On Moderate Probabilism

as the sun illuminates by its rays things previously obscure to us, which become visible when those rays are reflected back to us. And for this reason principles of this kind are rightly called reflex. In this therefore consists the efficacy of these very principles, that, since the existence of some law can be affirmed only probably, and by that very fact the obligation of observing such a law remains doubtful, from the aforesaid principles it is pronounced whether one acting against a doubtful law can act licitly, or whether he is bound to observe it.

That 5° reflex principles are necessary for solving the practical doubts here treated of is demonstrated from the very fact itself. For whatever opinion prevail in the present matter, immediately some reflex principle intervenes. Tutiorists, as well as probabilists, are compelled to concede that a doubtful law as such does not oblige, that is, in reason of the doubt itself, because doubt is a negative thing, from which nothing positive, such as obligation, can arise. On either side therefore recourse is had to some external principle, for determining what is practically to be decided. Tutiorists, affirming obligation in every doubt, lean upon this reflex principle : « In doubt the safer part must be followed. » Probabilists, who deny obligation, since the opinion opposed to the law is truly and solidly probable, place among the reflex principles they allege this principal one : « A doubtful law does not oblige. » Therefore in the present question some reflex principle necessarily intervenes.]