath who, for the sake of civility, swore that he would not sit, drink, enter the house, etc. before another, if compelled by the other he sits, drinks, or enters first; because generally an oath of this sort is null from defect of intention of swearing; or, if it is valid, it is relaxed by the other.⁴

5° He does not sin who reveals a sworn secret when the law itself of the secret ceases to obligate; because an oath, as we said, follows the nature of the act to which it is joined.

6° Parents rarely sin when not fulfilling an oath of punishing children, because generally the oath concerns a useless thing, or rather disordered vengeance; added to this is that the delinquents either are already corrected, or at least have promised amendment.⁵

7° Generally merchants also do not seem to be bound by an oath not to sell for less, or not to buy for more; either because oaths of this kind are, for the most part, concerning a useless thing, or because those men do not have the mind of swearing, or certainly because in the oath there is the tacit condition, unless matters seem to go better otherwise. - Thus more commonly.

8° The oath by which alumni of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide bind themselves (see p. LXXIII, note 2), and those who here or elsewhere are ordained to the title of the American Mission, that they will not enter any Religion or Congregation without permission of the Holy See, is valid, since it is in favor of a third party.¹ Besides, the condition added, without permission of the Holy See, causes no one to be prohibited absolutely from entering Religion. (x) p. 473.

But it is violated: 1) if someone, when the Bishop commands, should refuse to receive the Orders of diaconate or priesthood; 2) if he should refuse to betake himself to that place of the diocese in which the Bishop shall have judged that he ought to labor unto the salvation of souls; 3) if through his whole life he is unwilling to remain in the same diocese, or employs crafts and deceits to withdraw himself from the authority of the Bishop, or by this manner of acting introduces for the Bishop the necessity of dismissing him; 4) if he enters a religious Order without due permission.

Yet they are not to be judged to sin: a) subdeacons who, by the counsel of a confessor or agitated by scruples, would be unwilling to be promoted to the diaconate, or deacons who for the same reason would be unwilling to be promoted to the priesthood; b) those who for a grave cause seek leave of passing to another diocese; c) those who, knowing themselves not suitable, either from defect of knowledge, or because of infirmity of soul, decline the burden of laboring in the vineyard of the Lord; yet they ought not to trust their own judgment against the mind of the Bishop and confessor.²

9° Oaths imposed for securing observance of odious laws, or laws which are of strict interpretation, as, for example, those which pertain to customs duties and other burdens, are to be reduced to the narrowest limits which the words allow.³ - Resolve the same if those laws were unjust or are deservedly presumed unjust.⁴

For one or the other of these reasons, and often for both, those seem to be excused from perjury who see to it that a double document (invoice) of the goods which they have bought, for example from Europe, be permitted to themselves: one in which the lesser price of the goods is described, another in which the greater is noted; and, with only the former exhibited, swear that they bought at the price which is reported in this former one, provided nevertheless that the formula of the oath is not of such a kind as to preclude the possibility of broad mental restriction.

It happens besides that a merchant who paid the duties defined by law could scarcely gain anything by trading for the support of himself and his own, and this for the reason that either the duty is really excessive, or defrauding the duty as to this kind of merchandise has become common, from which it has come about that merchandise of this sort, if the whole duty is paid, cannot be sold at the price at which, because of common defrauding, it is generally sold. Such a merchant also seems to be excused, if he swears with words used in the strictest sense which they allow;¹ for in these cases the tax law has become unjust, either because it imposes an excessive burden, or because practically, namely from the fact that it is preserved by almost no one, it would burden too much the merchants who preserved it.

Nevertheless officials sin most gravely who, against the oath by which they have bound themselves, accept gifts so that they allow goods to be brought in immune from duty or under a duty lower than that which has justly been established.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON CONTRACTS, FIRST PART: ON CONTRACTS I…, Ch. III, ARTICLE I: ON AN OATH ADJOINED TO A CONTRACT

n. ¶864.

- An oath, as it is taken here, is the calling of God as witness of those things which are promised by contract. The obligation of an oath differs from the obligation of a contract also in this, that the obligation of an oath affects and binds immediately the person of the swearer, whence it does not pass to heirs; but the obligation of a contract confers on the other a strict right, or right of property, affecting the goods of the contracting party, and therefore the whole obligation passes to heirs.

n. ¶865.

Principles. - I. Contracts void by natural right are not strengthened by an oath. The reason is that an oath is an act altogether extrinsic to the contract, and therefore can in no way supply its force. Hence the axiom: An oath follows the nature of the act.

II. Nor are contracts ipso facto void by positive right strengthened by an oath if they are invalidated directly on account of the public good. The reason is that then the oath would be against the common good, and therefore an immoral bond, which God, the author of society, cannot sanction. But those void only in favor of the promisors must indeed be observed from the virtue of religion until the oath is relaxed, yet not from justice.¹

III. An oath is always invalid whenever it cannot be observed without sin of the one swearing. The reason is that an oath cannot be a bond of iniquity, nor can it obligate against good morals. - Thus all Theologians.

n. ¶866.

Questions. - Query 1° Does an oath strengthen contracts, not indeed those void by positive law, but those only rescindible?

Resp. According to the mind of St. Alphonsus,² it must be answered that the oath and contract must be observed from the virtue of religion (not from justice) even in the case in which rescindibility was introduced with regard for the public good. Thus he says a contract must be observed by a minor who swore that he would restore a loan for consumption, although the dissolubility of this contract was introduced with regard for the public good. It is also clear from the Response to the Question immediately following.

n. ¶867.

