Scandal

102. Definition. Scandal is defined by St. Thomas as: a word or deed less right furnishing to another an occasion of spiritual ruin.¹

a. From scandal properly and strictly such, which the given definition presents, scandal taken in a broader and improper sense must be distinguished; by this is frequently signified astonishment or rumor stirred up among the people because of an unusual action, though no one is incited to sin.

b. Word or deed: by these words not only a positive external action, but also an external omission must be understood, since even the omission of a precept can be an occasion of sinning for others. Less right, namely what is evil or at least has the appearance of evil, as when on a prohibited day one who has been dispensed eats meat before others. If an action in itself good or indifferent, which does not have the appearance of evil, is to another an occasion of sinning, the action is not the occasion of sin, but rather the evil disposition of the sinner, namely frailty or malice.

c. Furnishing to another an occasion, namely that by its presence, without exercising a positive influence upon his will, it furnishes to the neighbor an occasion of determining himself to sin: the sin itself is wholly from the will of another freely determining itself to the sinful act. Therefore of the nature of scandal it is that to the neighbor whose will is not yet determined to sin, by its existence, it furnishes an occasion of sinning.

d. Of spiritual ruin: for true scandal it is not required that the sin of the neighbor actually follow, but it is sufficient that from the action placed, the circumstances considered, it can follow and perhaps is foreseen as going to follow. But it makes no difference whether the neighbor is induced to the same sin or to a wholly different sin. A sin committed before others has the character of scandal if those before whom the sin is committed are foreseen to be drawn from it to sin, which otherwise they would not have committed; but it does not have the character of scandal if those before whom the sin is committed are either already determined to sin, or are so confirmed in probity that sin is not to be feared. One who by his example gives others an occasion of omitting a thing indeed good but not prescribed, for example prayer before or after table, likewise does not commit the sin of scandal, because he does not entice to sinning.

¹ Summa, II-II, q. 43, a. 1.

103. Division of scandal. 1. Scandal is divided into active and passive; active is called the action which furnishes to the neighbor an occasion of sinning, and passive is called the very sin to be committed for which the occasion is furnished to the neighbor.

a. The definition placed at the beginning fits only active scandal. Passive scandal is customarily called occasioned sin.

b. Active and passive scandal are not always connected with each other; for active scandal can be had without passive scandal following, which was thought going to follow; and passive scandal can be had without active scandal preceding, which is clear from the definition of pharisaical scandal.

2. Active scandal is divided into direct and indirect, according as the sin of another is intended or not intended, but only foreseen; direct scandal is again divided into diabolical, when the sin of another is intended because it is an offense of God or the spiritual ruin of the neighbor, and simply direct, when the sin of the neighbor is intended on account of another end, for example because it brings utility or pleasure to the one scandalizing.

3. Passive scandal is twofold: given, when it arises from an action which by its nature can furnish the neighbor an occasion of sinning; taken, when the sin indeed arises on the occasion of another's action, which nevertheless furnishes an occasion of sinning not by its nature, but only because of the evil disposition of the one scandalized. But if this occurs only from ignorance or weakness of the one scandalized, it is called scandal of the little ones, as if a young man from the honorable adornment of a woman takes an occasion of sinning; but if it occurs from the mere malice of another, it is called pharisaical scandal, as if a father from the exercises of piety of his daughter takes an occasion of blaspheming.

Since this division is not taken in the same way by all, attention must be paid to the sense which individual authors put under these terms.

104. Malice of scandal. 1. Active scandal is a sin from its genus grave against the precept of charity. Therefore Christ the Lord says: He who shall scandalize one of these little ones who believe in Me, it is expedient for him, etc. Woe to that man through whom scandal comes.¹ And indeed, if charity obliges us to correct the neighbor and to prevent him from falling, much more does it oblige us not to incite him to sin by bad example.

a. The sin of scandal will ordinarily be grave or light according as it furnishes an occasion of sinning gravely or lightly; therefore the gravity of scandal must ordinarily be taken from the gravity of the sin to which another is incited, not from the gravity of the action by which another is incited to sin. Wherefore it can happen that someone furnishes only light scandal through mortal sin, and conversely grave scandal through venial sin, indeed even through an act indifferent in itself. One who excels in dignity and esteem, for example, easily furnishes grave scandal, as if a priest keeps in his house a maid suspected by the people. Ordinarily, because passive scandal which arises almost from malice or excessive weakness must be excepted.

b. Therefore both parents and superiors, and also clerics, priests, and religious, ought carefully to guard themselves from any less right action: the former because children and subjects are always inclined to follow the bad examples of parents and superiors, the latter because they easily furnish occasion that in others the love of virtue and piety be diminished, that others judge and speak badly of clerics and religious, and that they despise religion and its exercises.

c. One who furnishes to a man very prone to committing grave sins only a light occasion of sinning mortally does not sin by grave scandal, because his grave sin arises more from his malice and bad custom than from the light occasion. Therefore children who know that parents from any light acts of disobedience take an occasion of gravely blaspheming and cursing do not sin gravely; nor do girls who by their vain levities furnish to young men an occasion of sinning gravely.²

2. Direct scandal is a special sin also against that virtue to the injury of which the neighbor is incited: for every virtue prohibits both that we ourselves violate it and that we will it to be violated by others; but through indirect scandal one sins only against charity.

a. With regard to indirect scandal St. Alphonsus (n. 45) affirms that a twofold sin is committed, against charity and against that virtue which is injured by passive scandal; but others with de Lugo deny this, saying that in this case sin is indeed committed against charity, but not also against that virtue to the violation of which another is indirectly incited: for every virtue indeed demands that it not be violated and that another not be directly stirred up to violating it, but it does not demand that its violation be prevented, which belongs to charity.³ Therefore one who by his example induces others to stealing indeed sins against charity, but not against justice, provided he neither intended the sin of others nor used exhortation, counsel, or command.

b. Wherefore it is not necessary in confession to declare the species of the sin which another committed because of indirect scandal, but it is sufficient to say: I was to another (or to others) an occasion of sinning, or I was scandal to another (or to others) by bad example. But one who committed direct scandal does not satisfy in confession if he says that he gave scandal or incited another to sin, but he must also declare the species of sin to which he drew another.

c. Diabolical scandal furthermore has a special malice against charity of God.

¹ Matt. 18:6-7. Cf. 1 Cor. 8:9 ff.

² Berardi, Praxis confessariorum, Faenza: Novelli, 1898, I, n. 271 ff.; Genicot, I, n. 232.

³ Cf. Lugo, De poenitentia, disp. 16, n. 157 ff.

105. Principles concerning permission of passive scandal. 1. Although an action good or indifferent, which does not even have the appearance of evil, is not properly scandal given, nevertheless from charity we ought to omit it where it can be done without inconvenience, so that the sin of the neighbor may be prevented; yet from any cause, even not grave, it is licit to place it.

a. Therefore even scandal of the little ones must be avoided if it can easily be done. Pharisaical scandal ordinarily indeed is not to be cared for; nevertheless without any cause it is not licit to place an action because of which another, even from mere malice, is foreseen as going to sin, because charity demands that without any cause we not offer to the neighbor an occasion of sinning.

b. It must be noted that the scandal of others can be avoided by omitting the action, or by deferring it to another time, or by hiding it, and, if the action presents some appearance of evil, by admonishing the neighbor concerning the rectitude of the action (that, for example, an excusing cause or dispensation is present); but if, after admonition has been made, scandal nevertheless continues, that scandal must be judged pharisaical.

2. That it is sometimes licit to place an action, although the sin of the neighbor is foreseen as going to follow from it, is established from the known principle: where from an action good or indifferent a twofold effect follows, one good (the advantage of the one scandalizing) and the other evil (the sin of the neighbor), the latter can be permitted from a just cause of necessity or utility.

106. Rules concerning the permission of scandal.¹ In order that these principles be applied more safely, the following rules must be noted, in which, however, pharisaical scandal is not considered.

1. Works prescribed by negative natural law, indeed also affirmative works in those circumstances in which the law truly urges, may never be omitted because of scandal.

The reason is that these can never be omitted without sin; therefore it is never licit to lie or perjure oneself to avoid scandal; nor is it licit to omit profession of faith where it is prescribed in order to prevent the sin of a tyrant, or the reception of baptism because of the scandal of parents.

2. Works prescribed by positive law, whether divine or human, can be omitted because of scandal, but they ought not to be omitted except perhaps once or twice.

a. The reason for the first is that, when two precepts concur which cannot both be observed at the same time, the natural precept of avoiding scandal prevails. Hence a parish priest can celebrate on a feast day when not fasting in order to avoid the scandal of the people, which cannot otherwise be avoided.

b. With regard to the second it must be noted: once or twice, that is, if the danger of scandal is foreseen as soon going to be removed, most authors affirm that these precepts must be omitted, because the natural precept is to be preferred to the positive, and because the omission does not bring great inconvenience. But all deny that this must be done rather often or for a long time, because this would be too grave. Therefore they say that a virgin who knows that a young man is scandalized by the sight of her ought, once or twice, to remain at home omitting Mass; and in like manner a wife ought to omit Mass or fasting if she knows that her husband takes an occasion of blaspheming from the observance of the precepts. But certainly they are not bound to omit these precepts for a long time, because this would be too burdensome for them. But since the opinion obliging them for a brief time is not certain, practically they cannot be obliged to omit a prescribed thing.

c. It must be noted that this alone holds if someone knows that a determinate person takes scandal from his action; for from fear lest the action be a scandal to some indeterminate person, it ought not to be omitted, because the obligation of preventing even this danger would be too grave and troublesome.

3. Works not prescribed, whether good or indifferent, we are bound to omit in order to avoid scandal, if it can be done without grave inconvenience; but with grave inconvenience we are not bound.

Therefore if a woman knew that she was an occasion of sinning to a determinate man, she would be bound to flee his sight if she easily could, for example by walking by another road, by not approaching the window; but she would not be bound to do this for a long time, because it would be too hard for her to be deprived of her liberty for a long time. She is not bound to abstain from a public walk in order to prevent scandal, because it is judged too burdensome.

4. Temporal goods must be given up in order to avoid scandal if they are of lighter moment; but if they are of greater moment, they need not necessarily be given up. The reason is that the spiritual good of others not only can be preferred to one's own temporal good, but where it can easily be done, it must also be preferred; but charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience.

Hence no one is bound to pay more to a worker whom he foresees will blaspheme: for this inconvenience, although light in itself, nevertheless becomes grave because it can occur often, and because impious men would thereby become more audacious. Parish priests are not bound, indeed cannot omit, those things which are necessary for preserving ecclesiastical goods, for example lawsuits and exactions of stole fees, in order to avoid scandals arising from them; but they are bound to prevent scandal by suitable admonition, for example by explaining the reason for the exaction.

¹ Cf. Reuter, Theologia moralis, II, tr. 1, n. 137; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 635.

107. On the adornment of women. a. First of all attention must be paid to the intention with which a woman adorns herself: for this can be done in order to preserve the decency of her state according to the custom of the country, to please her husband, to find a spouse, to hide defects of the body, and these intentions indeed are licit; then it can be done from levity or vanity in order to display beauty, and these intentions are lightly sinful; finally it can be done to provoke the concupiscence and impure love of men, and this intention is a grave sin.

Therefore to smear the face with rouge and cosmetics will be mortal if it is done for wantonness, venial if only to feign beauty, none if it is done to hide some defect.

b. As regards adornment itself, honorable adornment and adornment fitting one's state according to the custom of the country is licit and is to be permitted to women; therefore they are not bound to put aside decent and honorable adornment, even though others, even determinate persons, are thereby enticed to concupiscence: for to abstain from modest garments and ornaments which are according to the custom of the country would be too great a burden, which charity does not demand for preventing the sin of another.

c. Immodest and gravely sinful adornment is always grave scandal, because it gravely and proximately provokes others to lust.¹

Where authors speak of dishonorable feminine adornment, they have especially before their eyes the uncovering of the breast. What uncovering is gravely dishonorable depends much upon custom: for things to which people are accustomed entice less. Hence it can happen that adornment which in one place is not grave scandal furnishes in another place an occasion of sinning gravely. Therefore authors teach by common consent that a woman can sin gravely by introducing somewhere an adornment which elsewhere, because of a custom already long prevailing, is not gravely scandalous.

d. Superfluous and venially sinful adornment, for example an uncovering of the breast not gravely dishonorable, is not grave scandal, because it entices only lightly and remotely to sin. For this reason women are not bound under grave obligation to abstain from adornment of this kind. Yet if it is established for the woman concerning the grave danger of falling for some determinate man, which danger will cease after a brief time, she is bound under grave obligation to abstain from adornment of this kind for that time.²

A woman who without just cause uses male clothing, or a man who uses female clothing, commits a light sin, because this of itself induces a light danger of lust and light scandal; if this change of clothing is made from a just cause, for example to hide oneself, for honorable recreation, etc., it is no sin.³

¹ St. Alphonsus, n. 55. What adornment is to be called gravely immodest must be judged from the things which are said in De sexto praecepto, n. 48.

² Cf. Lessius, De iustitia, etc., bk. 4, c. 4, n. 112 ff.

³ Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 52.

108. On obscene pictures and statues. Obscene or immodest are called those pictures and statues which commonly excite to lust; this can happen either because of the scene which they present, or because of the nakedness of the persons who are represented. Wherefore those are obscene both which represent a more or less base action, and which display to sight dishonorable parts of the body; but those which, with the dishonorable parts covered, have other parts uncovered, at least if they are male images, are not judged obscene, nor are likenesses of infants, even if wholly uncovered, obscene, because they excite less. Therefore they commit grave scandal:

a. Those who make notably obscene images or statues, except, however, the case in which this is done from a just cause, as if something of this kind must be painted or fashioned for teaching anatomical science.

b. Those who expose publicly images or statues of this kind in their workshops, or in houses and gardens, or even in museums and art galleries to which all can have access.

c. Those who expose images and statues, even not gravely obscene, in public squares: for all see these, indeed they can scarcely not see them; and, with attention paid to the common frailty of men, there will always be several who take grave scandal from things of this kind, even if they are not gravely obscene.

d. By no means can what is said be conceded, that works of art, even if in themselves dishonorable, are not to be considered as an occasion of sinning, but that each one can look at them and licitly enjoy their artistry. For, omitting the question whether obscene representations truly deserve to be called works of art, insofar as they excite lust, they certainly do not cease to be occasions of sin and therefore, just as they cannot be recommended without restriction, so the one who has no other excusing reason than the pursuit of acquiring for himself, as they say, universal culture cannot licitly enjoy the sight of them. To these things must be added that works of ancient art, even if obscene of themselves, excite lust less than works of recent art. Therefore what Aertnys has is to be approved: "immodest images and statues, but of excellent art, made by distinguished artists of an earlier age, can be exposed separately in some hall (of a museum or art gallery) under this law, that entrance be open not to all, but only to experts in art of mature age."¹

¹ Aertnys, Theologia moralis, Paderborn: Schoningh, 1898, I, n. 72.

109. On participation in civil funerals. a. To accompany the funeral of a deceased person who, for example because of suicide, is deprived of ecclesiastical burial, is not a sin, because attendance is considered a merely civil action when the funeral is arranged without a special ecclesiastical or civil solemnity.

b. If funerals are carried out with a special civil solemnity, attendance is of itself illicit, both because it is judged a favor furnished either to an impious person or to an impious sect which requires or prepares a funeral of this kind, and because it begets scandal.

Therefore where this twofold reason ceases, participation in a civil funeral can become licit; but it ceases: a. in places in which funerals of this kind have already been held rather often and therefore are less noticed; for in these circumstances participation is considered a merely civil act, especially for those who by reason of kinship or friendship are more closely connected with the deceased; b. for those who by moral necessity must attend the funeral, such as soldiers compelled by commanders, bearers of the bier who otherwise would be deprived of office, subjects who are ordered by superiors to attend: for where the moral necessity of attending is publicly known or can easily be known, all understand that attendance is made only materially in order to avoid grave damages.

c. If a civil funeral is so arranged that Freemasons or socialists attend with their signs and banners and attach the signs of their sect to the bier, attendance can be permitted with much more difficulty: for since funerals of this kind have the character of a solemnity established by an impious sect, one who attends them without grave necessity is judged to approve the sect.¹

¹ Cf. Genicot, I, n. 236; Berardi, Praxis confessariorum, 6th ed., I, n. 333; Villada, Casus conscientiae, 2nd ed., Brussels: Vromant, 1885, II, p. 103 ff.

SCANDAL in its theological sense is any word or action which has at least the appearance of evil and is the occasion of sin to another. This is the received definition of active scandal. Passive scandal is the sin which another is led to commit through active scandal. It is quite immaterial whether passive scandal be a sin of the same species as the scandal which caused it or not; a priest who gets drunk may cause scandal by inducing others to follow his example, or by causing others to speak ill of priests or of the Catholic Church.

Scandal is direct when it is foreseen and intended. If it is intended precisely in order that another may fall into sin, it is called diabolic; if it is intended on account of the advantage it will bring to him who gives it, it is simply direct scandal.

Indirect scandal is foreseen by him who gives it, but it is not intended.

Scandal of the weak is caused by the ignorance or frailty of him who suffers it; pharisaic scandal is caused by his malice, as was the case with the Pharisees taking scandal at the words and actions of our Lord and his Apostles.

Giving scandal is of itself gravely sinful, as it is against charity; and it is a special sin against the precept of fraternal correction which obliges us to do what we can to rescue a fallen brother, whereas one who scandalizes his brother causes him to fall.¹ Although of itself scandal is a grave sin, it is frequently only venial in the concrete. The gravity of the sin is not measured by the malice of the sin which causes scandal, but by the malice of the sin which he who gives scandal foresees will certainly or at least probably be caused in another. Thus a gravely sinful word or act may be a venial sin of scandal, and a venially sinful word or act may be a grave sin of scandal. It is plain, too, that not every sin committed in the sight of others is a sin of scandal, but then only when it is forese n that at least probably it will cause others to commit sin.

¹ Cf. Matt. xviii 7.

There is a twofold malice in sins of direct scandal; such sins are against charity and also against that special virtue which he who suffers scandal violates. So that when A incites B to drink to excess, A sins against charity and against temperance, which not only prescribes moderation in one’s own actions, but forbids one to be the cause of its violation by another.

The question whether indirect scandal in the same manner also contains a twofold malice is disputed among theologians, The negative opinion is probable, for although the virtue of temperance, for example, forbids me to induce another to sin against it, and I violate temperance if I do so, yet temperance does not require of me that I should prevent others from sinning against it; I may sin against charity if I do not try to prevent a sin of intemperance in another, but I do not sin against temperance. And so when indirect scandal is given, thereby causing another to drink to excess, there is a sin against charity; but the sin of scandal does not contain in addition the malice of a sin against temperance.

When A solicits B to commit sin with him and B consents, both sin against charity and also against the virtue which is specially violated; so that although solicitation causes A’s sin to be greater, it does not constitute a specific difference, and need not be confessed.

If I foresee that scandal is likely to be caused by an action of mine which has the appearance of being wrong, but which in fact is perfectly lawful, I am under the obligation of removing the danger of scandal by explaining my conduct, or omitting the action altogether if I can do so conveniently. If I cannot explain or omit the action without serious inconvenience, I am justified in performing the action and permitting the scandal, for charity does not bind to one’s own serious inconvenience.

On the other hand, I am not justified in omitting an action which is prescribed by the natural or divine law on account of the scandal which the action would give, and so when God’s honour or the salvation of my neighbour or my own requires that I should make public profession of the faith, I am bound to make it though my profession will make the enemies of the faith blaspheme.

Even a positive precept does not cease to bind on account of a general fear of scandal; whether it ceases to bind or not on account of scandal in a particular instance is a disputed point. Some theologians maintain that if a woman knows that her presence at Mass is a cause of grave sin to another and she cannot hear Mass elsewhere, she is obliged to abstain from hearing Mass at least for a Sunday or two, because the natural precept of avoiding scandal is more important than the positive precept of hearing Mass on Sundays. Others, on the contrary, hold that inasmuch as the scandal is taken and not given, the obligation of hearing Mass does not cease to bind in such a case. Practically, therefore, one is free to follow either opinion. This disputed question refers to scandal of the weak, for positive precepts do not cease to be obligatory on account of pharisaic scandal.

A good action without any appearance of evil which is not prescribed, and which can without inconvenience be omitted, should be omitted when it would cause scandal. If it cannot be abandoned without some inconvenience, there is no obligation to abstain from it; and so I may receive the sacraments even when they are not obligatory from a priest whom I know to be in a state of sin and unworthy to administer them.

If I suspect the honesty of a servant, I do nothing wrong if I leave a sum of money where I know he will see it with the object of finding out whether he will steal it. If he is an honest man, no harm will follow; if he is a thief, my action does not make him one; I do but furnish the opportunity for him to betray himself, and in my own defence I am justified in doing that. It is of course morally wrong to use agents provocateurs in order to detect criminals; they are the cause of another’s sin, not merely the occasion.

If I know that someone has made up his mind to commit sin and there is no other way of preventing him, I may lawfully induce him to be satisfied with some less offence of God than he was bent on committing. And so if a man was determined to commit adultery, I do nothing morally wrong, but rather the contrary, by persuading him to commit fornication instead. Many theologians, indeed, deny this doctrine on the ground that we must not do evil that good may come of it. But there is no question here of doing evil one’s self; we are not justified in doing a less moral evil instead of a greater; we must abstain from all evil, great and small. The question is whether it is an evil action to persuade someone bent on committing a great sin to be satisfied with a less. This is denied by those who defend the above doctrine. And reasonably so, for it is a good action to persuade another to do less evil than he was bent upon doing. To lessen evil is surely to do good. This is the more probable view, according to St Alphonsus.¹

¹ Theol. Mor., 2, n. 57.

I. Notion. Scandal is a work which gives one's neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin, and is placed without sufficient cause. It is said:

1. A work (or omission of a work), whether evil, as drunkenness; or bearing before itself the appearance of evil, as if, having been dispensed, you eat meat on a day of abstinence before those who are ignorant of the dispensation; or altogether right, as if you pray before impious persons who for that reason are about to break forth into blasphemies.¹

2. Which gives occasion. Hence it is not required that the work influence the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor in the manner of a cause; but it suffices that someone without sufficient cause place or omit an act, from which, once placed or omitted, the neighbor will take an occasion of sinning.

3. Of spiritual ruin, that is, of formal sin. And so it is not enough that the work placed gives an occasion only of material sin, of just indignation, of astonishment, or even of defamation of the one scandalizing; yet these often bring sins with them, for example of unjust anger, detraction, calumny, etc. Nor is scandal properly so called had - although one can sin against charity - when someone draws his neighbor back from a more perfect act or from a good not prescribed.

4. And is placed without sufficient cause; this must be added because for a proportionate cause it is lawful to place a work which will give an occasion of the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor: in which case the work placed is not called scandal; these things will be explained more fully in n. 550.

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, Dissertations morales, 1st series, L'espece morale du scandale.

II. Division. Scandal is distinguished:¹

1. By reason of intention, into direct and indirect, according as the sin of one's neighbor is intended or (without sufficient cause) merely permitted. Direct scandal is subdivided into diabolical and simply intended, according as the sin of one's neighbor is intended formally as sin - or insofar as it is the evil of one's neighbor or an offense of God - or under another aspect, that is, insofar as it serves the advantage or pleasure of the one scandalizing.

2. By reason of efficacy, into causal and occasional. It is causal when the one scandalizing (morally) causes the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor, for example by persuading, by commanding sin. It is occasional when the one scandalizing merely gives the neighbor an opportunity of sinning; this can happen both by a positive act, as by blaspheming, and by omission of an act, as by neglecting the precepts of the Church (n. 551).

It is disputed whether example should be reckoned with causal or occasional scandal. Now example of itself is not a (moral) cause of the sin of one's neighbor, because of itself it does not involve the character of counsel (St. Alphonsus, II, 44, 40); by accident, namely with the circumstances considered, it can take on a character of this kind; as if you know that others are waiting to see what you are going to do, with the intention that they may follow your example.

Note. A work which gives an occasion of the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor is customarily called active scandal; but the spiritual ruin itself, or the sin of the neighbor, is passive scandal. The latter is called scandal of the weak, if it follows from active scandal on account of the ignorance or frailty of the neighbor; if it follows on account of mere malice, it is called pharisaical.

¹ Some distinguish scandal otherwise, or at least take the distinct species in a different sense. Other divisions seem superfluous and to entangle the matter uselessly.

III. Morality; concerning this, the quality and quantity, or gravity, of the malice which is present in scandal must be explained.

1. The quality of the malice. a) Every scandal, that is, both causal and occasional, is opposed to charity. For charity forbids that I become for my neighbor the cause or (without sufficient reason) the occasion of evil, a fortiori of such an evil as spiritual ruin is (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 43, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, II, 45).

b) Scandal besides is opposed to the virtue for the violation of which it gives an occasion, as follows:

a) This must be affirmed of causal scandal; for it is clear that he who (morally) causes another's evil act is guilty of the malice of the act.

b) The same seems, against many, to have to be said of occasional scandal; for one who cooperates in an evil act, in whatever way this happens, seems of himself guilty of the malice in which he cooperates. But occasional scandal involves some cooperation in another's evil act, insofar, namely, as it gives an occasion to it (St. Alphonsus, II, 45). If the intention of seducing another is added, all affirm it.

c) The sin of occasional scandal, opposed to the virtue violated by one's neighbor, seems to differ in species from the sin of the neighbor himself. For it is one thing to violate a virtue indirectly, another directly; but occasional scandal is indirectly opposed to the obligation of the virtue, while the sin of the neighbor is directly opposed to it. Yet they are of the same higher species or of the same genus. But causal scandal does not differ in species from the sin of the neighbor, because both are directly opposed to the obligation of the virtue.

Note. Although he is guilty of injustice who is only an occasion - not a cause - for another of stealing, nevertheless he is not bound to restitution, because an onerous obligation, such as restitution is, does not arise except from the fact that I have been the cause of injustice, or at least, as many admit, have given the occasion with that intention that another inflict harm on one's neighbor; these things will be explained more fully in the treatise on justice.

2. The gravity of the malice. a) Scandal, insofar as it is opposed to charity, is a grave sin from its genus. This is clear from Sacred Scripture: "Woe to that man through whom scandal comes."¹ Likewise from what has been said about the violation of charity in general (n. 282). It is only a light sin: 1. if the act placed influences the sin of one's neighbor only lightly; 2. if an occasion of light sin is given; and this holds even if the light ruin of the neighbor is intended (St. Alphonsus, II, 44, 20). Yet if the light sin is intended precisely as an offense of God, there is an affection toward God that is gravely evil.

b) Scandal, insofar as it is opposed to the virtue for the violation of which it gives an occasion, is generally grave or light according as the act of the one scandalized is gravely or lightly evil. I have said generally, because a light influence of itself involves only a light sin.

Corollary I. An act can contain light or no malice from its nature and grave malice by reason of scandal; as if a priest were to walk about manifestly half-drunk. Likewise an act grave in itself can contain only a light malice of scandal, as if someone were to sin before those who are moved only lightly thereby.

Corollary II. He seems guilty of grave scandal who gives an occasion of grave sin: 1. to him who is already actually prepared for such a sin, as if someone consents to one seducing him;² 2. to him who is habitually prepared for such a sin or for any sin of the same species, as if someone seeks intercourse from a prostitute or divination from a diviner. The reason is that he gives an occasion for an increase of grave malice, which seems grave; namely, "through the external work something of malice is added; because then the malice of the will itself is increased. For which reason, although, speaking speculatively, the opinion of the Thomists is more probable, in practice we nevertheless say that, from things commonly occurring, the malice of the will is always increased through the external act, on account of its greater complacency, effort, duration, etc." (St. Alphonsus, II, 47). There is added, with respect to him who is habitually prepared to sin, that here and now he again sins actually and commits another sin numerically. Thus St. Alphonsus and others, against others who judge that in the cases posited the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor is not notably increased.

Corollary III. One who induces his neighbor to sin is not bound to confess the circumstance of induction, since it is only an aggravating circumstance within the same species; in other words, both the one inducing and - according to what has been said under Corollary II - more probably even the one consenting are guilty of grave scandal; yet the scandal of the one inducing is graver (St. Alphonsus, II, 46).

¹ Matthew 18:7.

² The sin of the one consenting is rather referred to cooperation (n. 545).

IV. Causes excusing from scandal, or rather causes for giving occasion to passive scandal, that is, to the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor.

1. An occasion cannot be given to passive scandal without cause; but it can be given for a proportionate cause. It is said:

a) An occasion cannot be given to passive scandal without cause. For charity of itself requires that I hinder my neighbor's evil, much less does it permit that I give him an occasion of it.

b) But it can be given for a proportionate cause, because charity does not oblige with a proportionate inconvenience. Now a graver cause is required:

1. The more the action has the appearance of evil; likewise it is more easily lawful to place an act altogether right than one which is evil in appearance or in reality.

2. The graver the sin is which will follow.

3. The more certainly it will follow.

4. The more numerous those are who will suffer scandal (St. Alphonsus, II, 49).

If the act to be placed has only the appearance of evil, or gives an occasion of sin on account of the neighbor's ignorance alone, the appearance of evil or the ignorance, if it can conveniently be done, should be removed, for example by admonishing the neighbor about the lawfulness of the act. If afterwards he is nevertheless scandalized, the scandal for the most part can be regarded as pharisaical.

2. Sometimes an occasion must be given to passive scandal, namely if someone, in order to avoid scandal, would have to omit what is necessary by necessity of means, or do what is intrinsically evil, or omit what, all things considered, urges more gravely (St. Alphonsus, II, 51).

V. General resolutions. 1. Works prescribed by positive law must not be omitted or deferred on account of pharisaical scandal.

On account of scandal of the weak there certainly is no obligation if someone or some persons are foreseen only in confusion as going to suffer scandal. If a determinate person is foreseen as going to be scandalized, likewise the obligation is lacking if, in order that scandal be prevented, the precept would have to be neglected frequently, or if in a particular case a special reason occurs for fulfilling the precept. If the precept would neither have to be neglected more frequently, nor would a special reason for fulfilling it here and now be present, the matter is disputed; but St. Alphonsus holds as sufficiently probable that not even then is there an obligation, although in that case neglect of the precept is advised (II, 51). Yet if the precept, for example the hearing of Mass, can equally conveniently be deferred or fulfilled elsewhere, this - namely the deferral of hearing Mass or the hearing of Mass elsewhere - must be done, but only under light obligation, if there is question of pharisaical scandal.

2. Works of mere counsel must not be omitted on account of pharisaical scandal; more easily, but under light obligation only, they should sometimes be deferred.

On account of scandal of the weak there is not - as we have said about precepts - an obligation of omitting or deferring them, if the scandal is foreseen only in confusion; if the scandal of a determinate person is foreseen, likewise there is no obligation if, for preventing scandal, the counsel would have to be neglected or deferred more frequently, or if a special reason for fulfilling the counsel here and now, for example for receiving Communion, were at hand. Outside these cases there is an obligation (St. Alphonsus, II, 50).

3. Indifferent works which do not contain the appearance of evil, of themselves must be omitted or deferred somewhat more often than good works, if however there is question of the scandal of a determinate person. Some apply almost the same to acts only venially evil, for example to women's adornment that is not notably dishonorable; but such things by reason of scandal must of themselves simply be omitted under light obligation: moreover those who would introduce such a custom would easily sin gravely (n. 550).

4. Temporal goods must not be given up on account of pharisaical scandal (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 43, a. 8; St. Alphonsus, II, 52). Hence someone is not bound to pay more than is fair to a workman who is going to blaspheme; nor should a parish priest remit stole fees on account of detractions that will follow.

For avoiding scandal of the weak, likewise there is no obligation of undergoing a grave loss of goods; the opposite must be said of a light loss (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

VI. Particular resolutions. The following are guilty of grave scandal:

1. Those who have a custom of blaspheming.

2. Those who speak very filthy things, especially if this happens before younger persons or persons of a different sex. A milder judgment must be made about immodest jokes among married persons and ruder persons (St. Alphonsus, III, 426).

3. Those who compose, print, circulate, or sing truly filthy songs.

4. Those who compose, print, etc., notably filthy or impious plays; likewise actors and actresses and others who cooperate in such plays (St. Alphonsus, III, 428); likewise dancers of scenic dances in which, on account of the dancers' dress, obscene manners of dancing, or lascivious gestures, the greatest turpitude appears.

5. Those who sculpt, paint, or represent by photograph very filthy statues or images; likewise those who represent obscene things by the help of a lifelike instrument, such as a stereoscope, cinematograph, or bioscope; likewise those who expose things of this kind in gardens, a workshop, a house, to the sight of all (St. Alphonsus, II, 56; Hom. Ap., tr. 4, n. 8); likewise makers and sellers of women's clothing or adornment who publicly expose models adorned in such a way that they are gravely offensive.

6. Those who compose, publish, print, circulate books, newspapers, or other writings notably opposed to religion or good morals; likewise booksellers, or any others, who sell books or newspapers of this kind to anyone, or procure them to be read, and thus spread the poison of souls; likewise those who in libraries erected for lending books expose poisonous works for the use of all; likewise those who introduce into schools a pernicious method of teaching or dangerous little books; likewise those who hand over to children books which, although not evil in themselves, treat of matter whose knowledge for them, on account of their natural innocence and sensitivity, is thought to be gravely offensive.¹

7. Husbands who retain at home a maidservant suspected by the wife not without reason; likewise wives who, by admitting their pretty lovers to familiar conversations, are an offense to their husbands and to others, as experience teaches; likewise clerics who, by visiting or not dismissing a person suspected by the people, give an occasion of sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt of the clerical state, at least if the suspicion of the people is founded on the morals of the person retained or on known excessive familiarity.²

8. Parents and other superiors who blaspheme before their children or commit other grave sins, or neglect grave duties of a Christian person; likewise those who, without grave cause and without precautions having been applied, send them to dangerous schools or permit them other occasions and dangers, such as solitary conversations with lovers and betrothed persons.

9. Daughters and maidservants of tavern-keepers who behave rather loosely before everyone, commonly permitting kisses and embraces.

10. Women and girls who use truly dishonorable dress. But this - since indeed the question is very current - let us explain more fully. Now:

a) Dress, with our matter considered, can be distinguished as threefold: honorable, indecent, and dishonorable or lascivious.

Honorable dress is that which, with the circumstances of places considered, in no way or scarcely excites to lust; as if nothing or only a small part of the breast is bared, and the garments are lowered at least below the knees.

Indecent dress is that which, with the circumstances of places considered, lightly or moderately excites to lust; as if the whole upper part of the breast, or a notable part of it, is bared, or the garments reach only to the knees.

Dishonorable dress is that which, with the circumstances of places considered, gravely provokes to lust; as if the breasts are wholly or partly bared, or are covered only with a transparent covering, or the garments do not even reach to the knees,³ or are fitted to the body in such a way that almost the entire form of the body is displayed.

b) Not only those who use dishonorable dress, but also those who introduce indecent dress, are guilty of grave scandal, if from a custom of this kind introduced the spiritual ruin of many is imminent.

c) Women, in church or outside church, while they assist at sacred rites, should be with the head covered and modestly dressed, especially when they approach the Lord's table (can. 1262, § 2); these things should be extended to Catholic gatherings, whether religious or social.

d) Dress not only dishonorable, but even indecent, must be earnestly restrained and uprooted by preachers and confessors, as far as this can be done. This also holds with respect to boys and girls, who thus lose natural modesty; and this must be urged all the more because indecent and dishonorable dress is today promoted by deliberate effort.

Corollary I. It is lawful for women and girls, provided propriety or honorableness is preserved, to dress themselves and adorn themselves in an elegant manner, whether so that they may please their husband more, or, if there is question of girls of marriageable age, so that they may arrive at an honorable marriage, or so that they may present themselves fittingly according to their condition. If they act thus from vanity, they sin lightly; if with that intention that they provoke men or young men to lust, they sin gravely (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, II, 54, 55; III, 425).

Corollary II. If someone uses the clothing of the other sex, "of itself it is not a grave sin... and sometimes none, if a just cause is present, for example for hiding oneself. But it could be grave from the circumstances of danger of lust or scandal" (St. Alphonsus, II, 52; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 2, ad 3). These things you may also apply to the use of masks.

11. Finally, those introducing a manner of acting, for example women's adornment, as has already been noted, or amusements, which although they are not truly dishonorable, are nevertheless going to become for many an occasion of grave sins, are guilty of grave scandal (St. Alphonsus, II, 55).

¹ Konings, Theol. Mor., n. 295.

² Konings, loc. cit.

³ I do not speak of girls of lesser age, although this custom too cannot be approved.

VII. Special resolutions. 1. It is lawful for a just cause and for a good end deliberately to permit or not remove, indeed even by an indifferent act deliberately to place, an occasion of sinning; since it is right for a just cause to permit an evil effect (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 62, a. 3, ad 4; St. Alphonsus, II, 58). Hence, for example, "it is lawful for a master not to remove from sons or servants an occasion of stealing, when nevertheless he knows them to be inclined and prepared to steal, so that, having thus been detected, they may be punished and come to their senses" (St. Alphonsus, II, 58). Yet it is not lawful to intend the sin of one's neighbor; hence it is illicit to give an occasion of sinning for this sole or primary end, that the delinquent be punished; it is lawful for this end, that the one punished be amended, or that a test of the subject's probity be taken, for example by exposing money or leaving a key in a chest.

2. It is lawful, on account of a cause of necessity or notable utility, to seek something from someone who can provide it without sin, although it is foreseen that he will provide it with sin, for example a loan from a usurer, an oath from one about to swear falsely (if you suppose that a private person can have a grave cause for seeking it), a sacrament from a sinful priest. The reason is that in the hypothesis posited, the sin follows upon your petition for a lawful thing from the malice of the neighbor alone, so that it is not caused by you, but only an occasion is given to him; this is right to do for a proportionate cause. Now this is more easily lawful the more either the other is prepared for such a sin, or you have a right to the work sought (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 78, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, II, 47, 49, 77, 79, 80). If someone is prepared for any such sin whatsoever, according to many any reasonable cause suffices that I seek from another an action which he can provide without sin, although he is not going to provide it without sin. But since in this case there seems to be question of grave scandal (n. 548), the aforesaid opinion seems to have to be rejected (St. Alphonsus, II, 47).

3. It is more probable that it is lawful to persuade one determined to a graver sin to a lesser evil, or that he commit a lesser rather than a greater sin; for example, that he merely mutilate someone rather than kill him, steal less rather than more, steal from a rich man rather than from a poor man. And this holds even if the lesser evil is not a sin of the same genus, and is included in the greater neither formally nor virtually. Hence it is lawful, for example, to persuade someone determined to homicide that he rather commit adultery. The reason is that in this case, strictly speaking, not evil but the lessening of evil - which is good - is being advised (St. Alphonsus, II, 57).

Yet it is disputed whether it is lawful to persuade someone that he violate the strict right of a determinate third party, rather than commit another graver sin; for example, that he steal rather from Peter the rich man than from another poor man, that he rather violate the maidservant than the wife of Paul, etc. Now with St. Alphonsus (III, 565) and others,¹ it seems this must be denied. For it is not lawful for me to violate the right of one person in order to avert harm from another. But he who persuades someone to violate the right of a third party, himself also violates the right of the third party. Make an exception with St. Alphonsus (loc. cit.) if the former would be cast by the loss into extreme necessity: in which case, by persuading someone that he steal rather, for example, from Peter the rich man, I would not violate this man's right.

It is asked whether it ought to be clear from words or circumstances that the lesser evil is being advised as lesser, or as impeding the greater. It seems this must be affirmed, because otherwise the persuader, although he intends the lessening of evil, nevertheless in reality advises, not that the other lessen the sin, but that he sin.

¹ Lugo, De iust., disp. 19, n. 54; Sanchez, De Matr., l. 7, disp. 11, n. 24 sq.; Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., n. 799; Sweens, Inst. theol. de virt. card. iust., n. 325.

VIII. Reparation of scandal. 1. There is an obligation of repairing scandal, or: 1. of destroying the further influence of the scandal given, if this is feared; 2. of procuring the amendment of the one scandalized. This obligation indeed is greater in the one scandalizing, that is, in the author of the harm, than in others who have not given an occasion of spiritual ruin.

2. The obligation of repairing scandal is an obligation of charity if someone by example alone or persuasion gave an occasion of sin; if he did this by fear or fraud, an obligation of justice is added (St. Alphonsus, III, 662).

3. The mode by which scandal can and must be repaired will depend on the character of the scandal given, on the mode in which it was given, whether publicly or privately, and finally on the qualities of the one scandalizing and the one scandalized. Moreover, scandal given publicly must be repaired publicly. Hence:

a) One who gave scandal to others through wicked counsels still effective must, as far as he can, render them ineffective by diligent revocation, to be made known to the same persons either by himself or through another.

b) A father of a family who scandalized the household is ordinarily bound, in order to repair the scandal, if it is still judged effective, to manifest to the same household his displeasure over his evil example, and to exhort them paternally not to follow it in the future.

c) One who by false doctrine seduced others in matters of faith or morals is bound to revoke the error, even if the one seduced did not sin formally; because he still inflicted a grave injury, to which great harm is not rarely attached.

d) An evil author who has corrupted many by heretical, impious, or obscene books is bound by a public writing and other opportune means, insofar as he morally can, to retract his depraved writings and to impede their further diffusion.

e) A public concubinarian, after first abandoning his filthy commerce, should publicly approach the sacraments.

f) Ordinary scandals for the most part are sufficiently removed by that general reparation which is contained in the very cessation from scandal, in the offering of good example, in prayer for the one scandalized, and similar things.²

¹ Aertnys-Damen, Theol. Mor., I, n. 344.

² Konings, Theol. Mor., n. 301.

Scandal.—Scandal is derived from a Greek word signifying a snare or trap prepared for an enemy, or a stone or block laid in the road that he may stumble or trip over it. In use, it is applied in a wide or general sense, and in a strict or special sense. (a) In its wide sense, it refers to any kind of harm, especially of a spiritual or moral nature, that one brings on others. (b) In its strict sense, it refers to a fall into sin which one occasions for others by misconduct.

The following are some examples of the word “scandal” as employed in its wide sense: (a) It is used to signify physical or natural injuries of various kinds. Thus, the servants of Pharaoh called the plagues brought on Egypt by Moses a scandal (Exod., x. 7), and the Psalmist says of the sinner that he laid a scandal (calamity) against his brother (Ps. xlix. 20). Those who spread defamatory gossip are called scandal-mongers, and “scandal” often signifies opprobrium or disgrace, as when Shakespeare speaks of the wrangling of nobles as a scandal to the crown. (b) The word “scandal” is also used to signify moral injuries distinct from inducement to sin. Thus, the shock and offense given to virtuous persons by blasphemous language spoken in their hearing is described as a scandal, and one who would prevent another from following some more perfect course or practice to which there is no obligation (such as entering religion, saying grace at meals, etc.), is sometimes said to scandalize.

Definition of Scandal.—In the strict sense, scandal is defined as “any conduct that has at least the appearance of evil and that offers to a neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin.”

(a) By conduct is understood external behavior or manner of acting in the presence of others. Thus, scandal differs from sin, for sin is committed, not only by external acts done before others, but also by internal thoughts and desires and external acts that are secret.

(b) Scandal is conduct which is evil at least in appearance, that is, sinful, or from the circumstances seemingly sinful. Thus, an act is not scandalous, if it is morally indifferent or a less good, and is perceivable as being such.

(c) Scandal tends to spiritual ruin, that is, to a fall into sin, great or small. Here scandal strictly understood differs from scandal in the wide senses given in the previous paragraph.

(d) Scandal is an occasion of a fall into sin, that is, it sets an example of sin before the attention, and thus suggests to the will that the will imitate the sin. Scandal is not, however, the cause of sin, for a person causes his own sin in yielding consent to the suggestion offered by scandal.

(e) Scandal is to another. A person may be said to scandalize himself in the sense that by his looks or acts he puts himself in an occasion of sin (Matt., v. 29, 30), or inasmuch as he maliciously makes the acts of a virtuous neighbor an occasion of sin; but scandal is more properly understood of an occasion of sin prepared for one’s neighbor.

Causes of Scandal.—There are various divisions of scandal according to the kinds of external acts. (a) There is scandal in words, as profane language or calumnies spoken in a gathering of people. (b) There is scandal in acts, as when one is perceptibly drunk or fights in a city street. Scandal applies also to things, in so far as they are the result of acts or related to acts, such as disedifying books, pictures, dress. Thus, one gives scandal by having sinful objects on display, such as profane mottoes on one’s wall, obscene advertisements or announcements on one’s billboards. (c) There also may be scandal in omission, as when one is conspicuously absent from Mass on Sundays.

The following kinds of sinful acts are not scandalous, for they are unknown to others, and hence cannot suggest sin: (a) internal acts, such as wicked thoughts, desires, emotions; (b) external acts concealed from others, such as inaudible profanity, intoxication not noticeable by others, omission of an obligatory penance about which others have no knowledge.

There are, likewise, various divisions of scandal according to the internal purpose of the scandalizer. (a) Scandal is directly intentional, when the purpose of the scandalizer is to lead others to the guilt of sin (diabolical scandal). Example: Titus blasphemes religion before Caius in order that the latter may become irreligious, and thus be more easily persuaded to follow a life of crime. (b) Scandal is indirectly intentional when the purpose of the scandalizer is to perform some action whose nature is such that it will lead others to the guilt of sin, and he is determined to perform that action, although not directly willing the neighbor’s guilt that will result. Example: Titus does not like to see his children drunk, but he likes to get drunk himself occasionally, knowing all the while that his example encourages them to drink.

In the following cases there is no intention of scandal: (a) when one does an act that has no appearance of evil, and one neither directly nor indirectly wills that it should be an occasion of sin to anyone. Example: Balbus performs his duties faithfully, although he knows to his regret that his fidelity occasions envy and hatred in Claudius; (b) when one does an act that is evil or apparently evil, but is invincibly ignorant of the scandal it may give. Example: Sempronius and Titus converse together in a foreign tongue which they confidently think Caius does not understand. The conversation is disedifying, and Caius, who does understand, is shocked by what they say.

The act of the scandalizer who intends, directly or indirectly, the spiritual ruin of his neighbor, is called active scandal, while the act of the person who takes occasion from the active scandal to incur spiritual ruin, is called passive scandal. Active and passive scandal are sometimes together, sometimes apart. (a) Thus, there is both active and passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his neighbor, and the scandalized does fall. (b) There is active but not passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his neighbor, but the latter does not fall into the snare. (c) There is passive but not active scandal, when one makes the good action rightly performed by another an occasion of sin. Thus, some made the life and passion of our Lord a pretext for not accepting Him (Matt., xiii. 57; John, vi. 62; I Cor., i. 23), and are said to have been scandalized at Him.

As to the act that occasions the spiritual ruin of another, it must be wrong either in reality or in appearance. (a) The scandalous act is wrong in reality, when it is forbidden as a sin—for example, offering sacrifice in the temple of an idol, or diverting to personal use money collected for the poor. (b) The scandalous act is wrong in appearance, when on account of circumstances it seems to be an act forbidden as a sin. Thus, to take part in a banquet held in a pagan temple might seem like participation in sacrificial rites (I Cor., viii. 10), to expend secretly the money collected for the poor might have the appearance of improper use of funds (II Cor., viii. 20, 21). Hence, St. Paul directs; “From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves” (I Thess., v. 22).

The acts wrong in reality or in appearance that give scandal are innumerable, since the whole world is seated in wickedness (I John, v. 19). But today there are a number of acts that should be specially mentioned, as they occasion sin oftener or for more persons than other acts. Among these are: (a) occasions of sin against faith, such as atheistical literature, as discussed in the section on faith; (b) occasions of sin against morals, such as obscenity in dress, pictures, plays, writings, and dances. These last-mentioned will be discussed now in separate paragraphs.

