The case for probabilism

Whenever there is a solidly probable opinion that a particular action is lawful, there is no certain law forbidding one to perform it. But it is lawful to do what no certain law forbids. Therefore when there is only question of committing sin or not, it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion even though the opposite may be more probable.

The major premise of this syllogism is obvious. No opinion can be probable which has a certain law against it. The certain law imposes a certain obligation. On the other hand, if an opinion is probable and acknowledged as such by five or six experts, good, prudent, and learned men, it is impossible that there should be a law contrary to the probable opinion. Or if there is such a law, the law cannot be sufficiently promulgated, or else it would be known to the experts. But a law which is not sufficiently promulgated does not bind; ignorance excuses from its transgression. The minor premise, too, is clear. We are at liberty to do what no certain law prohibits. If indeed I doubt whether an action is forbidden, I am bound to inquire and satisfy my conscience on the point. But whenever there is a probable opinion, this inquiry has been already made by experts, and with the result that no law forbidding the action can be discovered, otherwise the opinion will not be probable. The conclusion then is certain.

Therefore in cases where there is a probable opinion, or a positively doubtful conscience, I may arrive at a certain conscience required for lawful action by reasoning implicitly somewhat as follows: The opinion is probable that this action which I am contemplating is lawful—for example, marrying according to my promise a good and suitable person in spite of the prohibition of my parents which indeed does not seem to be reasonable. But if this is so, there is no law forbidding me to do it; I violate no obligation in marrying her. Therefore J may marry her.

The proof of probabilism from what we must call at least the toleration of the Church for some centuries will perhaps appeal still more strongly to Catholic minds, The guardianship of faith and morals has been committed to the Church by her divine Founder. He has promised that she shall not fail in the task committed to her even to the end of time. But if a false doctrine is widely held and publicly taught for some centuries in the Church, and she does not condemn it, does not protest against it, the promise of Christ ’ fails to be effective, which is impossible. So that probabilism, which has been widely held and publicly taught for some centuries as a theory of morals without being condemned by the Church, cannot be a false system¹ A third argument may be drawn from the approbation of the works of St Alphonsus Liguori by the Holy See. The decree of May 18, 1803, on the revision and approbation of the works of St Alphonsus with a view to his beatification, gives a list of his works and expressly states that after careful examination nothing reprehensible was found in them. Among the works mentioned is a dissertation on the moderate use of a probable opinion when it conflicts with a more probable opinion on the other side, published in 1755. In this dissertation St Alphonsus clearly and ably defends and proves probabilism; he never withdrew or corrected this dissertation, though to save his Congregation and the doctrine he afterwards modified the statement of his views. He followed probabilism in his choice of opinions while writing his great work on moral theology which subsequently, though he admitted corrections in details, remained substantially the same.

¹ St Alphonsus, Dissertation, anno 1755, n. 10.

I. "Laws, even invalidating and incapacitating laws, do not urge in doubt of law" (can. 15). Now, in establishing these things, the Code altogether abstracts from the moral system, or conforms itself to no system. For the moral system treats of private doubt; but the Code treats of public or objective doubt, so to speak. And indeed order would be disturbed too greatly if Authority rendered the efficacy of law dependent on private doubt. Suppose, for example, the case: Peter doubts whether someone can validly contract marriage with a blood relative in the third degree; relying on canon 15, he enters marriage with Anna, who is related to him in the stated degree. The marriage is certainly invalid; this proves that the canon is not speaking of private doubt.

II. "In doubt, the revocation of a preexisting law is not presumed, but later laws must be drawn to earlier ones and, insofar as can be done, reconciled with them" (can. 23). For the reason alleged under I, it must be said that once again the discourse is about public or objective doubt, and not about private doubt. Hence even if someone, for example, doubts whether the law of abstaining from meats on Saturday has been revoked, the said law is and remains revoked.

III. "In doubt... of fact the Ordinary can dispense in them (i.e., in laws, even invalidating and incapacitating laws), provided there is question of laws in which the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to dispense" (can. 15). This canon establishes only that the Ordinary, in doubt of fact, can dispense as a precaution; but it abstracts from the question of what the law is if the Ordinary does not dispense.

Probabilism.—The meaning of Probabilism can be seen from a comparison with the opposite systems. (a) Unlike Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism, Probabilism does not require a greater or equal probability, but permits one to follow what is less probable; (b) unlike Laxism, it does not allow one to follow what is only slightly or uncertainly probable, or to apply the system to all cases of doubt.

A judgment is probable when it is supported by arguments that make it seem true, although there may remain reasons for doubt. Examples are conclusions based on analogy, on hypothesis, on the opinions of others, or on the calculus of probabilities.

Probability is of various kinds. (a) It is absolute or relative, according as the supporting reasons are grave, either when considered alone, or when compared with the objections. Even the Probabiliorists admit that an opinion that is merely probable may be followed, if it is solidly probable and there is no argument against it (see 649). (b) We have solid or slight probability, according as the supporting motives are or are not such as would move, if not convince, a prudent man—that is, a man who shows good judgment in most things. (c) We have certain or uncertain probability, according as a person is sure or not, after reasonable consideration, that the arguments seem valid and the opinion likely. (d) Probability is internal or external, according as the arguments are drawn from the matter at issue itself (i.e., from its nature, properties, causes, effects, etc.) or from the authority of the doctors who have defended an opinion.

Relative probability according to logicians remains even when a lesser is compared with a greater probability. (a) If the opposing arguments are drawn from different sources, the more probable does not attack the less probable, and hence does not weaken its probability. Example: An intrinsic argument has more weight than a mere appeal to authority, but it does not attack the opposite argument, and hence does not diminish its probability. (b) If the opposing arguments are drawn from the same source, each one weakens the opposite, since there is direct opposition. But the more probable does not destroy the less probable, since, in spite of the greater appearance of truth on the one side, there still remains room for the possibility that the other side may be true.

A moral judgment is solidly probable when the following conditions are present:

(a) For the judgment there must be an intrinsic or extrinsic argument that would be considered weighty by a prudent man. Example: An opinion that has the support of a universally acknowledged authority is strongly probable, whereas, if it has only the support of one obscure writer, it is only slightly probable.

(b) Against the judgment there must be no decisive argument from authority or reason. Example; The judgment that a certain course of action is lawful because St. Alphonsus permits it, is ordinarily solidly probable; it is not probable, however, if the opinion of St. Alphonsus (e.g., that Catholics may act as sponsors in non-Catholic baptisms) has been disallowed by the Church, or if the argument he uses (e.g., that concerning the amount that constitutes grave matter in theft, which reasons from conditions in his day) is not strong.

(c) The arguments for the judgment must retain their probability, if they are set over against the arguments for the opposite. Manifestly, if the arguments are all satisfactorily answered by the opposite side, the judgment based on them ceases to retain the appearance of truth. Probabilism does not require, however, that one determine the relative degrees of probability in opposite opinions.

It is not sufficient according to the Probabilists that another be certain of the probability of an opinion; but the person who follows the opinion must himself be certain that it is solidly probable.

Regarding the kind of authority necessary to make an opinion solidly probable from external evidence, Probabilism teaches:

(a) that absolute probability (that is, such a weight of authority as would appear strong even to the most learned) ought to be estimated by quality rather than quantity—by the learning, prudence, impartiality, and independent study of the authors, rather than by their numbers. If five distinguished moralists arrive by separate study at the same conclusion (i.e., that an opinion is probable), or if one of special reputation in a matter under question supports the probability of an opinion, the argument from authority is strong;

(b) that relative probability (that is, such a weight of authority as suffices for one who is unlearned, such as a child, a halfwit, an uneducated person) is had sufficiently through the word of only one person who is looked up to as a guide or instructor, such as a parent, confessor, or teacher.

Probabilism supposes that one regards the opinion one follows as truly probable, and that one is convinced that it is lawful to follow such an opinion. Hence, the system does not apply in certain cases.

(a) It does not apply to cases in which there is no probability on either side—that is, to cases of negative doubt (see 656 sqq.), whether the doubt be of law or of fact.

(b) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is only slight or uncertain probability for the less safe side. Example: Caius has heard that a certain novel opinion is defended by a recent author, but he is uncertain of the author’s standing as a theologian, and he realizes that the fact that a man has written a book does not make his ideas solidly probable.

(c) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is solid probability for the less safe side, but one doubts whether one can lawfully follow it; for it is always sinful to act with a doubtful conscience (see 641 sqq.). Example: Caius has read in a reliable work of theology that a person in certain circumstances, which are his own, is probably excused from Mass. But the word “probably” makes him uncertain whether he can follow this opinion.

For the above-mentioned cases, to which their principle does not apply, Probabilists refer to the rules for a doubtful conscience (see 656 sqq.). The following special rules are given for cases of negative doubt:

(a) If the doubt is one of law and insoluble, one is free to act; for it is a general principle that an act may be considered lawful, as long as there is no serious reason to the contrary. Example: Sempronius goes out into the country on Sunday afternoon. An opportunity to fish presents itself, but Sempronius begins to doubt whether there is or is not a church law against fishing on Sundays. As no argument for either side is known to him, he may act on the general principle that what is not forbidden is lawful.

(b) If the doubt is one of fact and insoluble, and a prohibitory law is involved, one is free to act; for it is commonly admitted that legislators do not intend their prohibitions, which are restrictions of liberty, to be interpreted with the utmost rigor. Example: Titus is eating a chicken dinner late on Thursday night when his watch stops. As he has no way of discovering the time, he does not know whether Friday or the end of the dinner will arrive first. He may continue the meal, making no undue delays.

(c) If the doubt is one of fact, and a preceptive law is in question, one must take reasonable precautions to settle the doubt; for the lawgiver wills that those who are subject to the law should make use of the ordinary means to learn the facts on which obligation depends (see above, 384). If the doubt remains insoluble, one may decide in favor of liberty; for it may reasonably be presumed that the legislator does not intend to obligate those whose obligation remains uncertain. Example: Caius doubts whether he has reached the age of sixty, when the obligation of fasting ends. He should try to discover his real age; but, if he can find no real proofs either for or against the age of sixty, he may decide in favor of sixty, if there are some indications that he is of that age.

The solutions given above for cases of negative doubt suppose that there is no other or higher law that forbids one to take the risk of deciding in favor of liberty. Hence, in the following instances one must decide against liberty:

(a) in negative doubts when the validity of acts is at stake. Example: Titus is uncertain whether the law requires the age of fourteen for a valid contract of marriage; he is also uncertain whether he is fourteen years old. The doubt of law and of fact does not excuse Titus from the law, if he wishes to marry. He must clear up the doubts, and if necessary he must secure a dispensation.

(b) in negative doubts when reasons of charity or justice forbid one to take risks. Example: Caius is uncertain whether he paid Sempronius for work done for him. He is bound to make inquiries about the matter.

Probabilism cannot be applied, therefore, when the mental state of the subject is doubt, weakly founded opinion, or practical uncertainty. But, even when one holds an opinion as solidly and certainly probable, one may not follow it as a moral guide, if there is something in the nature of the object or matter itself which forbids this.

(a) A probability of law favoring liberty may not be followed in those matters in which some natural, divine or human law requires one to follow the safer side (see cases enumerated above, 678, 661). Example: The following opinions are probable; that instruction regarding the Trinity and the Incarnation is not indispensable for salvation; that rye-bread is valid matter for the Eucharist. But in practice it would be unlawful to take the risk of following these opinions, except in cases of extreme necessity, when nothing else can be done.

(b) A probability of fact favoring liberty may not be followed so long as there remains nothing more than probability of fact; for, while the will of the lawgiver may on account of probability of non-obligation change one’s relation to the law from obligation to non-obligation, it does not change facts. Examples: On Friday Titus doubts whether a dish before him is meat or fish; probably it is meat on account of its appearance, probably it is fish on account of its odor. At night Fr. Caius is much fatigued, and doubts whether he has said Vespers. Probably he did not, because he cannot recall what feast will be celebrated tomorrow; probably he did, because he remembers having said Compline.

For probabilities of fact, to which as such their system does not apply, Probabilists offer the following solutions:

(a) In certain cases one may take from the doubt of fact its bearing on obligation, by recourse to the manifest will of the legislator as declared in the law itself or expressed through dispensation. Examples: While hearing confessions, Sempronius doubts whether his jurisdiction has already expired. He cannot recall the date of expiration, but, thinking the matter over, he sees that probably the date has not arrived. His difficulty is therefore solved, for the Code (Canon 209) supplies jurisdiction in cases of probability of fact. Titus and Caia wish to marry. There is a doubt whether or not they are first cousins, but it seems that probably they are not so related. Their difficulty is solved by obtaining a dispensation.

(b) In other cases one may change the probability of fact into a probability of law by recourse to a probable opinion or argument that under the existing doubt of fact the legislator does not wish the law to oblige. Examples: Titus, who has what is probably lawful food before him, argues with himself that it is not likely that the Church wills to put him to the expense, trouble, and loss of time required to order other food. Fr. Titus, who has probably said Vespers, argues that theologians of authority teach that, when there is a serious reason for thinking one has performed such an obligation, it may be presumed that the Church does not require more.

If a case of probability of fact on which obligation hinges cannot be solved by recourse to the expressed or inferred will of the lawgiver, one has no choice but to follow the safer side, for then, though it is probable that a certain thing is a fact, it is not probable that one has a right to act. Example: Sempronius, while hunting, sees an object moving in the bushes. The probabilities are that it is not a human being, but it is not probable that Sempronius has the right to risk homicide by firing at it.

Not all Probabilists use the principle of the presumptive will of the lawgiver for all cases of negative doubt; some employ different principles for different kinds of doubt, and sometimes arrive at other decisions than those given in the preceding paragraphs. Thus, they give such rules as the following:

(a) In negative doubt of law regarding the lawfulness of an act, use the principle that law or liberty should be followed according as one or the other is in possession (see 660). Example: He who has only slight reasons for thinking that a law exists, or that it is of grave obligation, or that it extends to his case, etc., may decide against the law. But he who has only slight reasons for thinking that a law has been abrogated, or that a dispensation has been granted, etc., must decide for obligation.

(b) In negative doubt of law regarding the validity of a past act, use the principle that what was done is to be held as rightly done. Example: He who has no reasons, or only trifling ones, for thinking that a Sacrament was not administered validly or received validly, should decide for validity.

(c) In negative doubts of fact, use the principles that one should judge according to what usually happens, or that facts must not be taken for granted but must be established, or that presumption favors that which has possession. Examples: If there is no good reason to think that a conscientious person gave consent to a temptation, one may decide for the negative, since that would usually be true. If there is no good reason to think that one has made a vow, one may decide for the negative, since the burden of proof is with the other side. If, in a question about fast and abstinence, it is uncertain whether or not a person has reached twenty-one years, or whether Friday has commenced, the presumption is for the negative, since liberty has been in possession; but if it is uncertain whether a person has reached the age of sixty or whether Friday has ended, the presumption is for the negative, since the law has been in possession.

Having discussed the cases to which Probabilism is not extended, we pass on to the cases to which it is applied. Probabilism is used in any and every case where speculative certainty as to what is lawful or unlawful is not had, but where there is only speculative probability against an opposite probability.

(a) Probabilism is used not only in probability of law, but also in probability of fact that can be reduced to probability of law, as was explained above (see 712).

(b) Probabilism is used in probability of law, whether or not the question be about the existence or the cessation of the law. There is probability against existence of law, when one has good reason to think that a law was not made or not promulgated, or that the time when it goes into force has not arrived, or that it does not apply to certain persons or circumstances, etc.; there is probability for cessation of law, when it is certain that a law did exist, but one has good reason to think that it ceased or was abrogated, that one is excused or dispensed from it.

(c) Probabilism is used in probability of law, whether the law in question be natural, divine or human—that is, in every case of law where invincible ignorance is possible (see 319 sqq., 356).

The claim of Probabilism is that, in all the cases given above, he who follows an opinion excusing him from obligation, may act with a practically certain conscience and be free of all moral guilt, if the opinion is theoretically and seriously probable. The arguments for this thesis are of two kinds: (a) extrinsic proofs, from the approval given Probabilism by the Church and the favor it has enjoyed among moralists; (b) intrinsic proofs, from the nature of law and obligation, and the superiority of Probabilism in practice.

Extrinsic Arguments.—(a) The Church gave explicit approval to Probabilism by praising the theological works of St. Alphonsus in which Probabilism is defended; she gave and continues to give implicit approval by the freedom she has granted to the teachers of this system from the days of Bartholomew Medina, its first expounder (1527-1581), down to the present. The Church even makes use of the principles of Probabilism in interpreting her own laws, as is evidenced by such rules of law as the following in the Decretals: “Things that are odious should be understood strictly, things that are favorable widely” (Rule 15); “Where the law is doubtful, follow the minimum” (Rule 30); “Where the lawgiver could have spoken more clearly, the interpretation should be against him” (Rule 57); “The kinder interpretation should be given penal laws” (Rule 89).

(b) In the Patristic and medieval periods Probabilism had not been scientifically formulated, but many of the Fathers and early Doctors solved cases probabilistically, and there are not a few passages in the great theologians before the sixteenth century which enunciate the same principles as those advocated by Probabilists. When the system was formulated by Medina in 1577, it met with universal favor among Catholic moralists, and, though it suffered an eclipse from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, it has been growing in influence since the days of St. Alphonsus, and appears today to have recovered its former preeminence. Among its adherents are some of the greatest names in the history of theology, and it is not confined to any particular school or body.

Objections of Equiprobabilists.—(a) The praise given to St. Alphonsus by the Church reflects no glory on Probabilism, since the Saint rejected Probabilism and professed Equiprobabilism. Further, more than one Pope, and especially Innocent XI (1676-1689), has expressed a dislike for Probabilism, while the silence of others does not mean more than toleration. The legal axioms used by canonists apply to the external forum, and cannot be used equally in the forum of conscience. (b) Probabiliorism had the field before Probabilism, having been formulated and defended before Medina appeared, and it is that more ancient system that is represented today in a milder form as Equiprobabilism.

Answer of the Probabilists.—(a) St. Alphonsus teaches Probabilism in his Moral Theology, which is his chief work; if later, in his old age, he was an Equiprobabilist, it can be shown that the change was not free, but under compulsion. As to Pope Innocent XI, he is the only Pope who expressed disapproval of Probabilism, and even he refrained from any official pronouncement. The fact that hundreds of works written by Probabilists since the sixteenth century have not been censured or forbidden by the Church authorities, indicates more than mere toleration.

(b) Probabiliorism, as a systematized method, preceded Probabilism as a systematized method only by a brief interval, if at all. Before the 16th century neither of these systems had been formulated, and neither can make much of the argument of priority in time. As for Equiprobabilism, it is first seen in the writings of Christopher Rassler (about 1713) and of Eusebius Amort (1692-1775).

Intrinsic Arguments for Probabilism.—(a) Theoretical Argument.—An uncertain law does not oblige. But a law is uncertain if there is a solidly probable opinion against its existence, or for its cessation, even though the other side be equally or more probable. Therefore, he who follows such an opinion does not violate any obligation.

(b) Practical Argument.—Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism impose on confessors and the faithful impossible burdens, since, as was explained above (see 683 sqq.), they require that one compare and weigh probabilities, decide whether or not possession is had by the law or by liberty, etc.; whereas Probabilism is simple and easily applied, requiring only that one be convinced that one’s opinion is really probable, and that one use it in good faith.

The proposition that an uncertain law does not oblige (saving cases of validity, etc., as above, 678), is defended as follows:

(a) If the uncertainty arises from the law itself, because it has not been clearly worded or sufficiently promulgated, the truth of the proposition is manifest, for the very nature of law requires that it be brought to the knowledge of those for whom it is made (see 285).

(b) If the uncertainty arises from the invincible ignorance of one who is subject to the law, the proposition is true in the sense that no one is a transgressor in the internal forum who fails against a law unwittingly (see 327, 489 sqq.). But an act that transgresses no law is lawful in conscience, for all that is not forbidden is lawful.

The adversaries of Probabilism offer the following criticism:

(a) As to the proposition that “an uncertain law does not oblige,” the use of this principle by Probabilism may be considered as a begging of the whole question; for what is in dispute is whether, in case a law is uncertain, there is or is not a higher law that requires one to decide for obligation. It can be shown, however, that there is such a higher law; for the legislator cannot be willing that his ordinances be at the mercy of every uncertainty or loophole which subtle minds can devise, and God cannot be willing that those who are subject to laws should expose themselves to sin by deciding against a law because it appears to them to be of doubtful obligation.

(b) As to the proofs given for that proposition, they proceed from an incomplete enumeration, for a law can be doubtful on account of vincible ignorance, as well as for the reasons given. And no one will maintain that vincible ignorance excuses.

The Probabilists reply: (a) The principle that “an uncertain law does not oblige,” cannot render law nugatory, since there is question here only of honest doubt, not of pretended or responsible ignorance. Neither can that principle expose one to the danger of formal sin (see 249), since it is supposed that he who follows it is convinced that it is true, and that he has the right to regulate his conduct by it. It does expose to the danger of material sin (see 249), since the law about which there is uncertainty may be existent; but we are not obliged to avoid every danger of material sin, else we should be under the intolerable necessity of fulfilling not only all certain, but all uncertain duties. Moreover, the danger of material sin is not avoided by any moral system except Tutiorism, since even equiprobable and more probable opinions may be false.

(b) The enumeration of cases of doubtful law is sufficient; for, as just remarked, only those cases are being considered in which one is judging about one’s duty in good faith.

The second proposition used above as the Minor of the argument for Probabilism—that “a law is uncertain whenever there is a solidly probable opinion against its existence or for its cessation”—is defended by the very definition of the term “uncertain.”

A thing is said to be accepted as certain when one yields it firm assent and has no serious misgivings that it may be false; hence, the uncertain is that which is not assented to firmly (the doubtful), or that which does not exclude serious doubts about its truth (matter of opinion). Now, a law whose existence or obligation seems likely, but against which there militates a solidly probable argument, is not so firmly established as to inhibit every prudent doubt. In other words, such a law is uncertain.

Criticism of the Argument in the Preceding Paragraph.—(a) The supposition on which the argument rests is false. It supposes that the interpretation of the legal axiom that “a doubtful law does not oblige,” should be drawn from the philosophical definition of the terms, whereas it should be drawn from the sense given it by other rules of law. Now, there are canonical rules which declare that in doubt one should follow that which has possession, or that which seems more probable. Hence, the axiom quoted by the Probabilists refers only to cases of negative doubt; the other two rules refer to cases of doubt in the wide sense, or to cases of opinion; otherwise, we should have to admit that these legal maxims are contradictory, one to the other. Thus, it appears that Probabilism is based on a principle formulated to solve difficulties of an entirely different kind from those which the system deals with.

(b) The argumentation itself is fallacious. It takes for granted that an opinion is certainly and solidly probable, not only when it has no opposite or when its opposite is less probable, but also when its opposite is equally or more probable. This cannot be. Solid probability on the other side of a question must create doubt about an opinion held, and so make it at best uncertainly probable or probably probable; while greater likelihood or presumption on the other side must make one’s own opinion appear imprudent and unworthy of a rational being, and therefore not solidly probable.

The Probabilists answer: (a) The two principles with reference to doubtful law are understood and proved by Probabilism by an analysis of the notions of obligation and incertitude (see 285, 654), and hence they apply to every case that is restricted to the question of probable lawfulness or unlawfulness.

The rules quoted against Probabilism—there are some that might also be quoted against Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism—are opposed to it only in appearance, since they deal with matters that are outside its sphere (see 697). Thus, in civil cases when both ownership and possession are doubtful, the decision must be given for the more probable side, since the issue is not what is lawful, but what seems to be true. As to the principle of possession, it is not, as supposed, unfavorable, but favorable to Probabilism; since liberty, inasmuch as it is presupposed by obligation (for only those who have freedom can receive obligation), has priority and must be given the benefit of the doubt, whenever a strictly probable reason in its favor cannot be refuted.

(b) Solid probability for the law creates doubt of the truth of the opinion for liberty, but it does not create doubt of its probability; for truth is the agreement of one’s judgment with the facts, probability the appearance of such agreement on account of the arguments by which the judgment is supported. Hence, greater probability for law does not make uncertain the probability there is for liberty. Neither is it a sign of imprudence to accept the less probable, if one has sincerely and diligently sought the truth; for even the more probable may not be true, and the great majority of moralists hold that one is not obliged to follow it.

Criticism of the Pragmatic Test Offered by Probabilists.—Probabilism boasts of the ease with which it can be used (see 700, 720); but the ease with which it can be misused is greater still.

(a) Persons not inclined to piety must quickly fall into Laxism, if they make use of this system, for they will accustom themselves to find every sort of pretext to escape unwelcome duties by raising doubts and dignifying them with the name of probable opinions; they will follow, now one opinion, now its contrary, according as it suits their interests; they will become stubborn in their own views, and unwilling to change or accept instruction.

(b) Persons inclined to piety, if guided by Probabilist principles, will soon lose all interest in what is higher and better, and content themselves with the minimum; for in every case of uncertainty Probabilism permits one to choose what is less safe and less probable.

General Answer of the Probabilists to the Objections of the Preceding Paragraph.—(a) The history of Probabilism contradicts these objections. From its beginning to the present day it has been defended and followed by men noted for piety, who used kindness towards others, but were severe with themselves. While the principles of stricter systems have proved a torture both to confessors and penitents, no detriment to holiness is observed from the use of Probabilism.

(b) The nature of Probabilism refutes the objections in question. There is no system so good that it may not be perverted and turned to evil, and stricter systems have been converted into Tutiorism or Rigorism. But the logical and usual results of Probabilism are not a lowering of moral standards. If these evils follow it, they do so only when it is not rightly understood or not rightly applied.

The charges of a tendency to Laxism are thus answered:

(a) Probabilism holds that only learned theologians are judges of internal probability. Others must not decide for themselves, but must seek instruction from their spiritual guides who have competent knowledge. The moralists themselves must not be so wedded to their opinions that they are not always ready to change when they find they are wrong or learn that the Church does not admit their view.

(b) Probabilism permits one to use contrary probable opinions in different instances (e.g., to use for one will or testament the opinion that informality makes it invalid, and for another will the opinion that informality does not make it invalid); but it does not permit contrary opinions to be used in the same case for one’s advantage (e.g., to use the opinion that an informal will is valid, in order to secure an inheritance, and at the same time to use the opinion that it is invalid, in order to escape the payment of legacies).

(c) Probabilism does not sanction the use of a probable opinion, unless it has been examined without prejudice, and has been honestly judged to be of certain and solid value (see 708 sqq.). Neither does it approve of the conduct of those who put themselves voluntarily in a state of doubt. On the contrary, it considers such conduct as sinful, and as gravely so, if the matter be serious and if this occur frequently. Example; Titus is uncertain whether three hours remain before Communion time, and yet he takes some refreshment, and thus makes it doubtful whether he has the right to receive Communion. The principle that a doubtful law does not oblige will enable Titus to receive Communion, but it does not excuse him from venial sin in putting himself without cause in a state of doubt and in danger of material sin.

The charge of a tendency to minimism in spiritual matters is thus answered: Probabilism deals only with what is lawful, not with what is better; it aims to show only what one may do without sin, not what one ought to do in order to become perfect. Hence, it is used when there is question of imposing obligations, or of deciding whether a certain course is lawful; for in these matters one must be kind, lest by exceeding one’s authority one drive others to sin; but it is not used when there is question of giving spiritual advice and direction, for here all should be exhorted to seek after progress in holiness.

"1. It is not illicit, in conferring sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, leaving aside the safer opinion, unless a law, an agreement, or the danger of incurring grave harm forbids it. Hence an opinion that is only probable is not to be used in conferring baptism, priestly ordination, or episcopal ordination. - 2. I think it probable that a judge can judge according to an opinion that is even less probable. - 3. Generally, when, trusting in probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic and however slight, provided that the limits of probability are not exceeded, we do something, we always act prudently. - 4. An unbeliever who does not believe, being led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from infidelity. - 21. The assent of supernatural faith which is useful for salvation is compatible with the fear by which someone fears that God may not have spoken." Propositions condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679.

"26. When litigants have equally probable opinions in their favor, a judge can accept money for rendering judgment in favor of one rather than the other." Proposition condemned by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665.

"3. It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions." Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"27. If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion must be considered probable so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable." Proposition condemned by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665.

"Rome, 19 April 1902. - A petition having been referred to this Supreme Congregation... in order to obtain official communication of the true text of the decree of the Holy Office on probabilism, directed to Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., the undersigned Assessor... has the honor to transmit herewith the authentic copy of the said decree, with an express declaration that this is the only true text; that consequently all the others, published in whatever manner and at whatever time, must be considered apocryphal; and that if any of these latter should happen to bear signs, even undoubted ones, of authenticity, it must be held that this occurred through mere mistake.... GIAMBATTISTA LUGARI, Assessor of the Holy Office."

"A report having been made by Father Laurea concerning the contents of the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzalez of the Society of Jesus directed to Our Most Holy Lord, the Most Eminent Lords said that it should be written by the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of Spain, that he signify to the said Father Thyrsus that His Holiness, having graciously accepted and read his letters not without praise, commanded that he freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with his pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the position of those who assert that, when a less probable opinion concurs with a more probable one so recognized and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion; and that he assure him that whatever he shall have done and written in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness that he not only permit the Fathers of the same Society to write in favor of the more probable opinion and to attack the position of those asserting that, when a less probable opinion concurs with a more probable one so recognized and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion; but also that he write to all the Universities of the Society that it is the mind of His Holiness that each one, as he pleases, may freely write in favor of the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary opinion; and let him command them to submit themselves wholly to the mandate of His Holiness.

On 8 July 1680, when the aforesaid Order of His Holiness was reported by the Assessor to the Father General of the Society of Jesus, he responded that he would comply in all things as quickly as possible, although it had never been forbidden either by him or by his predecessors to write in favor of the more probable opinion and to teach it."

"I, the undersigned Notary of the Holy Office, testify that the above-written copy of the decree issued on Wednesday, 26 June 1680, was taken from the original acts of the same Sacred Congregation, and that it agrees with them exactly, as is established from a word-for-word collation.

Given at Rome, from the offices of the Holy Office, on 21 April 1902. Canon MANCINI, Notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition."

1. Clemens, a learned theologian, thinks that the Probabilists favor liberty too much. Therefore he says that, when there is a concurrence of an opinion certainly more probable for the law, it is not licit to follow a less probable opinion for liberty. For this is clear, first, from the authority of Clement III, c. Capellanus, De Feriis, where he declares that the opinion is to be followed "which rests upon the better and more subtle reason." But where the probability is certainly greater, there without doubt the reason is better and more subtle. Therefore. Rule 45 of Law in the Sixth agrees: "In obscure matters we look to what is more likely." The same is clear, secondly, from the authority of the Probabiliorists, and of all the Probabilists of better note, who defend equiprobabilism in substantial matters. Before the rest let Suarez be heard, De Legibus, l. 8, c. 3, n. 19: "Greater probability is a certain moral certitude, if the excess of probability is certain." Muzzarelli says the same, Opusc. de Regul. moral. opin., in Migne, Cursus Theologicus XI, 1309: "Some excess of reasons for one side against the other, unless it is notable, does not remove doubt. But when it has been notable, the weight already preponderates for one side, we are already determined to one, and in it we stand." The same is clear, thirdly, from the authority of St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 56: "Whenever," he says, "it certainly appears to the intellect that truth stands much more for the law than for liberty, then the will cannot prudently and without fault adhere to the less safe part; since in that case the man would not act relying on his own judgment, or on his own belief, but rather by a certain effort which by his will he would bring upon the intellect, so that he might be removed from the part which appears to him far more likely, and be bent toward the part which does not appear true to him, indeed which seems not even to have a certain foundation by which it could be true. And to this pertains that saying of the Apostle to Rom. 14:23: Everything that is not from faith is sin." Ioannes-Petrus and Antonius, themselves also learned theologians but probabilists, hear these things incredulously. Cf. Marc. Instit. Moral. Alphons., n. 100, 101, second ed. 1886.

Q. 1. What is Probabilism? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first: the whole doctrine of Probabilism can be reduced in few words to two assertions.

The first is the certain principle, admitted by all, especially by St. Alphonsus: an uncertain law cannot beget a certain obligation; a doubtful law does not oblige. It is a certain principle, because law does not bind the will except through knowledge of itself. The other is that when against the law there is a truly probable opinion, the law becomes uncertain and doubtful. Likewise a certain principle, because certitude is incompatible with opposite probability. Therefore it matters little for the true doctrine of Probabilism whether the opinion for the law is equally probable, or a little more probable, or much more probable, or simply more probable. For the question is this and no other: namely, whether the opinion against the law is truly probable; for then, whatever may be the case concerning the opinion for the law, it is impossible that the law be certain and evident, binding the will through knowledge. I. M. 111 seqq.

To the second: the reasons brought forward for holding Probabiliorism prove nothing indeed. For first, in c. Capellanus 4, De Fer., Clement III defines by his authority a particular question in which there were two opinions, choosing one among them. The matter is of the three weeks during which the canon forbids marriages to be made before the feast of St. John the Baptist; and "some," says the Pontiff, "understand those weeks without interruption. But others, wishing to make an interval between the feast and the weeks themselves, understand that it was established out of reverence for the festivity of Pentecost, which is sometimes accustomed to intervene in those weeks; and thus, beginning from the three days of Rogations before the Ascension of the Lord up to the eighth day after Pentecost, those weeks being counted, they do not permit marriages to be celebrated in that space of time alone, in no way forbidding their celebration from that point." The question having been so proposed, the Holy Pontiff, thus interpreting the canon authentically, resolved it by his own authority: "Therefore, since we were consulted as to which of these opinions might seem stronger, it appeared to us and to our brothers that, although it is the custom of the Roman Church that, at whatever time marriage may be contracted, legitimate consent intervening in the present; yet because marriages are not permitted to be celebrated from Septuagesima until the seventh day after Pentecost, and afterwards they are also celebrated for three weeks or more before the festivity of St. John without distinction, the latter opinion rests upon the better and more subtle reason; and whether according to the canons marriages are suspended from Septuagesima until after the octaves of Easter, or according to the custom of the Roman Church until after seven days of the feast of Pentecost, which lacks octaves, on the Sunday which follows, and thereafter, they can be licitly celebrated." Therefore Clement III by no means defines that where there are two probable opinions, of which one is probable and the other more probable, or certainly much more probable, the latter is altogether and always to be held; but he says only that of the two proposed opinions the second is better and more subtle. Whence certainly nothing is drawn out for Probabiliorism. Indeed, what is the chief point, Clement III defines the matter not relying on a certainly much more probable opinion, but relying on a certain canon and a certain custom.

2. Rule 45 of Law in the Sixth does not properly regard probability, but doubt, which is quite different. Cf. I. M. 137, 138. Whence probability is almost excluded by that Rule, since it is said that we look to what is more likely, which properly bears before itself not probability but presumption. Indeed, the whole Rule is of the following tenor: We look in obscure matters to what is more likely; or to what for the most part is accustomed to happen. Namely, in obscure matters, that is, in those in which the truth does not even probably appear, which certainly is not the same as in probable matters. What is more likely, that is to say, what, with all the circumstances of the matter itself having been attended to, has a presumption founded in likelihood. Or what for the most part is accustomed to happen, that is, when the aforesaid presumption is lacking, that must be held which commonly and ordinarily is accustomed to happen, for then presumption stands for that. It is moreover useless to advert that this Rule, like other similar Rules, pertains rather to forensic judgments and to judicial sentences. Cf. Reiffenst. in Reg. cit. But now, from the fact that in those matters in which probability is even lacking, that is to be held, and indeed in judgments and in matters of justice, for it is a question of a Rule of Law, which, all the circumstances of the matter weighed, appears more likely; or which, this presumption lacking, is rather presumed from things commonly and ordinarily occurring; or finally, if not even this can be had, the least is to be followed and held, as Rule 30 in the Sixth has it; from this it certainly does not follow that, probable and more probable opinions standing against the law and for the law, the law certainly obliges. And indeed Canon Law does not contradict itself. Moreover, the remaining things now being passed over, in c. Cum iure 31, De Off. et Pot. Iud. Deleg., it is said: "Unless you have become certain of the mandate, you are not compelled to execute what is commanded." The same is had in c. Sicut quaedam, d. 14, where St. Leo writes these things: "In those matters which have been doubtful or obscure, let us know that this is to be followed, which is found neither contrary to the evangelical precepts, nor opposed to the decrees of the holy Fathers." And St. Alphonsus, l. 3, after n. 130, Epist. Resp., part Adversarius in Dissertat., adds this commentary: "This has place insofar as it can be asserted that some action is not gravely illicit. But, in order that it be affirmed absolutely that some action is a mortal sin, a probable opinion does not suffice; nor even a more probable one."