- Query 2° Are oaths extorted by fear valid for strengthening contracts void by fear?

Resp. The more common Opinion, and by far the more probable to St. Alphonsus,³ affirms, in the case in which the law does not at the same time void the contract on account of the public good. The reason is sought from the 3rd Principle. But he who swore thus can either obtain relaxation of the oath, or, after the performance of the thing concerning which contract was made, seek it back in judgment, or secretly compensate himself for it.¹

Merkelbach, Pastoral Questions

Benedict H. Merkelbach, O.P. — 15 passages

Ch. II, Section A. Concerning Cert…, Question II: Concerning Sins Against Reverence for God

n. ¶4645.

VII. Notions and principles concerning the morality of an oath. - An oath is the invocation of the divine name in testimony of truth, whether this is done directly, by immediately invoking God, or indirectly by means of creatures considered in relation to God (for example by faith, the cross, the Gospel, etc.); whether God is invoked as witness for manifesting truth (a contestatory or invocatory oath), or also as judge for punishing falsity (an execratory oath), as in the very well-known oath: so I swear, so may God help me.

n. ¶4646.

On the part of matter, an oath can be merely assertory if only an affirmation is stated, or also promissory if a promise is also affirmed.

n. ¶4647.

Now:

n. ¶4648.

Three conditions are required for the liceity of an oath:

n. ¶4649.

a) Truth, which excludes not material error but lying, so that the assertion is conformed to the actual mind of the one swearing, and the promise is also made with the present intention of fulfilling it.

n. ¶4650.

b) Justice or honesty, so that the assertion made under oath is lawful, or also the thing promised itself.

n. ¶4651.

c) Judgment or discretion, so that the oath is not made vainly and lightly but on account of a grave motive, and moreover the thing promised is in the power of the one swearing.

n. ¶4652.

A fictitious oath without the intention of swearing, the first two conditions being verified, is reduced to an oath without judgment, as the expression usual among us: by God.

n. ¶4653.

If some condition is lacking, to swear is a sin; and indeed:

n. ¶4654.

a) A false oath, without truth, is mortal sin from its whole genus, because it is grave direct irreverence against God, who is supposed either not to know something or to be able to testify to falsity; this is perjury strictly so called.

n. ¶4655.

b) An iniquitous oath, without justice, if it is promissory, is mortal sin, because it makes God the patron of sin; if it is merely assertory, it is of itself venial, unless it is directly used as a means of sinning, for example to affirm impure love in order to seduce a girl, because this is to make God a cooperator in sin.

n. ¶4656.

c) An incautious oath, without judgment, is of itself venial, and is not mortal except by reason of scandal or danger.

n. ¶4657.

VIII. Observations. - 1. One who accuses himself of oaths is to be questioned concerning what words he used, especially if he is unlearned. For often they say that they have sworn when they have simply affirmed something more firmly without any intention of invoking God as witness, for example by saying: God knows; God sees my conscience; I speak before God; it is as true as I sit, as the sun shines, as God, as the Gospel; I swear; I expose my head, may my ears be cut off if it is not so; indeed by my soul (mijn ziel), because ordinarily they do not regard the special relation between the soul and God. All these things of themselves are not oaths; unless nevertheless someone wished to invoke God as witness or avenger.

n. ¶4658.

In this matter, the formulas and common estimation must be attended to most of all, for there are usual formulas which are not oath-formulas, and, on the contrary, there are truly oath-formulas which by common estimation are not such.

n. ¶4659.

Since the whole matter depends upon the intention of the one swearing, the confessor a) should question him clearly, not indeed: whether he wished to swear (jurer, zweren), but more distinctly: whether he wished to offer an oath (faire serment, zijnen eed doen); b) should teach that for an oath there is required the intention of invoking God as witness; c) should turn him away from using formulas even doubtful and uttered without the intention of swearing, on account of irreverence toward God and the danger of scandal and deception.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 30 passages

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section B: On the Acts of …, Ch. IV, Question One: On Oath, Article I: On the Essence and Object of an Oath

S. Th. II-II, q. 89, a. 1, 4, 6.

n. 742.

742. Oath (serment; eed) is said from right, because it was introduced for right or law, among all nations, so that what is said under invocation of divine testimony may be held as true; therefore to swear (eed doen of zweren) is to appeal to God as witness of some matter, or, as St. Thomas says, a. 1, "to assume God as witness." Whence oath is defined: Invocation of divine testimony, or with the Code (can. 1316): "the invocation of the divine Name as witness of truth."

n. 742.

Therefore the end of an oath is the confirmation of truth. Confirmation in the sciences is made through reason, which proceeds from evident things to conclusions; there witnesses and oath are not employed: for one would seem ridiculous if, in the disputation of some science, he wished to prove what was proposed by an oath. But the particular and contingent facts of men cannot be confirmed through reason (from intrinsic causes), and therefore they are accustomed to be confirmed through witnesses. Human testimony, however, is not always sufficient for confirming these things, on account of defect of veracity or knowledge, and therefore it was necessary to have recourse to divine testimony, because God can neither lie nor be ignorant of anything (a. 1).

n. 742.

But one swearing does not ask that God here and now testify to the truth of the statement by an actual sign (for that would commonly be tempting God), but when and how it pleases Him, at least in the future judgment (a. 2, ad 3), or that He punish most gravely one swearing falsely (a. 1, ad 3). And yet the invocation serves to produce faith immediately among men, because someone is not easily judged to be of such impiety and boldness that he would make God a witness of falsehood and subject himself to divine vengeance.