Obscenity.—Obscenity is a quality of words, acts or objects by which impure thoughts are conveyed, or impure desires or actions suggested. We may consider it either internally (i.e., in the intention of the person who uses the words, acts or objects) or externally (i.e., in the nature of the things themselves which are used).

(a) Thus, internal obscenity, or the will to use what will corrupt the minds and morals of others, is of course a mortal sin. If the intention is to deprave another, the guilt of direct scandal is incurred; if the intention is only to satisfy one’s own wish to use the sinful words, acts or objects, the guilt is that of indirect scandal. Thus, a woman who dresses fashionably in order to excite impure love is guilty of direct scandal; if she dresses immodestly, not to excite impure love, but to follow a fashion, she is guilty of indirect scandal.

(b) External obscenity is the tendency of words, acts or objects themselves to call up impure images in the mind, or to excite impure desires or actions in those to whom they are presented. The use of such words, acts, etc., is therefore a mortal sin. For, if the thing said or done is wrong in itself (such as obscene language), it is a scandalous sin against purity, if it is wrong on account of those who will be influenced (such as a talk on sex matters to immature or weak persons), it is a sin of scandal. Hence, a good or even religious motive (such as instruction, refutation of error, health, or mysticism) does not excuse the employment of what is clearly obscene, for the end does not justify the means.

It is not always easy to determine in particular cases when a thing is obscene from its very nature, but the following general rules can be given:

(a) Pictures, statues and other images are obscene, when they represent scenes of immoral or sexual acts, or lascivious attitudes or postures; also, when they represent nude or partly nude human figures, ut quando depinguntur verenda adultorum vel pectora aut partes minus honestae mulierum.

(b) Female dress or adornment is lascivious, when there is a notable display of the person through abbreviated skirts, necks, and sleeves; or a suggestiveness expressed in transparency of material or a closeness of fit that brings out the lines and curves of the figure; or in an extremity of fashion whose striking color or design will make the wearer conspicuous and direct special attention to her physical charms.

(c) Plays on the stage or moving picture screen are obscene by reason of the lesson taught (as when purity is derided or impurity condoned), by reason of the thing represented (as when the main theme is impurity, or when acts of impurity are represented or suggested, or when sexual passion is emphasized), or by reason of the players (as when they are noted for immorality, or when their dress is indecent, or their language objectionable).

(d) Dances are obscene in themselves when the postures, movements, or contact of the dancers is indecent; they are obscene by reason of the dancers, when these are indecently attired. Public dance halls, cabarets, road houses, and night clubs—where there is no supervision and young girls come unattended to dance until late hours with men unknown to them, and where there is intoxication and boisterousness—are the natural haunts of the obscene dance, but it may be found even in more respectable places.

(e) Books or other writings contain obscenity When they inculcate or recommend impure acts, or advise how these may be committed; when they treat sins of impurity or narrate immoral facts or stories in such a manner as to make vice seem alluring or pardonable to the intended reader; when an erotic composition by language, allusions, details, sympathetic treatment, etc., gives prominence to animal passion.

As is stated elsewhere (see 1461 sqq.), scandal is not given unless the persons affected by one’s conduct are susceptible to evil influence. Hence, there is no obscenity when on account of circumstances there is no suggestion of evil in things which under other conditions would be immoral and seductive.

(a) Images of the nude in the studio of an artist, and anatomical charts, figures or illustrations in a book intended for the instruction of medical men, are not classed as obscene, since the persons for whom they are made are supposed to be so much under the influence of the esthetic or scientific principles of their professions that no harm will be taken.

(b) The obscenity of dress is largely dependent on its novelty, for things that are usual cease to excite special attention. This we can see from the fact that styles that are conservative today would have been extreme ten years ago. And so the scanty attire of hot countries, the dress of the bathing beach, and the moderate decollete tolerated in private gatherings are not obscene in their own proper times and places.

(c) Plays which contain gross or unseemly expressions or passages are not therefore obscene, if in the main they uphold decency and morality; otherwise, we should have to regard as immoral even the classic drama. Newman says of Shakespeare: “Often as he may offend against modesty, he is clear of a worse charge, sensuality, and hardly a passage can be instanced in all that he has written to seduce the imagination or to excite the passions.” It is a simple matter to omit from plays of this kind the word or phrase that is offensive to modern ears or to the innocence of youth.

(d) The fact that some individuals find all dancing a strong stimulus to impure passion does not prove that every dance is obscene. Some types of dance, it is true, might be rightly called “the devil’s march”; other dances, named after various animals, may also be suggestive. But there are also standard types of dance in which many experience not temptation, but innocent pastime, and which have also physical, esthetic and social values.

(e) To books and other writings should be applied what was said about plays, namely, that they are not to be classed as obscene on account of isolated passages unsuited for the reading of children or other susceptible persons, or excitable to prurient or impure minds. Even the Bible may seem objectionable to a prude, and the indecent will go through its pages with a fine-tooth comb in the search for indecent matter; but public opinion will rightly class as a lunatic the person who would endeavor to have the Bible rated as obscene.

Persons Who Give Scandal on Account of Obscenity.—(a) In case of obscene pictures or statues, scandal is given by the artists, painters, sculptors or others who make the images, and by the responsible persons who place them in museums, galleries, parks or other places to which there is general admission.

(b) As regards female dress, the guilty parties are proximately the wearers, but remotely and principally the designers and society leaders who impose their will in making the fashions dangerous and in causing one extreme mode to follow quickly upon another.

(e) With respect to obscene plays, the scandal is given by playwrights, managers, actors and actresses, and those who patronize or applaud them. The public itself and the civil authorities share in the guilt, when they supinely tolerate the degradation of the stage and the corruption of morals.

(d) In the case of obscene dances, the givers of scandal are the proprietors of resorts where the dances are held, the musicians and singers (especially when the songs themselves are obscene), and the dancers, spectators and other patrons.

(e) In the case of salacious publications or writings, authors, publishers, printers, vendors, and the reading public share responsibility for the scandal. Government censorship of the press is not desirable, but government suppression of obscenity has always been the policy of countries of English origin. The private citizen, then, is not free of guilt if he takes no interest even when he sees piles of indecent magazines, pictures, etc., being sold openly on the newsstands. Canon Law (Canon 1404) forbids booksellers to sell, lend, or keep books that deal ex professo with obscenity, though there is no objection to expurgated editions, as in the case of classical works.

Results of Scandal.—The spiritual ruin occasioned by scandal is sin.

(a) Thus, formal or material sin may be the result of scandal. Example: Titus blasphemed before a boy who did not understand the meaning of the word and before a youth who did understand, with the result that both repeated the same blasphemy. Thus, the scandal given by Titus produced material sin in the boy and formal sin in the youth.

(b) Mortal sin or venial sin may be the result of scandal, just as a stone in the road may cause either a fall or a stumble.

(c) Sin of the same species or sin of a different species from that committed by the scandal-giver may be the result of scandal. Thus, a calumny spoken against a neighbor may induce a hearer either to repeat the calumny, or to imitate the act imputed by the calumniator, or to give up religion.

(d) Sin already committed by the person scandalized or sin which is new to him, sin he had in mind to commit or sin he had not contemplated—any one of these results suffice for scandal. Example: It is scandal to recall to drunkenness by bad example a person who had reformed, or by bad example to bring back to another’s mind and desire a sin on which he was once resolved.

Scandal resembles solicitation and complicity, since like them it exercises an evil influence on others; but it is not identical with them.

(a) Thus, solicitation influences another to evil by counsel, persuasion, command, or invitation; scandal may influence to evil either in these ways or by mere example. Again, solicitation does not necessarily intend the fall of another into guilt, as does scandal. Thus, one may solicit another to get drunk who had already determined to get drunk, or one may persuade another that drunkenness is no sin, and then solicit him to drunkenness. But, if one who intends the demoralization and corruption of his neighbor solicits him to drunkenness, solicitation is joined with scandal.

(b) Complicity or cooperation influences another to evil by helping him in the commission of sin; scandal influences him to evil by suggesting that he commit sin. Example: Titus, an elderly man, gets drunk or praises drunkards in the presence of Balbus, a youth. Influenced by these acts and words, Balbus tells his acquaintance Claudius that he intends to get drunk, and Claudius supplies him with the intoxicants. Titus is guilty of scandal, Claudius of cooperation.

The persons before whom disedifying words, deeds or omissions are done, are of two classes. (a) Persons apt to be scandalized are those who are not experienced either in vice (especially that to which the disedifying example would lead), or in virtue (especially the opposite virtue); for such persons are readily subject to bad influence. Thus, young persons Whose character is yet unformed, the ignorant and well-meaning persons who are weak, are peculiarly disposed to be led astray by example. (b) Persons not apt to be scandalized are those who are habitually so bad or so good that anything disedifying done before them is not calculated to influence their attitude towards evil.

May a person hold himself guiltless of scandal, therefore, because his wrongdoing was committed before those who are not apt to be scandalized?

(a) If he is certain that the witnesses will not be weakened morally on his account, and if he does not intend their fall, he is free of the guilt of scandal. Thus, if one blasphemes in the presence of a lady renowned for piety, or of a rough crowd of men whose daily talk is interspersed with blasphemies, it is practically sure that no scandal is given.

(b) If a person is not certain that the witnesses will suffer no moral harm through his example, he cannot hold himself as not guilty of scandal. For, no matter how good or how bad the witnesses may appear to him, they may not be as fixed in character as he thinks, and his misconduct may be the starting point for them of a downward course or of a more rapid descent into evil. Generally speaking, there is this uncertainty about the influence of bad example, for the reading of character is no easy matter, and many sins are internal.

There are two cases especially, when even the very good may become bad or the very bad become worse through force of evil example: (a) when the sin committed is from its nature very alluring. Sic auctores censent vix fieri posse quin in materia luxuriae malum exemplum peccati motus cieat; (b) the second case is when the authority of the one who gives scandal is great. For the fact that he sides with or seems to side with evil, will demoralize the good and encourage the wicked in wrongdoing.

Passive scandal (see 1452), that is, the spiritual fall consequent on the example of another, is of two kinds: (a) scandal given, which is a fall into sin occasioned by conduct really disedifying, as when a youth becomes drunk because he has seen his elders intoxicated; (b) scandal taken, which is a fall into sin occasioned by conduct irreproachable in itself, but wrongly interpreted, either out of malice (Pharisaic scandal), or out of ignorance or frailty (scandal of little ones). The Pharisees were scandalized at our Lord’s dining with sinners, because they themselves were unmerciful (Matt., ix. 11 sqq.), and the weak brethren at Corinth were scandalized at the eating of certain meats, because their consciences were tender (I Cor., xi. 23 sqq.).

Sinfulness of Scandal.—(a) Scandal in the wide sense is not necessarily a sin. Thus, St. Peter acted out of love for his Master when he wished to dissuade Him from the Passion, but our Lord, in order to correct more vigorously the wrong ideas of Peter, called them a scandal (Matt., xvi. 23).

(b) Passive scandal is always a sin in the one who falls because of the conduct of another; but it does not always suppose that the conduct which occasioned the fall was a sin, as is clear from the remarks made above on Pharisaic scandal and the scandal of little ones.

(c) Active scandal is always a sin in the one whose conduct occasions the fall of another, since that conduct is either sinful, or has such an appearance of sin that it should have been omitted. But it does not always suppose a sin in the person who witnesses the scandal, for he may proceed without a fall in spite of the obstacle placed in his path.

Is scandal a distinct species of sin, or only a circumstance that may happen to any kind of sin?

(a) Passive scandal is not a special kind of sin. For the scandalized person may fall into any and every kind of sin, and the fact that example occasions his fall does not add any special or new opposition to the virtue against which he offends. Thus, he who breaks the fast because he saw others break the fast, is guilty of the same sin of intemperance as those who gave him scandal. But passive scandal may be an aggravating or an extenuating circumstance, aggravating if the scandal was taken, extenuating if the scandal was given.

(b) Active scandal, if it is only indirectly intentional (see 1450) and is offered by conduct evil in itself, is not a special sin. The reason is that in such scandal one does not specially intend the spiritual ruin of a neighbor, but only the satisfaction of one’s own desire. Thus, he who breaks the fast before others to satisfy his own appetite, does not directly wish the corruption of those others, and hence his sin is that of intemperance with the added circumstance of bad example.

(c) Active scandal, if it is only indirectly intentional and is offered by conduct not evil but evil-appearing, is reductively the special sin of scandal, For, since all active scandal is sinful, and in this case there is no other species of sin, the conduct not being really evil in itself, the sin in question must be reduced to scandal. Thus, one who is dispensed from the law of abstinence and who eats meat on a day of abstinence in the presence of others who know he is a Catholic but do not know he is dispensed, does not sin against temperance, but against edification. His sin is that of scandal only reductively, since he does not directly will the fall of others. There is also the circumstance that the law of abstinence may suffer as a result of the scandal.

(d) Active scandal, if it is directly intentional (see 1450), is directly also the special sin of scandal. For this kind of scandal directly intends the spiritual ruin of a neighbor, and so is directly opposed to a special good of another person and to the special charitable act of fraternal correction. Hence, a person who breaks the fast in order to lead his neighbor into a like transgression is guilty of both intemperance and scandal; he who to make his neighbor sin appears to break the fast, is guilty of scandal, but not of intemperance.

Practical Applications of the Preceding Paragraph to Confession.—(a) Species of Sins.—In case of passive scandal there is only one species of sin to be confessed, namely, the intemperance occasioned by bad example; in case of active scandal indirectly intended and offered by evil conduct, there is only one species of sin, namely, intemperance, with the circumstance of publicity or bad example; in case of active scandal indirectly intended and offered by evil-seeming conduct, there is only one species of sin, namely, scandal; in case of active scandal directly intended, there is only the species of scandal, if the conduct of the scandalizer is only evil-seeming, but there are several species of sin, if his conduct is really evil, namely, his own intemperance and the scandal he gives.

(b) Number of Sins.—As many sins of scandal are committed as there are persons present to be scandalized, for scandal is given to those present as individuals, not as parts of a group (see 219). Hence, one commits more scandals by being drunk on a public street than by being drunk with a roomful of companions; and by attacking religion before a large assembly than by attacking it before a small circle.

(c) Circumstances of Intention and Conduct.—Those who give bad example should confess especially the end and the means employed, for on these depends the important distinction between directly intentional and indirectly intentional scandal and the specific character of the sin committed, as explained in the preceding paragraph.

(d) Circumstance of Condition of the Persons Involved.—This should be mentioned in confessing scandal, if it adds a new malice. Thus, the fact that scandal is given by a superior bound by his office to give good example, adds to the violation of charity a violation of justice; the fact that the person whose ruin is intended is consecrated to God, or married, or a relative, adds to the malice of intentional scandal against chastity; the fact that a person is scandalized entirely against his will, makes the sin scandal rather than simple solicitation.

(e) Circumstance of the Result of Scandal.—The results of scandal should be confessed when they add a new malice to the sin or induce an obligation of restitution. This subject will be considered in the three following paragraphs.

Is the scandalizer guilty of the species of sin to which his conduct is calculated to lead the scandalized? (a) If the scandal is directly intentional, that is, if the scandalizer intends that some special sin or sins shall be committed by the one scandalized, the former is guilty in desire of that which he intends that the latter shall be guilty of in reality (cfr. 96, 102). Hence, if by calumniating clerics or religious or church members one intends that one’s listeners shall be induced to repeat these calumnies, or to do what the calumniated persons were said to do, or to abandon religion, one is guilty in desire of the particular sin or sins that one wills.

(b) If the scandal is only indirectly intentional, that is, if the scandalizer foresees but does not expressly will the fall of the scandalized (e.g., if he calumniates others to injure the calumniated and not those who hear the calumny), the matter is more difficult, and authorities differ in their opinions. Some moralists think that the scandalizer is guilty of the result he foresees, because he wills it interpretatively by offering the occasion for it. Others think that he is not guilty of the result foreseen, because he does not effect it, either in intention (for he does not desire it) or in reality (for he is not bound, except by charity, to prevent its accomplishment in others); he permits, but does not approve, the sin of his neighbor.

A practical application of the previous paragraph to confession may be made as follows: (a) those who are guilty of direct scandal must confess not only their own sin, but also the sin to which their conduct leads their neighbor; (b) those who are guilty of indirect scandal are not obliged, according to the second opinion given above, to confess the species of sin to which their conduct incited the beholder, and hence, if their conduct was only evil-seeming, it suffices for them to confess that they gave scandal.

Is the scandalizer responsible for the injuries to third parties resulting from the sins occasioned by his scandal?

(a) According to one opinion, he is bound to make his share of restitution for injustices occasioned by his own bad example, because it is admitted that he who counsels injustice is so bound, and example is more persuasive than words of counsel. Hence, one who steals from his employer before fellow-employees, and so brings on a custom of stealing among them, is bound to restore, not only what he took himself, but also a share of other losses not made good to the employer.

(b) According to the more common opinion, however, the scandalizer in the present case is not held to restitution, except as regards his own ill-gotten goods, even if there is question of scandal directly intended. For, either the scandalizer is not guilty of the injustice committed by the others, as not desiring it; or, at any rate, he is only the occasion, not the cause or cooperator in that injustice.

If scandal amounts to incitation or cooperation, the guilt of the neighbor’s sin and responsibility for injury the neighbor causes are incurred by the scandalizer.

(a) Thus, bad example may amount to incitation to sin, as when a person knows that others are directed to imitate him, and yet he gives them bad example. Even though he does not directly intend their fall into sin, he does intend his own conduct, while realizing that there is attached to it the circumstance that it is an invitation to sin; and hence it would seem that the guilt of this sin is also contracted.

(b) Bad example may amount to cooperation in sin, as when a person by his bad example shows others the way to commit sin, which they could not have learned without his example. Hence, if a person opens a safe to steal, knowing that other dishonest persons are observing in order to learn the combination and steal, it seems that to some extent he shares in the guilt and duty of restitution of the thieves who learn from him. There is no doubt that a defamer is bound to make reparation, not only before his immediate listeners, but also before others who have listened to them; for, by defaming before talkative persons, he virtually authorized them to spread his words.

The Gravity of the Sin of Scandal.—(a) From its nature all active scandal is a mortal sin. It turns man away from Christ (I Cor., viii. 12); it is spiritual murder, destructive of the souls of others, and so contrary to the mercy and brotherly correction required by charity (Rom, xiv. 15); it brings on oneself the wrath of God (Matt., xviii. 6), and on one’s family, friends and profession obloquy and disgrace.

(b) From the indeliberation of the act or from the smallness of the matter, active scandal may be venial, as will be seen in the following paragraph.

Mortal and Venial Scandal.—(a) Passive scandal is always a sin, mortal or venial according to the fall occasioned by the conduct witnessed. But mortal sin may be occasioned by venial sin, as when an inferior takes the liberty to blaspheme, because his superior used profane language; and venial sin may be occasioned by mortal sin, as when the blasphemy of an infidel provokes his neighbor to use profane language against the blasphemer.

(b) Active scandal indirectly intended is sometimes a venial sin, as when the scandalous conduct is only a venial sin, or is no sin but has the appearance of a slight sin; sometimes it is a mortal sin, as when the scandalous conduct is a mortal sin, or when a person so despises the spiritual welfare of his neighbor that he chooses to do an evil-seeming act that will cause the neighbor to fall into serious sin.

(c) Active scandal directly intended is sometimes a venial sin, as when a person intends by conduct venially sinful to lead a neighbor into venial sin; sometimes it is a mortal sin, as when one intends to lead one’s neighbor into mortal sin, or commits a mortal sin in order to lead one’s neighbor into venial sin.

Increase and decrease in gravity of scandal depends on the internal dispositions of the scandal-giver and the external influence he has on the person scandalized. (a) The internal factors on which the quantity of scandal depends are the amount of deliberation and the degree of intention. It is more serious to speak a scandalous word with premeditation than to speak it somewhat thoughtlessly; more scandalous to speak it when the hearer’s spiritual ruin is directly intended, than when that ruin is not directly intended. (b) The external factors on which the quantity of scandal depends are the amount of influence the bad example has and the character of the evil to which it leads. It is more serious to corrupt A, who would not otherwise have been corrupted, than to corrupt B, who would have been corrupted even without one’s bad example; it is more serious to cause another to commit mortal sin, than to cause him to commit venial sin.

Persons Scandalized.—Is it possible to scandalize people who are firmly rooted in virtue?

(a) If the question be understood of scandal in a wide sense, even the perfect may be scandalized. They may be shocked and horrified at the evil example they witness; they may be hindered from performing the external good works they desire to accomplish (I Thess., ii. 18). But these things do not hinder them internally, or separate them from the love of God (Rom., viii. 38, 39).

(b) If the question be understood of possibility in an absolute sense, even the perfect may suffer real scandal, that is, they may be influenced to sin on account of the example witnessed. Since they are not confirmed in grace in this life, it is not repugnant that they commit sin and lose grace.

(c) If the question be understood of possibility in a relative sense—that is, if we consider what we should expect in view of the character of perfect men, and what does usually happen—the perfect cannot be scandalized, since they are so firmly united to God that the sayings or doings, no matter of whom, cannot cause them to sin (Ps. cxxiv. 1, 2), although they may at times be disturbed thereby (Ps. lxxii. 2).

Duty of Avoiding Scandal.—At times it is impossible to avoid giving scandal, unless one surrenders some spiritual or temporal good. Hence, on this point there are two questions to be considered: (a) When is one obliged to surrender spiritual goods for the sake of avoiding scandal? (b) When is one obliged to surrender temporal goods for the sake of avoiding scandal?

As was said in the chapter on law (see 288 sqq.), the higher law has the preference in case of a conflict. Now, natural law itself requires that one avoid the scandal of the weak. Hence the following cases:

(a) Negative precepts of the natural law may not be contravened in order to avoid the scandal of the weak; for such contravention is necessarily sinful. Hence, one may not lie or commit perjury to prevent scandal.

(b) Affirmative precepts of the natural law should be contravened in order to avoid the scandal of the weak, but only when such scandal is a greater evil than the omission of the thing commanded. Thus, one should omit a fraternal correction or a punishment, if the one corrected would be made worse, or the punishment occasion a schism. But one may not neglect to help a person in extreme need because of scandal.

(c) Precepts of the divine law should be contravened on account of scandal of the weak, unless contravention of the law is a greater evil than permission of the scandal. Thus, the preaching of the Gospel is commanded by divine law, and yet it may be omitted to avoid scandal (Matt., vii. 6). Item integritas confessionis de jure divino est, et tamen poenitens deberet peccatum silere, si intelligeret confessarium cui ex necessitate confiteri deberet grave ex eo scandalum passurum. But it is not lawful to omit Baptism in order to avoid scandal to those who will be provoked to anger or blasphemy.

(d) Precepts of ecclesiastical law should be contravened, when otherwise there will arise a scandal of the weak which is a graver evil than the contravention of the precepts. Thus, a parish-priest should say Mass on Sunday, even though not fasting, if this is necessary in order to avoid great scandal among the people. A wife may omit Mass or a fast, in order to prevent her ignorant husband from using blasphemies or imprecations, or to avoid notable dissensions in the home. Puella quae scit juvenem infirmum ex suo aspectu scandalizari debet sacro omisso domi manere.

When Should Temporal Goods be Surrendered for the Sake of Avoiding Scandal.—(a) Temporal goods of which one is not the owner, but only the custodian or administrator, may not be surrendered at will on account of scandal; for no one has the right to give away the property of others. Hence, rulers in Church or State may not arbitrarily surrender common property; guardians may not give up the property of their charges.

(b) Temporal goods of which one is owner should be surrendered on account of the scandal of little ones, unless a greater evil results from such surrender; for, as said above (see 1165 sqq.), one should be willing to suffer some detriment in temporal things to avert from one’s neighbor detriment in spiritual things. Hence, one should abstain from a certain food, if one’s eating of it will cause spiritual ruin to some innocent person (I Cor., viii. 13).

(c) Temporal goods are not to be surrendered on account of Pharisaic scandal; for this would be injurious to the common good, since it would encourage the wicked to despoil the conscientious, and it would also be injurious to the wicked themselves, since they would continue in sin by keeping what was not their own. Hence, one may demand money owed, even if the debtor is greedy and will use profane language.

Should church goods ever be surrendered in order to avoid scandal of the weak? (a) On the one hand, goods of the Church have a special sacredness, because they have been given and set apart for spiritual purposes and the common good of the Church. Hence, he would be an unfaithful steward who would devote them to merely temporal ends, such as the enrichment or exaltation of himself or of his friends, or who would alienate them without due authority. (b) On the other hand, the temporal goods of the Church are to serve spiritual ends, and the spiritual must not be subordinated to the temporal. Hence, one of the chief causes of scandal in the Church is the appearance of avarice in churchmen (even as regards goods that are not personal, but common), especially if they seem to put money before the salvation of the people. There are times, therefore, when to avoid scandal a prelate or priest ought to forego something really due the Church.

Cases of Scandal and Renouncement of Church Goods.—(a) If there is question of Pharisaic scandal alone, one should not renounce the goods of which one is the custodian, but should resist spoliation as far as one is able. Thus, St. Thomas of Canterbury would not agree to the invasion of church rights by Henry II. So also a pastor should not neglect the collection of dues needed for the maintenance of the church, because some malcontents will take offense at this; neither should he yield to the extortionate demands of some hired person who will be scandalized because more is not paid.

(b) If there is question of the scandal of the weak, concessions should be made, lest spiritual things be made to suffer for the temporal. Thus, St. Paul would not accept any support for himself from persons newly converted to Christianity, lest this prove a hindrance to the preaching of the Gospel (I Cor., ix. 12). For the sake of the ignorant or the weak, therefore, the Church does not insist on dues and other payments, until these persons have had the opportunity of learning their duty. The faithful, indeed, are bound to contribute to the pastors who serve them, but the precept is an affirmative one, and obliges therefore not at all times, but when the conditions of time, place, person, etc., make this possible. It would be a real scandal of the weak, if a person were driven from church because he did not realize his duty of contributing, or if a poor person were taxed beyond his means, or if an affluent cleric were always asking for money and never giving to the needy, or if a priest were to talk collections instead of doctrine, or devoted most of his time to money-making enterprises. Anything that commercializes religion is also a scandal both to Catholics and non-Catholics.

Duty of Repairing Scandal.-The paragraphs immediately preceding have spoken of the duty of avoiding scandal. There is also a duty of repairing scandal that has been given. (a) Thus, there is a duty of charity to repair the scandal one has given; for, if all are required to practise fraternal correction, those especially are bound to this who are responsible for the sins of others. (b) There is sometimes a duty of legal justice, as when superiors, who are bound from their office to give good example, give scandal to their subjects. (c) There is sometimes a duty of commutative justice, as when the scandalizer has employed unjust means (such as force, fear or traps) in order to lead another into scandal.

Ways of Repairing Scandal.—(a) Scandal is repaired publicly or privately. Reparation is public, when it is made before the community, and private, when it is made before individuals. (b) Scandal is repaired explicitly or implicitly. Explicit reparation is made by retractation of one’s words, by condemnation of one’s acts, by the destruction of one’s scandalous writings, by efforts to bring back to virtue those whom one has misled, etc. Implicit reparation is made by reformation of one’s conduct, the abandonment of that which gave scandal, the practice of good example, prayer for the person scandalized, etc.

Particular Kinds of Scandal to be Repaired.—(a) Scandal is public or private. Public scandal is given before the community at large, as when one openly apostatizes so that it is the talk of the whole neighborhood or town, or writes a signed article favoring atheism, or makes a disedifying speech before a gathering of people. Scandal is private, when it is given before a few persons, and when it does not tend to become generally known, as when husband and wife quarrel before their domestic circle.

(b) Scandal is ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary scandal is given by bad example alone; extraordinary scandal adds to bad example injury or injustice, or the debt of punishment for a crime. Thus, one who becomes slightly intoxicated at a party gives ordinary scandal; while one who by trickery schemes to get another into a situation in which he will be effectually scandalized, or who strikes an inoffensive priest, or who spreads disedifying printed matter, is guilty of extraordinary scandal.

Denial of Sacraments in Cases of Scandal.—Is it lawful to administer the Sacraments to one who has not made satisfaction for public scandal?

(a) If the obligation of reparation is not grave, it is lawful to administer the Sacraments, since the person who gave the scandal is not subject to grave sin and unworthy of the Sacraments, and his admission to them will not be a new scandal.

(b) If the obligation of reparation is grave, it is lawful to admit the party in question to the Sacrament of Penance; for every person rightly disposed has a right to absolution, and the fact that a person who gave scandal goes to confession is edifying. But absolution should be given on condition that reparation for the scandal is seriously promised.

(c) If the obligation of reparation is grave, it is not lawful as a rule to admit to the other Sacraments, until the reparation has been actually performed. Thus, if it is notorious in a parish that a certain individual has been living in a serious occasion of sin or has been circulating impious doctrines, the occasion of sin should be removed or the doctrines should be retracted, before the individual is admitted to Communion, etc.; otherwise, a new scandal would be given the faithful from the apparent approval given the scandalizer by the minister of the Sacrament received.

What is scandal? - Scandal is defined: a word or deed less right, offering to someone an occasion of spiritual ruin. Word or deed, under which name omission also is understood. Less right, i.e., what either is evil in itself, as if you speak shameful things before a youth, or has the appearance of evil, as if, from a just cause, you eat flesh-meat on a forbidden day before others ignorant of that cause. Less right; for those things which are and appear right are expedient and edify. Offering occasion; although, metaphysically speaking, occasion is not the same as cause, nevertheless here that occasion is a true moral cause; for since the neighbor is really enticed by it and induced to sin, it exercises a true moral influence. Therefore a fortiori induction or solicitation and provocation to sin participates in the malice of scandal, which consequently contains the malice of direct scandal. Of spiritual ruin, namely mortal or only venial sin. Therefore spiritual ruin is not rumor, or the wonder of others, and a fortiori horror concerning the deed committed; but grave suspicions and rash judgments of others, detractions, calumnies, etc. Yet scandal is still had if occasion is given to another of sinning only materially, e.g., if another does the same, believing it to be licit, for instance if a priest offers an unconsecrated host to be adored. - Suarez, de Carit., d. 10, s. 1; de Cens., d. 6, s. 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 1; L. 43.

How many kinds of scandal are there? - Scandal is one kind direct, another indirect, according as the ruin of neighbor, or sin, either is intended, or, although it is not intended, nevertheless is foreseen, at least in confusion. And if the spiritual ruin of neighbor is intended, or the offense of God, it is called diabolical, against charity toward neighbor and God; but otherwise, if only the sin is intended, e.g., of fornication, but not as the spiritual ruin of another or as offense of God. - Likewise scandal is one kind active, another passive. Active is scandal given, and this is that to which the given definition belongs. Passive is scandal received, and is the spiritual ruin itself of the neighbor, which is improperly called scandal, since it should better be called the effect of scandal.

But scandal can be active, or given, without being passive or received, because an action apt per se for scandal can be posited without the effect following. And conversely it can be received without being given; but then scandal is not properly to be attributed to the action of neighbor, but rather to the ignorance, imagination, or even malice of him who suffers scandal, or admits it without foundation. But this is called scandal of the little ones if it flows from the infirmity or ignorance of neighbor; but it is called pharisaical if it comes from the mere malice of the subject. L. 43; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 1 ad 4; a. 3; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 127.

Resolves: It is not always scandal if you sin before others, but only when, attention being paid to circumstances both of the person acting and of those before whom the act is done, it can probably be feared that by this act those who otherwise would not sin may be drawn to sin. Hence blasphemy uttered before religious and pious men does not have the account of scandal, but of horror and abomination. Likewise it is not scandal to sin before vile and infamous persons who already for another reason are about to sin, as if someone fornicates before others who are already prepared to do the same and are not moved by his example. - L. 43, 44; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 5; Struggl, q. 5, n. 29.

What kind of sin is scandal? Scandal is a grave sin from its genus, having a special specific malice, whether it is direct or indirect. Proof of the first part. Christ the Lord exclaims: Woe to the world because of scandals...! Woe to that man by whom scandal comes! Matt. 18:7. Therefore scandal from its genus, unless namely smallness of matter excuses, is a grave sin. Proof of the second part. Scandal is directly opposed to fraternal correction, in which the removal of the sins of our neighbor is intended. Therefore it has a special specific malice against charity toward neighbor. Proof of the third part. "For if charity obliges one to correct neighbor and to impede him, when we can, lest he fall into sin, how much more does it oblige one not to impel him to sin by counsel or example?" L. 45; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, aa. 1, 4; E. M. 422.

Resolves: He sins only venially by reason of scandal who offers to another occasion of only venial ruin. This is true even if he directly intends that ruin, and indeed through a mortal act. For charity is not then gravely injured. On the contrary, he sins gravely by reason of scandal who offers to another occasion of mortal ruin, although he does this through an indifferent work, or only a venial one, e.g., if a religious utters joking and slightly shameful words before women, or before those who can take from them occasion of mortal sin. L. 44; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, aa. 4, 6; Ithur., Cas. 35.

Scandal given, as it is against charity, so from the same charity must be repaired. For if charity obliges us to correct a sinning neighbor, lest he sin, much more is he bound to draw neighbor back from sin who brought him into sin by scandal. It is regularly repaired by ceasing from scandal, by giving good example, by frequenting church and the sacraments, by detesting delicts and crimes. And if someone has spread false doctrines, by revoking and publicly retracting them.

What is the special malice of scandal? In direct scandal there is given sin not only against charity, but also against the virtue to whose violation the neighbor is induced. But in indirect scandal, both the opinion affirming and the opinion denying this other special malice are probable. Proof of the first part: 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2.

Because any virtue prohibits not only that someone injure it, but also that he will and cause it to be injured by others. Proof of the second part: 1. because for each opinion there are grave theologians. 2. Because, as the indirect voluntary suffices for sinning, so also it suffices for sinning against such a virtue with respect to which it is indirectly voluntary; whence it is that in morals the direct and indirect voluntary pertain to the same species. Therefore probably in indirect scandal there is given sin not only against charity, but also against the virtue which is injured by the neighbor. But against this is that virtues do not oblige us to impede in others opposed vices, even if foreseen, but only that we not intend and procure that others injure them. It is proper only to charity alone to forbid giving another an occasion of injuring it. Therefore probably in indirect scandal there is not given sin against the virtue which the neighbor violates. "For just as in natural things that which is per accidens does not constitute species, so neither in moral things, in which that which is intended is per se, but what follows beside intention is as it were per accidens." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 39, a. 1. - Lugo, de Poen., d. 16, nn. 159, 168; Struggl, q. 5, n. 21 seqq.; L. 44, 45, 46, 47; l. 3, n. 537.

Resolves: It suffices in Confession to express generally the sin of scandal, nor is it necessary to indicate the species of sin to which others were indirectly induced. Much less is it necessary that circumstances be expressed which perhaps add species to the sins of others, e.g., whether those who could be induced to lust by a shameful speech or picture are married or bound by vow, etc. The circumstance of soliciting and inducing another to sin, e.g., to fornication, is only an aggravating circumstance, and therefore it suffices to confess the fornication alone. For the same malice of induction or scandal is had, although less, when someone does not solicit but only consents; for by consenting he still participates with the other in his sin, and is a cooperating cause toward his ruin. Therefore this malice is only more aggravated within the same species if someone positively solicits another. And the same must be said about shameful conversation and similar things. Thus Lugo, whose opinion seems sufficiently probable to St. Alphonsus, "since even in cooperation toward fornication there is present a sin against charity, well distinct from the sin of cooperation toward fornication, by cooperating toward the ruin of the other party." L. 46.

Must scandal of the little ones be avoided? - Scandal of the little ones or weak must be avoided, as often as it can be done without grave inconvenience, both by omission of an indifferent work and by omission of a good work not commanded. Proof. Because from charity we are bound to impede the evil of neighbor when we easily can, e.g., by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by delaying it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc., when neighbor falls into that danger from a cause given by us. But the little ones or weak fall into that danger from a cause in some way given by us; for although our action of itself does not influence the sin of neighbor, nevertheless in fact it influences it, although this is because of the ignorance and infirmity of neighbor. Therefore. 1 Cor. 8:7 seqq. Hence it is clear that scandal of the little ones is not purely received, but in some way given, namely given not by reason of the work done, but by reason of the circumstances in which that work is done, although these are entirely extrinsic. L. 48; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 7.

Must pharisaical scandal also be avoided? - Pharisaical or malicious scandal, at least ordinarily, is not necessarily to be avoided either by omission of a good work, or by omission even of an indifferent work not having the appearance of evil. Proof. Such scandal arises from the sole malice of him who receives scandal, and for this reason is in no way given, but purely received. But charity in no way obliges us to impede the sins of others which are altogether voluntary to them and altogether independent of our manner of acting, at least ordinarily; for charity does not urge with so great an inconvenience. Therefore. Matt. 15:14. Ordinarily; for "if care concerning the good of neighbor can oblige one to doing good, why not also sometimes to omitting it? Especially since man is thereby deprived of no spiritual good... because this very thing, namely to deprive oneself of the merit of that work because of the good of neighbor, will be a greater merit than the good work itself. Whence in works of counsel the matter is clear." Suarez, de Carit., d. 10, s. 3, n. 9. The case could be if, for example, fruit were hoped for from delaying a good work. Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1723. But if the pharisaical scandal were for impeding spiritual goods, then it would altogether have to be contemned. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 7.

Is it licit to advise a lesser evil to someone already determined to carry out a greater one? Some deny it, because he who advises a lesser evil truly advises evil. Others more probably affirm it, because this kind of counsel tends formally to this, that the greater sin not be committed. Therefore formally it advises only good. And Sanchez with the Salmanticenses adds that this is licit not only for private persons, but also for confessors, parents, and others upon whom from office it is incumbent to impede the sins of subjects. L. 57; l. 5, n. 77.

Resolves: It is licit to induce someone to drunkenness so that he may be impeded from a graver evil, for example, from committing homicide. L. l. 5, n. 77. Cf. 337. - It is licit to advise one willing to inflict greater harm upon one person to inflict lesser harm upon the same person. The same person, because by reason of justice the same does not seem licit with respect to another determinate person, at least ordinarily and speaking per se, because then that counsel is a true cause, of itself efficacious, of another's harm, and unjust; for the other is not bound to suffer that harm, whence he would be reasonably unwilling. Ordinarily and speaking per se; for, as Viva affirms, prop. 36 Innoc.

XI, to one wishing to steal something from Peter, because of which Peter would be reduced to extreme poverty, it could be advised that he steal a little from Paul, a very rich man, who otherwise would be irrationally unwilling in this. Indeed there are those who hold that it is licit to advise a lesser evil even with respect to a different determinate person, because this is always only to turn away from a greater evil, and not also to induce to a lesser, and it is confirmed by the example of Lot, who offered his daughters to be violated in place of the guests. Gen. 19:1 seqq. Sanch., de Matr., l. 7, d. 11, n. 16 seqq.; Vasquez, Opusc. de Scand., art. 1, dub. 2, n. 14; L. l. 3, n. 565; Diana, t. 7, tr. 5, de Scand., r. 36.

Is it licit to permit an occasion of sinning, so that the guilty person may be corrected, and even to set it up? - R. Affirmatively, when the other is judged probably to be ready from another source to continue the sin. The reason is that to permit is not to induce to sinning, and there is a sufficient reason for permitting; because the permission is then impeditive of a greater evil, for one sin is permitted lest several be done. Likewise even to set up the occasion of sin is not from its nature to induce to sin, but is an act of itself indifferent, from which a twofold effect follows, one good, which is intended, the other evil, beside the intention of the agent and from the malice of the sinner; and besides there is a sufficient reason for positing that act. Thus more probably, and it can be confirmed by the example of Judith, who, when she saw that the permission of lust in Holofernes would be an impediment of very many evils for the whole Israelite people, voluntarily set before him an occasion, namely her adornment; and nevertheless in this they commonly judge that she did not sin. Judith 10. - Struggl, q. 5, n. 34; L. 58.

Resolves: It is lawful for a father and master not to remove an occasion of stealing from sons or servants, when they know them nevertheless to be inclined and ready to steal, so that thus, being caught, they may be punished and come to their senses. It is licit for a keeper of fields to hide himself, so that he may catch those causing damage and keep himself safe from the danger of damage to come. L. l. c.; S. Th. S. q. 62, a. 3 ad 4.

Does a girl sin mortally by presenting herself to be seen by a man who will suffer scandal? St. Alphonsus, 53, has these things: "Busemb., St. Antoninus, Sylvius, Navarrus, etc., affirm it.... But Cajetan, Sanchez, etc., very probably deny that she sins gravely. For it suffices, as they say, for excusing her, at least from mortal sin, the cause that she not be deprived of her own liberty, since on the one hand this scandal is not given, but received from the malice of the man; and on the other hand the matter would be very inconvenient for the woman and liable to scruples, if she always had to weigh whether she has a just cause of going out or not. But I could not excuse her from mortal sin if she, led by vanity, although she does not intend the scandal of that man, deliberately offers herself to his sight. Hence Sporer, Diana, Hurtado, rightly say that a woman is bound under grave sin to avoid the scandal of a determinate man, if she can conveniently go to another church, proceed by another way, abstain from a window, and similar things. Yet this is not to be understood for a long time, but only for one or another time, until the other can notice that he is being fled by her; and Sporer asserts that all consent in this. Nor could I excuse a woman from mortal sin if she sought some place which she would not go to unless she knew her lover was there."

Resolves: A woman who, from adornment even fitting to her state, probably foresees that someone in particular will fall mortally, is bound for a brief time to put it aside, or to flee the sight of such a one. For a brief time, because for a long time it would be too grave for her. But if the same thing were feared in particular from superfluous, vain adornment not fitting to her state, which to assume for the sake of vanity, other things being excluded, is only venial, she would be bound, speaking per se, to put it aside altogether, even under mortal sin, because she has no right to that adornment, and on the other hand is bound to avoid another's sin when she conveniently can.

Speaking per se, for since superfluous adornments, practically speaking, soon pass into the custom of the country's women who are honorable, it cannot be said absolutely that such a woman does not have a right to follow the custom of her country, nor is grave inconvenience lacking. If a woman thinks not so much in particular, but only in general, that some will be scandalized in her, provided she does not intend their lasciviousness nor take pleasure in it, although she may be pleased that she is praised as beautiful, she does not seem to be bound to abstain from that adornment, even superfluous, under mortal sin, e.g., by painting the face, etc.

The reason is both because the scandal is rather received than given, and that adornment and beauty only remotely provokes to sin, and because it would be too grave for that sex, especially if she seeks a husband, perpetually to abstain thus; since that occasion is universal and perpetual, and more beautiful women would never licitly go outside, since natural beauty moves more than artificial beauty. As to the custom of women walking with the breast uncovered, if the uncovering were not immoderate, and in some place there were a custom that women walk in this way, it would indeed be reproved, but not altogether condemned as mortal sin. The reason is the very common opinion of doctors, and because the breast is not a part vehemently provoking to lasciviousness, and custom diminishes the force of concupiscence. Thus St. Alphonsus, 55. - L. 53, 54, 55; l. 3, n. 425; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169, aa. 1, 2; S. Antonin., p. 2, t. 4, c. 5; Diana, t. 7, tr. 5, r. 9.

Are you bound to give up temporal goods in order to avoid scandal? R. Negatively, ordinarily speaking; for either a great loss of money must be suffered, and charity toward neighbor does not urge with so great an inconvenience; or there is only a light loss of money, and this, since it could occur rather often, already easily becomes grave. Besides, it would harm the common good, because an occasion would be given to wicked persons of extorting and seizing others' things, and it would be harmful to the wicked themselves, since thus they would be confirmed in their depraved will. Ordinarily speaking; for if, in some particular case, grave inconvenience ceases, and the scandal were not of Pharisees but of little ones, then either temporal goods must be given up, or the scandal must be calmed through some admonition. L. 52; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 8.

Resolves: You are not bound to pay more than is fair to a worker or coachman, although you foresee that otherwise he will blaspheme. - A parish priest is not bound to give up stole fees, although he foresees that several will detract. - These persons sin not because of infirmity, but because of their own improbitity, and therefore regularly no care is to be taken for them.

Are precepts sometimes to be omitted because of scandal?

R. Negatively, if from that omission one's own salvation would be endangered, or grave harm would be imminent to others, especially to the community. Hence spiritual goods necessary for salvation neither ought nor can anyone give up because of anyone's scandal. R. Negatively also, if that omission is intrinsically evil. Therefore negative natural precepts likewise neither ought nor can be omitted. - As to affirmative natural precepts, per se and generally, they are not to be passed over. For scandal is not properly given, and there is sufficient reason for permitting it. Nevertheless they can sometimes be omitted; indeed they even must be omitted if, all things prudently weighed, it is better to avoid the ruin of neighbor, and grave harm does not come to us from it. Yet more truly it is said in that case that those precepts cease and do not oblige, e.g., of correcting sinners, or punishing delinquents, when harm is feared more than fruit is hoped for.

As to positive human precepts there is controversy. The first probable opinion denies, because again the scandal is not properly given, but received; and therefore the precept does not cease. The second probable opinion affirms, grave inconvenience being excluded, because the precept of avoiding the scandal of neighbor, as natural, is to be preferred to positive precepts. Hence a woman knowing that she will be shamefully desired by someone if she goes to the prescribed Mass is bound to omit it once or again, if there is hope that afterward the scandal will cease; yet not several times because of the grave inconvenience which would follow from it. Nevertheless several others, no less probably, hold that she can rightly omit Mass once or again, but is not bound to this. She can, because of the probability of the latter opinion. She is not bound, because again the scandal is not properly given, and there is sufficient reason for permitting it. But it must be noted here that the present controversy also has place only in scandal which someone in particular can suffer; but by no means when there is a general fear that perhaps someone may be scandalized, because this would be too difficult. Likewise the matter concerns only the scandal of the little ones; for if the scandal were pharisaical, occasion would be given for maliciously always impeding good things. - Struggl, q. 5, nn. 30, 31; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 7; L. 50, 51, 52.

Is it a sin of scandal to ask something from another which he will not furnish without sin, when he is already prepared to sin? St. Alphonsus, 47, has these things: "If the thing which is asked is intrinsically evil of itself, so that in no way can it be furnished without sin, as is asking fornication from a prepared prostitute, several doctors are not lacking who say that it is not a sin of scandal, because since such a woman is always in actual or virtual will of sinning, he who offers her the occasion of executing that sin is judged to cooperate not gravely, but lightly. Thus Soto, Henriquez, Azor, Valentia, etc. I venerate the authority of such great doctors, but I would not dare to depart from the contrary opinion, which I judge must be followed, and which Sanchez holds with Cajetan, etc. The reason seems very powerful to me, because, although the prostitute is in actual will of sinning, nevertheless certainly she inflicts on herself a much greater ruin by completing in act that particular sin of fornication.

Therefore he who cooperates with her toward consummating the sin sins gravely in two ways, both against charity and against chastity." "If the thing which is asked is indifferent, and can rightly be furnished without sin, as would be asking a loan from a usurer and similar things, the first opinion holds that it is not a grave sin to ask without just cause. The reason is that, since that usurer already has a deliberate will of sinning, you will not inflict grave harm upon him if you propose to him an occasion by which he may execute sin beside your intention. For that anticipation of the external work varies his sin only accidentally. (If you do not ask now, another asking will soon come, and he will certainly give. And this also holds for the preceding case.) Thus Lugo, Cajetan, etc. The second opinion, which we embrace, holds that this is a mortal sin both against charity and against the virtue toward whose injury occasion is offered to neighbor, by asking from him a loan, etc., without grave cause; for when there is a grave cause, the one asking is altogether excused. Thus S. Th. 2. 2. q. 78, a. 4, Elbel, etc. The reason is that since the sinner by the external act inflicts a notably greater ruin on himself, he cannot be excused from grave sin against charity who without grave cause cooperates with him toward executing the work.... But when we have a grave cause for asking, we cannot abstain from asking without grave inconvenience, and therefore then indeed we excuse.