3. Suarez certainly was not a probabiliorist, nor is it necessary to demonstrate this, since it is conceded by the adversaries themselves. Cf. Marc. l. c. 92. Therefore his saying only has to be explained, and it is easily explained. It certainly happens sometimes that for some truth a greater absolute probability is had, and the excess of probability is so certain that the opposite opinion is scarcely probable, or enjoys only a certain slender probability, so that the probability of that opposite opinion is uncertain and doubtful. In such a case that greater probability, with such a certain excess of probability, is equivalent to a certain moral certitude. But in such a case, as is clear, it is no longer a matter of two truly probable opinions, although one is more probable than the other. Therefore nothing is drawn from the saying of Suarez for Probabiliorism.

4. The same must be said of Muzzarelli's affirmation. For he is treating of such a notable excess of probability that the doubt of the opposite side is removed, we are determined to one, and in it we stand. But in such a case we are already outside the limits of true probability, and we are found at least in moral certitude. Muzzarelli has these words in the cited Opusc., Roman edition, 1807, page 19: "If the excess is of great or notable moment, then I say that in practice ordinarily there does not subsist before the intellect a persuasion of reasons for the contrary opinion; and therefore that case has always seemed to me very rare in practice. For a great or notable preponderance of reasons for one opinion removes before the intellect the weight for the other, and makes it before the intellect not only less weighty, but even LIGHT and IMPROBABLE." But that Muzzarelli is not a probabiliorist but in reality simply a probabilist is clear from the Rule of acting which, after Benedict XIV, he established in the aforesaid little work. For this generally is it, namely that in obscure and more difficult matters we embrace that opinion which reason advises and authority confirms. "Which reason advises," that is, which reason proposes as true or likely in such a way that it induces a prudent man to give assent to it. For in this stands the force of reasonable persuasion; whence an opinion in which the reason of a prudent man cannot rest, although sometimes it bears before itself some apparent truth or likelihood, is nevertheless altogether to be refuted. It follows: "and authority confirms." For the authority of learned men is the greatest hinge by which the weakness of the human intellect is ruled, so that for the ignorant and unlearned authority of this sort almost always stands in place of reason.... God does not require from us that we always act with metaphysical or physical evidence concerning the material honesty of our action: for this is above the powers of human nature for this state of life; but he requires from us only that we never act without a firm and prudent persuasion that our action here and now to be posited is not sinful, but licit.... But he who in obscure and disputable matters finally executes that which, all things having been seriously weighed, reason advises him and authority confirms, follows that which prudently appears to him true and honest.... As soon as in controversial matters, after diligent examination and all things seriously weighed, I find an opinion which right reason advises to me, and several classical authors confirm, now I have no need to inquire further, and to search out all the doctors, to compare each of their reasons and authorities, and to judge concerning their inequality and preponderance, which would be a morally intolerable burden, as entangled in innumerable scruples and liable to dangers of erring." And hence it is more than sufficiently clear, not only that Muzzarelli in reality simply defends probabilism, but also that he excludes equiprobabilism and probabiliorism; whence below he asserts still more clearly: "But if it should sometimes happen that there is at the same time a greater notable persuasion for the respectively contradictory opinion, I would not indeed dare to add anything to the rule of Benedict XIV, who simply counsels following that which reason advises, not that which advises more....

Most prudently Pontiff Benedict XIV abstained from these comparative preeminences, and prescribed only that we descend to the opinion which reason advises and authority confirms." And this opinion indeed, in obscure and disputed matters, is indeed an opinion which is truly probable, whatever may be the degree of its probability, concerning which it is so difficult a matter to judge that, as the same Muzzarelli says, "it is not to be presumed that God willed, when it is a question of the observance of law necessary for salvation, to cast us into so many difficulties and ambages, from which we cannot extricate ourselves, and by which we are almost driven into despair."

5. The mind of St. Alphonsus is also the same; since the holy Doctor openly says that, when an opinion certainly much more probable for the law stands, the will cannot prudently adhere to the less safe part. Therefore this part, if it is such that the will cannot prudently adhere to it, is already not truly probable, and the opposite is already morally certain. And indeed the holy Doctor established this in order to retain Probabilism within the limits of true probability, and consequently to remove from it slender and doubtful probability. Hence in the text brought forward in the case, the holy Doctor does not speak of any probability whatever, but of that which plainly appears to the intellect of the one judging; who consequently, if he departed from this probability, would depart from his own judgment by a certain effort of the will, and would act against his conscience, to which therefore he applies that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 14:23: What is not from faith is sin. Hence the holy Doctor taught most constantly: "That there be no grave sin, it suffices that true probability be had; I understand that which rests on a foundation NOT SLENDER, so that safely, according to the common opinion, the question of the more probable and the less probable being set aside, it can be held and taught." Op. Mor. l. 3, after n. 130, Epist. Resp., part Adversarius in Dissertat. And the holy Doctor indeed opposes and calls lax that opinion which defends even the less probable for liberty WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION between grave and slender, between certain and doubtful probability. Apol. cont. il P. Patuzzi, year 1765. Cf. I. M. 131 seqq. And l. 3, n. 547, St. Alphonsus establishes and develops this assertion: "Precepts are not to be imposed under grave fault unless evident reason advises it." And this, as far as pertains to us, is truly the Probabilism which we defend, with every question set aside concerning the more probable and less probable, concerning the much more and the little more probable, and the equally probable. Probabiliorists simply assert that one must stand for the more probable, the less probable being left. Equiprobabilists affirm that one must stand for the much more probable, the much less probable being left; but they concede that someone can hold the probable, the other equally probable or a little more probable being left. Probabilists say that it is licit to follow an opinion simply probable, provided it is truly probable, the other being left although it is more probable and much more probable. Therefore we defend this system with St. Alphonsus and with St. Thomas, and no other: "Precepts are not to be imposed under grave fault unless evident reason advises it," l. 3, n. 547; "No one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept," Quodl. 14, De Verit., a. 3. - G. 46, 47, 56-64.

2. Probus the theologian does not approve Probabilism, but Probabiliorism; because, he says, the intellect strives to attain truth as nearly as possible. What concerning Probus?

R. That which Probus affirms, that our intellect strives to attain truth as nearly as possible, can be taken in two ways. First indeed for the objective truth of the thing, or for the effect of some action of ours, to be obtained absolutely. But in this sense the reason of Probus proves nothing against Probabilism. For when it is a question of that objective truth and objective effect to be obtained absolutely, the probabilists themselves say that it is neither probable nor licit to follow the less probable and less safe opinion. Therefore in such a case it is not licit to follow that probable opinion about the thing itself, not because it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, but because it is not licit to follow a false opinion. For it is not probable, but false, that it is licit to follow a probable opinion about the thing itself when the thing itself must be obtained absolutely. In the other sense, however, the assertion of Probus can be taken for the merely subjective truth of the liceity of some action, in the speculative order, which ought to be, in the practical order, that from which the practical dictate of conscience would be taken for acting, so that our action would become licit and honest. And in this other sense the assertion of Probus is altogether false.

For then the question is not whether the intellect ought to adhere to the more probable opinion, because it is, or rather appears, nearer to the truth. But the question is whether the will ought to adhere to the more probable opinion, because it is then bound by law. But it is not only not nearer to the truth, but altogether alien from the truth, that the will is then bound by the law; for then the law, if it has against itself a truly probable opinion, although it has for itself a more probable one, is doubtful, and it is an axiom that a doubtful law does not oblige.

Only then could the obligation of the will from the probability of the greater opinion have place, when, where there stood, for example, a more probable opinion for the law, the law would thereby become certain, and knowledge of the law would then be had. For the will is not bound except by a certain law, and by a certain law through knowledge of the law itself. But an opinion, although more probable, exhibits neither certitude nor knowledge. Therefore from the reason of Probus the contrary follows, namely, that if the intellect strives to attain truth as nearly as possible, the intellect cannot impose on the will the obligation of a law while its doubt stands; which Probabilism declares. Therefore from the fact that the intellect embraces what appears more probable, it does not follow that the will ought to follow what the intellect has judged more probable. For it is altogether one thing that this or that is speculatively more probable; another thing that consequently it is more probable that, that greater probability standing, notwithstanding the opposite probability, the law is certain and certainly obliges. This is not only not more probable, but not even probable, since the principles are admitted by all: Probability excludes certitude; a doubtful law does not oblige.

3. Titius, a confessor and probabilist, says: either Probabilism is true, and it is true in every case; or, if it is false even in one case, it is always false. Hence he does not hesitate to assert that Probabilism ought consequently to be extended even to the sacramental seal. But Titius adds: what is true speculatively is also true practically. Therefore without any scruple he is accustomed to speak in a rather free manner about things heard in confession. And if at any time others wonder at this manner of speaking, he says: they are ignorant; so much the worse for them.

Q. What as to the case?

R. It is true what Titius affirms: either Probabilism is true, and it is true in every case; or, if it is false even in one case, it is always false. The reason is, first, because the truth of a universal proposition must be verified in every other particular proposition contained under it; secondly, because in every true case of probabilism the axiom holds on which probabilism rests: a doubtful law does not oblige. Therefore if this axiom is once false, the foundation of all Probabilism is destroyed. - But the conclusion of Titius concerning the extension of probabilism to the sacramental seal of confession is not legitimate. The reason is that probability here does not regard the subjective liceity or illicitness of the action, which probabilism alone touches, but regards the very objective truth of the matter: whether the sacramental seal is manifested. For if it is probable that by speaking or acting in this or that way the sacramental seal is manifested, now it is not probable that it is licit to speak or act in this or that way, but it is certain that it is not licit. The reason is that the sacrament of penance is certainly rendered odious, and the faithful are removed from it; and moreover that probability does not make it so that, if in reality by that speech or by that action the sacramental seal is violated, the penitent is not thereby defamed, to which he has a certain right in whatever case, as much as is by force of the sacramental seal. And he has a certain right not to be exposed, by force of sacramental confession, even to a probable danger of infamy. Each has place, as is clear, both in probability of fact and in probability of law, which many wrongly distinguish in this matter. G. Comp. v. 2, 650; Cas. v. 2, 749; I. M. 116, 117, 120, 121. But what Titius adds, that what is true speculatively is also true practically, contains truth in the abstract, not in the concrete. For in the concrete, extrinsic circumstances can be superadded which render a matter licit in itself, although accidentally, illicit in practice. But in the case of Titius speaking in a freer manner about things heard in confession, according to his doctrine about probabilism, the matter is illicit not only extrinsically because of the wonder and scandal of others, but also intrinsically. Therefore not the others, but Titius himself, is ignorant, and for him the matter stands altogether badly.

4. Antoninus remembers that long ago, to avoid very frequent relapses against chastity, he most firmly brought into his mind that henceforth he wished to abstain from every sin against the angelic virtue, and that he had indeed often promised this to the confessor before receiving sacramental absolution, and that he had often renewed the same will immediately after receiving Communion. Hence Antoninus is anxious whether, by reason of a vow made, he ought to abstain from entering marriage. But he remembers that, in order to fulfill in deed what he had resolved in mind, on the feast day of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus he vowed several fasts to be performed, and several rosaries to be recited. But he does not now know whether he ought to do this on each Friday and Saturday, or only on the first Friday and Saturday of each month. He doubts besides whether he ought to do both on Friday and Saturday, or to fast on Friday and say the rosary on Saturday, and whether the whole rosary, or only a chaplet or third part of the rosary, since he himself did not distinguish sufficiently between the one and the other.

Q. Whether and how is Antoninus bound by the aforesaid vows?

R. Antoninus is not held by a vow of chastity; for a purpose of chastity, although most firm, which he most firmly brought into his mind to be observed, is not a vow. Nor is a promise often made to the confessor in confession and before sacramental absolution a vow. For a vow is a promise made to God alone. Nor likewise does that renewal of purpose and promise immediately after Communion have the value of a vow; for renewal is of the same will, which contained no vow. And, if Antoninus had truly emitted a vow of chastity, as he now well remembers that he vowed fasts and rosaries, so certainly he would also well remember that he vowed chastity. But as far as fasts and rosaries are concerned, after the matter has been weighed and the doubt remains, he is obliged only to the minimum. Therefore he must fast only and recite the rosary on the first day of Friday and Saturday each month; namely, fast on the first day of Friday, and recite the rosary on the first Saturday day, which seems more likely. And if there is also serious doubt about reciting the whole rosary, it suffices that he recite the chaplet, namely if, not sufficiently distinguishing between rosary and chaplet, he had in mind and vowed the rosary as he was accustomed to recite it in his family, and as it is also commonly accustomed to be recited. - I. M. 570, 572, 577, 586, 592, 593; Elbel 156 seqq.; G. 44.

5. Leofridus the confessor, following a probable opinion, imposed on his penitent an obligation of restitution from which he had already been freed by another confessor, who had also embraced a probable opinion in favor of his penitent. Hence, when the penitent refused to restore, Leofridus says: it is a matter of justice, in which probability has no place. For it belongs to justice to preserve equality; therefore, when doubt and probability stand, restitution must be made at least according to the proportion of the doubt and probability. - But although he himself was certainly persuaded about the reality of fire in hell, and he himself certainly held the contrary opinion as false and erroneous, nevertheless he did not hesitate to absolve a certain noble man who, on the contrary, thought the fire of hell to be metaphorical. For there are not lacking, he said, theologians, both old and also more recent, who think the matter doubtful, and the Church has as yet defined nothing about this matter. But a confessor does not have the right of imposing his own opinions on a penitent, since there are others who think the contrary.

Q. 1. Can the confessor impose on the penitent, at least a rude and ignorant one, his own opinion? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 119. To the second: first, Leofridus, in itself, is held to restitution toward his penitent. For since the penitent had for himself a truly probable opinion, Leofridus unjustly obliged the penitent to restitution, and so was an efficacious and unjust cause of the penitent's damage. But his general doctrine is false, that probability has no place in justice, as is seen everywhere among the doctors, and especially in St. Alphonsus. Likewise his reason is false, for it indeed belongs to justice to preserve equality and to restore it when injured; but restitution is to be made, from the same justice, by rendering to each one his own right, where it is certain concerning such a right. But where the right of another is doubtful, the very equality of justice to be preserved requires that the right of the possessor prevail, and that the possessor in good faith not then be despoiled of his own thing. G. 62, 70; L. 1, 6, n. 547.

Secondly, since Leofridus was certainly persuaded concerning the reality of fire in hell, and he himself certainly held the contrary opinion as false and erroneous, he could not give absolution to the noble man thinking otherwise. Nor indeed does his reason avail, namely that no definition of the Church has yet come forth on that matter, nor are there lacking some theologians who do not admit real fire of hell, but metaphorical fire. For first, if these things did not destroy the certitude of his intellect concerning the truth of the fire of hell, he could not form a conscience for himself by some reflex principle for absolving; for it is impossible that someone be directly certain concerning some truth, but reflexively doubt concerning the same. Then, in fact, it is not a matter here of something disputed among Catholic doctors, but of the common opinion of Catholic doctors, which Suarez affirms to be certain and Catholic. Cf. Suarez, De Angelis, l. 8, c. 12, n. 9; Petavius, De Angelis, l. 3, c. 5, n. 7; Toletus on I p., q. 64, a. 3, etc.; G. 71. But what Leofridus asserts in excuse of himself by no means excuses him. For from the fact that the Church has defined nothing, it does not follow that therefore the opposite opinion can be held as probable, or at least not improbable. Likewise from the fact that theologians are not lacking who hold the contrary opinion, this opinion cannot therefore be held as extrinsically probable, or at least not improbable. Extrinsic probability cannot be invoked if no probable reason is brought forward by the theologians; for extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic. And only then can extrinsic probability be invoked, abstracting from intrinsic, when it is a question of some matter entangled, obscure, involved in difficulties, not in reality sufficiently clear among doctors. Lastly, it is true that a confessor cannot impose his own opinions on his penitents when the opinion of the penitent is probable, or at least does not appear certainly improbable; but he cannot approve that the penitent follow false and erroneous opinions in a practical matter which pertains to faith and morals. L. 1, 6, n. 604; G. 69, 71-74. The present resolution is confirmed from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, 30 April 1890.

6. Sigismundus admits a testament made in his favor, but destitute of legal formalities, because, he says, it probably avails. But he refuses to pay certain pious and profane legacies inscribed in it, because, he says, they are probably null. The same Sigismundus juridically asks that another testament made in favor of Caius his blood-relative be annulled, since it is destitute of due formalities. He obtains the annulment of this testament. Likewise he refuses to pay certain profane legacies inscribed in it, because, he says again, they are null, as having been inscribed in a null testament.

Q. 1. Can one change a probable opinion once accepted, by acting according to the opposite probable opinion? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 128. To the second: Sigismundus, first admitting the testament, follows a truly probable opinion, and cannot be disturbed. Cf. I. M. 1029. But he cannot not pay the pious and profane legacies inscribed in it; since, accepting the testament as valid from a probable opinion, by that very fact he both acquires the right as to the advantage of the testament and at the same time contracts the obligation of the burden of the legacies, according to Rule 55 of Law in the Sixth: "He who feels the advantage ought also to feel the burden."

But if a testament lacking formalities is for a pious cause, it is certainly valid indeed, if from elsewhere the will of the testator is certainly established. I. M. 1030, 1031. But whether profane legacies contained in it are also valid is disputed. The reason for denying is that a testament of this sort does not avail except from the will of the Supreme Pontiff and from Canon Law, which does not involve itself in profane causes; and so profane legacies do not avail, but consequently by right of accretion they will pertain to the pious cause itself. The reason for affirming is that, since the pious cause suffers no damage from the defect of solemnities, equity at least requires that from the same defect, against the will of the deceased, it not take an advantage. But, on the contrary, since the heir is the pious cause itself, because the will of the deceased is certainly established by natural law alone, when by the same natural law the will of the deceased is certainly established as to the legacies, it is necessary that the pious cause execute this certain will of the testator. - Lugo d. 22, n. 274; L. 1, 3, n. 922.

Sigismundus, having recourse to the judge concerning the other testament, relying on a probable opinion concerning its invalidity, acts licitly, and uses his right, which a just law concedes to any citizen. But once the nullity of the testament has been declared by the sentence of the judge, consequently the profane legacies inscribed in it are null. For the law renders such testaments destitute of due formalities simply liable to nullity, no distinction being made between the testamentary disposition itself and the legacy. C. I. 804; C. G. 1001. - G. 75-78; I. M. 936.

57. Proof 3. St. Alphonsus has this in his Moral Theological Work, 6th ed., Rome, 1767, in which the Holy Doctor explained more fully his sentence concerning probabilism and never afterwards changed it, Theol. Mor., ed. P. Gaude, p. XIX: "There are two principles upon which, relying, I defend the licit use of probable opinion. The first, that a doubtful law, in the conflict of two equally probable opinions, does not oblige, because a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. The other, that an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation, because the obligation of law is posterior to the liberty with which man has been endowed by God." Both these principles are explained fully and proved by the Holy Doctor, l. 1, n. 66 seqq.; H. A., tr. 1, n. 37 seqq. But when a truly probable opinion is present, although it is in concurrence with another more probable and safer opinion, both principles are still verified, namely that the law is uncertain, if there is question of its existence, or that it is doubtful, if there is question of its interpretation, because obscure; and therefore neither does the law have the power of actually obliging, since it has not been sufficiently or certainly promulgated; "for then the doubt whether the law exists has been sufficiently promulgated, but the law has not been promulgated," L. I, n. 70, Turin ed., 1846; nor is man, having certain possession of his liberty, bound to reckon himself stripped of it because of an uncertain law; for prior to every law each one possesses his own liberty, since man must first be conceived as free, and then the law which is imposed upon man. Therefore. - L. 54 seqq.

Now, that in that hypothesis the law is in fact doubtful or uncertain, so that it is prudently judged such, whence that twofold axiom flows, is clear from the very nature of probability; for where true probability is present, greater probability does not of itself destroy lesser probability; and this both philosophers and theologians commonly affirm, and St. Alphonsus expressly hands down, H. A., tr. 1, n. 29, and l. 1, n. 40, where he says that the contrary of the more probable is also judged probable. The same Holy Doctor explains it in this way in the Dissertation, ed. 1755, n. 13: Greater probability does not destroy the lesser, "unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has for itself so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. Otherwise, however, one must speak if the excess is not notable, and the opposite probability receives its force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means destitute of its grave probability." Indeed, the probability or improbability of some opinion is not the same as its truth or falsity, so that one excludes the other, but is a suitability for meriting prudent assent, arising from grave motives, which, although greater or lesser, do not contradict one another if they are taken from diverse principles. But if they exhibit an argument so convincing that the opposite is judged improbable, we are now outside the case of greater or lesser probability, since one opinion will then be certain or probable, the other false or improbable.

Hence St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 604, raising the question: "Can a penitent be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion contrary to that which the confessor holds?" replies: "The common and to-be-followed sentence teaches that the confessor not only can but is also bound under grave obligation, where namely there is question of grave matter, H. A., tr. 16, n. 118, to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion, although the opposite seems more probable to the confessor... With this common sentence standing, strengthened by so many authorities and reasons, I do not see how the confessor can with safe conscience deny absolution to one wishing to follow an opinion which appears probable to the penitent himself, indeed perhaps more probable, if not directly, at least reflexively, as the probabilist authors commonly think, who, in following a probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one, judge that they embrace a sentence reflexively more probable, as one confirmed by weightier foundations and by the most common authority of doctors." The same Holy Doctor has the same doctrine in his last work, H. A., tr. 16, n. 118, to which sentence he adds no other limits than the following: namely, that "the opinion of the penitent have some probability, so that the confessor, although he does not hold it as solidly probable, nevertheless does not reckon it altogether false... evidently erroneous." Cf. also l. 1, n. 87, where the Holy Doctor, after Gerson, says: "Theologian doctors must not be easy in asserting that some things are mortal sins, where they are not most certain about the matter. Note, WHERE THEY ARE NOT MOST CERTAIN." - Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 26, n. 3; Pignatelli, Cons. Can., tom. 8, cons. 15.

63. An exception, and a true and illogical exception to probabilism, is the limitation which some probabilists and equiprobabilists add to probabilism from the principle of possession: In doubt, the condition of the possessor is better. Wherefore, they say, a doubtful law, indeed, in doubt about the existence of the law, does not oblige, because liberty possesses. But a doubtful law in doubt about its cessation obliges, because the law possesses. Hence, if it is probable that you did not emit a vow, you are not bound by the vow. If you certainly emitted a vow, and it is probable that you satisfied it, you are still bound to satisfaction. But thus to admit probabilism by halves around the existence of law, but not the cessation of law, is to admit the principles and deny the conclusions. If a doubtful law does not oblige, precisely because it is doubtful, whenever it is doubtful it will not oblige. But the law is as doubtful in the doubt about its existence, namely about its first existence, as it is doubtful in the doubt about its cessation; for if its cessation is probable, by that very fact the very existence of the law becomes doubtful. But an obliging law is not a law which existed, but one which exists; nor is it a law which exists in the abstract, but one which in its present certain obligation binds us. But if a probable opinion is had about the cessation of a law, however this is understood, its obligation becomes doubtful, and its existence likewise becomes doubtful; namely, again, not the very existence of the law in the abstract, but its force of obliging in the concrete, in the particular case, here and now. L. I, n. 63, 78. And thus, although it is certain that a vow was emitted and once existed, if probably you have satisfied it, that certain vow, insofar as once existing, becomes doubtful insofar as obliging you here and now; and that saying has force: A doubtful law does not oblige. Possession indeed constitutes a prevailing right insofar as he who possesses, by possession itself, is shown, or at least presumed, to be lord of the thing which he possesses. But how can this be either shown or reasonably presumed when the opposite is established by true or grave probability? For then it is established by true and grave probability that the possession is not legitimate, which is the only one that can constitute a prevailing right. For if the bare fact of possession, without legitimate title, at least reasonably presumed, constituted that prevailing right, then all thieves and robbers could retain another's thing by a prevailing right of possession. - Troplong, Della Prescrizione, c. 2, del Possesso, a. 2228; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 1, n. 260, 268.

64. St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 112, par. Secunda vero, says: "When it is probable that the obligation of a law never began, or that it has been abolished, then the presumption for the law ceases, and liberty possesses." Behold, the limitation of probabilism by the principle of possession has been dealt with, which, from St. Alphonsus, has no force except from presumption. The Holy Doctor joins indifferently two cases, that the law never began, or that it has been abolished; and when either is probable, from the Holy Doctor, the obligation of the law is not present. - Likewise in n. 290 he says that a probable custom suffices for excusing from the law. Behold, again, no account is taken by the Holy Doctor of possession of the law. And then, distinguishing between doubt and probability, he very well says: "that in doubt about custom the precept possesses, whence a dispensation is to be sought; otherwise, if it is probable that the custom is present."

69. Besides this most certain principle, there is another principle upon which all probabilism also rests; namely that, with a truly probable sentence standing against the law, it is metaphysically impossible that the law be certain. No one can deny this except the one who either does not understand the terms, or arbitrarily twists the terms into another signification.

70. It is worth the effort to hear from the Holy Doctor himself the definition of probable opinion and of certain sentence, so that it may appear from St. Alphonsus himself whether, with a truly probable opinion against the law, a certain sentence of the law can at the same time coexist. "Probable," says the Holy Doctor, "is that which rests upon a grave foundation, either intrinsic of reason or extrinsic of authority, which has power to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite... A morally certain sentence is one which excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite is reputed altogether improbable." Loc. cit., p. 21, n. 40. If an opinion opposite to a certain sentence must be altogether improbable, it is clear that together with the probability of an opposite opinion a certain sentence is utterly incompatible. Therefore the norm which probabilism provides for forming a practically certain conscience in doubtful matters is most safe; for each of these is most true: both that a doubtful law does not oblige, and that the law is doubtful when a truly probable sentence stands against it.

72. Besides, from the same Holy Doctor, who follows the doctrine of St. Thomas in this matter, certainty of law can be had only when knowledge of the law is had. However probable the notice of the law may be, knowledge of the law is not had; and therefore the law will then always remain doubtful, not sufficient for obliging. For under the name of knowledge of law probable notice cannot be understood. "This would be," says the Holy Doctor, "a new signification of a new vocabulary, since all philosophers, with the same St. Thomas, distinguish opinion from science, which is taken as certain cognition of some truth." Loc. cit., n. 74.

74. Therefore from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience we make a step by the following reasoning. What is forbidden by no certain law is lawful. But such and such an action, which is truly probably prohibited by no law, by that very fact is forbidden by no certain law. Therefore such an action is lawful. Since the major and minor of this syllogism are certain, the conclusion also will be certain. But the conclusion contains the judgment or dictate of conscience. - The same transition can be made by force of another reasoning. He who acts according to what prudence dictates acts honestly. But he who acts according to this or that probable opinion acts honestly. Since again the major and minor of this syllogism are certain, the conclusion also will be certain. - L. I, n. 67, 68, 69, 84; Muzzarelli, Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome, 1807, p. 30 seq.

82. Probabilism seeks utility, not truth. - It certainly seeks utility, but at the same time truth. It seeks utility, and a very great one: not sinning, and not multiplying sins without necessity. But it obtains this utility by this most certain truth, which St. Alphonsus hands down, l. 1, n. 60, p. 30, ed. 6, Gaude, which doctors most commonly hand down, and which is had in L. 31, De Off. et Pot. Iudic. Deleg.: "Unless you have become certain about the mandate, you will not be compelled to execute what is commanded." Certain, as the same St. Alphonsus says, l. 1, n. 75, p. 51, either through an evident reason or through manifest authority. - Wherefore again probabilism seeks utility: to impede formal sins. This indeed is the greatest utility; for no one is damned because of material sins, but because of formal sins.

83. But to seek utility is certainly not something illicit; otherwise it would be a sin to seek eternal beatitude itself, and virtue. What indeed can be more useful than to exercise virtue and avoid sin? If to seek utility is illicit, this is only because someone seeks either a vicious utility or seeks utility viciously. But the utility which probabilism seeks is neither vicious, nor does probabilism seek it viciously. For probabilism seeks this, and nothing else: not to multiply sins without necessity. And this utility is certainly not vicious. If entities are not to be multiplied without necessity, much less are sins to be multiplied without necessity. Nor is this sought viciously; for this is not sought except by means of this principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; with this other principle added: with true probability standing against the law, it is impossible that the law be certain. Each principle is most true, and consequently no vice can come from it.

84. Therefore while probabilism seeks a praiseworthy utility, it also seeks truth: for it seeks this practical truth, when a law obliges the will to observance of itself, and when it does not. And to find this truth in individual cases as they occur, it establishes the unshaken principle of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus: "No one is bound by any precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept." St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 63.

85. Probabilism is the art of evading moral duties by means of syllogisms. - Probabilism and probabilists, on the contrary, very commonly teach that it is altogether illicit both to act directly against the law and to act in fraud of the law. - It is indeed an art, or rather a moral system, and it is the science of evading moral duties or the law by means of syllogisms; but uncertain moral duties, a doubtful law. A doubtful law, St. Alphonsus cries out, does not oblige. An uncertain law cannot beget a certain obligation.

86. Probabilism selects means which render the attainment of the final end less safe. - Nothing is safer for the attainment of the final end than to remove the sins of an erroneous conscience; as, for example, the conscience of one would be erroneous who, in order to judge himself bound, would consider it sufficient that the law be uncertain and ambiguous. In the whole third chapter of the first book St. Alphonsus cries out against this, repeating, declaring, and proving a hundred times: A doubtful law does not oblige; An uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation.

87. Let St. Alphonsus be heard, following and reporting the doctrine of Father Bancel, the Dominican: "Since we ought not to form our conscience about obligation to something under penalty of sin, unless the existence of such obligation is morally established, we ought not to impose that burden upon ourselves; when, on the contrary, exemption from such obligation is morally established, ... it is morally established for us that liberty remains to us of embracing whichever of such probable opinions we wish." L. 1, n. 82, p. 62, ed. 6, Gaude. "That saying, He who acts probably acts prudently, can be taken in two ways. If it is taken as resting upon other reflex principles, it is truly prudent and certain; but if it is taken as a direct principle, with reflection of judgment excluded, it is false." It is false, namely, as the same St. Alphonsus immediately says, "of one operating with a practical doubt, having no principle by which he could lay aside the doubt." On the contrary, it is true "of one operating who forms the ultimate judgment not from the probability of the opinion alone, but from another certain reflex principle." L. 1, n. 79, p. 59; n. 65, pp. 35-36, ed. 6, Gaude. But this certain principle from the same Holy Doctor is: "Law, in order that it may oblige, must not only be promulgated, but also promulgated as certain." L. 1, n. 58, p. 27. "No one is bound by any precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept." L. 1, n. 59, p. 28. And consequently, "A doubtful law does not oblige." L. 1, n. 60, p. 30; n. 64, p. 34. "An uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation." L. 1, n. 61, p. 31; n. 73, p. 48.

88. Many canons prescribe that IN DOUBTS THE SAFER PART IS TO BE HELD. - St. Alphonsus himself replies: "What do the canons prescribe? They prescribe that in doubts the safer way is to be chosen. Therefore it is said, in doubts: What obstacle is that rule, if a man rests upon some certain principle? Then he already forms for himself a morally certain conscience about the honesty of the action, and he leaves the bounds of doubtfulness; nor can it any longer be said that he is in doubts. - Besides, the adversaries themselves concede that the aforesaid rule of following the safer part has no place in the matter of justice. But if the rule of the canons of following what is safer were universal for all doubts, even one who legitimately possesses a thing, in doubt whether the thing is another's, would be bound to be stripped of it. But St. Augustine teaches the contrary, saying: 'In the law of estates, each one is most rightly called a possessor in good faith so long as he is ignorant that what he possesses is another's,'" l. 1, n. 78, ed. 6, Gaude, p. 58.

89. But Probabilism renders the attainment of the final end less safe. - Nevertheless it renders it safe, and this suffices. But it is false and absurd by reason that that attainment must be rendered safer. Indeed, this is impossible; because, whatever safer means has been devised, another still safer could always be brought forward. Someone approaches confession with attrition. Is this not safe, and does it not suffice? Yet it is safer to approach with contrition. It is safer; but is it not still safer to approach with contrition perfect at the same time appreciatively and intensively? It is still safer; and would it not be much safer also to premise before confession the strictest bodily penances, fasts, scourgings, hair-shirts, alms, daily and nightly prayers and meditations?

90. Let St. Alphonsus be heard: "It was always a fear for me lest God require an account from me equally if I approved lax opinions as probable, as if I rejected probable opinions as lax. Looking at the present frailty of the human condition, it is not always true that it is safer to direct souls by the narrower way, since we see that the Church has often proscribed both too much liberty and too much rigor." L. 3, n. 547, p. 53, ed. Gaude. - Probabilism renders safe the attainment of the final end, because it directs conscience in doubtful matters, lest it practically err by affirming that something is sin which is not sin, and thus in fact by sinning. "But someone will object," says St. Alphonsus, "how can reasons which are only speculatively probable become morally certain in practice? This happens... not because the speculatively probable reasons themselves of some opinion become morally certain in practice, but because there are other reasons of a reflex principle, by which in practice the ultimate morally certain judgment is formed from that certain principle; and thus an action which speculatively is only probably honest, in practice becomes certainly morally honest." Loc. cit., p. 36, n. 65, par. Et sic.

91. Through probabilism man constitutes himself judge concerning divine precepts. - A distinction certainly must be made: As regards themselves and their objective existence, it is denied; As regards us, and as regards our obligation, it is conceded. And so it wholly must be; because what is not from faith is sin. Let St. Alphonsus be heard: "When an opinion turns around the mode of a thing, whether it is honest or not, then a probable opinion does well bring it about that the action is honest, although perhaps in itself it is not. The reason is that (as has been proved at length in the Dissertation on the use of probable opinion...) in those cases in which we probably opine that a prohibiting law is not present, or at least has not been proposed sufficiently manifestly, then the law does not oblige; and therefore the operation, because we do not sufficiently find it prohibited by law, certainly remains honest and free." L. 3, n. 700, note, p. 168, ed. Gaude. Through probabilism, therefore, man does not constitute himself judge concerning divine precepts, but concerning his own human actions.

92. By probabilism equivocation and mental restriction are legitimized; whence it is clear that the judgment of conscience is perverted by probabilism. - Equivocation and mental restriction are sometimes affirmed to be licit not by probabilists, but by all. If this licitness was affirmed beyond due limits by some probabilists, the abuse and error of probabilists, not the deceitful norm of probabilism, was the cause. Do equiprobabilists and probabiliorists have a privilege of infallibility, and are they not also sometimes deceived? Therefore from some errors of probabilists it does not follow that the judgment of conscience is perverted by probabilism. Otherwise, would this not have to hold also of the moral system of St. Alphonsus himself, whatever in the end this system may have been? For all know well that, with the progress of time, the Holy Doctor reprobated several sentences which he himself had previously embraced. Most certainly the Holy Doctor erred either the first time, when he had taught those opinions, or afterwards, when he retracted them. Therefore, if from the fact that some probabilists erred about equivocation and mental restriction, one must say of their moral system that the judgment of conscience is perverted, the same surely will have to be asserted of the moral system of St. Alphonsus himself, whatever in the end it may have been.

