Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales
ARTICLE I: On Oath
- DEFINITION. An oath comes from right, because attestation under oath founds right, and it is defined: the invocation of God as witness of truth.
It is said: INVOCATION, that is, a calling to aid, that it may be distinguished from a vow, which is a promise; OF GOD: God, the first Truth, is invoked as a witness greater than every exception, and he is asked that by his infallible testimony he manifest the assertion as known by him and true, when and how it shall please him, whether in this life or in the other; AS WITNESS, so that oath may thus be distinguished from other acts by which God is invoked for help, for example from adjuration (n. 618); OF TRUTH, under which name also comes a promise, for which God is employed as a sort of surety (III, 133; St. Thom., 2.2, q. 89, a. 1).
DIVISION. Oath is distinguished in many ways:
By reason of manner, one is implicit, when through creatures in which the attributes of God shine forth in a special way God is invoked, for example by heaven, by the Gospels. Another is explicit, when God is directly invoked.
By reason of form, one is CONTESTATORY, or invocatory, by which God is simply invoked as witness; another EXECRATORY, or imprecatory, by which God is invoked not only as witness, but also as avenger.
Thus there is an execratory oath when the one swearing subjects himself, or something of his or of his own, to God to be punished, if he speaks falsely, for example: If I do not speak the truth, may God punish me; may I behold neither spouse nor children alive today, etc. To this also pertains the invocation of God as giver of goods, for example: So may God help me and his holy Gospels. For in these formulas the contrary
execration is understood, as if the one swearing said: for the truth of the assertion and fidelity in promises, may God help me, and may he deprive me of his help if I lie or am unfaithful (III, 140, 143).
- By reason of matter, it is divided into ASSERTORY, by which past or present things are affirmed or denied, and PROMISSORY, by which something future is promised.
This again is twofold: one simple and standing of itself, by which someone swears that he will do or omit something, without a promise toward another, for example: I swear that I will fast; the other confirmatory of a promise, by which namely a promise made to God or to man is confirmed (III, 141; Bill., de Relig., Diss. 5, a. 2).
- By reason of circumstances, one is JUDICIAL, another EXTRAJUDICIAL; another is SOLEMN, which is made with a certain solemnity, as before a notary, witnesses, the Gospels; another SIMPLE, which lacks ceremonies of this sort.
Note. All these oaths are of the same species, because in all God is brought forward as witness of truth.
- PRINCIPLE. Oath of itself is licit and laudable. For it is an act of religion by which we profess God to be the more powerful witness and confirmer of things. The proposition is established besides both from the definition of the Council of Constance, Sess. 8, against Wycliffe, and from the Bull Auctorem fidei, n. 75; and from the universal practice of the Church and of peoples, as well as from various places of Sacred Scripture, for example (Deut., 6, 13): Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God ... and shalt swear by his name (III, 114).
- Yet the PRIMARY END of an oath does not regard the worship of God, but the making of faith and correcting the vice of incredulity and infidelity among men. And therefore St. Thomas says (2.2, q. 89, a. 5): "An oath is to be held not among those things which are to be sought of themselves, but among those things which are necessary for this life," just as medicine, which is to be used not habitually, but rarely and cautiously. Thus we can say: Whatsoever is more than this, namely than simple affirmation or denial, is of evil (Matt., 5, 33).
These things having been set down, there now comes to be discussed: 1. the validity of an oath; 2. the licitness of an oath; 3. the promissory oath.