Thus Busemb., Sanchez, Valentia, etc." "But Sporer, Pontas, etc., note that for licitly asking a loan from a usurer, precise necessity is not required, but any notable utility suffices, whether for the conservation or for the decency of state or family." - Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 25, n. 235; Diana, t. 7, tr. 5, rr. 34, 55; L. 48, 49, 78; l. 3, n. 103, q. 5; n. 149; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 78, a. 4.

Note: From the resolution of this question, the resolution of other questions is clear: whether it is licit to accept, offer, give, sell, or do something which another does not give, accept, receive, buy, or use without sin. In all these, scandal is by way of cooperation. Cf. 440.

Resolves: Therefore it is not licit to ask, for example, from a notary something opposed to his office. But it is licit to ask the sacraments from an unworthy minister, or an oath from one who is going to commit perjury, provided a just cause is present, namely for the first case, if there is necessity or notable spiritual utility; for the second, if a judge asks for an oath by reason of office, or it matters greatly to you, as by perjury for manifesting the frauds of another, so that you may obtain your right. A girl sins by accepting gifts from a lover if they proceed from shameful love, for they foster that shameful love; but otherwise, as is clear, if they proceed only from honorable benevolence and friendship, or if they are offered before others and cannot be refused without the scandal of others and her own infamy. In no way is it licit for an innkeeper, in order to allure more guests, ordinarily to admit gravely shameful dances in his house, or to propose to them for reading public papers which are evidently and ordinarily adverse to religion or good morals. In cities in which it is permitted for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, it is licit to rent a house to a usurer and to a prostitute, especially if other tenants are lacking, or it is easy for them to rent another house, unless nevertheless the prostitute would gravely harm honorable neighbors, or because of the location would give greater occasion to sins. It is not licit to call a non-Catholic minister so that he may furnish his helps of false religion to the sick or dying person. S. O. 15 Mar. 1848.

L. 47, 60, 61, 70, 76, 77, 79; l. 3, nn. 434, 734; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, a. 11; q. 98, a. 4; Ithur., Cas. 26.

It is licit to sell indifferent things, or things which can easily have a good use, if the seller knows nothing about the evil intention of the buyer, because evil is not to be presumed. Hence it is licit to sell dice, swords, cosmetics, wine, etc., although very many abuse these things, because these are not ordered per se to sin, indeed often they serve good use. - But it is not licit to sell these same indifferent things when it is certainly known that the buyer will use them badly, unless they could not be denied without grave inconvenience, or also unless they would equally be bought from others; for in this last case, if the seller sinned, this would be only because he does not impede the sin of neighbor. But although he did not sell, he would not thereby impede the sin; for there would be another who would sell. Hence it is not licit to sell honorable ornaments to a girl, if it were established to the seller concerning future abuse, unless he would suffer notable damage, or unless she would equally buy them from others. Thus La-Croix, l. 2, n. 263, and others. But St. Alphonsus, 71, does not admit this last case. Cf. here 442. It is not licit to sell wine without grave and proportionate cause to those who resell it mixed with water. Likewise it is not licit for an innkeeper to sell wine to those who are foreseen to be about to become drunk, or to offer flesh-meat to those who are going to eat it on a forbidden day, unless a grave reason excuses, for instance if otherwise he would be notably harmed from diminution of buyers. Hence it is also commonly licit for an innkeeper to give flesh-meat when it is asked, unless the request is made in contempt of religion, because it would be a most grave inconvenience to inquire about the reasons of each one asking. L. 68, 69, 78. Indeed it is generally licit for an innkeeper, at whose place public coaches stop, to set a table with licit or illicit foods, because since it is established that several are going to ask for flesh-meat, it does not seem necessary to ask from individuals what they wish. A fortiori it is licit to sell flesh-meat on days of abstinence and in the time of Lent, because the seller cannot judge concerning the reasons of those buying, nor does it pertain to him to inquire about them. L. l. 3, n. 1030.

But it is not licit to sell things which by their institution or use are destined for evil, unless in a particular case it is established that the danger of abuse is absent, or unless a grave and proportionate reason excuses. Hence it is not licit to sell poison, unless it is morally established that the buyer will use it well, e.g., for the making of colors, medicine, etc. Nor is it licit indiscriminately to sell depraved books, namely to any buyer. Nevertheless sometimes they can be sold to prudent and learned men who can read books of this sort usefully, e.g., for refuting them, etc. Except, however, books altogether obscene, which must be extirpated from the root. Tambur., in Decal., l. 1, § 4, n. 37; L. 66, 72, 76.

It is licit for workers to build and adorn theaters, if the ornaments are honorable in themselves, although another grave reason is lacking, because it is licit for Princes to permit spectacles. It is lawful, with the legitimate magistrate permitting, to restore and build synagogues of Jews and temples of heretics, yet scandal and any contempt of religion being excluded, especially if it would equally be done without them. It is also licit to make statues of idols if these are not to be used for false worship, but for the adornment of streets, buildings, etc. On the contrary, it is not licit to build temples of idols, or to cooperate in their building; likewise it is not licit, so that danger of death or exile may be avoided, to build altars or idols, or to cooperate in their building, when this is had as a deed protestative of false religion. It is licit for Christian captives, from grave fear, to row in the galleys of infidels against Catholics. For they do nothing intrinsically evil, nor proximately pernicious to Christians. Besides, there is a most grave and proportionate cause for doing this. It is not licit to compose or represent gravely shameful comedies, whatever the profit may be. This also holds concerning shameful representations in Cinematographs. "Likewise those sin gravely who paint or publicly expose obscene images, namely with the shameful parts uncovered or covered with a thin veil; otherwise if, other parts being uncovered, the shameful parts are covered." L. 56. Yet except if something of this sort must be painted, e.g., for teaching or learning anatomical or obstetrical science. L. 73; l. 3, nn. 427-429; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 1733, 1748, 1845; E. M. 365, 366, 367, 368.

Is it never licit to cooperate in another's sin? - Cooperation in general is concurrence with another principally acting. But insofar as it can be opposed to charity, it is a certain participation in the depraved action of another. Cooperation is: 1. immediate or mediate, according as the one cooperating acts with the one sinning in the very act of sin, or posits other actions having some connection with the sin of another. 2. Proximate or remote, according as the action of the one cooperating is more nearly or more remotely connected, from its nature or from circumstances, with the depraved action of another. 3. Positive or negative, according as the one cooperating either posits some action influencing the sin of another, e.g., by helping him, or omits a due act, e.g., if he does not oppose when he ought to oppose. 4. Formal or material. Formal cooperation concurs in the evil will of another, and cannot exist without sin, as intending cooperation itself toward the depraved action of another, either by the explicit intention of the one operating, or by an implicit intention in the work itself, which by its nature is ordered to the depraved action. Material cooperation concurs only in the evil action of another, without any intention of cooperating in sin, neither in actu signato nor in actu exercito.

As scandal, so cooperation can be had in two ways: 1. by inducing another to sin, and this is properly scandal; 2. by acting in some way together with him who sins, and this is properly cooperation; and it has the same malice in species as scandal, namely both against charity and against the virtue which another injures by sinning, when the cooperation is formal. It is certain that formal cooperation is never licit, since this morally influences the sin of another, and consequently is its moral cause. Material cooperation is licit, provided: 1. the action is per se good, or at least indifferent; 2. one is not bound from office to impede the sin; 3. there is present a just and proportionate cause according to the gravity of the sin of another and the proximity of concurrence toward the execution of the sin. The reason is that when you furnish an honorable or indifferent action, without depraved intention, if another wishes to abuse it for executing sin, you are not bound except from charity to impede it; and since charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore by positing your cooperation with a just cause, you do not sin; for his sin does not proceed from your cooperation, but from the malice of him who abuses your action.

A proportionate cause; for since the obligation of avoiding that action arises from the obligation of the virtue to which the neighbor's sin is opposed, and the obligation of every virtue is not equal, but some things approach more, some less, to sin; besides, there is not always equal certainty that, if you do not cooperate, the other will not sin; nor indeed is the right to the action always the same, but sometimes greater, sometimes less; therefore an equal cause will not always be proportionate for furnishing this cooperation, but sometimes a greater, sometimes a lesser one will be necessary. Hence a more urgent cause is desired when the sin is against justice than against charity alone, and such a cause as can rightly be preferred to another's harm. The reason is that in the former an innocent person unwillingly suffers damage; but in the latter the one sinning alone undergoes spiritual detriment, and this by his own will, which same detriment he suffers when he sins against justice. - But when from the circumstances scandal can be had, and material cooperation in sin can signify consent in sin, a protestation must be premised. - Sanch., l. 1, c. 7, n. 12; L. 59, 63; cf. here 212; E. M. 440.

Resolves: It is lawful for a servant to open the door to a prostitute, because material cooperation of this sort is sufficiently remote, especially while, even if he did not open, there would still be someone who would open. It is certainly not illicit if a servant saddles the master's horse when he is going away to sin, because in this he does not seem to cooperate more in the master's sin than by opening the door to a prostitute. It is licit for a servant to accompany his master to the house of a concubine when, even without the servant as companion, the master would go, and he is not thereby rendered more bold, because then it is mere accompanying; and service itself sufficiently excuses. Thus Busemb. and others. But St. Alphonsus, 63, 64, and others excuse this case and the preceding only from fear of grave harm. But if the master should use the servant as companion so that he may sin more safely and freely, then it would certainly be illicit, because he would already proximately influence the sin. Likewise it would be altogether illicit for a servant to put his shoulders under, or carry a ladder for, the master ascending to fornicate, to open a door by force, and similar things; for the cooperation is altogether proximate, and makes sin easier, to the most grave harm of a third party. Nevertheless, since these actions are not intrinsically evil, they would still not be illicit if fear of death or mutilation acceded. St. Alphonsus adds, 66, that no other fear excuses the one cooperating except fear of death; for otherwise, because of mere fear of loss of goods or infamy, it is not licit to concur in the dishonoring of a girl to be deflowered. Sporer, de 8 Pr., c. 1, n. 99, also excuses a servant carrying gifts to a prostitute, "because," he says, "on the one hand he from his office and condition is bound to serve and obey masters; but on the other hand cooperation in sin is merely material and only remote." But others require another very grave reason, because since these gifts are apt for fostering lust, the cooperation is proximate. And because of this same reason it is not licit for a servant to carry love letters to the concubine of his master, unless a graver and proportionate reason is present. Nevertheless others, as concerning carrying gifts, so concerning letters to be carried, do not require this special reason beyond service itself. For here it does not seem to be necessary to attend whether the letters or gifts have force for fostering shameful love, but the very action of carrying letters or gifts must be considered, which of itself is indifferent. Otherwise, since sight has greater force for fostering shameful love, it will not be licit even to open the door. Moreover the servant is not bound to inquire what is contained in letters. - L. 63-68, 75; l. 3, n. 571; Salm., tr. 21, c. 3, n. 72; Sanch., in Dec., l. 1, c. 7, nn. 22, 23.

Political elections are permitted in Italy, in particular cases, when by reason of necessity, because of the good of souls and of the Church, Bishops request it from the Holy See. Pius X, Encyclical Letter, 11 June 1905. They were also declared licit in France, in the present circumstances of things, 2 Apr. 1906, yet with the consent of one's own Ordinary and of the Ordinary of the place. Likewise in Spain, from the declaration of 20 Feb. 1906, party zeal being set aside, Catholics ought to labor so that those may enter the assemblies of cities and of the kingdom who will better provide for the good of religion and the fatherland. Cf. E. M. 440, 441.

Is it licit to serve prostitutes or concubinarians? Is it licit for Catholics to attend civil funerals? R. To the first. Negatively, per se and ordinarily speaking, both because of the scandal of others and also because of the greatest danger of falling. Therefore those cases which are to be excepted in practice will have to be judged from the degree of necessity and the circumstances of persons, removing scandal and proximate danger of sinning. R. To the second. Affirmatively, per se, because the homage is merely civil. Per accidens, by reason of scandal, it can easily be illicit.

Is it ever licit to cooperate in publishing depraved books? - In this matter, indeed, the author sins by the sin of scandal; the publisher and the owner of the printing house by the sin of cooperation. But as to others who devote labor to the printing of these books, generally it does not seem licit immediately to cooperate in the printing of such books, e.g., to arrange types, place paper on the types, direct the printing, etc., because this approaches very closely to spreading the depraved doctrine of books. Nevertheless, in a case of most grave detriment, for a brief time, something of this sort could be materially furnished, since the matter finally is not intrinsically illicit. But it is licit, from a grave cause, to cooperate mediately or remotely, e.g., to prepare ink or paper, or to arrange printed books. Laymann, de Carit., c. 13, n. 4. But sellers are numbered among proximate cooperators, and therefore, generally speaking, they sin gravely.

If someone has received a depraved book lent by another to be read, can he restore it to the owner? - R. Negatively, unless prudent fear of some grave inconvenience persuades otherwise. This flows of its own accord from the obligation of impeding the sins of others by reason of charity, when this can be done without grave inconvenience. But it is to be judged a grave inconvenience if you fear grave quarrels, blasphemies, hatreds, and other things of this sort from the owner.

What intention is required in adults for receiving the individual sacraments? - In baptism and order there is required at least a habitual explicit will. The reason is that sacraments of this kind impose grave obligations to be fulfilled. But no one is judged to receive a grave obligation; rather, his positive will must be altogether clear. Lugo d. 9, n. 119, 127; L. 81, 82. The sacrament of baptism and of order is indeed invalidly conferred on those having only interpretative intention. Nevertheless Coninck, Sporer, Dicastillo, etc., apud Croix l. 6, p. 1, n. 168, and others judge that for receiving baptism an implicit intention contained in contrition or attrition had by the recipient suffices, or, as Lugo d. 9, n. 130 says, in the will of giving one's name to the Christian Religion, or, if he is ignorant of this, of doing whatever things are necessary for salvation, as La Croix has it, l.c. Cf. L. 82. This indeed can have place in urgent necessity, but baptism must then be conferred conditionally, and therefore repeated conditionally if time allows, unless there is certainty concerning a true and explicit intention not retracted. Cf. S. C. de P. F., March 30, 1898.

In confirmation, extreme unction, and the Eucharist, a habitual implicit will suffices, which is less rightly called interpretative, and which consists in this, that someone has had a general intention, and has not retracted it, of applying those things which are necessary and useful for his salvation; or of living and dying in the Catholic religion, with the helps of the same religion; or, a fortiori, of receiving all the sacraments in life and at death. The reason is that these sacraments bring many advantages and no disadvantage. But all are judged to wish to receive advantages. Hence both confirmation and extreme unction can be conferred conditionally on a dying person deprived of his senses. Ritual, de Extr. unct. § 6; L. 82. But if he in reality had never thought of receiving them, they would have to be altogether repeated.

For penance there is required either actual or at least virtual intention; nor therefore does habitual intention suffice. The reason is that in this sacrament the acts of the penitent are required for the matter, and these indeed cannot be had without at least virtual will of receiving the sacrament.

L. 82. - Likewise for matrimony at least virtual intention is required. For "since each spouse is not only receiving, but also minister of the sacrament, in each of them there is certainly required that intention which is demanded in the ministers of the other sacraments." L. 82.

Fr. Lehmkuhl, ed. 11, n. 66, requires for the Eucharist, besides the case of viaticum, an expressed habitual intention. Yet ordinarily it is not only virtual, but even actual. The reason, he says, is that "in the general will of living a Christian life there is in no way contained the will of receiving the sacred Eucharist so many times and at such a time." - But if, besides the case of viaticum, it is a question of the Eucharist to be received from obligation, certainly that general will also implicitly contains this. And if that general will is conceived more determinately, namely of applying all the means constituted by God as necessary and useful for salvation, certainly this will would also implicitly include the Eucharist to be received from mere devotion. Finally, if the general will of dying in a Christian manner includes the will of receiving the sacraments of the Church at the point of death, why does the general will of living a Christian life not include the will of receiving Christ's sacraments during life? "Wherefore," the same Fr. Lehmkuhl concludes, "an adult to whom, besides the case of viaticum, the Holy Eucharist were given without his knowledge, would indeed receive it materially, but not with fruit." - But consequently to the things which have just been noted: if in the case of Viaticum the aforesaid adult would receive the sacred Eucharist sacramentally and with fruit, also outside that case he would receive it sacramentally and with fruit, if namely, as was said, he has its will at least implicitly.

1. Fulvia knows well that her husband, given to hidden thefts, feeds the family from them. Fulvia indeed shows her displeasure to her husband, but in vain. But since she does not have anything from which she and her numerous offspring may sustain themselves, she uses stolen money and other things for the necessary support of the family. But, since she is of a timorous conscience, although she sees that she cannot act otherwise, nevertheless she always fears lest she sin, either by thus inducing and confirming her husband in those thefts, or at least by cooperating. Wherefore she sets forth the whole matter to the confessor.

Q. 1. What is scandal, and what kind of sin is it? - 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 419 seqq. To the second: Since Fulvia does not have from elsewhere the means by which she can sustain herself and her children, she seems able with a safe conscience to use those stolen things for sustaining the family. A husband owes food to wife and children, which consequently Fulvia can claim from her husband. But that he is unwilling to give anything except what was obtained by theft is per accidens with respect to Fulvia, who, as pressed by inevitable necessity, by accepting must be judged merely to behave permissively in order to the sins or thefts already committed by the husband. And certainly no one will say, in the circumstances of a case of this sort, that Fulvia induces the husband to commit thefts, or confirms the husband in them, or cooperates with the husband in the same. Lig. l. 4, n. 110.

"This is confirmed by parity. For according to the common opinion of the doctors, to which Diana, Sporer, and Babenstuber also subscribe, on account of a reasonable cause which service itself or subjection furnishes, cooks, male and female, licitly prepare meats for their masters who are going to violate the fast and serve them, because this action by its nature is not ordered to sin, but only to the substance of the act of eating, to which the sin of the masters is joined per accidens, which the male servants and maidservants, morally speaking, cannot impede, and by this very fact are not held to impede. Therefore similarly, if the husband is unwilling to furnish food unless it has been stolen here and there, the wife, pressed by grave necessity, licitly accepts it, otherwise behaving permissively with respect to the sins of the husband, since, morally speaking, she cannot impede them." Elbel 369; D'Annib., Summ., ed. 3, p. 2, n. 94.

But Fulvia, as appears from the case, having nothing else for the support of herself and of the family, is not only in grave, but in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity. For to verify this, one must not first wait until someone perishes by hunger. Hence from this head there can be no difficulty, that Fulvia, using the things of others, destroys and consumes them. Cf. I. M. 676, 1006; Lig. l. 2, n. 78; l. 3, n. 695; l. 4, n. 110; Pavone, Spicilegium, dissert. 2; G. 725, 726.

2. Ugolinus, on a certain day, at night, in his own house attacked by two armed robbers, and foreseeing unavoidable death, spontaneously offers to the unwelcome guests not only a numerous amount of money, but also a most abundant draught of very excellent wine, with other choice and very strong liquors. The rogues drink eagerly, and soon lie utterly drunk. Then Ugolinus, first having recovered the money and called for help, hands the robbers, bound hands and feet, over to the guards.

Q. What as to the case?

R. Ugolinus is not to be condemned of grave sin from the fact that he placed the cause of drunkenness. For he placed an indifferent cause, namely by placing wine and liquors before the robbers. Hence he certainly placed an occasion of drunkenness, but not truly a cause necessarily producing the effect, since the robbers can drink freely without becoming drunk; nor indeed does he compel them to drink, but they drink freely. And if, by placing wine and liquors before them, he thus induces them to drinking, nevertheless he by no means thus also induces them to drunkenness. Moreover, Ugolinus by no means intends the evil effect, or drunkenness, but merely permits it, intending only the good effect: to preserve his life unharmed and recover his money; and this good effect well compensates for the evil; this is, in the case, a sufficient reason for permitting the drunkenness of the robbers. G. 183.

234. • DEFINITION. Scandal is a saying or deed less right, furnishing someone an occasion of spiritual ruin.

DIVISION. Scandal is distinguished as direct or indirect, according as the evil action of another either is intended, or although it is not intended, nevertheless is foreseen at least in the confused way.

Direct scandal is also called diabolical when the spiritual ruin of the neighbor is properly intended. But if the spiritual ruin of another is not intended, but only the satisfaction of one's own will, it is called simply direct ¹.

¹ More briefly Suarez (De Char. Disp. 10. Sect. 2. n. 1.): It can be understood in three ways that one leads someone to sinning. First with this direct intention, that he may spiritually die, as the devil does. Second also directly by inducing to the work, not that he may fall, but on account of some utility or pleasure of mine. Third only indirectly, by doing something whence he is stirred up to sinning. The first with Cardinal de Lugo (De Poenit. Disp. 16. n. 157.) can be called direct and formal scandal; the second simply direct; the third indirect.

Theologians commonly distinguish active and passive scandal. Active scandal is that to which the given definition applies. Passive scandal is the spiritual ruin of the neighbor itself, and is improperly called scandal, since it ought better to be called the effect of scandal ².

² It must be noted, says Suarez (De Char. Disp. 10. Sect. 1. n. 1.), that commonly this passive scandal is wont to be thought and called not so much the spiritual ruin which consists in sin, as a sort of astonishment and rumor which is stirred up in neighbors from the sin of another; but that never has the proper reason of scandal, unless it includes some malice which in some way draws its origin from him who gave scandal, as is gathered from Jerome..., and St. Thomas.

But scandal can be active or given, without being passive or received; because an action apt per se for scandal can be placed without the effect following. And vice versa it can be received without being given; but then the scandal is not properly to be attributed to the action of the neighbor, but rather to the ignorance, imagination, or even malice of him who suffers the scandal, or admits it without foundation. But this is called scandal of the little ones, if it is taken up from weakness or ignorance of the neighbor; but it is called pharisaical if it comes from the mere malice of the subject. - St. Lig. n. 43.

235. Principles. - I. Scandal, even indirect, is not only a grave sin from its genus, but a sin of specific malice ³, most great and horrible, since it thrusts down into Gehenna souls redeemed by Christ. For this reason Christ the Lord exclaims, Matt. 18.7: Woe to the world from scandals... Woe to that man through whom scandal comes ⁴.

³ The specific reason of this sin is that it is against charity, and, as St. Thomas says (2. 2. q. 43. art. 3.), it is directly opposed to fraternal correction, in which the removal of a special harm is intended. But there are those who think that St. Thomas held this only concerning direct scandal, and indeed that by which the sin of another is intended as his spiritual evil. Thus Suarez (De Charit. disp. 10. sect. 2. n. 4.), who alleges others of the older authors for the same opinion. But those words of St. Thomas: When someone... intends to draw another to sinning, do not necessarily signify the intention of drawing to sin insofar as it is the spiritual evil of another. Otherwise, indeed, Suarez himself (ibid. n. 3.) cites the same Holy Doctor for himself, where he attributes the proper malice of scandal to any direct scandal.

But that this malice is present also in indirect scandal is the common doctrine against some older authors (apud Suar. l. c. n. 5.), and is easily proved. For it is clear that a sin is aggravated, even by a new species, from harm foreseen with the obligation of avoiding it, even if it is not intended per se: and this is plainly evident, because in morals the direct and indirect voluntary belong to the same species.

⁴ Yet do not infer that the sin of scandal is always mortal. For one can sin venially in this not only on account of the imperfection of the act, but also on account of smallness of matter, namely if you induce another only to a light fault, for example, to lying. Thus St. Thomas (2. 2. q. 43. art. 4.): But if he intends to induce the neighbor to sin venially..., it is a venial sin. And this indeed, as St. Thomas has (l. c.), has force not only with regard to indirect scandal, but also with regard to direct; and it is to be understood of the act insofar as it induces the spiritual ruin of another. For if the act by which scandal is begotten is considered in itself, certainly (as Sanchez well notes, Moral. Lib. I. cap. 6. n. 11.) it can happen that a work otherwise mortal per se is nevertheless light with regard to the reason of scandal, and vice versa grave by reason of scandal, although per se it is either light or even in no way evil, but only has the appearance of evil; whence that saying of Paul (1. Cor. VIII. 13.): If food scandalizes my brother, I will not eat flesh forever.

II. Scandal of the little ones or of the weak is to be avoided as often as this can be done without grave inconvenience, both by omission of an indifferent work, and even by omission of a good work not commanded; the reason is that from Charity we are bound to impede the ruin of the little ones when we easily can, for example, by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by deferring it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc. ⁵.

⁵ Since truly in this way too the occasion of spiritual ruin is furnished to the neighbor, so that in some proper sense this ruin is said to be caused; for this reason it has pleased others to call this scandal of the little ones not merely received, but also given. Thus Bonac. (De Pecc. Disp. 2. q. 4. p. 2. n. 2. 3.), Sanchez (Moral. Lib. I. cap. 6. n. 1.), and others.

III. Pharisaical, or malicious, scandal, at least ordinarily ⁶, is not necessarily to be avoided either by omission of a good work, or by omission even of an indifferent work, not having the appearance of evil: the reason is that such scandal arises from the malice alone of him who receives the scandal, and for that reason it is in no way given, but purely received.

⁶ Thus Suarez (De Charit. Disp. 10. Sect. 3. n. 9.): When it is said that the scandal of the Pharisees is not to be avoided by omitting spiritual goods, it must be understood either regularly, or certainly that it is never to be omitted in fact; nevertheless it is necessary sometimes to omit an external good work. But he gives the reason (ibid. n. 8.): If care for the good of the neighbor can oblige one to doing good, why not also sometimes to interrupting it? especially since a man is deprived of no spiritual good on account of this: both because that omission is chiefly necessary in an exterior act, but in interior desire he can retain the fruit and merit; and also because this very thing, that he deprives himself of the merit of that work on account of the good of the neighbor, will be a greater merit than the good work itself. Hence in works of counsel the matter is clear.

236. Questions. - Q. 1º Are precepts sometimes to be omitted on account of scandal of the little ones?

Resp. 1º Neg., with regard to negative precepts of natural right, because these oblige always and for always, and works contrary to them are intrinsically evil. But affirmative precepts which do not oblige for always can sometimes lawfully, indeed must ⁷, be omitted, for example, the precept of correcting sinners, if graver ruin is to be feared from it; but it must rather be said that then the law itself ceases. - St. Lig. n. 51.

⁷ This rule is general; but, as Suarez notes (De Char. Disp. 10. Sect. 3. n. 9.), then one must prudently judge in the individual case what outweighs more, whether the ruin of the neighbor to be avoided, or that work to be omitted. It must also be considered how grave that precept is, how great its necessity or utility, and after all things have been considered judgment must be given, as must be done whenever things occur looking to diverse precepts, which nevertheless cannot be done at the same time. And indeed these things must also be considered when it is a matter of positive precepts.

Resp. 2º With regard to positive human precepts, it is controverted. The 1st probable opinion affirms, when grave inconvenience has been excluded, because the precept of avoiding scandal of the neighbor, as natural, is to be preferred to positive precepts. Hence a woman knowing that she will be shamefully desired by someone if she goes to the prescribed Mass is bound to omit it once or again, if hope is present that afterward the scandal will cease: nevertheless not more often, on account of the grave inconvenience which would follow from this. - St. Lig. ibid. - Suarez. - Laymann, etc. - Yet others deny no less probably ⁸. - See St. Lig. ibid.

⁸ They deny, namely, that a woman is bound to omit Mass, although they grant that she can omit it. This latter point indeed seems difficult, unless they grant it on account of whatever probability of the opposite opinion. For if the necessity of avoiding scandal is absent, it does not appear why she would not be bound to be present at Mass. Meanwhile note three things: 1º this question is made concerning scandal which someone in particular can suffer, but not when fear generally arises lest perhaps someone be scandalized; 2º an obligation of this kind of avoiding scandal rarely occurs, as Suarez notes (De Char. Disp. 10. Sect. 3. n. 10.); 3º in this variety of opinions the Confessor can indeed furnish counsels, but cannot urge obligations.

Q. 2º Are you bound to let go temporal goods in order to avoid scandal?

Resp. Neg., ordinarily speaking, because Charity toward the neighbor does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Hence you are not bound to pay more than is fair to a workman or coachman, although you foresee that otherwise he is going to blaspheme: for that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur more often, and thus easily becomes grave; indeed more, this could often be an incitement to blaspheming ⁹. - St. Lig. n. 52.

⁹ Thus neither is a pastor bound to let go those things which are owed to him by right of stole, in order, namely, to forestall slanders; for a grave inconvenience would arise from this not only to himself, but also to his successors; but with the poor it will be more expedient that he later help by alms those from whom he exacts his own right.

Q. 3º In scandal is there not only a sin against Charity, but also against the virtue to the violation of which the neighbor is induced?

Resp. 1º Affirm., with regard to direct scandal. For any virtue especially forbids not only that it be violated, but also that someone directly induce another to violate it. - Thus almost all.

Resp. 2º Some affirm also with regard to indirect scandal. Yet others better deny with Lugo, de Poenit. D. 16. n. 159. For otherwise he who by his example moves another to stealing would be bound to restitution, which the Doctors very commonly deny ¹⁰.

¹⁰ Therefore it suffices in confession to express generally the sin of scandal, nor is it necessary to indicate the species of sin to which others were indirectly induced. Much less is there need that circumstances be expressed which perhaps add a species to the sins of others, for example, whether those who could have been induced to lust by shameful speech or picture are married or bound by vow, etc. Add that neither is it necessary, where several have been scandalized by the same act, to express their number, according to those things which were disputed in the Treatise on Sins.

** VV. (in the Note at Pag. 915.) object that what is said here, namely that it is not necessary to indicate the species of sin to which others were indirectly induced, does not cohere with the things contained in the Note at n. 235, namely that the proper malice of scandal is present both in direct and indirect scandal, because in morals the direct and indirect voluntary belong to the same species. - Resp. The proper malice of scandal is that which is opposed to charity; and this is found also in indirect scandal, because, as Suarez says (De Char. Disp. 10. Sect. 2. n. 9.), I can be bound to avoiding a work, lest the neighbor be induced to sinning, from the obligation of charity. But the same Suarez (ibid.) indicates the distinction between indirect and direct scandal with regard to guilt against another virtue thus: In that case (of indirect scandal) he is judged to be the moral cause of the ruin of the neighbor, insofar as it is against charity, but not insofar as it is against other virtues. Nor is it similar concerning him who directly induces by counsel: for this is openly against the obligation of any virtue. Lugo himself (De Poenit. Disp. 16. n. 161.) expressed this thus: Therefore neither do you sin against justice, if, foreseeing, outside your intention, that another will be induced from your intemperance to stealing, you do not impede it; because justice indeed obliges you not to procure that others steal, but not that you impede their thefts and abstain from intemperance for this end. Since Lugo has these things, and explains and defends them at length, it does not appear how St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 45.) alleges him for the opposite opinion, which he holds, as also Tamburini, who (Conf. Lib. 2. c. 1. n. 105.) teaches the same as Lugo, and moreover Collet (Tom. 3. p. 327.), who indeed establishes that one also sins against the virtue to the violation of which one induces by scandal; but he has this in the thesis concerning direct scandal.

237. • Q. 4º Must one sinning with an accomplice declare in confession the circumstance of solicitation?

Resp. More probably neg., because, with the consent of the other acceding, solicitation is only a merely aggravating circumstance; nor less does the accomplice by consent become guilty of scandal; therefore the sin of scandal is sufficiently accused by confessing the sin committed with others. - St. Lig. n. 46. - Lugo. - Yet the Salmanticenses and others probably affirm, who say that the action of inducing to sinning is a distinct and special sin ¹¹.

¹¹ That reason does not contradict the first opinion; for this does not deny that a special sin of scandal intervenes; but it affirms that this is common to each one sinning, and therefore is sufficiently expressed in confession when complicity with another is expressed, for example, the sin of fornication.

Q. 5º Is it lawful to persuade a lesser evil to someone determined upon a greater?

Resp. Affirm. more probably with St. Lig. n. 57. Yet some limit this, if the lesser evil is contained in some way in the greater, as striking in homicide, etc.; which limitation, however, does not seem necessary to St. Alph. ¹².

¹² Others except, if to one wishing to inflict a greater damage on one person, you persuade that a lesser damage is to be inflicted on another. Thus Sporer (T. 4. Cap. 3. n. 27.) after Lugo (de Iust. et Iur. Disp. 19. n. 47.), to whom St. Alph. adheres (Lib. 3. n. 565.). But Sanchez (De Matr. Lib. 7. Disp. 11. n. 24.), Turrianus (De Fide, etc. Disp. 95. dub. 6.), and Vasquez (Opusc. De Scandalo art. 1. dub. 2. n. 14.) affirm more probably that this is lawful. The reason is (says Vasquez), because this kind of counsel formally tends to this, that a greater sin not be committed, from which it happens that he from whom the robber steals that which is less is not reasonably unwilling concerning him who furnished the counsel. Nor does Lugo's reason on the opposite side seem very efficacious, because namely while you propose this theft to one who was thinking nothing about it, it is the same as if you opened the door for him to steal. For it still remains to be proved that in those circumstances it is illicit to open the door in that way.

Q. 6º Is it lawful to permit an occasion of sinning, so that the guilty person may be corrected?

Resp. Affirm., because to permit is not to induce, and there is sufficient reason for permitting the sin. Hence they are excused from sin per se: 1º parents and masters who allow children or servants to sin, so that they may find an opportune place of correcting them; - 2º guards of fields, vineyards, etc., who hide themselves so that those doing damage may be caught, and they may exact punishment from them. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig. n. 58. - Laymann, etc.

238. • Q. 7º Is it lawful even to place an occasion of sin?

Resp. It is controverted. Affirm. more probably, because the one sinning is not induced into sin, just as the usurer from whom a loan is requested is not induced: for an indifferent act is placed with sufficient reason. Hence probably a master does not sin who deliberately leaves the key of the chest in which money is stored placed there, in order to test the doubtful fidelity of a servant. - St. Lig. n. 28. - Laymann, Collet, against certain persons who deny for this reason, as if this were the same as positively concur with the sin, expressly creating its danger and inducing to it.

Q. 8º What about the communication of the faithful with Jews?

Resp. Both for protecting the dignity of the Christian Religion and for avoiding any danger whatever of perversion, it has been established by the Church: 1º that Christians not dwell with Jews; 2º that they not be present at their banquets; 3º that they not serve them; 4º that they not eat their unleavened bread; 5º that Christian women not nurse the infants of Jews, whether in the homes of the latter or in their own home (C. Nullus, C. Omnes, C. Iudaei, and St. Lig. n. 18. Pius IV Constit. Cum enim, and S. Congr. Inquisit. on the day 15 March 1612).

Nevertheless, with any danger of perversion excluded, probably it is not deadly, indeed there is no fault, if this is done from a reasonable cause. - St. Lig. l. 2. n. 18. - See Cases, n. 226 et seq.

1º Around lust; 2º around depraved books; 3º around dances; 4º around spectacles.

239. • It is a most grave scandal to do, represent, or display those things which notably provoke to lust; because no subtler poison can be offered to the soul.

Hence those are guilty of most grave scandal: - 1º who represent shameful things in comedies or other gatherings; - 2º who compose or sing shameful ditties or songs; - 3º who make or expose obscene statues or images; - 4º who seduce pupils entrusted to them by depraved examples. - St. Lig. n. 56.

Questions. - Q. 1º Does a woman walking with uncovered breast sin gravely?

Resp. Affirm., if the uncovering is immoderate, or very notable, notwithstanding any contrary custom whatever. But if it is not so immoderate, custom will easily excuse from grave sin. For custom notably diminishes the force of concupiscence, since accustomed things excite the imagination less. - St. Lig. n. 55. ¹³.

¹³ Although it is the most common opinion of the Doctors, as St. Alphonsus testifies (Lib. 2. n. 55.), that a moderate uncovering of the breast is not to be condemned as mortal sin where such a custom flourishes; yet for the most part they perhaps do not say what kind of uncovering is moderate or immoderate, because the custom can be varied for various places. Concerning this matter Cajetan says thus (Sum. V. Ornatus): The (inordinate) quality of adornment commonly induces venial sin, if it is indecent and less chaste, as the adornment of women showing half the breasts. Nevertheless, where the custom is already accustomed, it seems to be without sin.

Whatever be the case, St. Alphonsus has two things (l. c.) most worthy of note. The first is, that those women who introduce this custom somewhere sin gravely. But the other is a general warning, which St. Antoninus hands down in these words: It seems that it must be said, that where in ornaments of this kind the Confessor finds what is clearly and undoubtedly mortal, he should not absolve such a one, unless she proposes to abstain from such a crime. But if he cannot clearly perceive whether it is mortal, then the sentence does not seem to be hastened (as William the Speculator says in a certain similar case), namely so that he would deny absolution on this account, or make for her a conscience concerning mortal sin; because by afterward acting against that, even if that were not mortal, it will be mortal for her, because everything which is against conscience builds unto gehenna... And since laws are more ready to loose than to bind... and it is better to render an account to the Lord concerning too much mercy than concerning too much severity, as Chrysostom says... it seems rather that she is to be absolved and left to the divine examination. Yet I confess that both preachers in preaching, and Confessors in the hearing of confessions, ought to detest such things, and persuade that they be put away, since they are excessive and immoderate, yet not so indiscriminately to assert that they are mortal.

Q. 2º Does a woman sin gravely who wears superfluous adornment, or paints her face with cosmetics?

Resp. to the 1st. Neg. per se, because adornment does not of its nature gravely provoke to lust; indeed it is often required for the becomingness of one's state ¹⁴. Resp. to the 2nd. Neg. likewise: for of itself this by no means exceeds a venial stain, if it is done to catch a little vain glory; but it will be free of all sin if a just cause intervenes, for example a natural defect to be covered, etc.

¹⁴ Let St. Thomas be consulted (2. 2. q. 169. art. 1.), where he shows that both virtue and vice can be present in adornment. Virtue indeed is present if the person conducts himself moderately in all things according to the custom of the country, and according to his own condition and dignity; but vice is present both by excess and by defect.

But specifically concerning the adornment and paints of women, the doctrine of St. Thomas is reduced to these heads (from 2. 2. q. 169. art. 2., and Comm. in Isai. cap. 4.): 1º They sin mortally if they adorn themselves with the mind of provoking to lust; 2º They sin venially if they employ ornaments merely from vanity, levity, ostentation; 3º It is a venial fault from its kind that adornment is superfluous, or beyond the condition of one's state, whether this is done by excess or by defect; 4º There is no sin per se if the custom of the country and the condition of the state is observed; 5º Women licitly add something of ornament, that they may please husbands either whom they have or whom they ought to take; 6º Paintings will be mortal if they are applied for lasciviousness; venial if merely for feigning beauty; but none if for concealing some defect; 7º Those are excused from sin who go about with hair not veiled, if they do this not from vanity, but from custom, which otherwise is not praiseworthy.

But to the question whether a woman is bound to put away adornment for avoiding the scandal of others, Suarez thus answers from the common opinion (De Charit. Disp. 10. Sect. 3. n. 10.): If the adornment is moderate and becoming, per se she is not bound (to put it away) for avoiding scandal; because of itself the act is not evil, nor does it have per se the character of active scandal more than natural beauty, and because it would be grave to oblige to this. And indeed, for avoiding the dangers of others, no one has yet obliged women to disfigure their own face.

Q. 3º Does a woman sin gravely who puts on men's clothing?

Resp. Neg. per se: for if this is done for a just cause, it can be free from every fault; if from levity or jest, it does not exceed venial sin, scandal or danger of lust being set aside, however. - St. Lig. n. 52.

Q. 4º Do those sin gravely who go about masked or in disguise?

Resp. Neg. per se, provided, that is, they do not go to those gatherings in which for the most part a proximate occasion of sinning occurs.

240. • Q. 5º Is it lawful to serve prostitutes or those keeping concubines?

Resp. to the 1st. Neg., both because of scandal, and also because of the very great danger of falling. But if perhaps any cases are to be excepted, these will have to be judged from the circumstances of the persons, or from the degree of necessity.

840. 1. Notion and species. (A) Scandal, from the word skandalon, literally designates any obstacle placed in the way, at which, if someone strikes, he must stumble or fall; metaphorically it is someone or something by which a man is induced to err or to sin.² It is defined by St. Thomas as "a saying or deed less right, furnishing occasion of (spiritual) ruin."

¹ Besides the authors cited above, cf. Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXIII, 1901, p. 1195.

² Grimm, Lexicon graeco-latinum, 4th ed., 1903, p. 401.

Therefore three things are required for scandal: (a) an external act, or the omission of the same; for a merely internal act, since it is unknown to others, cannot induce them into sin. This act can consist in words, deeds, manner of conducting oneself, etc.; or in the omission of some external act, when from this the neighbor can be induced to the omission of some duty. (b) An act less right, whether in itself, or by reason of the person or circumstances; for an act good in every respect does not allure others to evil; yet it suffices that the act have the appearance of evil; thus one who eats meat in the presence of others on a prohibited day can scandalize those who do not know that this is done for a legitimate cause. (c) An act furnishing to another an occasion of ruin, or at least of some spiritual harm. It is not required that the neighbor actually suffer some spiritual harm, but it suffices that, all things considered, an occasion is probably furnished to him for sinning, whether gravely or lightly. It matters little whether the sin to which the neighbor is induced is of the same or of a different species; scandal is truly given whenever it is probably foreseen that, by the less right action which is performed before him, the neighbor will commit some sin which otherwise he would not have committed. Wherefore, if it is morally certain that those before whom the evil action is performed are so confirmed in virtue, or already so determined to sin, that this action has no influence upon them, there is not truly a sin of scandal. Yet it is not licit to ask from the neighbor an evil thing, even if he is habitually disposed to doing it; for it is more grave actually to sin than to be disposed to sin.

Theologians commonly say that scandal properly is not committed by one who draws others back from perfection, without inducing them to sin. Whatever may be the case, by acting thus he sins against charity, which demands that we furnish others a good example: "So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven."³

³ Matt. 5:16.

841. (B) Scandal, on the part of the intention, is direct, when the sin of another is truly intended; indirect, when it is only foreseen, without being intended in itself (above, n. 168). (a) Direct scandal is called diabolical when the sin of the neighbor is intended insofar as it is an offense of God, or the ruin of another, for example, when someone has conversations against the faith directly in order to tear faith out of hearts; it is called simply direct when the sin of the neighbor is intended for another end, for example, for one's own utility or pleasure, as often happens in filthy speech. - To direct scandal can be referred in practice the sin of inducement, by which someone, by command, prayers, counsel, and other modes of this kind, solicits or provokes another to sin: then he is not only the occasion, but also a partial cause of the sin. (b) Indirect scandal happens in many ways, for example, when someone sins before others, foreseeing that they will fall from this into the same sin; when he does those things which, although not evil in themselves, are morally dangerous and probably allure others to sin; when something less right is accomplished, from which it is foreseen that certain persons will abandon the faith or despise religion; when something legitimate in itself is required, from which, however, it is foreseen that others will fall into sins of hatred or blasphemy.

842. 2. Malice of scandal. (A) Scandal directly willed is a grave sin from its genus, both against charity, and against the virtue to which the neighbor is induced to do injury.

(a) Scripture strictly reproves scandal:⁴ "But he that shall scandalize one of these little ones that believe in Me, it were better for him that a millstone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals! For it must needs be that scandals come. Nevertheless woe to that man by whom the scandal cometh!"

⁴ Matt. 18:6-7; cf. Mark 9:42; Luke 17:1.

(b) Truly, if God so loves men that, for their salvation, He handed over His only-begotten Son, if Christ gave His own blood for the redemption of souls, does not he gravely offend God and Christ who by word or deed induces others to sin, and wills to destroy those for whom the Redeemer died? - Again, if charity commands that we love the neighbor and sincerely desire his eternal salvation, if we are bound to correct the neighbor who is slipping, and to turn him away from evil, do we not sin gravely when we intend his spiritual ruin, and allure him to evil by words or examples?

843. Moreover the gravity of scandal depends upon many circumstances. (a) Generally speaking, scandal is grave when the sin to which another is moved is lethal; otherwise it is light. Hence a sin venial in itself can be mortal by reason of scandal, namely when the neighbor is induced to grave fault; on the contrary, a sin mortal in itself sometimes causes only light scandal, by reason of the circumstances. (b) Besides, the gravity of scandal depends much upon the influence of the scandalous action upon the ruin of the neighbor; and this influence can be greater if the person acting is constituted in dignity, or if the person suffering scandal is weaker in mind; thus, other things being equal, scandal given to younger persons is more grave, since they more easily contract depraved habits from it. Hence parents, superiors, priests, and religious ought carefully to abstain from less right actions, which furnish scandal much more easily to children, subjects, or laypersons than if they were performed by the common people.

(c) The gravity is also increased from the number of persons who are scandalized by the same action, although it is disputed whether scandal is multiplied numerically according to the number of these persons.

(d) Finally it depends most of all upon the foresight and intention of the agent: for nothing is willed unless first known; therefore, the graver the harms foreseen by the agent, the greater is the scandal.

From this it is inferred that scandal, even direct scandal, is sometimes light from lightness of matter, or lightness of influence, or from imperfect advertence.

844. Disputed question. Here, moreover, it is asked whether it is licit to advise a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater one. (a) It is not licit to advise a lesser evil to which the neighbor is not yet determined; for example, if someone is ready to kill an enemy, it is not licit to advise him to theft, to which he was not determined; for evils are not to be advised that goods may come. (b) But if someone is already determined to perpetrate some evil, and cannot be turned from it, according to many it is licit, in order to avoid a greater evil, to advise him to a lesser evil of the same species; thus one who is ready to steal one hundred coins from Peter can be advised that he steal only fifty. We think this probable, provided however that the counselor so speak that he by no means seem to approve the evil action; for example, in the case brought forward, if Titius, after having tried with all his strength to turn Caius away from theft, says: at least do not steal one hundred, since fifty are enough for you. Or, in other words, to advise sin is forbidden; to turn away from a greater sin is licit.⁵

⁵ St. Alphonsus, n. 57; Laloux, De act. humanis, p. 344.

845. (B) Indirect scandal is not licit, except when the action is good in itself or indifferent, the end of the agent is honorable, and a proportionately grave reason is had for permitting the sin of the neighbor. For then the principle concerning the indirect voluntary, set forth above, n. 175, can be applied.

(a) The Apostle inculcates this, setting forth the manner of acting concerning idolothytes, or foods which were offered to idols. Certain Christians, knowing that idols were nothing but vain images, did not doubt to eat idolothytes; but others suffered scandal from this, because they thought the eating of these things polluted the conscience. Paul indeed agreed with the former, but admonishes them not to furnish scandal to weaker brothers:⁶ "But take heed lest perhaps this your liberty become a stumbling-block to the weak. For if a man see him who hath knowledge sit at meat in the idol's temple, shall not his conscience, being weak, be emboldened to eat those things which are sacrificed to idols? And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died? Now when you sin thus against the brethren, and wound their weak conscience, you sin against Christ. Wherefore, if meat scandalize my brother, I will never eat flesh, lest I should scandalize my brother."

⁶ 1 Cor. 8:9-13.

(b) Reason suggests the same. For, on the one hand, we are generally bound, by the law of charity, to avoid whatever can induce the neighbor into sin, and therefore to abstain from an action on whose occasion we foresee that the neighbor will sin. On the other hand, however, if there is a grave reason for doing some act, private and public good demands that this act not be prohibited because of an evil effect which is foreseen to follow from the weakness or malice of the neighbor.