93. Adversaries of the Christian religion abused the placita of probabilists in order to attack the Christian religion. - This indeed is true; but did they not also sometimes bring forward the doctrines of St. Alphonsus himself in order to mock the same religion?

94. The Church has never authentically proposed probabilism. - This is wholly true, that the Church has never explicitly proposed probabilism as a moral system. But although it has not proposed it explicitly, nevertheless it has always proposed and does propose it implicitly. - For first, when it condemned various opinions concerning probable sentences, nevertheless it never condemned this proposition, that a doubtful law does not oblige, to which probabilism in fact, whole and entire, is reduced. Likewise it never condemned this other proposition, that with a true probable sentence standing against the law, the law becomes doubtful. And this second proposition together with the first enunciates simple probabilism.

95. Besides, it implicitly proposed probabilism by the proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions." For, if it is lawful to follow the most probable opinion, it is also lawful to follow a probable opinion. For, as St. Alphonsus himself expressly affirms, l. 1, n. 78, p. 58, ed. P. Gaude, n. 81, pp. 60-61, a most probable opinion remains within the limits of probability, and nevertheless it is lawful to follow it, the safer one for the law having been omitted, for this reason, which the same Holy Doctor weighs, because the law is doubtful. But it is also doubtful when against the law there is only a truly probable opinion. Behold what Suarez has, whom St. Alphonsus reports and wholly approves, loc. cit., n. 60, p. 31: "So long as there is a probable judgment that there is no law prohibiting or commanding the action, such a law has not been sufficiently proposed or promulgated to man; whence, since the obligation of law is of itself burdensome, ... it does not urge until it is established more certainly." And Benedict XIV writes in his Notifications: "Bonds must not be imposed when there is no clear law which imposes them." Apud St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.

96. The Church also implicitly approves probabilism by often approving probable opinions and confirming them for practice. And thus, for example, the Church supplies jurisdiction when a probable opinion is had for it. Nor certainly has anyone up to now required, nor does St. Alphonsus himself require this, that the opinion for jurisdiction be either certainly more probable, or at least equally probable as the opinion for its defect. Thus also the Church often refers to approved Authors; and certainly Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, Lessius, Castropalaus, and six hundred others are approved authors, and they are probabilist authors.

97. And by approving the Moral Works of St. Alphonsus, the Church implicitly approved probabilism also. For the Holy Doctor, apart from his own system itself expounded in his various Dissertations, follows only opinions simply probable, and approves them for practice although the opposite seems to him more probable. If St. Alphonsus had never written Dissertations about his moral system, surely no one could deduce probabiliorism or equiprobabilism from his moral works, as is demonstrated even from the very exquisite diligence by which he weighs the probability of each sentence.

98. Moreover St. Alphonsus in fact speculatively proposes the moral system of simple probabilism. For his system rests upon the aforesaid principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; and upon the aforesaid proposition, that when against the law there is a truly probable proposition, although for the law there is a truly and equally probable proposition, the law becomes doubtful and consequently does not oblige.

99. Nor indeed is the probabilism of St. Alphonsus converted into another moral system by another proposition which the Holy Doctor adds for completing his system, namely that when for the law there is a sentence certainly notably, or certainly evidently much more probable, we must follow it. For then there would be a different moral system of the Holy Doctor, as equiprobabilists pretend, if from the Holy Doctor the contrary sentence for liberty remained itself probable, although in an inferior and notably inferior degree. But the Holy Doctor does not hold some sentence for the law as certainly and much, or notably, more probable unless when through it the law already appears at least morally sufficiently promulgated, and therefore by no means doubtful; and consequently the opposite sentence for liberty cannot be called certainly probable. This the Holy Doctor wished explicitly to note in order to remove from his system slight and doubtful and uncertain probability. And this whole thing is certainly not against probabilism, but against laxism.

100. Behold how the Holy Doctor embraces his whole system in a few words, speculatively and practically, in his Moral Theology recently edited by Rev. Father Leonard Gaude of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, book 1, tract 1, On Conscience - Chapter 3, On Probable Conscience - Moral System, n. 82, p. 62: "There are many things which it is safer to do; but at the same time it is also safer not to believe oneself obliged to do them... unless such obligation is morally established for him." These things are from Father Bancel, the Dominican; and a little after the Holy Doctor adds: "For the rest, I protest that just as I do not approve those confessors who, adhering to excessive austerity, easily condemn the use of several opinions which rest upon a grave foundation; so, on the contrary, neither can I approve those who easily acclaim opinions without certain foundation as probable. - A confessor, before he embraces some opinion, is certainly bound to weigh the intrinsic reasons; and when some convincing reason occurs to him for the safer opinion, then he cannot embrace the opposite, less safe opinion." But does not this whole thing contain simple probabilism? Do probabilists say that it is lawful to follow opinions against the law, although for the law there is a convincing reason, and against the law no grave foundation is present? And when true or grave probability is present against the law, can it be said that its obligation is morally established?

101. Besides, in the same Moral Theology and new edition of Rev. Father Gaude, l. 4, c. 1, Epist. Resp. after n. 132, p. 456, the Holy Doctor thus expounds his moral system: "In order that it may be said that some action is not a grave sin, it suffices that true probability be had that it is not such, AS ALL ADMIT: I understand that probability which rests upon a foundation not slight, to be such that safely (according to the common sentence, the question of the more probable and the less probable having been set aside) it can be held and taught... Therefore, in order that some action be gravely illicit, certainty is required, as all teach." Does not probabilism teach and hand down the same thing? Does it not contend that certainty is required for affirming sin? Does it not also, the question of the more probable and less probable having likewise been set aside, constantly affirm this, that for removing grave sin true probability suffices, namely one which is not slight, but rests upon a grave foundation, so that it can safely be held and taught?

102. And in the same place, p. 457, he thus concludes his doctrine concerning the norm of human actions: "Hence Benedict XIV, in his work On the Synod, in very many chapters admonishes bishops of nothing else than that they never condemn as grave sin those opinions which doctors of either side defend as probable." Behold again simple probabilism. Probabilists say this same thing, and nothing else, neither more nor less. And the Holy Doctor repeats this a thousand times:

"It is certain, or to be held as certain, according as the doctors commonly teach... that things are not to be imposed upon men under grave fault unless an evident reason persuades this." L. 3, n. 547, p. 53, vol. 2, ed. P. Gaude. And this is simple probabilism.

103. Nor indeed is it of force to object that St. Alphonsus limited common probabilism, and that the whole hinge of the question turns on this limitation. For he says: "that if an opinion which stands for the law seems certainly more probable, we are altogether bound to follow it, nor can we then embrace the opposite opinion which stands for liberty." Loc. cit., n. 54, p. 25. Certainly more probable, as Rev. Father Gaude notes in the Preface, p. XX, is the same for St. Alphonsus as notably more probable. But this certainly or notably more probable opinion, for the Holy Doctor, is the same as a morally certain sentence, so that the opposite is only doubtfully or slightly probable; and therefore that former one is called by the Holy Doctor certainly or notably more probable. Behold how, says the same Rev. Father Gaude, "the Holy Doctor in the sixth and seventh edition, n. 55, expounded that principle," p. 25. But this exposition the Holy Doctor, with the same Rev. Father Gaude as witness, p. XIX, did not afterwards change substantially. This exposition is: "I say... certainly, because when the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything except notably more probable. And in that case, the safer opinion will no longer be now doubtful (understanding doubt strictly so called), but is morally or quasi-morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has for itself a certain foundation that it is true. Hence then it comes about that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either slightly or at least doubtfully probable in respect to the safer one." But it is said by the Holy Doctor, "which lacks a certain foundation"; because if in truth, notwithstanding that greater probability of the sentence for the law, the opposite for liberty rests upon a sufficient foundation, the Holy Doctor himself will say that this is probable or sufficiently probable, and that we can follow it.

104. And thus, loc. cit., l. 3, n. 404, p. 660, concerning the question there proposed: Can a prince with only a probable opinion for himself wage war against another, who possesses a kingdom in good faith? the Holy Doctor reports three sentences: the first affirming, the second holding that in order that a prince, not possessing, can wage war, he must be supported by an opinion at least more probable; finally, the third sentence requiring certainty of his right. He says that this third sentence is by far more probable to him, adding also that Elbel holds it as certain, and Tamburini thinks the contrary opinion improbable from intrinsic principles. And nevertheless immediately the Holy Doctor says that the second sentence is sufficiently probable to him, speaking speculatively, even intrinsically. Behold therefore how from the Holy Doctor a sentence not improbable, but sufficiently probable intrinsically, is opposed to a notably more probable sentence.

105. In the same place, n. 649, p. 127, concerning the question: Is a man having a vow of chastity or religion bound to marry a deflowered virgin after a true or fictitious promise of marriage? St. Alphonsus reports the first sentence denying, the second more probable sentence affirming; and then he says: "This second sentence seems to me certainly and by far more probable. But whether the first sentence is probable, Tamburini doubts; indeed Sporer says that Diana, who defends it, is not to be heard. I do not dare to call it either probable or improbable." - Behold again how from the Holy Doctor himself, from the fact that some sentence is certainly and notably more probable, it does not follow that the opposite is improbable.

106. In the same place, n. 293, p. 561, it is asked: Is it lawful on feast days to work because of piety alone, without actual necessity? St. Alphonsus reports the affirming and the denying sentence. Concerning the denying one he says: "This second sentence seems to me certainly more probable, with Sanchez... and commonly." But concerning the affirming one he does not say that it is improbable or slightly or doubtfully probable. Rather, on the contrary, he expounds its reason from cap. Conquestus de Ferris, where judicial acts are excused, "if necessity urges or piety persuades." And then the Holy Doctor adds: "And this reason does not seem to be despised, since judicial acts and servile works are forbidden by the same ecclesiastical law; but in things equiparated, where the same reason runs, the same disposition of the law runs, as we have said from the common doctrine, l. 1, n. 200, v. Haec tamen." Hence therefore we also have that the Holy Doctor, notwithstanding an opinion certainly more probable, still judges the opposite not to be despised, and consequently sufficiently probable.

107. In the same place, l. 3, n. 520, q. 4, St. Alphonsus asks: Is a thief consuming a thing taken away in extreme necessity always bound to restitution? The Holy Doctor brings forward the first sentence denying, and the second sentence affirming, which he calls most grave and more common; and, the reasons of this latter having soon been explained and handed down, he then adds: "Nevertheless, these things notwithstanding, I do not think the first sentence improbable." Therefore a sufficiently probable sentence at least is had, notwithstanding the opposite notably more probable, for it is called most grave. - But let us proceed to other things.

108. It is insisted: St. Alphonsus reproved probabilism as a lax doctrine, for he asserts that the doctrine which Theologians of the seventeenth century commonly held on this matter was lax. Likewise he asserts that he does not follow the system of the Jesuits. - The Holy Doctor holds as lax not probabilism simply, but broad and lax probabilism, which is extended even to doubtful and slight probability. Let the Moral System of St. Alphonsus be read, as it is expounded in the very edition of the Moral Theology of Father Gaude. In that whole Dissertation the Holy Doctor does not attack a truly probable opinion, but an opinion which, although it is called probable, in reality is not probable, since it is only slightly, or at least doubtfully, probable; as Rev. Father Gaude himself, p. 25, interprets St. Alphonsus, with the note added from St. Alphonsus himself in the sixth and seventh edition. And indeed St. Alphonsus, on the contrary, in that whole Dissertation does nothing else except defend ex professo and diffusely probable opinion against probabiliorists, from the fact that knowledge, or certain notice of the law, is required for affirming obligation; whence a doubtful law does not oblige, an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation. - Nor indeed does the Holy Doctor say that the doctors of the seventeenth century commonly held that lax sentence which he reproves; but that those authors held it as if commonly, therefore not commonly. As if commonly, not because all or almost all, or the greatest or greater part held it, but only because many held it. The Holy Doctor himself declares his assertion in the Dissertation of the year 1765, in which he says: "I did not pretend, nor do I pretend, to establish a new system; I also know well that no probabilist of solid doctrine declares licit the use of an opinion only slightly or doubtfully probable. But because many probabilists without distinction say that it is lawful to follow an opinion less probable if it is founded in reason or authority, I wished to distinguish, etc." And from these things it is openly clear that the Holy Doctor holds and defends only probabilism of solid doctrine, which excludes sentences slightly and doubtfully probable. Besides, it is clear that the Holy Doctor does not disapprove probabilism, but only its abuse. For this reason, H. A., tr. 1, n. 73, he says: "And in truth, in the past century very many abused matters in opining, in approving as probable many lax opinions; and therefore the Church proscribed several opinions, because they were undeservedly called probable." But how could the Holy Doctor have disapproved probabilism, when he defends it against its detractors who assert that it had already been condemned by the Church? Cf. l. 1, n. 85, 70, pp. 66, 70, ed. P. Gaude. Finally, if in truth the Holy Doctor had held the authors of the seventeenth century as lax, at least in the greatest or greater part of them, how would he not have contradicted words by deed? For the greatest part of the authors whom St. Alphonsus praises and follows belong to the seventeenth century. To this century, among other probabilist doctors, belong Gregory of Valencia, S.J.; John Azor, S.J.; Gabriel Vasquez, S.J.; Dominic Bannez, O.P.; Peter Lorca, O. Cist.; Thomas Sanchez, S.J.; Francis Suarez, S.J.; Vincentius Fillucius, S.J.; Leonard Lessius, S.J.; Martin Becanus, S.J.; Basil Pontius, O.S.A.; the Salmanticenses, Discalced Carmelites; Martin Bonacina, doctor of Milan; Aegidius Coninck, S.J.; Ferdinand de Castropalao, S.J.; Didacus Alvarez, O.P.; Paul Laymann, S.J.; Augustine Barbosa, Bishop of Ugento; Francis Amicus, S.J.; Cardinal De Lugo, S.J.; Peter Marchant, O.S.F.; Hermann Busembaum, S.J.; Anthony de Escobar and Mendoza, S.J.; Christian Lupus, O.S.A.

109. Nor indeed, when the Holy Doctor says that he does not hold the doctrine of the Jesuits, does he intend to say of all or almost all Jesuits, but only of some one or of a few. And St. Alphonsus himself expressly affirms this in the letters to Remond, March 30, 1756, and June 30, 1768. Besides, he often praises Jesuit authors, and he himself clearly says in the cited letter of March 30, 1756, that he took from the Jesuits the things which he wrote. "For, that which I always say, they were and are masters in moral theology."

110. The principal schools reproved probabilism. - St. Alphonsus in the Dissertation on the less probable opinion of the year 1755, n. 8, says that probabilism, expounded in terms, was first from Medina, a Spaniard, of the Order of St. Dominic, in the year 1577; nevertheless, in substance and in equivalent terms, ancient authors handed it down, and used it commonly in practice. And then in n. 9 he adds: "But it cannot be denied that for the space of a hundred years, or at least until the middle of the seventeenth century, the benign sentence (of probabilism) was received by all doctors." And indeed, as D'Annibale says, Summ., ed. 4, P. 1, n. 10 seqq., probabilism, namely in terms, according to the expression of St. Alphonsus, "having gone out from the borders of Spain from about the year 1610 until the year 1650, held sway over almost all the schools... All the disciples of St. Thomas, with one or another exception, gave their name to it; the disciples of Scotus, with Mastrius as witness, who calls the sentence of the probabilists most common and most received in every school; all the Fathers of the Society of Jesus entirely (with very few exceptions), to whom, excepting the Theatines, almost all theologians gave their vote." The same D'Annibale counts among these St. Alphonsus, "who undertook to defend: that it is licit to use a probable opinion, even in the occurrence of a more probable one for the law, whenever that opinion has a certain and grave foundation." Which is, as is clear, to defend probabilism in terms. Nor indeed did St. Alphonsus ever desert this probabilism. For when did St. Alphonsus teach that it is illicit to follow an opinion which has a certain and grave foundation? More than enough is even the conclusion alone of the Holy Doctor in the tract On Conscience, as it is had in the edition of Father Gaude, l. 1, n. 76, p. 53: "It must be concluded that the divine law does not oblige unless when it is known, unless when it is MOST CERTAIN, unless when KNOWLEDGE is had of it, unless it itself BECOMES KNOWN."

111. After Bartholomew Medina, almost all Bishops, universities, and doctors from every nation and religious order indeed embraced probabilism in terms. Cf. Franc. Ant. Zachar., De Locis Moralis Theologiae, tr. 5, c. 3, and St. Alphonsus, Scholastico-moral Dissertation for the moderate use of probable opinion in the concurrence of a more probable one, Naples, 1755. But before Medina, the ancient doctors truly handed down probabilism in substance, and used it. And thus St. Antoninus, part 1, tit. 3, cap. 10, Sect. 10; p. 2, tit. 1, cap. 11, Sect. 28, says that there are contrary opinions among doctors especially in moral matter, and that anyone can follow any opinion, provided he forms for himself a good conscience, when no express authority and sufficient reason to the contrary is had. And St. Thomas, Ulricus, Albertus Magnus, Hostiensis, William, Peter de Palude, and Godfrey of Fontaines, reported by the same St. Antoninus in the cited places, also held this. And Christian Lupus, Opp., tom. 11, disp. 1, shows that the reason for resolving moral questions in doubtful matters by the principles and method of probabilism was familiar even to the most ancient Fathers.

55. • The efficacy of probability is situated in its force for forming the ultimate dictate of conscience, practically certain. But from those things which we asserted in no. 39, certain conscience alone is the right rule of morals. In what way, then, can it happen that from even greater probability it is sometimes licit to act? Certainly this is not licit by force of probability alone. Therefore recourse must be had to some morally certain principle, so that certitude may be had. Therefore one must now discuss what probability avails for this end; namely, whether sometimes, with solid reasons favoring both the law and liberty, we can consider ourselves free from the very bond of the law.

That we may discuss and resolve these questions, we establish the following theses.

It is not licit to follow a probable opinion, nor a more probable one, with the safer one left aside, as often as there is an absolute obligation of obtaining some determinate end, which the use of a means probably unfit would bring into danger; then therefore the safer part must be followed.

56. • It is proved. Whoever is compelled to obtain an end absolutely and more certainly, is held to choose those means by which he is certainly going to attain the end. But the end can be obtained certainly only through the safer part: for by hypothesis the means, only probably apt, brings into danger the end which I am held absolutely to attain. Therefore it is not licit to use a means only probably apt, but more apt and the same safer means must be chosen ¹. Therefore the safer part must be followed.

¹ It must be denied that in these circumstances any probability remains for the opinion. For from what has been said above, no probability remains for liberty where a certain law militates against it. But thus the matter stands in the case. It is certainly a law that I cannot inflict injury on another; and therefore it is certainly a law that I am held to guard against a probable danger of another's harm, since it is injurious to bring a probable danger of harm to another. Therefore as often as from my action a probable danger threatens another, the action is manifestly illicit, as being opposed to a certain law.

52.^† Hence You Will Resolve. - 1. In those things which are necessary for salvation by necessity of means, you are held to follow the safer; for a most grave obligation urges everyone certainly to care for the eternal salvation of his own soul; therefore means absolutely safe and certain must be applied ². Therefore in matters pertaining to the Faith or to the true Religion, the safer opinion must necessarily be followed, opposite probability being set aside ³. Hence the following proposition was condemned by Innocent XI under no. 4: An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief ⁴. - St. Lig., no. 43.

² Hence if you are uncertain whether you were baptized, or if you prudently doubt whether your grave sins were duly expiated through confession, you are held to seek the grace of justification by suitable means.

³ This most grave obligation of natural law is violated by all those who, perhaps thinking themselves unfit for another examination, nevertheless confess that salvation can be obtained in the Catholic Church; but in the meantime neglect to embrace it, because they think they can be saved also in their own sect. For at least this can and ought to cast grave doubt upon them, that against the opinion of their own salvation they have the opinion of all Catholics; and therefore the obligation either of inquiring more diligently into the matter, or certainly of choosing the safer part, cannot be hidden from them.

⁴ Beware, nevertheless, lest you conclude from this that anyone, when faith is at issue, is obliged to adhere to an opinion, even a more probable one. For by the same Innocent XI the sentence was proscribed (prop. 21) that supernatural assent of faith, useful for salvation, stands with only probable knowledge of revelation, and with fear by which someone fears that God has not spoken. Therefore from that fourth condemned proposition you will conclude this one thing: that that unbeliever is not excused if, led by a probable opinion, he remains tranquilly in his sect; for he would fail in a grave obligation of solicitously applying those means by which he may reach the truth.

2. A hunter fearing lest by discharging shot at a wild animal he perhaps injure some man cannot fire, even if he judged more probably that the danger is absent; for this danger, if perhaps it is present, cannot be removed by a contrary probability, even a greater one.

3. A physician and surgeon are held to apply the safer medicines and remedies which can be had here and now; because by a tacit contract they have obliged themselves to obtaining the end more securely, insofar as it can be done. The same must likewise be said of all others who have contracted some obligation of this kind toward the neighbor ⁵. - St. Lig., no. 44.

⁵ Thus a judge is held to render a sentence according to the more probable reasons. On this matter you have proposition 2 condemned by Innocent XI: I think probably that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable.

4. The minister of a Sacrament, where its validity is at issue, unless the defect is supplied by the Church, or a case of necessity urges, is held, insofar as he can, to follow the safer part, with the less safe probable, or even more probable, one left aside; the reason is that otherwise he would expose the Sacrament to danger of nullity, and his neighbor to danger of spiritual harm. Hence deservedly the proposition was condemned by Innocent XI under no. 1: It is not illicit in conferring Sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the Sacrament, with the safer one left aside. - St. Lig., no. 48.

I said 1. unless the defect is supplied by the Church; for sometimes the Church can and is considered to supply that which is lacking for the validity of a Sacrament: and this indeed can happen in two sacraments, namely in the sacrament of Penance, if for a grave reason it is conferred with doubtful jurisdiction, or with probable jurisdiction, and in the sacrament of Matrimony, when it is celebrated with a doubtful impediment of ecclesiastical law, or even if the delegation of the assisting Priest is doubtful, as will be said in its own place. - St. Lig., no. 50.

I said 2. unless a case of necessity urges: because since the Sacraments are for men, they must be ministered to a man constituted in grave danger of life in the best way in which it can be done, even with mere probability, indeed with slight and very slight probability concerning their value. - St. Lig., no. 49, and others commonly.

It is not licit to follow an opinion slightly probable, with the safer one left aside ⁶.

⁶ ** However manifestly Father Gury opens his mind in this thesis; however Father Ballerini in the attached note said that the opposite doctrine is condemnable; indeed however the same Father Ballerini in the little Dissertation already reprinted several times On the Moral System of St. Alphonsus clearly professed that no one of sound mind could have adhered to this condemnable doctrine, namely with these words (final proposition): Certainly no one of sound mind, to speak with Dominicus Viva, taught or could teach that men act prudently and licitly if they rest on an opinion in no way probable, of which sort the adversaries whom the thesis of St. Alphonsus attacks are...; nevertheless both VV. (page 38) and their French Confrere (see Univers, May 8, 1873) do not hesitate to accuse both Gury and Ballerini, as though they profess this condemnable and foolish doctrine, on which account (ibid.) they furthermore traduce them as supporters of laxism, liberalism, and rationalism. Perhaps you will wonder, friendly reader, at these monstrosities; but you will be more stupefied that, although in the preceding words Father Ballerini proclaims that that condemnable doctrine which St. Alphonsus attacks could not have been defended except by those who lacked a sound mind, VV. accuse Ballerini not once, but again and again (see Additional Summary, cols. 499 and 507; and V., page 112), because he made a blasphemous jest against St. Alphonsus and in the alleged words traduced him as a man not of sound mind. And in these few things you have some specimen, candid reader, of what sort is the method by which VV. undertook to attack both Gury's Compendium and the added notes.

58. • It is proved. For a slightly probable opinion, as has been said, rests on light motives, which cannot attract the assent of a prudent man; whence from them it cannot be persuaded that the existence of the law is uncertain. But it is illicit to follow some opinion, with the safer one left aside, unless the law can be said to be invincibly unknown; but the law cannot be considered unknown unless by solid reasons it is proved to be uncertain. Therefore....

It is also clear from the third proposition condemned by Innocent XI: Generally, when trusting in intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided that one does not depart from the limits of probability, we do something, we always act prudently ⁷.

⁷ Another vice is present in the preceding proposition, on account of which it could be condemned, because namely while it always, and thus in every case, affirms the use of probability to be licit, it comprehends also those cases in which a certain law forbids it, as was said at the preceding thesis, no. 56, 57. Nevertheless if with most more recent authors by the name slight probability you understand that which is not equal to eliciting a prudent assent, and therefore cannot even cast prudent doubt on the existence of the law, the proposition will be condemnable also on account of the reason brought in the text. Dominicus Viva (On Proposition III Condemned by Innocent XI, no. 1) attributed this false opinion to Tamburini, Bresserus, and Amicus; but from mere lack of diligence. For 1. Tamburini (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 3, § III, no. 11) expressly cautions lest the probability of the other proposition be so great that it cast the opposite down from probability, and thus the intellect can prudently assent. 2. Bresserus (On Conscience, book 3, ch. 6, no. 77) discusses an opinion for which a reason of great moment militates. 3. Finally Amicus (Scholastic Theology, vol. 3, disp. 15, sect. 3, no. 49) speaks not of slight probability, but of slight assent, which he ascribes to a probable opinion having a more probable one against itself.

It is licit to follow the most probable opinion, and even the more probable one, with the safer one left aside, where there is question only of the honesty of the action.

59. • It is proved 1. As to the most probable. It is clear 1. from the condemnation of the proposition of Sinnichius, which is the third of the thirty-one proscribed by Alexander VIII and is of this sort: It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among probable ones. Therefore it is licit to follow at least the most probable opinion. Besides, in this condemned proposition there is question of a less safe most probable opinion, since no one ever denied that it is licit to follow the safer most probable one. Therefore. - It is clear 2. from the fact that according to St. Ligorius and others, where a most probable opinion is given, the opposite proposition becomes slightly probable, as was said above (no. 52) in the definition of the most probable opinion. For it is not conceived how a solid reason can stand on one side, if on the other side a most grave foundation of thinking otherwise appears. Therefore with the most probable opinion standing, a very slight fear of erring remains, and therefore, if not absolute certitude, at least some broad moral certitude of the law's non-existence is had. Therefore, etc.

It is proved 2. As to the more probable. That must be admitted as true in which all theologians agree; for it cannot be supposed that all theologians have fallen into error by unanimous consent. Moreover, if you except the very few rigorists, all agree in crowds in admitting this doctrine, at least if there is question of an opinion truly more probable.

Moreover, if you wish to inquire into the intrinsic reason of this sentence, no other solid reason seems able to be brought except that by which the following proposition concerning the liceity of the use of moderate probabilism is accustomed to be proved, namely that the law, if perhaps it is present, is altogether unknown, and therefore that it cannot oblige.

It is licit to follow an opinion truly and solidly probable, with the safer one, equally probable or even truly more probable, left aside, where there is question only of the licit or illicit ⁸.

⁸ ** Thus also St. Alphonsus, who (Dissertation according to the Naples edition, year 1755), after, as he says (no. 1), to avoid ambiguities and equivocations, he set forth beforehand this definition of a more probable opinion: More probable is that which rests on a graver foundation, but also with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary is also truly probable, or gravely verisimilar, although less so; then (ibid., no. 3) writes: We undertake to prove the last, more benign and most common sentence, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one for the law, whenever the former has a certain and grave foundation. Concerning this thesis then (ibid., no. 52) he puts forward this judgment: Our sentence, namely that it is licit to follow a probable opinion for liberty, with the more probable one left aside, is far more probable, or most probable, indeed morally or in a broad way certain. This is clear from the arguments set forth above..... These arguments indeed are each strong enough to show the moral certitude of our sentence; much more when joined together. Moreover even the Authors of the Alphonsian Vindications concede, indeed contend, that St. Doctor never changed his sentence.

This proposition can be demonstrated by a threefold genus of arguments, namely 1. from reason; 2. from authority; 3. from the consequences which flow from the opposite sentence.

60. • From reason one can argue thus: There is no obligation unless it is certain concerning it; but it is not certain concerning the obligation of observing a law against which true and solid probability militates. Therefore there is no obligation of following the safer part, with the truly probable opinion left aside; therefore it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, with the safer, even more probable, one left aside.

I. THE MAJOR IS PROVED from the necessity of cognition for obligation. For he is not obligated who invincibly does not know that he is obligated. But in the hypothesis I invincibly do not know that I am obligated. Therefore I cannot truly and properly judge myself bound by obligation; therefore in reality I am not obligated.

61. • The proposition is confirmed from the doctrine of St. Thomas. For thus he himself says in the Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 17, art. 3: No one is bound by any precept except by means of knowledge of that precept... The same virtue is that by which a precept binds and by which conscience binds, since the precept does not bind except by virtue of knowledge. Whence thus: no one is bound except by virtue of knowledge; but, from St. Thomas, to be bound by virtue of knowledge is the same as to have a certain obligation. Therefore no one is bound unless his obligation is certain to him. - And indeed St. Ligorius chiefly uses this argument in Moral System, § II.

62. • II. THE MINOR IS PROVED, namely it is not certain concerning the obligation of observing a law probably not existing. For by hypothesis the law is uncertain, since true and solid probability is supposed against it; therefore also the obligation following from it is uncertain. For a greater degree of certitude cannot be given in the obligation than in the law from which it proceeds; otherwise the certain would arise from the uncertain. Therefore.

It is confirmed. A certain obligation, as effect of law, supposes a certain cause or law. For if the effect could be certain without the cause being certain, the effect could exist without a cause; which is repugnant. Therefore there is not a certain obligation where the law is uncertain, or probably not existing. Therefore.

63. Nor say that, the directly certain law being deficient, there exists another indirectly certain law producing a certain obligation. For if such a law could be feigned, either it would be a law of avoiding the danger of sinning, or a law of following the safer; moreover neither can be feigned.

1. Not a law of avoiding the danger of sinning. For 1. the objection can be turned back against the probabiliorists themselves; since, such a law being supposed, it would no longer be licit to follow even the solidly more probable, with the safer one rejected, because even then such a danger would be present. - 2. That law could not certainly exist, and therefore certainly oblige me, except insofar as there truly was a danger of sinning formally in the violation of the direct law which probably does not exist; moreover there is no danger of sinning formally, since that direct law, as uncertain, produces no certain obligation, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore if perhaps that wholly uncertain law exists, there will be only a material violation of the law: therefore no sin will be present.

2. Nor a law of following the safer. For 1. if such a law were feigned, it would be strong also against the adversaries, and would lead us into tutiorism, proscribed in the condemnation of the proposition of Sinnichius: It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among probable ones. 2. That law of following the safer would suppose that it is not simply safe to disregard a law probably not existing: moreover this is false where there is question only of the licit or illicit. For it is safe enough to avoid sin and the danger of sin. Moreover sin and the danger of sin are avoided by not fulfilling a direct law probably not existing, as was said above. Therefore.

64. • It is clear from various heads, namely:

1. From the more common consent of authors through several centuries. For from the time when the dispute concerning probabilism arose, namely from the middle of the sixteenth century, innumerable authors at once from every nation, state, condition, and from all Religious Orders undertook its patronage, among whom not a few shine forth illustrious by the fame of doctrine, such as Suarez, Cardinal de Lugo, Lessius, Eusebius Amort, Bonacina, etc., and in more recent times St. Alphonsus de Ligorio. But if some among so great a multitude of Doctors perhaps seem to have extended the limits of probabilism too much ⁹, let us surely guard against a danger of this kind, yet retaining the limits of true probabilism, namely by not admitting an opinion as probable unless it rests on a solid foundation, or unless solid reasons militate for it, according as nearly all, even before St. Ligorius, understood probabilism ¹⁰. moral questions, which is sought from the principles of probabilism, was also very familiar to the most ancient Fathers of the Church, and indeed in matters of the gravest moment.

⁹ Beware, nevertheless, lest you think that the lax opinions which had to be rejected are generally due to probabilism (as certain persons have either imprudently or even fraudulently suggested) as their proper source. And indeed with slight trouble from those Authors who are accustomed to be sold as probabiliorists, a lengthy catalogue could be brought forth of those laxities, of which no one has yet been able to bring forth an example from the books of the probabilists.

¹⁰ And thus concerning an opinion which rests on a grave foundation, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, must be understood certain sayings of the old Doctors which St. Antoninus reports (Summa, part I, title 3, ch. 10, § 10). For after he set forth beforehand that sometimes there are contrary opinions among Doctors greatest in sanctity and knowledge in moral matter even necessary for salvation, and proved this by the example of St. Thomas, who holds that after a fall into mortal sin it is not necessary that someone immediately confess under precept when a supply of a confessor has been had, while nevertheless Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bonaventure are of the contrary opinion in this: but neither of their opinions is reproved, although the opinion of Blessed Thomas is more commonly held, which nevertheless seems less safe; then to confirm that which he had established, namely that with good conscience someone can hold one part of some opinion and operate according to it,... especially when someone applies diligence in inquiring and does not find something which sufficiently moves him to this, that it is illicit, he subjoins these things: Likewise Ulricus in the Summa says that if someone concerning some doubtful thing to be done consults those more skilled, about which he has no express authority, whether it is so or not: provided that he forms for himself a good conscience, even if the matter holds itself otherwise than that which he thinks and which was advised to him, he is excused, because he did what he could, and God requires no more. Likewise from the responses which seem to have been given by Albert the Great, it is had that a simple brother or any man can with salvation follow in counsels whichever opinion he wishes, provided that he follows the opinion of some great Doctor. Hostiensis also says...: Where there are diverse opinions and diverse judgments, the more humane and more equitable is always to be preferred.... William also in the gloss of Raymond says that in the niceties of law, where even the wise doubt, ignorance is excusable. Nevertheless if someone in good faith chooses that part or that, he ought not on this account to have a conscience too scrupulous. Likewise Peter de Palude says... that if a confessor doubted whether that, concerning which the one confessing neither repents nor confesses, were mortal, and the one confessing says that he did this by counsel of skilled men, concerning whom from life and knowledge it is probable that they would not advise except well, he can conform himself to that judgment. Geoffrey of Fontibus seems to think the same in these contrary opinions which are tolerated by the Church. Thus St. Antoninus; from which it is sufficiently clear how much those are deluded who ascribe the beginnings of this doctrine and practice to Bartholomaeus Medina, otherwise an excellent theologian from the Order of Preachers, as though he first introduced it. For from the things adduced above it manifestly shines forth that, as to substance, it preceded even the age of scholastic theology. And worthy indeed to be read is the Dissertation which Christian Lupus published on this argument (Works, vol. XI, diss. I), in which it is splendidly shown that the method of solving questions

65. • 2. From the doctrine commonly handed down in this time. For if the schools spread through the whole world are inspected, in very many of them the doctrine of moderate Probabilism will be found handed down and defended, especially at Rome, which rightly must be considered as the center of theological sciences, and where false doctrine, and indeed publicly, while the Church is silent, certainly cannot be taught. So likewise in all Italy, Spain, Germany, etc. - In France itself also the doctrine of St. Ligorius, which certainly altogether recoils from probabiliorism, is now received daily with almost unanimous applause.

3. From the approval of the Church, at least implicit, in the approval of the works of St. Ligorius. For the sacred Congregation of Rites solemnly declared that there is nothing worthy of censure in the works of the holy Doctor. Again in the decree of the Sacred Penitentiary (5 July 1831), approved by the Supreme Pontiff Gregory XVI, any professor of theology can follow and teach all the opinions which St. Ligorius professes in his Moral Theology, nor is the Confessor to be disturbed who follows the same opinions in the practice of the sacred tribunal of Penance ¹¹.

¹¹ To this pertain the words of our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX in the letter given to Peter Scavini on 7 April 1847: We vehemently congratulate you, because in composing these theological Institutions you had nothing more ancient than to propagate more and more the salutary doctrines of Alphonsus Maria de Ligorio, a most holy and learned man, and to imbue with them especially the minds of ecclesiastical youth.