743. An oath is an invocation; therefore it is an act of reason: an interior speech, which nevertheless presupposes an act of the will, namely, at least the implicit intention of swearing and of calling God as witness.

Hence an oath is not:

a) An invocation pronounced indeliberately by him who does not know what an oath is, or by him who is ignorant of the sense of the words or does not advert sufficiently: an unconscious oath.

b) Nor an invocation pronounced merely materially in circumstances which exclude every intention of invocation, for example, if it is made in school or in a theater for the sake of teaching or representing, or by way of interjection as in common speech, by God (for example, par Dieu, c'est vrai): a narrated oath.

c) Nor a deliberate but merely external invocation without intention: a fictitious oath, for example, by him who does not admit the existence of God.

For a human act does not operate beyond the intention of the agent. But an oath must be a human act, not only insofar as it is speech, but also insofar as it is an invocation of God as witness: for invocation can be made for a diverse end. Therefore, in order that it be made for a witness, the intention of uttering words and expressing an invocation of divine testimony does not suffice, but the will of invoking God as witness is required. A fictitious oath is an irreligious lie, of itself venial, sometimes mortal because of grave public or private harm, as in judgments and contracts.¹

¹ Hence condemned by Innocent XI is proposition 25: "With cause it is licit to swear without the mind of swearing, whether the matter is light or grave."

A merely internal oath, although it is valid before God, as if someone invokes Him internally as witness that he wishes firmly to avoid sin, nevertheless does not obtain its effect of confirming assertions and promises before men, whence it is incomplete; likewise if someone, intending to swear, uses a formula wholly unfit for this. Therefore, in order that an oath be complete, it must be expressed by some oath formula; and therefore on the part of the mode by which the invocation is expressed, it is divided into verbal, real, and mixed, according as it is expressed either by words or by signs (the raising of fingers, the touching of a scepter, cross, or gospels), or by both.

744. An oath is the invocation of testimony or an appeal as witness of truth.

Hence a) it is not the invocation of the merciful and omnipotent God by way of prayer and supplication for obtaining some good, favor, or help, even, for example, for showing truth or conciliating faith for ourselves; but it is the invocation of the infinitely true God for obtaining testimony for confirmation, by which, insofar as it is in us, we constitute Him witness, that is, we cite Him and consent that He be witness, if He wills.

b) Nor is it the invocation of Sacred Scripture to confirm doctrine: for it is one thing to use testimony already given, another to invoke the testimony of God as to be exhibited (a. 1, ad 1).

c) Nor is it a simple assertion of divine omniscience, as in the expressions: I speak before God; God hears me; He knows that I speak the truth; God is witness; God will testify in His own time; God is truth; the Lord lives; the Lord sees my conscience, etc.; unless they are pronounced not only narratively and enunciatively, but invocatively, as the Apostle, Gal. I, 20: Behold before God, that I do not lie...

d) Nor is it a simple comparison of the asserted truth with an evident truth, for example, it is as true as God exists, as the sun shines, as I sit here (as in Dutch waarachtig Gods), or with a truth of faith, for example, it is true as the Gospel, after the likeness of faith, as infallible as the Church: in which case nevertheless ordinarily some irreverence toward God or sacred things will not be lacking.

e) Nor is it a simple vehement affirmation as in the expressions: in truth, by my faith (that is, human faith), in conscience, by my conscience, by the conscience of my soul (for example, ma foi, ma parole d'honneur; op mijn woord).

f) Nor is it a simple wager or obligation of a penalty, for example, if it is false, I pledge my head; I wish to be a thief; let me be a heretic; let my ears be taken off; let me be killed, hanged, die; let the devil take me; ... by damnation, come here, etc.; unless God is invoked as witness of truth and at the same time avenger of falsehood.

On the part of the testimony which is sought, an oath is merely contestatory or directly invocatory (getuigeniseed) if God is invoked only as witness for manifesting truth; or indirectly, namely, execratory or imprecatory (vervloekings- of verwenschingseed) if He is also invoked as avenger for punishing falsehood. This often happens if He is expressly named, for example, if I lie, may God punish me, destroy me, damn me..., or if the evil is commonly regarded as proceeding specially from divine providence, for example, if I lie, may lightning from heaven strike me, may I descend into hell (a. 1, ad 3).

745. An oath is the invocation of divine testimony or of the divine name. Hence he does not swear 1. who does not say whom he invokes, for example, I swear that it is so, unless from the circumstances it is clear that he intends God, for example, if the demand for an oath preceded; nor 2. he who invokes false gods; nor 3. he who appeals to men as witnesses; or 4. even to the saints, stopping at their testimony: for this is nothing but an act of dulia.

Yet a) if a creature is invoked insofar as it belongs and is referred to its Author, and represents His supreme truth and majesty, the Creator who shines forth in creatures is implicitly and mediately invoked, for example, if someone swears by heaven, by the holy faith, by the cross, by the Gospels, by the sacraments, by the temple, by the saints, by relics, or by other nobler creatures which commonly are regarded insofar as they have a special relation to God; but by baser creatures no one is judged to swear, nor would that be licit because of irreverence.

Similarly b) if someone obliges himself or something pertaining to himself to a penalty and offers it to God as avenger of falsehood, there is an execratory oath in which God is implicitly invoked as witness and avenger, for example, I swear by my head, by my son, by my salvation... Such an oath is the expression by my soul (II Cor. I, 23), unless nevertheless, as often happens, the faithful do not advert to the special relation of the soul to God.