When, moreover, the good effect compensates the evil can be judged from the things already said, n. 175-181, and from the following rules.

846. Practical rules. (a) If there is question of works which, although not prohibited, nevertheless have in themselves the appearance of evil, one must generally abstain from them, unless an urgent and grave reason is present, or unless scandal can be removed by some explanation. Thus a priest ought to abstain from frequenting suspicious persons, even if he is moved by no depraved motive, unless a reason urges him to administer the sacraments to them; likewise a cleric ought to abstain from prohibited food, unless he informs those standing by that, on account of weak health, he has been dispensed from the law of abstinence.

(b) When there is question of good or indifferent works not prescribed, we are generally bound to omit them in order to avoid scandal, if this can be done without grave inconvenience; but not with grave inconvenience.

If a woman knows that she is shamefully loved by a determined man, so that she is for him an occasion of sinning, she ought to flee his sight, if she easily can, for example, by walking by another way, by not coming to a meeting where he will be present. But under this head she is not bound to abstain from every walk or recreation: for this would be too burdensome.

847. (c) If there is question of works prescribed by positive law, whether divine or human, they can be omitted on account of scandal, and indeed sometimes they ought to be, for a time, if a proportionately grave reason requires this. For when two precepts concur which cannot be fulfilled at the same time, generally the natural precept of avoiding scandal prevails, as the greater and stricter one.

Hence a girl who knows that a young man takes occasion from the sight of her for sinning can, and sometimes ought for a time, abstain from hearing Mass in the church where this young man is present. Likewise a wife can and ought sometimes to omit the hearing of Mass or fasting, if she foresees that her husband, in such or such a circumstance, will from this take occasion of blaspheming and despising religion. But I have said for a time, because we are indeed bound to defer a prescribed work in order to avoid a greater evil, but not for a long time or altogether to abstain from it, with great spiritual detriment. Wherefore, if a husband altogether forbids his wife to hear Mass or to make confession, the wife can abstain from these for a time, in the hope of alluring the man to better things; but, after some time, she ought sweetly and firmly to vindicate and exercise her rights.

848. Corollaries. (a) From this it is possible to understand what must be said about the scandal of the little ones and pharisaical scandal. Scandal of this kind is not active, or given, but passive, or received: if it arises from the ignorance or weakness of the one sinning, it is called scandal of the little ones; if from his malice, it is called pharisaical.

These things posited, scandal of the little ones is to be avoided whenever this can be done without grave inconvenience. For this is gathered from the text of Paul cited above, n. 845. Pharisaical scandal, however, is not necessarily to be avoided, provided there is even a slight reason for acting; for the whole malice of the act proceeds from him who is scandalized. Thus a priest, for a slight cause, can pass through streets where he will find haters of religion who for that reason will blaspheme.

(b) From the same principles the question can be solved whether it is licit not to remove an occasion of sinning, or even to place one, although it is foreseen that the neighbor will sin from it. Each is licit, provided a proportionately grave reason is had; for, of itself, to place such an occasion is not to cause evil, but only to permit it; which is licit for a just cause. Thus parents and masters can leave money in an open place, or purposely open a chest in which coins are stored, in order to test the fidelity of children or servants; for it is of great moment that they be able to correct or dismiss them, if they are found unfaithful.

849. 3. Reparation of scandal. (A) That there exists some obligation of repairing scandal, insofar as this can be done, can be inferred from what has already been said: for if by fraternal correction we are bound to procure the amendment of the one sinning and to forestall his relapse, a fortiori when we ourselves by scandal furnished the occasion of sinning.

We incur this obligation from charity alone, if we have seduced others only by persuasion or bad example; but from justice, if by unjust means, for example by deceit, force, fear, or false doctrine, we have drawn them to sin; from office, if superiors have induced to evil subjects whom, by force of their office, they were bound to edify.

850. (B) The mode of reparation is diverse according to diverse circumstances. (a) If the scandal was public, it ought also to be repaired publicly, so that the reparation may become known and profit all to whom it was given. (b) If the scandal was given by depraved counsel, false doctrine, or bad books, one must strive first that the further influence of the scandal be removed, and second that the evil already caused be compensated by good example. Thus, if wicked counsel was given and still remains efficacious, it is necessary to revoke it, by oneself or by another, by suggesting good counsel. If certain persons were seduced by false doctrine, the errors ought to be retracted and corrected by an exposition of the truth. If many have been corrupted by depraved books, their diffusion must be impeded, insofar as this can be done, and good books written or spread.

(c) Ordinary scandals, which are furnished only by bad example, are usually sufficiently removed by cessation from the scandal, by public frequentation of the sacraments, by good example, by prayer for the one scandalized, and by other similar means.

Moreover, in order that sins opposed to charity may be avoided more securely, nothing is more efficacious than assiduously to cultivate kindness,¹ mercy, and patience, according to the words of the Apostle: "Put ye on therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, the bowels of mercy, kindness, humility, modesty, patience; bearing with one another, and forgiving one another, if any have a complaint against another; even as the Lord hath forgiven you, so also do you. But above all these things have charity, which is the bond of perfection."²

¹ Cf. Faber, Spiritual Conferences, Kindness; rendered in French as Conferences spirituelles, Bonte; Guibert, La Bonte, Paris, 1904.

² Col. 3:12-14.

2. We sin indirectly against the spiritual welfare of our fellowmen by giving scandal.

Scandal (scandalum) is defined by St. Thomas, following St. Jerome, as "something less rightly done or said that occasions another's spiritual downfall."¹⁰

¹⁰ St. Jerome, In Matth., l. II, c. 15 (Migne, P. L., XXVI, 107); St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, 43, art. 1.

If the "thing less rightly said or done" is immoral, either in itself or at least according to outward appearance, the scandal is called active or objective (scandalum activum). If the act or utterance in question is apt to give scandal merely in an accidental way, and the offense to others, therefore, arises from their own intellectual or moral condition, the scandal is called passive or subjective (scandalum passivum). Subjective or passive scandal, consequently, is identical with the sin caused by the act by which scandal is given (ruina spiritualis).¹¹

¹¹ See Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 214: “A distinction is made between direct or indirect scandal, accordingly as the neighbor’s sin is intended by the agent or only foreseen, at least in general. Direct scandal is also called diabolical when the spiritual ruin of the neighbor is precisely intended. But if the sin of another is intended for one’s own advantage, it is called simply direct. Theologians commonly distinguish active and passive scandal. Active scandal is that to which the given definition applies. Passive scandal is the spiritual ruin of the neighbor itself and therefore is improperly called scandal, and should better be called the effect of scandal.”

It follows from what we have said that not every active scandal entails passive scandal, while, conversely, passive scandal may exist where no active scandal has been given. The reason for this is the spiritual and moral disposition of men.

If one takes scandal because of his own ignorance or indecision, this is called scandalum pusillorum vel infirmorum; if malice is the cause of the scandal taken, we speak of scandalum pharisaicum.¹²

¹² Matth. XV, 11–20; XVIII, 6 sqq.; John VI, 62; Gal. V, 11; 1 John II, 10.—Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 214: “Scandal can be active or given without being passive or accepted, because an action may be posited which is of itself apt to give scandal without the effect following. And conversely, scandal may be accepted without being given; but then the accepted scandal is not properly to be attributed to any action of one’s neighbor, but rather to the ignorance, imagination, or even malice of him who suffers the scandal—or rather admits it without foundation. This is called the scandal of the little ones if it is taken from the weakness or ignorance of one’s neighbor; but it is called pharisaical if it proceeds from the mere malice of the subject.”

The duties that arise in connection with the giving and taking of scandal may be briefly defined as follows:

1. It is a sin to give scandal (scandalum activum) knowingly and wilfully, because by so doing a man violates charity; it is a mortal sin if one knows that by committing the act in question he will become the occasion of mortal sin to another.

The guilt incurred by giving active scandal is measured by the position, reputation, and influence of the person who gives it. The larger the number of those who are injured, and the more grievous the sin they are induced to commit, the greater is the guilt of him who gives scandal. Nor is it necessary that the sin of one's fellowman be directly intended or directly caused by the scandalous act (seduction), but it suffices that his spiritual ruin was foreseen and so at least indirectly willed.

The gravity of this sin can be inferred from our Lord's solemn utterance recorded in the Gos- pel of St. Matthew: "He that shall scandalize one of these little ones that believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals! For it must needs be that scandals come: but nevertheless woe to that man by whom the scandal cometh. And if thy hand or thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee. It is better for thee to go into life maimed or lame, than having two hands or feet, to be cast into everlasting fire. And if thy eye scandalize thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee. It is better for thee having one eye to enter life, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire. See that you despise not one of these little ones: for I say to you, that their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven."¹

¹ Matth. XVIII, 6 sqq.: “But whoever shall scandalize one of these little ones who believe in me, it is expedient for him that an ass’s millstone be hung about his neck and that he be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals. For scandals must needs come; nevertheless, woe to that man through whom scandal comes. And if thy hand or thy foot scandalizes thee, cut it off and cast it from thee: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed or lame than, having two hands or two feet, to be cast into everlasting fire. And if thy eye scandalizes thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee: it is better for thee to enter into life with one eye than, having two eyes, to be cast into the hell of fire. See that you despise not one of these little ones: for I say to you that their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven.”

2. In regard to taking scandal (scandalum passivum) it is necessary to make a distinction. No attention need be paid to the scandalum pharisaicum, that is, one need not omit any act dictated by duty or necessity on account of the offence it may give to persons of a hypocritical turn of mind. This rule can be inferred from the conduct of Christ Himself and that of St. Paul.

When Our Lord declared: "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man, but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man,"² and His disciples told Him that the Pharisees were scandalized by what He had said,³ He replied: "Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind."⁴ St. Paul informed the Galatians that he would not yield to the false brethren who pretended to be shocked because the converts from paganism were not circumcised.⁵

² Matth. XV, 11: “Not that which enters into the mouth defiles a man, but that which proceeds out of the mouth, this defiles a man.”

³ Matth. XV, 12.

⁴ Matth. XV, 14: “Let them alone: they are blind, and leaders of the blind.”

⁵ Gal. II, 3 sq.

As for the scandalum pusillorum, even the semblance of injustice should be avoided unless the act to which it attaches is dictated by strict duty.⁶ Whatever is necessary and a matter of duty may and should be done, but Christian prudence and charity will avoid giving needless offence to the weak and ignorant.

⁶ Rom. XIV, 13 sqq.; 1 Cor. VIII, 9 sqq.; X, 22 sqq.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 43, art. 7 sq.

Regard for the pusilli should not, however, be carried so far as to give scandal to the mature and educated.⁷ The maxim, “In omnibus caritas,” is correct only when taken in conjunction with, “Ante omnia veritas.”

⁷ John VIII, 32, 36.—St. Gregory the Great, Hom. in Ezech., l. I, 7, n. 5: “Insofar as we can without sin, we ought to avoid scandalizing our neighbors. But if scandal is taken from the truth, it is more useful to allow scandal to arise than for the truth to be abandoned.” (Migne, P. L., LXXVI, 842).—Cfr. St. Bernard, Epist., 34, n. 2: “It is better that scandal should arise than that the truth should be abandoned.” (P. L., CLXXXII, 140).—IDEM, Epist., 78, n. 10 (P. L., CLXXXII, 197); Apol. ad Guilielm., c. 7, n. 15 (CLXXXII, 908).

3. We are never allowed to seduce our neighbor to commit a lesser in order to keep him from a greater sin, but we may permit a lesser sin in order to prevent a more grievous one,⁸ or advise one who is firmly determined to perpetrate a major crime, to commit a minor one.

⁸ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 78, art. 4: “It is in no way lawful to induce a man to sin; it is lawful, however, to make use of another’s sin for a good, because even God makes use of all sins for some good.”—Ibid., 3a, Suppl., qu. 62, art. 3, ad 4: “Sometimes a man who has a wife suspected of adultery lies in wait for her, so that he may be able to catch her in the crime of fornication with witnesses, and thus may proceed to an accusation.”

The reason is that, in the words of St. Alphonsus, by so acting we do not seek something that is evil, but something that is good, namely, the preference of a lesser to a greater evil,⁹ which is an actio bona ex obiecto.¹⁰

⁹ St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. II, n. 57: “The second, more probable opinion holds that it is lawful to counsel a lesser evil if the other has already been determined to carry out a greater one. The reason is that then the counselor does not seek evil but good, namely, the choice of the lesser evil.” (Ed. Gaudé, I, 353).—St. Augustine, De Coniug. Adult., l. II, c. 15, n. 15: “If he is going to do what is not lawful, let him now commit adultery and not commit homicide, so that while his wife is alive he may marry another and not shed human blood.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 482).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 78, art. 4: “It is lawful for him who falls among robbers to disclose the goods which he has, which the robbers sin by plundering, in order that he may not be killed.”

¹⁰ The contrary opinion (non licet suadere minus malum ad evitandum maius) is defended, e. g., by V. Patuzzi, Ethica Christiana, III, 156 sq.—Cfr. this Handbook, Vol. I, p. 213, note 3.

4. Damage or loss caused by active scandal entails the duty of restitution, to be made either in the form of admonition, or instruction, or good example, or prayer, according to the nature of the case. If the damage done was material, material restitution is a duty, provided the damage was, or could have been, foreseen.

St. Paul's admonition: “Ab omni specie mala abstinete vos”¹¹ means, not that we should avoid the semblance of evil, but that we should abstain from evil in every shape.

¹¹ 1 Thess. V, 22: ἀπὸ παντὸς εἴδους πονηροῦ ἀπέχεσθε.

Women in our licentious days have a special duty to avoid giving scandal by an immodest and seductive attire.

The ethics of clothing have been explained in a previous volume of this Handbook.¹²

¹² Vol. III, pp. 27 sqq. On giving scandal by immodest dress see Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., l. II, pp. 123 sqq.

READINGS.—H. Noldin, S. J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 13th ed., pp. 118–126.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, 7th ed., pp. 53–61.—Aug. Lehmkuhl, S. J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 433–439.—T. Slater, S. J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 198 sqq.

— Human society brings it about that we can help or impede the actions of others by words or admonition, by example, and by physical or moral participation.

According to the varied kind of action, charity will counsel or command one or the other. Hence we must treat, in order, of fraternal exhortation and correction; of edification and scandal; and of cooperation in the good and evil action of neighbor.

The Good and the Modes of Fraternal Exhortation. — Since we are all weak in performing a good work, a most suitable exercise of spiritual mercy consists in the pious exhortation by which neighbor is stimulated to good actions. Pious exhortation of this kind can be common and public, in sermons directed to the people or in addresses to some community; it is most usefully made privately, whether in the sacrament of penance or outside the sacrament. Charity will move the confessor not to neglect in the least the most favorable occasion of spiritual counsel which the spontaneous accusation of the penitent offers him, especially when there is question of those who, rarely approaching the sacraments, would scarcely ever otherwise hear the spiritual counsel of a friend. Yet even with pious persons that method is usually not to be omitted. It is wont to be pleasing to penitents, especially if the exhortation is not general and indefinite, but adapted to the proper soul. And even in merely private conversation, how often have prudently persuasive words been the fruitful beginning of great good! Indeed this kind of apostolate among men of the same condition is proclaimed as most efficacious. Further, with attention to the object, exhortation is of a twofold kind: one, directed to the intellect, rather teaches, instructs, indicates or recalls the opportunity of spiritual gain; while the other, acting upon the will, moves more and adds courage for doing good. With attention to time, one again precedes a good action, urging it on, while the other approves and praises it when it has been well done. By sincere and temperate encomium, alien from flattery, men are wonderfully stimulated to attempt better things, while many are gravely chilled by the silence of others and almost lose heart.

— Fraternal reproof or correction denotes an admonition by which someone, moved by fraternal charity, tries to call neighbor back from sin. It is an exercise of spiritual mercy attempted in a spiritual necessity of the common grade. And both by the person correcting and by its end it differs from admonition and from authoritative and judicial correction, which only a public person performs, whether secretly or publicly, for the public or in some way common good to be guarded after a delict has been avoided. In the canonical forum this is ordered by cc. 2307-2309. Its use is rarer in the civil forum, where for the most part only vindicative justice is exercised, and correction consists in the very imposition of the penalty.

Interpreters commonly read the precept of fraternal correction in the place of St. Matthew 18, 15: "If thy brother shall sin against thee, go and reprove him, etc."

It is established by reason itself: we must from charity, apart from grave inconvenience, avert grave evil from neighbor. Nor is it an obstacle that no one sins unless willing, nor that alms are owed to him who labors under voluntary poverty. For the man whom an unhealthy desire agitates is to be compared with one raving, who without another's help will scarcely abstain from inflicting evil upon himself; and there are besides ignorances to be driven away, and also involuntary dangers to be removed.

Matter of Correction. — 1. Every mortal sin of neighbor is per se sufficient matter that this precept oblige under mortal sin. For that which takes away spiritual life induces a sufficient necessity of correction. Venial sin begets no grave obligation of correcting, nor even a light one unless you can do it most easily. And only venially does a private man sin who, on account of fear, shame, or pusillanimity, thinks that he is not so obligated, or is less fit for it. For to such a one, from an affection of this kind, there generally arises a grave inconvenience with which charity obliges less. But judgment must be made more severely concerning a Superior, to whom it pertains from office to correct. He, for guarding the strength of discipline, must easily correct even venial faults and transgressions of rules under grave obligation (not, however, in individual cases).

2. What has been said thus far holds also concerning sins already done or to be done from vincible ignorance, especially gravely culpable ignorance. But if the ignorance has been invincible, the very foundation of correction properly so called, that is, delict, is withdrawn. Yet correction more broadly so called enters in, which is imposed by the office of teaching the ignorant. This office is more proper to Superiors; yet the obligation also affects others because of the harm which an uncorrected defect may bring either to the ignorant person himself, whether there is question of points necessarily to be believed for salvation, or of lust which from custom would become tyrannical, or of other matters; or to others, whether they suffer scandal thence, or are harmed in goods of fortune, reputation, or body; or to the very honor of God.

On this matter these things are to be observed. Transgression of the natural law is always harmful; wherefore there is at least a light obligation of warning him who materially violates that law. - When there is question of goods of fortune which, by a correction made, merely change possessor, but not of harms which bring no equivalent profit to anyone, correction does not oblige under grave sin unless the legitimate possessor is pressed by grave want or, for another cause, ought to be preferred by you. For it matters little per se to the common good that exterior goods be detained by this one rather than by that one; and good faith per se takes away every scandal.

But if someone by accident, for instance from forgetfulness of the day, and without scandal, violates some human precept, for example of fasting or abstinence, no one contends that there is a grave obligation of warning; and not a few deny every obligation.

Persons Obligated. — Private persons are obligated from charity alone; parents also by piety; Superiors and Prelates from strict office. This office is of religion or quasi-piety, indeed of commutative justice, if it is part of an office undertaken.

And although piety obliges no less than justice, the common good to be cared for brings it about that Superiors are held with a graver inconvenience than parents themselves.

Conditions of the Obligation. — The conditions of the obligation are gathered from the necessity of correction, from the probability of effect, so that in doubt you are excused, and elsewhere from the inconvenience which correction brings with it. That these may be explained more fully:

1. Only a Superior must investigate. Nor must he do this indiscreetly, by inquiring curiously about individual matters, but only about those concerning which indications have been given. For a private man it is necessary that the neighbor's sin or danger of sin be certainly evident of itself; nor does a doubtful sign suffice. An inquiry which a private person would attempt would be odious and rather vicious.

2. Alms are to be given only to one in need. Therefore, that you be held to correct, it is necessary that it be at least probable that there has not been amendment, nor that there will be amendment without admonition.

3. A private person is not held, if another equally suitable person is present who is thought about to correct.

4. Without hope of fruit no obligation of correction presses at least a private man. For a Prelate sometimes, for avoiding scandal, must make even a correction immediately useless. It is necessary that a strong reprehension of vice confirm the good. - Where there has been a small hope of fruit, the grave obligation will cease, at least in a private person. Correction which perhaps would be harmful is no longer prescribed, unless a reason of a greater good concurs. In doubt, however, correction is to be presumed useful. And as long as there is hope of fruit, correction will have to be repeated.

5. Outside a suitable place and time, correction is not to be made. Nor is a private person held with grave harm to himself.

Corollary. - Therefore a grave obligation of correction in private persons (not likewise in Superiors or Confessors) will be present rather rarely. Regularly the scrupulous are excused from making it, since they are incapable of employing opportune counsel in this matter, and the obligation would be of very grave inconvenience to them. Finally, with those whose disposition he does not know, a private person will do better to omit correction. Cf. concerning one hearing detraction, St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 73, art. 4.

The Order to Be Observed in Correction. is indicated by Christ Himself: first that it be done entirely privately, then before witnesses, then that the matter be referred to the Prelate of the Church or to the Superior. For the words "Tell the Church" are commonly admitted to mean as much as "tell the Presidents of the Church." Cf. Knabenbauer on Matthew 18, 17. The reason is that reputation must be preserved.

A public sin, or one so notorious that it cannot be hidden by any evasion, can at once be corrected openly or referred to the Superior; this is per se manifest.

The utility of the delinquent himself (which is proportioned to the harm of revelation), an equal harm of an innocent person to be prevented, harm to the community, or the special or general consent of the delinquent himself, also permit that, with that order omitted, the matter be referred immediately to the Superior. And, as our customs are, although the Lord said that one or two should first be employed (St. Matthew 18, 16), it will not often happen that other witnesses besides the Superior, or before the Superior, must be called in.

Is it preferable to refer the matter at once to the Prelate? Let us receive these things from St. Thomas, Quodlib. 11, 9, 10: "This must be held as a rule, that in all these things charity must always be preserved, and that which seems better and more expedient; and if he intends this, namely the amendment of neighbor, and preserves as much as he can the good of charity, then by denouncing he does not sin."

But let Superiors themselves not give easy ears to spontaneous accusers who, under an appearance of the common good, often seek themselves. Nor let them hold one denounced as convicted or suspected before they have heard his explanations.

Denunciation. — Since fraternal correction is mixed with some denunciation, it seems worth the labor to hand down these few things concerning denunciation, especially since every denunciation is at last ultimately directed to warding off evil, whether one's own or that of neighbor.

A threefold denunciation is distinguished: evangelical, canonical, and judicial. The first is made to a Superior as to a father, and has as its end the good of the delinquent himself. - The second is received by a Superior as president of the community whose good he must provide for; and it tends to preserving the safety either of an innocent person or of the community. - The third is made, on account of the common good, to the public avenger of security, whether evils which the guilty are planning must be impeded, or at least by the punishment of the delict the guilty must be restrained and courage must be added to the good.

Judicial denunciation is per se lawful, to be made without any other consideration: because the office of the judge cannot be supplied by any private action, and the reputation of the delinquent can be neglected before the common utility which the punishment of delicts brings. Only by accident, in certain circumstances, on account of excessive harm either of a private person or of religion (as if a very Catholic person or a priest is denounced), will it have to be omitted from charity or religion. Where it becomes necessary for avoiding public harm, the same denunciation will be prescribed.

Canonical denunciation is subject to the same rules as fraternal correction itself, of which it is a certain extension. Here therefore the reputation of the guilty person will have to be spared where he can prudently remain unharmed. Therefore denunciation will per se have to be omitted if its end is obtained sufficiently by private correction. Provision must also be made for common charity, which is easily shaken by an imprudent denunciation. The very person of the Superior, more or less benign, discreet, and prudent, must be attended to. Yet in an equal cause of utility or detriment, the innocent person will have to be preferred to the guilty.

Evangelical denunciation is the very mode of fraternal correction which, after matters have been prudently weighed, seems to be preferred to immediate admonition. By evangelical denunciation the Superior can proceed only as a father, and therefore impose only a medicinal penalty. Yet nothing prevents him from forbidding certain things to the denounced subject in virtue of holy obedience or under penalty of excommunication, if that seems likely to profit the good of the same subject.

From canonical denunciation it is lawful for the Superior to take all sanctions which seem conducive to guarding or restoring common discipline, and this even if these sanctions are foreseen by accident to be harmful to the denounced person.

Judicial denunciation gives place to public vengeance.

If the matter bears it, the Superior can declare to one referring evangelically the obligation of canonical or judicial denunciation, and strictly command either to the same person. But as long as evangelical denunciation has not been legitimately changed into canonical or judicial denunciation, the Superior per se, by the general law of entrusted secrecy, is prohibited from acting canonically or judicially. I say per se, because the very obligation of entrusted secrecy is circumscribed by certain limits.

Corollary. — 1. The indication of hidden corrupters in colleges over which prudent Superiors preside is regularly to be strongly advised; yet the harm of him who is reported must be weighed, since perhaps, if he is expelled, spiritual ruin may threaten him. - 2. As long as there is question only of the harm of one or another, it does not seem, if the inconvenience of the one reporting is grave, to be imposed strictly. A grave inconvenience would exist if the one reporting would have to manifest his own delict thence, or if as an "informer" he would become hateful to others. - 3. But if corruption of many, infamy of the house, or another reason of common harm is feared, the delation will have to be made, with grave harm to oneself disregarded. Yet the confessor will be able to be silent about the matter, if the warning seems plainly about to be useless, or if there must be doubt concerning the efficacy of the denunciation made for preventing evil.

He is not yet a corrupter who has spoken less chastely. But it must be seen whether the occasion was extraordinary, or rather whether from some habit he mixes base conversations; such a one is per se to be reported.

According to the quality of the Superior, the manner of acting can be changed. But the Superior is to be presumed prudent and discreet.

— In ascetical works, the word edification is customarily taken metaphorically to designate that positively beneficent action which even unconsciously a man sincerely devoted to cultivating piety and virtues exercises. The wonderful power of good example is expressed and confirmed by the proverb itself: "Words sound, examples draw." And nothing more excellent is to be adduced in praise of good example than these words of Christ: "So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven" (St. Matthew 5, 16).

Yet virtue is not therefore to be feigned or simulated, as we are also taught by Christ: "But thou when thou fastest, anoint thy head, and wash thy face, that thou appear not to men to fast, but to thy Father who is in secret" (St. Matthew 6, 17. 18). For merit then perishes, if these things are done for human glory alone, and edification itself perishes, if suspicion of vain glory arises.

There are, therefore, actions which, as done openly, always edify, because they yield directly to the honor of God, and by the very manifestation virtue is exercised: for example, profession of faith, observance of an external law, for example of hearing Mass, of abstaining from meats. And there are good actions which, because they are in esteem among all, are easily mixed with a less right intention. These are rather to be hidden than displayed, and circumstances must be permitted to manifest them.

Moreover there is a certain exercise of virtue, either imperfect and partial, or incautious and inelegant, which excites aversion mixed with a certain envy. While, on the contrary, simple, humble, and modest virtue draws souls to God and to itself. Aptly did St. Paul proclaim charity to be kind (1 Cor. 13, 4).

That a man may acquire for himself the merit of edification he must sufficiently intend it. Cf. I, 130. This intention is manifest when someone deliberately goes before others by example, for example in confessing the faith, in undergoing danger for a noble cause, in performing an office of charity. But what must be said concerning that edification which is given by virtue that does not know itself and, from modesty, hides itself? Although distinct knowledge of that edification escapes the agent, nevertheless the humble man does not ignore the power of good example in general, and often says or does those things which manifest the intention of helping neighbor spiritually in every way the opportunity for which is given to him. Therefore an intention sufficient for merit does not seem lacking to him.

The Notion and Division of Scandal. — Scandal properly signifies a stumbling-block which, placed in the way, prepares a fall for him whose foot strikes against it. Metaphorically, it is a saying, deed, or omission on whose occasion neighbor easily sins. - Per se, an action of this kind is only something done less rightly, although by accident a very good action can give occasion to sin. Is not Christ Himself said to have been set for the ruin of many? When such a thing happens, scandal is called merely received or passive, but not actively given.

Therefore they are accustomed to define active scandal as a deed less right, furnishing to another an occasion of spiritual ruin. It is less right insofar as it is evil in itself, or has the appearance of evil. - Active scandal is divided into direct, when something is done with this intention that another should sin, for example direct solicitation to sin. And if, from some hatred of God or of neighbor, the very character of sin is formally intended, scandal is called diabolical. It is indirect when the sin of neighbor is indeed foreseen and permitted, but not intended.

Passive scandal is the occasioned sin itself. If it is connected with active scandal, it is called scandal of the little ones or of the weak; if it has been merely received from the malice of the one scandalized, it is called pharisaic, because the Pharisees, from hatred and envy against Christ, on occasion of His good deeds, suffered such scandal.

What shall we call that which not a few poor, rude, and unlearned persons suffer on occasion of priests, religious, and their action, because, deceived by evil writings, they represent those persons and that action to themselves under a false color? It is rather scandal of the little ones; yet it arises less from the priest himself or from his action, than from the calumnies of those who hate religion.

But observe that not the sin of another itself, but only temptation, is the immediate effect of scandal given: no one sins unless willing.

Further, passive scandal is sometimes a sin of the same kind as the scandal given, such as is necessarily had among accomplices; and not rarely it is of an entirely different kind. Thus scurrility and the impurity of a priest induce contempt of the sacerdotal order and of religion. - It is also per se manifest that passive scandal can be had without active scandal, and conversely. Indeed an evil action, for instance blasphemy, can give beginning to good actions, such as holy protests and expiations. Nor is scandal the very wonder or horror of those seeing and hearing, which they are accustomed to call by the name of scandal. Therefore he who sins before others is not always at the same time actively scandalous, but only then when, after the circumstances of the sinner and of the witnesses have been considered, it is to be feared lest among the witnesses there are those who are drawn to a sin which otherwise they would not have committed. On account of the depravity or probity of the witnesses scandal can be absent: on account of depravity, as if someone blasphemes or violates chastity before others who, prepared to do the same, are in no way moved by that example; on account of probity, as if someone contends, quarrels, or strikes before the meek. Nor will scandal be given to witnesses so accustomed that they are in no way excited by the dangerous thing. Yet evil actions which are publicly committed are deservedly presumed scandalous, especially by persons of certain name or authority.

The Sin of Active Scandal. — 1. Concerning the sin of direct scandal, there is no room for doubt; and it is established that the species of the sin to which someone intends to lead another is contracted. - Diabolical scandal, since it contains formal hatred, denotes a special contrariety to charity, which must be opened in confession.

2. But the author of indirect scandal also sins per se. And his sin is contrary to the office of fraternal correction. For if charity obliges us to impede the sin, at least grave sin, of neighbor, much more does it impose upon us that we not be the cause by accident (that is, the occasion) of another's sin. - But contrary to what many and grave authors hold (for example Sanchez, Decal., l. 1, c. 6, n. 3), that sin is opposed only to the common obligation of charity, not to another virtue. For that which is outside the action and intention of the agent does not constitute the species (2, 2, q. 43, art. 3). But a sin merely occasioned is outside the intention, as is manifest, and also outside the action of the agent. For the sufficient cause of sin is the proper will of the one sinning (ibid., art. 1 ad 3). Wherefore the varied conditions of the persons who suffered that scandal are not to be declared, except the quality of parishioner, son, and the like, to whom the author of scandal owed spiritual edification by a special title; nor is he held to restitution who by example alone induced others to theft or damaging.

Permission of Scandal. — Scandal can be given by an evil act and by an act which has the appearance of evil. And it can be merely received, whether from weakness or from malice. Hence:

a) It is clear that he always sins who by an evil act is the author of scandal. And under grave obligation I must avoid inducing another by my evil deed into such danger of grave sin from which he may extricate himself with difficulty. For this is to cast another into spiritual necessity, which I ought to drive away unless I were excused by proportionate inconvenience. If another is tempted merely to venial sin, even directly, the author of scandal per se will sin only venially.

b) If the action merely has the appearance of evil, the author of scandal can be excused by proportionate inconvenience. And if there has been grave danger of many, grave inconvenience must be suffered by me to avoid it. Indeed if the whole Christian life, the very faith of many, is in danger, I shall be excused by no harm to myself.

c) Scandal merely received or passive per se cannot be permitted: because the sins of neighbor, if we can easily do so, we must impede. A proportionate cause of necessity or utility excuses the permission of scandal. These things are to be weighed: the inconvenience of abstaining from the action, the gravity of the evil which is feared in others, the proximity of the occasion of sin, the nature of the scandal, whether it is of the little ones or pharisaic. A greater cause is required that scandal of the little ones be permitted than pharisaic scandal; pharisaic scandal can be permitted for any cause whatever, unless from delay of the action a great fruit is hoped.

Indeed passive scandal sometimes must be permitted; for, to avoid it, it is not lawful to sin, or to expose one's own salvation to grave danger, or to harm others gravely, especially the community.

Reparation of Scandal. — He who by evil example has scandalized others must give them good example, insofar as the force of the evil example is thought to remain in some way. He must remove that force from charity; yet this is not true restitution, but rather a cessation from an evil action. This reparation will vary according to the nature of the scandal (public, occult, against one's proper office or not). - For the most part a general reparation which is contained in open conversion will be able to suffice. Cf. Aertnijs, I, 395. 396.

Some Applications. — 1. Two who commit sin simultaneously are necessarily scandalous to each other. For even if each conceived the evil intention by his own movement, nevertheless the execution, or exterior sin, required the complicity of the other, so that even the accomplice gave the instigator an occasion of sinning. Certainly he sins more who excited or induced another to sin. Yet because this is a merely aggravating circumstance, it need not be opened in confession, contrary to what some opine.

2. It is not lawful without cause to ask an honest work from him who will not perform it without sin, for example to ask an oath from someone who will perjure himself, or a sacrament from a minister whom you know to be living in a bad state. Yet this will be lawful on account of a reasonable cause: for the other sins from his own malice. Indeed, if, for example, the unworthy minister is already actually determined to sin, your petition merely anticipates the external sin, so that the petition does not seem to many to be gravely sinful, even if it is made without cause. Cf. Lugo, De Iure et Iustitia, d. 25, n. 234, against St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 47. (He argues from this, that external sin increases the malice of the internal will.) Hence they simply permit the faithful to ask sacraments from their bad priest. For they have a right to this administration. Likewise the wife of an onanist husband has a right to copulation. Therefore she will be able to ask this, unless by moderate abstinence she can draw her husband to better counsels.

3. On account of pharisaic scandal, no one ought to omit or defer good things not necessary, whether spiritual or even temporal, according to that saying of St. Matthew 15, 14: "Let them alone: they are blind and leaders of the blind." Except if from delay a notable fruit is hoped.

4. More easily and more often those good things are to be deferred or omitted on account of scandal of the little ones. Thus entrance into religion will have to be deferred on account of the scandal of parents, if their consent seems about to be obtained shortly.

5. When an explanation has been given which removes the appearance of evil, for example which shows a suspect action to be just, scandal of the little ones can easily be changed into pharisaic scandal, so that the obligation of avoiding it is greatly weakened.

6. Therefore scandal of the little ones excuses from fulfilling certain positive precepts of fasting, abstinence, etc., unless the omission would be more harmful to the one omitting. The case can be that of a wife whose husband would be gravely offended by abstinence on Friday; of a woman who in church would have before her a young man by whom she is basely desired. Some oblige, in such circumstances, that precepts sometimes be omitted, because the law of nature concerning avoiding scandal must be preferred to a positive law. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 51, thinks this opinion more probable. But the observance of a precept seems to others to be a just cause for permitting scandal. Therefore the obligation is not established, unless by office you ought to impede the sin of the person about to sin.

7. Ecclesiastical prelates, for avoiding disturbances, will sometimes have to omit certain sacred ceremonies; - they can, for avoiding greater evils, dissemble the sins of subjects which otherwise they would have to correct; - they neither must nor per se can omit lawsuits or those things which are necessary for guarding ecclesiastical goods, that scandals of Pharisees, or even of the little ones, may be avoided. Yet in a special case it will be better for them to yield their right; but unless the matter is of small moment, the assent of the Holy See will have to be sought.

8. A beautiful girl, decently adorned, need not be anxious concerning the temptations and sins of the men whom she will meet. Yet if she can easily avoid a man whom she knows to sin on her occasion, and can extinguish that lust by one or another flight, she must do this under grave obligation. (Aertnijs, 384, 4.)

9. On account of a just and proportionate cause, it seems lawful that you place an occasion, yet not a proximate occasion, of sin: thus a father who deservedly suspects his son to be prone to stealing can place an occasion of theft before him in order to detect and correct him. For detecting and expelling or punishing servants, the master will be able to do the same. Nor do they prohibit a husband from prudently and cautiously testing the fidelity of his wife. Indeed, on account of a very great cause, especially a public one, they say it is not repugnant that a woman, yet doing nothing immodest herself, permit a temptation to arise on her occasion, as Judith is narrated to have done in Sacred Scripture.

— You will ask whether it is right to ask from another an action honorable in itself, which he, on account of an erroneous conscience, cannot perform without sin? Suppose an attendant of false worship (Jewish, Mohammedan) to serve you, who must abstain on the Sabbath from servile works or must observe certain fasts; or suppose someone to be unjustly detained in prison, the injustice however being unknown to the guard, or to be prevented by hostile dominion from going out from the borders of the fatherland.

Resp. Without a grave cause it would be unlawful thus to induce another to subjective sin. On account of a grave cause, as if the work is urgent and you cannot seek it from another, or if you vindicate your right, this will be lawful. For the intention of the one asking is borne toward an action objectively good; the sin, which must be attributed to false conscience, is accidental: this is merely permitted by the one asking, on account of a just cause. But, if the one asking the action has this opportunity, after an explanation has been given concerning the objective honesty of the act, he must try to spare the other the subjective sin itself.

Nor should money perhaps to be paid to a guard or soldier cause scruple: for it is paid in order to redeem oneself from an objectively unjust vexation.

On Womanly Adornment. — a) Garments can derogate from the rules of decency in two ways: insofar as they excite lust, and insofar as they manifest a certain boldness contrary to modesty. Of the former character are the too-short garments of theaters and circuses; there are also garments too thin or too few, which have begun to be used in worldly dances; there are also garments which are fitted so artfully to the body that they either display every form of the body or exaggerate the sexual marks; finally there are - and this must not be disregarded - shorter garments of boys and girls: many are tempted on their occasion. Rather of the other character are indecorous uncoverings of the neck. And note that lust is excited more by mysterious veils than by complete nudity.

b) Those who introduce adornments that are not very decent, as well as the women who first wear them, sin gravely: they are the cause of innumerable sins, nor is their fault weakened by any excuse.

c) Those who merely accommodate themselves to accepted customs are rarely to be blamed gravely, especially since the manner of wearing garments has much force for diminishing, as also for increasing, indecency.

d) Those who increase indecency, according to the graver or less grave mode, will sin gravely or lightly.

e) The remote cooperation of a maker who, when asked, makes garments a la mode, practically will be excused by necessity or a grave cause.

f) A woman who foresees that it will happen that many in general are scandalized by her vain and superfluous adornment (yet not base), is not bound under grave obligation to lay it aside. For the occasion is in itself remote; moreover it is universal and perpetual, which beautiful women necessarily furnish when they go out of doors, and it would be too grave for the same women to abstain from adornment.

N. B. The rules concerning womanly adornment gathered from St. Thomas are proposed by Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, n. 269.

But Catholic and pious women accept an excessive servitude to usages which the less pious, indeed prostitutes, introduce. Wherefore an effort must be made that, a league having been formed, they vindicate their liberty, I say the liberty of elegant modesty. Nor can the cultivation of modesty be sufficiently urged upon all, both for themselves and for the family which they have to rule.

And because this is the head matter for amendment, as much as is in our power, we must procure for the common people that solid instruction turn the souls of girls away from futile matters toward fulfilling their grave offices, both familial and social.

On Dances. — a) No modern dances seem positively to be approved, if perhaps you except certain innocent dances which in some villages or Catholic regions are celebrated rarely, for example on the feast of the patron of the place. Berardi testifies that he has known such dances. On the contrary, there are also popular dances which end in true Bacchanalia.

b) While a few years ago the question was raised about certain modes of dancing, especially about that which is called the "waltz," today more attention must now be given to dances which figure a certain action.

Although certain modes of dancing are less pleasing, there is none which, where it has been introduced, we can condemn absolutely. But dances of the latter kind, unless they represent a sacred procession or a warlike action, are accustomed to express or imitate amorous deeds, for example the pursuit by which the male follows after the female; to express or imitate them in such a way that the very mode of execution casts the actors into an occasion scarcely not proximate of lust. Therefore it has happened that some, for example the "tango," have sometimes been reproved by ecclesiastical authority (*).

(*) Yet that you may respond prudently, this also must be observed: it sometimes happens that, with the name retained, the vices of certain dances are corrected, almost as corrected editions of evil writers are customarily published. - But again the license, neo-pagan and increasing day by day, makes matters worse and exaggerates the incentives of passions. What is to be said of the fact that in the very art of learning dances, under a futile pretext, dress wholly immodest has begun to be used? Nor only immodesty of dress, but several other, more recent, "worldly" usages seem as it were to declare war on virtue. Cf. Josue Germain, Dangereuses? Enquete sur les danses modernes, Paris, 1923; and, concerning that work, Doncoeur, Etudes, April 1923, t. 160, p. 193 ss.; or Hocedez, Nouv. Rev. Theol., 1924, t. 51, p. 32 ss.

c) Yet it can happen that for certain richer young men the intercourse of persons with whom they must observe the laws of civility, even if they mingle with honorable dances, is to be preferred to the vulgar intercourse of taverns to which otherwise they would be addicted.

d) If any wish or ought to go to dances, they must at least take care that they have honorable company. Masked dances are more dangerous, since they render the lustful more audacious and more impudent.

e) Penitents will have to be judged according to their case. Absolution is not to be denied to those who have not sinned. For those who are accustomed to sin in dances, dances will have to be prohibited, if the dances themselves, and not the weakness which is found in every association with women, are the proximate occasion of sin, and the occasion is not morally necessary, as it can be, for example, for a wife accompanying her husband.

— You will ask whether it is lawful, for avoiding a greater evil, to counsel a lesser evil, or whether that counsel is to be accused of active scandal.

The matter is controverted. Some deny that this is lawful, because the counselor of a lesser evil still remains a counselor of evil; others think it lawful, because the counsel merely affects the note of the lesser evil, and the evil which remains is neither intended nor has its cause in the counsel but in the evil will of the other. Or, if you prefer, the counsel, because conditional, is reasonable. For it is rendered in these words: since you want the greater evil, do rather the lesser. Thus Lugo, Iust., d. 19, n. 42 ss. Yet others think that this reason is valid only when the lesser evil is contained in the greater, or when there is question of evil to be inflicted on the same person. In this opinion, it will be lawful to counsel the mutilation of a person whom the other intended to kill; or in general theft or fornication to him who had determined to commit killing or adultery. But it will not be lawful to counsel him who intended by theft to despoil a poor man that, leaving such a one, he should take money from a rich man, because the rich man is reasonably unwilling with respect to that counsel. Therefore make an exception if, on account of the small quantity, the rich man cannot reasonably be unwilling. But since a prostitute is not unwilling, the designation of a prostitute to be chosen before a married woman does not seem to be reproved if it has been made by the counselor with the intention of diminishing the evil.

We judge this third opinion to be truer. Yet one must beware of the scandal which the counsel can bring with it. For which cause, unless we are deceived, on 22-23 Nov. 1922, the Holy Office denied that it was lawful that a confessor counsel dimidiate copulation to an onanist husband. For the Bishops of the Netherlands, in the preface of their petitionary booklet, had indicated why, in the concrete circumstances, that counsel would be scandalous, insofar as it would offend pious ears and pave the way for propagating Malthusian arts. Cf. Per. XII, p. 33-37.

On this matter cf. Lugo, Iust., d. 19, n. 13 ss. He also, nn. 50-54, discusses and benignly solves the question concerning him who counsels an equal evil, because that counsel also is purified by this condition having been placed: "If you are determined to this, do that other." And he even concedes that to one hesitating between two determinate men, which he would harm, he can be counseled that he damage Titius rather than Caius, at least insofar as he wishes to avert evil from Caius.

— Cooperation, by the force of the word, denotes the simultaneous action or operation of two or more. Thus in every good action we cooperate with the grace of God. Cooperators can either all assume principal parts for themselves, or some principal parts and others secondary parts. These latter are more strictly called cooperators: yet in such a way that the distinction regards rather the exterior execution than the whole action. Therefore, although, as the Code itself teaches in can. 2209 §3, one commanding or ordering is the principal author, apart from the executor or executors he is numbered among cooperators.

Cooperation is distinguished as formal and material. Formal cooperation is chiefly had when the intentions themselves are joined, or when concurrence is offered to the intention of the agent, or the matter is done and aided by common counsel. - Material cooperation is offered when one acts with a different intention, and another concurs. But that cooperation also is called formal which in itself, whether by its nature or by its necessary signification, contains goodness or malice of the same kind as the principal action. Others call this immediate material cooperation.

Therefore material cooperation in evil is done without the intention of the evil intended by the principal agent, through an action good in itself or indifferent, or at least wholly extraneous to the malice of the principal action which is considered: the principal agent himself then abuses your action for his depraved plans; he himself joins his evil will with your action. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 63.

According to its distance from the principal action it is called proximate or remote.

The Utility, Value, and Merit of Cooperation. — Alone we have power for few things. Therefore charity counsels prompt and manifold cooperation, both physical and moral, toward good, by counsel, exterior help, approval and praise, communication of knowledge, or furnishing of strength.

Aid of this kind, since it often prepares applause and success for others, frequently contains an exercise of humility and is very remote from envy. Therefore the same cooperation is commended by the very purity of affection. And it reaches the highest praise when the cooperator chooses labor for himself, and procures honor for another. On account of the communion of saints, all our prayers and good works can cooperate with all pious undertakings which are attempted everywhere on earth.

Formal or "intentional" cooperation communicates the merit of the principal action; not so material cooperation, unless it is conscious and, as cooperation, approved or intended.

— Superiors of religious institutes are accustomed to admit friends and benefactors to the society of merits and good works. Those who are given that communication are now ascribed among those for whom not a few sacrifices and suffrages are offered in the religious institute, whether from the appointment of the Superiors or from the spontaneous prayers which religious are accustomed to pour out according to the mind of the Superiors; and besides, as joined in a special way with the religious institute, in a mode analogous to that by which those themselves who are enrolled in the institute are joined, they can thence expect for themselves manifold supernatural help and divine mercy. Cf. concerning this matter St. Thomas, in 1 Sent., d. 45, q. 2, art. 1; Tamburini Ascan., De iure abbatum, t. 2, d. 9, quaesit. 3; Bucceroni, Theol. mor., tom. IV, p. 428, Altera affiliatio, where he treats this argument more fully.

— 1. Strictly formal cooperation necessarily participates in the malice of the principal action. Therefore, if this is intrinsically evil, the cooperation itself never becomes lawful. The same must be said of formal cooperation which others call immediate material cooperation, if you except only injustice in material goods. For, on account of the right of necessity, it is sometimes lawful to cooperate materially, even immediately, in such injustice.

2. Material cooperation itself is per se illicit. For with respect to the agent it is opposed to the office of fraternal correction, by which we ought from charity to impede or correct his evil action; and often besides another effect is connected with it, derogating from the honor of God, or harmful or damaging to others.