66. • I. In the system of the probabiliorists there would follow a difficulty too grave for Confessors. For the Confessor would expose himself to the danger of sinning because of a defect of sufficient diligence in weighing the various degrees of probability, especially in the matter of restitution, when from two equally probable opinions he would follow one. For if he assumed the more benign sentence, he would sin by permitting that in which he apprehended a deformity probably existing. If he acted according to the stricter sentence, he would sin by imposing an uncertain yoke on the penitent ¹². Besides, although the stricter sentence appears more probable to him, when will he be certain that it is truly such, and that the opposite one does not seem more probable to another Confessor? Nor could anyone undertake the office of Confessor, unless perhaps he had been so versed in moral theology that he could certainly distinguish between more probable and less probable opinions: for the burden of doing includes the burden of knowing; but very few are able to furnish this ¹³. Hence there follows also that contradiction of Confessors who, though professing probabiliorism, nevertheless not rarely keep saying that they cannot apply the principles of probabiliorism rigorously ¹⁴ in the administration of the sacrament of Penance; and so they hold one thing in theory, but the wholly opposite in practice. Being constituted in anxieties, there are not lacking those who easily judge that to be more probable which at other times they would have held less probable. Would it not be better to establish and admit milder principles with so many most wise Doctors, and to lead them into practice more exactly?

¹² Hence one must repeat that Confessors imbued with the principles of probabiliorism, and otherwise of a timorous conscience, for the most part flee the sacred ministry of hearing confessions, harassed, of course, by dreadful anxieties, or certainly devote all their labor to cultivating in spirit certain little devout persons.

¹³ ** Concerning this matter St. Alphonsus thus says (Dissertation, edition of the year 1755, no. 17): Such appearance (namely of greater probability) cannot constitute a certain rule of acting, since it can deceive in many ways. For not rarely some opinion, which appears more probable to one person, will appear less probable to another; indeed to oneself an opinion which yesterday was less probable will appear more probable today.

And again (ibid., no. 42), giving the reason why a more probable opinion cannot oblige, he brings forward the same reason: For some opinion, which is more probable to me, will often be less probable to others; and therefore the law would be particular only for those to whom that opinion appeared more probable. But this certainly would be against the nature of law, which for the common good must necessarily be universal, and proposed universally, lest the people, who are held to observe it, be more often divided and perplexed concerning the truth to be embraced, while each preacher or confessor, from the diversity of opinions, would often instruct the faithful according to his own sense.

Then the holy Doctor solves the objection, showing that these inconveniences press only those who wish some obligation to arise from a more probable opinion. Thus he says (ibid., no. 43): Nor is it valid to say that, by following the benign sentence (what the benign sentence may be, see above, Note to thesis IV), deformity also can intervene, since the same opinion can seem probable to one person, improbable to another. It is not denied that this can happen; but it will always be true that when some opinion possesses solid probability, and rests on a certain grave foundation, it will be judged probable among the greatest part of the wise: and this will already be enough for conserving the universal uniformity of the observance of law, notwithstanding that among some particular person it is not probable; for that which rarely happens does not take away universal conformity. Yet this certainly does not occur concerning the estimation of more probable opinions; because, since greater or lesser probability depends on moral motives, namely on judgment and weighing of reasons, which some draw from one principle, others from another, it happens not rarely, but commonly, that what is stronger to one appears weaker to another.

Besides, the holy Doctor intimates the difficulties and inconveniences which would follow the necessity, if there were any, of determining certainly which opinion is truly more probable in preference to the opposite. Thus he says (ibid., no. 48): BUT THAT WE BECOME CERTAIN THAT SOME OPINION... IS TRULY MORE PROBABLE, OR HAS THE REQUIRED PREPONDERANCE, THIS IS MORALLY IMPOSSIBLE. For either that preponderance is small; and who will be secure that the opinion is truly more probable? For since the excess is modest, it can with difficulty be perceived certainly. Or the preponderance is great; and who will be able to judge that it reaches a sufficient measure, so that the safer opinion (in the present matter let us say, the opposite, or less safe one) is judged false or at least slightly probable? And so we would always have to act with a practical doubt.

Hence concerning the anxieties which the obligation both of knowing and of following the more probable things would bring, the holy Doctor brings forward these things (ibid.) from Ven. Father Segneri: Either I am held to follow the more probable things in themselves, and then when shall I know what opinion is truly more probable in so many cases, where grave reasons and authorities occur opposed on this side and on that? Or the more probable things for me, and the anxieties would be increased; for often I would have to judge my opinion to be more probable against another sentence of several wise men; and then who will render me safe, that my opinion is certainly more probable, and more notable with that notable preponderance which some of the adversaries require? How will I be certain that I myself have understood well and solved well the opposite reasons? That the dictate of conscience, which I formed for myself, is sufficiently certain and safe? That I have not been hallucinated by my own sense, so that, if I err, my error is truly invincible and inculpable?

But that the common sentence lacks these inconveniences, the holy Doctor thus continues (ibid., no. 50): But they do not expose themselves to that danger who follow an opinion certainly probable, although less so. Because after they have been made certain concerning the probability of the opinion, they are not held to apply greater diligence. For when some opinion rests on a grave and certain foundation, there is no longer a moral or prudent hope of finding certain truth; and therefore if they are mistaken, they are mistaken invincibly.

¹⁴ The principles of probabiliorism rigorously admitted, as they were defended by the older authors, for example Gonzalez, Antoine, Gennett, Sinnichius, etc., labor under another inconvenience, and one not slight, which also did not escape the eyes of St. Alphonsus (cf. Index of Authors, which Father Michael Haringer prefixed to St. Alphonsus' Theology, see Gonzalez, page LXV, Ratisbon edition 1846). For they do not deny, nor can they deny, that which is confessed among all and ought to be, namely (see above no. 39 with note), that for an act to be honest, a certain conscience concerning the honesty of it is altogether required. But on the other hand, to acquire this certitude concerning the honesty of the action, they neither wish nor are able to invoke for themselves any support from reflex principles, just as they attack it in adversaries. Therefore it is necessary that they borrow a certitude of this kind altogether from direct principles, or from the innermost and proper reasons of each matter. Hence that saying of Antoine (On Conscience, ch. 4, q. 1): It is not licit (to follow probable conscience), unless the probability is so great that it excludes every reasonable fear of falsity, and produces certitude at least relative: because, as I said in ch. 2, for not sinning there is required a certain judgment, at least by moral certitude, by which doubt and the fear of sin, at least reasonable fear, is prudently excluded. And again (q. 3, no. 4) he gives the reason, because an opinion only equally probable standing for liberty cannot bring moral certitude, which is at least required for not sinning. Nor otherwise does Gonzalez, at the very front of his work, assume for himself the task of proving that, for someone licitly to be able to follow a probable opinion favoring liberty..., it is altogether necessary that that opinion... be judged by him to be true by an absolute, firm, and non-fluctuating judgment: which certainly are the marks of certitude. Hence after he contends (disp. IV, § XII, in the title) that a certain and evident practical judgment is necessary for acting rightly, he adds (see Index, under Reflection) that the one acting must make the opinion his own by direct assent. But now, from the sentence of all (see St. Alph., Apostolic Man, tr. 3, no. 2, and Viva on proposition 3 of Alexander VIII, no. 2), a sentence at least morally certain differs from a most probable opinion in this, that the former excludes every prudent fear of the opposite, but the latter does not. Therefore from their sentence, not only by their words expressly, but also from the intrinsic force and nature of the system itself, it follows that not even the most probable opinion suffices for acting rightly. Hence that saying of St. Alphonsus (l.c.): I do not know how the aforesaid authors, by asserting that it is not licit to use in acting any but morally certain sentences, since thus in reality they utterly reprobate the use of probable opinions, although in words they seem to admit it; I do not know, I say, how they can be excused from the condemned proposition, which said (it is the third of the thirty-one proscribed by Alexander VIII): It is not licit to follow the most probable opinion among probable ones.

67. • II. A most troublesome difficulty for the faithful would follow. For in doubts there would be imposed on them an obligation of inquiring what opinion is more probable; since the obligation of operating according to the more probable includes the necessary duty of inquiring into it. But for the most part there is a moral impossibility of distinguishing between the more probable and the less probable; for even to the learned this is often very difficult. And indeed I ask, whether I am held to the more probable in itself or absolutely, or as to me or relatively? If the former, whence shall I know it? If the latter, again either there is question of intrinsic probability, or extrinsic. If of the latter, what school must be followed?... what Doctors must be consulted?... If of the former, the difficulty increases: whence shall I know whether I am sufficiently fit for this judgment? whether I am in invincible ignorance or not? Therefore being uncertain, and pressed by doubts, what shall I do? Shall I have recourse to Masters? But by hypothesis it belongs to me to judge. Therefore it becomes manifest how many and how great anxieties threaten the faithful from that necessity of following the more probable or the safer. - Segneri, little work on probability.

68. • III. There would follow a perpetual fluctuation of doctrine. For from probabiliorism there follows a perpetual fluctuation of doctrine among the probabiliorists themselves, as daily experience proves. But this discrepancy arises also from the very nature of probabiliorism. For it is impossible that they agree in fact; for, with the obligation of following the opinion which appears more probable to each one being posited, necessarily some will resolve for the affirmative part, others for the negative. One will bind, another will loose; and what appears more probable to you will very easily seem equally or less probable to another. Hence there will follow confusion of decisions, perplexity of the faithful, and anxieties of the Confessors themselves, who from some supposed excess of probability will impose most grave obligations. But probabilism rightly understood lacks inconveniences of this sort, at least for the most part. For only two things are to be weighed by probabilists, namely certain obligations, and merely probable obligations. But although the true probability is not always clear, nevertheless no one does not see that, ordinarily speaking, it is much easier to discern whether a solid reason or authority is had against the law, than to pronounce a judgment concerning some excess of probability. Therefore... etc....

69. Objections. - 1. It is objected from Sacred Scripture, Eccli. 3. 27: He that loves danger shall perish in it. But probabilists love danger by following an equally or less probable opinion. Therefore... - Eccli. 37. 20: Before all thy works let the true word go before thee. But in probabilism there is not a true word. Therefore... - 1 Thess. 5. 22: Abstain from every appearance of evil. But probabilists permit one to follow an appearance of evil. Therefore...

I answer 1. What is this to the matter? An empty and vacuous application!

I answer 2. I retort. For these objected places of Scripture, understood thus, would not permit even the use of probabiliorism. For in a more probable opinion against the law there is a danger of sin ¹⁵, a word not true..., an appearance of evil....

¹⁵ ** Indeed St. Alphonsus (On the Moral System), by an argument to the man, observes that not even those are immune from danger of this sort who otherwise hold that the use of an opinion against the law is licit only when it is most probable. For he reasons thus: As the most probable opinion does not lack every prudent fear that it is false, so the opinion opposite to the most probable does not lack every prudent motive that it is true.... Now I ask.... in what way will he who judges it illicit to expose himself to the danger of transgressing the law, wishing to follow the most probable, ever be able in practice with tranquil conscience to be induced to believe firmly that the opinion standing for the law is not truly probable? Where will he find a balance so exact that it renders him secure that the opinion standing for the law lacks so much weight of probability as would make it probable?

I answer 3. Directly. To the first: there the question is of final impenitence, as is clear from the context: A hard heart shall fare ill at the last; and he that loves danger shall perish in it. Besides, no danger is present where no sin is detected.

To the second: among us the true word is the reflex principle itself, which produces practical certitude, and therefore the act placed from it is conformable to truth.

To the third: he abstains from an appearance of evil who does that in which he sees no sin; for then he does not discern even the appearance of sin.

We now come to a consideration of the systems that have been devised for the purpose of insuring practical certainty in cases of speculative doubt, or, if we may express the same thought somewhat differently, to satisfy oneself whether an act, the morality of which is speculatively uncertain, is practically allowed or forbidden. 1. STATE OF THE QUESTION. —In all cases where a definite decision has to be made under conditions which do not admit of full certainty regarding the existence of a law or obligation, a man may act safely with what is called a probable conscience (conscientia probabilis ). Such doubtful cases owe their existence to the fact that law cannot regulate the actions of men in every detail, nor adequately express the will of the lawgiver, and hence a sphere is left open in which man may use his own judgment.

In every "case of conscience" there are two opposing opinions: one in favor of the law (opinio pro lege), the other in favor of liberty (opinio pro libertate). Neither is certain, but both are more or less probable (probabiles). Note that the discussion of such cases by Catholic moralists never turns on the question, which is the more perfect course to pursue? but merely, what is licit or not? In other words, in trying to solve so-called cases of conscience, theologians do not ask: "Which of the two actions is the more perfect?" but "Which of the two is one obliged to perform under pain of sin?" For example: I am uncertain whether or not to-day is a day of fasting. I have reasons for thinking that it is. But these reasons are merely probable. What am I to do if I cannot obtain reliable information? Am I obliged to fast? Or may I, on the strength of the reasons I have for thinking it is not a fast-day, absolve myself from the duty of keeping the fast? The question at issue is plainly one of licitness, not of greater perfection, for no one disputes that to fast would be the more perfect act.

2. GENERAL PRINCIPLE. —Aside from Laxism, it is a general principle that in case of doubt the pars tutior must be chosen, i. e., that course of action must be followed which most effectively excludes the danger of sin. Abstractly and objectively considered, the opinion in favor of the law (opinio pro lege) is the safer (opinio tutior scil. a periculo peccandi) for the reason that by following it one can best avoid the risk of sin. That the pars tutior must be followed in all cases is the teaching of Rigorism. The so-called Probabilistic systems, on the contrary, contend that the opinio pro lege does not always furnish moral certainty, that such certainty may also be afforded by the opinio pro libertate, and that in case of doubt one may, for good reasons (probabilitas), safely follow the latter.

The controversy thus narrows itself down to the question which of the two opposing opinions, —that favoring the law or that favoring liberty, —is safer to follow in case of doubt.

is not permitted to act upon a mere opinion, but when direct certitude is unattainable, should try to reach reflex certitude by earnest consideration and careful comparison. The conscience or dictate of conscience based upon such an opinion is called probabilis. The relation of the different conflicting opinions is determined according to the degrees of intrinsic or extrinsic probability which each can claim.

The difference between intrinsic and extrinsic probability is that intrinsic probability rests upon reasons contained within the opinion itself, whereas extrinsic probability is based on authority.

A probable opinion (opinio probabilis) may be based either on intrinsic or extrinsic grounds, provided these are good and solid.

If two contrary opinions have the same degree of probability they are called aequiprobabiles.

A more probable opinion (opinio probabilior) is one that rests on weightier reasons than its opposite, which in that case is still probable, but less so (minus probabilis, or simply probabilis).

When a probable opinion rests on such solid grounds that it is almost a certainty, it is called most probable (probabilissima). Its opposite can not, of course, be solidly probable, but, in the language of the schools, may be parum vel tenuiter probabilis.

From what we have said it follows that the probability of an opinion is measured by the weight of the intrinsic and extrinsic arguments on which it rests. The authority which creates extrinsic probability is that of theological experts or confessors.

4. THE SCOPE OF PROBABILISM. —Though, as we have seen, the claims of liberty may in all cases be asserted against those of the law, the sphere of liberty in Moral Theology is nevertheless greatly restricted, for the reason that the safer side (pars tutior) must always be chosen where it is absolutely necessary to attain a definite end, and where following an opinio probabilis or even probabilior would involve danger of frustration.¹ This is the case whenever faith or religion are involved, especially in the administration of the Sacraments,² in medical and surgical prescriptions, and when there is an obligation to protect the interests of one's fellowmen.³

¹ Cfr. J. P. Gury, Compendium Theologiae Moralis, Lyons and Paris, 1850, Vol. I, n. 55-56: saria "It is not lawful to follow a probable, or even a more probable, opinion after abandoning the safer one whenever there is an absolute obligation to attain some determinate end which the use of a probably unsuitable means would place in danger; therefore the safer course must then be followed."

² Cfr. Gury, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 57, 1 and 4: "In those things which are necessary for salvation by necessity of means, you are compelled to act more safely; for so great an end must be attained absolutely before all others, entirely by necessity, and therefore safe and certain means must be employed. Accordingly, in matters pertaining to that end or to religion, probability being rejected, the safer opinion must necessarily be followed. Hence the following proposition, under no. 4, was condemned by Innocent XI: 'An unbeliever who does not believe will be excused from unbelief when led by a less probable opinion.' [See Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1154]. Indeed, in such a case it would not be lawful to use even a more probable opinion after setting aside the safer one. A minister of a sacrament, where its validity is at issue, unless a defect is supplied or a case of necessity presses, is bound to follow the safer course insofar as he morally can, abandoning the less safe course, whether probable or even more probable, because otherwise he would expose the sacrament to the danger of nullity and his neighbor to the danger of spiritual harm. Hence the following proposition was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI under no. 1: 'It is not unlawful in conferring sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, abandoning the safer opinion.' " (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1151).

³ Gury, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 57, 2-3: "A hunter who fears that by firing a bullet at a wild animal he may perhaps injure some man cannot fire it, even if he judges it more probable that the danger is absent; for if the danger is perhaps present, it cannot be removed by the contrary probability, even though greater. A physician and a surgeon are bound to employ the safer medicines and means which can be had here and now, because by an implicit contract they have bound themselves to attain the end insofar as this can be done. The same must likewise be said of all others who have contracted an obligation toward their neighbor." —Cfr. the Propositiones Damnat. sub Innocentio XI., n. 2: "I judge it probable that a judge can render judgment according to an opinion that is even less probable." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1152).

Hence Probabilism may be applied only when there is question of the mere morality, i. e., the licitness or illicitness, of an act or omission (sola actionis honestas). In all other cases the pars tutior must be chosen. This is no argument in favor of Tutiorism, however, nor an exception to the general rule of Probabilism, because in such cases there is always present a direct speculative certitude, whereas Probabilism was expressly devised for cases in which no speculative certitude can be attained.

Absolute Tutiorism or Rigorism (tutiorismus absolutus sive rigidus) is based on the principle that the opinion which favors the law must be followed always, and that it is never lawful to follow a probable opinion, even though it be probabilissima, in favor of liberty.⁴ This system is untenable because it misconceives the problem at issue, ⁵ and has been formally condemned by the Church.⁶

⁴ Tutiorism was adopted by the Jansenists. Its foremost defender was the Irish theologian Joan Sinnichius (+ 1666).

⁵ Cfr. 1 Macc. II, 31 sqq.; IX, 44; 2 Mace. V, 25; VI, 11; Matth. XXIV, 20.

⁶ See the Prop. damn, ab Alexandro VIII. (Dec. 7, 1690), n. 3: "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1293).

In order to escape ecclesiastical condemnation a certain school of Rigorist theologians modified the fundamental tenet of Tutiorism by saying that one may decide in favor of liberty only if the opinion favoring that side is most probable (probabilissima). This system does not differ substantially from absolute Tutiorism and is useless for the solution of difficult cases of conscience. Its principal representatives are the Jansenists M. Steyaert († 1701) and J. Obstraet († 1720), Henry a Sancto Ignatio († 1719), and Cardinal H. S. Gerdil († 1802). ⁷ 6. LAX PROBABILISM OR LAXISM (probabilismus absolutus sive excessivus). —This system maintains that the opinion which favors liberty may be followed always, even when it enjoys but a slight or doubtful degree of probability (tenuiter vel dubie). The Church rejects Laxism for the reason that this system is incompatible with the dignity of the moral law.⁸

⁷ A sketch of Card. Gerdil's life will be found in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. 471.

⁸ Cfr. the Prop. Damnat. sub Innocentio XI, n. 3: "Generally, whenever, relying upon either intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided the bounds of probability are not exceeded, we do something, we always act prudently." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1153).

Excessively lax propositions were taught by J. Sanchez († about 1620), ⁹ F. Amicus, S.J. (+ 165 1),¹⁰ St. Bauny, SJ. († 1649),¹¹ Thos. Tamburini, S.J. († 1675),¹² J. Caramuel, Ord. Cist. († 1682),¹³ J. Cardenas, SJ. († 1684),¹⁴ A. Diana, Ord. Theat. († 1663),¹⁵ Z. Pasqualigo, Ord. Theat. († 1664), ¹⁶ A. Escobar y Mendoza, S.J. († 1669), ¹⁷ M. de Moya, S.J. († 1684), ¹⁸ and others.

⁹ John Sanchez must not be confounded with Thomas Sanchez, S.J. (+ 1610). Cfr. Hurter, Nomenclator Lit. Theol. Cath., Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 592, 893.

¹⁰ See the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I, p. 429.

¹¹ V. supra, p. 63.

¹² On Tamburini see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, p. 441.

¹³ Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 329 sq.

¹⁴ Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 332 sq.

¹⁵ Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 773.

¹⁶ Hurter, Nomenclator Lit. Theol. Cath., Vol. IV, 3rd ed., col. 298 sqq.

¹⁷ V. supra, p. 62.

¹⁸ Father Matthew de Moya was professor of Moral Theology in Murcia, Alcala, and Madrid. Under the nom de plume "Amadaeus Guimenius" he wrote a book entitled Adversus Quorundam Expostulationes contra Nonnullas Jesuitarum Opiniones Morales (Palermo 1657), in which he showed that the lax doctrines attributed to the Jesuits in a libelous pamphlet, Teatro Jesuitico, Apologetico Discurso con Saludables y Seguras Doctrinas Necessarias a los Principes y Senores de la Tierra, by Francisco de la Piedad (also a pseudonym), were taught long before by other writers. Both the Teatro and Moya's reply were put on the Index, where they remain even after the Leonine revision.

7. PROBABILIORISM. —This theory contends that if a man is in doubt regarding the existence of a law, he must nevertheless obey the same and may follow the opinion in favor of liberty only if that opinion is certainly more probable (certe probabilior) than its opposite. Hence the axiom, "In dubio stricto seu aequali pars tutior sequenda est," i. e., as long as the conscience is strictly in doubt, that is to say, while it suspends judgment without inclining either way, the law must be obeyed.

This principle is theoretically incontrovertible but useless for practical purposes, and therefore no longer has any followers. While all Catholic moralists admit that a man may safely follow Probabiliorism, most of them maintain that this system is of no value in the solving of doubtful cases precisely for the reason that in such cases no opinio probabilior is attainable. In practice Probabiliorism leads to Tutiorism, and "solves" only those cases of conscience which in reality are no "cases" at all, because the greater probability in favor of one side or the other can be easily perceived.

The most eminent defenders of this system are: Cardinal Cajetan († 1534),¹⁹ Alexander Natalis († 1724), ²⁰ Vincent Baronius († 1674),²¹ C. R. Billuart († 1757),²² D. Concina († 1756),²³ V. Contenson († 1674),²⁴ P. M. Gazzaniga († 1799),²⁵ J. B. Gonet († 1681),²⁶ J. V. Patuzzi († 1769), ²⁷ —all Dominicans —and the Jesuits Thyrsus Gonzalez de Santalla († 1705),²⁸ M. de Elizalde († 1678),²⁹ P. G. Antoine († 1743),³⁰ and P. Collet († 1770).³¹

¹⁹ On Cardinal Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio Gaetani) see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. III, pp. 145 sqq.

²⁰ On Alexander Natalis (Noel Alexandre), ibid., Vol. I, pp. 296 sq.

²¹ Not to be confounded with the famous Jesuit Cardinal Cesare Baronius. Brief sketches of both in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. II, pp. 304 sq.

²² V. supra, p. 57.

²³ V. supra, p. 60.

²⁴ V. Cath. Encyc., IV, 330.

²⁵ V. Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. 401.

²⁶ V. supra, p. 60.

²⁷ V. supra, p. 60.

²⁸ Gonzales was the thirteenth general of the Society of Jesus, and while holding that office, published his famous Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis, i. e. Tractatus Theologicus de Recto Usu Opinionum (Rome 1694). It is reproduced in Migne's Cursus Theologiae, Vol. XI. —Cfr. J. Salsmans, S.J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, pp. 635 sq.; Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten in der römisch-kath. Kirche, Nördlingen 1889, Vol. I, pp. 120 sqq. —For an account of the controversies that raged about the decree of Innocent XI on Probabilism see J. Brucker S.J., in the Paris Études Religieuses, 1901-02, and F. Ter Haar, Das Decret Innocenz XI. über den Probabilismus, Paderborn 1904. —Latin text of the decree given by the latter, pp. 29 sqq. and by Lehmkuhl, Prob. Vind., pp. 81 sqq. For an English translation see p. 230, note 40, infra.

²⁹ V. Hurter, Nomenclator Lit. Theol. Cath., Vol. IV, 3rd ed., col. 286 sq.

³⁰ V. supra, p. 58.

³¹ Cfr. Buchberger, Kirchl. Handlexikon, I, 964.

8. SIMPLE OR COMMON PROBABILISM (probabilismus simplex sive benignus, communis sive latus). —This system teaches that whenever there is doubt concerning the mere lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act, it is permissible to follow a solidly probable opinion in favor of liberty, even though the opposing view be more probable (probabilior). But why may a more probable opinion be relinquished in favor of a less probable one? To this Probabilism answers as follows: If the opinion favoring liberty is truly and solidly probable (vere et solide probabilis), it must be because the law is doubtful or insufficiently promulgated (lex dubia aut non sufficienter pr omul gat a). Now a doubtful law is not binding (lex dubia non obligat), and therefore one is at liberty.

But this statement of the Probabilist position does not remove the logical and moral objection that Probabilism permits men to follow a less probable opinion (sententia minus probabilis sic cognita et iudicata) even though its opposite is perceived to be more probable.

"The wise practicians who established the moral system of the Jesuits," says a Protestant ethicist, "correctly perceived that probability plays a part in moral conduct, and that to reject Probabilism absolutely, would betray a hasty judgment. Were man permitted to follow the axiom, 'Quod dubitas, ne feceris' and to act only when he knows for certain and without doubt that he is right, he would frequently be unable to act at all; nor would abstention from action help him out of the difficulty, for the mere omission of an act also entails consequences and is equivalent to a definite decision of the will, which may be either right or wrong That a certain mode of procedure is absolutely right in all circumstances, and its opposite absolutely wrong, can be asserted only from the standpoint of an omniscient intelligence. Man is a short-sighted creature and can act only if he has the courage to make a false move and to do something which may prove objectively wrong, and which he would not do were he better informed. Nevertheless, his conscience absolves him from guilt if he has acted to the best of his knowledge and understanding in accordance with the most probable opinion. The only thing we reject in the teaching of the Jesuits is that they base probability preferably on authority and allow a man to follow an opinion which he himself must admit to be less probable." ³²

³² Ch. Sigwart, Vorfragen der Ethik, 2nd ed., Tübingen 1907, pp. 40 sq. —Cfr. Mandonnet, Le Decret d'Innocent XI. contre le Probabilisme, Paris 1903, pp. 79 sqq., 99 sqq.

"There can be no doubt," says St. Alphonsus, "that the Tutiorists in their excessive rigorism do much damage; but on the other hand the Probabilists, who follow an opinion which they recognize as less probable (but which I no longer regard as probable because the law in its moral sense is sufficiently promulgated), are also to blame for the loss of many souls." ³³ Neither the Fathers nor the early Schoolmen give any general rule for determining moral obligation in doubtful cases. But from the way in which they decided controversies it is evident that they were guided by the principle that a doubtful law does not bind. Thus St. Gregory of Nazianzus addressed the following challenge to a Novatian writer who had denounced second marriage as illicit: "Either prove that you are right, or if you are unable to bring proof, do not pass judgment. If the matter is in doubt, let humanity and convenience prevail." ³⁴ The first theologian who reduced Probabilism to a formula and attempted to demonstrate it systematically was Bartholomew de Medina, O. P. († 1581). In his commentaries on the Second and Third Parts of the Summa of St. Thomas, this learned writer, who is usually called "the Father of Probabilism," defends the proposition: "We are permitted to follow a probable opinion even if its opposite is more probable." ³⁵ This thesis was favorably received by the majority of Catholic moralists and met with no ex professo opposition until Father Andrew Bianchi, S.J., attacked it in his treatise De Opinionum Praxi Disputatio, published at Genoa in 1642.³⁶ The bitterest opponents of simple Probabilism were the Jansenists, especially Blaise Pascal, who, in his famous Lettres a un Provincial (1656), attacked Probabilism with vigor and grace of style. The result was that many theologians adopted Probabiliorism. In the ensuing conflict, which lasted nearly two centuries, Probabilism received its hardest blows from the Dominicans. Alexander VII (1665), Innocent XI (1679), and Alexander VIII (1690) censured a series of propositions which were mostly taken from the writings of Probabilistic authors.³⁷ At the instance of the last-mentioned Pope, a general chapter of the Dominicans, held at Rome in 1656, advised all members of that Order to espouse Probabiliorism.³⁸ Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, General of the Jesuits, tried to banish Probabilism from the Society by publishing an anti-Probabilistic work, Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis.³⁹ The so-called decree of Innocent XI, of June 26, 1680 (which in reality was merely a protocol of the Holy Office), strongly approved of his action.⁴⁰

³³ Letters, III, 355.

³⁴ Orat., 39, n. 19 (Migne, P.G., XXXVI, 358): "Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot do this, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and mildness prevail." —Cfr. Chr. Lupus, Dissertatio de Antiquitate, Auctoritate et Legitimo Usu Sententiae Probabilis (Opera Omnia, Venice 1729, Vol. XI, pp. 1 sqq.).

³⁵ "If an opinion is probable, it is lawful to follow it, even though the opposite opinion is more probable." (Expositio s. Scholastica Commentaria in D. Thomae S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 19, art. 6, Salamanca 1577. For a sketch of B. de Medina's life see D. J. Kennedy, O. P., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X, pp. 143 sq. Modern writers are divided as to Medina's teaching on Probabilism. Echard (followed by Billuart) maintains that Medina's system differed greatly from Probabilism as expounded by its later defenders. H. Hurter, S.J., says of him: "He was numbered among the leading cultivators of Scholastic and moral theology of his age, and from this also gained a certain renown; he is said to have anticipated the system of Probabilism." (Nomenclator Literarius Theologiae Catholicae, Vol. III, 3rd ed., Innsbruck 1907, col. 144). Cfr. Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 28 sqq.; Ter Haar, De Systemate Mor., pp. 17 sqq.; A. Schmitt, Zur Geschichte des Probabilismus, Innsbruck 1904, pp. 43 sqq.

³⁶ Andrea Bianchi, S.J., is perhaps better known by his Latin name, Blancus. He died at Genoa, March 29, 1657. His treatise De Opinionum Praxi Disputatio was published under the pseudonym "Candidus Philalethes." It is Tutioristic in tendency. —Cfr. Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 31 sqq., 51 sqq.; Ter Haar, De Syst. Mor., pp. 18 sqq.

³⁷ For a list of these condemned propositions see Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1101, 1151, 1289, 1291; A. Rohling, Medulla Theol. Mor., pp. 479 sqq., St. Louis 1875.

³⁸ Cfr. Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 42 sqq.

³⁹ V '. supra, p. 225, n. 10. —Cfr. A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Prob. Vind., pp. 83 sqq.; A. Koch, "Neue Dokumente zu dem Thyrsus Gonsalez'- Streit," in the Theol. Quartalschrift of Tübingen, 1905, pp. 95 sqq.

⁴⁰ Cfr. Mandonnet, Decret d' Innocent XL, pp. 73 sqq.; T er Haar, Das Dekret Innozenz' XI, pp. 29 sqq.; G. Arendt, S.J., De Conciliationis Tentamine nuper Iterate Aequiprobabilistas inter et Probabilistas, Rome 1902 (cfr. the Civiltà Cattolica, 1902, quad. 1253, pp. 574 sqq.). The "decree," the authentic text of which was published Apr. 19, 1902, by the Secretary of the Holy Office, reads: "A report having been made by Father Laurea of a letter directed by Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., to Our Most Holy Lord; the Most Eminent Lords said that the Secretary of State must write to the Apostolic nuncio of the Spains [directing him] to signify to the said Father Thyrsus that His Holiness, having received his letter favorably, and having read it with approval, has commanded that he [Thyrsus] shall freely and fearlessly preach, teach, and defend with his pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that in a conflict of a less probable opinion with a more probable, known and estimated as such, it is allowed to follow the less probable; and to inform him that whatever he does and writes on behalf of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness. Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus, as by order (de ordine) of His Holiness, not only to permit the Fathers of the Society to write in favor of the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those who assert that in a conflict of a less probable opinion with a more probable, known and estimated as such, it is allowed to follow the less probable; but also to write to all the universities of the Society, [informing them] that it is the mind of His Holiness that whosoever chooses may freely write in favor of the more probable opinion, and may attack the aforesaid contrary [opinion]; and to order them to submit entirely to the command of His Holiness." (Cfr. J. M. Harty in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, p. 445).

The present status of Probabilism may be described as It has never been either officially approved or officially censured by the Church, but was and is tolerated ⁴¹ and upheld by the majority of Jesuit theologians, though it is not the official teaching of the Society.⁴²

⁴¹ Cfr. Ter Haar, Das Decret Innocenz XL, pp. 177 sqq.

⁴² For some of the leading arguments for and against Probabilism see J. M. Harty in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 444 sq.

Lately J. de Caigny, C.SS.R., published several books ⁴³ for the purpose of reconciling Probabilism with Æquiprobabilism. His arguments were met by G. Arendt, S.J.⁴⁴ 9. ÆQUIPROBABILISM (probabilismus moderatus). —Æquiprobabilism takes middle ground between Probabiliorism and simple Probabilism. It teaches that unless the opinions for and against the existence of a law have equal or nearly equal probability, it is not permissible to choose in favor of liberty. The leading principle of this system, which it shares with Probabiliorism, is this:

⁴³ Apologetica, etc. (see p. 235, infra); De Gemino Probabilismo Licito Dissertatio Exarata Conciliationis Gratia; De Genuino Morali Systemate S. Alphonsi Dissertatio Irenico-Critica.

⁴⁴ Apologeticae de Aequiprobabilismo Alphonsiano Historico-Philosophicae Dissertationis a R. P. J. Caigny, C.SS.R., Exaratae Crisis iuxta Principia Angelici Doctoris Instituta. Freiburg i. B. (Herder). —Fr. Lehmkuhl says towards the conclusion of his little book, Probabilismus Vindicatus (p. 126): "What I have said more often I now repeat: I recognize only a slight theoretical difference, and either no practical difference or scarcely any, between moderate or equiprobabilism and probabilism."

"In obscure matters the certainly more likely side, or the more probable side known and judged as such, is to be followed in favor of the law." However, if the opinions for and against the existence of a law have equal or nearly equal probability, and there is consequently a state of real doubt, it is permissible to follow the less safe opinion. Hence the axiom, "Lex stricte dubia non obligat. In other words, when there is doubt as to the existence of a law, liberty is in possession. When there is doubt in regard to the cessation of a law, the law remains in possession. Consequently, whereas simple Probabilism teaches that a man may always follow the opinion favoring liberty, if that opinion is based on good and solid grounds (opinio vere ac solide probabilis), even though he knows that the opposite opinion is more probable, Æquiprobabilism maintains that the less safe opinion may be followed only when it is quite or nearly as probable (aeque aut fere aeque probabilis) as its opposite, and only when there is question of an obligation arising, not ceasing.