Diss. I, Chapter I — What God commands, or forbids, by this second precept of the Decalogue, is explained · Diss. I, Chapter III — Propositions are reviewed which, holding the oath cheap, the Church has proscribed. Innocent XI condemned them · Diss. I, Chapter IV — Lax, or improbable, propositions are reviewed, which not a few Casuists teach

On the part of Him by whom one swears, an oath is explicit or immediate, or implicit or mediate (a. 6).

n. 746.

746. Famous is the division of oath into assertory and promissory, which is taken on the part of the object or matter, according as an oath turns upon the assertion or affirmation of the one swearing concerning the present, for example, I think it is so, I am incapable of paying, or concerning the past, for example, I did this, or upon an action or omission to be executed by the one swearing in the future. In the first case it is assertory (bevestigende of bloote eed), in the other promissory (belovende of verbindende eed).

n. 746.

In a promissory oath 1. God is invoked to testify to the present intention of the one swearing to do what he proposes; whence it includes an assertion concerning the present and adds a purpose concerning the future, and therefore when we distinguish an assertory oath from a promissory one, we understand it as merely assertory. 2. Nevertheless God is not invoked as witness of the future execution, for testimony is not given about a thing not yet done;² nevertheless 3. God is as it were the patron,³ who gives special authority and force to the promise and urges its execution by a special obligation of religion: for just as men promise or enter betrothals before a king, judge, or other man of great authority, who lends authority to the contract, so that they understand that they would do injury to him if they do not fulfill the promises, so also they promise with God invoked; but if they do not fulfill, they inflict injury upon Him. Whence by such an oath God is invoked that He may confirm the present sincere will and bind it lest it be changed in the future.

² Although future things are present before God, nevertheless by oath there is not asked from God testimony concerning a future thing as it is present to Him, but as it is in the word of the one promising. But in this way testimony does not fall upon the word except insofar as it is capable of truth when it is spoken; therefore with respect to a future deed God is not invoked as witness. Suarez, De Religione, l. I, c. 9, n. 25.

³ Others say surety, but "this word... we cannot take in the strict sense, in which he is called a surety who answers for another so as to take upon himself the burden of paying the promise in defect of another." Dignant, De Virtute religionis, n. 221.

n. 746.

A promissory oath is a) strictly promissory or accessory when the action which is sworn is truly promised, whether to God by vow (a sworn vow), or to man (a sworn deed), or to both (a sworn vow in favor of a third party); or b) broadly promissory or standing of itself when the action is not promised but only proposed, whether for another's honor or favor (an oath confirmatory of a purpose or a sworn purpose), or for penalty or vengeance (a comminatory oath; bedreigingseed).

n. 747.

747. An oath is an act of religion. For nothing is confirmed except by something which is more certain and more excellent; therefore he who invokes divine testimony to confirm what he says, by this very fact professes God to be more excellent, as one whose truth is indefectible and whose knowledge is universal, and thus he exhibits reverence to God. But to reverence God belongs to religion; therefore. Cf. Deut. VI, 13; Ps. LXII, 12; Hebr. VI, 13-16.

n. 747.

All oaths in the account of oath are of the same species, because since the account of oath consists essentially in the invocation of God, all the differences brought forward above, or diverse modes of invocation, are related materially and per accidens to God's testification, and consequently do not change its essence and species.⁴ - Nevertheless other species can accede, for example, of fidelity, justice, dulia, and if the oath is sinful, of blasphemy, injustice, scandal, etc.

⁴ Nor is a promissory oath distinguished in species because one thing is to invoke God as witness of present truth, and another as patron of future execution. For in an oath the testimony of God and His authority are not invoked distinctly and separately, but God is invoked as testifying to the present intention and consequently He urges the future execution, because the matter concerns a future thing promised; which returns to a material difference. Dignant, o. c., n. 246.

n. 748.

748. Practical observations. - 1. In doubt concerning the intention of the one swearing, judgment is to be made from the circumstances, for example, whether the demand for an oath preceded, whether the one swearing is accustomed to swear, etc., but especially from the words employed: if the formula from its proper sense and common usage is oath-like, and was pronounced advertently, an oath is presumed; if it is doubtfully oath-like, it is not presumed but must be proved; but if it is ambiguous and the intention is not established, an oath is not judged to be present.

n. 748.

By the prescription of the Church, "an oath which the canons require or admit cannot validly be furnished through a proxy" (can. 1316, § 2).

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 1 passage

Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the Second Precept of t…, Chapter II. On Oath

n. 222.

An oath is the invocation of the divine Name as witness of truth; and it is distinguished in many ways, namely:

1st. Assertory or promissory, according as it is assumed for asserting things present or past, or for confirming something future. But this is called promissory, not because every oath concerning the future contains a promise, but either because more often it is ordered to confirming that, or because, even with any pact excluded, it is equivalent to a promise, insofar as it induces the obligation of carrying out the sworn proposal.

2nd. Solemn or simple, according as it is made in the form required by law, and with solemn ceremonies, or with these excluded.

3rd. Explicit or implicit, according as God is expressly invoked as witness, or creatures are employed in testimony in which divine attributes specially shine forth.

4th. Attestatory or execratory or imprecatory, according as the one swearing invokes God only as witness, or also as avenger of perjury.

