§ 3. On Pure Probabilism

349. Reasons for pure Probabilism. Since among modern Probabilists Noldin, S.J., stands out, we give here his arguments, which otherwise do not differ from the argumentation of other Probabilists.¹⁴⁷

1. From reason. A doubtful law does not oblige. But a law against which there is true and solid probability is truly doubtful. Therefore a law against which there is true and solid probability does not oblige. To prove the major, the worn arguments are applied, namely, a doubtful law is a law not sufficiently known, is uncertain, and the right of liberty precedes the right of law and its obligation. - But the minor is proved in this way: as long as the opinion for liberty is probable, the opinion for law cannot be certain. But it makes no difference whether this opinion for law is less, equally, or more probable, provided the opinion for liberty is probable.¹⁴⁸

2. From authority. "A moral system cannot be false which in every time (!) is expounded, vindicated, and applied in particular questions as a rule of morals by the greater part of theologians, of which sort is the Probabilistic system" (l. c. n. 240).

3. From the approbation of the Church. Explicitly indeed the Church has never approved Probabilism; but implicitly she has manifested her mind clearly and without doubt by that special approbation with which she distinguished the works of St. Alphonsus (who several times explicitly and in express words said that he was not a Probabilist, and who explicitly rejects the system teaching that it is licit to follow a known less probable opinion, "as Busembaum, Lacroix, and almost all the Jesuits say"¹⁴⁹). Nevertheless Noldin says:¹⁵⁰ "The system which St. Alphonsus used in composing moral theology is pure and simple Probabilism." And he confidently concludes:¹⁵¹ "It is licit to follow an opinion truly probable for liberty in all cases of doubtful law, whether the opposite opinion for law is less or equally or more probable.... The probabilistic principle, altogether universal, extends itself not only to the doubt of an existing law, but also of a ceasing law... [and] can also licitly be applied in the matter of justice.... Nothing prevents someone from using, in diverse cases concerning the same matter, according to pleasure, now one, now another probable opinion.... Thus the same person can, for one testament, use the opinion by which a testament lacking the formalities of law is valid, and for another testament the contrary opinion."

¹⁴⁷ Summa theol. mor. de principiis n. 237 sqq.

¹⁴⁸ St. Alphonsus expressly denies this last point; cf. Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 65.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. above n. 347.

¹⁵⁰ L. c. n. 239.

¹⁵¹ L. c. n. 241 and 242.

350. Difficulties against pure Probabilism. 1. The whole of Probabilism is founded upon the principle, "A doubtful law does not oblige," even if there is question of doubt broadly so called. But this foundation is by no means solid, nor is it sufficiently proved from reason or from authority. Not from reason: for the Probabilists attempt to prove this principle by no other arguments than the following: such a law is not sufficiently known, or is uncertain, or is invincibly unknown, and therefore it does not oblige. "But this argumentation is not pleasing: both because it involves a begging of the question, and because it can be turned back against the authors thus: an ordering permitting, not sufficiently known or uncertain or invincibly unknown, confers no right; or: moral liberty not sufficiently known or uncertain or unknown is to be reckoned as nothing."¹⁵² Not from authority: for the old authors, when they assert, "In doubts liberty," speak of doubt strictly so called, where the mind is inclined to neither part of the contradiction, but not of doubt broadly so called, where, on the contrary, they teach that that which is safer must be chosen.¹⁵³ Besides, not even the new Code of Canon Law admits without limit the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige. For c. 15 establishes: "Even invalidating and incapacitating laws do not urge in a doubt of law; but in a doubt of fact the Ordinary can dispense in them, provided there is question of laws in which the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to dispense." But for what is a dispensation of the Ordinary still required, if according to the Probabilists no doubtful law obliges?

2. Noldin asserts too boldly that Probabilism has been approved by the Church. If anyone considers without party zeal the testimonies brought forward above, especially from Alexander VII, Innocent XI, Clement XI, Clement XIII, he will rather be convinced of the contrary, thinking with Professor Koch and many others that the Church never favored Probabilism. Nor can it truly be said that the Church approved Probabilism by approving the moral works of St. Alphonsus, for that Holy Doctor expressly rejects pure Probabilism. Therefore at most it can be said that the Church tolerates Probabilism.

3. Pure Probabilism was unknown before Medina.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, it is dangerous to apply some system which through sixteen centuries in the Church was neither known nor applied. For it is altogether incredible that all the so-called ancient Summists, who wrote Manuals for the practical use of confessors, erred concerning the right solution of practical doubt; or also that all confessors, as many as there were in the world, did not act rightly in this matter until Bartholomaeus Medina most happily discovered Probabilism.

4. Pure Probabilism leads to Laxism. This proposition is proved: a) from history. For no one can deny that several Probabilists, and those excellent in talent, such as Tamburinus, Moya, Caramuel, Diana, etc., in reality taught lax opinions and afterward were proscribed by the Supreme Pontiffs. - b) from reason and the nature of the thing. For if the mere external or internal probability of some opinion now suffices for it to be licitly brought into practice, disastrous errors are almost inevitable. For how easily someone, not to say a layman, but even a cleric theologian, persuades himself that some opinion is truly probable! Did not only Catholic physicians, but also celebrated theologians in our times think that craniotomy was probably licit, if otherwise the mother and infant would have to die? - If in a matter of such great moment an error crept in, can the same not happen in other matters not so momentous? Therefore if someone always in his actions followed the principles of Probabilism, that is, if he left behind the opinion known as certainly more probable and followed the opinion favoring liberty certainly less probable and safe, he would gradually slide into Laxism. Hence Noldin himself, a Probabilist, acknowledges:¹⁵⁵ "If a Christian man in the service of God did nothing other than what the law strictly demands from the principles of Probabilism, certainly he would live a life little worthy of a Christian man." Moreover, a system which, its own patron admitting it, leads, although gradually, to a life little worthy of a Christian man has already been judged. The system of Christian prudence, about which presently, avoids the dangerous rocks of Probabilism.

¹⁵² Cf. Wouters, De Minusprobabilismo 2, 147.

¹⁵³ Cf. the arguments brought forward above (n. 345) for Probabiliorism.

¹⁵⁴ There is no leisure to refute the trifles and ineptitudes of Caramuel, who at length and breadth attempts to prove that Probabilism had already been applied by Adam and Eve, and that it excused them from many grave sins before the fall. Likewise that St. Thomas merited from Christ the words, "Thomas, you have written well of me," because he wrote probable things in the matter of faith and morals. (Apologema pro antiquissima et universalissima doctrina de probabilitate p. 127, n. 223, Lyons 1663.)

¹⁵⁵ L. c. n. 242.