Thence a not small question arises, whether material cooperation, when it is illicit, wounds the virtue of charity alone, or also the diverse other virtues to which, according to the diversity of the case, the principal action is opposed. Cardinal d'Annibale, I, n. 174, judged that charity alone is wounded, unless besides you bear a special office of parent, judge, minister of the sacraments, which imposes upon you the opposite care, because the material cooperator effects nothing evil in itself. Sanchez thinks otherwise, Decal., l. 1, c. 7, nn. 10, 12; but he says this consistently with his opinion concerning the malice of indirect scandal, which we rejected. Others (cf. concerning prop. 51 of Innocent XI, Cardenas, diss. 31, nn. 10, 11) hold the same conclusion, because cooperation, joined with the principal action, participates in this action's malice. But this must be denied, since the connection is not intrinsic but extrinsic, from the evil will of another. And, if this reason were admitted, the cooperation itself would become intrinsically evil, so that it would never be excused: which is very commonly rejected. There are those who distinguish injustice from other sins, because then, besides the reason of impeding from charity the sin of the agent, "there is present the reason of impeding the damage of a third party who has a right that another should not concur to his damage." Thus Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, tr. 5, n. 297. But Cardinal d'Annibale objects, l. c., why should justice bind more than the other virtues? There are not lacking those who, concerned only about the gravity of the sin, omit the question of species, although other virtues oblige in one way, charity alone in another; or those who propose the matter very briefly and rather confusedly. Thus Lehmkuhl, I, 786, has these few words: "the wounding of charity is not the only, indeed often not even the principal, reason why some cooperation is illicit." Yet by these words, with the common opinion, he dissents from the view of d'Annibale.

We think it must be said briefly thus. The only cooperation which comes here to be considered is that which is positive, or by action. This alone truly concurs. Negative cooperation merely does not impede. Therefore, unless you have a different obligation from office, this can wound charity alone.

Positive material cooperation itself is no more than scandal a per se cause of the evil thing. Yet this difference exists between scandal and this cooperation: from no physical operation of the scandalous person, as such, does the effect depend; whereas, apart indeed from the intention of the one operating, his causality is assumed for an evil effecting, which is thus actively permitted. But various virtues impose upon us an unequal positive care, lest our action, even unwillingly on our part, harm their cause or good. Therefore material cooperation is not forbidden by a negative precept of the virtue, because one cooperating materially in truth does nothing contrary to the virtue himself (and thus the second opinion is rejected); but it can be forbidden by a positive office, insofar as the cooperator has wrongly permitted an efficacy opposed to various virtues. And this seems to have escaped Cardinal d'Annibale.

3. Material cooperation is not intrinsically illicit, but becomes lawful insofar as it is joined with sufficient care of virtue. The same thing is said in other words: material cooperation is excused by a proportionate inconvenience.

Principles Concerning Lawful and Unlawful Material Cooperation. — 1. Insofar as cooperation is forbidden by charity, the rules handed down above concerning indirect scandal recur. Insofar as it is forbidden also by another virtue to which the principal action is opposed, the very proximity of the cooperation to be avoided creates a formally graver obligation, and the rigor of that virtue also must be attended to.

2. Furthermore, this formula can be handed down. Material cooperation must be purged from affection toward the evil, from the vice of scandal, from a further evil effect. Therefore the cause excusing it ought to be such: a) that it can be joined with a mind wholly averse from the evil; b) that by an explanation of the cause scandal is removed, or because of the gravity of the cause scandal can be disregarded; c) that it compensates for the other damages which will follow from the cooperation.

Difficulty of Estimation. — The estimation of lawful and unlawful cooperation is impeded by difficulty: a) of considering adequately the matter with its circumstances. Now, if the business were completed between only the agent and the cooperator, the scandal which is often mixed with cooperation complicates the solutions. Thus Titius indeed wishes to read a bad work, but at the same time to preserve faith. If you foresee that from the reading he will lose the faith, by cooperating with the reading you give scandal of lost faith. - But the execution of an evil thing easily brings further effects damaging to religion, virtue, other persons, and society itself; b) of distinguishing an action intrinsically or always illicit from an action which in certain circumstances can be made honest. Now in that estimation writers do not agree, although per se it does not seem too arduous; c) of distinguishing the reasons of scandal and cooperation which occur in the case.

But the difficulty increases: a) because many writers propose the principles confusedly; b) because they do not agree concerning the reason why cooperation is illicit; c) because not a few circumstances have changed since the classic authors contemplated the various cases of cooperation, whose authority nevertheless is so great that modern authors retreat with difficulty from their literal responses.

The Prudent Mode of Examining a Case. — a) First of all it must be defined accurately what, in the proposed case, is intrinsically illicit.

b) Then the various respects of the proposed case must be considered: the respect of the proper danger to which the cooperator is exposed in the cooperation itself, and of the damage which is to be feared from denied cooperation; - with respect to the principal agent, the connection between him and the cooperator, the damage which seems about to accrue to him in relation to the common character of sin; - the respect of others who will suffer either scandal from the cooperation, or damage from the action to which cooperation is given; - the respect of the virtue to which the principal action will be at least materially contrary: this consideration can reveal a direct obligation of positively impeding the principal action; - the respect of the action which preceded and of the action or effect which follows: thus one who sells a bad sheet helps the publisher and harms the readers.

c) These things having been considered, as by a simple intuition you should see whether the cooperation appears to be a rational mode of acting, or the contrary. This intuition of a prudent man contains no small presumption of truth.

d) If the importance of the matter requires it, the various parts of the case must be weighed separately.

e) That you may suitably add counsel to the response, you will examine the very utility sought from the cooperation. We shall not favor cooperation which brings merely temporal gain; we shall be easier if damage is to be avoided; if a nobler end is intended, with a more inclined mind we shall indulge the matter. For if the casuist inclines toward the more benign things, the spiritual director suggests the better things.

Helps for Right Estimation. — It is useful to recall these things which are generally admitted:

1. He who gives an occasion of sinning to a man prepared to sin, or whose will is already evil, does not thence gravely harm him. Lugo, Iust. et Iur., d. 25, n. 235.

2. Per se, or with scandal excluded, remote cooperations which are not removens prohibens, i.e. which would be supplied by another, are excused from grave sin. Sanchez, Decal., l. 1, c. 7, n. 16.

3. Every cooperation toward grave evil which either is proximate or, if remote, is removens prohibens, can be excused only by grave damage. If at the same time it is proximate and removens prohibens, or if there follows the gravest evil of one person, or the grave evil of several or many, cooperation is excused only by gravest damage.

4. For rescuing someone from extreme spiritual necessity, every damage must be borne, whereas damage of life or state or fortunes is not to be undergone for freeing neighbor from temporal necessity, even extreme.

Grave spiritual necessity imposes a grave inconvenience, at least on those who have a positive office of caring for the good, or unless the necessity has been general; then damage of life itself must be undergone. Cf. n. 99.

For avoiding formal sin for someone, grave inconvenience is not to be suffered.

5. But we are forbidden more severely lest we cause such evil. Wherefore it happens that of the same evil from which you ought not to free neighbor with grave detriment, you cannot be a positive and proximate cause,[^017-1] even by accident,[^017-2] unless you are excused by morally extreme damage of your own.

6. Causes excusing cooperation are distinguished as very slight, light but reasonable, rather grave, grave, very grave, and gravest. It is useful to declare these by examples.

A very slight excuse is brought by ordinary profit: this scarcely ever suffices.

A light but reasonable excuse is brought by service, the condition of a subject: it is always considered damaging that you should have to deny what seems to pertain to an office. - Extraordinary profit also induces such a reason, as does the inconvenience of not selling one's goods equally well.

A rather grave excuse is sought from fear of losing good service, a good client, indeed notable profit, if there is question of a man of slender fortune.

A grave excuse is present in the true difficulty of finding another service, another office; - in lack of things, whether this present lack is to be removed, or a future one is feared; - in infamy before one discreet man; - in secret expulsion from a college; - in the desertion of several clients; - indeed in great indignation of a husband, father, or master.

A very grave excuse is shown by the loss of state or civil condition; by defamation before several; - by notorious expulsion from a college; - by the danger of falling notably from one's state.

A gravest excuse is had when a good equivalent to life is placed in danger.

And observe in general that a graver excuse proceeds from positive damage than from cessation of profit.

But when, to excuse a servant, they demand a reason which is added to service, the servant ought to decline that cooperation by seeking another service, unless the very loss of such service induces sufficient inconvenience.

— You will ask whether or not you can cast illicit cooperation upon another already prepared: as if a magistrate or soldier should ask others to indicate causes or execute things which, conscience forbidding, cannot be indicated or done by you?

It is not lawful to ask illicit things. Therefore a Catholic magistrate or soldier cannot formally and honestly ask from another an action illicit in itself and illicit for the other. But no one is forbidden simply to refuse his own cooperation, to ask from him who distributes causes or commanded actions that these things not be imposed on him to be indicated or done. Nor does the foreseen substitution of another stand in the way. He who refuses his own action merely permits that future substitution. Therefore it is not repugnant that in an unbelieving region Christian servants pay money to the master of works, lest they be compelled to perform or participate in superstitious things. Lehmkuhl, I, 820; Noldin, Praec., 122.

It is very useful, by reading approved authors, to acquire for oneself a right judgment, so that afterwards you can more easily apply the principles to various cases, by weighing the connection with sin and the character of this sin, the fruit of refused cooperation, and the damage to be sustained.

Wherefore we adduce various examples, warning at the same time that there is not one opinion concerning all.

— A parish priest, minister of a sacrament, confessor, lest they violate secrecy, lest they make someone infamous, etc., not rarely must, in the public or even private administration of a sacrament, cooperate in sacrilege. Just as a bride lawfully cooperates in the same when she contracts marriage with a bridegroom living in the state of mortal sin.

Cooperation of Religious Sisters in Clinical Hospitals. — Since today there easily occur physicians and surgeons who, in exercising their art, in a conscious or unconscious manner sin against the natural divine law, as it is declared by the Holy See, a question of grave moment arises concerning the cooperation of Sisters. The chief cases are: the administration of morphine, not for alleviating present pain, but for procuring alienation of mind in the agony of death; then the direct procurement of abortion and feticide.

Furthermore, hospitals to which Sisters are assigned are of three kinds: some are public; others are private hospitals of physicians; others belong to the Sisters themselves.

In no hospital, as is clear, can Sisters formally cooperate in an illicit action; but material cooperation can be excused less with difficulty in public hospitals than in private ones. For it pertains to the common good of religion and to the salvation of very many souls that Sisters rather than lay women minister to the sick in public hospitals. Wherefore, with the exception of formal cooperation or the execution of the illicit operation itself, such as an infusion of morphine certainly illicit, which they must wholly refuse, material cooperation, even that of cleaning and arranging the instruments, washing and preparing the body for the operation, and the transfer of the sick person to the place of operation, will not be able to be condemned, with scandal excluded, which will be removed rather conveniently, for example by a declaration.

But if there is question of the private hospital of a physician, first, before they promise their own labor and that of the Sisters, the Superiors must take cautions, lest anything against the conscience of the Sisters ever be asked; and every cooperation, even material, must be denied, unless perhaps very remote, as is the very reception of a person laboring under an evil into a room adorned by the Sisters.

Finally, if the ownership of the hospital belongs to the Sisters themselves, they must take care in the contract with the physician lest any physician be called or admitted who attempts anything illicit. And only in an extraordinary, unforeseen case will there be room for tolerating the action of the physician, illicit in itself, and for cooperating materially, in order to avoid worse evils.

Finally, in doubt, when the act is invincible, the Sisters can in any hospital permit the matter to the conscience of the physician, otherwise upright. If, however, a firm presumption cannot be drawn from the very religion of the physician, concerning a case which is foreseen to be going to occur several times, afterwards they will have to procure fuller security for themselves.

Concerning the difficulty which the false worship of a non-Catholic sick person can bring, cf. below, 147, 6 and 7.

— In what way a spouse can or even ought to have carnal commerce with an onanist spouse, or one who is bound by a vow, is explained in the tract On Chastity and the Opposite Vices. Cf. nn. 255, 265-268.

A Servant. — 1. On account of the reason of service alone he can per se render services which are accustomed to be demanded from servants and concur remotely in sin: for example, to dress the master, to saddle a horse, to open the door for a concubine and prepare her bed, to set wine before a master making himself drunk, to prepare meats on a forbidden day, to buy a liberal newspaper or a book not so obscene, etc.; indeed even to accompany the master or convey him by carriage to the house of a mistress, or to carry letters which he suspects to be amatory. For it would be intolerable that, while he performs these customary offices, the servant should carry out a censorious inquiry concerning the end, or should look to the master's intentions. Yet for permitting the later actions (those enumerated after the word "indeed") many require that a reason of notable damage be added, which will scarcely be absent. All require this reason that he may lead the prostitute herself to the master.

N. B. Public drivers, since without very grave inconvenience they cannot publicly refuse an office to one asking, nor are they accustomed to be solicitous concerning the reason of the journey, can render these things more easily. Certainly they will be praised who industriously avoid these things.

Yet we think that a stricter answer must be given concerning those who, beyond the boundaries of a region in which a duel is forbidden, convey those who ask for the journey with a manifest intention of duel. Not every cause then seems sufficient.

2. Another proportionately grave cause is required besides, that a servant may be able to render to a master inviting or ordering him those things which approach more nearly to sin, as for example, to put his shoulders under, to move ladders near, for the master climbing through a window to a concubine; to carry letters certainly amatory to a prostitute; to accompany to a duel; to write, at the dictation of the master, letters which indeed contain only signs of civility but are foreseen to be going to increase base love; to buy an image not so base that it is properly obscene, or not such that it can serve for nothing except lust.

3. A gravest cause is required when an action is demanded which at the same time approaches more nearly to sin and will effect grave damage to an innocent person, or which contains proximate cooperation: for example, to put his shoulders under a master climbing up to violate a virgin; to keep watch to defend the master if perhaps, while he is with a mistress, arriving rivals attack him (Sanchez, l. 1, c. 7, n. 23); to carry letters which certainly contain a base invitation, etc.

4. For no cause would it be lawful both to write and to carry letters containing base things or a base invitation, or to invite a person in the name of another to meet for the sake of sin, with the depraved end indicated. With the depraved end kept silent, cooperation by invitation can be excused by a gravest cause.

Therefore it is not lawful for those Black servants, who are commonly called "boys," to obey Europeans who order them to seek a concubine for them from among Black women.

According to the things said in n. 3, if in that meeting a girl is to be deceived, fear of death alone would excuse from the invitation; or the girl would have to be notified that snares have been laid for her.

— A judge or magistrate does not merely declare an existing law, but, as a Superior, authentically intimates it to the parties, so that by sentences passed the law is practically confirmed and received into morals. Yet he does not command of his own accord, but ordered by the law, compelled by office, and as it were the legislator's mandatory. It is besides of the highest interest that Catholic and upright judges can remain in office. Therefore the cooperation of a judge with an unjust law, which cannot be declined except by resignation of office, is demanded by a grave reason of the common good. The object and circumstances of the cooperation must now be considered.

With voluntary cooperation excluded, which, as quasi-formal, cannot be excused, a judge can never directly command things which are intrinsically illicit: for example, incense to be offered to an idol, cohabitation with an illegitimate spouse. But if there is question of a penalty to be imposed, and the same is not grave, the solution seems to be sought from the consideration of the prevailing public good. As long as one must strive in every way against a law, whether because it is openly impious, or because it is recent, or if this is the manifest will of the Superiors of the Church who define or declare moral obligations, office will rather have to be yielded than that it would be lawful to offer cooperation of this kind to the unjust law; on the contrary, scandal having been removed and hope of accomplishing something having been taken away, the innocent person to be fined is not judged reasonably unwilling that he be condemned to pay a moderate sum of money. Moreover, it is sometimes lawful to cooperate immediately in unjust damage in goods which one can licitly renounce; and the public utility of preserving good judges can make this renunciation of his right necessary for the innocent person from charity. Thus, for example, in Belgium the case seems to be that of a judge who imposes a fine on a priest who has imparted the nuptial blessing before the civil marriage ceremony. Lehmkuhl indeed, I, 962, raises this grave difficulty, that to affect an innocent person with a penalty, to declare him worthy of penalty, is intrinsically evil. But Noldin, De praeceptis, n. 726, thinks that this malice can be removed by the consent of the innocent person. We think that the distinction must be made thus: - that condemnation harms the innocent person and contains per se a disapproval of the action. Insofar as it harms, if there is question of those goods which can be directly taken away on account of public utility, the sentence is not intrinsically evil. But the note of disapproval can be removed by common interpretation, so that it is known merely to be a literal application of the law, which must be tolerated to avoid greater evils. And then nothing intrinsically evil is now shown in that sentence.

If the law is unjust for this reason, that it contains usurpation of the ecclesiastical forum, in certain regions custom itself has removed at least the positive sanctions of that immunity, as was declared by the Cardinal Secretary of State in the year 1911. Cf. Periodica, t. 6, p. 190. Therefore regard must then be had to the natural obligation of consulting for the honor of the Church. And, in a graver or unusual case, a license or declaration sought from the Ordinary or, through the Ordinary, from the Holy See, will make the magistrate more certain concerning his office. In this matter civil causes and criminal causes of minor clerics must be distinguished from criminal causes of Bishops. Concerning the former, either Concordats or custom in several regions indicate what must be done; elsewhere the license to be requested will not be denied. Concerning the latter causes, as graver, the matter will have to be arranged mediately or immediately with the Holy See.

Nor, by applying the law of divorce, does a judge command anything intrinsically dishonorable, but he removes civil protection from marriage and concedes to the parties the faculty of a new civil marriage. In this matter nothing intrinsically dishonorable is discerned, but something which, according to the circumstances, will either be scandalous and to be inhibited, or to be tolerated. And the responses of the Holy See have varied according to time and place. Cf. the writings on chastity, n. 286.

While concerning the application of an unjust law Lehmkuhl, I, 962, speaks more severely than Bucceroni, Theol. mor., nn. 19, 20, the former, II, 921 note, solves more benignly than the latter, l. c., the case of one pronouncing divorce.

— In speaking about judges, we have already spoken about jurors, whose case is similar, except that these can more easily, by denying condemnation, impede a sentence against the rights of the Church. Yet it is not per se expedient that a convicted accused person be absolved. Therefore it will be more satisfactory that, where there is need, after the faculty has been sought, they answer according to the things alleged and proved. Nor is it per se to be advised that Catholic jurors refuse that office, since there is danger lest ministers of the Church be judged by enemies.

N. B. Jurors, according to their conscience, pronounce merely concerning guilt, by responding affirmatively or negatively to the questions proposed by the president of the court.

Innkeepers. — 1. They cannot favor the violation of the laws of the Church or render them difficult to observe; yet they themselves, again, because Catholics and non-Catholics, the pious and impious, the healthy and the weaker are mixed, today experience great difficulty in serving on days of abstinence foods forbidden by law to those alone for whom they would be permitted to prepare them. Thence there are not lacking regions where a general dispensation of the law has been conceded in lodging houses and inns. And, except in places plainly Catholic, where the offering of forbidden food would be scandalous, today innkeepers will satisfy their office if they supply clients every convenience for observing the law, and do not by various pretexts or even by a lesser quality of foods increase the reasons why clients may decline the observance of ecclesiastical discipline as too grave. It is never lawful to supply meats requested in contempt of religion.

2. Dances are the occasion of many sins. Therefore those innkeepers cannot be excused who introduce them or alone retain them. Those who merely, according to received custom, furnish a place for dances, otherwise not dishonorable, are not to be blamed, at least gravely. But that there should be held there dances of that more recent kind, which even among persons select by their condition are to be criticized not lightly, can in no way be tolerated either by a pastor of souls or by a confessor.

3. They are forbidden to buy newspapers wholly opposed to faith and morals, or obscene ones, even if they are deserted by many clients. On the contrary, they must take care that good newspapers be ready for those same clients. Concerning other newspapers, they should strive to give the least occasion of reading things which are less becoming, whether you regard faith or morals; let them lessen the evil which they cannot extinguish.

They themselves do not draw clients by less good newspapers, which would be unlawful; but they impede being deserted by clients. Therefore this can be lawful.

4. They can never furnish a place for sinning to those asking in such a way that they seem to consent to the sin. Indeed, a notable necessity, which alone would excuse, is for the most part not present. Lodging houses which admit persons of this kind are often marked by a certain infamy, whereas others from which they are severely excluded are commended by that very good name. Yet it is clear that inquiries are not to be made concerning persons who present themselves as spouses.

— Artisans cannot spontaneously make things which, whether in themselves or with attention to the region where they are made, have no use except a depraved one: images wholly base and without scientific use, abortive drugs, "condoms" in our region, idols in an idolatrous region. For a general and spontaneous making of this kind contains manifest favor offered without necessity to an evil thing, so that it must be marked with the note of formal cooperation. - But what if you make them under compulsion? Here the things and the makers must be distinguished. The very making of certain things can scarcely be had without sin: for example, a truly obscene painting or photograph; to perform these things will never be lawful unless perhaps to avoid a gravest evil. The making of other things is indifferent in itself, but their use will be evil. For example, instruments of the neo-Malthusian art, and the idol itself. The kind of evil must be attended to. Since idolatry is gravely injurious to God, to offer work in making or adorning a statue which is destined for idolatry will for the most part not be lawful, and cooperation of this kind can be made honest only from a gravest cause. Cf. Noldin, II, 123, c.

As to condoms, in certain regions, as they report, these same things serve for children's games; and in moderate quantity, just like abortive drugs themselves, they should be ready for men who study the medical sciences. Again, the cooperation of a hired worker in a workshop is remote, and he ought not to be solicitous concerning the special destination of the things. Therefore, if only a few are to be made, a worker who is prohibited from seeking an explanation will be able to cooperate, lest otherwise he be dismissed from the workshop. But if a great quantity of these things must be prepared in our regions, so grave a common evil is propagated through them that a worker who cannot otherwise refuse his cooperation must under grave obligation seek another master, nor can he remain in that workshop except for a short time. - In a typography, individual workers can and must be solicitous only concerning the kind of printing establishment; nor, where a better occasion is lacking, are they forbidden to hire out their work where, although obscene or truly impious works are not published, they have books to be printed, some good, others less good.

Even insufficient garments can always be completed by those wearing them. Therefore the work of an individual worker can be admitted with less difficulty.

2. Managers or masters of a workshop, since they preside over many things to be made and care for the diffusion itself of the things made, can never administer the making of things which can scarcely have an innocent use. For they would be the cause of many sins which otherwise would not be committed.

Yet here also attention must be paid to the varied nature of the things.

Books or newspapers which are not given over to obscene matters are accustomed, besides their less approvable parts, to contain things innocent and useful. Therefore they are not to be put among things whose good use is almost none. Therefore, when there is not question of an obscene or truly impious book, a hired manager, on account of a grave cause, for example if otherwise he would be deprived of a sufficient amount of works, is permitted to print a less good work, unless, because he is known as very Catholic, his cooperation would be scandalous. Yet he will not be able formally to publish such a book, since the publisher must care for its diffusion, so that his cooperation must be held as formal.

Those who by their own device invent and make dishonorable or less honorable women's garments cannot be excused from grave sin. On the contrary, a moderate or grave cause will excuse those who adorn such garments when asked: a moderate cause will suffice if the garments are a little freer; a graver cause will be required if they have been notably dishonorable. But today the conscience of managers who equip their large shops with no other ready-made garments except less honorable ones is burdened more gravely. For since they are sold at a lower price than garments adorned according to the desire of the client, they are bought by women of more obscure place, so that the less modest clothing of plebeian women and girls must be imputed at least in part to those managers.

A moderate cause seems sufficient, with scandal excluded, that you make garments, not strictly sacred, for a heretical or schismatic minister, by which his usurped dignity is recognized, as if you prepare the violet habit of bishops for a Jansenist bishop.

To avoid a necessity quasi-extreme, Lehmkuhl, I, 815, permits that emblems of Freemasons or of a condemned sect be made, because they do not contain superstition in themselves and are directed only by sectarians to depraved ends. And a very grave excuse seems to us sufficient, with special scandal from the quality of the maker excluded.

He exercises no superstition who, in preparing foods, avoids those things from which others think one must superstitiously abstain. Therefore it is lawful to consent to one asking these things for a very slight cause. And he who spontaneously announces that chocolate made by him is pure from elements which Jews do not want mixed in, today will seem to all to wish to gain profit, not to approve the Jewish sect. Therefore a moderate cause, for example a notable increase of profit, will excuse that cooperation. (Yet it is necessary that the rite itself be decorated with no honorary title.)

— A merchant holds a middle place between the maker and the user. His cooperation is more proximate; besides, one who proposes things for sale (at least spontaneously) seems to recommend them and is stimulated by the very zeal of profit to seek buyers. Therefore his cooperation approaches more to formal cooperation and is spiritually dangerous to him. But again the merchant presupposes the maker, so that the thing-making person sometimes, by his action, brings forth a necessity to which the merchant conforms while he has those things for sale.

Thence writers speak in a similar way concerning artisans and merchants, yet so that they estimate the cooperation of merchants a little more benignly. Hence the following norms are established:

1. Morally it is never lawful to sell things which have no use except a depraved one. Yet they excuse him who, in a special case, compelled by the gravest necessity of avoiding death, has done it.

2. Things which are subject to immense danger of abuse regularly cannot be sold unless the future good use is morally certain. Thus most poisons, excepting however those which, because they have a frequent good use, are now accustomed to be offered to all.

3. Things indifferent are sold without fault, which many use well although very many abuse them: dice, cosmetics, swords, guns, alcohol, as long as the intention of abuse is not certain. For the order to sin is remote; and those businesses cannot be impeded.

But if the abuse is morally certain, a proportionately grave reason, to be estimated from the principles prudently considered, must be added. Hence if the abuse is toward idolatrous worship, a very urgent cause is demanded; a graver one is likewise required if an innocent person is going to suffer unjust damage; indeed proximate cooperation which at the same time is necessary to the effect is excused only by a gravest cause. Therefore you could not sell a sword to one going to kill a man unless to avoid an evil equivalent to death. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 571, where he corrects what he had written more severely in l. 2, n. 66.

Is it lawful, absolutely or without condition, to sell good merchandise, for example pure wine, to another who afterwards, under his own name, will sell it adulterated? St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 69, does not permit this except on account of fear of death or infamy; others, for example Lehmkuhl, I, 832, require a grave cause, while others, better, are content with a moderate one. The cooperation of the seller is very remote; there is no public scandal; and the cooperation is refused in vain. Indeed, from usage, from diminished price, etc., often the very injustice of the one adulterating will be doubtful. Yet a gravest cause will be required if the adulteration has been harmful and consequently notably damaging to the public good.

Concerning selling women's garments or ornaments that are not very modest, the things said about making them recur, n. 145.

There is a special difficulty concerning books and newspapers. Catholic booksellers are given the faculty that they procure prohibited books for selected persons who are helped in studies or profession by them. But it is not lawful for the same booksellers to have those books promiscuously for sale.

Concerning newspapers these things are to be observed especially: a) The spontaneous sale of newspapers which are opposed to faith or morals brings proximate cooperation to not a few sins. Therefore, even when formal recommendation is avoided, this cannot be tolerated except on account of the gravest cause of poverty and for a short time; b) far less grave is the cooperation of him who, with obscene and very impious newspapers excluded, has newspapers of various kinds for sale. His work can be indirectly useful, if he recommends or displays the less Christian newspapers less than another who would sell such in his place. Therefore, with scandal removed, this in certain circumstances could simply be permitted; c) it sometimes happens that from the public or general administration there is bought the right or monopoly of selling newspapers in "stations" of railways or streets, on this law, that newspapers of all political parties be sold equally. This sale-distribution of newspapers can be compared with the distribution of all letters, newspapers, and books which is done through postal offices. Therefore nothing prevents a Catholic man or Catholic society from acquiring such a right for itself. No scandal of connivance with evil will be given; and indirectly there will be an occasion of impeding not a few evils.

[^017-1]: Insofar as we can be the cause of another's sin.

[^017-2]: By accident, i.e. apart from intention.

Cooperation Toward False Worship. Present circumstances warn us that the danger of a certain indifferentism must be carefully removed, which honors or neglects various religions in almost an equal way; yet at the same time, indeed more, irreligion must be fought, which surely is worse and more false than erroneous worship. Besides, in most places at least, the profession of false worship offends Catholic worship less directly than formerly. Finally, in our mixed societies, material cooperation is judged less to be a favor furnished to a false sect.

1. Therefore this general rule can be established concerning that cooperation: that, with a positive prohibition of law excluded, it is rather easily called lawful when it savors of no indifferentism, but can be joined with aversion from the false sect, creates no danger for the cooperator, and scandal is absent or is excused by grave inconvenience.

2. To give one's work in constructing a non-Catholic temple, whether pagan, Mohammedan, Jewish, or heretical, will never be lawful if it is sought in contempt of the Catholic religion, or if it is held as a kind of protestative sign of false worship. In this way the most severe decrees given by the authority of the Holy Office, by the S. C. of the Propagation of the Faith, e.g. January 8, 1851, concerning cooperation in building temples of idols, must be explained. Cf. Ball.-Palm., t. 2, tr. 5, n. 300. Although a graver necessity must be present for you to be excused from cooperation toward a pagan temple than toward the very "mosque," on account of the greater distance from true worship.

But hired simple workers can, from their very condition, cooperate in constructing a temple which, permitted by law, is erected with no offense to the Catholic religion. But contractors for works (entrepreneurs, appellatori, intraprenditori), insofar as they merely execute the model of the architect, will be excused with more difficulty than workers, more easily than architects. Where a different custom has not already prevailed, on account of merely sufficiently grave damage the contractor for the work seems able to be excused: the scandal of indifferentism stands in the way. But a wholly grave damage must be required for you to excuse the architect: for he adds splendor, and thus favors false worship. Yet I would answer more mildly if he rather seems, against irreligion, to favor divine worship under a common aspect. Nevertheless one must guard against the scandal of indifferentism.

Because the constructions of heretical temples in the City were judged especially scandalous, the Instruction of the Cardinal Vicar of June 12, 1878, declared architects, contractors, masters of workers, "who undertake care and work for constructing and adorning some Protestant temple," guilty of mortal sin.

3. To contribute money for the building of a temple is not intrinsically illicit, because the building itself is not yet the exercise of false worship, nor does the contribution necessarily contain approval of error. Yet if it immediately helps the very plan of building a temple, as Noldin says, Praec. n. 122, "in itself it contains external consent with the depraved intention of heretics or unbelievers, and an external favor furnished to heresy or idolatry." Yet that note can be removed either by protestation or by the circumstances themselves, as if Catholics can in this way free themselves from the simultaneity - scandalous in itself - by which they are forced to have one church in common with heterodox persons. Cf. N. Paeii. 1822. With circumstances of this kind excluded, it is better to avoid this as much as opportunity is had, and rather to offer money to a lodging-house or to a profane good of Protestants. Where the contribution cannot be avoided, it will be excused by grave inconvenience, if by common interpretation no favor is judged to be given to heretical worship, but benevolence merely has been signified.

Thus also it is tolerated that Catholic deputies approve subsidies which customarily are paid from the treasury to various sects: they grant these not to non-Catholics as such, but to fellow-citizens, and for avoiding grave damage to the Catholic religion. Lehmk. I, 818.

4. To sell indifferent furniture for adorning a non-Catholic temple (benches, seats, a table, lamps) is so remote a cooperation that the excuse of profit to be received therefrom suffices. A graver cause is required for things of this kind to be made expressly for that temple, because these help the formal exercise of worship; and the more immediately they serve a non-Catholic rite, the graver cause is required. Cf. Noldin, Praec. n. 122. Today nevertheless they permit that simply, on account of the profit to be received from it, a lamb to be sacrificed be sold to Jews: that cooperation is very remote ¹. But a grave cause is required so that sacred vestments can be sold to them, and scarcely except for averting gravest damages will it have been lawful to sell sacred vestments which contain superstitious signs. But simply it will be lawful to sell our liturgical books for a price to non-Catholics who use them, since these at the same time commend our faith.

5. To ring a bell is not to exercise a rite, but it is either formally to invite to a sacred ceremony or to give a sign of a future ceremony. Where, from the circumstances, it seems to be an invitation, this is intrinsically illicit; but if, as per se it is to be understood, it is held for a mere announcement, this material but rather proximate cooperation will be lawful from a very grave cause. Lehmk. I, 812; Noldin, Praec. 120. That for a profane solemnity, e.g. as a sign of joy for the victory of the fatherland, Catholic and non-Catholic bells should be rung together even by agreement, nothing prevents; but lest the scandal of indifferentism be given, it is not to be approved that at an appointed hour all should be rung for this end, so that they give to the faithful and to non-Catholics at the same time the sign of a sacred function. Cf. Lehmk. I, 812.

6. To prepare things necessary for exercising a superstitious or non-Catholic rite, e.g. to spread a table and place there the things which come into use for the minister in assisting the sick person, is to exercise proximate cooperation, material however, which will be excused by a grave cause. But ambiguity of intention, if any is present, must be removed by protestation. Cf. Lehmk. I, 811.

7. Formally to invite a non-Catholic minister to exercise his ministry with a dying person is formally to ask from him an illicit action, which is unlawful. Cf. S. Off. March 15, 1848, apud Lehmk. I, 810. Merely to warn him that there is a sick person of his sect there is only to furnish material cooperation, which will be lawful from a cause wholly grave. Lay persons set over prisons or hospitals, for example, will be able to do this. With attention to their quality, let Sisters not do this of themselves per se.

8. To play the organ for ritual chant seems hardly not to be formal cooperation. Wherefore only from very grave necessity can that proximate cooperation be admitted. But one who, in a certain concert, is compelled to perform his musical part on some instrument will be excused a little more easily. And the case is different of a concert which, on account of a profane reason, e.g. for honoring a prince, celebrating a victory, is set during a sacred function. In circumstances of this kind this commonly will be lawful per se.

9. That in the heretical temple itself Catholics assisting together with non-Catholics should sing a sacred canticle of thanksgiving, e.g. the Te Deum, as a sign of common joy rather than for carrying out a sacred function, this does not seem lawful except to avoid scandal: lest they seem destitute of patriotic affection. If it is rather considered as a sacred thing, one must abstain more from that communication, which nevertheless is not yet intrinsically illicit. Wherefore care must be taken, as much as opportunity is given, that demonstrations of this kind be made separately by Catholics and by non-Catholics.

10. When a heretical minister recites prayers before or after the table, it will be unlawful to respond to him if he recites them as a heretical minister. If as an elderly man devoted to sacred things, where custom was to entrust this to the elder, the thing does not seem to be prohibited, since no authority is then added to him as minister. If custom is lacking, let us reverently abstain.

On English ships, the captain, from office, must on Sunday recite in common prayers taken from the book called the "Prayer Book." Provided that he chooses prayers free from error, a Catholic captain seems able to fulfill those parts. His action is explained by the office to which he is bound, and a religious demonstration today is rather to be desired.

11. If in a non-Catholic region an oath must be taken by touching sacred Bibles edited or translated by heretics, and there is no opportunity of using a Catholic edition, the thing does not seem illicit, since per se it is manifest that these are used only insofar as they contain the word of God, but not insofar as they are not perfectly conformed to the Catholic edition. If it can be done, this mind should be declared. Cf. Lehmk. I, 552 note. - Concerning cooperation toward false worship, Sanchez, Dec., l. 2, c. 9, n. 7; Laymann, l. 2, tr. 3, c. 13; Lugo, De Fide, d. 14, s. 5; d. 22, s. 1, nn. 10, 11; Lehmk. I, 800-823; Noldin, Praec. 122, are read usefully.

¹ But the cases are sufficiently different of a lay man who sells to Jews some lamb from among lambs which are offered for sale in various places, and of an ecclesiastical man who sells to a schismatic priest flour expressly requested for making hosts for Mass, and which no one else can sell. A very grave cause, especially of public order, alone seems able to excuse that cooperation.

— Concerning the construction of buildings of Freemasons, the things said concerning temples apply. They are connected more remotely with the evil use than the sacred buildings of heretics. Cf. Lehmk. I, 816. Yet again the sect is usually more actually hostile to the Catholic faith and religion than a non-Catholic sect, especially an ancient one. Wherefore it is worse to favor their impiety than the false piety of these latter.

The same must be said of favor furnished to societies of socialists, such as they are commonly known. Therefore to procure money for these, so that they can have buildings proper to themselves, cannot be excused from objectively grave guilt.

Yet it is not intrinsically illicit, but on account of a proportionate cause it will be lawful to contribute money to a society of socialists whose immediate end is honorable. Noldin, Praec. 122.

605. Notion. Scandal, derived from the Greek word skandalon, signifies according to etymology any obstacle at which someone strikes his foot, totters, or falls. Scandal is one thing active, of which we treat directly here and which consists in an occasion of the ruin of neighbor being given; another thing passive, which is the ruin itself or the very sin of neighbor caused from such an occasion. Active scandal (anstossige Handlung) is defined by St. Thomas:¹⁰⁶ "a saying or deed less right, furnishing to another an occasion of ruin" (spiritual).

It is said 1: a saying or deed, by which words there is comprehended also the omission of a due saying or deed, which furnishes to another an occasion of ruin.

It is said 2: less right, i.e. either evil in itself, or having the appearance of evil; for no one takes an occasion of sinning from a work which either is good in itself or at least appears good. In pharisaic scandal and in the scandal of the little ones (concerning which below), the work from which it arises is indeed good in itself, but appears evil from the malice or from the imperfection of him who takes scandal.

It is said 3: furnishing to another an occasion of ruin, i.e. scandal is apt for inducing another to moral evil. Certainly nothing can sufficiently and necessarily induce man to evil, since man always remains free; but scandal entices him (although not always efficaciously) to sinning.

¹⁰⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 1.

606. Divisions. Scandal is divided in many ways. Besides the division into active and passive scandal, of which mention has already been made, the following subdivisions are to be noted:

1. Active scandal is subdivided into direct scandal and indirect scandal. The former is had if the intention of the agent is borne toward the sin of another, e.g. by command, counsel, seduction, etc. The latter is had when the sin of another is not indeed intended, but is foreseen, and notwithstanding the foresight, the act which furnishes the cause of another's sin is not omitted; e.g. if someone publicly commits a sin, foreseeing that others will thereby be induced to some evil. Therefore indirect scandal is like an indirectly voluntary evil or even like the voluntary in a qualified sense, concerning which see above n. 53 sq.

Direct scandal is again subdivided into direct formal or diabolical scandal and into direct scandal simply. The former is when someone from hatred of God or neighbor by his action principally intends the perversion of neighbor. It is deservedly called diabolical, because such a man truly acts like the devil, "who as a roaring lion goes about, seeking whom he may devour."¹⁰⁷ The latter is when a man by his action does not indeed directly intend the formal sin of another, but something else with which sin is joined, e.g. his own pleasure, vengeance, etc. But since he cannot attain that end without the sin of another, he also indirectly intends this sin.¹⁰⁸

2. Passive scandal is subdivided into scandal given and into scandal accepted or taken. The former is that which is produced from the truly evil action of another, e.g. a girl is seduced from wanton speeches which someone publicly utters. The latter is that which does not arise from the evil action of another, but from an action right and good in itself, which nevertheless is taken by another, either from ignorance and weakness or from malice, as an occasion of sinning. If passive scandal arises from ignorance or imperfection, it is called scandal of the little ones, e.g. if someone should take scandal on seeing a priest on a two-wheeled machine (commonly Velociped), thinking this to be prohibited to priests of itself. But if passive scandal is taken from malice, it is called pharisaic, because the Pharisees, seeing the best works of Christ and His miracles, nevertheless were scandalized from their own malice and ill will.

From the explanations given it follows that sometimes active and passive scandal are simultaneous, e.g. if someone commits sin precisely because another has given a true occasion. In this case there is had on one side active scandal and on the other side passive scandal given. But sometimes there is active scandal on one side, namely, when someone does a work inductive to the sin of another; but on the other side there is no passive scandal, because that man strongly resists the temptation arising. Finally, sometimes there is passive scandal without active scandal, namely, if someone from his own weakness or malice takes an occasion of sinning on account of a truly good work apprehended. In this case passive scandal accepted is had.¹⁰⁹

In order that the divisions of scandal may more easily be furnished at one glance, we place the following schema:

1. active
   direct (per se)
      formally direct or diabolical
      materially or simply direct
   indirect (per accidens)

2. passive
   given
   accepted
      of the little ones
      pharisaic

Malice of scandal.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. 1 Petr. 5, 8.

¹⁰⁸ This is the common division of scandal given by moderns, e.g. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I 628; Noldin, De praec. n. 103; Gopfert, Schindler. Another is the division given by St. Thomas (S. theol. l. c. a. 1 ad 4), namely, active scandal is subdivided into scandal per se and scandal per accidens. Scandal per se is present "when someone by his evil word or deed intends to induce another to sin, or even if he does not intend this, the deed itself is such that of its own nature it has that it is inductive to sinning." If the agent intends the sin of neighbor precisely as it is sin (namely, led by hatred of God or neighbor), it is called diabolical scandal; but if he intends only the action of another, with which sin is necessarily connected, it is scandal simply direct. To this scandal per se there corresponds, in him who falls into sin on account of scandal, scandal given. - Scandal per accidens is a word or deed which, beyond the intention of the one operating and beyond the condition of the work itself, is an occasion of sin for another on account of his weakness or malice. Passive scandal arising from scandal per accidens is either pharisaic or of the little ones.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 1 ad 4.

607. Principle 1. Direct scandal is a mortal sin from its genus, and indeed both against charity and against that virtue to the violation of which neighbor is induced.

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture. Christ says: "But he who shall scandalize one of these little ones who believe in Me, it is expedient for him that an ass's millstone be hung on his neck, and that he be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals! For it is necessary that scandals come; nevertheless, woe to that man through whom scandal comes."¹¹⁰ From these entirely grave words it is manifestly established that scandal from its genus is a mortal sin.

Proof 2. Scandal is against charity, which gravely prohibits injuring the spiritual good of neighbor. Hence St. Thomas teaches: "Active scandal is always sin in him who scandalizes: because either the very work which he does is sin; or even if it has the appearance of sin, it is always to be laid aside on account of charity toward neighbor, by which each one is bound to provide for the salvation of neighbor; and thus he who does not lay it aside acts against charity."¹¹¹ But since all sins which are directly against charity are mortal sins from their genus, hence the sin of direct scandal is mortal from its genus. - Not only charity, however, but also that virtue is injured which the scandalizing person or the scandalized person violates. Hence active direct scandal commonly includes three sins; e.g. he who acts immodestly before a girl in order to seduce her commits three grave sins, namely, a double sin against chastity (namely his own sin and the girl's sin, which is also imputed to him), and a sin against charity, insofar as he harms the girl.¹¹² - Direct scandal, although from its genus it is a mortal sin, nevertheless can become a venial sin; and indeed not only from imperfection of the act, insofar as the one scandalizing acted with half-full advertence or imperfect consent, but also from smallness of matter.

The gravity of scandal depends on many circumstances. It is always a mortal sin if the one scandalizing by his action, which perhaps from its object is not gravely sinful, intends the grave sin of neighbor. For such a depraved intention gravely injures charity, although perhaps the neighbor in reality did not consent to the seduction furnished to him.

The following general rules can be had for judging the gravity of scandal:

The guilt of scandal is the graver, according as a) the sin of neighbor is more willed; b) the action more influences the sin of neighbor; c) the sin committed by neighbor is graver.

The guilt of scandal is the lighter, according as a) the defect of sufficient deliberation is greater; b) the action itself influences neighbor more lightly; c) the sinful matter to which neighbor is induced is lighter, e.g. if someone is induced to a small officious lie.

Note. The malice of scandal becomes greater if the scandalized neighbor truly falls into sin. But even if the one scandalizing (directly) foresees that his solicitation will probably be fruitless, nevertheless he commits the sin of scandal. Wherefore prostitutes soliciting men to sin cause scandal as often as they solicit, although often they foresee that they themselves will suffer rejection.

¹¹⁰ Matth. 18, 6 sq.

¹¹¹ S. theol. l. c. a. 4.

¹¹² Cf. nevertheless below n. 611 concerning a girl freely consenting to fornication.

608. Principle 2. Indirect scandal is indeed a sin against charity, but not against that virtue which is injured by the scandalized person.

Thus St. Thomas and very many of his Commentators,¹¹³ such as Cajetan, Banez, Ioannes a S. Thoma.¹¹⁴ The same opinion is held by several modern authors, such as Ballerini,¹¹⁵ Lehmkuhl,¹¹⁶ Noldin.¹¹⁷ The mind of St. Thomas, concerning which authors dispute much, nevertheless seems to be sufficiently clear; for the Angelic Doctor writes: "Active scandal can be taken in two ways: namely per se and per accidens; per accidens indeed, when it is beyond the intention of the agent; as when someone by his deed or disordered word does not intend to give to another an occasion of ruin, but only to satisfy his own will: and thus also active scandal is not a special sin; because that which is per accidens does not constitute a species."¹¹⁸ - St. Alphonsus holds the opposite opinion, saying: "He who directly or indirectly induces neighbor to sin, sins in two ways, namely, both against charity and against the virtue to the violation of which he induces neighbor."¹¹⁹ The holy Doctor cites for this opinion of his many authors, some of whom nevertheless are not rightly alleged. - The first opinion seems to be better, because in indirect scandal there is not properly a willing and approval of another's sin, but rather its permission, which is not necessarily imputed to the one giving indirect scandal. Besides, in practice there is not such great difference between the two opinions, as Concina himself,¹²⁰ patron of the second opinion, admits. - The following things are to be attended to in practice:

¹¹³ On S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 1-4.

¹¹⁴ On 1, 2, q. 18, disp. 10, a. 1.

¹¹⁵ In notes to Gury, Comp. Theol. mor. I, n. 236.

¹¹⁶ Theol. mor. I 789.

¹¹⁷ De praecept. n. 104.

¹¹⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 3. The same Angelic Doctor teaches the same still more explicitly, 4, dist. 38, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 2. The mind of St. Thomas is explained excellently by Cajetan in the Commentaries on S. theol. l. c. a. 1.

¹¹⁹ Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 45. - G. J. Waffelaert discusses this controversy at great length and breadth in "L'espece morale du scandale." His general conclusion is: "1. Every scandal contains a species against charity. 2. Indirect scandal is not, generally speaking, a sin of the same nature as that to which it gives occasion" (p. 145).

¹²⁰ Lib. 1 in Decal., diss. de scand. c. 2.

609. Resolves: 1. He who without sufficient cause gives indirect scandal through an action good or indifferent in itself sins against charity only. Hence scandal of the little ones or pharisaic scandal foreseen and culpably not impeded is a sin against charity in him who was the voluntary occasion of those scandals. Wherefore, e.g., a priest legitimately dispensed from the law of fasting and eating meat before laymen, foreseeing that they will be scandalized and perhaps by his example be induced to eating meat on forbidden days, indeed sins against charity, but not against temperance. In confession he is bound to say: Legitimately dispensed, I ate meat before laymen, foreseeing that they would take scandal from it, and I neither warned them concerning my dispensation nor had any sufficient reason for so acting.

2. He who gives indirect scandal through an evil action performed before others commits a double sin to be declared in confession, namely, one through the evil action considered in itself, the other through injury to charity, because he was an occasion of spiritual harm for neighbor; but he does not sin against the virtue which neighbor perhaps violated on account of indirect scandal. Hence, e.g., he who committed theft before others, foreseeing, but in no way intending, that a neighbor, having seen this evil example, would also commit theft, indeed sinned against charity by publicly perpetrating theft, and he is bound to declare this in confession, but he did not sin against justice from the fact that the neighbor also committed theft; and a fortiori he is not bound to restitution on account of the theft committed by neighbor.

Or St. Alphonsus himself¹²¹ and several other authors, thinking that in this case there is a double sin against justice, do not oblige him who gave indirect scandal to restitution. But other favorers of the second opinion, speaking more logically, oblige to restitution in this case. Therefore Billuart,¹²² a favorer of the second opinion, says: "If [someone] by his example efficaciously moves another to damage, he sins equally against justice with respect to the one damaged, as if he moved him by counsel or persuasion." But he who efficaciously counsels unjust damage, beyond all doubt, is bound to restitution. And in truth, as will be taught below in the treatise on unjust damage, with all theologians agreeing, an unjust damager is bound to restitution if his action was truly, formally, and efficaciously unjust. But according to the second opinion the action of him who by his example causes the damage of another is truly, formally, and efficaciously unjust. Hence logically it would have to be inferred that from such indirect scandal there arises an obligation of restitution. This, however, very few authors teach and require in practice. Hence the first opinion, also on account of this reason, namely, because it proceeds more logically, is to be preferred in theory and besides is safe in practice.