Concina, Theologia Christiana III

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 39 passages

Diss. I, Chapter I — What God commands, or forbids, by this second precept of the Decalogue, is explained

I. St. Thomas explains the threefold sense in which the name of God can be used, in these words (II-II, q. 89, in the proem of that same question): "We must now treat of the taking of the divine name. Now the divine name is taken by man in three ways. In one way, by manner of oath, for the confirmation of one's own words; in another way, by manner of adjuration, to induce another; in a third way, by manner of invocation, to pray, or to praise. Of these three we too, following the Angelic Doctor's words, shall have our discourse." For the rest, St. Thomas explains more broadly the several modes by which the name of God can be used in vain. But because our discourse will also be of the various formulas of oaths, we make progress toward explaining these too.

n. II.

II. Wherefore, since God forbids his name to be usurped in vain, he at the same time commands that this same holy name be honored by us, and that, through it, we swear justly, holily, and with the highest reverence. This precept of the Decalogue, then, contains two things. First, it forbids anyone to despise, pollute, or use the most sacred name of God vainly, or without necessity; and it forbids that anyone swear by it falsely, or rashly, or recklessly. Second, it commands us to praise, venerate, and honor that same holy name with the utmost obedience. This the Catechism of the Council of Trent, on the second commandment, teaches perspicuously (ch. 10): "What this commands, again, and what it forbids, are these: that the name of God is to be honored, and by it holily to be sworn — but that no one is to despise or use the divine name in vain, nor swear by it falsely, or rashly, or recklessly."

n. III.

III. The divine name, to which we are commanded to show honor and worship, is not taken merely according to the syllables and letters, or the sound of the voice, but as to what the name itself signifies. Now the name to be sworn by, chiefly according to this, betrays the divine majesty and its infinite attributes... . Whatever name, then, expresses the immense majesty of God, we are bound to render honor to those names. For frequently, in the divine Scriptures, God is called Lord, Omnipotent, Most High, Highest, King of Kings, Just, Father of mercies, and by other names, under all of which he is to be honored by us. Wherefore the Catechism of Trent rightly reproves, in the place cited, the superstition of the Jews, in these words: "From this it is easily gathered how empty is the superstition of certain Jews, who dared not pronounce the name of God, as though they were writing it, as if there were some power in those four letters, and not in the divine reality itself."

n. IV.

IV. We praise and honor God, then, when we confess him in the sight of all; when we proclaim his goodness, justice, wisdom, and mercy; when we acknowledge him as the author and maker of all things; when we learn his law and commandments, and strive to carry them out. We honor the divine name when, whether in prosperous or adverse events, we render thanks to God... , as Micah says: "Blessed be the name of the Lord"; or, with David (Psalm 33): "I will bless the Lord at all times: his praise shall be always in my mouth." We further honor the divine name when we implore his aid, that he may free us from evil, preserve us from temptations, and render us strong and steadfast in bearing all calamities, and persevering in the way of virtue. Finally, we worship the name of God when we call God himself as witness, necessity requiring it, to confirm the truth to unbelievers, according to that saying (Deuteronomy 6): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve him only, and thou shalt swear by his name." If you wish more on this subject, consult Natalis Alexander (Bk. IV, ch. 4), where he explains more fully what the Catechism of Trent teaches, in the place cited, §3.

Diss. I, Chapter III — Propositions are reviewed which, holding the oath cheap, the Church has proscribed. Innocent XI condemned them

I. Among the sixty-five propositions which... Innocent XI, in the year... four or five (for one pertains directly to amphibologies) touch upon the matter of the oath. They are the following, which I will transcribe here in the order in which they are listed in the pontifical decree.

n. 24.

24. To call God to witness to a light lie is not so great an irreverence as to warrant that one should be unwilling, or unable, to condemn a man for it.

n. 15.

15. When there is a just cause, it is lawful to swear without intending that one should be believed, whether the matter be light or grave.

n. 16.

16. If someone, whether alone, or in the presence of others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other purpose, swears that he did not do something which he really did, understanding within himself something else, or some other way than that in which he did it, or whatever else added being true, he does not really lie, nor is he a perjurer.

n. 27.

27. A just cause for using these amphibologies exists whenever it is necessary, or useful, for preserving health, honor, goods, or for any other purpose, provided the concealment of the truth is then judged expedient and prudent.

n. 28.

28. One who, through commendation, or a gift, has been promoted to a magistracy, or public office, can, with mental restriction, take the oath which is usually exacted from others by royal mandate, without regard to the intention of the one exacting it, since he is not bound to confess a hidden crime.

n. II.

II. We say nothing at present concerning the propositions listed, since we shall discuss them more fully below, and shall explain the various senses which they admit, and shall explain everything necessary for a full knowledge of them.

Diss. I, Chapter IV — Lax, or improbable, propositions are reviewed, which not a few Casuists teach

I. The sacred oath is, as it were, applied to the confirmation of the leagues, pacts, and commerce of men. To this sacrament, as though to the supreme and divine judge, men have recourse with the utmost submission, and both those contending in court, and those fighting in camp, and any men whatsoever, approach it, so that they may settle disputes, so that they may foster and confirm mutual friendship, so that they may put an end to controversies. He is held wicked who refuses to give credence to one swearing. No one, then, fails to see that an oath is to be interpreted in a strict sense — not only on account of the reverence owed to God, but also lest truth grow cheap among men, and be brought into peril and held of little worth, so that a refuge to which one might have recourse to gain victory be lost. No one fails to see that the rules to be handed down for the use of the oath ought to breathe sincerity without disguise, truth without equivocation, and candor without circumlocution. Hence it follows that those opinions of Casuists are to be rejected which involve the oath in ambiguities, which teach the use of amphibologies and equivocations in the use of oaths, which, finally, all too easily excuse the habit of swearing. Lest the reader be deceived by the allurements of these opinions, I have thought it fitting to weave together, according to my custom, at the beginning of this disputation, a review not of all, but of certain propositions only, which seem to relax the laws of the oath too much, and to set it before the eyes.