/Equiprobabilism is regarded by some as an advance over simple Probabilism, in so far as it sets up a practical instead of a purely logical probability. ⁴⁵ The extrinsic reasons in favor of Æquiprobabilism are summed up by Archbishop Simar as follows: "This theory is the fruit of long scientific debates and has in its favor the presumption that, by dint of logical development, it is the golden mean between the two conflicting extremes of absolute Probabilism and Tutiorism. The followers of St. Alphonsus may point to the official declaration of the Church that, unlike Tutiorism and several forms of Probabilism, his teaching has never been censured. To these advantages must be added the great personal authority of the Saint, which deserves to be the more highly regarded because the problem in question was for him a vital one, which he investigated with the utmost conscientiousness and zeal, and also for the further reason that the conviction at which he finally arrived has stood the test of pastoral experience and triumphantly resisted innumerable attacks." ⁴⁶ The most prominent representatives of Æquiprobabilism are the Jesuits Christopher Rassler (+ about 1730) and Antony Mayr († 1749), Eusebius Amort of the Canons Regular of St. Augustine († 1775),⁴⁷ St. Alphonsus de' Liguori, founder of the Redemptorist Order,⁴⁸ Bishop Martin of Paderborn, Archbishop Simar of Cologne, and the moral theologians of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer.48a

It is unjust to charge that Probabilism and the allied systems permit man to act on the strength of a mere opinion and thus dispense him from the duty of regulating his life in accordance with the dictates of conscience, which must be the highest rule and measure of all morality. Probabilism, Probabiliorism, and Æquiprobabilism were all devised for the express purpose of enabling man to follow the voice of conscience in doubtful cases.⁴⁹ So far from undermining morality, these systems, as a whole, deserve great credit for having safeguarded the important principle of liberty against the attacks and snares of the Jansenists, Rigorists, and Talmudists.

⁴⁵ Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., I, n. 58: "For acting lawfully probability alone does not suffice, but moral certainty concerning the uprightness of the action is required." —Cfr. op. cit., I, 54: "If the opinion which stands for the law appears certainly more probable, we are bound altogether to follow it and cannot then embrace the opposite opinion which stands for liberty. The reason is that, in order to act lawfully, we must seek and follow the truth in doubtful matters; but where the truth cannot be clearly found, we are bound to embrace at least that opinion which approaches nearer to the truth, such as the more probable opinion." (Ed. Gaude, I, 25). —Cfr. Ter Haar, Das Decret Innocenz' XI, pp. 8 sqq.

⁴⁶ Th. H. Simar, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, 3rd ed., p. 143. — The translator of this work thinks it but fair to note, however, that Lehmkuhl and others hold that St. Alphonsus never held Aequiprobabilistic principles. Lehmkuhl (Theol. Mor., ed. 11a, Vol. I, p. 118) illustrates the difference between the Saint's teaching and that of the Aequiprobabilists as follows: EQUIPROBABILISM says: With probability alone that a law exists, an obligation does not exist. With probability alone that a law has ceased, the obligation has not ceased. ST. ALPHONSUS says: With probability alone that a law exists, an obligation does not exist; with probability alone that a law has ceased, the obligation has ceased. —For an able defense of the Probabilist position see the same author's Probabilismus Vindicatus, Freiburg 1906.

⁴⁷ Cfr. Ter Haar, De Systemate Mor., pp. 20 sqq., 52 sqq. —On Amort, see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. I, pp. 434 sq. He was one of the foremost theologians of the 18th century. (Thos. J. Shahan, Cath. Encycl., Vol. I, p. 434). 48a See L. Wouters, C.SS.R., De Systemate Morali Dissertatio, new edition, "ad novum ius accommodata," Wittem (Holland), 1918.

⁴⁸ Æquiprobabilism "gained vigor and persistence from the teaching of St. Alphonsus, who began his theological career as a Probabiliorist, subsequently defended Probabilism, ... and finally, about 1762, embraced Æquiprobabilism. In a new dissertation he laid down the two propositions that it is lawful to act on the less safe opinion, when it is equally probable with the safe opinion, and that it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion when the safe opinion is notably and certainly more probable. In the sixth edition (1767) of his 'Moral Theology' he again expressed these views, and indeed towards the end of his life frequently declared that he was not a Probabilist." (Cath. Encyc., Vol. XII, pp. 442 sq.; cfr. Irish Theol. Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 24). —On the systema compensationis seu rationis sufficientis, which d'Annibale ascribes to Potton, O. P., and which has been latterly espoused by Prummer and some French moralists, see Vermeersch, Theol. Mor., I, pp. 306 and 313; K. Neuner, O. Cap., in the Kath. Kirchenstg. of Salzburg, 1924, No. 26.

⁴⁹ Cfr. Joseph Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, pp. 69 sqq.; A. Meyenberg, Die kath. Moral, 2nd ed., pp. 161 sqq.; Ter Haar, Vcn. Innoc. XL de Probabilismo Decrcti Histona, Rome 1904, pp. 126 sqq.

READINGS. —On the moral systems in general: K. Werner, System der Ethik, Vol. I, pp. 430 sqq. —W. Wilmers, S.J., Lehrbuch der Religion (ed. Lehmkuhl), 6th ed., pp. 537 sqq. —F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 114 sqq. —F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., pp. 168 sqq. —Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 68 sqq. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 441 sqq. —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 478 sq. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, Tournai 1905, pp. 213 sqq. —C. Gaudé, C.SS.R., De Morali Systemate S. Alphonsi, Rome 1894.

On Probabilism: F. Ter Haar, De Systemate Morali Antiquerum Probabilistarum Dissertatio Historic o-Critica, Paderborn 1894, pp. 77 sqq. —P. F. Mandonnet, O.P., Le Décret d' Innocent XI contre le Probabilisme, Paris 1903, pp. 99 sqq. —A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Probabilismus Vindicatus, Freiburg 1906, pp. 16 sqq. —L. Wouters, C.SS.R., De Minus probabilismo, Amsterdam, 2nd ed., 1908, pp. 17 sqq. —J. L. Jansen, Geschichte und Kritik im Dienste der "Minus probabilis," Paderborn 1906, pp. 14 sqq. —F. Mentré, Courot et la Renaissance du Probabilisme au XIXe Siècle, Paris 1908. —Chr. Lupus, Dissertatio de Antiquitate, Auctoritate et Legitimo Usu Sententiae Probabilis (Opera Omnia, XI, Venice 1729). —Dinneen, De Probabilismo Dissertatio, Dublin 1898. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 443 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, Moral Philosophy, pp. 152 sqq. —W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 215 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 303 sqq.

On Probabiliorism: Thyrsus Gonzalez, Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis, i. e. Tractatus Theologicus de Recto Usu Opinionum, Rome 1694. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 442 sq. —J. Biederlack, S.J., in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1890, pp. 186 sqq. —L. Wedff, "S. Alphonse est-il Probabilioriste?" in the Revue Thomiste, Paris 1904, pp. 129 sqq., 477 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, pp. 220 sqq.

On Æquiprobabilism: Vindiciae Alphonsianae seu Doctoris Ecclesiae S. Alphonsi de Ligorio Doctrina Moralis Vindicata a Plurimis Oppugnatoribus A. P. Ballerini cura et studio quorundam Theologorum e Congregatione SS. Redemptoris, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Bruxelles 1874. —J. De Caigny, C.SS.R., Apologetica de Æquiprobabilismo Alphonsiano, Tournai 1894. —G. Arendt, S.J., Apologeticae de Æquiprobabilismo Alphonsiano Historico-Philosophicae Dissertationis a R. P. J. de Caigny Exaratae Crisis iuxta Principia Angelici Doctoris, Freiburg 1897, pp. 65 sqq. —IDEM, Æquiprobabilismus ab Ultimo Fundamento Discussus, Rome 1909. —Vindiciae Ballerinianae seu Gustus Recognitionis Vindiciarum Alphonsianarum. Insunt Dissertationes Ballerini de Systemate S. Alphonsi et Altera Dissertatio de Probabilismo et Æquiprobabilismo eiusdem, Bruges 1873. —A. Ballerini, S.J., Opus Theologiae Moralis (ed. Palmieri), Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 606 sqq. —Le Bachelet, La Question Ligorienne, Paris 1899, pp. 25 sqq. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, p. 445. —Berthe-Castle, C.SS.R., Life of St. Alphonsus de' Liguori, Dublin 1905. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, pp. 223 sqq. —Sabetti-Barrett, S.J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 27th ed., New York 1919, pp. 163 sqq.

— We shall proceed in this way: after the other systems have been briefly excluded, we shall show that the system of pure but moderate probabilism is true.

I. Neither Tutiorism, which no Catholic now admits, nor Probabiliorism, nor Equiprobabilism, nor the system called from compensation can be admitted speculatively or theoretically.

We say speculatively or theoretically; because, if by these various names they merely contend to obtain that, in the moral discipline of Catholics, that moderate probabilism alone should flourish which Suarez, Lugo, and other outstanding doctors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cultivated, then the things said concerning the practical concord of most Catholic writers of our age return. Therefore:

1. Tutiorism labors under this fundamental defect: since it does not distinguish between facts of the physical order and facts of the moral and juridical order, it wholly passes over this, that it can happen that because of the doubt itself the condition necessary for the law to exist or to be applied to the subject ceases. But then there remains no danger of violation of law whence the Tutiorists were taking their argument, while the danger of a physical fact is by no means removed by my doubt concerning the event. Cf. the positive demonstration of probabilism.

2. Probabiliorism needs this principle: probable reasons which incline toward contradictory parts mutually destroy one another, so that, if they are equal, no probability remains; if they are unequal, the excess of the greater probability remains as the only motive for assenting, so that only one prudent conclusion remains: that which is founded upon that excess ¹.

But it is so far from being the case that that mutual destruction is necessary, that you will scarcely find a case where it is demonstrated to occur ². The reason is that most often motives are drawn from diverse sources. Since they are disparate, they can very well stand together. Thus, v.g., is there, from natural law, an obligation of restoring to the poor what, having been unjustly acquired, you cannot return to the owner? Those who deny argue from this, that natural law commands this one thing, that the owner unjustly harmed be restored from the damages; those who affirm contend that that unjust possession cannot be sanctioned by natural law. Does he sin who omits a more perfect action to which he is clearly invited? Those who deny rely upon the distinction between works of counsel and precepts; those who affirm call upon man's charity toward himself and the necessity of acting reasonably. How, they say, can the choice of the less good part be reasonable? But who does not see that to both reasons their own proper force is preserved, and that motives of this sort can by no means be compared with weights placed in the two pans of one balance? Indeed, if five witnesses, otherwise approved, do not agree concerning some matter, but two narrate the fact in one way and three in another way, it will indeed be doubted in what way the matter truly happened, but a positive reason for each narration will remain.

But when the distinguished Marc, Institutiones, I, n. 74, conceding that it rarely happens that the motives themselves destroy one another, nevertheless contends that their force is relatively and practically destroyed, insofar as, because of the equality of the motives, the intellect can now be moved to assent by neither, so that, moved by the will alone, it adheres to one part, he offends against sound philosophy. For this teaches us that it is repugnant to the nature of the intellect to adhere to some part by the will alone, without any reason; then, that the intellect by itself is not determined to assent except by the evidence of the thing, so that even if there is only one probable motive, it needs the command of the will in order to arrive at opining. Finally, as will soon appear better, it is not even necessary, for the right use of probabilism, that the intellect adhere to either part as true.

But if, besides, the probabiliorists contend that this is the law of our reason, that, when evidence is lacking, we adhere to the part more like the truth, this cannot be admitted, at least universally, either speculatively or practically. Not speculatively: for it is enough for the intellect to testify to that which it truly sees, i.e., that the matter is doubtful but more like the truth; indeed of itself it does not receive except what it sees. Not practically. Even in the external forum a defendant is absolved who is more likely to be culpable. In a civil judgment, if discretion is left to the judge, in the sentence he will have regard to the probability of the opposite side, at least in computing expenses. Only then, when there is a necessity of awarding the whole matter to one or the other litigant, will the judge pronounce right according to the things more like the truth. But in our private action, sometimes we shall prudently have to abstain from an action whose happy outcome is much more like the truth; it also happens, if from the less probable part a far greater profit is hoped, that a merchant prudently tries his fortune by this less safe way. Therefore we are never moved by what is like the truth as by what is certain, far less can it be said that, when certainty is lacking, likeness to truth is perpetually present to us as guide.

Why therefore, in the internal forum, where, when certainty is lacking, the very condition of obligation can be lacking, do you impose the rule of following parts certainly more like the truth, a rule which cannot even be called constant in the external forum and in exterior matters?

Add that, in this distinction of degrees, much must be attributed to subjective inclination, so that what one will call more probable another will hold as equally or less probable. And, as R. P. Prummer, O. Pr., says, Manuale Theol. mor. I, n. 346, probabiliorism is almost impossible in practice. For the common opinion holds that a penitent must be absolved who, having left aside the more probable opinion, wishes to follow the probable opinion, so that a probabiliorist confessor is sometimes compelled to act against his own system. "Whence today perhaps I think there is no confessor who applies all the logical consequences of Probabiliorism in the practice of the tribunal of penance" (Prummer, l.c.).

3. Equiprobabilism, in the part in which it agrees with that system, sins by the common error of Probabiliorism. Besides, it employs that fictitious possession of law or liberty which we demonstrated in the introduction itself to pertain least of all to the matter. R. P. Prummer, op. c. I, n. 348, can say thus ad hominem: "If the law is strictly doubtful, that is, if equally grave reasons urge its obligation or deobligation, liberty always possesses, which by nature and reason seems to precede law. Whence, in that case, to distinguish between the cessation of law and the existence of law is superfluous. For in strict doubt one must stand for that for which the presumption stands. But the presumption stands for liberty until the obligation of the law has at least been made probable."

4. As to the system of compensations: 1. Since the conscious violation of an obliging law is a sin not only material but truly formal, while the "compensators" merely object to the probabilists the permission of material sin, they freely admit that no obligation arises from the merely probable law itself, but tacitly appeal to a higher law which would forbid the permission of material sin made without proportionate cause: which law remains to be demonstrated by them. 2. Nor must material sin always be apprehended. For since an objectively obscure law has not been promulgated, often the very foundation of material sin will be lacking: a law which is unconsciously violated. 3. Even when material sin can be present, either the matter concerns positive law, and then, scandal being excluded, its non-culpable violation is harmful to no one; or the matter concerns natural law, and then a grave reason of answering in favor of the least obligation will always be present as excusing. For questions of this sort are not raised except when some serious utility of the present order, at least temporal, renders the observance of the doubtful law difficult. 4. Nor ever, if we speak strictly, is material sin properly permitted. For that effect is properly permitted which is foreseen as going to follow. Here it is not foreseen except perhaps as going to follow. Therefore rather the danger of material sin is permitted. How will they ever demonstrate that permission of this sort is forbidden under grave sin without proportionate cause, if of itself there is only a light obligation of warning him who materially but certainly violates natural law? 5. Finally, the system does not have universal use. For what if the proportionate cause itself is present only probably?

Concerning that system d'Annibale, I, n. 263, note 1, has these words: "The foundation (entirely new) upon which this whole edifice has been built surely totters."

But, as Bouquillon observes ¹, this can be true in fact, that we give place to some compensation. Since broad moral certainty, which is required and suffices for acting prudently, is sufficiently undefined, and sometimes scarcely exists in the lowest degree, the consideration of the importance of the law will be able to avail for affirming practically an obligation which is scarcely morally certain; and, on the contrary, the consideration of the difficulty, whether extrinsic or even intrinsic, will be able to avail for denying practically an obligation which is almost morally certain." And also, as we shall see, the dissolution of a particular law by no means absolves a man from the common duty of observing the general rules of honest action, whether they regard the object, or the motive, or the mode of honesty.

¹ Cf. Billuart, diss. 6, and Sertillanges himself, La philosophie morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin, pp. 552. 553.

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, Op. Theol., T. I, Tr. 2, n. 188.

¹ Theol. mor. fundament. n. 297.

— II. The true moral system is established. 1. In order to forestall the fallacies of arguments, these things must be well noticed:

a) The distinction between a manifest thing and a thing like the truth. When a certain thing is manifest, it can equally be said: the thing is seen, its evidence is perceived; but when a thing is only like the truth, the likeness to truth indeed, but by no means the thing itself, is known. Wherefore it cannot at all be said: he approaches nearer to the thing who seeks it where it is more like the truth that it will be found, since, on the contrary, it can happen that he is farther from that place than from the place where the seeker now stands;

b) We free man from no divine service. Him whom we free from some definite obligation we least of all make immune from the general divine service by which man, in every action of his, is commanded to procure the glory of God. For man is capable of constituting a certain order in things both his own and another's by his rational appetite ². And while thus, as a subordinate orderer, he disposes certain things fitly, he praises the divine Majesty, whose perfections he manifests and to whom he can also refer the free actions of his own. Therefore he serves God even who does what he is commanded to do by no divine precept. For the rest, in the end or mode of any action, some precept to be observed necessarily occurs;

c) Perfect concord between intellect and will is impossible. Concord between intellect and will must indeed be procured. But while direct conscience can affirm an obligation, deny it, or doubt concerning it, the will can only do or omit, nor can it have an act perfectly congruent with doubt. Hence, if, as often as conscience reports an uncertain obligation, you pronounce the will bound so often, you will seem to demand too much; but too little, if so often you absolve it from every bond. This discrepancy of intellect and appetite at length gives place to the question concerning a moral system ¹: that knot of it must be untied;

d) How one arrives at opinion. The intellect is compelled by the evidence of the thing alone. Wherefore opinative assent is always determined by the will ². But the will is moved by reason of good ³. Therefore, if no other good than truth offers itself as to be sought, man will incline toward the parts more like the truth. But there are other goods, other utilities also of the human order, on account of which we prudently determine that something else is to be done than the parts which are more like the truth would urge. Consider that practical distinction.

If certain ruin, certain shipwreck, certain invasion of robbers is foreseen, no prudent man would commit money to business or to a ship, or, unarmed, make a journey through ways which robbers hold occupied. But if these things are not morally established, for the sake of great utility, for the sake of attaining a great good, fortune will prudently be tried, although the hope of success is less than the hope of disaster or misfortune. The mind of the agent will turn itself to considering the contrary probability. Certainly he will not say to himself: I judge that it will happen that the ship perish, that robbers oppress me; but rather he will reason in this other way: there is a serious probability of escaping shipwreck or the hands of robbers, and the danger is redeemed by the utility;

e) No force is brought upon the intellect. He who embraces the less probable parts ought not to bring any force upon himself so that he falsely estimates them more like the truth; but it is enough that he judge them practically safe because probable.

² "Man," as Leo XIII writes most wisely, enc. Rerum novarum, 15 May 1891, "... under the eternal law, under the power of God governing all things most providently, governs himself by the providence of his counsel."

¹ We borrow this observation, which we think pertains to the hinge of the matter, from a certain professor of dogmatic theology.

² Cf. 2, 2, q. 1, art. 4, c.; q. 2, art. 9, c. and ad 2.

³ Therefore to the element which the will adds it must be attributed that contradictory opinions exist. And thus it happens that probabilities do not mutually exclude one another, as the contradictory opinions themselves do. And because no opinion necessarily infers the falsity of the opposite opinion, it also happens that no properly contradictory opinions are given, although opinions of contradictories are given. Cf. R. P. Munzi, Logica, n. 294.

— 2. These things having been premised, let this be the simple demonstration of probabilism. Every divine precept either is certainly established or is uncertain. We are bound by a certain precept, even if it is such only morally: this is undoubted. Are we also bound by an uncertain one?

If we are bound, the various degrees of doubting are distinguished in vain; but until it is morally established that a precept is absent, the parts of the precept, or the safer parts, must be embraced by us. But if we are not bound by an uncertain precept, again, every other distinction being omitted, we shall preserve free option until it is morally established that a precept is truly had.

But the reason for doubting concerning the honesty of free option is drawn from the danger alone of violating, if you act otherwise than the probable precept shall have indicated, either the divine precept which perhaps exists, or the moral order which is sanctioned by divine precepts.

But if you consider the matter more closely, no violation of precept is to be feared. For a divine precept means a will divinely intimated to a subject man and therefore of itself known. But an uncertain precept of itself is unknown. For only by efficacious proof is the thing itself, which is called true, known; but he who has learned a thing as like the truth knows not the thing itself, but merely its appearance, sometimes fallacious. Wherefore an uncertain precept must be held as none.

But, the divine precept being excluded, we ought not to be solicitous about the danger of acting against the moral order. For by the same limits by which the divine precept is contained, by the same limits the care of avoiding its material transgression is contained ¹. Whence will you demonstrate that a general law which demands more has been promulgated? Besides, we can positively add this: right order demands that, when a precept ceases, man preserve free options, by which he may make actions at least formally good. Therefore material transgression is permitted by God on account of the goodness of that human liberty ². Finally, if greater care were necessary for us, not even when an action seems certainly honest to us would we be permitted to put away anxious solicitude: for to err is human. Much less would that be permitted when the opinion of honesty is only more probable or most probable; for then positive apprehensions of material violation remain.

Hence it is also clear what must be answered to one objecting that, in the proposed case, not less than the obligation, the very permission of acting is at least directly unknown. We readily admit it. But permission of acting ought not to be demonstrated, on account of the commonly admitted principle: whatever is not prohibited is permitted. For the physical faculty of choosing, the various solicitations by which we are impelled to acting, the goodness which of itself is present in action as such ³, the very formal object (good) under which we seek all things, prove moral liberty of acting, unless there stand in the way a divine prohibition known by human reason.

Wherefore those also are mistaken who, like C. d'Annibale, think that favor must be shown equally to law and liberty, and therefore defend equiprobabilism. For if the law exists, it always prevails over the liberty which it takes away; but if it is doubtful, common sense with every law says, not that sometimes answer must be made for law and sometimes for liberty, but simply: in doubt one must answer for liberty, or: a doubtful law does not oblige ⁴.

Finally, cause yourself to advert that the order which man constitutes by his free election can be better or more sublime in itself than that whose observance would undeservedly be imposed upon him from a more severe system. For an election contrary to a probable or more probable obligation can be directed by our will to the best ends of charity, of the salvation of neighbor.

Thus far the simple exposition of the matter and yet an adequate consideration. For in reality speculative judgments concerning the honesty of an action belong to two kinds, not to more: they are either certain or uncertain.

3. But what if you wish to discern the various degrees? - Yet to those who wish to observe the various degrees by which a thing not demonstrated, if it is compared with the opposite, can be more or less or even equally like the truth, an answer can be made thus.

Certainly, at first sight, this kind of reasoning offers itself. A man studious of truth, to whom full arguments are lacking, will opine according to the things more like the truth. But if contrary arguments seem to be of almost equal weight, then he will remain doubtful, wavering, and as it were suspended in mind between each part.

But, as we have already noted, the pursuit of truth is not the only good by which we are moved to acting. And in every use of life, practical judgments indeed are directed according to properly so-called speculative persuasions; but when there is question of uncertain conclusions, often, on account of a just cause, one prudently recedes from the parts which are more like the truth. We saw examples above, nn. 358, 3; 359 d.

But in a moral matter these questions at once arise in the mind: prudent fear of error is not excluded by an opinion; therefore the obligation is uncertain, and also the honesty which are predicated as more like the truth are uncertain. Why therefore must I act in the same way whether the obligation was certain or uncertain; why will I be permitted to act in the same way whether the honesty is certain or uncertain? For only then, when the affirmation or negation of obligation is certain, does the action truly agree with the mind; but when the affirmation or negation of obligation is uncertain, the obligation seems to be imposed too severely, or relaxed too benignly.

If the state of the mind opining alone is considered, these questions cannot be satisfied; a certain argument is desired, by which it may be effected that a speculative opinion suffices so that we must or can act according to it. And thus the principles called reflex above are recalled: that no one is held by a non-promulgated law; that no one is bound by a precept of which he does not have knowledge. But the diverse principles concerning the destruction of probabilities or concerning possession have already been exploded. Moreover the former principles permit no distinction between various degrees of probability ¹. Therefore one must return to the simple and logical division by which a certain speculative judgment is separated from an uncertain one.

4. We can also use this brief reasoning. An action which practically is prohibited by no law is certainly honest and therefore practically safe. But an action whose liceity is speculatively probable is prohibited by no law. Therefore it is certainly honest and practically safe.

The major is proved. As we said above: since our liberty does not remove order, since to act is good of itself, since we seek all things under the species of good, since we are freely borne to seeking our own good, it must be held with common sense: those things are permitted which are not prohibited.

The minor is proved. An action is not forbidden by a particular law to which the action is only probably conformed: for knowledge of this law, or imputable ignorance of it, is not had; but the law itself cannot reach us except by means of certain cognition of it.

Nor is it forbidden by a general law by which whatever is only probably not against a particular law would be prohibited. For that general law is not demonstrated, and therefore has not been promulgated. R. D. De Bock reasons similarly, Tract. fundam. theol. mor. 2, n. 223.

The thesis is confirmed, a) by considering human nature and its fragility. It seems little human that fragile man should morally have to fulfill also uncertain obligations, or obligations probably null. Wherefore, concerning human law, already ancient wisdom pronounced that rights are more prompt to loosen than to bind, and that in doubts one must answer for liberty. Cf. St. Alph., diss. 1765, c. 4, n. 35.

It is also confirmed, b) by the logical necessity of choosing for probabilism or for tutiorism, which is repudiated by all. For either the principle stands: A law which after diligent investigation appears truly doubtful does not oblige; or the principle, A doubtful law does not oblige, is rejected. If it is true, it demonstrates probabilism. If it is rejected, logically neither probabiliorism nor equiprobabilism can be admitted. For both systems permit that answer be made for liberty to which a less probable law, therefore a simply doubtful law, is opposed. Nor let them say: liberty is morally certain when a less probable law is opposed to it. For this is affirmed gratuitously, unless you recur to the principle: A doubtful law does not oblige. R. P. Prummer, Manuale, I, n. 346, 1, almost concedes that this is a logical conclusion.

N.B. C. d'Annibale demonstrates by many examples the principle: A doubtful law does not oblige, I, § 162, note 21. But he well sets forth, § 261, that liberty precedes law. "The contrary opinion," he says, "is most alien from the nature of law... we understand that to be licit which the law does not forbid, that to be illicit which the law prohibits."

¹ He who would deny this must impute to God a moral order not sufficiently sanctioned.

² This is the direct refutation of tutiorism and of the system of compensations.

³ Cf. Sertillanges, op. c., p. 43, n. 1; p. 45, n. 4.

⁴ "In obscure matters, the minimum is to be followed." R.I. 30 in 6°. Cf. d'Annibale, Summula, I, 162.

¹ In order that we could distinguish various degrees, it would be necessary to have reflex principles by which they are distinguished; but we have only two, which do not bear that further distinction.

— Scholia. I. What St. Thomas thought. In the age of St. Thomas, those questions concerning probabilism were not being posed. Wherefore we do not wish to call upon him as a formal patron of our opinion. It has sufficiently profited us, since he formally taught our reflex principles.

For he has these things: "Promulgation itself is necessary for this, that a law have its force" ¹. "No one is bound by any precept except by means of knowledge of that precept. And therefore he who is not capable of knowledge is not bound by a precept, nor is anyone ignorant of the precept of God bound to doing the precept, except insofar as he is bound to know the precept. But if he is not bound to know and does not know, in no way is he bound by the precept" (2). "When I say conscience, I do not say or imply knowledge only strictly accepted, insofar as it is only of truths, but knowledge accepted in a broad way, for any knowledge whatsoever, according as whatever we know, by common use of speaking, we are said to know" (3). "That is called licit which is prohibited by no law" (4).

¹ Summa 1, 2, q. 90, art. 4. - (2) De veritate, q. 17, art. 3. - (3) Ibid. art. 2 ad 2. - (4) In 1. 4, d. 15, q. 2, art. 4, solution 2.

— II. On the uniquely probable opinion. An opinion can also be uniquely probable, which is impugned by no grave reason, and yet is not truly demonstrated. It is not permitted to follow the less safe parts against that opinion; for their election would not be prudent or rational. Wherefore an opinion of this sort is practically assimilated to what is morally certain. Cf. Noldin, Principia n. 224, 5. But, as we said in handing down the notions, moral certainty is here taken broadly.

— III. An opinion probably probable. Here it is customary to ask whether, from an opinion probably probable, a practically certain judgment concerning the honesty of an action can be gathered.

With Ballerini-Palmieri ¹ and Noldin (2), we judge that the answer depends upon the signification of the words. If, with that moral certainty broadly so called, concerning which n. 351, or because of a grave reason impugned by no contrary grave reason, you affirm that an opinion is probable, certainly the same must be estimated by you as truly probable.

But if the probability itself comes into serious controversy, and you discern serious motives on each side, the probability itself seems to us uncertain, just as a law is uncertain which is affirmed and denied by serious motives. But uncertain probability is probability not seen, which therefore is only doubtful and does not suffice.

¹ Opus Theol., I, tr. 2, n. 190. - (2) Princip. n. 235, 2.

— IV. The force of presumptions. Presumption, taken from the customary way of acting, in not a few cases produces sufficient probability why, unless a grave reason positively stands in the way, you may solve the case according to that presumption. This rule is founded in human necessity, lest we be compelled to live a life full of anxieties, and is contained in various sayings: "From things commonly occurring, a prudent presumption is made." "In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act."

Wherefore he who is accustomed to be diligent in accusing sins, - in fulfilling penance, - in reciting the office, - in repelling temptations, can disregard a doubt concerning a sin accused, etc.

Likewise disregard negative doubts whether you had contrition in confession, whether you gave absolution, indeed whether you baptized well. Let the Ritual itself be heard, concerning consecration: "If the celebrant does not remember that he said the things which are commonly said in the consecration, he ought not therefore to be disturbed... But if he very probably doubts that he omitted something essential, let him repeat the form, at least under condition. But if they are not of the necessity of the Sacrament, let him not resume, but proceed further."

By a similar reason, a mandate given to you by a Superior is presumed legitimate; the wine which is offered to you in church for sacrificing, pure; an altar-stone, portable, well placed, so that, unless a special cause persuades otherwise, you can abstain from positive investigation.

333. 1. A doubtful law does not oblige. From the rise of Probabilism this principle caused very sharp controversies. Some, namely the more rigid Probabiliorists (Concina,⁷⁸ Patuzzi, etc.), reject it altogether, teaching that in doubt the safer part must be chosen. Others, namely the laxer Probabilists (Caramuel, Diana, Tamburini, Moya, etc.), on the contrary proclaim this principle as the philosopher's stone and apply it without any exception, whether there is question of the validity of the act or of its licitness, whether of strict doubt or broad doubt. But since the Holy See condemned this exaggerated application of the principle in some matters, hence moderate Probabilists indeed admit the principle, but do not extend it to the four following cases:

a) If there is question of the validity of the sacraments. For from the virtue of religion and charity, indeed sometimes also from the virtue of justice, the minister ought to administer the sacraments validly, because otherwise great irreverence is caused to God and great harm to the man receiving. Hence, unless grave necessity urges or unless the Church supplies the defect, it is a grave sin to administer a doubtfully valid sacrament. For this reason Innocent XI also proscribed proposition (1): "It is not illicit, in conferring the sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, the safer one having been abandoned, unless law, agreement, or the danger of incurring grave harm forbids this. Hence an opinion only probable is not to be used in the conferral of baptism, priestly order, or episcopal order."⁷⁹

b) If there is question of things necessary for salvation, for example, of truths to be believed by necessity of means, of baptism to be received when someone doubts whether he was validly baptized, of the proximate danger of sinning, etc. For eternal salvation must be obtained and eternal damnation necessarily avoided; hence if there is question of danger to eternal life, the safer part must be chosen. Right love of self manifestly demands this. Even the "prince of the laxists" himself, Caramuel, teaches this.⁸⁰ Hence likewise proposition (4) was condemned by Innocent XI: "An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief."⁸¹

c) If there is question of a certain right of a third person. Hence in a civil case the judge is bound to render judgment according to the more probable opinion. The reason is that the judge is obliged from justice to settle the litigation according to objective truth without any acceptance of persons. But there would be manifest acceptance of persons if the judge, abandoning the certainly more probable opinion, judged according to the less probable opinion.⁸²

But if the case of each litigant is equally probable, the judge is bound either to divide the controverted matter between them or to persuade them to an amicable settlement. Hence it is easily understood why the following propositions were condemned: "I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable."⁸³ "When litigants have opinions equally probable for themselves, the judge can receive money for rendering a sentence in favor of one rather than the other."⁸⁴ - When one part of the litigants already possesses the thing in good faith, then the adage must be applied: "The condition of the possessor is better." And so the thing is not to be adjudged away from the possessor unless the other party proves his right. - In a criminal case favor is to be shown to the accused as long as his crime has not been proved. Hence Rule of Law 11 in VI: "When the rights of the parties are obscure, favor is to be shown to the accused rather than to the plaintiff," and the Code of Canon Law, c. 1748, § 2, establishes: "If the plaintiff does not prove, the defendant is absolved."

d) If there is question of grave danger of spiritual or temporal harm (whether one's own or another's), which we ought to prevent from charity or from justice. Therefore a physician is bound to employ more certain and safer remedies (when they can be had) and sins if without urgent necessity he employs doubtful remedies, so that the life of the sick person is endangered. Likewise it is illicit to take a drink that is doubtfully gravely poisonous.

These four exceptions, which, even the Probabilists themselves admitting it,⁸⁵ must be added to the famous principle, "A doubtful law does not oblige," show enough and more than enough that it is not so precious a philosopher's stone as certain Probabilists advertise it. But if that principle is understood with the clauses added, and if there is question of a true and serious doubt concerning the existence of a law, nothing prevents it from being applied to eliminate practical doubt.⁸⁶

⁷⁸ De probabilismo diss. 8, c. 3.

⁷⁹ Denz. n. 1151. John Lugo taught a similar proposition, De sacr. in genere, disput. VIII, n. 139 and 141.

⁸⁰ Theol. fund. n. 533.

⁸¹ Denz. n. 1154.

⁸² Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 63, a. 4.

⁸³ Innocent XI (Denz. n. 1152).

⁸⁴ Alexander VII (Denz. n. 1126).

⁸⁵ Cf. Noldin-Schmitt, De consc. n. 236. The author nevertheless thinks that those four cases are not exceptions from the principle of probabilism. It is a quarrel about words.

⁸⁶ So also St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 64). The difficulty nevertheless remains, when the law is truly doubtful.

349. Reasons for pure Probabilism. Since among modern Probabilists Noldin, S.J., stands out, we give here his arguments, which otherwise do not differ from the argumentation of other Probabilists.¹⁴⁷

1. From reason. A doubtful law does not oblige. But a law against which there is true and solid probability is truly doubtful. Therefore a law against which there is true and solid probability does not oblige. To prove the major, the worn arguments are applied, namely, a doubtful law is a law not sufficiently known, is uncertain, and the right of liberty precedes the right of law and its obligation. - But the minor is proved in this way: as long as the opinion for liberty is probable, the opinion for law cannot be certain. But it makes no difference whether this opinion for law is less, equally, or more probable, provided the opinion for liberty is probable.¹⁴⁸

2. From authority. "A moral system cannot be false which in every time (!) is expounded, vindicated, and applied in particular questions as a rule of morals by the greater part of theologians, of which sort is the Probabilistic system" (l. c. n. 240).

3. From the approbation of the Church. Explicitly indeed the Church has never approved Probabilism; but implicitly she has manifested her mind clearly and without doubt by that special approbation with which she distinguished the works of St. Alphonsus (who several times explicitly and in express words said that he was not a Probabilist, and who explicitly rejects the system teaching that it is licit to follow a known less probable opinion, "as Busembaum, Lacroix, and almost all the Jesuits say"¹⁴⁹). Nevertheless Noldin says:¹⁵⁰ "The system which St. Alphonsus used in composing moral theology is pure and simple Probabilism." And he confidently concludes:¹⁵¹ "It is licit to follow an opinion truly probable for liberty in all cases of doubtful law, whether the opposite opinion for law is less or equally or more probable.... The probabilistic principle, altogether universal, extends itself not only to the doubt of an existing law, but also of a ceasing law... [and] can also licitly be applied in the matter of justice.... Nothing prevents someone from using, in diverse cases concerning the same matter, according to pleasure, now one, now another probable opinion.... Thus the same person can, for one testament, use the opinion by which a testament lacking the formalities of law is valid, and for another testament the contrary opinion."

¹⁴⁷ Summa theol. mor. de principiis n. 237 sqq.

¹⁴⁸ St. Alphonsus expressly denies this last point; cf. Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 65.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. above n. 347.

¹⁵⁰ L. c. n. 239.