3. He who culpably gives indirect scandal before many probably commits as many sins against charity as there are persons truly scandalized. The reason is that charity is injured toward each scandalized person, inasmuch as each scandalized person is a total object. Hence, e.g., he who has uttered filthy words before twenty persons gathered together ought (insofar as he morally can) to declare in confession the number of persons scandalized. But since in practice it is often impossible to indicate the exact number of persons scandalized, and since indirect scandal frequently is not a mortal sin, whether on account of smallness of matter or on account of imperfection of the act, it is often enough to declare in confession in a general way that such a sin was committed before many. - According to the first opinion reviewed above in Principle 2, it is not necessary to confess the special condition of the persons scandalized through indirect scandal. Hence, e.g., it is not necessary to confess that filthy words were uttered before a nun, or a blood relative, or a married person. But sometimes the condition of the one scandalizing is to be explained, as if a superior, father of a family, parish priest, etc. scandalized subjects, because these are bound not only from charity but from office to guard against the ruin of their subjects.¹²³

4. An action gravely sinful from its nature, perpetrated before others, is not scandal if it exercises no causality at all upon the neighbor seeing or hearing; e.g. if those before whom such an evil action is committed are so stable in good that they are in no way moved; or conversely, if they are imbued with such lost morals that they are no longer induced to sin from the evil action of another, but have been accustomed to sin from their own malice or passion.¹²⁴ Thus in theory; but in practice the circumstance that a gravely sinful action was done before others is generally to be accused, because this circumstance not only aggravates the sinful action, but also often produces true scandal, since it is almost impossible to establish whether an action of this kind exercised absolutely no harmful causality upon neighbor or not. Hence, e.g., he who would commit fornication, others even of the most lost morals being present, would have to confess this circumstance of the sin committed. For it is almost impossible that so great a foulness seen should move nothing toward lust. Authors commonly teach that it is a true sin of scandal if someone directly induces another to a thing evil in itself, even if that other had already before been prepared for sin. The reason is that a new actual ruin is caused to the other. Wherefore that man acted illicitly who, doubting whether a woman living in his house was a prostitute, disguised, sought fornication from her in order to expel the doubt. When the woman immediately consented to sin, she was cast out by the man.¹²⁵

¹²¹ L. c.

¹²² De carit. diss. 7, a. 6, § 3.

¹²³ Cf. Billuart, De carit. diss. 7, a. 6, § 3.

¹²⁴ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 45.

¹²⁵ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 47.

610. Obligation of avoiding scandal.

1. Pharisaic scandal is not necessarily to be avoided if there is some reasonable cause for acting.

The reason is that such scandal arises from the malice alone of him who takes scandal. This indeed is confirmed by the example of Christ, who answered the disciples saying: "Do you know that the Pharisees, having heard this word [concerning foods], have been scandalized? - Let them alone; they are blind and leaders of the blind."¹²⁶ Sometimes, however, charity requires that even this scandal be avoided; e.g. a cleric is bound from charity, if he easily can, not to pass through a street where wicked men, seeing him, would break forth into blasphemies against religion.

2. The scandal of the little ones is to be avoided as often as this can be done without grave inconvenience.¹²⁷

The reason is that charity obliges us to prevent the evils of neighbor when it can be done easily. But if a notable inconvenience arises for the agent, then scandal of the little ones can be permitted; and this inconvenience ought to be the graver in proportion as the sin feared is graver, as it is more certainly foreseen as going to happen, and as there are more persons going to suffer scandal. Hence indifferent works, or works which are only of counsel, are sometimes to be omitted in order to avoid scandal of the little ones; e.g. a girl who knows that she is being foully desired by a young man is bound sometimes, but not for a long time, to omit hearing Mass on weekdays; indeed, according to several theologians, even once or twice on days of precept.¹²⁸ Likewise entrance into Religion ought to be deferred somewhat if otherwise parents would take grave scandal, and there exists hope that they will shortly give consent. On the contrary, no one is bound to pay more to some workman, even if he foresees that the man, notwithstanding the just price received, will blaspheme. The reason is that such a workman by a greater payment would be rendered still more insolent and worse another time. A parish priest who is not fasting could, indeed would be bound to, celebrate Mass if otherwise a great scandal would arise among the people. The reason is that the positive law of the Eucharistic fast ought to yield to the natural law of avoiding scandal. But never (as, moreover, is self-evident) is it licit to do something intrinsically evil in order to avoid scandal; e.g. it is not licit to deny the faith in order to avoid the blasphemies of heretics.

3. It is not a sin of scandal, from a just cause, to permit an occasion of sin or even to place it by some honorable action.

Thus St. Alphonsus¹²⁹ and theologians commonly. St. Thomas agrees, saying: "To induce someone to sin is licit in no way; nevertheless to use the sin of another for good is licit; because even God uses all sins for some good; for from any evil whatever He draws out some good";¹³⁰ and: "Sometimes a man, having his wife suspected of adultery, lays snares for her, so that he may be able to discover her with witnesses in the crime of fornication; and thus he can proceed to accusation."¹³¹ Hence Judith, for a most grave reason, offered Holofernes an occasion of sinning. The reason, however, is that to permit sin is not something evil in itself, since God also permits many sins. But for discerning in practice when it is licit to permit sin, those rules are to be applied which were given above, where there was treatment of the indirectly voluntary (n. 57 sqq.), namely when it is licit to place a cause from which there follows a double effect, one good, the other evil. E.g. it is licit for a master not to remove the occasion of stealing from sons and servants, so that, having been detected, they may be suitably punished and corrected; guards of gardens, orchards, and vineyards can hide themselves so that those doing damage may be apprehended; it is licit to borrow money from a usurer from a just cause, even if he is going to commit the sin of usury.

Certain questions are usually proposed and solved here by theologians, namely:

¹²⁶ Matth. 15, 12-14.

¹²⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 7 et 8.

¹²⁸ S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 51.

¹²⁹ Ib. n. 58.

¹³⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 78, a. 4.

¹³¹ Suppl. q. 62, a. 3 ad 4.

611.

1. Whether it is licit from a reasonable cause to ask from another that which he himself will not furnish without sin? R. Affirmatively, if the sin proceeds from the malice alone of the other; negatively, if the work asked is intrinsically evil. Hence it is licit from a reasonable cause to ask sacraments from an unworthy priest; an oath from one who is going to perjure himself; the conjugal debt from a spouse who is going to perpetrate onanism. On the contrary, it is not licit to buy stolen things from a thief, or to ask sacramental absolution from a priest who lacks jurisdiction.

2. Whether it is licit to counsel someone to a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater? R. Negatively, unless that lesser evil is virtually included in the other greater evil already determinately willed. Yet there are many and great authors, among whom are St. Alphonsus,¹³² Dominic Soto,¹³³ and Cajetan,¹³⁴ teaching that it is more probably licit to counsel a lesser evil, if the other has already been determined to carry out the greater, as Lot is read to have done (Gen. 19, 8), when, the Sodomites wishing to abuse two men, he counseled fornication with his two daughters. Nevertheless the first opinion, namely the negative one, seems to be better and truer. For he who by counsel induces another to a lesser evil not virtually included, but disparate, really causes a new sin and does not prevent the first greater sin (according to its malice). E.g. if someone determinately wishes to commit adultery, I cannot counsel him to simple fornication. For if he consents to my counsel, he is guilty before God not only of the adultery willed, but also of the fornication counseled by me, and I am really the cause of this fornication done. On the contrary, if someone wishes to steal 100 francs from Peter, I can counsel him to take only 10 francs, because then this second sin is virtually included in the first.¹³⁵

3. Whether in sins which cannot be committed without an accomplice the circumstance of induction is necessarily to be declared in confession? R. All indeed teach that he who induced another to sin sinned more gravely than if the sin had been done without induction; but several grave theologians, among whom are Lugo, the Salmanticenses, St. Alphonsus,¹³⁶ and many moderns, rightly affirm that this circumstance of induction is only an aggravating circumstance and not one changing the species, unless, however, the induction had been made by threats, coercion, or fraud. Hence he who committed fornication is not strictly bound to say that he induced the woman to this sin, if she gave consent freely, without preceding threats, fraud, or coercion. The reason is that no special injury was inflicted upon one consenting.

¹³² Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 57.

¹³³ De iur. et iust. l. 6, q. 1, a. 5.

¹³⁴ Summula v. Tyrannis.

¹³⁵ Cf. below II, n. 103.

¹³⁶ Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 46.

612. Reparation of scandal.

There exists a true obligation of repairing scandal, because through scandal the charity of neighbor has been wounded, and not rarely also the public good. Wherefore he who has given grave scandal cannot be admitted to the sacraments unless he has repaired the grave scandal given, or, if there is question of sacramental absolution, unless he has at least seriously promised the reparation of that scandal. This obligation arises from the virtue of charity, or even from the virtue of legal justice, but not from the virtue of commutative justice, unless neighbor had been seduced by means truly unjust, e.g. by threats, coercion, fraud, etc.

1. Public scandal must also be repaired publicly. The reason is obvious, namely because otherwise its evil influence is not eliminated. It is to be noted that this obligation of public reparation exists even if from the active scandal given no ruin of neighbor in fact followed. For the public good requires that the individual members of human society lead a morally ordered life. But if they have publicly neglected this obligation, they ought also publicly to return to good conduct. This return is sometimes had sufficiently if he who gave scandal now gives good example; e.g. if a notorious adulteress publicly receives the sacraments, devoutly assists at the exercises of religion, and diligently fulfills the duties of her state. Sometimes, however, good example publicly given is not sufficient for the due reparation of scandal, but besides this an express retraction is required. Thus, e.g., he who spread false doctrines ought publicly to revoke them; he who publicly gave his name to the Masonic sect is bound expressly and notoriously to retract his adherence, etc. It belongs to a prudent confessor, or parish priest, to determine the mode of reparation of public scandal. In graver cases recourse must be had to the Ordinary or to the Holy See.

2. Secret scandal must be repaired before those persons who have borne some damage from it. Hence, e.g., a seducer is bound in the best way he can to see that the seduced neighbor recover his former salvation. If from secret scandal no true damage has befallen the neighbor, then it suffices that he who gave scandal show thereafter, by his good example, the amendment made.

Scandal in Certain Particular Cases.

The whole world indeed is set in evil,¹³⁷ and there are very many things which cause scandal. But there are certain things which more frequently entice to sin, and concerning these it is usual to treat specially in the treatise on scandal. Now these things are: 1. the adornment of women, 2. obscene images and statues, 3. dances and spectacles, 4. bad books and evil newspapers.

¹³⁷ Cf. 1 Jo. 5, 19.

613. 1. The adornment of women. It is licit for women to adorn themselves, provided, however, that this is done in a right manner and for an honorable end. Hence St. Paul says: "I wish therefore ... likewise also women in adorned apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, and not with braided hair or gold or pearls, or costly clothing, but what befits women."¹³⁸ First of all attention must be given to the end or intention by which a woman adorns herself. This intention can be either a) honorable, e.g. that she may please her husband, that she may find a spouse, that she may conceal natural defects; or b) less honorable, e.g. that she may present her beauty for the admiration of all; or c) finally directly sinful, e.g. that she may provoke the concupiscence and impure love of men. It is self-evident that in the third case every adornment of women is gravely sinful. But in the first and second case adornment is licit, or only lightly evil, provided however that it is not immodest adornment. Therefore women can assume modest adornment from an honorable end, even if perhaps someone takes an occasion of sinning.

But notably immodest adornment is a grave sin, because it is grave scandal furnishing to many a cause of spiritual ruin. But for discerning what adornment of women is immodest, attention must first of all be given to the customs of the country in which the women live, e.g. in hot regions. That adornment or dress is censured by deserved right as immodest which, the circumstances of place and time being considered, incites to lust. Cf. Instruction of the S. C. of the Council to diocesan ordinaries, "On the dishonorable manner of dress of women," Jan. 12, 1930. Act. Ap. Sed. XXII 26 sqq.

When theologians speak of the immodest dress of women, they chiefly have before their eyes the uncovering of the breast. But what uncovering of the breast is gravely dishonorable depends much upon custom. For things to which people are accustomed entice less. Hence it can happen that a woman furnishes grave scandal on one occasion and not on another, although she appears adorned in the same manner. It will easily be a mortal sin of scandal if women publicly in the streets present themselves to the sight of all with a transparent garment about the breast, or with some, although not so immoderate, denudation of the breast; on the contrary, it is not so easily a mortal sin if in some private society, e.g. on the occasion of a more solemn dinner, dancing, or another festivity, they appear in such dress - with moderate denudation, however, and not down to the middle of the breasts. The reason is that there is an almost universal custom that women in those circumstances somewhat bare the breast or wear transparent garments about the upper part of the breast. Hence it would be a grave inconvenience if some woman had to refuse obedience to that custom.

Decency of dress is especially to be observed in assisting at sacred functions. Wherefore many bishops have issued special statutes concerning decency of dress in these circumstances. - Whether it is licit for women to paint their face with rouge? St. Thomas answers that this is licit if it is done to hide some blemish or deformity; but that it is a light sin if it is done from vanity, yet without an evil end.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ 1 Tim. 2, 9 sq.

¹³⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 169, a. 2 ad 2.

614. 2. Obscene images and statues. Images and statues are called obscene which are accustomed to excite to venereal lust. This indeed can happen either on account of the scene which they exhibit, or on account of the nudity of the persons whom they represent. Wherefore those are obscene which represent acts truly foul, and ordinarily also those which represent adult persons entirely nude; on the contrary, those which represent nude infants cannot be called obscene. Likewise anatomical figures are not obscene (although they cannot licitly be looked at by all). Likewise so-called "artistic studies" (Aktstudien) upon a nude human model, provided they are made from a just cause. Likewise if nude persons are represented in a manner so artistic or idealistic that those looking are moved chiefly by the art or by the idea represented. Hence, e.g., the very celebrated Laocoon in the Vatican Museum cannot be called obscene; likewise several representations made in the Catacombs or in the first times of the Middle Ages are not obscene, whose piety we admire, and which also are sometimes had in Catholic churches. Furthermore it certainly cannot be said that the Catholic Church, and especially the Church in the Catacombs, to which holy martyrs and confessors gathered, admitted obscene images.

Nevertheless even those artistic or idealistic representations, if they represent nude adult persons, today are no longer to be placed before the eyes of all, especially of the young, because several are not able to discern art so well, but rather are moved from the thing itself represented. - Those who make obscene images or statues, or place them before the eyes of all in public streets or gardens, commit a grave sin of scandal. But entrance into public museums and other public exhibitions, where several nude statues and images are set forth, is not to be permitted (without a reasonable cause) to young persons not yet having mature judgment.

615. 3. Dances and spectacles, although in themselves they are something indifferent, are nevertheless very frequently accustomed to produce grave scandals and to be proximate occasions of sinning gravely. Certainly it is never licit to institute dances in which, by reason of nudity, gestures, etc., something notably dishonorable is externally done; but if these things do not occur, although the sins of many to be committed on the occasion of dances are feared, those who institute them from a reasonable cause, or who are present at them, cannot in themselves be said to be liable to grave sin. A cause is required that is the graver in proportion as the occasion of sinning is more proximate. In our times it is often most difficult to turn the faithful away from instituting and frequenting all dances. Therefore let the parish priest and confessor strive according to their powers that young persons be present at dances more rarely, that nothing dishonorable be perpetrated there, and that a proximate occasion of sinning be absent. - Almost the same thing ought to be said of spectacles and cinematographic exhibitions. But in our times not a few spectacles are wicked, both on account of things represented against religion or good morals, and on account of the immodest dress of those representing. Since in ordinary cases someone can more easily exempt himself from the obligation of assisting at these spectacles than from the moral compulsion of assisting at dances, it seems that a stricter practice with respect to spectacles than with respect to dances should ordinarily be observed.

616. 4. Bad books and evil newspapers in our times constitute a most abundant fountain of scandals, because they pervert very many men with respect to morals and with respect to religion. Hence authors and editors of bad books, journals, and other writings furnish very grave scandal. Likewise booksellers gravely sin who sell books and writings of this kind to anyone at all, or furnish them to be read. But on account of great inconveniences that would otherwise arise, booksellers can sometimes sell such books to men having mature judgment, who incur no danger of perversion from the reading, provided, however, that those books are not obscene by profession. Concerning this matter the Code of Canon Law establishes c. 1404: "Sellers of books are not to sell, lend, or retain books treating of obscene matters by profession; they are not to have the other prohibited books for sale, unless they have obtained the due permission from the Apostolic See, nor are they to sell them to anyone unless they can prudently judge that they are legitimately sought by the buyer." Workers also, who proximately cooperate in the printing and distribution of these writings, sin gravely of themselves.

505. NOTIONS. Scandalum in Greek is the same as offendiculum in Latin, a stumbling-block placed in the way, against which a traveler incautiously stumbling falls. Whence the name scandal, transferred from physical things to morals, signifies everything which can furnish to neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin, and also the spiritual ruin itself arising thence.

Therefore the essence of scandal is not to be sought in the admiration caused, nor in the knowledge stimulated, nor in the irritation produced; but in this, that it can furnish, or is capable of furnishing, an occasion, or an occasional cause, of sinning, for example if at the least rash judgment, unjust suspicion, or rumor would follow.

It differs from positive induction or seduction, which is rather cooperation in sin or an external action by which another is explicitly and directly provoked to sin (II, 58). Cf. Noldin, II, n. 110.

DIVISION. Scandal is twofold: namely, active and passive.

I. Active scandal is: "A less right word or deed, furnishing another an occasion of spiritual ruin" (2.2, q. 43, a. 1).

It is said: 1. word or deed, under which name also comes an external omission, for example the omission of Mass on a day on which the precept urges; 2. less right, that is, what either is evil in itself (as if you speak filthy things before a youth), or has the appearance of evil in the eyes of others (although in itself it is good), as if from a just cause, before others ignorant of it, you omit Mass on a feast day, leave parents in order to follow the evangelical counsels, eat flesh on a forbidden day; 3. furnishing another an occasion of spiritual ruin: for, for the notion of scandal, it is not required that spiritual ruin actually be brought upon neighbor; but it suffices to furnish to him an occasion of fall or an occasion of sinning in such a way that, the circumstances being attended to, his fall is probably to be feared.

Active scandal is subdivided into direct and indirect. 1. It is DIRECT if the ruin or sin of another is intended. But it can be intended either formally, namely if something is therefore done so that neighbor may fall into sin, and then the scandal is called diabolical; or materially, namely if neighbor is therefore exposed to sin so that his sin may serve the usefulness or pleasure of the one intending it, and then the scandal is called simply direct. 2. It is INDIRECT if the sin of neighbor is not indeed intended, but nevertheless is foreseen as probably going to follow from a word or deed posited (without just cause) (II, 43).

II. Passive scandal is the spiritual ruin itself of neighbor, or the sin for which an occasion is furnished to neighbor. It is similarly divided into two parts: 1. Scandal is GIVEN if it arises from active scandal, namely from a deed which is evil in itself or at least has the appearance of evil. 2. Scandal is ACCEPTED if it does not arise from active scandal. And this latter can happen in two ways, namely: a) if it arises from weakness alone or ignorance. Then it is called scandal of the little ones, because, from a deed which contains neither evil nor the appearance of evil, an occasion of sinning is taken solely on account of weakness or ignorance; for example, if a young man from the modest adornment of a girl takes occasion of desiring her basely; b) if it arises from malice alone, and then it is called pharisaical. Thus the Pharisees conceived hatred against Christ on the occasion of his words or deeds; so also one who sees a priest walking, and from this maliciously takes an occasion of saying that the ministers of the Church labor under sloth.¹

506. From these things you will gather: 1. Sometimes active and passive scandal are found together, namely when someone, from an occasion of sinning which neighbor furnished to himself, actually falls into sin. Sometimes there is active scandal without passive, namely when someone induces another by word or deed to sin, but the effect does not follow. Sometimes there is passive scandal without active, as happens, for example, in pharisaical scandal.

2. "It is not always scandal if you sin before others; but only when, the circumstances both of the person acting and of those before whom the act is done being attended to, it can probably be feared that by this act those who otherwise would not sin are drawn to sin" (II, 43, 3). Wherefore those are not guilty of scandal who, living with a man prone to blasphemies, posit actions lightly evil, for example words of impatience, or even indifferent actions, from which new blasphemies can be foreseen; all the more because it is morally impossible to abstain from all these things (Aertnys, l. 2, tr. 3, n. 62).

3. "He is not judged to give scandal who, although he sins publicly, nevertheless does it before those who are either so vile, or infamous or wicked, or who are so upright, that no one is moved to sin: for example, if someone fornicates before others who are prepared to do the same and are not moved by his example; or if before the meek someone contends, brawls, or strikes another" (II, 44, 6; VI, 257).

These things having been posited, let us consider: 1. the malice; 2. the permission; 3. the reparation; 4. the frequency of scandal.

Passive scandal does not have a special malice; for it is nothing other than the sin itself of the one scandalized. Here only ACTIVE scandal is treated, and it is asked what kind and how great its malice is.

507. PRINCIPLES. I. Every scandal has at least a twofold malice: one against charity, the other against the virtue to the wounding of which neighbor is exposed. As regards direct scandal, theologians generally agree. As regards indirect scandal, some say that through it one sins only against the virtue wounded; others think that one sins only against charity. Yet the opinion affirming that by each scandal one sins both against charity and against the virtue is to be preferred, with St. Alphonsus. Against charity indeed, because if from charity we are bound, when we can, to impede the sin of neighbor, much more are we bound not to be the occasion for neighbor of committing it. Against the virtue, because each virtue prohibits someone from being the cause or occasion to others of wounding it. And a very urgent reason against the first opinion is this: because where it is a question of consent in sin, the direct and indirect voluntary belong to the same species.²

We said at least twofold; because direct diabolical scandal sometimes also wounds charity toward God. Besides, every scandal can contain several malices: either on account of the quality of the person scandalizing, for example if a father scandalizes children, a Superior subjects, a teacher pupils; for these are held, not only from charity but also from office, to forestall the ruin of their subjects; or on account of the quality of the person scandalized, as if someone induces a married person, or one bound by a vow of chastity, to filthy things. All these malices, diverse in species, can also be several in number: for there are as many sins of scandal as there are persons scandalized (cf. n. 331). See St. Alph., V, 46; Selva, P. I, c. 8; P. II, c. 2.

508. II. Scandal is a mortal sin of its kind. The reason is that it is opposed to the precept of charity toward neighbor, since the greatest of harms is inflicted upon him. Whence Christ said in Matt. 18:7: Woe to that man by whom scandal cometh.

But the gravity of scandal is measured: 1. from the more or less explicit intention of the ruin of neighbor; whence direct scandal is graver than indirect; 2. from the greater influence upon the ruin of neighbor; wherefore the scandal of a priest or religious is regularly graver than the scandal of a layman; 3. from the gravity of the sin of which it is the occasion. The reason is that it participates in the malice of this sin, as is established from the things said (n. 507). Hence it can happen that a sin grave according to itself is venial by reason of scandal, for example if your grave theft is the occasion to another of committing a light theft. Conversely, a sin light according to itself can be grave by reason of scandal, for example if a religious utters a less honorable word before women, or those who can thence take occasion of mortal sin (II, 44).

509. Corollaries. 1. To ask from another something which he himself will not furnish without sin, if he is already PREPARED to sin, is a sin of scandal, if the thing which is asked is intrinsically evil, so that in no way can it be furnished without sin; for example, fornication with a prostitute is certainly a sin of scandal, even if the other is already prepared to sin. The reason is that thus an occasion is given of greater ruin (II, 47; l. El. qq. ref., n. 8 and 16).

Yet he will not be guilty of scandal who, from a just cause, asks for a thing good or indifferent in itself, although the other, in furnishing it, commits sin. Thus, for example, it is lawful, for the sake of necessity or usefulness, to ask a loan from a usurer, the sacraments from a sacrilegious priest, the conjugal act from an abusing spouse. Cf. n. 315. But if a just and proportionate cause is lacking, it is not licit, without guilt of scandal, to do these things (II, 47, 77, 79).

2. To advise a LESSER EVIL, so that a greater may be avoided, to the execution of which another is already determined, is licit of itself, according to the more probable opinion (whether this lesser evil which is advised is of the same species or of a diverse species); namely, when the one acting is so firmly determined to execute the evil that in no other way can he be turned away from the execution. The reason is that then the one advising does not seek evil, but good, namely the choice of the lesser evil. Hence, to one prepared to kill an enemy, it is licit to advise that he rather strike him, or steal something from him (II, 57). Cf. Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1911, p. 380.

Yet per accidens, by reason of justice, this is not licit: namely, if he is advised that a lesser evil be inflicted upon some other determinate person, which that person here and now is not bound to suffer (III, 565). Cf. n. 980.

3. To PERMIT an occasion of sinning (not evil of itself) is licit; even if the fall of another is thence foreseen, or probably feared; namely, if a cause is present, for example, that the delinquent may be corrected. For permission of itself is not induction; it is a merely indirect volition.

In this way, a father and a master can refrain from removing an occasion of stealing from sons or servants whom they have known to be prone to theft, so that, being caught, they may be punished and come to their senses; for one theft is reasonably permitted so that several may be avoided. Thus also it is licit for custodians of fields, vineyards, and forests to hide themselves, so that those causing damage may be caught, and, being punished, may be turned away from inflicting further damage.

Thus finally a man having a suspect wife can lay snares for her and catch her in the crime, in order that he may provide. Thus St. Thomas and others rather commonly. Cf. II, 58; H. Ap., IV, 30.

4. Probably it is also licit to PLACE an occasion, if a just cause is present; for only an indifferent act is posited, and the evil is permitted with sufficient reason.

Hence, probably the master does not sin who deliberately leaves open the chest in which money is kept, for the end that he may test the doubtful fidelity of a servant. St. Thomas (2.2, q. 78, a. 4) gives this general rule: "To induce a man to sin is in no way licit: yet to use the sin of another for good is licit."

5. In sins which necessarily have an ACCOMPLICE, the circumstance of induction is not to be explained in confession, according to a sufficiently probable opinion. For since in sins of this kind a mutual wounding of charity is found, the circumstance of induction is only an aggravating circumstance, within the same species, against charity, and therefore is not necessarily to be disclosed in confession. But he sufficiently accuses the sin of scandal who confesses the species of the sin, for example fornication, adultery, incest, etc. (II, 46; H. Ap., IV, 26; l. El. qq. ref., n. 7). Except, unless the one inducing to evil had used threats, or prayers so importunate that they could be equated with force.

510. From these things you will resolve: 1. A penitent does not satisfy in confession when he says: I gave scandal; but besides his own sin by which he gave scandal, he must express the species of mortal sin to which, by his evil example, praise, blame, etc., he gave occasion; besides, the number of persons to whom he furnished, or probably could furnish, an occasion to such sin; likewise, the quality of himself and of the person scandalized, whenever from this a new species is had; similarly, the unjust mode, if he used force or threats. But as regards those penitents who, in relation to indirect scandal, adhere to the opinion of modern authors (cf. n. 507), let the confessor act according to the principles to be established n. 1789.

2. Let the confessor and preacher gravely rebuke those giving scandal, after the example of Christ saying: Woe to that man by whom scandal cometh (Matt. 18:7). For by their work the world is filled with sins, and hell with souls (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 1, n. 46).

The state of the question is whether it is licit to posit a good act having the appearance of evil, or an act wholly good or indifferent, from which passive scandal is foreseen as going to arise. That this is licit when the due conditions intervene is already established from the things said about the indirect voluntary (n. 315). Therefore it remains that we show when the due conditions are found, and since, in relation to the first three, there is no difficulty, there remains to be weighed when the fourth condition is verified, namely, WHEN A SUFFICIENT REASON IS GIVEN for permitting the scandal of neighbor. Yet we forewarn that here it is chiefly a question of grave scandal; although the things which we are about to say also hold, in due proportion, concerning scandal in light matter.

511. PRINCIPLES. I. Grave inconvenience is a sufficient reason for permitting scandal given or scandal of the little ones. This is established from the fact that charity does not oblige one to undergo grave inconvenience lest neighbor suffer harm which depends upon his free will, since then he is not constituted in strict necessity (cf. n. 480 and 519). But we are bound with light inconvenience, because from charity we ought to impede the sins of neighbor when we easily can (cf. n. 493). But a greater cause is required if a graver sin is feared, if there are several to be scandalized, if it is more certainly foreseen that scandal will follow (II, 48, 49).

Moreover, in practice, we can avoid scandal either by concealing the action, or by deferring it to another time, or by omitting it altogether; and specifically, as regards scandal given, or when the work from which scandal is foreseen bears before itself the appearance of evil, the occasion of ruin is to be removed, as far as it is in the power of the agent (yet not with grave inconvenience), by admonition made to neighbor concerning the rectitude of the action, for example on account of a dispensation, an excusing cause, etc. But if, after the admonition has been given, the scandal persists, it can now be equated with pharisaical scandal (II, 52).

II. Any reasonable cause whatsoever is a sufficient reason for permitting pharisaical scandal. The reason is that this scandal arises from the malice alone of neighbor. It is clear besides from the example of Christ, who despised the scandal of the Pharisees: Let them alone; they are blind and leaders of the blind (Matt. 15:14). Wherefore if some reason of utility is present, whether one's own or another's, no further care is to be had concerning this scandal. Yet some reason is required, because charity demands that without any cause we should not offer even a remote occasion of sin to one who is about to sin from malice alone (II, 52).

512. Corollaries. 1. Precepts which here and now oblige are never to be omitted for avoiding any scandal whatsoever. The reason is that then to pass them over is sin, and consequently illicit. In that case the rule of Law is consonant: "More usefully is scandal permitted to arise than truth abandoned" (Reg. 3, l. 5, tit. 41).

Of this kind are: a) Precepts which are concerning things necessary for salvation, as the precept of receiving faith and baptism, and consequently also the precept of ministering a Sacrament necessary for salvation.

b) Precepts of natural law urging here and now, and not ceasing on account of changed circumstances. Thus on account of no scandal to be avoided is it licit to lie (II, 50).

c) Precepts of positive law, when pharisaical scandal is foreseen; because if they did not oblige and were omitted, an occasion would be given to depraved men of maliciously impeding the goods of others. But whether they oblige, and therefore are to be observed, when scandal of the little ones is foreseen, is controverted. Some probably affirm, because even positive and human precepts do not cease to oblige when scandal is not given but accepted. Others more probably deny, because there is present a conflict of laws, in which the natural precept (namely of impeding the sin of another) removes the obligation of the positive precept, which therefore is to be omitted, yet not with great inconvenience. This opinion is to be recommended only for one time or another, since frequent omission would induce grave inconvenience (II, 51, 53; cf. H. Ap., IV, 28; Conf. dir., IV, 14). Whence, in practice, since each opinion is probable, a woman, in order to avoid the sin of her husband, who would take from it an occasion of blaspheming, can well omit the precept of hearing Mass, or of observing fast, once or again, but is not bound to do so. Similarly, a girl, lest she offer herself to the sight of a young man by whom she knows she is basely loved, rightly omits Mass once and again, so that thus the other can notice that he is avoided by her.

2. Works of counsel or indifferent works are sometimes to be omitted for avoiding scandal of the little ones. Thus, for example, a woman who would foresee that she would be to some determinate person the cause of ruin would be bound once or another time, provided it can be done conveniently, to flee his sight, by going, for example, to another church, walking by another road, not approaching the window, and similar things.

But she would by no means be bound to do this for a long time, since this would be very burdensome. "For, ordinarily speaking, a cause suffices to excuse her at least from mortal sin, lest she be deprived of her liberty...; since it would be a very inconvenient thing for a woman, and liable to scruples, if she always had to weigh whether she has a just cause of going out or not." Nor is she bound to abstain from public walking on account of the scandal of others; for this must be judged too grave for her. Yet a girl could not be excused from mortal sin if, led by vanity, even if she does not intend the scandal of that man, she deliberately offers herself to his sight. Likewise if she seeks some place which she would not approach unless she knew her lover was present there (II, 58).

3. Temporal goods, if they are one's own, can indeed licitly be given up for avoiding the scandal of others; but they do not necessarily have to be given up.

Hence you are not bound to pay more than is fair to some workman, although you foresee that he will blaspheme; because that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur often and among many; whence, in the whole complex, it becomes grave. Similarly, a parish priest, of himself, is not bound to remit the stole fees owed to him, although the parishioner, sufficiently conscious of his obligation, breaks out into various detractions, etc.; for thence grave inconvenience would come both to the parish priest himself and to his successors (II, 52; St. Thom., 2.2, q. 78, a. 4).

Note. We said if they are one's own; for if the goods are another's, they cannot even licitly be given up, unless from the consent of the owner, at least reasonably presumed.

REPARATION OF SCANDAL generally demands two things for itself: one, sometimes under grave sin, that the further influence of scandal be removed as far as can be done; the other, which ordinarily does not seem to urge under mortal sin, that the amendment of him who suffered scandal be efficaciously consulted.

513. PRINCIPLES. I. He who from scandal has induced neighbor into sin, or into a harmful error, is bound from charity to repair this evil according to his powers. And indeed, if anyone whatsoever is bound from charity to correct one sinning or about to sin, a fortiori he who, by giving scandal, was the author why neighbor fell into sin or into danger of sinning, is bound by this obligation, even with greater inconvenience than all the rest. The same is to be said a fortiori concerning him who, through induction properly so called, persuasion, or counsel, made another sin or err.

Hence: 1. He who gave scandal to others by wicked counsels which are still efficacious must render them inefficacious through diligent revocation to be made known to the same persons, either by himself or by another. Thus an author who, through heretical or obscene writings, was to others a cause of sinning, is bound to impede the diffusion of his books, publicly retract his writings, and compose and publish new ones, if he can, for the edification of the Christian faithful.

2. He who induced neighbor into a stable perversion, for example of concubinage or irreligiosity, is bound under grave sin to labor for his conversion, so that he may lead him back, either by himself or by others, into the path of virtue. We say either by others; for sometimes it is better to use the work of others, especially when it is a question of the conversion of an accomplice in filthy matter: in which case the occasion of sinning could easily be brought back.

3. As regards ordinary scandals, which bring forth not full perversion but only passing sins, these regularly cannot be repaired except by that general reparation which is contained in the cessation itself from scandal, in good example, in prayer for the one scandalized, and similar things.

514. II. Public scandal obliges the guilty person to public reparation. Otherwise the further influence of scandal is not sufficiently removed, nor are all the scandalized admonished concerning the evil which they suffered.

Wherefore a concubinary, a usurer, or another sinner of this kind is to be constrained, if it can be done, to public reparation of scandal: suppose that, his commerce or wicked business having first been abandoned, he publicly approach the sacraments with devotion.

III. The scandal of a Superior, given to subjects, must be repaired by him from office. Thus, for example, a father of a family who scandalized domestics is ordinarily to be constrained to repair the scandal, if this is still judged efficacious, so that he may manifest to the same domestics his displeasure concerning his evil example, and paternally exhort them not to follow it in the future.

IV. Scandal unjustly inflicted must be repaired from justice. It is said: unjustly inflicted, that is, by fraud, force, deceit, unjust fear. It must be repaired by restraining the influence of the action. The reason is that each one has a right not to be injured unjustly in spiritual goods.

But after the unjust means have been removed, the one scandalizing is probably bound only from charity to repair the scandal. For when force or fraud has now ceased, and the other knows that he was deceived, he can, if he wishes, extricate himself from sin by himself, and therefore, if he does not amend himself, this is imputed to him (III, 661).

515. Those are to be held guilty of much pernicious scandal:

1. Those retaining the custom of blaspheming, especially before younger persons, most of all if before children.

2. Reporters of grave detraction, relating the matter to others; for thence arise hatreds and quarrels.

3. Messengers of love to some woman, whether married or unmarried, apart from the end of marriage. Thus especially servants and maidservants sin who furnish help to sons of families for fostering base loves (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 1, n. 45).

4. Those spreading books of harmful reading, namely who scatter them, sell them, or hand them over to be read by others. Likewise, those who make, spread, or publicly sing filthy little songs or poems.

5. Those introducing into schools a pernicious manner of teaching, or dangerous books. Without scandal anatomical and surgical books, or even books of pagan authors not sufficiently expurgated, cannot be handed into the hands of boys (cf. Const. Officiorum ac munerum, n. 10).

6. Those uttering lascivious speeches, whether in clear words or equivocal ones (yet sufficiently understood by the hearers). This is, says St. Alphonsus (l. c.), "ordinary scandal: men speak dishonorably before women, youths, and sometimes even before innocent children. And alas, what ruin they cause!..."

7. Those given to alluring performances. Thus the authors, actors, and actresses of comedies in which neither religion, nor virtue, nor the sanctity of marriage is spared; or of theatrical dances in which, by reason of the dress of the dancing-women, by reason of the obscene manner of the dances, or of lascivious gesticulation, filthiness appears (III, 428). Cf. n. 835. Likewise the authors of a cinematographic exhibition which infects especially the mind of youths, excites the imagination, indeed provokes the will to crimes to which a man would certainly be less prone unless he saw them remain unpunished, and their authors praised on account of their cunning and dexterity. But whether and how far the spectators of such exhibitions (who ordinarily defile themselves with many internal sins) are also guilty of grave scandal must be resolved from the principles later to be established concerning cooperation (III, 427). Cf. below n. 519, 525, 836.

8. Painters, sculptors, photographers, and others who at home or in gardens or museums, etc., exhibit to the sight of all obscene statues or images, namely those in which those parts of the body (we do not say of an infant, but of a more grown person), which modesty teaches among all peoples are to be veiled, appear naked or covered only by a thin veil. "Otherwise if, with other parts uncovered, the shameful parts are covered" (II, 56). Yet there is no one who does not know that images and statues truly can be obscene when, although all things are covered, from the gesture and manner of holding oneself a mind addicted to lust appears.

9. Persons who by a special title ought to remove others from sin; thus sin: a) Parents and masters who permit their daughters or maidservants conversations in hidden places with spouses and lovers. b) Wives who, by admitting their graceful lovers to familiar conversations, are an offense to their husbands and others, as experience teaches. And the same must be said of a husband who keeps a maidservant suspected by his wife not without reason. c) Clerics who, keeping at home a person suspect to the people, furnish an occasion to sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt of the clerical state, etc. etc. (Council of Trent, Sess. 25, c. 14, de Ref.).

516. You will ask. What is to be thought concerning THE ADORNMENT OF WOMEN?

1. Moderate adornment, according to the decency of state, is licit of itself, because it does not give occasion of sinning. Hence there is no sin if a woman decently adorns herself in order to please her husband, or to find a spouse. But if she acts from levity or vanity, she sins venially (II, 54).

2. Excessive adornment, namely that which exceeds the condition of one's own state, is of itself venial, because of itself it does not gravely move others to equal luxury. But it becomes mortal: a) if it is indulged in for provoking the lasciviousness of men; b) if the fall of some man in particular is foreseen. Women who use rouge and pigments, scandal being prescinded from, sin only venially; but not at all, if they intend thus only to conceal defects of the body (II, 54, 55; III, 425).

3. Immodest adornment, such as is not rarely accustomed to be displayed at solemn dinners and evening gatherings, is illicit according to the degree of immodesty.¹

Hence: a) if the uncovering is so immoderate that the breasts are shown almost entirely or are covered with a very thin veil, it is of itself grave scandal, because such immodesty of itself incites to lust; b) but if it is not so immoderate, so that only the arms, or the breasts in part, are uncovered, those women indeed are not excused from mortal sin who introduce the use of such dress where it does not prevail; but others who follow what has already been introduced, although they are to be severely rebuked, nevertheless are not, of themselves, to be condemned for mortal sin; because custom causes concupiscence to blaze up much less. For the rest, by denudation of the breast women not rarely seek to be dishonorably desired by men, in which case direct scandal will be present. Wherefore this worst custom is to be restrained and extirpated by preachers and confessors as far as can be done; c) what has been said concerning denudation of the breast seems also to be said concerning garments so studiously made, tight and thin, that the whole conformation of the body appears.

I. Notions. - Scandal is a saying or deed less right, furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin, or an external action (or omission), whether evil in itself or having the appearance of evil, because, namely, it is apt to induce and draw the neighbor into sin.¹

¹ There may be consulted St. Thomas, II-II, q. 43; St. Alphonsus, Th. M., l. II, n. 33-58; Aertnijs, Th. M., I, l. II, n. 57 sq., II, l. VI, n. 316-321; Noldin, Th. M., II, n. 102 sq.; Berardi, opusc. De Occasionariis.

This definition is of scandal which is active or given. For passive scandal, or scandal received, is the spiritual ruin itself or sin of the neighbor, into which he has fallen by occasion taken from another's word or deed; and this is either received because given, when it arises from active scandal, or from the less right word or deed of another, or received only, when someone takes occasion from another's action altogether right: whether this happens from his own weakness, i.e., from ignorance or frailty, and then it is called scandal of the little ones, as if a young man from the modest adornment of a girl takes occasion of desiring her; or whether it happens from malice, and then it is called pharisaical, as if someone from the good works of another takes occasion of detracting from him or of hating him.²

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 43, a. 1, ad 4.

Hence sometimes it happens that there is at once active scandal in one and passive scandal in another, as when by the inducement or evil example of one another falls into sin; sometimes active without passive, as if someone induces another to sin and the latter does not consent; sometimes on the contrary passive without active, as in the scandal of the little ones and pharisaical scandal.

Active scandal is distinguished as twofold: direct and indirect.³ It is merely indirect if the sin of another is not intended but only foreseen as probably going to follow from a less right action, which of its own nature impels to sinning, as if someone publicly commits sin or furnishes an evil example. On the contrary it is direct if the sin of another is intended and, so far as is on the part of the scandalizer, procured and caused, as happens by command, persuasion, counsel, seduction, praise, or petition that a sin be committed. This again is twofold: material, or intended simply, if the sin is intended materially on account of some advantage, i.e., utility or pleasure of the scandalizer, as if a lustful person seduces another to sin, or a prostitute or seller of evil books intends to profit by an evil business; and formal, or formally intended, if the sin is intended precisely insofar as it is sin, as is done by the impious, which truly is and therefore rightly is called diabolical.⁴

³ In handing down the division we follow the manner received among moderns; for a more accurate manner of speaking see in our Summa Theologiae Moralis, I, n. 960-961, and in Waffelaert, Etude sur l'Espece morale du scandale.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 43, a. 3.

II. Principles. - 1. Active scandal is a grave sin from its genus. For charity binds under grave obligation, by an affirmative precept, to procuring the amendment of the neighbor by correction and to impeding his sin; hence much more, by a negative precept, to not impelling him to sin by counsel or example. Hence Christ says, Mt. XVIII, 6-7: "But he who shall scandalize one of these little ones who believe in me, it is expedient for him that a millstone turned by an ass be hung about his neck, and that he be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals! For it must needs be that scandals come. Nevertheless, woe to that man through whom scandal comes!" - Cf. Rom. XIV, 13, 19 (printed: Rom. XI, 13, 19); I Cor. VIII, 13.

Nevertheless it can be venial, not only on account of the imperfection of the act or on account of indeliberation, but also from smallness of matter, if another is induced to venial sin, even if this is formally intended, or from the lightness of the influence which the action exercises upon the sin of the neighbor: thus if someone gives an evil example to persons whom he knows will not be much moved from it.

2. Active scandal, therefore, of itself is a sin against charity toward neighbor; but per accidens it contracts several other accidental malices, sometimes also against justice, namely if the scandalizer is bound not only from charity but from office to guard against the ruin of subjects, or has used unjust means, such as force, fear, threats, fraud, or deceit.

Thus because of the quality of the person scandalizing, for example if a father scandalizes children, a superior subjects, a teacher pupils; or because of the quality of the person scandalized, as if someone directly induces to base things a married person, or one bound by a vow of chastity, or a superior so that he neglects his office; or because of the manner in which it is committed, if unjust means, such as force or threats, are employed.

3. Indirect scandal of itself seems, at least probably, to be against charity alone; for of itself charity alone commands that we procure the good of the neighbor and impede his evil, and consequently prohibits us from giving him an evil example. Direct scandal, however, in addition certainly is against the virtue which it induces the neighbor to violate: for every virtue obliges us not to act directly against it, and consequently not to intend and be the cause and positively procure that it be violated by others. But if scandal is formally intended, it is also a special sin, i.e., having a distinct species and diverse malice, against charity, and a most grave one, which is directly opposed to fraternal correction, because it explicitly intends as an end, and has as its proper object to which it tends, a special and most grave harm of the neighbor, namely his spiritual ruin: but the end and object give species to a human act; in other cases the character of scandal in a less right action is a circumstance adding and changing the species.

Moreover scandal is so much graver: a) the graver is the ruin of the neighbor, as in the corruption of an innocent person; b) the more that ruin is intended, and thus direct scandal is graver than indirect; c) the more the ruin follows from it or is more efficaciously induced by it, and thus the evil examples of parents, of a priest, of a religious, and of others who are of greater authority or esteem are wont to be graver; and d) the more numerous are the persons who are moved to sin.

III. Corollary. - Therefore a penitent in confession ordinarily does not satisfy by saying: I gave grave scandal, but in addition he ought to express:

1. his own sin by which he gave scandal;

2. at least in direct scandal, the species of mortal sin to which he induced another by command, counsel, persuasion, praise or vituperation, seduction, etc., where the quality of the scandalized person comes to be attended to as often as a different species of sin is had from it, as if someone induces to base things a married person or one bound by a vow of chastity;

3. in formally intended scandal, also the special sin against charity;

4. the quality of himself, if from this an accidental species is added because by office he is bound to guard against scandal, as if a father scandalizes a son, a superior subjects, a teacher pupils;

5. likewise the unjust manner, if he employed force, fear, threats, etc.

But the penitent is not bound to express merely aggravating circumstances, such as are, whatever several have said:

a) the circumstance of solicitation by which he led an accomplice to sin, for the accomplice by consenting becomes guilty of the same scandal, although in a lesser degree; hence scandal is sufficiently accused when complicity with another is expressed;

b) the determined number of persons whom he efficaciously induced to sin, but it suffices to accuse their plurality, because from this scandal is not multiplied but only its gravity is increased.

IV. The reparation of active scandal comes to be considered especially. It, insofar as it can be done, is obligatory: for if from charity we are all bound to guard against the fall of the neighbor and to procure the amendment of one sinning, a fortiori he who by scandal was the occasion why another sinned is so bound. The obligation arises of itself from charity alone, because the neighbor sinned knowingly and willingly, and to one knowing and willing no injury is done; and therefore the scandalizer is not bound from justice or office, unless he used unjust means, for example deceit, force, fear, or unless a superior gave scandal to subjects whose spiritual good, by force of his office, he ought to care for.

Moreover reparation generally demands two things: a) that the further influence of scandal, insofar as it can be done, be taken away; b) that the amendment of him who suffered scandal be efficaciously cared for.

To this the following principles are valid, which of themselves bind under grave obligation:

1. He who gave direct scandal and by persuasion, counsel, prayers, etc., induced the neighbor to sin or into harmful error, is bound explicitly and especially to repair it, and therefore to take away its further influence; otherwise he would persevere in being the voluntary cause of those things. Thus, for example, he who gave unjust counsels still efficacious must render them inefficacious by a revocation to be made known by himself or by another; he who proposed false doctrine must retract it; he who wrote or spread evil, impious, or obscene books is bound to impede the diffusion of the books and publicly retract them, or, if he can, to take them from the hands of others; he who ordered a plot against the Church must detest it, etc.