I. "Whatever words, even those containing an express oath, are used in swearing, the mind and the intention of swearing must always be attended to, so as to discern in the forum of conscience whether one has truly sworn, or not. For either one positively intends to invoke God as witness, or one positively did not wish to invoke God, or, being negatively disposed, or ignorant, one abstracts from the invocation of God. If the first, it is always certainly an oath. If the second, it is certainly not an oath in the forum of conscience, but only a lie, if he asserted something false. If the third, again it is not an oath, since God is not thereby invoked as witness — otherwise those who blurt out, at almost every word, their 'By God,' 'By the sacrament,' etc., would always be swearing, and would very often be perjuring themselves. Whence a Confessor, hearing a penitent accuse himself of having sworn falsely, ought not immediately to judge that he has perjured himself, but should ask whether he intended to invoke God as witness, and indeed of a falsehood. And he will very frequently discover that these were not perjuries, but only lies, to be judged according to their matter — sometimes officious, sometimes jesting, and thus venial." — Fr. Patritius Sporer, tract. 3, on the 2nd precept, ch. 1, sect. 1, n. 9, p. 103. Nor, when the swearer testifies that he did not intend to swear falsely, is faith to be placed in him; but he must be asked whether, when he affirmed "By God" that the matter was so, he intended to invoke God as witness, and indeed of a falsehood.

n. II.

II. "By whatever words, even those clearly and unambiguously containing an oath, it is uttered — much more so, then, must attention always be paid in the forum of conscience to the intention of the swearer, if we wish to discover whether it is truly an oath. For either, whatever words are finally uttered, one intends, first, positively to invoke God, or, second, positively not to invoke him, or, third (whether because he does not advert to it, or because he does not know), he abstracts from such invocation — that is, he neither intends, nor does not intend, to invoke. This division seems adequate; for it contains contradictories, and precision itself. Now if the first, it will certainly be an oath, as is clear of itself. If the second, it will certainly not be an oath, as the Doctors commonly admit... For although I say, 'I swear by God,' if I do not wish, by these words, to implore God as witness of what I say, I certainly will not implore him, except materially, just as a parrot taught by its master would utter the same words. Certainly in Sicily common men swear 'Per Dio' at every other word. Who would say that these common men truly swear, since they themselves sometimes do not know what 'Per Dio' signifies? It seems, however, from its own notion, to signify 'by God.' Finally, if the third, likewise it will certainly not be an oath, since he does not invoke God. For since here he abstracts from invocation, it clearly appears that he does not exhibit invocation." — Thomas Tamburini, Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 1, §3, n. 6, p. 78. Felix Potestas, Vol. I, Part II, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 2, n. 1555, p. 111 in my copy; see below, ch. 6.

n. III.

III. "For the truth of an assertory oath, it is required, and it suffices, that the swearer prudently judge the matter to be so, and be led not by a light conjecture, but by a certain, or verisimilar, and probable one..." Tamburini, however, adds that no probability whatsoever suffices for swearing; but that which attains to moral certainty is necessary. But certainly any probability makes for this — that is, as we have often said, moral certainty common with the Church. Whence, as Palao well says, it will suffice, if he prudently judges, according to a probable reason, that it is so, so as to make for himself moral certainty. Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament, on the oath, disp. 7, q. 8, p. 48. It follows from this teaching that anyone may either affirm or deny the same matter by oath — a proposition which is contained among those condemned. See below, ch. 9.

n. IV.

IV. "I swear to you that I have not slept with your wife" — meaning by a vest [i.e., understanding "with" a garment called "vestis" rather than carnally]; "I do not have your money" — meaning, which I am willing to give you outright; "your husband, or wife, has not broken the laws of marriage" — meaning, manifestly; "I do not owe you a hundred" — meaning, in such a way that I cannot offset it against the hundred acts which you owe me. Response: it is licit to do this, as the same authors teach (namely, Lessius, Castropalao, Rebello, Bonacina), and it is taught everywhere, provided, however, one abstracts from the harm which this deceitful oath unjustly causes; even if one is not asked to swear, but offers to do so of his own accord." Thomas Tamburini, Bk. II, in explaining the Decalogue, ch. 2, §2, n. 1.

n. V.

V. "One asked by a judge about a crime, which, at least under a probable opinion, he is not bound to reveal, can deny that he committed it, if only semi-full proof is given, understanding within himself that he is in prison, or [is not bound] to speak... Indeed, he can even offer himself to swear thus, when this is necessary." Antonio a Spiritu Santo, tract. on oaths, disp. 1, sect. 9, n. 53, p. 141.

n. VI.

VI. "A woman who has committed adultery can, under oath, deny that she committed it, understanding within herself that she is not bound to reveal it." The same author, ibid., n. 54, p. 143.

n. VII.

VII. "Merchants who cannot obtain a just price from buyers, unless they swear that their goods stand them at such-and-such a price, when in fact this is not so, can indeed swear that the goods stand them at such-and-such a price, understanding, with all expenses computed, or reckoning in the goods which they have at home, or which they bought elsewhere." Castropalao, tract. 14, disp. 1, punct. 7; Lessius, Bk. II, ch. 42, dub. 9, n. 4; Leander, tract. 1, disp. 45, q. 27; Candido, disp. 2, art. 3, dub. 14.

n. VIII.