¹⁵¹ L. c. n. 241 and 242.

350. Difficulties against pure Probabilism. 1. The whole of Probabilism is founded upon the principle, "A doubtful law does not oblige," even if there is question of doubt broadly so called. But this foundation is by no means solid, nor is it sufficiently proved from reason or from authority. Not from reason: for the Probabilists attempt to prove this principle by no other arguments than the following: such a law is not sufficiently known, or is uncertain, or is invincibly unknown, and therefore it does not oblige. "But this argumentation is not pleasing: both because it involves a begging of the question, and because it can be turned back against the authors thus: an ordering permitting, not sufficiently known or uncertain or invincibly unknown, confers no right; or: moral liberty not sufficiently known or uncertain or unknown is to be reckoned as nothing."¹⁵² Not from authority: for the old authors, when they assert, "In doubts liberty," speak of doubt strictly so called, where the mind is inclined to neither part of the contradiction, but not of doubt broadly so called, where, on the contrary, they teach that that which is safer must be chosen.¹⁵³ Besides, not even the new Code of Canon Law admits without limit the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige. For c. 15 establishes: "Even invalidating and incapacitating laws do not urge in a doubt of law; but in a doubt of fact the Ordinary can dispense in them, provided there is question of laws in which the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to dispense." But for what is a dispensation of the Ordinary still required, if according to the Probabilists no doubtful law obliges?

2. Noldin asserts too boldly that Probabilism has been approved by the Church. If anyone considers without party zeal the testimonies brought forward above, especially from Alexander VII, Innocent XI, Clement XI, Clement XIII, he will rather be convinced of the contrary, thinking with Professor Koch and many others that the Church never favored Probabilism. Nor can it truly be said that the Church approved Probabilism by approving the moral works of St. Alphonsus, for that Holy Doctor expressly rejects pure Probabilism. Therefore at most it can be said that the Church tolerates Probabilism.

3. Pure Probabilism was unknown before Medina.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, it is dangerous to apply some system which through sixteen centuries in the Church was neither known nor applied. For it is altogether incredible that all the so-called ancient Summists, who wrote Manuals for the practical use of confessors, erred concerning the right solution of practical doubt; or also that all confessors, as many as there were in the world, did not act rightly in this matter until Bartholomaeus Medina most happily discovered Probabilism.

4. Pure Probabilism leads to Laxism. This proposition is proved: a) from history. For no one can deny that several Probabilists, and those excellent in talent, such as Tamburinus, Moya, Caramuel, Diana, etc., in reality taught lax opinions and afterward were proscribed by the Supreme Pontiffs. - b) from reason and the nature of the thing. For if the mere external or internal probability of some opinion now suffices for it to be licitly brought into practice, disastrous errors are almost inevitable. For how easily someone, not to say a layman, but even a cleric theologian, persuades himself that some opinion is truly probable! Did not only Catholic physicians, but also celebrated theologians in our times think that craniotomy was probably licit, if otherwise the mother and infant would have to die? - If in a matter of such great moment an error crept in, can the same not happen in other matters not so momentous? Therefore if someone always in his actions followed the principles of Probabilism, that is, if he left behind the opinion known as certainly more probable and followed the opinion favoring liberty certainly less probable and safe, he would gradually slide into Laxism. Hence Noldin himself, a Probabilist, acknowledges:¹⁵⁵ "If a Christian man in the service of God did nothing other than what the law strictly demands from the principles of Probabilism, certainly he would live a life little worthy of a Christian man." Moreover, a system which, its own patron admitting it, leads, although gradually, to a life little worthy of a Christian man has already been judged. The system of Christian prudence, about which presently, avoids the dangerous rocks of Probabilism.

¹⁵² Cf. Wouters, De Minusprobabilismo 2, 147.

¹⁵³ Cf. the arguments brought forward above (n. 345) for Probabiliorism.

¹⁵⁴ There is no leisure to refute the trifles and ineptitudes of Caramuel, who at length and breadth attempts to prove that Probabilism had already been applied by Adam and Eve, and that it excused them from many grave sins before the fall. Likewise that St. Thomas merited from Christ the words, "Thomas, you have written well of me," because he wrote probable things in the matter of faith and morals. (Apologema pro antiquissima et universalissima doctrina de probabilitate p. 127, n. 223, Lyons 1663.)

¹⁵⁵ L. c. n. 242.

86. • V. Simple Probabilism. This system labors under a twofold vice. First indeed, it extends the limits of probability more than is just, by contending that an opinion can enjoy solid probability even though the opposite is much more probable, which we sufficiently showed cannot be admitted in nn. 71-73. Then Probabilism does not temper the principle by the principle of possession; hence it violates the right of possession of the law and indulges liberty more than is just. For the patrons of this System, by always defending the parts of liberty wherever the opinion is probable, use weight and weight; indeed, the arguments by which they prove that liberty is not bound by a doubtful law do not convert against liberty, where precisely the same reason has force for a certainly existing law. For if the following reasoning has force in favor of liberty where the law is doubtful - a doubtful law does not oblige, because he is not obliged who invincibly does not know himself to be obliged - the conversion of the same must necessarily be made in favor of the law when a doubt concerning liberty follows.

Finally it must be noted here that most Probabilists sustained a false principle, namely: "He who acts probably acts prudently." The vice of this principle is in this, that in order to make a certain judgment concerning the honesty of an action it relies on probability, and therefore on doubt as on a motive, but not as on a mere condition, which being posited, a certain reflex principle is employed to form a certain conscience. For when two opposite opinions are about equally probable, the motives of each elide each other's strength for determining the assent of the intellect to one rather than the other. For as much as the motives of one strive to obtain assent, so much do the motives of the other strive in the opposite direction; hence the intellect can prudently adhere to neither before the other, but necessarily remains unmoved and suspended, just as a balance remains suspended in equilibrium when equal weights are in each pan, or just as a stone, drawn in opposite parts by a double equal force, rests unmoved. Therefore he who in such a case commands assent to the opinion favoring liberty, and from it forms the ultimate dictate of conscience, acts imprudently and culpably.¹

88. • Objections against Probabilism in general. - Some of these attack the application of the principle: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better, namely, of liberty; and you will easily refute these if you always have properly before your eyes the proper thesis of the Probabilists. For they do not ask whether liberty precedes the law insofar as it is existing in first act, but this one thing: whether it precedes the law insofar as it is actually obliging, or apprehended by conscience.⁵ The Anti-probabilists, by denying this, fall into that absurdity which we noted in n. 74, Conclusion, under 2°. - Notice besides that Probabilists do not affirm that doubtful liberty is certain in itself (which would imply a contradiction in terms), but that in doubt concerning the law liberty certainly possesses, and therefore preserves its right.

89. • Others attack the principle itself: A doubtful law does not oblige, and deny that it has force; either because a) in very many cases it is not doubted whether the law exists, but whether a certainly existing law comprehends this or that case; or because b) the Probabilist, by following a probable less safe sentence, is exposed to the danger of sin; or because c), according to the principle of Canon Law, in doubt the safer part must be chosen.

You will easily remove the objection under a), if you notice that a law, although certainly existing, becomes doubtful with respect to that case about which there is really doubt whether it is comprehended under the law, and therefore with respect to that case does not oblige.¹

To the objection under b):

Resp. 1° I retort the argument against the Probabiliorists: for by following the more probable opinion favoring liberty, which itself can be false, the same danger is given; therefore one would have to flee to condemned Rigorism.

2° I distinguish. It is not permitted to expose oneself to the danger of formal sin: I concede; of material sin: I deny; because merely material sin is not imputable, nor does it offend God, since it is nothing other than the matter of sin, separated from every malice of the will; but where no depraved will intervenes, no sin is present. For this reason proposition 46 of Baius was condemned: "To the reason and definition of sin the voluntary does not pertain."² But Probabilists are in danger of material sin, not of formal sin; for from the reflex principles of Probabilism we are plainly certain that a doubtful law, even if objectively perhaps it were present, is not present subjectively, or does not oblige, that is, is not a law as to us, and therefore its material transgression cannot be imputed to fault.

3° The objection of the adversaries either proves that the principle of possession cannot be applied even in the matter of justice, or it proves nothing. For in the matter of justice, if someone, after a doubt has arisen, perseveres in the use of the right which he possesses, he exposes himself to the danger of violating the natural law; but, as the adversaries confess, this danger of violating the natural law in the matter of justice does not prevent the possessor from conquering in doubt. Therefore the same has force for liberty in any other matter. - Proof of the major. For as soon as a doubt has arisen concerning the property of a thing which someone possesses, there is danger of exercising a right which perhaps belongs not to the possessor but to another, and of receiving fruits which perhaps are not the possessor's, but belong to another despoiled of his right; these two things are manifestly contrary to the natural law.

90. • To the objection under c):

Resp. 1° The aforesaid rule has force a) in practical doubt concerning the formal honesty of the action; b) in doubt of fact with which there is joined the danger of an evil which does not depend on conscience and which we are bound to avoid, about which we spoke in nn. 58-60. For such were the doubts to which the Canons apply that rule; for in those cases it was always a question of practical doubt, or of some evil to be avoided, independent of conscience, as St. Alphonsus clearly proves,¹ by discussing each of those cases. Besides, theologians almost commonly teach that the aforesaid rule of the Canons, as to speculative doubts, is of counsel, not of precept.

2° To the cited rule we oppose Rule 15 in the Sixth: "It is fitting that odious things be restricted and favors amplified"; the 30th: "In obscure things the minimum must be followed"; and this Canon: "Unless you have been certain of the mandate of the Apostolic See, you will not be compelled to execute what is commanded."²

91. • There are those who also object this: that Probabilists are not consistent with themselves, since they except from the principle, A doubtful law does not oblige, those cases which we said in nn. 58-60 must be excepted. But this is objected absurdly, since those cases are improperly called excepted, and in reality must be called cases foreign to Probabilism or not pertaining to Probabilism. For what is the case? Probabilism is occupied with doubtful law, not with certain law. But in those exceptions there is a question of cases in which some law is known certainly to exist, and the doubt is whether by those means which are employed for executing the law the end of the law, and that necessarily to be obtained, is in reality obtained, and therefore whether the law itself is really fulfilled; in which case the safer thing must always be chosen. And the reason is ready to hand: for, since the law is certain, and its execution altogether urges, those means must be used by which the end of the law is certainly, or at least more safely, obtained, and in this way satisfaction is made to the law. For he who wished to employ only doubtful means, where certain means are supplied, would deliberately commit himself to the danger of violating a known law, and therefore would sin. Therefore, where there is a certain obligation of obtaining the end, safer means for attaining this end must be used.

96. Thesis. In the state of a true and strictly so-called speculatively practical opinion concerning the mere honesty and dishonesty of an action, remaining after diligent examination, man must, before he acts, form a practically certain conscience by force of a reflex principle; and this is different in the different opinions of theologians. According to the Probabilists, he can always do this from the principle: An uncertain law does not oblige, and so licitly do that which is less safe, even if it is more probable that the obligation exists or has not ceased; unless, however, it is very notably more probable, because then the law is practically certain (as was said in n. 80). According to the Probabiliorists and Equiprobabilists, not always; for if the law is certainly more probable, it must be observed, since it is now, as it were, practically certain, according to the principle: In uncertainties, the more truthlike is to be done.

It is proved: 1. Man must, before he acts, form for himself a certain conscience from a reflex principle, because this alone is the rule of acting (n. 78), and in the case it cannot be had except indirectly from a reflex principle.

2. He must act more safely and observe the law in the case in which it is very notably more probable, because then the law is equivalently or, as it were, practically certain, and the principle is valid: The more truthlike is to be done, as all now admit (n. 80).

3. On the contrary, he can do the less safe thing if liberty is more probable, from the principle: An uncertain law does not oblige, because in the case the law is more than strictly doubtful; in this all now agree.

4. One point remains controverted, namely, if the law is simply but certainly more probable, whether the principle An uncertain law does not oblige can be employed, or that other one must be employed: In doubts, the more truthlike is to be done.

The whole point of the controversy is situated in this: whether every opinion understood in the strictly so-called philosophical sense always is equivalent to practical certitude broadly so called.

A. The Probabilists deny this, and therefore they say: if it is only more probable that the law exists, although the reasons for the law are graver, nevertheless they are not practically certain, because grave reasons remain against it; and therefore it is certain that the law is uncertain, and we judge certainly that it does not oblige. This being posited, they form for themselves a certain conscience thus:

"That which, all things having been diligently considered, is not prohibited, is licit.

"But this action here and now to be placed certainly is not prohibited to me:

"for it is certain that an uncertain law does not oblige;

"but, although I rather think that this law exists and now obliges, and I adhere to this opinion, nevertheless I do not think this with certitude, even broadly so called, and therefore the law is uncertain for me;

"therefore it is certain that in the case it does not oblige me.

"Therefore this action here and now to be placed, all things having been diligently considered, is certainly licit for me."

B. On the contrary, the Equiprobabilists distinguish:

Either the opinion is a little more probable and the excess of reasons is slight; and then in practice it is doubtfully more probable, and almost or morally equally probable, in which case it is judged doubtful, and does not oblige on account of the principle: A doubtful law does not oblige. And then they form for themselves a certain conscience by a process similar to that above.

Or it is certainly more probable even by one degree (moral); and this in practice is impossible unless it is notably more probable and the excess of reasons is notable. Then, however, it is practically certain with certitude broadly so called and imperfect (n. 80). This the Probabiliorists also acknowledge.

The Probabilists observe, however, that many degrees of probability are found between equal probability, or strict doubt, and practical certitude; but it would be strange if in practice we could distinguish none of them with certitude, so that opinion would either be equivalent to doubt or equivalent to certitude, and in practice there would be no middle state between strict doubt and certitude. This seems incredible, they say, and it is nothing other than to eliminate one of the more principal states of mind.

Against this the Equiprobabilists object with St. Alphonsus:¹ That which is certainly more probable is notably more probable, otherwise the intellect could not certainly and evidently, i.e., without any hesitation, affirm that it is more probable. But that which is notably more probable is practically certain (n. 80).

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, nn. 56, 67, 77; and Diss. of the year 1762.

The Probabilists answer that the principle is not always and necessarily true, because, as it seems, a man of keen mind can certainly perceive that one thing is more probable than another, although nevertheless it is only a little, or at least not so notably, more probable. Yet often for many questions and minds that principle is verified; whence the fact that something is certainly more probable will ordinarily be a sign that it is notably more probable. Therefore present-day Probabilists, as being moderate (at least with their principles considered), and Equiprobabilists differ little in practice. For the former teach that a notably more probable law must be observed; the latter, however, teach that a certainly more probable law must be observed, but add that such a law does not exist unless it is notably more probable.

Hence it is clear that in practice this dispute is of lesser importance.

98. Practical observations. - 1. Some Probabilists understand a solidly probable opinion relatively to the opposite. And these agree in substance with the Equiprobabilists and can be called moderate Probabilists.1 Others hold every opinion absolutely and in itself probable to be solidly probable, without caring about relative probability. Namely, they deny that the use of a probable opinion must be confined within limits, and that the part to which another, however much even evidently more probable, is opposed becomes illicit.2 This is absolute Probabilism, which opens the way to Laxism.

There is also a twofold system of Equiprobabilism. Some, the milder, say that St. Alphonsus never intended to found a new system substantially different from moderate Probabilism, but willed to confine it within just limits by positing the restriction: that which is certainly more probable is very notably more probable, and therefore is practically certain. Hence he never enunciated the axiom of the Probabiliorists, In doubts, the more truthlike is to be chosen, as absolutely true, nor as a properly so-called reflex principle, but only as an expression of this doctrine: in morals, when we cannot arrive at perfect certitude, we are held to be content with certitude broadly so called and to choose the more probable, not indeed everything that is more probable, but what is certainly more probable, because that comes nearest to perfect practical certitude. And thus they understand St. Alphonsus when he says, Th. M., book I, n. 56: "Where truth cannot clearly be found, we are held to embrace at least that opinion which comes nearer (altogether) to the truth, such as is the opinion (certainly) more probable." And these do not differ as to substance from the moderate Probabilists.1 - But the more recent are stricter,2 and affirm that the principle of the Probabiliorists, In doubts, the more truthlike is to be chosen, is a reflex principle by which conscience certainly must be formed in the state of opinion, even if the certainly more probable opinion were not certain with certitude broadly so called; yet this hypothesis is not verified in practice. And these, in principle, approach more nearly to Probabiliorism.

Indeed there is also a twofold Probabiliorism. Some are milder, as the older authors and among the more recent Billuart, and do not depart so very much in various practical solutions from the Equiprobabilists and moderate Probabilists; others are stricter, as Concina and Patuzzi, and wholly approach Tutiorism.

2. They rather often say that Probabilism cannot be brought into practice because it is not certain, since several theologians are opposed to it. But the same could be objected against Equiprobabilism, since the Probabiliorists contradict it. This argument, however, is valid only for those who think that they see certainly that Probabilism (or Equiprobabilism) is false or illicit. For others it is not valid, because they can act according to Probabilism from the authority of the greater part of the moralists of our time, or even perhaps form for themselves, from a certain ratiocination, a practically certain conscience in this matter. For the principle An uncertain law in practice of itself does not oblige seems sufficiently certain (n. 92). Whence this principle, in a state of positive doubt or mere opinion, can be applied to form a certain conscience, unless a certain higher law of charity, religion, justice, etc., obliges (n. 91). The Equiprobabilists and Probabiliorists contend that in the state of opinion the higher law obliges: In uncertainties the more truthlike is to be chosen; yet they do not prove this sufficiently, with certitude. Until they prove it, liberty, or the right of applying the principle An uncertain law does not oblige, remains practically certain.

3. Formerly certain authors placed as the foundation of Probabilism the axiom: He who acts probably, acts prudently. But:

a) This is not a primary principle having force of itself in the formation of an indirectly certain conscience; for prudence requires that we act only with a certain conscience of honesty. But it can be valid as a consequence of the primary principle: probability, namely, is a condition so that a certain conscience can prudently be formed from the more general principle: A doubtful law does not oblige, - The condition of the possessor is better, - or: In doubts the more truthlike is to be done. Probability is the reason by which through discourse we come to a certain conclusion.

b) Nor is it valid absolutely concerning every probability; for to act prudently, a slender, or doubtful probability, or one considered absolutely without comparison to the opposite reasons, does not suffice. For it can happen that a reason probable in itself absolutely, from comparison with much graver opposite reasons, loses solid probability or becomes doubtfully probable (n. 74).

c) Nor is it valid without restriction, because in doubts concerning the validity of an act or the necessity of a means one must not act probably, but more safely (n. 90).

Hence a threefold mode of Probabilism is altogether to be rejected: 1) both that one which rested on the sole principle: He who acts probably acts prudently; 2) and laxer Probabilism, which also admits light probabilities, or absolute Probabilism, which necessarily leads to the use of a light probability; 3) and unlimited Probabilism, which posits no restriction and does not exclude from the use of probability cases concerning validity and the necessity of a means to the end.

4. From canon 15 Probabilism is to be applied to ecclesiastical laws, not indeed in doubts of fact, but in a case of doubt of law.⁴ But from this an argument cannot be drawn and a conclusion made that the same is valid for natural and divine law, because the obligation of ecclesiastical law alone, not of natural and divine law, depends wholly upon the intention of the Church.

⁴ Some have interpreted this more laxly, as if it were enough to doubt approved authors, even if the agent himself judged the benign interpretation of the canon to be false, and thus it were clear to him that there was no doubt of law! Indeed they add: received interpretations of some authors, after some time, found a usual interpretation from which one must not depart. But for a usual interpretation the consensus of some authors does not suffice; all the conditions necessary for juridical custom are required, among which first is the general observance of subjects. Besides, how is such a general usage possible for rarely occurring cases, to which nevertheless they intend to apply their rule? - But if the said interpretation were valid, laws from day to day would always become more lax.

1. Thus, besides those who in the Order of Preachers adhered to Probabilism, also Suarez, Vasquez, Lugo, Lessius, Laymann, Sylvius, Palaus, Viva, Abelly, Reuter, Voit, and several recent authors.

2. Lacroix, Arsdékin, Illsung, Ballerini, Bucceroni are cited.

1. Thus, for example, Scavini and the older disciples of St. Alphonsus, Aertnijs and de Caigny.

2. Among others, Dubois, Janssen, Ter Haar and Wouters of the C.SS.R.

In this Supplement, according to the order of the numbers and tractates of the Moral Institutions, there are found those things which in them are confirmed by the new Code, and those things which must be changed from it. This arrangement of the matter by way of an appendix, although it has against it the fact that it is not inserted into the book itself, nevertheless bears before itself no lesser utilities, especially from this, that thus it may be seen clearly and immediately what things are retained in all moral theology, and what things truly are abolished or renewed, after the Code has begun to have binding force, i.e., after the nineteenth day of the month of May of the year 1918. From it there is thus at once understood the distinction between the old and the new discipline, which helps not a little toward understanding better the new dispositions of law and toward retaining them more easily in memory. It is supposed that anyone possesses a volume of the new Code, which indeed not only most greatly befits a cleric and especially a student of Sacred Theology, but is also plainly necessary for him for observing ecclesiastical laws.

N. B. - Lest the word is confirmed (confirm.) recur too much, it will be omitted whenever it would have to be applied to several immediately following numbers.

For solving doubts the canons 6 § 4, 15, 23 contribute. Cf. also canons 19, 50, 85, 1748 §§ 1-2.

Probabilism, as was observed above, is applied not to all cases, but only to those cases in which there is discussion of the licit and the illicit; for if there is question of obtaining some necessary end, for example, of procuring the matter or form of some sacrament, one must always flee to the safer part, any probability whatsoever being set aside. Besides, it must be noted that in the application or use of probabilism two essential conditions are required, one which regards the remote foundation, but the other which regards the proximate foundation upon which the probabilist relies while acting. The remote foundation is probability itself, which ought to be not slight, not doubtful, not apparent, but true and solid. But the proximate foundation is some reflex principle, and this must always be invoked by the one operating, either explicitly or implicitly. These things, which are the compendium of the whole system, are explained more fully in the following twofold proposition.

Proposition I. It is not licit to follow a probable opinion, nor a more probable one, the safer having been left aside, whenever there is present an absolute obligation of efficaciously obtaining some determinate end, which the use of a probably unfit means would bring into danger; therefore then the safer part must be followed.

Proof. Whoever is driven by an absolute obligation to efficaciously obtain some determinate end, he is bound to choose those means by which he will be about to attain that end in the more efficacious way in which he can. But by the safer part alone can the end be more efficaciously obtained: for from the hypothesis, a means only probably apt brings into danger the end which I am bound absolutely to attain. Therefore it is not licit to use a means only probably apt, but more apt means and the same safer means are to be chosen. Therefore the safer part must be followed. Hence the following are deduced.

Corollaries. 1st. In those things which are necessary for salvation by necessity of means, you are bound to follow what is safer; for the most grave obligation presses each one to attain certainly the eternal salvation of his soul; therefore absolutely safe and certain means are to be applied. Therefore in matters pertaining to faith or to true religion, the opposite probability being put after, the safer opinion must necessarily be followed.

2nd. A hunter, fearing lest by discharging lead at a wild animal he perhaps wound some man, cannot fire, even if he should think it more probable that danger is absent; for this danger, if perhaps it is present, cannot be removed by a contrary probability, even a greater one. For he is bound by a certain law to remove even the probable danger of harm.

3rd. The physician and the surgeon are bound to apply the safer medicines and means which here and now can be had; because by a tacit contract they have obligated themselves to obtaining the end more securely, insofar as can be done. The same likewise must be said concerning all others who have contracted some obligation of this sort toward their neighbor.

4th. The minister of a sacrament, where there is question of its validity, unless the defect is supplied by the Church, or a case of necessity presses, is bound to follow the safer part, insofar as he can, the less safe probable or even more probable opinion having been left aside; because otherwise he would expose the sacrament to the danger of nullity, and his neighbor to the danger of spiritual harm. Hence the following proposition was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI: "It is not illicit, in conferring the sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, the safer having been left aside."

I said, 1st, unless the defect is supplied by the Church; for sometimes the Church can and is judged to supply that which is wanting for the validity of the sacrament: and this can indeed happen in two sacraments, namely in the sacrament of Penance, if for a grave reason it is conferred with doubtful jurisdiction, or with probable jurisdiction; and in the sacrament of Matrimony, when it is celebrated with a doubtful impediment of ecclesiastical law, or also when the delegation of the assisting priest is doubtful, as will be said in its own place.

I said, 2nd, unless a case of necessity presses, because since the sacraments are for men, they are to be ministered to a man constituted in grave danger of life in the better way in which it can be done, even with mere probability, indeed with slight and most slight probability concerning their validity. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 43-49.

Proposition II. It is licit to follow an opinion truly and solidly probable, the safer having been left aside, which is at the same time more probable, where there is question of the licit or illicit alone.

Proof, 1st, From Reason. A law against which true and solid probability militates is not a certain law; but a law which is not certain induces no obligation. Therefore a law against which true and solid probability militates induces no obligation, and therefore it is then free to each one, that law not certain having been left aside, to follow the opinion favoring liberty. The major is most openly clear from this, that probability and certainty necessarily exclude one another: therefore either the hypothesis is not verified, namely that true and solid probability in fact militates against some law in particular; or if the matter so stands, that law cannot be certain. But the minor is proved from this, that the effect cannot surpass the cause; but it would surpass it, if the binding produced by some law were certain when the force of binding is not certain. But this is most beautifully illustrated by St. Thomas by the following comparison: "The command of someone governing stands toward binding in voluntary matters, in that mode of binding which can happen to the will, as corporeal action stands toward binding corporeal things. But the corporeal action of an agent never induces necessity into another thing except through the contact of the coercion itself with the thing upon which it acts. Hence neither is anyone bound from the command of some lord, unless the command reaches him to whom it is commanded. But it reaches him through knowledge." These words of the Angelic Doctor having been related, St. Alphonsus thus continues: "The likeness brought forward here by St. Thomas cannot be more lucid and convincing for proving our sentence or principle, namely that an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation. The holy Doctor says that knowledge of the precept is like a bond which binds the will; hence, just as for binding some thing there is need that a cord actually be applied, so for binding the will of man, so that he is bound to exercise or omit some action, it is necessary that he have knowledge of the precept; otherwise that man remains in his liberty.... Therefore, just as he who is not actually bound by some bond has the power of turning aside where he wills, so he who is not bound through knowledge of the precept is free from the obligation of the precept." Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 90, art. 4; 2-2, q. 1, art. 4; QQ. DD. De Veritate, q. 17, art. 3. - St. Alphonsus, Systema Mor., §§ 1 and seq.

Nor should you say, 1st, that under the name of knowledge here, in each holy Doctor, there is not understood certain cognition, but only probable cognition; for St. Alphonsus responds "that this would be a new meaning of a new vocabulary, while all philosophers with the same St. Thomas distinguish opinion from knowledge, which is taken as certain cognition of some truth." Cf. St. Alphonsus, Syst. Mor., § 2, Objic. 1.

Nor should you say, 2nd, that, the law which directly obliges being lacking, there exists another indirect law, which, as certain, produces a certain obligation. For if such a law could be feigned, it would either be a law of avoiding the danger of sinning, or a law of following what is safer; moreover neither can be said. Not the first, for in order that someone expose himself to the danger of sinning, it is not enough that he incur the danger of acting against the law, but it is required that he undergo the danger of acting against an obligation imposed upon him by the law; for although perhaps a law exists, if from elsewhere it is certain that I am not obligated by the law, it is not to be feared lest I formally violate the law. Nor can the other be said, for that law of following what is safer would suppose that it is not simply safe to set aside a law probably not existing; but this is false where there is question of the licit or illicit alone, for it is indeed safe to avoid formal sin and the danger of sin. Besides, the objection, if it has any force, can very well be turned back against the probabiliorists who urge it. For the probabiliorist will neither avoid the danger of sinning, nor follow what is safer, unless he practically says farewell to his own system and falls into absolute tutiorism.

Proof, 2nd, From Authority. For (a) St. Gregory Nazianzen thus urges a certain Novatian: "Do you give to young widows, on account of the slipperiness of age, the power of entering marriage? But Paul by no means doubted to do this.... But, you say, this by no means after baptism. By what argument do you confirm this? Either prove that the matter so stands, or if you cannot do this, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and ease prevail." Orat. 39, in Sancta Lumina, n. 19.

(b) St. Jerome, reproved by Chrysogonus, the disciple of Rufinus, because he taught that those who had successively taken two wives, one before, the other after baptism, could be promoted to the Episcopate, responds: "Let him hear us again proclaiming: the old Adam dies wholly in the laver, and the new is raised with Christ in baptism.... We say these things not because we ourselves, Christ being propitious, are held by this question; but having been asked by brothers what seemed to us, we have responded, prejudging no one from following what he wills, nor overturning the decree of another by our sentence." Apolog. advers. Rufin., lib. 1.

(c) St. Bonaventure, treating of the dispensation of vows, recounts three sentences or opinions, and finally concludes: "Which of these three opinions is truer, I confess that I do not know, and any of them can sufficiently be sustained; yet if someone wishes to accept this last one, no manifest inconvenience occurs to him." In 4, dist. 38, a. 2, q. 3.

(d) St. Antoninus, after he had established that only two things are required for the honesty of an action: first, that the agent not doubt practically about the goodness of the act; the other, that the sentence which he follows is not against the express authority of Sacred Scripture, nor against the determination of the Catholic Church, descending to a particular case says: "If it were said that here there is usury, and usury is against the decalogue, it is answered: that usury is against the precepts of the decalogue is true reductively; but that this contract is usurious is not clear, since wise men think things contrary to one another in matters of this sort." Summa, p. 1, tit. 3, cap. 10, § 10, reg. 4; and p. 2, tit. 1, c. 11, § 28.

(e) Melchior Cano, attacking Scotus who said that sinners are bound to elicit contrition on every feast day, writes thus: "There is no human or evangelical law by which this precept is asserted; let them bring it forth, and we shall be silent." And again: "Since I do not know whence those doctors have come to this opinion, I can freely deny what is not sufficiently ascertained as precept." Relect. 4, de poen., p. 4, q. 2, prop. 3.

(f) Dominic Soto requires that a man look upon the law, namely so that he know it as certain: "He who uses a rule must look upon it." And again: "When there are probable opinions among grave doctors, whichever you follow, you have your conscience in safety." De just. et jur., lib. 1, q. 1, a. 4; and lib. 6, q. 1, art. 6. Cf. Bouquillon, n. 298 and seq.

Nor should you say, 1st, that probabilism is something recent, and therefore that it is not licit to recur to the authority of the ancient Fathers and scholastics; for it is answered that two things are to be distinguished in the system of probabilism, namely its use founded upon its substantial foundation, and its scientific form. Moreover, whatever may be the case concerning the latter, it suffices for the force of the argument to show that the former is most ancient in the Church of God; and this is clear not only from the cited texts and many others which can be cited, but also from this, that when in the year 1577 Bartholomew Medina proposed to the schools the doctrine of probabilism reduced scientifically into a system, no one cried out against it as something new, but it seemed to all altogether conformable to the rule of morals, and was received by unanimous consent.

Nor should you say, 2nd, that probabilism lay as if dead in the middle of the seventeenth century, and throughout the whole following century; for it is answered that that death, which the adversaries boast of, was finally nothing other than a diminution of splendor, and that this must be owed entirely to the frauds, reproaches, and outcries of the Jansenists. But if it is certain that many truths have sometimes been somewhat obscured by the force and pertinacity of adversaries, what wonder if the same happened to probabilism? But in these our days, if the schools diffused throughout the whole world are inspected, in most of them will be found the doctrine of probabilism handed down and defended, which, the Jansenistic outcries having been stilled and the heresy overcome, chiefly by the work of St. Alphonsus, today enjoys new honor and new patronage. Cf. Bouquillon, nn. 300 and seq.

Proof, 3rd, From Consequences. For if, probabilism having been rejected, we were bound to follow probabiliorism,

(a) There would follow a difficulty too grave for confessors, and one so great that the office of hearing confessions would be altogether intolerable for many. For the confessor would perpetually expose himself to the danger of sinning on account of defect of sufficient diligence in weighing the various degrees of probability, especially in the matter of restitution, when from two probable opinions he would follow one. For if he should assume the more benign sentence, he would sin by permitting that in which he would apprehend a deformity probably existing; but if he should act according to the more rigid sentence, he would sin by imposing an uncertain yoke upon the penitent. Besides, although the more rigid sentence may appear to him more probable, when will he be certain that it is truly such, and that the opposite does not seem more probable to another confessor? Hence follows also that contradiction of confessors who, although professing probabiliorism, nevertheless not rarely keep saying that in the administration of the sacrament of Penance they cannot rigorously apply the principles of probabiliorism; and therefore they hold one thing in theory, but another altogether opposite in practice. Would it not be better to establish and admit milder principles with so many most wise Doctors, and to bring them into practice more exactly?

(b) There would follow a most troublesome difficulty for the faithful. For in doubts there would be imposed upon them the obligation of inquiring which opinion is more probable; for the obligation of operating according to the more probable necessarily includes the duty of inquiring into it. But for the most part there is given a moral impossibility of distinguishing between the more probable and the less probable; for even for the learned this is very often quite difficult. And indeed I ask whether I am bound to what is more probable in itself, or absolutely, or with respect to me, or relatively? If the former, whence shall I know it? If the latter, again there is question either of intrinsic probability or extrinsic probability. If of the latter, what school is to be followed? And what Doctors are to be asked? If of the former, the difficulty increases: whence shall I know whether I am sufficiently fit for this judgment? Whether I am living in invincible ignorance, or not? Therefore, uncertain and pressed by doubts, what shall I do? Shall I recur to teachers? But from the hypothesis, it is mine to judge. Therefore it becomes manifest how many and how great anxieties would hang over the faithful from that necessity of following what is more probable or safer.

(c) There would follow a perpetual fluctuation of doctrine. For this is clear not only from the daily experience of probabiliorists, but also from the very nature of probabiliorism; since, the obligation of following the opinion which appears more probable to each one having been posited, it is impossible that several probabiliorists agree in the same decision. Wherefore some will necessarily stand for the affirmative part, and others for the negative: one will bind, another will loose, and what will appear more probable to you will very easily seem equally or less probable to another. Hence there will follow confusion of decisions, perplexity of the faithful, and anxieties of the confessors themselves, who from some supposed excess of probability will impose most grave obligations. But probabilism well understood lacks inconveniences of this sort, at least for the most part. For only two things are to be weighed by probabilists, namely certain obligations and merely probable obligations. But although it is not always clear concerning true probability, nevertheless no one fails to see that, ordinarily speaking, it is much easier to discern whether a solid reason or authority is had against the law, than to bring forth a judgment concerning some excess of probability. Therefore.

Nor should you say, 1st, that probabilists are oppressed by greater inconveniences, not only because they love danger, which is against that saying of Ecclus. iii, 27: "He who loves danger will perish in it," but also because they lack a true word or directive principle, which is against that saying of Ecclus. xxxvii, 20: "Before all your works let a true word go before you"; for it is answered that the true word among us is the reflex principle itself, which, since it produces practical certainty, means that we incur no danger of formally sinning. Besides, each text can very well be turned back against the probabiliorists who object them, unless they wish to flee to condemned tutiorism.

Nor should you say, 2nd, that against probabilists that well-known rule of canon law can be urged: "In doubts the safer part is to be chosen"; for besides the fact that the argument could again be turned back, it is answered that in the aforesaid rule there is question either of practical doubt, or of cases in which some end must necessarily be obtained.

Nor should you say, 3rd, that probabilists can be accused of imprudence, because, not choosing the more truthlike opinion, they do not imitate those prudent physicians who seriously strive to drive out diseases of the body; for in no way can he be called imprudent who, the obligation having been weighed, acts after he has seen certainly that no deformity is found in his action. But to the example it is answered that it is not to the point, for the physician, just as also the judge, does not deal with the licit or illicit, but the first seeks the efficacy of the means, and the other the truth of the matter; and these two do not depend upon some reflex principle.