2. He who gave ordinary or indirect scandal by evil example alone, which is wont to cause not full perversion but only passing sins, of itself suffices to repair it implicitly and by general reparation, which is contained in the cessation itself from scandal, in good example, in public reception of the sacraments, in prayer for the one scandalized, and in other similar things.

3. He who induced the neighbor into stable perversion is bound to labor for his conversion, so that he may lead him back to virtue, whether by himself, or through others if that can more opportunely be done; namely so that the evil caused may thus be compensated.

4. He who gave public scandal is bound to repair it publicly, both so that the further harmful influence of it may be taken away, and so that the reparation, by which they are warned concerning the evil, may become known to all the scandalized and be of use to them. Wherefore notorious excommunicates and interdicted persons, or manifestly infamous persons, such as prostitutes, concubinarians, or other sinners of that kind, are to be constrained to public reparation of scandal as far as they can, if it can be done; nor can they be admitted to the sacraments unless first they have left the unspeakable business and its occasion and have publicly removed the scandal.

But the manner of public reparation can be diverse according to various circumstances: either a retraction drawn up in writing and to be spread by public papers; or pronounced before two witnesses who will afterward spread the matter; or also before the pastor or confessor, who will make known that the sinner has satisfied his obligations, etc., provided it suffices for taking away the scandal. As to the manner, it is often better to consult the Ordinary.

5. Superiors who gave scandal to subjects are bound from office to repair it. Thus, for example, the father of a family or master who scandalized his domestics is ordinarily to be bound to repairing the scandal, if it still exercises a harmful influence, so that he manifests to them displeasure concerning his evil example and paternally exhorts them not to follow it in the future.

6. He who by an unjust means, such as force, deceit, fraud, or fear unjustly inspired, induced another to sin, is bound from justice to restraining the influence of scandal, namely: a) to take away the unjust means; indeed b) also to recall the other to good, if he cannot of himself return to his former state: for although by sinning he consented, nevertheless the consent is not full, because he did not consent to the deception or violence employed. Namely each one has a strict right not to be injured unjustly in spiritual goods.

V. The case of scandal through concubinage frequently occurs and presents a special difficulty in practice.⁵ It is scandal by which the accomplices not only mutually scandalize themselves, but truly also others if the concubinage, as it is apt to happen, is now public.

⁵ There may be consulted: St. Alphonsus, Th. M., l. III, n. 432, 436, 437, 441; Segneri, Instructio confessorii, c. 5 and 6; Berardi, op. De Occasionariis, n. 139-141; Aertnijs, Theol. Moralis, II, l. VI, n. 316-321; Noldin, on the sixth precept, n. 16.

Concubinage is repeated intercourse with the same woman, whom someone keeps after the manner of a wife in his own or another's house. Commonly it is exercised between unmarried persons; nevertheless it can be found in adultery and in other species of lust.

Besides the public scandal which they are wont to furnish, concubinarians are placed in great danger of damnation, because they have a firm purpose, at least virtual, of persevering in sin, and therefore with greatest difficulty can return to true penance and free themselves from the bonds of the accomplice. To this, therefore, by the pastor, or also by the confessor, an opportune and efficacious remedy of serious warning and cure is to be provided.

Among remedies: 1. before all things marriage is to be counseled, when it is morally possible and an unhappy outcome is not feared: for this radically cuts off the occasion of sin and sometimes is the only remedy. This is chiefly to be urged: when the concubinarians cohabit, as if the concubine is supported by the paramour in the same house and in another way scarcely can procure support for herself; likewise when the concubinarians pursue one another with a great ardor of true love, especially if the concubinage is long-standing or has been apparently legitimized or confirmed by civil marriage; most of all in danger of death of either party.⁶

⁶ Nevertheless secret marriage, or as they say, marriage of conscience, is rarely to be permitted, except in the case of lethal sickness, or in the case where the concubinarians are publicly thought to be spouses. Generally it is to be avoided because of the danger either of divorce, or of scandal if offspring should be born, or of onanism lest scandal arise.

But let it be noted that, in a case of necessity on account of grave evil, if a canonical impediment obstructs the celebration of marriage, and there is not time for recourse to the Holy See, the Ordinary can dispense from all impediments of ecclesiastical law, except the presbyterate and affinity in the direct line, and, if the Ordinary cannot be approached, even the pastor or also the confessor can dispense (can. 1043-1044). Thus, theologians say: if from delay of the marriage great scandal and great infamy would be feared; if delay would be the cause that the marriage would no longer be contracted and therefore either the concubine would be left pregnant, or the offspring would not be legitimized, or the concubinarians would remain in perpetual concubinage; most of all if the marriage urged in order to consult for the eternal salvation of a dying counterpart.

2. When the possibility or opportunity of marriage is lacking, or when the delay of it for some time stands, separation is to be urged, which, where it can be done, is a necessary remedy for removing the proximate and free occasion.

Separation will be easier if the concubine is supported in a different house, and the concubinarian frequents her not from love of the person but from desire of pleasure. In this case, besides the general remedy against the occasion and danger of sin, it must generally be required that the concubine's partner no longer enter the house of the concubine nor have any intercourse with her. But the concubine can refuse to open the door to the partner arriving, always cohabit with some person so that she is never found alone, or also change domicile. But if they cohabit, separation will be more difficult, but for that reason the more to be urged; but if it is impossible and the occasion is necessary, for example from very great harm, during this time opportune remedies are to be employed by which the formal danger may be warded off and the occasion may become remote from proximate.

3. When even separation is lacking, several helps are numbered as to be employed. And indeed, if the concubinarians dwell in the same house, they generally ought to avoid being alone, man with woman, at least for a long time, or also by a firm declaration and serious reproach to forestall future sin, to flee every familiarity, even, insofar as possible, the sight of the accomplice, not to think about him or her, to finish truly necessary business swiftly, and other similar things; and to exercise mortification and live more piously in prayer and frequentation of the sacraments.

Especially let the concubine, particularly if she stays with the concubinarian under the title of maidservant, openly declare that she is unwilling any longer to lead such a life, and from the beginning resist him in every way, and at night shut and secure the door of the chamber so that the master cannot open it. The same principles otherwise hold concerning a male servant with respect to a mistress. And if the maidservant afterward is cast out of the house by the master and has nowhere to turn nor the means by which she may be supported, let the pastor or confessor take care that she be placed in some refuge founded for endangered girls or in another honorable house.

VI. Especially as regards the absolution of concubinarians and their admission to the sacraments:

A. In public concubinage: 1. If the occasion is voluntary, they are not to be absolved before they have separated themselves, because otherwise they are in proximate danger of breaking their purpose, and a public sinner ought not to be absolved unless he has done penance publicly and has satisfied for the scandal. Hence before he is absolved, the concubine's partner should dismiss the concubine, or, if she dwells outside the house, he ought for some notable time not to have gone to her; but the concubine ought to depart from the house of the concubinarian, or, if she does not cohabit, it is necessary that for some notable time she have broken off intercourse with him.

957. Scandal is opposed to beneficence. - There are many sins which are opposed to beneficence, of which most inflict injury or cooperate with it, and therefore wound justice. Against charity there is especially scandal. This word etymologically signifies a stumbling-block, and is taken actively for the placing of a stumbling-block in the way, against which one striking with the foot is disposed to a fall or ruin; and passively for the very striking against the stumbling-block, or offense of the foot. Hence in the theological sense, actively, it is the placing of an action which disposes someone to spiritual ruin; passively, it is the very fall or spiritual ruin on account of the action of another.

Therefore in the theological sense scandal is not that which in common speech is so called, namely, rumor, or wonder, or horror and indignation concerning the sin of another; but grave suspicions, and rash judgments, detractions, calumnies arisen among the people, - indeed also delight or approval or consent in sin, although these latter things in common speech are not scandal.

S. Th. II-II, q. 43, a. 1-6.

958. Active scandal is defined: A less right word or deed furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin. It is said:

1. word or deed, but not something desired, because a merely internal sin cannot furnish to another an occasion of sinning. But since affirmation and negation are reduced to the same genus, therefore under the name of word or deed there also comes omission: not said, not done;

2. less right, that is, what according to itself is evil or at least has the appearance of evil; as if someone speaks of shameful things before an adolescent, or for a just cause eats meat on Friday before others who are ignorant, or works on Sunday: for nothing disposes to spiritual ruin except according as it has a defect of rectitude, because that which is properly right rather fortifies man against a fall than induces him to ruin;

3. furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin, both a) because scandal is not the efficient cause of another's sin, but this cause is his will alone, and b) because for scandal it is not enough that someone sin before others (for scandal does not fall upon the perfect man nor upon the altogether impious),¹ nor is it required that the ruin of neighbor in fact follow, but that an occasion be furnished to him, that is, that the action, either always or in these circumstances, of itself be naturally apt to move him to sin. But if the action does not move in itself, but by accident someone is moved to sin on account of it from his own disposition, the scandal will not be active, but only passive (a. 1, ad 4).

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, q. 43, a. 5; and St. Alphonsus, Th. M., l. 2, n. 47, ad 5: "He is not judged to give scandal who, although he sins publicly, nevertheless does this before those who either are so vile, or infamous or wicked, or who are so upright that no one is moved to sin, for example, if someone fornicates before others who are prepared to do the same and are not moved by his example; or if before the meek someone contends, quarrels, or strikes another."

959. Active scandal is a mortal sin. - It is proved:

a) From the words of Christ, Mt. XVIII, 6-7: "Woe to that man through whom scandal comes" (Rom. XIV, 13, 20; I Cor. VIII, 13).

b) From reason: Charity obliges under grave obligation (by an affirmative precept) to correct neighbor and to impede him from rushing into sin; therefore much more (by a negative precept) it obliges us not to impel him to sin by counsel or example.

It is mortal from its genus; because it can be venial not only on account of imperfection of the act, but also on account of smallness of matter, if the other is induced only to venial sin, even if this is formally intended.

Moreover the sin of scandal is so much graver as the ruin of neighbor is greater, and as it is more intended, and as it follows more from our action (for example, given before an adolescent or by a priest), and as the persons who are moved to sin are more numerous.

960. Active scandal is divided by reason of efficacy: into direct, when someone is the true moral cause of the sin of neighbor, which is done by command, counsel, seduction, praise, request to commit sin, etc.; - and indirect, when someone places a less right action which is only a probable occasion of sinning for neighbor, as an evil example is.

Direct scandal is a sin not only against charity but also against the virtue to the violating of which it induces neighbor; indirect scandal is a sin, but probably against charity alone. Hence if someone by command, counsel, etc., has led someone to sin mortally, for example, to commit adultery, the species of sin to which he led him, in the case adultery, must be declared in confession; on the contrary, if someone has scandalized by evil example alone, it suffices to confess: I gave grave scandal. The reason is because any virtue obliges not only that we not violate it, but also that we not be a cause and positively procure that it be violated by others; but it is not proved also to oblige that we not furnish to another the mere occasion of violating it, nor that we impede its violation. And indeed the sin of another cannot be imputed to us (directly and in itself) unless we are its cause. Whence he who only gave to another the occasion of stealing (by example or intemperance) is not bound solidarily to restitution, and this is a sign that he did not sin against justice. And similarly concerning other virtues.²

² Do not say that it is indirectly imputed to us, insofar as we are bound to impede it, while direct and indirect voluntary are of the same species; - for we are bound to impede the sin of another insofar as it is his evil and is against charity, not insofar as it is such an evil and of such a species, and is against such a virtue.

961. Active scandal is divided by reason of intention: into directly or explicitly intended, whether it is formally and in itself intended (as an end), if someone explicitly intends the sin of neighbor insofar as it is sin (which is called diabolical scandal), or is simply intended (as a means), if someone explicitly intends the sin of neighbor on account of his own utility or pleasure; - and implicit or interpretative, if someone does not intend the sin of another but only places a less right action from which it can probably be feared that another will be drawn to sin.³

³ That scandal which is formally intended is called by St. Thomas active in itself, that is, from the intention of the agent or on the part of the one operating, "when someone by his inordinate word or deed intends to draw another to sinning," and it is called a special sin, because "the end gives species in morals"; - any other active scandal whatever, even direct, is only scandal by accident, or "besides the intention of the agent, as when someone by his inordinate deed or word does not intend to give another an occasion of ruin, but only to satisfy his own will, and thus even active scandal is not a special sin, because what is by accident does not constitute a species." Thus in article 3; elsewhere St. Thomas uses similar terminology but in an entirely diverse sense, which must be carefully noted. For example, in article 1, ad 4, every active scandal is called a cause of sinning in itself, on the part of the work, "when someone by his evil word or deed intends to induce another to sinning, or even if he does not intend this, the very deed is such that by its character it has that it is inductive to sinning"; - but in merely passive scandal, the deed of one is a cause of sinning for another by accident, "when both besides the intention of the one operating and besides the condition of the work someone badly disposed takes occasion" of sin.

But just as someone can sin by a merely internal act, not indeed by the sin of scandal, but by a desire or affection for scandal, so also by an internal act someone can desire the sin of another more than he procures it externally by scandal. Hence if someone directly and explicitly intends to procure the sin of another by merely indirect scandal, as if by evil example alone he explicitly intends to lead another to lust, he indeed sins by desire or affection against the virtue (for example, of chastity) which he intends to be violated, which must be declared in confession; but the external sin of scandal, as being indirect, is against charity alone.

But if someone formally, with a diabolical intention, intends the sin of neighbor, he commits a special (that is, a distinct species) and most grave sin against charity toward neighbor, directly opposed to fraternal correction, by which he explicitly intends as an end the special and most grave harm of neighbor, which is spiritual ruin. But the end gives species to human acts. Otherwise the character of scandal is as it were a circumstance changing the species of another sin.

962. There is an obligation of repairing active scandal, as much as can be done: for if anyone from charity is bound to forestall the fall of another and to procure the amendment of one sinning (or erring), a fortiori he who through scandal was the occasion why another sinned is bound. The obligation arises from charity alone, because no injury is done to one knowing and willing; not, however, from justice or office, unless someone used unjust means, for example, deceit, force, fear, or unless a superior gave scandal to subjects for whose spiritual good, by force of his office, he ought to provide.

As regards the mode of reparation: 1. It suffices to repair implicitly indirect scandal given by example alone, namely, by cessation from scandal, good example, public reception of the sacraments, prayer for the one scandalized, etc.

2. Direct scandal, given by depraved counsel, false doctrine, depraved books, machination against the Church, etc., must be repaired explicitly, so that first its further influence is removed, and then the evil caused is compensated, so that he who suffered scandal may be recalled to good. Thus wicked counsel and false doctrine are to be recalled, machination against the Church is to be publicly detested, the diffusion of depraved books is to be impeded as much as can be done, and good books are to be written or spread.

3. Hence public scandal must also be repaired publicly, both so that its further influence may be removed, and so that the reparation, by which they are warned concerning the evil, may become known to all and profit them.

The mode of public reparation can be diverse: either a retraction drawn up in writing is published through public newspapers, or it is done before witnesses (two) who will afterwards publish the matter, or before the parish priest who will afterwards publish that the sinner has satisfied his obligations, provided it suffices for removing the scandal. But since the sacraments cannot be ministered to the unworthy, it is clear that he who has not removed public scandal cannot be publicly admitted to the sacraments; indeed, the minister would commit scandal, because he would furnish an occasion of judging that the sacraments are ministered to the unworthy and that scandalous actions are tacitly approved. Thus a public concubinary is bound first to leave the shameful commerce and its occasion before he publicly receives the sacraments. - In practice it belongs to confessors, parish priests, and bishops to determine the congruent mode of reparation.

963. Observations. - 1. It can happen that a sin grave according to itself is venial scandal, for example, if your grave theft is an occasion for another to commit light theft. Conversely, a sin light according to itself can be grave scandal of disobedience or irreverence or injury or immodesty, for example, if a religious utters a less honorable word before women or those who from it can take occasion of sinning mortally, or a priest keeps a suspect person at home.

2. Scandal can contain several other malices acceding to it, either on account of the quality of the person scandalizing, for example, if a father scandalizes children, a superior subjects, a teacher disciples: for these are bound not only from charity but also from office to forestall the ruin of subjects; or on account of the quality of the person scandalized, as if someone directly induces a married person, or one bound by a vow of chastity, to shameful things; or on account of the mode in which it is committed, if unjust means such as force or threats are employed.

3. "Some deed is not therefore scandal because another begins to suspect or think evil concerning such a man, because this latter does not sin if he suspects on account of sufficient indications. Nevertheless it is otherwise if he begins to think evil concerning the Catholic faith, the clergy, a religious order, or to be less disposed toward piety" (St. Alphonsus, l. II, n. 44, 6). For it makes no difference whether the sin by which scandal is given furnishes an occasion for sins of the same species or for sins of a diverse species. Hence those give scandal more easily who are of greater authority, or piety, or esteem.

S. Th. II-II, q. 43, a. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8.

964. Passive or occasioned scandal is a sin, because it is the very spiritual ruin of neighbor on the occasion of the word or deed of another; but it is not a special sin, because taking an occasion from another's word or deed happens according to any genus of sin whatever and does not have a special deformity.

Passive scandal is 1. accepted because given, if the sin of neighbor truly arises from the word or deed of another, or from active scandal; or 2. only accepted, when the sin of neighbor does not truly arise from the word or deed of another, but either a) from the malice alone of the one sinning (for example, concerning exercises of piety or virtue), and then it is Pharisaic, or b) from his ignorance or infirmity alone, and then it is scandal of the little ones or of the weak (for example, concerning a woman honorably adorned). Hence St. Thomas notes that sometimes there is passive scandal without active, as Pharisaic scandal; sometimes active without passive, as when someone induces another to sinning and the latter does not consent; sometimes there is active with passive, if from the induction or evil example of one another sins.

965. The obligation of avoiding passive scandal. - From the law of charity by which we are bound to do good to neighbor, there is also given an obligation, grave from its genus, of avoiding passive scandal, that is, of omitting those things from which neighbor is going to take an occasion of sin, whenever there is not present a sufficient reason for placing the act and permitting the spiritual ruin of neighbor.

But a cause is required so much greater as the sin feared is graver, and as it is foreseen more easily and certainly that it will follow, and as more persons are going to suffer scandal. Hence:

1. generally it is illicit to ask, counsel, command, etc., a work which, although it can indeed be done by another without sin, nevertheless this person certainly or probably will not do without sin, for example, an oath from one who is going to perjure himself; - unless it is done for a just cause of necessity or utility, for example, in the case, by a judge;

2. a greater cause is required that a cleric be the occasion of sin and permit it, than that a layman permit the same; a greater cause is required for permitting scandal of the little ones than Pharisaic scandal;

3. only from most grave necessity is it licit to do a work, however otherwise good, which of itself is very inductive to sinning, for example, to wash oneself or swim naked in public, to exercise the marital act publicly; - and if a great multitude of men is feared to be induced to grave sins, sometimes it would even have to be omitted with the loss of life: namely, to avoid the grave necessity of many.

966. Principles and practical rules. - Therefore, for avoiding passive scandal, certain things are to be omitted. And indeed:

I. For avoiding scandal accepted because given:

a) Every work which actively scandalizes, if it is evil, must always be omitted.

b) Also, generally, a work which has only the appearance of evil must be omitted, unless an urgent and grave reason is present.

This reason ordinarily sufficiently removes scandal; but if it should not suffice for this, then the occasion of ruin must be removed, insofar as it is in the power of the agent, for example, by warning made to neighbor concerning the rectitude of the action on account of a dispensation, an excusing cause, etc.: thus a dispensed priest eating meat on a forbidden day, - or frequenting a suspect person for counsel or administration of a sacrament. And if active scandal, that is, the appearance of evil, cannot be sufficiently removed, one must abstain from the work, whatever some moderns may seem to assert, for St. Thomas says, a. 2: "Active scandal is always a sin in him who scandalizes: because either the very work which he does is a sin; or even if it has the appearance of sin, it must always be left aside on account of charity toward neighbor, from which each one is bound to provide for the salvation of neighbor: and thus he who does not leave it aside acts against charity."

II. For avoiding scandal of the little ones:

a) Things necessary for salvation (the reception of Baptism or of the true faith) must never and cannot be omitted, nor the precepts of the natural law, whether negative (not to lie), or also affirmative if the law urges here and now (the precept of confession of faith or of penance), because it is not licit to do things intrinsically evil that good things may come about.

The chief ones are hatred, envy, quarrel, scandal, and cooperation in the sins of others. We shall speak only of the two latter, since concerning the others treatment has already been made above, or is to be made in the fifth precept of the Decalogue.

Scandal is a saying or deed less right, furnishing to someone an occasion of spiritual ruin. - I said 1st, a saying or deed, under which name omission also is understood. - I said 2nd, less right, that is, what is either evil in itself or has the appearance of evil. I said 3rd, furnishing an occasion, because the proper cause of sin is the will of the one acting. - I said 4th, of spiritual ruin, which can be grave or light; for by this name sin is understood, whether mortal or venial. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 43, art. 1; and de Verit., q. 15, art. 1.

Scandal is divided: 1st, into direct and indirect, according as the evil action of another is intended in itself, or only in a cause by which one's neighbor is incited to sin; 2nd, into active and passive, according as the saying or deed itself which furnishes an incitement or occasion of sin is considered, or rather the incitement itself already taken up.

But two things are to be noted here:

1st. Direct scandal is also called diabolical when the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor is formally intended. But if the spiritual ruin of another is not intended, but only one's own utility or pleasure, it is called simply direct.

2nd. Any scandal whatsoever can be active or given, without being passive or accepted; because an action apt of itself for scandal can be posited, without one's neighbor taking from it an occasion of spiritual ruin. And vice versa there can be accepted scandal, without its being given; but in that case scandal is not properly to be attributed to the action of another, but rather to the ignorance, imagination, or even malice of him who suffers scandal or admits it without foundation. If it is taken up from weakness or ignorance, it is called scandal of the little ones; but if it arises from the mere malice of the subject, it is called pharisaical. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 43.

I Say 1st. Scandal, even indirect, is a grave sin from its genus, because from its genus it is opposed by commission to charity, since it is directly opposed to fraternal correction: for this draws one's neighbor away from sin, but that on the contrary draws him to sinning. Wherefore besides the proper malice of the action, which is called scandalous, there is had the specific malice of scandal, by which charity is injured. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 43, art. 3.

I Say 2nd. Scandal of the little ones or of the weak is to be avoided whenever it can be done without grave inconvenience, by omission both of an indifferent work and also of a good work not prescribed. The reason is that by charity we are bound to impede the ruin of our neighbor who needs our help, when we easily can, for example, by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by deferring it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc.; but the little ones need help, since because of ignorance or weakness they are placed in a certain spiritual necessity. Therefore. - But St. Thomas well observes that scandal of the little ones after admonition for the most part becomes pharisaical. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. cited, art. 7.

I Say 3rd. Pharisaical or malicious scandal, at least ordinarily, is not necessarily to be avoided either by omission of a good work or by omission even of an indifferent work not having the appearance of evil. The reason is that those suffering scandal from their malice alone are not in a necessity from which they cannot easily free themselves without the help of another, and otherwise a place would be given to the wicked for impeding good works whenever they wished.

Question 1. In scandal is there had not only a sin against charity, but also against the virtue to violating which one's neighbor is induced?

Response. Affirmatively, as to direct scandal; for any virtue specially forbids not only that it be violated, but also that someone directly induce another to violate it. But as to indirect scandal there is much dispute, but the negative opinion which Lugo defends with others seems probable. The reason is both that virtues do not oblige us to impede the opposite vices in others, but only not to induce our neighbor positively and directly to violate them; and that otherwise he who by his example moves another to steal would be bound to restitution, which the Doctors most commonly deny. In this opinion it is enough that the penitent express generally the sin of scandal, without being bound to add the species of sin to which others were indirectly induced. Much less is it necessary to express circumstances which perhaps add a species to the sins of others, for example, whether those who are induced to lust by foul speech are married or bound by vow, etc. Cf. Lugo, de Paenit., disp. 16, n. 159. - Baller., note (b), p. 207.

Question 2. Are precepts sometimes to be omitted on account of scandal of the little ones?

Response. Negatively, as to negative precepts of natural law, because these oblige always and for always, and works contrary to them are intrinsically evil. But affirmative precepts, because these do not oblige for always, it is sometimes licit and indeed necessary to omit, for example, the precept of correcting sinners, if graver ruin is to be feared from it; or rather it must be said that then the law itself ceases. As to positive human precepts, there is controversy. The more probable opinion affirms, excluding grave inconvenience, because the precept of avoiding scandal to one's neighbor, as being natural, is to be preferred to positive precepts. Hence a woman knowing that she will be shamefully desired by someone, if she goes to the prescribed Mass, is bound to omit it once or twice, if there is hope that afterward the scandal will cease; but not several times, on account of the grave inconvenience which would result from it. But because the negative opinion is also probable, a burden concerning which there is no certainty must not be imposed. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 51. - Baller., note (a) and (b), p. 206.

Question 3. Are you bound to give up temporal goods in order to avoid scandal?

Response. Negatively, ordinarily speaking, because charity toward neighbor does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Hence you are not bound to pay more than is fair to a workman or coachman, although you foresee that otherwise he will blaspheme; for that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur rather often, and thus easily becomes grave; nay, it could rather often be an incitement to blaspheming. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 52.

Question 4. Must one sinning with an accomplice declare in confession the circumstance of solicitation?

Response. Negatively, more probably, provided either from the nature of the sin, or from the mode in which the sin is accused, the confessor sufficiently understands that some accomplice was present. The reason is that by the simple communion of crime it is effected that there was mutual scandal, and indeed active on each side, between the one soliciting and the one consenting, and therefore, once that has been declared, the sin of scandal also is declared. But that one of the accomplices placed the cause of scandal before the other is a merely aggravating circumstance, which does not change the species of sin. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 46.

Question 5. Is it licit to persuade someone determined upon a greater evil to a lesser evil?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably with St. Alphonsus. Yet some limit this if the lesser evil is contained in some way in the greater, as beating in homicide, etc.; which limitation, however, does not seem necessary to the Holy Doctor. Certain other theologians, as, for example, Cardinal de Lugo, posit another limitation, namely provided that to one willing to inflict greater harm on one person, you do not persuade lesser harm to be inflicted on another. But others deny that this limitation also is required. - But the reason of the solution is that this kind of counsel tends formally to this, that a greater sin not be committed; from which it happens that he from whom a robber steals what is less is not reasonably unwilling concerning him who gave the counsel. - Cf. Vasquez, Opuscul. de scand., art. 1, dub. 2, n. 14. - Baller., note (b), p. 208.

Thence you conclude that if someone persuades another to inflict a lesser harm so that a greater evil may be avoided, he is not bound to restitution: not by reason of a thing received, because he has received nothing; not by reason of unjust damaging, because by his counsel he rather usefully managed the matter of another. Nor is the one giving counsel bound to restitution who has brought help to another, for example, to a robber, because he manages the master's matter usefully. And this conclusion is of very grave moment, namely lest an obligation of restitution be imposed where there truly is none. Sanchez, de Matr., l. 7, disp. 11, nn. 17, 18; De Lugo, De Just. et Jure, disp. 19, n. 44.

Question 6. Is it licit to permit an occasion of sinning so that the guilty person may be corrected?

Response. Affirmatively, because to permit is not to induce, and often there is a sufficient reason for permitting sin. Hence parents and masters are of themselves to be excused from sin who allow sons or servants to sin, in order that they may find an opportune place of correcting them. Indeed it is licit also, at least probably, to place an occasion of sin, provided the act is indifferent, and a just cause is present for placing it. Hence a master ought to be excused from sin who, deliberately, leaves the key attached to the chest in which money is stored, in order to test the doubtful fidelity of a servant; but in no way can a father be excused who keeps a prostitute at home, in order that he may take an experiment of his son's chastity. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 58.

Note. - From the doctrine handed down thus far, all cases concerning scandal could already be solved, but because of special difficulties it will be useful to say something in particular concerning luxury, bad books, dances, and spectacles.

Concerning Luxury. To do, represent, or display those things which notably provoke to lust is indeed most grave scandal; because no subtler poison can be offered to the soul. Hence those are guilty of most grave scandal: 1st, who represent shameful things in plays or other assemblies; 2nd, who compose or sing shameful songs or poems; 3rd, who make or expose obscene statues or images; 4th, who seduce pupils entrusted to them by bad examples, etc. But especially attention must be given to the following.

Question 1. Does a woman sin gravely by displaying nudities on the breast and arms?

Response. Affirmatively, if the nudity is immoderate or very notable, notwithstanding any contrary custom whatsoever. But if it is not so immoderate, custom will easily excuse from grave sin, because it notably diminishes the force of concupiscence, since things customary excite the imagination less. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 55.

Question 2. What is to be said concerning women's adornment and cosmetics?

Response. The doctrine of St. Thomas concerning this matter is reduced to the following heads: 1st, women sin mortally if they adorn themselves with the intention of provoking to lust; 2nd, but venially, if they do this merely from vanity, levity, or boasting; 3rd, to wear superfluous adornment is only a venial fault from its genus; 4th, there is no sin of itself if the custom of the country and condition of state is observed; 5th, women licitly add something of adornment, so that they may please husbands either whom they have or whom they ought to receive; 6th, cosmetics will be mortal if they are applied for lasciviousness; venial, if merely to feign beauty; but none, if to hide some defect. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 169, art. 1 and 2; and Comm. in Isai., chap. 4. - Baller., note (a), p. 210.

Question 3. Is it licit to rent a house to prostitutes?

Response. Affirmatively, probably, especially if there are not other renters present, or if it is easy for the prostitutes to obtain another house. Yet except the case if the prostitutes gravely harm honest neighbors, or by the location of the dwelling furnish a greater occasion for sinning. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 70.

Question 4. What is to be said concerning the exposure of images along public ways, as is accustomed to be done among us by merchants?

Response. Often exposure of this kind is gravely scandalous, for those images sometimes, both because they are painted with more vivid colors and because they display immoderate nudities, gravely move the imagination and entice to sin. Nor should you say that scandal is not intended, because those images are exposed only either for showing the art, or for attracting buyers; for the response is that an end, even if good, can never be obtained by illicit means.

Concerning Bad Books. Among every kind of scandals, none is more execrable than that which is produced from impious and obscene books. This is the most dreadful plague of all, because it infects not one region or age only, but is diffused to all places and times. Therefore the reading, printing, and spreading of books altogether opposed to faith and morals is never to be permitted, even independently of the positive prohibition concerning which there will be discussion in the tract on censures. Wherefore altogether wisely the Fathers of the Third Council of Baltimore, after they had bitterly complained about the abuse of the excellent art of typography, warn pastors of souls, confessors, and preachers with most grave words concerning the obligation of keeping the faithful away from the reading of bad books. - Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. III, nn. 224 and following.

Question 1. Can books which are partly good, partly bad, be committed to type?

Response. Negatively, generally speaking, unless they have been accurately purged; otherwise, however, if the danger to be feared from them is not so grave, and this seems to be compensated by a great utility to be taken from them. But printers should diligently ask learned and experienced men, especially ecclesiastical superiors, what is to be done in doubtful matters.

Question 2. Can bad books sometimes be sold?

Response. They can in no way be sold indiscriminately, namely to any buyer, as is clear. Yet sometimes they can be sold to prudent and learned men, who can read books of this kind usefully, for example, to refute them, etc. Except books altogether obscene, which are to be rooted out completely. The same, with proportion observed, is to be said concerning donation or rental of the same books.

Question 3. Can books of this kind be returned to the owner who has rented them?

Response. Negatively, unless prudent fear of some grave inconvenience suggests otherwise. This flows of itself from the principles handed down above. But it is to be judged a grave inconvenience if you fear grave quarrels, blasphemies, hatreds, and other things of this kind from the owner. Slight sadness, or even fear of dissolving friendship, certainly would not be judged a reason, at least for the most part, for returning bad books to a friend.

Concerning Dances. Dances of themselves are not illicit, if they are done in an honorable manner, that is, with every immodest touch, gesture, or act removed; for dances of themselves are acts of gladness, and are prohibited by no law. But by reason of nudities, the manner of dancing, words, gestures, and songs, dances can become gravely illicit. But as to the fact, among dances gravely illicit certain more recent dances which among us are called round dances are reckoned by some. - Yet since, the case of a special prohibition always excluded, the malice of these dances consists only in danger, which is essentially relative, and therefore diverse for diverse persons, it will belong to the confessor to judge concerning particular cases. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de sexto praec. Decal., n. 429.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Those who are so weak that they undergo grave danger of sinning in dances even honorable ones must abstain from them under mortal sin; unless perhaps sometimes a certain necessity presses, and then, at least probably, proximate danger of consent is absent.

2nd. To be present at honorable dances, even without necessity, excluding however danger and notable scandal, and to dance decently in them, not only is not mortal, but can easily also be free of every sin. For there are found sometimes men, and not rarely women, to whom no danger or only very remote danger threatens. Although these persons are to be dissuaded from dances, nevertheless a promise of avoiding dances would be demanded from them altogether imprudently.

3rd. To legitimate the practice of those confessors who indiscriminately deny absolution to all those who lead dances commonly called among us round dances, it is not valid to say that those dances were condemned by the Fathers of Baltimore. For when the Baltimore Fathers name the aforesaid dances in the Pastoral Letters, they do not impose a precept, but only furnish an admonition. But when they speak more severely in Decree 472, they not only make no mention of those dances in particular, but neither do they impose a precept on all the faithful, and they require only that pastors of souls "attack immodest dances and condemn them altogether." - Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, n. 472, and the Pastoral Letters, n. x.

4th. Nor did the Fathers of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore properly condemn any dances whatsoever, or even the aforesaid dances, when in n. 290 they imposed the following precept: "We command also that priests take care that the abuse by which banquets are prepared with dances (balls) for promoting pious works be altogether removed."

5th. Generally speaking, it is not expedient publicly in preaching to reprehend certain dances by name, because the preacher would accomplish nothing, indeed perhaps he would entice some persons to them. It is rather expedient to act indirectly against dances, and directly against the sins which are accustomed to be committed in them.

6th. Generally speaking, dances with masks (masked balls) are illicit and altogether to be condemned, because experience establishes that they incline very much to lust, from the fact that they suppress modesty, which is the guardian of decency.

7th. Certain very recent dances have seemed gravely indecent to many; hence because of the dangers connected with them, especially young persons of either sex are generally to be kept away from them altogether. Wherever there is a special prohibition, there indeed they are in no way to be permitted. It is wholly clear that the holding of them must never be favored. But when the confessor encounters particular cases, let him judge concerning them according to the circumstances of the singular case.

Sacred Consistorial Congregation. Decree concerning certain dances in the United States of North America and in the Canadian region. - In the last century, in the Federated States of North America, there had begun a custom of calling together Catholic families to dances which were accustomed to be prolonged for many hours of the night with banquets and other recreations. The reason and cause of this thing was given, namely that Catholics might mutually know one another and be united more intimately by bonds of love and charity, and at the same time that subsidies necessary for this or that pious work might be procured. But those who were accustomed to announce these gatherings and preside over them were for the most part presidents of some pious work, and not rarely rectors of churches themselves or pastors. But the Ordinaries of the places, although they did not doubt concerning the right end of those who promoted these dances, nevertheless, perceiving the harms and dangers of the introduced practice, judged that it belonged to their office to proscribe them; and therefore in can. 290 of the Plenary Council of Baltimore they established these things: "We command also that priests take care that the abuse by which banquets are prepared with dances (balls) for promoting pious works be altogether removed." But, as often happens in human affairs, those things which had most justly and wisely been commanded from the beginning gradually began to come into oblivion, and the use of dances again to prevail, indeed also to be diffused into the neighboring region of the Canadian dominion. Knowing these things, the Most Eminent Fathers of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, having heard several Ordinaries of the places, and with the matter subjected to examination with much study, judged that one must altogether stand by the sanctions established by the Third Council of Baltimore: and, with the approval of Our Most Holy Lord Benedict XV, Pope, they decreed that all priests, whether secular or regular, and other clerics, are altogether prohibited from promoting and fostering the mentioned dances, even if for the relief and subsidy of pious works, or for any other pious end; and moreover that all clerics are forbidden from being present at these dances, if perhaps they are promoted by laymen. But the Supreme Pontiff commanded that this decree be made public law and be observed religiously by all, anything whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding. Given at Rome, from the buildings of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, on the day of March 31, 1916.

To a certain Ordinary asking: Whether the dances of which the decree of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation of March 31, 1916 treats, and which the same Sacred Congregation proscribed, are sometimes licit, or are not comprehended in the reprobation, if they are held during daytime hours, or only in the first hours of the night, and are not too greatly prolonged, or even if they are held without banquets or by that method which commonly is accustomed to be called picnic? The Sacred Congregation responded: "They are comprehended in the reprobation: and therefore all clerics are prohibited from promoting them, even in the mentioned circumstances, and if they are promoted by others, they are prohibited from being present at them." Sacred Consistorial Congregation, Dec. 10, 1917.

Concerning Spectacles. Concerning spectacles nearly the same thing is to be held as concerning dances, namely that they are not illicit of themselves, but can become evil because of circumstances. The reason is that they are opposed to no law, neither natural nor positive. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 168, art. 3.

You Will Resolve. 1st. He does not sin mortally who, scandal being set aside, is present at a play not gravely shameful, unless perhaps he knows by experience that he is vehemently moved by games of this kind toward lust with proximate danger of consent, so that the spectacle is for him a proximate occasion of sinning. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de sexto praec. Decal., n. 427.

2nd. If in plays things notably shameful were represented, or in a shameful manner, it would indeed be mortal to watch them on account of delight arising from the shameful things themselves; but venial on account of curiosity only or vain enjoyment, excluding however danger of consent in shameful delight, which will easily be present in adolescents, or in others of little timorous conscience, and unless scandal is present; and it would plainly be present if clerics or religious were present at shameful plays. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid. and Hom. Ap., tract. 9, n. 10.

3rd. Deservedly, because of the scandal of others, both those who by money or applause cooperate in notably shameful plays are condemned of mortal sin, and those also who are bound to impede them and, when they conveniently can, do not impede them; but a fortiori those who represent them. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Cooperation in general is concurrence with another principally acting. But insofar as it can be opposed to charity, it is a certain participation in the evil action of another. Cooperation is distinguished in many ways; for it is: 1st, immediate or mediate, according as the cooperator acts with the sinner in the very act of sin, or posits other actions having some connection with the sin of another; 2nd, proximate or remote, according as the action of the cooperator is connected more closely or more remotely with the evil action of another; 3rd, positive or negative, according as the cooperator either posits some action influencing the sin of another, for example, by helping him, or omits a due act, for example, if he does not obstruct, when he ought to obstruct; 4th, formal or material: the former concurs with the evil will of another, and participates in his evil action insofar as it is evil; the latter concurs only with the action, insofar as it is something physical and indifferent, abstracting from the end and malice of the principal agent.

Cooperation is made chiefly in nine ways, namely by commanding, counseling, consenting, praising, furnishing recourse, participating in the action or profit, by being silent, by not obstructing, by not manifesting. Hence the verses:

Command, counsel, consent, praise, recourse, One participating, mute, not obstructing, not manifesting.

Formal cooperation is never licit; but material cooperation can become licit if there is present a just cause proportioned to the gravity of the sin of another and to the proximity of the concurrence to the execution of the sin. The reason of the first is taken from the very definition of formal cooperation. But the reason of the second is that, when you cooperate only materially, you do not contract the malice of the action itself, for this is supposed to be good or indifferent; nor do you sin by virtue of any evil intention whatsoever, because this must be wholly absent; nor finally do you become guilty by virtue of the sin of another, because if he wishes to abuse your cooperation for executing sin, you are not bound except from charity to impede it, and because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, therefore, when a just and proportionate cause intervenes, you are excused from every sin. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 63.

From the application of this principle all solutions concerning cooperation must be gathered. But this application, if it is considered speculatively, appears easy; but practically speaking, nothing in all moral theology is more difficult. For often it can scarcely be determined whether cooperation is formal or material, which indeed would always have to be determined in the first place. Then, once it is posited that it is known that cooperation in some case is only material, it does not follow from that that it is in fact licit, but only that it can be licit if the aforesaid required conditions have place. Now the verification of those conditions cannot be known from some physical mark of discernment or scale, but from rules of prudence and discretion, the application of which has always been difficult. Wherefore we add here several particular solutions, so that they may be an example for obtaining other similar ones.

As Regards Servants. - Question 1.

Is it licit for a servant to bring wine to the table, by which the master and guests will become drunk, or to prepare and serve meats on days of abstinence?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably as to each; for on the one hand cooperation of this kind seems certainly material, and on the other a servant could scarcely refuse those and other services of this kind without at the same time being bound to refuse any service whatever, at least among us, which certainly imports a grave inconvenience. Add that often it is difficult to foresee excess in drink or to know certainly that no reason or dispensation is had for eating meats. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 68 and 69. - Kenrick, n. 137.

Question 2. Is it ever licit for a servant to put his shoulders under, or to carry a ladder for, a master climbing up to fornicate, to open a door by force, and similar things?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably, because these actions are indifferent of themselves, at least in relation to fornication, and the whole malice is held on the part of the master requiring them. But the sole reason of service, or fear of any notable detriment whatsoever, does not suffice for excusing, but fear of death, mutilation, or similar most grave harm is required. The reason is taken not only from the condemnation of the proposition to be cited immediately, but also from the proximity of the influence which cooperation has upon the sin. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 66 and 68. - Kenrick, n. 141.

Question 3. Can a maidservant open the door of the house to a prostitute?

Response. The Doctors more commonly affirm, and very many excuse her by the sole reason of service, but not when another who would open is lacking. - But other theologians contend that it is never licit to open the door to a prostitute, and they rely on the following proposition, which is the 51st condemned by Innocent XI: "The servant who, with shoulders placed under, knowingly helps his master to climb through windows to violate a virgin, and many times subserves him by carrying a ladder, opening a door, or cooperating in something similar, does not sin mortally if he does this from fear of notable detriment, for instance lest he be badly treated by the master, lest he be looked upon with fierce eyes, lest he be expelled from the house." - But these words, opening a door, manifestly ought to be understood of opening by force the house of another, as is clear from the context. Cf. Viva on this proposition. - St. Alphonsus, n. 66. - Kenrick, n. 140.

Question 4. Can a servant by reason of service saddle a horse for a man about to go forth to sin, or accompany him?

Response. Affirmatively, probably, if the servant only saddles the horse, because in this he does not seem to cooperate more with the sin of the master than if he should hand shoes or a hat to him when he is going to leave the house. But according to St. Alphonsus it would not be permitted to him to accompany his master to the place where the sin is to be perpetrated, unless he must incur some grave harm. But there are not lacking grave theologians who indeed require some other grave harm in the case in which the master would not go to sin without the servant, because then the cooperation would be more necessary and therefore more proximate; but if another servant would not be lacking, or the master would go equally without the servant, then they teach that the sole reason of service suffices for accompanying him. Yet all make exception for the case in which the master would be rendered more emboldened for sinning by the servant accompanying him, because then the cooperation would be formal, which is never licit.

Applying this solution to another similar case, we can say that it is licit for a coachman to carry someone to a brothel by the sole reason of service or of the fare accepted, since, if he refused, another coachman would not be lacking. Yet he seems to cooperate formally who would lead someone ignorant of where the brothel is to that place, or would furnish his work for carrying him there more secretly and safely. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 64. - Kenrick, n. 137. - Baller., note (b), p. 218. Revue des sciences ecclés., vol. 9, p. 161.

Question 5. Is it licit for a servant to write or transmit letters inciting to shameful things, or to carry gifts to a prostitute?

Response. It indeed seems never to be licit to write or transmit letters of this kind, when what they contain is known, because to utter shameful things or suggest them to another is intrinsically evil. - But if in those letters it is said only that the prostitute should wait at such a place, should come to the house at such an hour, or something else of this kind, then the malice is held only on the part of the agent, and therefore the cooperation would be only material, which, a proportionate cause being posited, can be excused. The same must be said concerning the transmission of gifts, which is not evil except from the intention and end of the master. Thus it seems that what is taught in diverse ways by different authors concerning a servant carrying love letters or gifts must be explained. - Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 219, and note (a), p. 220. - Revue des sciences ecclés., loc. cit., pp. 158 and following.

As Regards Workmen. - Question 1.

Is it licit for workmen to build temples of heretics?

Response. Negatively, if this is demanded by heretics in hatred of religion; but otherwise in another hypothesis, when a just cause presses, excluding however scandal, which among us scarcely has place.

Question 2. Is it licit to make statues of false gods?

Response. Affirmatively, if these are not to be employed for false worship, but for the ornament of streets, buildings, etc.; but otherwise, if they are to be handed over to a pagan. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 69.

Question 3. Is it sometimes licit to cooperate in publishing bad books?

Response. It is licit for a grave cause to cooperate mediately or remotely, for example, to prepare ink or paper or arrange printed books. But to cooperate immediately in the printing of such books, for example, to arrange the type, to direct the printing, etc., generally speaking, does not seem licit. I said generally speaking, because in a case of most grave detriment, for a brief time, Laymann indicates that some such thing can be furnished materially, de Caritate, chap. 13, n. 5.

Question 4. What is to be said concerning the cooperation of clerks among bankers?

Response. Kenrick has this: "Clerks among bankers are not bound to judge concerning their manner of acting whether it is just; nor are they considered to concur effectively in fraud, if perhaps there is any, since they furnish a bare ministry according to defined rules. Otherwise one must speak if they themselves persuaded others to sell promissory notes at an unjust price, or if they compose accounts falsely for fraud." - Cf. Kenrick, n. 154.

Question 5. Is it licit for a Catholic to make masonic signs?

Response. Negatively, unless there is a truly grave cause.

As Regards Merchants. - Question 1.

Is it licit for merchants to sell dice, swords, cosmetics, women's adornments, etc., when future abuse is foreseen?

Response. Affirmatively, because a sale of this kind is not evil of itself, since those things are indifferent, and can be turned to a good use. Therefore the only reason for doubting is taken from the foreseen sin of the buyer, which charity obliges you to impede. But charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, and this could easily be present, especially among us, if merchants, suspecting or even certainly foreseeing future abuse, refused to sell to someone in particular wares exposed to all and indifferent of themselves. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 71. - Baller., note (a), p. 223.

Question 2. Is it licit to sell poison?

Response. Affirmatively, unless it is morally established that the buyer will use it badly; the reason is that today poisonous potions or herbs are employed for many effects, either good or indifferent, and therefore it can easily be presumed that poison is not bought for perpetrating evil. But the answer is otherwise if it is a question of the sale of those instruments (male protectors) which today are frequently employed for sinning more freely.

As Regards Innkeepers. - Question 1.

Is it licit for innkeepers to give liquors to those who are foreseen as about to make themselves drunk?

Response. It is not licit without a grave reason, as is clear. But it is licit on account of fear of some grave harm, for example, acts of violence, quarrels, etc. ...; because charity does not oblige us to turn another away from sin with grave inconvenience. Likewise for preventing blasphemies, which are graver evils. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 69.

Question 2. How must one act with innkeepers who admit dances in their buildings, so that they may attract more guests?

Response. Generally they are to be turned away from this insofar as can be done, because dances, especially those which are held in an inn, for the most part are done less honorably and furnish an occasion to many sins. Nevertheless absolution is not always to be denied to them, but the circumstances and the ordinary manner in which those dances are held must be considered.

Question 3. Is it licit for masters of inns to propose any public journals whatsoever to be read by guests?