VIII. "The same must be said of buyers, who, so as not to be compelled to buy goods from merchants above the just price, affirm under oath that they bought the goods elsewhere at a lower price, or that they are offered to them at a lower price, so that the sellers may descend to a just, or the lowest, price — understanding, however, in mind, goods bought at a different time for a lower price within the just price." Candido, disp. 26, art. 4, dub. 14; Leander, tract. 1, disp. 45, q. 28; Palao, Bonacina, Rebello, and others in Leander. See below, Diss. 4, ch. 4, n. 12.

n. IX.

IX. "Even if the one asking wished to exclude every equivocation, and required an oath about the fact done, beyond an oath about the accusation, and demanded an oath to speak the truth sincerely without any equivocation, you can still swear an amphibological oath, with a mental restriction made — since you can understand that you will swear without equivocation, without your being able to have any restriction in mind. For this proposition [that you must swear without any restriction] cannot be taken so broadly, without it being unjust." Castropalao, tract. 14, disp. 5, punct. 7, n. 16, p. 111 in my copy; Leander, tract. 1, disp. 45, q. 37, and in these authors Sánchez, Bonacina, Suárez, Lessius, Trullench, Diana, and other theologians of this recent school. See below, Diss. 4, ch. 4, §15.

n. X.

X. "Titius, who induces a witness to swear falsely, which the witness thinks is true, does not sin, even though Titius himself knows it to be false." Pedro Hurtado, Diana, Tancredo, in Tamburini, who considers this opinion probable, indeed safe in practice. Bk. II, ch. 1, disp. 2, q. 8, n. 7, p. 80. Fr. Matteo Moya, Vol. II, tract. 11, §6, n. 2, p. 116, called it probable; Tamburini, Diana, Leander, Hurtado, and other similar authors called it probable; Fr. Moya added an increase of safety. See Diss. 7, ch. 3, n. 35.

n. XI.

XI. "A culpably retained habit of swearing falsely, deliberately, or indifferently truly and falsely, is more probably not a sin of actual perjury, but is to be confessed as the very sin of the habit of perjury." Patritius Sporer, tract. 3, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 1, sect. 4, §5, n. 151, p. 226 in my copy, from Tamburini, Bk. III, ch. 1, n. 2. See Diss. 7, ch. 5, and others.

n. XII.

XII. "For it morally suffices to confess something less distinct concerning oneself, than to open it up plainly. He who has perjured himself from the impetus of a contrary habit, although deliberately, is to be judged to have offended less, than one who has done so with a recent, spontaneous mind, and freedom." Sporer, ibid.

n. XIII.

XIII. "Absolution is therefore to be imparted to a penitent who is willing, and who proposes the cessation of sin, and who has no external occasion, however much he has become habituated to the sin." John Sánchez, in his Select Disputations, disp. 9, in Tamburini, Bk. III, ch. 1, §4, n. 3, p. 75. See Diss. 7, ch. 6.

n. XIV.

XIV. "One who, from an inveterate habit, knowingly swears falsely — does it suffice to say, 'I once swore falsely,' or will it be necessary also to add that this was from a bad habit? I answer that it is not necessary... The same must be said, that I may say this once for this occasion, of an inveterate habit of fornicating, of blaspheming, and other similar things; for the reasoning is the same." Tamburini, Method for Expediting Confession, Bk. II, ch. 3, §3, n. 21, p. 109. See Diss. 7, ch. 6.

n. XV.

XV. "Understand, however, this teaching, provided that he does not, by a positive act, accept that depraved habit, but only, being negatively disposed, neglects, or despairs, of overcoming it — which indeed is not rare, and greatly to be noted by the Confessor, lest he vex, or greatly afflict, consciences." Patritius Sporer, loc. cit., n. 154. One who despairs of overcoming a habit of swearing is not to be vexed, or approved; for this often happens, because such persons are not to be urged to root out the aforesaid habit. Whether this doctrine savors of Jansenism, see Diss. 8, ch. 5.

n. XVI.

XVI. "One, however, who has a habit both of swearing and of lying, but not of joining an oath to a lie, if, as often as he swears, he swears advertently, and takes care not to join a lie to the oath, is not bound, under mortal sin, to extirpate such a habit." Fr. Domenico Viva, Vol. I, Part 7, art. 7, n. 3, p. 86; several others teach the same. See Diss. 7, ch. 5.

n. XVII.

XVII. Fr. Fernando Castropalao, Vol. III, tract. 14, disp. 1, punct. 7, n. 13: "If, indeed, an honest cause of concealing the truth intervenes, such as would be for the preservation of your health, or that of your family, your honor, your goods; or if it were fitting not to assent to one questioning unjustly, you commit no fault, swearing thus amphibologically. This holds true, however, if you are not asked to swear, but you offer yourself to swear — provided an honest cause intervenes."

n. XVIII.

XVIII. "Asked about a crime, which at least under a probable opinion you are not bound to reveal, either because you are not asked juridically, or because a harm to yourself would arise from revealing it, you can deny that you did it, understanding within yourself: 'in prison,' or 'so as to be bound to say it.'" The same author, ibid.

n. XIX.

XIX. "Asked, even though not asked juridically, whether you promised marriage, from whose obligation, according to a probable opinion, you are free, you can swear that you did not promise it, understanding: 'so as to be bound.'" Ibid., n. 5.

n. XX.