Nor should anyone object, 4th, that the more probable opinion must be embraced as being nearer to truth; for a greater or lesser approach of two contradictory propositions is ineptly asserted in relation to truth, since one is true and the other false; but which is true, which false, we do not know. There is indeed a greater appearance of truth in one than in the other; assent can be given to each, but to neither without fear. Indeed truth can stand on the part of the less probable; and therefore the assent given is not necessary. And although it is licit to embrace the more probable, the obligation of embracing it is not to be affirmed; it is licit also to embrace the less but truly probable, because there is present a grave reason and one worthy of assent. Nor should anyone say that this is repugnant: it is indeed repugnant in evident matters in which the intellect necessarily assents, but not in merely probable matters in which the will determines the mind to assenting.

Nor does it suffice, 5th, that there are more probable reasons for someone to assert that this obligation of the law is imposed upon us, because as long as there is had only that greater probability in favor of the obligation, this obligation can exist or not exist, and therefore it is not known. "What is known," as the Angelic says, "cannot possibly be otherwise." Hence, while the solid probability of the contradictory opinion remains, the obligation cannot be imposed; for it is unknown. And an unknown obligation is to be held as none for this subject. Moreover, an object cannot truly be called necessary when it is not known whether it is such or not. Namely, the force of law consists in this, that it imposes necessity upon some object in order to the will; and surely when a twofold opposed probable opinion is had, this very necessity remains uncertain, and therefore the object itself, as necessary, cannot be proposed to the will.

6th. We certainly ought by every human effort to tend toward the agreement of our acts with their norm, and hence with truly reasonable diligence to inquire what the law itself is; we ought also to be prepared to fulfill the known law itself. For to these things we are obligated by nature itself. Namely, objective obligation is the effect of an existing objective law; but subjective obligation is the effect of law existing in the mind: but known law is law existing in the mind, and hence subjective obligation is the effect of known law, but not of unknown law. But law is unknown when opposed probable opinions concerning it are had. Therefore there is no subjective obligation in the case: or, an uncertain obligation is none. Therefore we are bound to conform our acts with their known norm, but not with an unknown norm.

Nor did the Decree of Innocent XI given on 26 June 1680 condemn probabilism, although many have asserted this. The genuine text of this Decree was at last published on 19 April 1902 by the secretary of the Holy Office: "A report having been made by Father Laurea of the contents in the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzalez of the Society of Jesus directed to our Most Holy Lord, the Eminent Lords said: that it should be written through the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of Spain, that he signify to the said Father Thyrsus, that His Holiness, his letters having been kindly received and read not without praise, has commanded that he freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also vigorously attack the sentence of those who assert that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one thus known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable, and that he make him certain that whatever he will have done and written in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness. Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus, by order of His Holiness, that he not only permit the Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the sentence of those asserting that, in the concurrence of the less probable with the more probable thus known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; but also that he write to all the Universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that each one, according as it shall please him, write freely for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary one, and command them that they submit themselves altogether to the mandate of His Holiness." It is added in the exemplar of the Holy Office on 8 July 1690: "The aforesaid Order of His Holiness having been announced to the Father General of the Society of Jesus through the Assessor, he responds that in all things he will obey as quickly as possible, although neither by himself nor by his Predecessors had it ever been forbidden to write for the more probable opinion and to teach it."

The decree itself contains a singular and private mandate, 1st, to Father Thyrsus, that he himself freely and intrepidly preach, teach... the more probable opinion, etc.; 2nd, to the Father General of the Society, both that he permit the same to the Fathers of the Society and that he write to the Universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that each one, according as it shall please him, write freely for the more probable opinion, etc. The difficulty arises especially from the second part. Namely, seriously and constantly the Supreme Pontiff desired that in the Society of Jesus there be full liberty for teaching that it is not licit to follow a sentence favoring liberty against the law, unless the one operating should first prudently and probably persuade himself that it is true and not contrary to the eternal law, which persuasion he will never be able to have unless by authority and reason, or by both together, it is clearly more truthlike to him that the matter is licit and permitted by divine law. From the order of His Holiness, liberty was conceded to the Fathers of the Society of defending the more probable sentence: "each one, according as it shall please him, write freely."

This father, when he was a subject, was wholly intent on this: that he persuade the superiors "that it was expedient for the Society that in its schools," I use his own words, "each sentence be read indifferently," probabilism and anti-probabilism (Monumenta ad Gonzalezii Fundamentum, p. 216); that they should "leave free to the Fathers to hand down that" sentence of the Probabilists "or the opposite" (ibid., p. 214); "lest the Society should undertake to defend that" probabilistic sentence "by common studies" (ibid., p. 214). The liberty conceded removed an obligation, if any had ever existed, not of defending the more probable opinion; it did not impose an obligation of defending it; it removed the obligation of defending probabilism, but not the liberty of defending it. Thus the Society itself understood the Order of His Holiness when it established the 18th Congregation, decree 12, by force of which it is clear that the Society neither prohibited nor prohibits defending the sentence contrary to this: "in acting it is licit to follow a less probable opinion favoring liberty, the more probable standing for the precept having been left aside." Indeed, if the decree of Innocent XI had condemned probabilism, Father Gonzalez, exercising the supreme office in the Society, could not have written these things in his book concerning the right use of probable opinions: "But I do not publish this treatise as the General Superior of the Society of Jesus, but as one theologian from the Society: intending to bind none of my subjects to teaching thus, but leaving full liberty to all, so that in this most grave controversy they may defend that part which, after accurate study undertaken from a sincere desire of finding the truth, they have found to rest upon more solid foundations." Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis, Rome, year 1694, p. xv, n. 41.

Add, if this decree had transfixed probabilism, it also transfixed no less equiprobabilism. Probabiliorism, confirmed in it, is the system of Father Gonzalez, who admitted that "the limitation applied by Father Esparza, by Father Terillo," and by certain others to the licit use of the less safe opinion in the occurrence of the safer "is indeed necessary and very useful for restraining the abuse of probable opinions; nevertheless it does not suffice; and further I inferred," thus he continues, "that it is permitted to no one to embrace the less safe sentence in the occurrence of a safer one equally or almost equally truthlike to him; and therefore for the licit use of the less safe opinion it is altogether necessary that, after diligent inquiry of the truth, it appear to the one operating, apart from passion and fault, sensibly and clearly more truthlike than the opposite, and for this reason be judged by him true by an absolute determinative judgment" (ibid., XII, n. 36); "indeed it is required," as he afterwards says, n. 38, "that it be notably and clearly and manifestly more truthlike: for since a little is reputed as nothing, if the excess of truthlikeness is slight, morally those opinions will be equal; and then he will not be able prudently to judge that the contract is licit." In the seventh Dissertation the same Father Thyrsus investigates: "Whether it is licit to follow a probable opinion favoring liberty, in the occurrence of an equally probable opinion standing for the precept?" Concerning the affirming sentence he says: "I judge it false, and the negative true and altogether to be held" (ibid., p. 134, n. 2), which negative he indeed attempts both to prove and to defend from objections through very many pages. Besides, it must be noted that "no reflection can make it licit to follow a less safe opinion which someone knows to be directly less probable by authority and reason" (p. 124). The probabiliorism of Father Thyrsus rejects both probabilism and equiprobabilism, and the favor shown to Father Thyrsus must be said to transfix this no less than that, if it destroyed any system. The more benign sentence at that time was not only the doctrine of very many authors of the Society, but also of almost all sacred religious orders and universities, a few doctors excepted. Concerning it Father Segneri, on 8 June 1692, wrote to Father Gonzalez: "The whole Roman Curia in more than a hundred affairs is directed by this ancient sentence; whence to condemn this it would be necessary to turn the world upside down." A splendid example of this practice of the Roman Curia exists in the responses of the Holy Office made on 11 February 1661 concerning the obligation of denouncing soliciting confessors. The solution is given according to the probability of the sentence denying that the obligation exists; namely, where the denying sentence is probable, the confessor is not to be denounced; but where this sentence is not probable, he is to be denounced. Let the examples be: The lord qualifiers judged that he was to be denounced, and that the negative opinion was not probable, 1. 5. 8. 9. 13.; that he was to be denounced, the contrary opinion being rejected, which they judged not to be probable, 2.; that he was to be denounced and that the contrary opinion was not probable, 3.; but in other cases: if the solicitation is made outside the place of confession and without pretext of confession, they judged that the negative opinion was probable; otherwise if in the confessional, or in the place of confession, 4.; they judged that the negative opinion did not lack probability, 6. 7. 14. 15.; as to each article, they judged that the negative opinion was probable, 10.; they judged that the negative opinion was probable, 11.; they judged that if that praise is serious and has no scent of depraved intention, the negative opinion is probable. But if otherwise, it is not probable, 12. 16. And Urban VIII, when a certain faculty was requested by Lugo for a Missionary in Paraguay, said: Respond to Lugo that a need for his special faculty does not seem to him to exist; but where the sentences of doctors on both sides would intervene as probable, they should follow the opinions more favorable to the Barbarians according to the condition of places and men.

Corollary. If it is licit to follow a solidly probable opinion favoring liberty, a fortiori it will be licit for you to follow the more probable or most probable opinion, provided that, relying proximately upon some reflex principle, you form for yourself a certain conscience. Nevertheless one must beware lest the burden of favoring liberty only in that case in which this appears more probable or most probable be imposed also upon others, according to that saying of Chrysostom related by St. Alphonsus: "concerning your own life be austere; concerning another's, benign." Moreover, this is the sense in which several probabilists affirm that it is licit to follow probabiliorism. It is likewise licit to use equiprobabilism; but if someone wished to impose that system as such upon both confessors and penitents, all the arguments brought above would have to be solved by him, which have force no less against equiprobabilists than against probabiliorists.

as the sun illuminates by its rays things previously obscure to us, which become visible when those rays are reflected back to us. And for this reason principles of this kind are rightly called reflex. In this therefore consists the efficacy of these very principles, that, since the existence of some law can be affirmed only probably, and by that very fact the obligation of observing such a law remains doubtful, from the aforesaid principles it is pronounced whether one acting against a doubtful law can act licitly, or whether he is bound to observe it.

That 5° reflex principles are necessary for solving the practical doubts here treated of is demonstrated from the very fact itself. For whatever opinion prevail in the present matter, immediately some reflex principle intervenes. Tutiorists, as well as probabilists, are compelled to concede that a doubtful law as such does not oblige, that is, in reason of the doubt itself, because doubt is a negative thing, from which nothing positive, such as obligation, can arise. On either side therefore recourse is had to some external principle, for determining what is practically to be decided. Tutiorists, affirming obligation in every doubt, lean upon this reflex principle : « In doubt the safer part must be followed. » Probabilists, who deny obligation, since the opinion opposed to the law is truly and solidly probable, place among the reflex principles they allege this principal one : « A doubtful law does not oblige. » Therefore in the present question some reflex principle necessarily intervenes.]

[Since in the present question we treat of the value of probable opinion relative to conscience, in practical matters, it must first be said what opinion is, and then what probability is and in how many ways it is diversified.

Opinion in general is assent to one or the other of two propositions, or adherence to one or the other of two contradictories, with fear of the other. It excludes certainty, which so clearly manifests a thing that the opposite appears not merely doubtful, but impossible.

Probability is the likelihood which, according as it is greater or less, draws the assent of the mind more or less toward one of two contradictories. Hence a probable opinion or sentiment is a judgment resting upon a weighty motive or foundation, though with fear of the opposite. An improbable opinion, however, is a judgment destitute of a solid motive. Whence it seems that opinion, so long as it does not exceed the limits of probability, however probable it be, does not altogether destroy the likelihood of the contradictory proposition, but only weakens it, according to the solidity of the foundation on which it itself rests.

Probability is distinguished in many ways:

1° It is intrinsic, when the reasons establishing it are sought from the very nature, properties, causes and effects of the thing, and also from the inconveniences of the opposite side. It is extrinsic, when it rests upon the authority of weighty doctors who deservedly consent that this sentiment should be held on account of solid reasons, even if those reasons have not been weighed in themselves.

2° It is of law or of fact, according as it turns upon the existence of a right or law and its application, or upon some fact.

3° It is speculative or practical, according as it regards the question in itself, abstracting from every act here and now to be posited, or an act to be posited presently.

4° It is absolute, if on account of the validity of its reasons it is admitted by all or by most; or relative, when only one man or a few are determined by arguments that do not draw common assent.

5° It is solitary or comparative, according as such it appears in itself, without any relation to another, or its reasons are compared with the arguments which contend for the contradictory proposition.

6° Comparative probability is divided by degrees into greater, less and equal: that is, a certain proposition is more probable, or equally or less probable than its opposite, according as it rests upon stronger reasons, or upon reasons equally or less strong.

7° A more probable opinion also admits of degree; for an opinion is more probable, or notably preponderant, when the reasons of the sentiment preponderate; a little or notably more probable than its adversary, when

8° Most probable likewise is the opinion which rests upon a most weighty foundation. Then the opposite is slightly or doubtfully probable.

9° Moreover, a probable opinion is safe, or safer, or less safe, according as it simply favors the law, or favors it more or less than does its adversary. Therefore a more probable sentiment is not necessarily safer, since a greater probability can also stand for liberty.]

I. In this whole work I shall first of all recall before the readers' eyes the theses condemned by the Church, that they may be able in advance to guard themselves from the danger of erring. The following, in the controversy of Probabilism, the Roman See proscribed under Alexander VII and the Venerable Innocent XI, Supreme Pontiff:

1. If a Book be that of some more recent and modern author, its opinion ought to be considered probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the apostolic See as improbable. — Proposition 27 of Alexander VII.

2. It is not illicit, in conferring the Sacraments, to follow a probable opinion regarding the validity of the Sacrament, leaving aside the safer one, unless law, convention, or the danger of incurring grave harm forbid it. Hence it is only in the conferring of Baptism, of priestly or episcopal Orders, that a merely probable opinion must not be used. — Proposition 1 of Innocent XI.

3. I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable. — Proposition 2 of the same.

4. In general, when we do anything relying upon probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability, we always act prudently. — Proposition 3 of the same.

5. An infidel who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused of infidelity. — Proposition 4 of the same.

6. It is probable that the precept of charity towards God does not, of itself, rigorously oblige even once in every five years. — Proposition 6 of the same.

IX. The Antiprobabilists deny it. The Probabilists on the contrary affirm it, and defend the position that the use of either opinion is licit, so that the Christian can choose whichever he prefers: the more probable, indeed, by the counsel of greater perfection; but the less probable by the liberty of election, since no precept urges to the former.

I. It is an article of faith that the Gospel of Christ contains the sole and pure truth, with the exclusion of any falsity whatsoever; and that this Gospel is the certain and safe rule which God has assigned to us for the directing of our conscience.

This first proposition is an article of faith, and is placed beyond the hazard of any disputation or cavil whatsoever.

II. The Probabilists teach the licit use of both of two contradictory propositions, of which, if one is true, the other must of necessity be false. For both cannot be true, as all confess.

This second proposition is the very state of the question. It is a most luminous truth of fact, which can be called into controversy by no one, unless the state of the question be destroyed.

III. Therefore the doctrine of Probabilism is antievangelical, since it teaches the licit use of the falsity which is contained in one or the other of the opinions, and which wars as an enemy against the Gospel. This consequence is legitimate, and flows necessarily from the two first propositions.

IV. Assuredly the evangelical law is the extrinsic and remote rule of moral operations; and the intimate and proximate rule is the reason of the mind, by which the evangelical law itself is proposed. But since that law is a law of truth, as is of faith, those who lay down that the rule of conscience is a falsity, and a falsity known as such, teach an antievangelical error. Who will deny this? This the Probabilists teach by the force of their system; which I prove by explaining the second proposition.

V. I confess that it is not certainly established for us which of the two opinions is true. For it can happen, though very rarely, that the opinion which seems to us more probable is false, and the less probable true. What follows from this? This surely: that if, after mature diligence, the Antiprobabilist errs in choosing falsity in the place of truth, the error is worthy of excuse. For the Antiprobabilist venerates and champions truth as the certain and evangelical rule — that truth alone is the norm of our conscience. And he does not contradict this principle if, through his own weakness, he is deceived in selecting the opinion which he certainly judges nearer to the truth.

VI. The Probabilist, on the contrary, knowingly and willingly lays down, in the place of a system and principle, that the use of contradictory opinions is licit — of which, if one is true, the other must be false. The Probabilist knows certainly and evidently, as all know, that one or the other of the contradictories is false. Therefore, when the Probabilist lays down as a principle the licit use of contradictory opinions, he errs dogmatically; because he establishes as the rule of conscience a known falsity — one, that is, which he certainly knows to be contained in one or the other of the contradictory opinions. For although he does not know which of the two is true, he nevertheless evidently knows that in one or the other falsity is contained. Therefore, in the place of a system, by establishing the licit use of both contradictory opinions, he systematically teaches the licit use of falsity, even of known falsity. But nothing wars more hostilely against evangelical truth than falsity. The Probabilist therefore errs in two ways. First, dogmatically, as has been shown, because he lays down as his system the licit use of a known falsity contained in one or the other of contradictory propositions; secondly, morally, against prudence and against the duty of finding the truth, when he selects the less probable opinion — that is, the one less near to truth and more neighboring to falsity — in view of the more verisimilar, as the rule of his conscience. But of this second point below. For now the discourse is of the error alone, which can be called dogmatic.

VII. The Probabilists can twist their wits and stuff in patchworks of distinctions; but they will never give a simple and perspicuous answer to the aforesaid demonstration. The first proposition is an article of faith, repeated a thousand times in the Scriptures. Thy law is truth. The law of truth was in his mouth. Psalm 118: All thy commandments are truth. Thou hast commanded justice thy testimonies, and thy truth exceedingly. Zacharias adds, chapter 8: Love ye only truth and peace. God delivered the truth to his people to be guarded. A just nation, keeping the truth, says Isaias, chapter 26. The people of God manifests this truth; Isaias repeats it in chapter 38: He shall make thy truth known. And along this path of truth the sons of God walk. 3 Kings 3: Walking in truth. This David chose, Psalm 118: I have chosen the way of truth — by no means the way of probability. By this truth we become holy: Sanctified in truth. These men are prepared to champion the truth, says Paul, 2 Corinthians 13: For we can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth. This is the rule of sanctity: In the sanctity of truth, adds the same Paul to the Ephesians, chapter 4. Christ came into the world that he might teach us this truth, Paul continues, 1 Timothy 2: Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. His elect he calls sons of truth, James chapter 1: He hath begotten us by the word of truth. For God is truth. It is truth which frees us from sin, as is added in John chapter 8: You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.

VIII. The privation of truth is the mark of the reprobate, as is found in the first book of Machabees: There is no truth in them. These are they, says Paul, 1 Timothy 6, who are destitute of the truth; and he adds, 2 Thessalonians chapter 2: They believed not the truth; nay, they will turn away their hearing from the truth: 2 Timothy 4, turning themselves away from the truth; Titus 1; they resist the truth: 2 Timothy 2. They are destitute of the love of this truth: They received not the love of the truth: 2 Thessalonians 2. They do not acquiesce in the truth: Romans chapter 2. They speak not the truth: Jeremias chapter 9. Who detain the truth in injustice [Romans 1]; and by the depravity of their opinions they transform it into a lie: They changed the truth of God into a lie: Romans chapter 1. Forgetfulness of the truth has filled the earth, says Isaias: Truth hath been made into forgetfulness. So it is, cries Osee, chapter 4: There is no truth upon the earth. This truth men attempt to obscure and to whittle down: Truths are decayed from among the children of men: Psalm 11.

II [IX]. And what greater diminution of the truth can there be, than if that be rejected which more approaches the truth, and that be chosen which stands farther from the truth — that is, which is judged less true — while God commands the contrary? Thou hast commanded thy commandments to be kept most diligently: Psalm 118. Finally God, in Ecclesiasticus 37, gives this precept: Before all thy works let the true word go before thee, and before every action a steady counsel — no less true, and no less steady.

IX. Hence, then, the argument is constructed. It is an article of faith that the evangelical law, which Christ Jesus gave us as the certain, safe, and indefectible rule of our conscience, contains pure and sole truth, and rejects and detests all falsity. This, as I have said, is a truth of faith. The Probabilists defend, and that most pugnaciously, the licit use of contradictory opinions, in one or the other of which they know certainly and evidently that an antievangelical falsity is contained. Therefore the Probabilists certainly and evidently teach that a known falsity, by the force of their system, is the rule of a right conscience. Therefore the Probabilists champion an antievangelical doctrine.

X. The second proposition is most evident, since it is the very argument subjected to the disputation. Do the Probabilists deny the licit use of the more probable opinion? Do they deny the licit use of the contrary less probable opinion, concerning the very same action, and in respect of the same person? Would that they denied it — for then they would repudiate Probabilism, and devote it to the Furies. Not only do they by no means deny it; rather they most expressly affirm it; and in the name of them all, Fr. Antonio Casnedi thus addresses Christ, in tome 2, in the very dedication of his work: Since thou art the Master of truth, thou condescendest so far to human ignorance, that in thy tribunal of truth inculpable error equals truth itself. For thou dost not accuse it, but excusest it; thou dost not punish it, but rewardest it — holding thy very law for no law, and thy no-law for law, if the law be invincibly unknown as no law, and the no-law as law.

XI. This doctrine, as we have seen above in chapter 3, all the Probabilists commonly admit and defend. Therefore the second proposition of our demonstration is most evident: namely, that the Probabilists teach that the use of falsity, clothed in the cloak of Probabilism, is licit; and that this falsity, and error itself covered with the cloud of ignorance, enters the gate of Paradise, and is crowned by the Father of truth with the eternal reward of glory. But this doctrine, to my weakness, and saving better judgment, appears evidently false, antievangelical, and full of scandal.

XII. It is my pleasure to confirm what I have said by a sensible example. There are two cups of wine, in one of which poison lies hidden; but I do not know in which one determinately it resides. If I were to hand both cups to two men to drink, I should surely be guilty of homicide: since I know for certain that in one or the other a mortal poison is contained. There are two contradictory opinions, in one of which is contained the transgression of the divine Law, and therefore the guilt of eternal damnation. You do not know, indeed, which is determinately true; but you know most certainly that in one or the other falsity is contained. You propose that both be followed — the one by Peter, the other by Paul. This proposition contains the state of the question which all the Probabilists defend. Let us hear one above all, Fr. Paul Laymann, the most moderate of all the Probabilists, who in book I, treatise I, chapter 5, writes as follows: I judge that it will be nothing alien to reason, if a Doctor who is consulted signify to the one consulting him that an opinion is defended as probable by certain learned men, and that he may accordingly follow it — although the same Doctor certainly persuades himself that such an opinion is speculatively false, so that he himself cannot follow it in practice. For since the one consulting, in a doubtful matter, has the right of conforming himself to an opinion which is defended by certain learned men, notwithstanding that some others contradict it and judge the opinion speculatively improbable, the Doctor is not forbidden to indicate this very right to the one consulting him; and hence it comes about that a learned man can give opposite counsels to diverse persons according to opposite opinions, discretion and prudence however being preserved. Here you have, in few words, the whole secret of Probabilism laid open. You judge a proposition which treats of mortal sin to be certainly false speculatively, that is, absolutely, in itself. If you certainly judge it false, you also certainly judge it to be antievangelical, and therefore proscribed by God; since all falsity is disapproved by God. It is not lawful for you to follow it, says Fr. Laymann; yet it is lawful for you to urge it upon others. What? You can urge upon others what is not lawful for you? Where then is the oracle of Christ: What thou wilt not have done to thyself, do not to another? Where is the love of the truth, which you are commanded to follow, and to teach to others?

XIII. I come now to the last proposition set forth by me. A learned man can give opposite counsels to diverse persons according to opposite opinions. The learned man evidently knows, as we have said, and absolutely recognizes, that in one or the other of the opinions the poison of falsity is contained; yet he offers and urges both, to diverse men, to be followed. Therefore, knowingly and willingly, he kills one of those consulting him with the poison of falsity. You are deceived, they say. The poison of falsity, smeared over with the varnish of Probabilism, loses its power of killing. Is it so indeed? That falsity covered by invincible ignorance becomes harmless, I myself confess. But that falsity evidently known is vicious, no one can deny. Fr. Laymann, and with him all the Probabilists to a man, teach these two paradoxes — monstrous enough, in truth. The first: that you can urge upon another an opinion which you know to be certainly false in itself. The second: that you can offer opposite counsels to diverse men according to opposite opinions, while you know most certainly that in one or the other opinion the poison of falsity lies hidden. For to one of those men you urge a doctrine antievangelical in itself — as is every false doctrine. But an antievangelical doctrine does not raise to heaven; it thrusts down to hell. Who does not most evidently gather from this, that this Probabilism reduces the Gospel of Christ to pure and unmixed Scepticism, Pyrrhonism, and Academicism?

I. What has been said hitherto would suffice, and more than suffice, for overthrowing and exterminating Probabilism. But the more luminous the truth is, the more cavils, evasions, hiding-places, and sophistical distinctions do they need who strive to obscure and assail it. Wherefore we too are compelled to prolong the discourse, and to confirm what we have said by the authority of the Supreme Pontiffs.

II. Alexander VII, in the year 1665, on the 24th day of September, published this decree: "Our most holy Lord has heard, not without great grief of his soul, that several opinions, relaxative of Christian discipline and bringing destruction upon souls, are partly being revived after having grown obsolete, and partly newly brought forth; and that that extreme license of luxuriant wits grows greater day by day, through which, in matters pertaining to conscience, a manner of opining has crept in which is wholly alien to evangelical simplicity and to the doctrine of the holy Fathers — and which, if the faithful were to follow it in practice as their right rule, an immense corruption of Christian life would burst forth. Wherefore, lest at any time the way of salvation, which the supreme truth, God, whose words endure for ever, has defined to be narrow, should be widened — or rather perverted — unto the destruction of souls: the same most holy Lord, that in his pastoral solicitude he might call back the sheep entrusted to him from such a spacious and broad way, along which men go to perdition, into the right path, committed the examination of these same opinions to several ..." and so forth.

III. Let this decree be compared with the preceding demonstration, and it will forthwith appear that Probabilism wars against evangelical doctrine no less than darkness against light. Three things are to be weighed in the Alexandrine decree. First, the condemned propositions, of which there is now no dispute. Second: a manner of opining has crept in into the Theology of morals, that is, in matters pertaining to conscience. This manner was intruded by the extreme license of luxuriant wits. This manner of opining, or of probabilizing, is wholly alien to evangelical simplicity — that is, to the spirit and sincerity of the evangelical law — and to the doctrine of the holy Fathers. What follows from this? If the Faithful, if the Pastors and Directors of souls were to follow this manner, an immense corruption would burst forth upon Christian life. The third point is that this manner of opining probabilistically thrusts Christian souls into the broad and spacious way which leads to perdition. Wherefore the most holy Pontiff, that he might call them back into the path of salvation, which God has defined to be narrow, condemned several opinions. He declared the probabilistic plant poisonous — that is, alien to the evangelical law and the doctrine of the Fathers; and he reprobated many of the fruits proceeding from it.

IV. Hence it is plain, clearer than the noonday light, that in this decree the Pontiff discourses, not of particular opinions only (for these opinions he condemns one by one), but of the probabilistic system itself. A manner of opining has crept in, which, if the Faithful followed it as their rule, they would slide down into the way of perdition. Now the rule of forming conscience is Probabilism, as Terillus proves at length in his treatise on the rule of morals. The rule is, as the Probabilists themselves confess, a benign one. But the Pontiff declares that this rule wars against the Gospel and the doctrine of the Fathers. Let the Probabilists explain to us: what other manner, what other rule alien to the Gospel and to the doctrine of the Fathers, has crept into the Theology of morals, besides Probabilism? Let them point out to us another manner, another system, another rule.

V. All this is evident in the obvious sense of the decree. Add to this that, as all the Historians confess, Probabilism had been denounced to the Supreme Pontiff. Moreover Stefano Gradi, Prefect of the Vatican Library, and a near contemporary of Alexander VII, testifies — both in a votum published by order of the sacred Congregation, and in a disputation published at Rome in the year 1670 against Fr. Honoré Fabri — that the Pontiff, by those words a manner of opining, etc., branded Probabilism. For the Pontiff, having received so many letters against Probabilism from the Bishops of France and of Belgium, had conceived (says Gradi), as an excellent reporter of the things of God, an impulse toward measures altogether grave and severe in this whole matter (of Probabilism), and toward cutting off the evil, as he said, utterly at its fountain and root, by publishing an express constitution ... Nor was anything nearer than that he should do it; and he would without doubt have done it, had not Cardinal Pallavicino intervened in his counsel, to whom that matter seemed to demand a more careful deliberation than could be dispatched quickly, as it appeared it would be; and that it would be much wiser if, the fuller censure being deferred for a while, the opinions themselves should in the meantime be struck down by name, as was done ... and a preface was added, which, though under a veil of words, makes truly manifest the mind of the one decreeing, as alien from this way of philosophizing about morals — which for that reason, as you see, he called a manner of opining contrary to evangelical simplicity and to the doctrine of the holy Fathers.

VI. That Alexander VII by these words (a manner of opining, etc.) branded Probabilism, is attested also by the whole Gallican Church congregated in general Assembly in the year 1700, in these words: "Now, that we may come to another head of the faith — namely, to moral Theology, corrupted in these latest times by the depraved license and subtlety of wits — we think the words of Alexander VII of happy memory should be set first ... a manner of opining has crept in, etc.; in which sentence he not only complains that errors have increased, but also — and this is the chief point — he willed it to be noted that the very method of treating the matter had been introduced, whence we might see that a corruption of morals would not only follow, but would even, as it were with a charge made, burst in upon us — one which we could scarcely restrain. Nor was it enough for the most holy Pontiff (let the Probabilists weigh these words) to have uncovered this new method of making sport of conscience and of wrapping up the truth — that is, the very fountain of the evil — but he pursued also the rivulets of the deadly doctrine," and so forth.

VII. Finally, after many things, that Assembly published this solemn edict against Probabilism, the fountain of all laxities:

"Far be it from us to approve the error of those who deny that it is lawful to follow, even among probable opinions, the most probable. But for the right use of probable opinions we recognize these rules prescribed by the Law.

"The first is that in doubts concerning the business of salvation, where equal weights of reasons offer themselves to the mind on both sides, we should follow that which is safer — or that which is in that case (mark it well) solely safe; and that we should hold this not in the place of a counsel (as the Probabilists say), but of a precept, Scripture saying: He that loveth danger shall perish in it. This is the first rule.

"The second: that concerning probable opinions about Christian doctrine we should follow what the ecumenical Council of Vienne decreed concerning the virtues infused in baptism both in infants and in adults, in these words: We have judged that this opinion, as more probable, and more consonant and concordant with the sayings of the Saints and of the modern Doctors of Theology, is to be chosen. And it is evident that this judgment of the Council pertains the more to the direction of morals, the more the sanctity and salvation of the Faithful depend upon these very things, etc.

"That therefore in practice it should be lawful for us to follow an opinion which not even they themselves would judge should be chosen as the more probable — this is new, unheard of; this was brought forth by certain known authors only in this last (mark it well) century, and set up by them as the rule of morals; it is repugnant to that saying of Vincent of Lérins, etc. This is the beginning of the evils, and the head of all the aforesaid corruptions. This was censoriously branded, in the censures of the Apology of the Casuists, by our predecessors, men strong and religious." See Tome 2 of the Apparatus, book 3, dissertation 2.

I. Two decrees this supreme Pontiff published, by which Probabilism is overthrown: the one in 1679, directed to the universal Church; the other in 1680, given to the General of the Society of Jesus, in which he perspicuously declares that he detests Probabilism. See Tome 2 of the Apparatus, book 3, dissertation 3, chapter 2.

II. In the former decree four propositions are condemned, which are as it were the four hinges of Probabilism. I shall weigh them in few words. The third is this: In general, when we do anything relying upon probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability, we always act prudently.

III. The Probabilists answer that the thesis was condemned on account of those two words, in general and always: because, they say, Judges and Confessors cannot use a less probable opinion. A futile response. For the Pontiff condemned separately the use of the less probable opinion in Judges and in the administration of the Sacraments. Others cavil that a slight probability is not true probability. A vain evasion. For in the proscribed thesis it is said: provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability. Therefore the use of true probability stands condemned.

IV. The other condemned proposition is this: I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable. Before the birth of Probabilism no theologian, so far as I know, taught this thesis. It is a legitimate offspring of Probabilism. Before the Pontiff's decree the Probabilists commonly defended it, as the Salmanticenses testify, treatise 29, chapter 1, point 4; and Fr. Camargo attests that about seventy Probabilists maintained, before the decree, both that a judge can use the less probable opinion, and all the rest. Therefore, by the testimony of seventy Probabilists, the use of the less probable opinion is condemned absolutely no less in respect of all men than in respect of judges. And with good reason did they assert it. For this is the single foundation of Probabilism: He who acts probably, acts prudently; therefore he acts licitly. Hence this principle either stands everywhere, or nowhere. They rejoin that he acts prudently who follows an opinion practically probable, not he who follows an opinion speculatively probable; and that the less probable opinion in the tribunal is only speculatively, not practically, probable. Why? Because practical probability regards the licit or the illicit; speculative probability meditates rights and laws. An opinion which decides to whom estates, fiefs, and fields are owed is not practical. A most amusing fiction! The judge, then, adjudging the estate to Peter according to the more probable opinion, judges according to an opinion speculatively, not practically, probable?

V. Terillus — easily the prince of reflex Probabilism — answers that the judge is bound to pronounce sentence according to what appears to him truer, every human affection being excluded. But why are not the judges of souls also bound to do the same? By no means, replies Fr. Terillus, On conscience, question 24, number 26, page 476, in these words: I answer that there is a disparity, because the Confessor forms the dictate of his own conscience dependently upon the dictate of the conscience of the penitent. For the penitent does not sin, nor is he excused from sin, through the judgments of the Confessor, but only through his own judgments. Therefore the Confessor, who must judge concerning the sin of the penitent, must look to the opinion which the penitent has followed in good faith; which opinion, even if directly less probable, excuses the penitent from sin, and therefore determines the Confessor to say that that opinion, though directly less probable, frees from sin the man who follows it in good faith. But the judge does not regulate his own judgment by the judgment of the litigants: otherwise he would have to pronounce sentence in favor of both. And so the judge regulates his own judgment and his own sentence by those things which seem more probable to himself, not to others; and therefore he must follow those things which he himself, all things weighed, judges to be more probable.

VI. Many of the Probabilists complain when we cry out with raised voice that these are unheard-of and portentous paradoxes. But I most humbly beseech them, and earnestly beg, that, prejudices laid aside, they be willing seriously to weigh whether this doctrine can be joined — I do not say with the Gospel, but with common sense. The Confessor forms the dictate of his conscience dependently upon the dictate of the penitent? Who can bear to hear this? The Confessor sitting in the tribunal either is, or is not, a judge. Who will deny that he acts the person of a judge? Therefore, as judge, he cannot depend upon the judgment of the penitent. If Confessors depended upon the judgment of their penitents, and not upon the laws of the Church and the divine law, penitents would always have to be absolved, and never bound. For no Catholic approaches the tribunal who does not have a dictate by which he judges that he ought to be absolved. For if they judged themselves unworthy of absolution, they would assuredly not approach it.

VII. Another disparity between the Judge and the Confessor the Probabilists commonly assign. The judge, they say, cannot follow the less probable opinion, because, if it be false, the evil is not avoided which thence befalls Caius, who loses his cause. On the contrary, if the less probable opinion which the Theologian follows be false, no evil follows: for the violation of the law is then material; and, on the other hand, God suffers no harm. So teaches Terillus, On conscience, question 24, number 53: God is incapable of all harm; he can only be dishonored through offense. But every offense is manifestly avoided through the good faith of the agent, reasonably established. And a man, in the case of the objection, is not bound to judge in favor of God; though the judge is bound to pronounce sentence for the more probable part. Terillus is followed by La-Croix, Viva, Segneri in his epistles, and the other Probabilists.