XX. "One probably exempt from paying a toll can swear that he is not carrying such-and-such a thing, even though he is, understanding: 'so as to be bound to declare it for the toll.'" The same, ibid.

n. XXI.

XXI. "Merchants who cannot obtain a just price from buyers, unless they swear that their goods stand them at such-and-such a price, can indeed swear that they stand them at such-and-such a price..." , since it does not in fact stand thus, understanding, all expenses computed; or with other goods which they have at home, or bought elsewhere." The same, ibid.

n. XXII.

XXII. "Beyond what has been said above, it must be especially noted, that one who employs any of the aforesaid amphibologies ought at least to know, in general, that he can conceal the truth without a lie, by which he swears. It is not, however, necessary to know the particular manner by which the truth might be found. Wherefore, if he intends to swear in that sense in which a learned man would find the truth, and he knows that the truth can indeed be found, it will suffice for his excuse." The same, ibid.

n. XXIII.

XXIII. Fr. Domenico Viva, in his Commentary on the proscribed proposition 27 of Innocent XI: "When, however, no convenient equivocation, or external restriction, occurs, if the cause is grave, rustics can, by the use of their double knowledge, easily conceal the truth from one questioning — not with the intention of deceiving, but merely by permitting the deception."

n. XXIV.

XXIV. "A habitual perjurer, even if he has often promised and never amended, can be absolved, provided he has sorrow, and promises to amend." Fr. Torrecillas, Vol. I, Summa, tract. 3, disp. 1, ch. 2, sect. 3, n. 105. He praises Palao and Bonacina.

n. XXV.

XXV. "Although words, considered in themselves, may not be equivocal, nonetheless, by reason of the circumstances of place, time, office, of the one questioning, and of the one responding, etc., a restriction, which would otherwise be purely mental, can become sensible, and excused from lying and perjury, and can become lawful with just cause for its use." The same, consult. 27, n. 134.

n. XXVI.

XXVI. "Indeed, it is not even necessary for the one swearing, or testifying, to recognize the specific manner by which he can conceal the truth. For it suffices, especially for the unlearned, that, although he uses denying words, he add in his mind, 'I wish to conceal the truth, without lying, or perjuring myself, in some way in which the Doctors teach this can be done.'" The same, ibid., n. 135; he cites Sánchez, Suárez, Castropalao, and others.

n. XXVII.

XXVII. "Similarly, it would be no more than a venial lie to say, 'I swear,' when one does not truly swear." Fr. Thomas Sánchez, Bk. III, n. 3.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 1 passage

Tr. IV, Disputation VI: On the Oath

NATURE has so instructed MAN, conscious of his scant fidelity, that, that less distrust be placed in him, he presently compels with an oath the divine truth, being of infallible testimony: And if man would follow this guidance of nature with such fidelity as to fulfill in effect what he promises by his sworn word, nor with that levity would bring his Creator in as witness for however small a thing, he would furnish not so much an argument of another's distrust as a most weighty proof of his own trustworthiness: but as the other dictates of rational creature are drawn astray into byways by that foul crookedness of sin, which bends the mind tending straightly toward God into an excessive love of self, so the invocation of the Divine name for bearing witness (which I shall prove below to be not only licit, but to have its exemplar in God) is implicated, because of the depravity of sin, in various labyrinths of errors; we shall therefore endeavor, throughout this whole disputation in several questions, to extricate it, insofar as it takes on the nature of an OATH.

Slater, Cases I

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 12 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Slater, Cases I, The Second Commandment, Case 2. A Confirmatory Oath

Titius and Bertha, Catholics, seriously gave mutual promises of entering into marriage in the future without committing them to writing, which they thought useless since Titius had confirmed them by oath. But, such is the instability of the human heart, through the familiarity permitted to him as Bertha’s betrothed, Titius gradually conceived a more ardent love for Catharine, Bertha’s sister. At length, after some time, his disposition was so changed that he could not endure Bertha, because he regarded her as an obstacle to union with Catharine. The parish priest, consulted by Titius about his freedom, answered that the promises in the case indeed had no canonical effects, but nevertheless produced a natural obligation which bound in conscience, especially since they had been confirmed by oath. Hence it is asked:

What is the effect of an invalidating law with respect to an act valid by natural law?

What is an oath, and what kind of obligation does it introduce?

What is to be said of the case?

Solution

What is the effect of a voiding law on an act which is valid by the law of nature?

The effect of a voiding or annulling law on an act which otherwise would be valid depends very much on the intention of the legislator. Sometimes the legislator merely.

intends to deny the right of bringing an action in court to enforce a claim; sometimes the claim is made voidable, not void; sometimes it is made void. What the effect is of any particular voiding law will therefore largely be a question of interpretation. :

What is an oath, and what sort of obligation does it impose?

An oath is the calling of God to witness to the truth of what we say. It imposes a special obligation out of reverence for God, the God of truth, to tell the truth, or, in a promissory oath, to be faithful to the promise given. A promissory oath is accessory to the promise which it confirms, and must be interpreted according to the nature of that promise. If for any reason the promise was null and void from the beginning, or if it becomes so, the oath, as being accessory, will also cease to bind.

The case. Titius and Bertha enter into a verbal engagement to marry, and Titius confirms his promise with an oath. Afterward he falls in love with Catharine, Bertha's sister, and wants to marry her. As now he can not endure Bertha, he asks his parish priest whether he may do as he desires, but he is told that though the verbal engagement with Bertha produced no canonical effects, yet it gave rise to a natural obligation by which he is bound to marry her, especially as the promise was confirmed by oath.