VIII. I am compelled, against the end of brevity that I set before myself, to transcribe the principal words of the Probabilists themselves: because readers would in no way believe that these paradoxes could have been devised by Theologians. God is incapable of all harm. True enough. Therefore so much diligence is not to be applied that his offense may be avoided, as must be applied that the temporal losses of a single man may be averted? What, I ask, is more unworthy of Christian ears? This response, the more common it is among the Probabilists, the more inept it is, and the fuller of scandal. For, this being granted, iniquity might be drunk like water, since God suffers no harm from it. How horrendous this is, everyone sees. That response is refuted on two heads. 1. The violation of the law, however material, is a grave evil in itself. That it is not imputed to you as fault, as the Probabilists contend, is per accidens, on account of invincible ignorance — if indeed it be present; but in reality it is a real transgression of the divine law. And this is a far graver harm than the evil inflicted upon Caius by the loss of his estate. Therefore, if the Judge sins, more gravely sins the Theologian using the lesser probability. 2. The Probabilists are evidently deceived when they say that this transgression is material in the Theologian, but not in the Judge. Tell me: why is the transgression of the law formal in the Judge? Because the Judge does not apply all diligence and industry to avoid the transgression of the law. Well and rightly said. But is not all diligence and industry morally possible perhaps necessary, absolutely and apart from any circumstance whatever, that the offense of God may be avoided? If you use the lesser probability, you do not apply the aforesaid diligence: because you not only neglect, but positively repudiate, all the probability that lies before you. Therefore you sin, just as, by the definition of the apostolic See, the judge sins. Therefore the use of the less probable opinion makes criminal in equal measure every Theologian who neglects to avoid the danger of the divine offense, as it makes criminal the judge who neglects to decline the danger of injuring the right of Caius. What do you mutter? Is greater diligence in finding the truth required in the judge of temporal things than in the judge of eternal salvation? Is this the prudence of Probabilism — to make more of temporal detriment than of the loss of eternal salvation? Is it not a monstrous prudence which in the least things, such as earthly things are, demands the utmost diligence, and in the greatest things, such as eternal things are, a lesser solicitude? Would God be too severe if, in the settling of controversies over his law, he commanded his judges the use of the greater probability — while those Princes are not severe, nor Rigorists, but benign, who command their judges that in controversies about eaves-drippings, about a beam, about an estate, they embrace the more probable doctrine? The whole of holy Scripture commands that we search the divine law, and love it above gold and topaz. The Probabilists, on the contrary, will have us love the civil law, which declares the rights of contracts, of estates, of sales, more than the law of God, and embrace the greater probability in these causes. This is the benign probabilistic Theology. Although it be more verisimilar to you that your action violates the law of God and offends God himself, provided it be probable that you will not violate the law, you act prudently and holily in performing the action which you more probably judge to violate the Law and to contemn God. On the contrary, a civil judge would be unjust and criminal if he applied this rule.

IX. The last disparity, finally, devised by the Probabilists is this. A pact intervenes between judges and the Commonwealth, that judgments be pronounced according to the more probable opinion. But by this pact Theologians and Confessors are not bound. But whence do the Probabilists prove this pact? Their prince answers, question 24 On conscience, number 15, Terillus: For this presumed will, from the very constitution of nature, is equivalent to a pact, and has the force of a pact. This pact the other Probabilists obtrude, especially Fr. Paolo Segneri: they obtrude this pact, I say, as the last anchor to which they tie their shipwrecked Probabilism.

X. This anchor is of straw, and chimerical. That pact, limited to civil judges alone, is fictitious. Nay, I say that this pact has been implanted by the author of nature in all men. This pact is a fruit of the divine light signed upon the countenance of all souls. The civil Commonwealth elects its judges. The ecclesiastical Commonwealth elects its judges — Bishops, Parish priests, Confessors, Theologians. Whence, I ask, do the Probabilists have it that the civil Commonwealth, but not the sacred, enters into a pact that judgments be pronounced according to the more probable opinion? Whence does the knowledge of so great a secret shine upon them? What foundation urges that this pact be instituted in the lay Commonwealth, but not in the sacred? Does the Commonwealth, insofar as it is sacred and ecclesiastical, make less of truth and justice than the lay and civil Commonwealth? In the first centuries of the Church, Bishops and Parish priests were chosen as judges of civil causes among Christians. The same often happens even today. Do those judges, outside of confession, judge according to the more probable opinions, but in the sacred tribunal according to the less probable? Will they free, in the sacred forum of penance, from restitution, from usury, from simony, the litigant whom in the lay tribunal they judged liable to restitution, or guilty of usury, according to the more probable opinion? If civil Principalities and Commonwealths impose on their chosen judges the burden of embracing, in controversies of temporal things, the greater probability, does the Catholic Church absolve her judges of eternal things from that burden? If the civil Commonwealth chooses judges more learned and more skilled, does the Church choose men less learned, less skilled, less upright? Holy Scripture, Exodus chapter 18, cries out: Provide out of all the people able men, such as fear God, in whom is truth — it does not say, probability. Likewise Ecclesiasticus [recte Osee] chapter 7 [recte 4]: Woe to you for ever and beyond, because there is no truth in you.

I. The first and universal extrinsic rule of morals is the eternal law of God. The second rule, proximate and formal, intrinsic, is the reason, or practical dictate, of our conscience, as has been shown above. About this first proposition there is no dispute. That an action may be honorable, it must be consonant with both laws, as St. Thomas perspicuously teaches, I-II, q. 21, art. 1: In those things which are done through the will, the proximate rule is human reason, but the supreme rule is the eternal law. Whenever, therefore, a human act proceeds to its end according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, then the act is right; but when it is bent aside from this rectitude, then it is called sin. Now it is manifest from the premisses that every voluntary act is evil by this, that it recedes from the order of reason and of the eternal law; and every good act accords with reason and the eternal law.

II. The eternal law of God is a law of truth: Thy law is truth; all thy commandments are truth. Truth alone is the single rule of an honorable conscience — truth alone, I say, known either evidently and certainly, or probably and obscurely. When falsity appears to us under the aspect of truth, the rule is false, and the operation is not honorable, but vicious. If the falsity be invincible, the vicious action is not imputed to fault; but it never becomes good and meritorious, as has been shown above.

III. The third ineluctable principle is expressed in the holy Scriptures themselves — namely, the most grave commandment of inquiring after and investigating the truth. Nothing is more frequent in Scripture than this most grave precept, by which all are bound to learn and to meditate the law. It is said in Deuteronomy 6: And these words which I command thee this day shall be in thy heart; and thou shalt tell them to thy children, and thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey. David continually prays, and promises that he will investigate the law: Set before me for a law, O Lord, the way of thy justifications, and I will always seek after it. Give me understanding, and I will search thy law. Matthew 28: Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you. St. Paul, Ephesians 4 [recte 5]: Become not unwise, but understanding what is the will of God. Not to be long: a thousand times this most grave precept of learning, meditating, searching, and not forgetting the law of truth is repeated to us. These things being laid down as certain, I press the Probabilists thus.

IV. If you hold the truth of the Law evidently, are you not bound to fulfill it? They say yes. Then you must say the same when you judge it more probable that the law exists. A clear knowledge of the law imposes the duty of fulfilling the law, as all confess. Therefore, according to the degree of knowledge, such will be the degree of obligation. Therefore, when the law more probably obliges, the burden of keeping the Law presses.

V. He who acts according to the lesser probability, the greater being repulsed, evidently violates the most grave precept of investigating, learning, and meditating the law. For he who acts according to the less probable opinion knows and reckons that his operation is more contrary than conformed to the law; he knows that he is receding from the law more than approaching it. Therefore he does not inquire after the law with sincerity of soul. Would you sincerely and with deliberate mind search for a treasure, if you abandoned the way which would more probably lead you to the finding of it, and selected the opposite way, which would less lead you to, and more lead you away from, the finding?

VI. If a sick man chose a medicine which he knows to be more probably poisonous than wholesome, would he be free from sin? They answer that these examples are inept: since, if the medicine be poisonous, it brings death, no good intention of the mind availing; but an opinion about the honesty of an action, even if false, excuses from mortal sin, by the benefit of invincible ignorance. Below I shall show that this probabilistic invincible ignorance is a portent monstrous in the extreme. Dismissing, then, the chimerical disparity which the Casuists are wont to assign between the recounted examples and the less probable opinion, I press the Probabilists thus.

VII. Let the Probabilists explain to us. Do they dare themselves to affirm that this sick man desires and loves his health with a sincere and efficacious mind? They would show themselves fools if they affirmed it. But why does that sick man not love or desire health with a sincere mind? Because he repudiates the medicine which he more probably judges to be more suited to the acquiring of health. Therefore, by the same reasoning, the Probabilists do not seek with a sincere mind the observance of the law of God, if, the greater probability being repudiated, they select the lesser. Whatever, then, be the case with the distinction between a medicine and an opinion, we now press the Probabilists to answer whether he studies to fulfill, with a sincere and efficacious mind, the most grave precept of finding and learning the truth, who in obscure matters rejects what is more verisimilar and embraces what is less verisimilar. From another side I press them.

IX. Two things here I would have you weigh carefully. The first is that, by the adversaries' own admission, our discussion concerns a doubt not light, empty, founded on scruples and inept conjectures, but resting on grave reasons on either side. The second is that, in the aforesaid doctrine, the whole deadly poison of Probabilism lies hidden. Even when stronger reasons press in favor of the vow's having been made, the one in doubt will still be free of the vow! Without doubt. Why? Because the certain possession of liberty can be dislodged from its place not by stronger, and weightier, reasons, but only by the most evident, and most invincible ones. But tell me, first of all: do these stronger reasons render the doubt merely speculative, and not practical? They incline the intellect, at least, more strongly in favor of the vow. The doubt, then, will be direct and practical, not merely reflex. Nothing could be clearer, or more significant, for the integrity of evangelical morals. Then, on what foundation do you assert that human liberty, in a doubtful contest, takes precedence over natural or divine right? For natural and divine right are, in fact, prior to the liberty of the one vowing; indeed, the liberty of the one vowing is born subject to natural and divine right, from which the vow shines forth in the obligation of payment. It is so, you say, when this divine right is really given. But when I doubt whether the vow was made, I doubt whether this divine right exists or not; and, on the other hand, I am certain that I was free from this right before making the vow. This is precisely what we are asking. Why do they wish, when contending at the tribunal of reason between divine right against liberty, and liberty against divine right, that the judgment ought to be given in favor of liberty, even when stronger reasons press in favor of divine right? Human laws, indeed, have established a rule to remove quarrels, lawsuits, and countless other evils — that, in the possession of estates, the condition of the possessor be the better one. But what book of the sacred Scriptures, what Council, what ecclesiastical decree has issued any canon establishing that, in matters pertaining to the business of eternal salvation, the condition of human liberty in possession takes precedence over divine right, when doubts, or disputes, occur on either side — indeed, even when stronger reasons press in favor of the vow, or of divine right? Let them produce a single Scripture, or a single Council, or some Father, or some Doctor of eminent name and authority, who, before the fifteenth century, taught that, in doubts where mortal sin is at issue, the condition of human liberty in possession is the better one. We, on the contrary, establish from Scripture, the canons, and the Fathers, that in doubtful ways the safer is to be chosen, and uncertainties abandoned, when certainties present themselves. But, to drive our adversaries to the wall, let me reduce that rule — "the condition of the possessor is the better one" — to our own case, so that it may be seen to be true even here: natural, or divine, law is itself the will of God, or God himself. God is the first possessor. The will, or liberty, [of man] is born subject to God. Whenever, then, there is doubt about possession, possession stands for God. Better, then, is the condition of him who possesses God, through his own law. See our History of Probabilism and Rigorism, Vol. II, diss. 3, where we have explained this argument at length. But more on this in its proper place.

A recent author proves, as it seems to him, that probabilism is opposed to the judgment of the Church given by Alexander VII, Innocent XI, Innocent XII, and Clement XI, and indeed is opposed to reason, insofar as I must sincerely strive for the agreement of my action with the objective morality of that action—something I by no means accomplish when I choose a norm which, in my judgment, is more probably opposed to the aforesaid morality than in agreement with it. He thinks that by these arguments the system of probabilism has been demolished, but that it is still maintained because of men’s inclination toward that which is easier and because of the great influence which the Society of Jesus has exercised upon theological science. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a system of moral theology, and how do probabilism and equiprobabilism differ?

2. What can be answered to the arguments of that recent author?

3. Can probabilism rightly be called the distinctive doctrine of the Society of Jesus?

1. What is meant by a system of moral theology, and how does probabilism differ from equiprobabilism ? By a system of moral theology is meant a body of rules which enables a person to form a certain conscience in cases of doubt where direct certainty as to the lawfulness of an action can not be had. Thus probabilism is that system of moral theology according to which it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion even against a more probable opinion in favor of the existence of a law which would forbid the action when the sole question is one about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the action. Equiprobabilism only allows one to follow an opinion in favor of liberty against such a law when the opinion is equally or almost equally probable with that in favor of the law. Equiprobabilists also add to this a subsidiary rule to the effect that in case of doubt whether a law hitherto in force has ceased to be obligatory, it must be obeyed as long as it is not certain that it has ceased to be of obligation.

2. What answer may be given to the arguments of the recent author alluded to?¹

1 L. Wouters, C.SS.R., De minusprobabilismo.

The recent author alluded to confounds two very different things — the private opinion of a Pope, and a Pope’s authoritative decision, which is the judgment of the Church. As Benedict XIV explains in his classical work De Synodo Dioecesana, the private opinion of a Pope has no more weight than that of another theologian of equal learning and virtue. It is only when he gives an authoritative decision — when he acts as Pope — that he expresses the judgment of the Church. It may be conceded that the Popes mentioned were, as theologians, adverse to probabilism, but they never condemned it authoritatively. Of all the proofs of his contention that the recent author adduces, the strongest, as he confesses, is the decree of Innocent XI, and we will give here the authentic version of that decree to show what it really prescribed.

Wednesday, 26 June 1680

“After Father Laurea had made a report of the contents of the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzalez of the Society of Jesus directed to our Most Holy Lord, the Most Eminent Lords said that it should be written through the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of Spain, so that he may signify to the said Father Thyrsus that His Holiness, having graciously received and read his letters not without praise, commanded that he freely and fearlessly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and likewise manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that, in a concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one recognized and judged as such, it is lawful to follow the less probable; and that he should assure him that whatever he shall do and write in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

“It should be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus, by order of His Holiness, that he not only permit the Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those asserting that, in a concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one recognized and judged as such, it is lawful to follow the less probable; but that he also write to all the Universities of the Society that it is the mind of His Holiness that each one, as he wishes, may freely write for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary opinion; and that he command them to submit completely to the command of His Holiness.”¹

1 Lehmkuhl, Probabilism Vindicated, p. 82.

There is obviously no condemnation of probabilism in this decree, neither is there any condemnation in the other documents alluded to by the recent writer.²

2 Compare Lehmkuhl, at the cited place, p. 80 and following.

The recent author’s argument from reason is weaker than his argument from authority. It amounts to this. We are under the obligation of sincerely trying to make our actions agree with the objective rule of morality. Therefore we are under an obligation of following the more probable opinion. The antecedent of this argument is true when the objective rule of morality is known. If there is no known objective rule of morality which binds me in the case in point, I am left to my liberty. The consequent is false. It gratuitously supposes that the opinion which seems to the agent the more probable is more in accordance with the objective rule of morality. What seems more probable to one is often less probable to others, and even to the same person at another time. And even if we grant that a more probable opinion is more in accordance with the objective rule of morality, it does not make that rule certain. And a certain obligation can not arise from an uncertain law else the effect would surpass its cause.

3. Can probabilism be called with truth the peculiar doctrine of the Society of Jesus?

No, it can not. As Fr. Oliva, who was General of the Society when the decree of Innocent XI was issued, asserted, there is no prohibition in the Society against defending probabiliorism or any other recognized system of morals. The long list of authors who have taught probabilism which St. Alphonsus gives in his Dissertation published in 1755 contains names belonging to all schools of theology. Probabilism was first formulated by Medina, a Dominican, and its first chief defenders were also Dominicans.

Titius, a priest, always instructs and directs the faithful committed to his care according to probable opinions. Hence he preaches that they need not be solicitous about directing their intention to God, for he says it is solidly probable that an intention once had in life and not retracted suffices to give form to all the works of the whole life. Nor, he says, need they be solicitous about gaining indulgences, for the same intention once had and not retracted suffices for gaining any indulgences whatever, provided that the prescribed works are fulfilled, even if the indulgence attached to them is unknown. Hence it is asked:

1. How do probabilism, equiprobabilism, and probabiliorism differ?

2. Is the use of probabilism lawful in every matter?

3. Within the limits of lawful matter, is it always and for everyone better to use probabilism?

4. What is to be said about Titius’s manner of acting?

1. See approved authors. 2. See the answer to this question, p. 54. 3. Even when probabilism may be applied, is it well always to apply it for everybody? No, it is not. There is room for prudence on the part of the confessor as to when a probable opinion is to be used.

The confessor indeed has no legislative authority and can not impose on his penitents an obligation which does not exist. But if the penitent is willing to do what is more generous and more perfect, the confessor should encourage him, and he would act very imprudently if by insisting on a probable and contrary opinion he caused the penitent to adopt a less perfect course of action than he had been prepared to follow. Occasionally when he knows his penitent and thinks that it will be for this benefit, the confessor may laudably urge him to act in a generous way, even though there is no obligation in the matter.

4. What about Titius' way of acting?

It may be hoped that the case is a fictitious one, and that no priest was ever so foolish and ignorant as to misapply probabilism in the way that Titius is said to have done. Probabilism is specially meant to settle doubts of conscience, and for use in the confessional. It is not intended to furnish matter for pastoral instruction and sermons. The preacher and instructor, without exaggerating obligations, should always propose a high ideal to his hearers and exhort them to follow it. As Rodriguez says: “By this discourse we easily see how important it is that in our spiritual exhortations we speak of that only which is perfect in a sovereign degree. If we preach, for example, on humility, it must be that humility which is most profound, and which reaches to contempt of oneself. If we preach on mortification, it must be on that which subjects all our passions to reason; if we preach on conforming our will to God, we must recommend a conformity which leaves us no will but that of the Almighty, which resigns our will entirely to His, and which establishes all its content and joy in the accomplishment of the divine will. . . . Because you are weak I must propose to you the most perfect kind of virtue and devotion, that by your aiming at what is best you may be able to perform at least what is of strict obligation.”¹

1 Practice of Religious Perfection, vol. i, chapter viii.

Titius tells his people that they need not trouble themselves about directing their intention to God, for it is solidly probable that an intention elicited once for all will suffice to direct all the actions of one's life to God if it is not retracted. This is probably true, bearing in mind the clause “if it is not retracted.” But it would most likely be understood to mean that there was no necessity for thinking about God oftener than once in a lifetime, which is, of course, altogether false. Besides it is only an opinion, and those who acted upon it might lose a great deal of merit if it is not the true opinion. Titius adopted the wrong tone in his instructions; he should not be content with the minimum, even if he tells his people what the minimum is, but he should exhort them frequently to renew their intention of pleasing God, so that they may be the more secure and may reap the greater reward.

Titius followed a probable opinion about the intention which is necessary for gaining indulgences, but here again it is only probable; it is not certain that it would suffice for gaining all indulgences as he says. So in this matter also Titius acted imprudently and from a wrong point of view, and he should correct what he said. For it is not certain that probabilism may be used in the matter of indulgences, inasmuch as indulgences are a grant made by the Church on certain conditions, and anyone who wishes to gain them must satisfy the conditions laid down.²

2 Bulot, Compend. Theol. Mor., vol. ii, n. 1002.

There is scarcely any subject of which so much has been spoken in the Church as has been spoken, for forty or fifty years, of that of probability. But it has been spoken of so variously, and so many people, either through malice or for want of understanding the matter sufficiently well, have cast so much confusion into it, that most of the world does not have a sufficiently distinct idea of it. This is why, it being fitting to make oneself well understood here and to explain oneself on this article without evasion, it was believed that a clear notion ought to be given of the terms employed in this matter, as well as of the true and principal state of the question. Not only the Jesuit Theologians, but also all the others who have treated this subject with the design of clarifying it, require first that an opinion, in order to be truly probable, have two general conditions. The first, that it have nothing contrary to the dogmas of the faith, nothing opposed to the truths received by the Church, nor to any evident reason. In the second place, it must be supported by good reasons, and one must not rashly undertake to maintain it against the common sentiment of the Doctors. If one of these conditions is lacking in an opinion, it is no longer probable and is not among those of which there is dispute here.

Among probable opinions there are, as it were, two kinds, according to the degree of probability which they have. There are some which are called less probable, and others which are called more probable. The principal question in this matter turns upon the comparison made, touching some point of practice, between two opinions which are both probable, but of which one is less probable and the other more probable; that is to say, of which one is supported by stronger reasons, and the other by reasons less strong, though good. It is asked whether it is permitted, on this point of morals or practice, to follow the opinion which is less probable, abandoning the more probable.

This question has no place when the less probable is the safer. Here that one of the two opinions which, by everyone's admission, may be followed without sin is called the safer opinion. That one which some reasons prove would involve sin if it were followed is called the less safe. For example, upon this question: Whether a man who has committed a mortal sin is obliged to confess it at the first opportunity, and, supposing that he does not do so, whether he commits a new sin; there are two opinions: that of Saint Bonaventure, who says that in this case one is obliged to confess it as soon as possible; and that of Saint Thomas, who says that there is no obligation, under pain of sin, to do so. The first is the safer, because it is certain that in practicing it one does not sin. The second is the less safe, because there are reasons which prove that one sins in following it, although there are also other reasons which prove that one does not sin.

It can therefore happen, and it often happens, that the less probable is the safer; and in this case it is clear that one may follow the less probable. But the question is to know whether, when the less probable is at the same time the less safe, one may follow it. This is properly the capital question on this subject. From it have arisen an infinity of other difficulties in this matter, of which it would be too long to make an enumeration. It is therefore upon this capital question that the Jesuits must explain themselves here, and say what they think of this proposition: In the concurrence of two opposed probable opinions, one may follow that which is the less probable and the less safe. Here is what they have to say upon it.

First, this proposition, taken according to the odious ideas and explanations which the adversaries of the Jesuits are accustomed to give of it in their books and in their discourses, was never the opinion of their Society nor of their Theologians. They condemn it, and have always condemned it, such as it is represented in those false portraits which are made of it. In a word, it was never the sentiment of their Society that one may follow the less probable opinion when it is not truly probable and when it does not have the two conditions marked above, one of which is negative, namely, that it must not be contrary to Scripture, nor to Tradition, nor to the Decisions of the Holy See, nor to an evident reason. The other condition is positive, namely, that it must be supported by good reasons which are even recognized as such by all those, or by most of those themselves, who combat it.

Second, this doctrine, even taken with the two conditions which I have just stated, is not the opinion of their Society in the sense that one is obliged to follow it. In fact, several of their Theologians have combated it and combat it still every day. And it was thus that their thirteenth General Congregation replied when this question was put to it on behalf of the Pope: namely, whether the Society adopted this doctrine as a sentiment to which it attached itself to the exclusion of the opposed doctrine.

Third, the Jesuits will not say absolutely of this doctrine, as they have said of the error of philosophical sin and of what is imputed to them on the article of the love of God, that it has not been the doctrine of the Society. They acknowledge that it has been so in this sense, that a great part of their Theologians have maintained it; and it is of this that they must render a particular account to the public.

This reason is taken from the rule which the Jesuits imposed upon themselves from the birth of their Society, and of which I spoke at the beginning of this writing, which was to teach in Theology the opinions commonly received in the Catholic Schools. Now, that one may follow the less safe opinion, provided that it is truly probable, was not only the doctrine commonly received when the Jesuits began to write on Theology, but it was also almost generally maintained in all the Catholic Schools, so that the contrary had incomparably fewer followers there; and this is what caused the Jesuits to incline to this side much more than to the other. This fact is so important and so essential to their justification that, although it has been demonstrated a thousand times, it is well to report here a part of the proofs.

Pierre Navarre, whose book was printed as early as the year 1597, says that this was in his time the more common doctrine, communiorem Theologorum sententiam. [Lib. 3 de restitut., c. 1, n. 237. Edit. Tolet. 1597.]

As early as the year 1592, Salonius of the Order of Saint Augustine wrote that this doctrine had a greater number of defenders, and defenders of greater authority, and stronger reasons than the opposed doctrine: Cum habeat plures ac graviores authores & firmiora fundamenta quam opposita; and above all from the School of Saint Thomas, ac maxime ex discipulis Sancti Thomae. [De justit. & jure, controv. 2, concl. 4, ad art. 4, quaest. 63.]

This doctrine was therefore upon this footing before any Jesuit had yet written on Moral Theology. The greater number of the Jesuit Doctors followed it, as the greater number of the Doctors of the other Catholic Schools, and above all the School of Saint Thomas, followed it; what can their crime have been in this?

It was so generally followed in the School of Saint Thomas that, from 1570 until 1659, in the space of nearly a hundred years, during which a great number of Thomists wrote on Theology, perhaps not a single one will be found who was not of this sentiment.

In this space of time several Bishops wrote on these matters, and almost all embraced the same sentiment. One may see upon this a little Latin book printed at Paris in 1659 and entitled Quaestio facti, which gives the proof of it in detail. An infinity of Doctors of Louvain, Salamanca, Douai, and all the most celebrated Universities did not hesitate upon it. The only three Doctors of the Sorbonne who printed Courses of Theology were of the same opinion, as was M. Bail, Sub- Penitentiary of Paris. M. Hambert in France says that it was the ordinary doctrine of Theology: Ita communiter Doctores. [a. In 1. 2ae de opinione probabili, art. 4.] Bonacina, who was a Bishop in Italy, wrote the same thing there: Ita communiter Theologi. [b. T. 2, disput. 2, q. 4, l. 3, de restitutione.] Others in Germany and in Spain say the same.

This being so, what could the Jesuits have done more prudently than to conform themselves in their doctrine to the multitude of all the Theologians of whom I have just spoken, among whom are counted several Bishops, a great number of Religious of all the Orders, and above all of that of Saint Dominic, and the most distinguished Doctors of the most famous Universities of Europe?

But that upon which the Jesuits doubtless have a right to ask justice from the public is that, despite facts so evident and so incontestable, despite what is attested by several Doctors who printed before the Jesuits had written on matters of Moral Theology - that from that time the doctrine of probability was the most common among the Theologians - despite all this, it has been undertaken to persuade the whole earth that this doctrine was born in the School of the Jesuits; that it is an invention of their policy, a secret which they found to accommodate the Gospel to the corruption of the heart of man; that it is desired to render them alone responsible for the bad effects which it is claimed to produce; finally, that after this doctrine has been disfigured and rendered infinitely odious, it is spoken of as the doctrine proper and specific, so to speak, of the Jesuits, who nevertheless received it only from others and taught it only with all the others.

It is upon this, I say, that the Jesuits hope that the public will render them justice; but they must still enlighten it upon an important point in this matter. Why is it, it is said, that the Dominican Fathers, for example, having proscribed this doctrine in their Schools, although it had taken birth there and had been universally followed there for nearly a hundred years, why do the Jesuits, who received it from them, not do as much? Here is what they have to answer upon this.

1. Among the Jesuits full liberty is left to combat the doctrine of probability, and there is no obligation to maintain it.

2. Several make use of this liberty every day; and for many years there have been seen in their principal Colleges of France, as at Paris, La Fleche, Lyon, and Toulouse, various Theses maintained against this doctrine; the same thing has been seen at Rome and elsewhere.

3. If one counts the printed Books which have appeared for fifteen or twenty years upon this matter in order to treat it theologically (for I do not speak of satires against the Jesuits), one will find more Books come forth from the Society than from any other Religious Order or any other School which were made to maintain the doctrine opposed to that of probability.

Let us now say why their Society has not until the present judged it fitting authentically to forbid all Professors to teach this doctrine. These reasons are such that there is much likelihood they will be approved.

The first and principal is that the Jesuits do not believe that they can attribute to themselves the authority to condemn a doctrine which has been that of all the Catholic Schools and Universities; which has been maintained in Books by several learned and holy Prelates, and by almost all those of this rank who have treated the matter since it has been disputed in the School.

Second, it in no way befits the Jesuits to proscribe a doctrine which the Holy See has always refused to censure. For it is known that its condemnation was pursued at Rome with all possible vigor, above all during the Pontificate of Innocent XI, and that the Holy See never wished to do so; and this was apparently one of the reasons which prevented the last Assembly of the Clergy of France from placing the proposition which contains this doctrine among the propositions which the Prelates censured, contenting themselves with making at the end a declaration of the sentiment which had prevailed upon this matter in the Assembly. Even if the Jesuits had only this reason, which includes several, there is no person who, weighing it maturely, would not acknowledge that their conduct in this is very prudent; but they have still others.

The second reason for the conduct of the Jesuits in this regard is the manner in which the decline of this doctrine in the School in France came about, for elsewhere it is not upon the same footing. First, those who initially attacked it did so in order by this means to render the Jesuits odious, not knowing, through the little familiarity they had with Scholasticism, that in attacking them on this point they were taking to task all the most celebrated Schools and almost all the Theologians. Second, they began by disfiguring this doctrine and by proposing it in an odious and captious manner, concealing the reasons upon which it is founded, drawing conclusions which are in no way attached to it, and confounding a thousand things in a subject which demands, in order to be well treated, a very exact analysis, because of an infinity of circumstances of which a single one altogether changes the case; attributing to the doctrine itself the abuses which could be made of it, an inconvenience common to almost all questions of Morals. After having thus decried it by the expositions which they made of it according to their fancy, they combated it represented under those ideas under which it was easy to make it appear bizarre, ridiculous, and untenable. This soon produced the universal unleashing of all those who do not take the trouble to examine things thoroughly.

Nothing more was needed to shake many Theologians and entire Schools, who for various reasons made it an honor and a merit to abandon this doctrine. For, moreover, the question having always been problematic, there was nothing which could constrain a Theologian to defend this opinion rather than that which is opposed to it. But after all, this reflection upon the manner in which the face of Theology has changed so greatly in this regard in France is a very strong motive for suspending one's judgment upon the quality of the doctrine itself until the Church or the Holy See have declared themselves. For, finally, without doing wrong to the Doctors who combat it today, one may bring into comparison with them those who formerly defended it so unanimously and those who still defend it in several places of Europe.

The third reason of the Jesuits, which in my opinion ought to appear very strong, is that there are certain very important matters in which ordinary practice, even among the most upright people, seems scarcely capable of being justified except by the doctrine in question. These consequences, which the Jesuits envisage, cause them to go with bridle in hand and prevent them from advancing too far before the Church has spoken.

The plurality of Benefices, even supposing that the Beneficiaries make a good use of them; the determination of what is called in this matter decent maintenance in relation to their estate and quality, furnish great difficulties; and it would not be easy to show that the most regular persons commonly follow in practice, upon all this, the more probable opinion. But whatever may be the case upon this point, here are still some other examples.

Is there an unanswerable demonstration that the common practice in France touching contracts for the constitution of annuities is supported by the more probable opinion? It is not more than three centuries since there was much dispute about the nature of this Contract, and as strongly as there is dispute today upon the question of the Three Contracts. Several learned Doctors maintained that it was usurious, because the sum, having been found to be reimbursed at the end of twenty years by the interest which equals the principal, the same interest continues to be received; and when redemption takes place, the principal is paid anew; so that for twenty thousand francs given, one finds oneself to have received forty thousand francs, and very often much more.

It is also certain that, to justify this Contract, a good direction of intention is necessary, according to which one intends to purchase, by the alienation of the principal, not a certain sum of money payable every year (for one does not purchase money with money), but the right to exact every year a certain sum from the one to whom the principal has been paid. All this, not without reason, appeared delicate to those ancient Doctors, and appeared so much so to the Popes who were consulted upon it that Martin V and Callixtus III consented to permit this Contract only upon several conditions, of which there were two principal ones. The first was that the annuity should be secured by mortgage, and that the right of the one who constitutes it should be established upon a determinate property which was of a nature to produce revenue, for example upon a piece of land or upon a house. The second, that if this property should perish, the annuity should no longer be paid. Pope Pius V, after these two other Popes, and the Council of Bordeaux held in the last century, declared that these two conditions were necessary.

Nevertheless, in France these two conditions are not observed: annuities are often constituted upon all the goods and upon the person of the one who receives the principal. If the goods are lost, the annuity always continues and the person remains obligated. Is it therefore quite certain that the practice of France in this kind of contract is founded upon the more probable opinion, being contrary to the Bulls of three Popes and to the decision of a Council of France; this contract, destitute of the conditions which I have just stated, having appeared usurious to these Popes and to a Council, and having even appeared such by its nature to so many able ancient Theologians, without stronger reasons having since that time been brought forward than those which were produced then? And it is to be observed

that this opinion, upon which there is no hesitation, would scarcely be probable if one held to the definition which the common run of Casuists give of a probable opinion, in which they place a condition that it not be contrary to the decisions of the Holy See and of Councils; for here it is a question of a pure dogma of Morals, and not of those questions in which there is conflict over the bounds of spiritual authority and temporal authority. It is solely a question of knowing whether it is a contract permitted in conscience or not.

What shall I say of the contracts made by Guardians on the occasion of wards' monies, above all in Brittany, and of many others used in commerce among Merchants or among men of business? Some of them were proposed to the last Assembly of the Clergy, upon which it dared decide nothing.

Many other examples could be furnished in various matters in which it would be difficult to show that the rule of practice was the more probable opinion. And if this is not demonstrated, there is no longer any rule of conscience for acting without danger of sinning except the doctrine of the less probable opinion. It even seems that these particular cases ought to be solidly decided before the general principle were touched, for fear of falling into contradiction. All this shows that the Jesuits have reason not to go so quickly, and that they are in no way blameworthy for not yet having made a decree against the doctrine in question, and for having in this imitated the Holy See, which, despite the solicitations made at Rome, has not yet judged it fitting to declare itself. Is it laxity in Moral Theology to await the decision of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, when one is in the disposition in which the Jesuits are to follow it in everything, and when one is, like them, without obstinacy and without interest upon it?

Here, then, in a few words, is the conduct of the Jesuits upon all this. 1. Their Doctors for the most part taught this doctrine because they saw it almost generally followed in all the Catholic Schools. 2. They did not for that reason make it a sentiment of their Society to the exclusion of the other, which several among them have followed and still follow every day. 3. They were neither its authors nor its only defenders, but they maintained it with the multitude of the Theologians and with a great number of Bishops. 4. They await the authority of the Holy See in order to condemn it, because they do not believe they can do so by their own authority and without this perhaps drawing consequences for usages upon which it does not belong to them to decide. It appears that one would have to be very hard to please not to approve this conduct, and very inequitable to render the Jesuits responsible for the doctrine of probability, supposing that it were such as so many people claim.

Although the Popes did not wish to condemn the doctrine of probability, they nevertheless censured some particular propositions which have relation to this matter, and upon which the Jesuits also wish to declare their sentiment to the public. Here are these propositions.

If a Book by a modern Author appears, his opinion must be judged probable, provided that it is not established that it has been rejected as improbable by the Holy See. [Alexander VII, Proposition 28, 1665.]

It is not illicit, in the administration of the Sacraments, to follow a probable opinion touching the validity of the Sacrament, abandoning the safer, unless some law, some pact, or some danger of great harm forbids it. [Innocent XI, 1679.]

I deem it probable that a Judge may judge according to the less probable opinion.

Generally speaking, one acts prudently in following a probable opinion, however slight the probability may be, whether it is extrinsic or intrinsic, and provided that the opinion does not go outside the bounds of probability.

An infidel, relying upon a probable opinion, will be excused from his infidelity in not believing our Mysteries.

It is not permitted to follow a probable opinion, even the most probable among those which are probable. [Alexander VIII, Proposition 3, 1690.]