Response. They cannot admit those which evidently and ordinarily are opposed to religion and good morals, even if guests cease to flow to them on that account. Yet they can admit all those which treat of merely political matters. Nor do they seem bound to reject some journal because it sometimes contains something less right against the faith, provided it is not generally opposed to religion.

As Regards Nuns and Other Catholics Serving the Sick. - Question 4. Is it licit for them to call a heretical minister to one dying?

Response. To call spontaneously a heretical minister, so that he may furnish the dying person with the consolations of religion, is illicit on account of forbidden communication in divine things. For the same reason it is illicit for nuns having care of the sick in a hospital to comply with the custom of a dying heretic asking the help of a minister of his sect, as the Holy Office responded in a particular case on March 14, 1848. The decree is as follows:

"D. Evens ... humbly sets forth that in the city of Neutz ... there exists a hospital, of which he himself is Rector and Chaplain, and in which Nuns have the care of the sick. ... But since in this hospital followers of a non-Catholic religion are from time to time received, and the same repeatedly ask for a heretical minister from whom they may receive the aids and consolations of religion, it is asked whether it is licit for the aforesaid nuns to call a minister of false religion? It is asked moreover whether the same solution is to be given where a sick heretic stays in the private house of a certain Catholic; namely whether then the Catholic can licitly call a heretical minister?

"Response. According to the things set forth, it is not licit; and according to the mind." The mind is, "that they conduct themselves passively." In the Declaration to the Vicar Apostolic of Egypt of February 5, 1872 the sense of the words they conduct themselves passively is explained: "The mind of the Most Eminent Fathers is that the Prelate Orator be notified that to Nuns or other Catholic persons assigned to the direction or service of the Hospital, it is not licit to furnish their work directly to non-Catholic sick persons for calling their own minister, and it will be well if, when the occasion has been given, they declare this; but the Most Eminent Fathers add that for calling the minister the ministry of some person belonging to the respective sect of those asking can be employed. And thus the doctrine remains intact with relation to forbidden communication in divine things." This Leo XIII approved on Dec. 26, 1898. Cf. Analecta Ecclesiastica, year 7, pp. 98, 99, where you will find the Declaration rendered into Latin. But if no non-Catholic is present, it is illicit for Catholics to call the minister, so that he may perform his heretical rites. But to say to the minister: this sick person wishes that you visit him, seems licit on account of a most grave reason, for example, on account of hatred against the Church and other harms otherwise going to arise. Cf. Genicot, vol. 1, n. 201. Lehmkuhl, vol. 1, n. 652.

It Must Be Noted. "In hospital ... X ... whose ownership belongs to the Sisters of the Congregation of S. N., the Superior is anxious: 1. Whether she ought to inquire into the doctors by questioning them themselves or by another means, whether they rightly observe the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Roman and Universal Inquisition of May 4, 1898, with its declaration of March 5, 1902. The reason for the doubt is that practicing doctors are chosen by the Sisters. 2. Or whether it suffices that they choose conscientious doctors, to whom they leave both the manner of proceeding and the responsibility, without themselves inquiring." The Sacred Penitentiary responded to the proposed doubts: To 1 ... Negatively. To 2 ... Affirmatively, nor is the Superior bound to obstruct the work of such doctors, unless in the case in which their intention of prevaricating will evidently betray itself. Sacred Penitentiary, July 7, 1911. - Nouvelle Rev. Théol., v. 44, p. 35.

I. Innocent XI condemned the following theses:

13. If you act with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened over someone's life, or rejoice over his death; seek it and desire it with an inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure at the person, but on account of some temporal advantage.

14. It is licit, with an absolute desire, to wish for the death of one's father — not indeed as an evil to the father, but as a good to the one wishing it — because, namely, a rich inheritance will fall to him.

15. A servant who, with bowed shoulders, knowingly helps his master climb through windows to ravish a virgin, and many times abets him in this, carrying the ladder, opening the door, or cooperating in some similar way, does not sin mortally, if he does this from fear of notable detriment — for instance, lest he be ill-treated by his master, lest he be looked upon with fierce eyes, lest he be expelled from the house.

II. "Coninck believes that no fear whatever makes it licit to paint an idol, or to make a priestly vestment at the request of an Infidel ... But I believe that it can be excused by a most grave fear, if these things are not demanded of you in contempt of Religion, and there is no scandal in your not scorning them. For the fabrication of an idol, and the painting of a concubine, are not intrinsically evil, but can often be rendered honest." Castropalao, treatise 6, disputation 6, point 12, number 7, page 434.

III. "Of the sculpture or painting of an idol there is a doubt: and indeed it is licit, when idolatry is neither sought nor feared; but when it is feared, I say that he sins against Religion who furnishes it without a most urgent loss. This is proved both from the law of charity, and because every virtue obliges that all occasions of violating it be avoided. But if I cannot myself refuse to furnish the idol without grave and proportionate loss, I do not sin in giving it." Hurtado de Mendoza, on the second part of the Second Part, disputation 66, section 6, § 181, in Diana, coordinated edition, Tome 7, treatise 5, resolution 64.

IV. Fr. Antonino Diana, Tome 7, coordinated edition, resolution 9, number 6, frees from the sin of scandal women using superfluous and excessive adornment. "But I" (he says) "think that there is no sin, even if the adornment were superfluous and excessive, provided it be according to the custom of the country." Does the custom of the country, then, prevail over the Gospel which prohibits such superfluity?

V. That women's cosmetics, and the exquisite adornments of face and head, hold a middle nature, removed both from honesty and from malice, Lessius writes, book 4 On justice, chapter 4, doubt 14, number 114. "Finally, to paint the face, and to apply various colors to it, is not evil of itself, but indifferent." But the divine Scriptures cry out against ornaments and allurements of this kind. He answers: "Those Scriptures either contain an exhortation, since they have no word of precept ... or certainly it was expedient at that time, for the edification of the Heathen, that this be commanded." Place cited, number 114.

VI. Caramuel, in his Theologia Praeterintentionalis, Tome II, precept 6, question 8, chapter 2, case 2, writes the following conclusions: "First. Servants can, with the knowledge that she is a prostitute or a concubine, minister foods at table — not only common foods, but also warm ones, and season food that provokes to Venus, and make ready a private bed." At number 297 he praises for his opinion Azor and Diana, and adds: "I have advisedly spoken not only of common foods, because I know that there is altogether greater difficulty if there were such foods as would excite Venus — for then, according to certain Theologians, servants would have to desist from such service, lest they cooperate indirectly toward illicit Venus. But we, the more prudent, believe that even such foods can be seasoned without fault." Is it licit, then, to incite Venus? To cook foods that kindle it? And is Caramuel to be held the more prudent for teaching these things? But hear the reason he brings forward. Such foods can be eaten without fault even by one who foresees the future pollution, provided he is prepared not to give consent: therefore the foods can be seasoned and ministered. Let this suffice to have pointed out, that it may be detested.

"Second. They can make the bed for their master and his mistress without venial fault," consonant with Azor, whom Diana cites.

"Third. It is not a mortal sin to procure for one's master and his concubine, about to have intercourse, a lodging, or to prepare a bed better than usual, or to strew it with flowers."

"Fourth. It is not a sin to hire a mistress into one's master's house, even though you foresee that she will sin in it."

VII. Fr. Tommaso Tamburini, book V on the Decalogue, chapter 1, § 4: "If my friend wishes me to carry little gifts and the like — namely incitements of shameful love — which he himself sends to his concubine, can I carry them without sin? The answer was absolutely negative: because on the one hand this action, though otherwise indifferent, is conjoined with the sin of the friend and of his concubine; and on the other hand there is no excusing cause, drawn from servitude (for this he grants to servants) or from another detriment, as we suppose. Nor indeed, if there is some modest blush of shame, does this seem regularly to be of such moment as sufficiently to excuse. I confess, however, that if such a friendship were of great value to you, and you truly feared to lose it, you could be excused: because then a just fear of notable detriment is added."

The same, number 30: "Can those who by office carry litters on their shoulders, or drive carriages, licitly, hired for a price, bring a girl to a lascivious young man? Answer: I say they cannot. Nor does the reason of servitude excuse this: for these are not servants or subjects; nor does the loss of gain excuse it, because this is quite small. I have, however, one point from Navarrus, from which something more benign can probably be gathered. From these things," he says, "there seems to be gathered a reason for defending many from sin, at least deadly sin — provided, as in the case proposed, the sin does not please them, and they perform the aforesaid services for some good end — for instance, because they render what belongs to their office, or for a just wage. For although these offices and services are very much conjoined with sin, they are not, nevertheless, in themselves and by their own nature sins; and therefore they can be separated from the sin by a different and separate end. Thus he." Note that phrase: of their office, or for a wage.

VIII. Fr. Antonino Diana, Tome 7, coordinated edition, treatise 5, resolution 48: "Is it licit, for some just cause, to lend a bedchamber to someone asking it for fornication; or to let a house to a prostitute, even if, on account of the circumstance of the place, someone should commit a sin; or if the prostitute, hiring that house, should do great harm to honest women neighbors? On this case I was once asked; for a certain most noble man was insistently seeking his friend's house for the purpose of fornicating. But if he had denied him this, he would have fallen into most grave harm. He asked whether he would sin by doing this. And I answered in the negative: because without a proportionate loss to himself he could by no means deny this; and to lend a bedchamber is not, from its object, intrinsically evil, but indifferent, and is ordered to evil only from the depraved intention of the one abusing it. Therefore, etc. And thus Merolla teaches this same opinion most recently, in specific terms."

"Hence it is inferred, a fortiori, against Navarrus, chapter 17, that it is licit, for a just cause, to let a house to a prostitute — even if, on account of the circumstance of the place, someone should commit a sin, which he would by no means perpetrate if that place were not granted to him, by reason of its situation, etc. — or if the prostitute, hiring that house, should do great harm to honest women neighbors."

The same Diana, resolution 50: "Is it licit to give a gift to a judge's mistress, that she may intercede with him, since she herself would go to speak with the judge, and it is mortal by reason of scandal, since she exposes herself to a most vehement danger of sinning? Sanchez, most recently, answers in the negative ... But I judge the affirming opinion no less probable, if the business is grave, and you see that the judge is not favorable to you, but you hope that through the mistress's intercession he will become well-disposed, and no other way appears by which you could bend him to preserve your right: because you are not asking for something which she herself could not licitly furnish. For although by that intercession the judge and the mistress foster a shameful love, this you do not intend, nor are you the cause of any harm. All these things Castropalao teaches, Tome I, treatise 6, point 15, number 2."

The same, resolution 42: "I have adduced Francesco Merolla in his moral-theological disputations, Tome I, disputation 2, where he speaks thus. From these things it is gathered what must be said of coachmen who carry a prostitute from one place to another, when they know that she seeks that place in order to sin. For these are regularly excused from sin: because there is a cause of not losing the gain which they procure from that ministry. So he, and I."

IX. Fr. Patritius Sporer, treatise 5 on the fifth precept of the Decalogue, chapter 1, section 3, number 92: "Without doubt painters sin mortally, regularly speaking, who paint very filthy and obscene things; and much more actors representing such very filthy things ... But I say 'regularly speaking': for in a rare case, if the necessity of the painter or actor were so great that he needed such gain for food, clothing, or some other necessary thing, certain Doctors, with Tamburini, permit it once or twice, until another means of livelihood should occur — provided there be absent the mortal danger of impure venereal delight." This opinion is more than lax, as will be said in its place. For according to these Theologians, regularly speaking, very filthy and obscene scandal is not licit. But if food, or clothing, or something of the kind presses, then a very filthy scandal will be honest, until another means of livelihood occurs.

I. Question I. What, and of how many kinds, is scandal? Answer. It is a word or deed less right, furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin. Under the name of word or deed, omission also is comprehended. For those inflict most grave scandals who, in a grave matter, neglect to fulfill their parts. What incredible and irreparable losses and spiritual ruin proceed from this! It is called less right, that we may understand that not only evil, but also the appearance of evil, can beget scandal. Furnishing an occasion of ruin. It is not required that the ruin actually follow, but it suffices that an occasion of spiritual ruin be furnished, whether it follow or not.

II. Scandal is twofold, active and passive. Active is that which I have described, and which can be committed in three ways. 1. Directly and formally, when someone expressly intends the spiritual ruin of his neighbor; and this is called the scandal of demons. 2. Directly but not formally, when someone induces another to sin, not because he intends the malice, but because he wishes to satisfy his own appetite. 3. Indirectly, when it is foreseen, or can be foreseen, that from such an occasion the neighbor will take occasion of spiritual ruin.

III. Passive scandal is the very spiritual ruin of him who suffers the scandal, an occasion having been accepted from another's word or deed. Passive scandal is often joined with active, as when one gives, and another accepts, the occasion of sinning. Sometimes there is active scandal without passive, as when someone furnishes an occasion of sinning, but the other, scorning such an occasion, remains constant in virtue. Passive scandal without active occurs when someone, from an innocent occasion, seizes a handle for sinning — either from ignorance and infirmity, and this is called the scandal of the little ones; or from malice, and is called pharisaical scandal.

IV. To scandal placed in a word are referred lewd songs, immodest conversations veiled with allurements of words, with metaphors and allegories very significant, contumelious words, mocking or in whatever way unjustly irritating; likewise obscene books, commonly called romances, immodest Poets, and the like, which even today are worn thin in the very hands of weak women. Lascivious pictures, and innumerable other deeds which furnish the neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin, are referred to the scandal of deed. It is not required that the sinner have an express intention of inducing the neighbor to sin; but it suffices that he perform an action, or utter a word, which by its own nature induces to sin. This is called indirect and interpretative scandal.

V. Question II. Is scandal a special sin? Answer. All affirm that it is a peculiar sin, distinct from the evil work itself, and opposed to charity. Wherefore in confession this twofold malice must be expressed — one against charity, the other against the virtue to which is opposed the depraved deed or word that generates the scandal. And this is plain from holy Scripture: Woe to the world because of scandals: for it must needs be that scandals come; nevertheless, woe to that man by whom the scandal cometh. And whosoever shall scandalize one of these little ones...

of these little ones that believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea. Matthew 18. That word woe sets forth the enormous malice of scandal. In the other clause, woe to the world because of scandals, the Evangelist indicates the multitude of scandals. For the greatest part of Christians is damned by reason of scandals. Men infect one another with malice, no otherwise than lepers, and entice one another to sin. On every side the contagion of scandals rages and creeps everywhere. The earth and the air resound with the clamor of blasphemies and of oaths. The poison of unchastity pours itself out in words, in dress, in deeds, into the eyes, into the ears, and pervades the inmost senses. On every side floods of simonies, of the crimes of calumnies, of detractions, of oppressions, and of persecutions of sound doctrine, and the plague of lax opinions flattering the senses, inundate all things.

VI. Question III. How grave is the duty of declining scandal? Answer. A most grave obligation, and the utmost vigilance to be applied in avoiding scandal, Christ the Lord expresses, Matthew chapter 5, in these words: If thy right eye scandalize thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee; and again, Mark 9, he adds: And if thy hand scandalize thee, cut it off. It is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell. What could be uttered by Christ more forcefully, more vehemently, to express the most grave duty of avoiding scandal? Hence gather how much the opinions of certain men oppose the doctrine of Christ, who, by various petty distinctions and inept inventions of remote and proximate scandal, frequently foster and confirm Christians in occasions of sinning.

VII. Question IV. Must the truth of life be kept silent, that scandal be avoided? Answer. The Angelic Doctor distinguishes a threefold truth, II-II, q. 43, art. 7, ad 3: of life, of doctrine, and of justice. In the truth of life, of doctrine, of justice is comprehended not only what is of the necessity of salvation, but also that by which salvation is more perfectly attained. Of these three there is discourse; now the truth of life is explained, which is placed in the conformity of human actions to the life of Christ and to his divine law. This divine law is one affirmative, another negative. It is never licit to violate a precept of the negative natural law for the sake of avoiding scandal. A precept of the affirmative law can sometimes be set aside for the sake of avoiding scandal. By this reason the precept of fraternal correction is omitted, when it is foreseen that the brother will come off worse — because then the precept does not press. Good works must never be omitted on account of pharisaical scandal. Works absolutely necessary to salvation can never be neglected on account of any scandal whatsoever, even of the little ones. But good works, without which we can still attain eternal salvation, can sometimes and must be concealed or deferred, that the scandal of the little ones be avoided, until they are instructed.

VIII. Question V. Must the truth of doctrine be kept silent, that scandal be avoided? Answer. The truth of doctrine must be preached, whether by voice or in writing, especially when from the falsity of opinions detriment threatens the integrity of morals. The precept of confessing the truth, and spiritual almsgiving, then presses. Wherefore Preachers, Theologians, and Confessors gravely sin who, either seized by a vain fear, or allured by the hope of catching popular favor, or in order to gain the favor of the World, either hide the truth of evangelical doctrine, or accommodate it, with the pigments and allurements of a harmful benignity, to the time and the temper of men. Against these Christ inveighs: He that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty. Luke chapter 9. I do not deny that there is need of prudence and dexterity, and that sometimes certain things must be deferred or omitted on account of various circumstances — provided this be done charity impelling, not cupidity seducing.

IX. Question VI. Must the truth of justice be set aside for the sake of avoiding scandal? Answer. The truth of justice directs those human actions which regard our Neighbor, and which render to each his own rights. Prelates, Superiors of a higher grade and dignity, not rarely neglect to correct offenders on account of fear of future evil and scandal. But for the most part the scandal itself is fictitious. Frequently the People suffer a most grave scandal because they see minor offenders severely punished even for light crimes, while, on the contrary, the sources of graver crimes go unpunished and free from any penalty whatsoever, because they are of some grade and dignity.

X. Question VII. Must temporal things be set aside on account of scandal? Answer. Either the discourse is of another's goods committed to our keeping, or of our own goods; as the Angelic Doctor wisely teaches and resolves, II-II, q. 43, art. 8: another's goods, of which we are keepers or administrators, are not to be set aside on account of scandals. On the contrary, goods of which we are the owners are sometimes to be neglected for the sake of avoiding the scandal of the little ones, or the scandal is to be removed by another way.

XI. Question VIII. Must spiritual works be either concealed or deferred on account of scandal? Answer. Works which are altogether necessary to salvation must never be omitted on account of any scandal whatsoever. But works of counsel, that the scandal of the little ones be avoided, must sometimes be concealed and deferred — unless, however, greater evils follow from this. Wherefore, since the preaching of evangelical doctrine is necessary to the salvation of many, it cannot be licitly dissembled or neglected, even if some little ones should thereby suffer scandal. But pharisaical scandal is to be despised.

XII. Question IX. What must be said of the scandal of Naaman the Syrian? Answer. I have treated this question at large in Tome 2 on the Decalogue, dissertation 9, chapter 7. Now I touch on it briefly. The sacred text is this: For thy servant will not henceforth offer holocaust, or victim to other gods, but this one thing there is, for which thou shalt pray to the Lord for thy servant: when my master goeth into the temple of Remmon, to worship there, and he leaneth upon my hand, if I bow down in the temple of Remmon, when he boweth down in the same place, that the Lord pardon me thy servant, for this thing. And he said to him: Go in peace. Naaman pledges that he will never in the future sacrifice to other gods. But since he was still bound to the King's service, he feared that he might have to accompany the King entering the temple, and stretch out his hand to him as he prostrated himself before the idol, and prostrate himself with him, as he had been wont to do before. This deed he feared; yet he did not know whether it must happen. Just as those who dwell in a necessary proximate occasion fear a future fall, though they be truly contrite. For Naaman did not say when I shall worship, but if I shall worship. When Elisha saw his proselyte agitated by scruples and anguishes, he answered: Go in peace; as if he had said: Take courage; nothing of the kind will happen. Be strong. God, in whose power are the hearts of Kings, will not permit you to serve the King prostrating himself before the idol. Trust in the Lord, go in peace. So we ourselves are wont to console and animate penitents converted from some depraved habit, and fearing a relapse at the sight of a mistress, or at the encounter of another occasion. Fear not: trust in the Lord; he himself who has begun will perfect his work.

XIII. Question X. Is it licit to sell idols and incense to the Heathen, to build shrines and Synagogues, and other such things whose evil use is foreseen? Answer. Several affirm that a craftsman struck by a most grave fear can construct an idol for an Infidel who asks for it. This opinion is false. The construction of an idol, and the building of a synagogue or a shrine, are works evil by their own nature, all circumstances considered, since they have no other use besides a worship polluted with superstition. By no fear, then, not even of losing one's life, can they be purged of crime. Similarly forbidden is the selling of an idol to him who buys it not for the adornment of his house, but for the purpose of practicing idolatry. Similarly they sin who sell incense to the Heathen, a lamb to the Jews, when it is certainly or probably foreseen that such merchandise will be applied to superstitious use. What several teach on this matter is opposed to the doctrine of all the ancient Fathers.

XIV. Question XI. Do Christians who row in the Turks' galleys against Christians sin gravely? Answer. The Theologians dispute on both sides. I judge the affirming opinion the more probable, explained in the true sense. Different times of rowing must be distinguished. The first, when it is known to the Christian captives that in the battle to be joined the Christians will be victors over the Turks. The second, when the war is unjust, and there threatens to the Christians the loss of liberty, of goods, and of life. The third, when there threatens to the Christians only the loss of external goods, but to the captive rowers the loss of life or the mutilation of limbs. In the first and third cases all affirm that Christian captives can licitly row. Of the second case the Theologians dispute; and the opinion which condemns as guilty of grave fault the captives rowing against innocent Christians is the more probable to me. For by no right is it permitted to bring aid to another against the innocent, whom it is a crime to injure. Now the Turks sin, killing Christians in an unjust war; therefore Christians also sin who furnish aid to the Turks in this unjust action. Nor do I see by what reason the opposite opinion is not contained in the condemnation of Innocent XI. If servants cannot help their masters, going in a boat to ravish virgins, by rowing, or, climbing through windows to fornicate or to kill, hold the ladder or support them with their shoulders — by what reason can Christian captives, by their rowing, drive the Turkish fleet forward to the destruction of Christians? Rowing is indifferent, absolutely regarded, just as holding a ladder and supporting another with one's shoulders; but, the circumstances being regarded, it is harmful, as is plain from innumerable examples.

XV. Question XII. Is it licit to receive money as a loan from a usurer ready to lend at interest? Answer. St. Thomas answers, II-II, q. 78, art. 4, in these words: To induce a man to sin is in no way licit; but to use another's sin for a good end is licit: because God uses all sins for some good, as is said in the Enchiridion, chapter XI. And therefore Augustine, to Publicola asking whether it would be licit to use the oath of one who swears by false gods ... answers that he who uses the faith of one who swears by false gods, not for evil but for good, does not associate himself with that man's sin, by which he swore by demons, but with his good pact, by which he kept faith. If, however, he induced him to swear by false gods, he would sin. So also in the matter proposed it must be said that it is in no way licit to induce anyone to lend at interest; yet it is licit to receive a loan at interest from one who is ready to do this and practices usury, for the sake of some good which is the relief of one's own necessity or another's. A man pressed by necessity asks for a good thing, namely a loan; that the other is unwilling to grant it without interest is his own fault, which rests in him, and which does not infect the exterior action of the one receiving. Rowing performed by Christian captives against innocent Christians is harmful, because it regards an exterior object that is evil, namely the ruin of guiltless Christians; climbing through windows to ravish a virgin is evil, because the object is depraved. But the borrowing of money regards a good object, namely the relief of a needy Neighbor. Hence, necessity being absent, to seek money even from a usurer ready to lend is a sin, as the more probable opinion teaches. On the contrary, grave necessity pressing, it is licit to seek a loan from anyone whatever, even one not ready to lend at interest, even though he be unwilling to lend the money without usury.

XVI. A merchant cannot seek usurious money to increase and amplify his business; but he can licitly seek it, grave necessity pressing, by which he may be relieved, that he may sustain himself and his family. Nor is it licit to deposit money with a usurer, when the depositor foresees that he will disburse that money for lending at usurious interest. Similarly it is not licit to give wine to an innkeeper, when it is certainly foreseen that he will sell it mixed with water. That if you cannot sell wine to another without grave inconvenience, you can sell it to the aforesaid innkeeper, Sanchez and Castropalao teach. But in practice it scarcely occurs that the seller cannot prevent unjust sales of this kind: because he can make such innkeepers known to the Judge or to the Community. However, if, pressed by urgent necessity, you could not sell wine to others, then you could use your right, and permit the unjust sales.

XVII. Question XIII. Is it licit to persuade one who will certainly sin to sin more lightly, that he may omit a graver crime? Answer. The more probable opinion, and the true one to me, denies it: since it is never licit to counsel an evil, however small. An offender can be asked to desist from a grave crime, by permitting a lesser and light one; but this can in no way be persuaded. Wherefore it is not licit to persuade a poor man ready to steal to snatch money by theft from a rich man rather than from a poor one, whatever Molina and Sanchez say to the contrary, for the reason given: that it is never permitted to counsel an evil. Now the theft of the rich man's goods is an evil, though the theft committed against the poor man be graver.

XVIII. Question XIV. Is it licit to invite to supper one who is ready to break his fast? Answer. The common opinion denies it, because he is invited to an action which, the prohibiting law being considered and the circumstances regarded, cannot be separated from malice. Now it is a sin to invite anyone to an action which, all things considered, is objectively harmful. Wherefore neither can servants licitly serve meat to their masters, nor innkeepers to their guests, at the time of a fast, nor can they furnish supper to those already well dined, while they know that they are not exempt from the fast either by dispensation or by necessity. In doubt, favor must be shown to the accused, and it must be presumed that they have been legitimately dispensed.

XIX. Innkeepers are excused who sell wine to soldiers who abuse it unto drunkenness, when they cannot refuse without loss either of life or of goods: because they are not bound, at so great a risk, to prevent others' sins. This grave danger being removed, innkeepers cannot...

sell wine to those whom they foresee will be made drunk by it. These sellers frequently sin, since they desire to sell wine for the sake of gain. A Parish priest is bound to refuse to administer the Eucharist to a hidden sinner publicly asking for it, that public scandal may be avoided.

I. I undertake to discuss a most grave question, the knowledge of which is especially necessary to Confessors and Preachers. I shall touch on it in few words, so far as can be done.

II. Question I. Can women licitly adorn themselves? Answer. St. Paul, 1 Timothy 2, says: Women in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, art. 2, ad 4, discourses luminously on this matter. Women can licitly adorn themselves, either to preserve the decency of their state, or to add something further, that they may please their husbands. Garments were instituted not only for covering the shameful parts and preserving nature, and guarding it from cold and heat, but also for distinguishing grades and sexes. Wherefore noble men and magistrates use more refined garments than others. Noble women too can licitly adorn themselves more elegantly than plebeians, either to please their husbands, or to enter into marriage.

III. Question II. Is immoderate adornment of women disapproved by holy Scripture? Answer. Vehement and most sharp are the declamations of the Prophets against the superfluous and immodest adornment of women. Isaias, chapter 3, has these words: And the Lord said: Because the daughters of Sion are haughty, and have walked with stretched-out necks, and wanton glances of their eyes, and made a noise as they walked with their feet, and moved in a set pace: the Lord will make bald the crown of the head of the daughters of Sion, and the Lord will discover their hair. In that day the Lord will take away the ornaments of shoes, and little moons, and chains, and necklaces, and bracelets, and bonnets, and bodkins, and ornaments of the legs, and tablets, and sweet balls, and earrings, and rings, and jewels hanging on the forehead, and changes of apparel, and mantles, and fine linen, and crisping pins, and looking-glasses, and lawns, and headbands, and fine veils. And instead of a sweet smell there shall be stench, and instead of a girdle a cord, and instead of curled hair baldness, and instead of a stomacher a hair-cloth.

IV. St. Peter, chapter 3, restrains the adornment of women in these words: Whose adorning let it not be the outward plaiting of the hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel. St. Paul, 1 Timothy 2, says: Not with braided hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire, but as it becometh women professing godliness. I pass over very many other oracles of Scripture against the vain pomps of women.

V. Question III. Do the holy Fathers detest the pomps of women? Answer. Tertullian, Cyprian, Chrysostom, Augustine, Jerome, and the other Fathers published whole books against the ornaments of women. Would the holy Fathers have inveighed so vehemently against the pomps of women, unless these were criminal? Tertullian, book On the dress of women, chapter 11, says: For the very sake of assembling together and of seeing and being seen mutually, they bring forth their pomp into public, so that either luxury may drive its trade, or glory grow insolent. St. Cyprian, book On discipline and the dress of virgins, cries out: If you adorn yourself too sumptuously, and go about in public in a notable manner, drawing the eyes of youths upon you, dragging after you the sighs of young men, nourishing the lust of desire, kindling the fuel of sighing — so that, though you yourself do not perish, you yet destroy others, and offer yourself as a sword and poison, as it were, to those who see you — you cannot be excused, as though you were of chaste and modest mind. For brevity's sake I pass over the testimonies of the other Fathers.

VI. Question IV. Do women sin who adulterate their face with cosmetics and antimony? Answer. All affirm it. Tertullian, in the place cited, chapter 5, inveighs sharply against so great a corruption: In this too they offend, that they anoint the skin with medicaments, stain the cheeks with rouge, and darken the eyes with soot. Doubtless the workmanship of God displeases them. In their very selves they reprove and reprehend the artificer of all things. For they reprove him when they amend, when they add — taking, of course, these additions from an adversary craftsman, that is, from the devil ... I see certain women also turning their hair yellow with saffron. They are ashamed even of their own nation, that they were not born German or Gallic women: thus do they transfer their fatherland to their hair. Even in Tertullian's time the women of Gaul led the rest in luxury, vanity, rouges, antimony, and white lead.

VII. Cyprian, book On the dress of virgins, has similar words: God says: Let us make man to our image and likeness. And does anyone dare to change, to alter, what God has made? They lay hands upon God, when they strive to reform and transfigure what he has fashioned, not knowing that whatever is born is the work of God; whatever is altered, of the devil.

VIII. Passing over the testimonies of Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine, St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, art. 2, ad 2, teaches this: The painting of women ... cannot be without sin ... Yet such painting is not always with mortal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of wantonness, or in contempt of God. St. Bernardino of Siena, with Alexander of Hales, Tome I, sermon 47, article 1, writes as follows: Women who smear themselves with vermilion, or wear counterfeit hair, sin mortally for three reasons ... For Alexander of Hales asks, on the fourth book, distinction on the Sacrament of the Eucharist: Whether women painted, or wearing counterfeit hair, whether of the living or of the dead, taken up for their adornment, ought to approach sacred Communion? And he answers that such women sin mortally, and render themselves unworthy of sacred Communion. And this he says is so chiefly on account of three things that follow from it: first, an offense against God; second, an offense against one's neighbor; third, an offense against oneself. Let this suffice to have touched on briefly, out of the many things I ought to have adduced from the Fathers.

IX. Question V. What do certain men teach on this argument? Answer. Fr. Diana, Tome 7 of the coordinated edition, resolution 9, number 6, writes this on the adornment of women: But I think that there is no sin, even if it were superfluous and excessive, provided it be according to the custom of the country. Can the custom of the country, then, derogate from the holy Scriptures, from the doctrine of all the Fathers, and from nature herself, which abhors superfluities?

X. Fr. Lessius, in answer to the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers, book 4, chapter 4, doubt 14, number 114, answers: Those Scriptures either contain an exhortation, since they have no word of precept; or, if they contain a precept, the discourse is of those who adorned themselves that they might please others, as Doctor Thomas notes in the Gloss; or certainly it was expedient at that time, for the edification of the Heathen, that this be commanded. This method of interpreting the Scriptures being admitted, they come to nothing. Was it expedient at that time that an honorable and modest adornment of women be commanded, but not in ours? Why should not a similarly graceful answer be furnished to many other oracles of divine Scripture as well? Are the divine precepts, then, matters of the times? Are they exhortations, not precepts? The universal tradition of the Fathers cries out to the contrary. But this invention is so vain that it collapses of itself.

XI. Question VI. When is the adornment of women to be judged superfluous and deadly? Answer. From various heads the adornment of women can be deadly: 1. From the excessive affection of displaying beauty. 2. From the depraved end of pleasing and of kindling the fire of lust. 3. From its effects. Debts are not paid, alms are not laid out, the wages of craftsmen are defrauded, patrimonies are squandered. Women addicted to vain ornament most frequently prostitute their chastity, and beneath the most splendid apparatus of garments the most putrid harlotries are hidden. For commonly men are not ignorant of the incomes of families; hence, beholding wives burdened with so many pomps, they infer that these women acquire them by harlotry, whence they shine with the splendor of their pomps.

XII. A certain and precise rule cannot be designated for when the superfluous adornment of women is a mortal sin. This, however, is certain: that most frequently women sin mortally in this kind, especially in our time, on account of the continual mingling of women and men. For to this end such women devote their study, that they may shine in these gatherings, and each strives to outdo the rest in outlandish fashions of dress. The malice of such adornment must be gathered not so much from the superfluous price and value of the clothing, as from the vain and immodest form of the ornament. For clothing can be costly, elegant, and of great price, and at the same time modest and becoming, as can happen in a noble matron and a princely woman. But commonly the clothing of these women is vain, immodest, and unchaste, and proves such women to be shameless, proud, and lost to modesty. These women are fans of concupiscence, routers of modesty and chastity, the scandals of cities, and a perpetual subject of murmuring.

To the example of a good work, whereby the Church of God is built up, Scandal is opposed, whereby the hostile man labors that it fall into ruin: for he dissolves the cement of Charity, and places in its stead stones of offense, upon which, falling from the structure, they strike their feet who walk iniquitously, as I shall soon say.

Julius, an English commander in India, when he saw that very many soldiers were being rendered unfit for war because of venereal diseases contracted from common prostitutes, expelled from the camps all the prostitutes infected with disease, and asked Caius, a subordinate officer and a Catholic, to provide healthy women for the use of the soldiers. Although Caius knew that according to the laws of the army Julius could not enforce the command, he acquiesced and procured several healthy women. Wounded and returned to England, while confessing to a priest, he asked whether he had acted lawfully. Hence it is asked:

1. What is the sin of scandal, and how are direct and indirect scandal distinguished?

2. Whence arises the obligation of abstaining from scandal, especially direct scandal?

3. Is it the sin of scandal to induce to sin someone already prepared for it?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is the sin of scandal and what is the difference between direct and indirect scandal ?

Scandal is any word or action having at least the appearance of evil which is the occasion of sin to another. When another’s sin is intended by him who gives scandal, this scandal is direct; when it is foreseen but not intended, it is indirect.

2. Whence arises the obligation of abstaining from direct scandal especially ?

We are obliged to abstain from giving scandal in the first place because it is against charity, and against the special obligation of fraternal correction which has its root in charity. He who gives scandal is the cause of sin to his neighbor, whereas he should do what he can to prevent the sinner from falling into sin, and to recover him when he has fallen. Direct scandal is also against that special virtue which is violated by him who sins through scandal. Thus he who incites another to drink to excess sins against charity and against temperance.

3. Is the sin of scandal committed by one who invites another to sin who was already determined to commit that sin?

St. Alphonsus teaches that at least with regard to those things that are intrinsically evil, such as fornication, the sin of scandal is committed by inviting another to execute what he was already determined on doing. The reason is because the execution of an evil purpose constitutes with that purpose a complete and perfect sin, distinct in species from the merely internal and habitual intention of sinning.¹

1 St. Alphonsus, book ii, treatise 3, no. 47.

4. The case. From the answer to the last question it is clear that Caius was not justified in acting as he did. His superior officer had no authority to give him such an order according to the regulations of the British army, and in any case Caius could not execute it without committing sin. In reality he became procurer for the soldiers. This solution does not preclude the medical examination of prostitutes so as to guard against the infection of the soldiers.

Agatha and Lucy, the former a Catholic, the latter an Anglican of the church called High, were joined to one another by the bond of friendship. They often helped each other in works of charity; indeed, not rarely Lucy brought help to Agatha in works of religion, and in particular acted the part of a saleswoman in selling smaller goods of every kind (took a stall at a bazaar), so that the Catholic church might be built more splendidly. A little later, the Anglican church which Lucy frequented was to be restored by employing the same means, and Agatha was asked by her friend that she herself should perform the similar part of saleswoman for the Anglican church. Not knowing how to refuse, Agatha assented; indeed, she herself contributed some things to be sold as a testimony of a grateful spirit toward Lucy. The Catholics, however, were not a little scandalized, and accordingly Agatha afterward relieved her troubled conscience to her confessor. It is asked:

1. When is someone obliged to avoid the scandal of others?

2. When is cooperation in another’s sin lawful?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. When is one obliged to avoid giving scandal to others ?

We must of course avoid giving scandal to others by doing anything wrong ourselves which will lead them into sin. We are also obliged to omit any action which is indifferent or good but not of precept by which scandal would be given to the weak or ignorant, if we can do so without serious inconvenience. We may not omit in this case an action which is prescribed by natural law; whether we are bound to omit what is prescribed by positive law is a disputed question among theologians. We are not bound to avoid pharisaic scandal by omitting an action which is good or indifferent and which has no appearance of evil.

2. When is co-operation in another’s sin lawful?

Formal co-operation in another's sin is never lawful; material co-operation is lawful provided that the action by which co-operation is given is good or at least indifferent, and provided that there is a good and proportionate reason for the co-operation (see p. 152).

3. The case. Agatha, a Catholic, and Lucy, an Anglican of the High Church party, were friends. They often helped each other in works of charity, and Lucy often helped Agatha in what she did for religion, taking a stall when a bazaar was held to raise funds for making an addition to the Catholic church of the place. When the Anglican church was to be restored, Lucy asked Agatha to take a stall for her, and Agatha not only consented but gave some objects to be sold at the bazaar as a mark of her gratitude. At this Catholics were scandalized, and so Agatha told what she had done when she went to confession.

There was no harm in the two friends working together in deeds of charity, and Lucy’s help could be accepted in the Catholic bazaar. But Agatha should have shown her gratitude to her friend in some other way than by taking a stall and giving things to be sold at the Anglican bazaar held for the restoration of the Anglican church. For this is a religious object, and a Catholic is not at liberty to help and show favor to a non-Catholic religious object. It naturally gave scandal to other Catholics. Agatha, therefore, was guilty of material wrong-doing as she seems to have acted in good faith, and she should avoid such actions in future, as a general rule. There might be exceptional circumstances which might excuse a Catholic who contributed to the restoration of an Anglican church because it was an ancient historical monument, if it could be done without scandal. In the case we suppose no such special circumstances to exist.

Bertha, who serves in the household of a non-Catholic master, approaches James, her confessor, and sets forth the following facts, concerning which she has a scruple and seeks his judgment about them: (a) Every day before she went to bed she had recited the Rosary, and in the presence of the other servants, although, because they had seen the rosary beads, they took from this an occasion to blaspheme the Blessed Virgin Mary. (b) Several times she had not hesitated to tell less modest stories, foreseeing that the other servants would probably take from this an occasion to begin truly indecent conversations. (c) Returning from church on Sunday, she had frequented streets where dissolute youths walk about, although she had often furnished one or another an occasion for uttering indecent things. (d) She had left the sons of the family, whose care she had, an occasion for stealing food, in order to catch and punish them. Hence it is asked:

1. What does scandal mean, and what are its species?

2. What is the malice of direct and indirect scandal?

3. What is the obligation of omitting works both of precept and of counsel in order to avoid scandal?

4. What judgment ought to be rendered by James?

1. This question is answered in “Manual of Moral Theology,” vol. i, p. 198. 2. See the answer to this in “Manual of Moral Theology,” vol. i, p. 199.

3. For the answer to this, see “Manual of Moral Theology,” vol. i, p. 200.

4. The case. Bertha, a Catholic governess in a non-Catholic family, tells James her confessor the following facts about her conduct and asks his advice about them: (a) She said her Rosary in presence of the other servants before going to bed, although the sight of the Rosary caused them to blaspheme the Blessed Virgin. Bertha can say her Rosary without letting it be seen by the other servants, and she should do this to prevent their blasphemies. (b) Often she has told suggestive stories although she foresaw that the other servants would take the occasion to tell really immodest ones. In this Bertha committed the sin of indirect scandal, and its gravity will depend on the gravity of the sins committed by the other servants in telling their immodest stories. (c) Coming from church on a Sunday she came by streets frequented by youths of bad character although she often occasioned indecent remarks. It is not suggested that Bertha chose these streets in order to meet the young men. If she can without inconvenience return by some more respectable streets, she should do so. We suppose that there is nothing in Bertha’s dress or manner to provoke the remarks, and so the scandal is pharisaic, and she need not put herself to inconvenience to avoid it. She should pay no attention to the objectionable remarks. (d) She allowed the children, of whom she had charge, to pilfer small morsels of food in order to catch and correct them. Such an action is not scandal, and so she need not be troubled about it.

Claudia, a woman of considerable physical charm, admits in her confession that she is not over-modest in her dress. She is not, of course, positively indecent, or grossly immodest, but at the same time she admits that she would hardly pose for a model of Christian modesty in the matter of dress. She maintains that her intentions are pure, even though vain, and that if others think evil on her account, they do so because they are evil-minded, and that it is no concern of hers. She does not propose to dress like a nun, just because some people happen to be disposed to think evil. The evil that they think must be ascribed to their own impure minds, and not to her way of dressing. Though all the while she admits that her manner of dress is not as modest as it might be, nor in keeping with the general tone of dress adopted by the women of her own condition in life. The confessor knows that she has been the occasion of grave sins of thought and desire to certain young men of the parish. But he fears to insist too much, lest Claudia give up going to the Sacraments altogether. In this difficulty he desires to know:

First: How far is Claudia to be held responsible for the scandal that her way of dressing seems to occasion?

Second: What advice ought the confessor give Claudia?

Answer.—In its original sense the word scandal means a trap, or a snare, laid for an enemy. In the Greek version of the Sacred Scriptures, the word is used in a metaphorical sense, to signify a stumbling-block, an offense, scandal, etc., because one who is the occasion of the sins of others, is like a man who puts a stumblingblock in their way and becomes "a stone of stumbling, or a rock of offense" (Is. viii, 14). In this latter sense the word scandal is used by the theologians and canonists. The definition of scandal, generally accepted in theology, is the one given by St. Thomas, II. ii, q. 43, Art. 1: "Opus minus rectum, praebens proximo occasionem spiritualis ruinae." Any conversation or any conduct which is, or at least appears to those present to be sinful, and which is calculated, therefore, to lead others into sin, is scandalous.

The speech, or the actions, or conduct which give scandal, must either be sinful in fact, or else have the appearance of being sinful. If there be no sin in our speech or our conduct, and no appearance of sin, then such speech or conduct can not possibly be the occasion of another's sin. If our speech and our conduct are lawful and innocent, and have no appearance of evil, and still another takes occasion from them to commit sin, his sin can in no wise be imputed to us, but wholly to his own evil disposition, moral weakness and malice. To be guilty of scandal, one's speech or conduct must be in reality sinful, or at least have the appearance, as far as others are concerned, of being sinful. Thus, if I eat meat on Friday without a sufficient reason, I commit sin; and if another is led by my example to do likewise, my action becomes the occasion of my neighbor's sin, and therefore scandalous. But if I have a sufficient reason, or even a dispensation, to eat meat on Friday, but my neighbor is not aware of it, and takes occasion by my example to transgress the law of abstinence himself; although my eating meat on Friday is not a sin, since I have a sufficient reason or enjoy a dispensation to do so, nevertheless my conduct may seem to my neighbor to be sinful, since he is ignorant of my reasons justifying my action, and I become guilty of scandal, since by my conduct, which appears to my neighbor to be more or less sinful and reprehensible, I lead my neighbor into sin.

There is a popular use of the word scandal, which must not be confounded with its technical meaning. In ordinary parlance, the verb, to scandalize, is often used in the sense to shock, or astonish, or to cause wonder or amazement. Thus we say that such conduct is scandalous, meaning thereby that it is shocking or that it out rages our moral sense. But, strictly speaking, no conversation and no conduct is scandalous, even though it be very shocking, unless it be calculated to lead those who hear it or see it into sin. The action that scandalizes need not necessarily be sinful; it may be indifferent, or it may even be good; but if good or indifferent, it must, at least, owing to the circumstances, be connected with the spiritual damage done to our neighbor, and therefore such action, on account of this relationship, is called by St. Thomas and the theologians minus recta. Indeed, as a rule, no shock accompanies scandal. The person scandalized, instead of being shocked or astonished by, or amazed at, the conduct that scandalizes him, is pleased by it, as justifying his own sin. It palliates his own transgression, in his own view of it, and lessens his guilt, if it does not wholly excuse it.

The speech or the conduct that gives scandal is not the cause of another's sin, but only the occasion of it, the accidental or incidental cause that provokes it, but not its efficient cause or its sufficient reason. The real cause of the sin that follows on scandal is the freewill of the person taking scandal. Such a person, seeing the evil, or seemingly evil, conduct of another, is provoked or incited by it to make up his mind to commit sin. The sin that follows must be ascribed entirely to his own free will as to its efficient cause. The speech or conduct that incited him to sin was not the cause, but only the provocation, or incitement, or occasion, of the sin.

One may give scandal without another person taking scandal. It is not of the essence of scandal that it should actually lead another into sin. All that is required in order that any speech or conduct be scandalous, is that, of their nature, they should be calculated to incite another to sin. If, under ordinary circumstances, the person guilty of evil speech or evil conduct must naturally apprehend that another person will be incited or provoked by them to commit sin, then such speech or conduct is scandalous, even though the person hearing or seeing the same is not, as a matter of fact, incited by them to commit sin. On the contrary, if I know that those who are listening to my conversation or who see my evil actions will not be incited by them to commit sin, because they are too firmly founded in Christian virtue to be influenced by my bad example, then I do not give scandal.

If, while I perform an action that is sinful, or at least seems to others to be sinful, I intend to incite or provoke another to commit sin, I am guilty of direct scandal. Generally speaking, the one who gives direct scandal does so for his own advantage or pleasure. He derives or hopes to derive some benefit from the sin into which he leads his neighbor. Therefore he directly intends the sin of his neighbor, hoping to derive from it some advantage. He sins himself, in order to incite his neighbor to sin, hoping to profit by his neighbor's sin. If, on the contrary, I do not intend or desire to incite my neighbor to sin, but at the same time I foresee that, if I commit such or such a sin in the presence of my neighbor, my neighbor will be incited by my conduct to commit sin himself, and nevertheless I commit the sin, then in that case I give indirect scandal. One who gives indirect scandal does not wish, or desire, or intend to lead his neighbor into sin, but nevertheless he foresees and apprehends that his neighbor will be provoked to commit some particular sin, if he himself speaks or acts sinfully in the presence of his neighbor, and yet he proceeds to speak or act in a sinful manner, or in what at least appears to his neighbor to be a sinful manner.

One may commit a mortal sin or only a venial sin in giving scandal. It all depends on the gravity of the sin that one foresees one's neighbor will commit. The action that I perform may be only venially sinful, and yet I may by it commit a mortal sin of scandal, because I either intend to incite my neighbor to commit a mortal sin, or at least I foresee that he will be incited by my conduct to commit a mortal sin. On the other hand, I may sin mortally myself and still only give venial or slight scandal, where I foresee that my action, although mortally sinful, will lead another only into venial sin. Consequently the gravity of the scandal one gives does not depend on the gravity of the sin one commits, but on the gravity of the sin that one foresees one's neighbor will be incited to commit. Thus a priest may give grave scandal by some act that is only venially sinful, whereas a layman, by the same act, would only give slight scandal or no scandal at all.

Whoever gives direct scandal, that is, whoever intends, by his own action, to lead or incite another to sin, is guilty of sin not only against the love we owe our neighbor, but also against the particular virtue or commandment against which he incites his neighbor to sin. Thus if I, by my sinful conduct, hope to provoke my neighbor to steal, I am guilty of a sin not only against charity, but also against justice. In case I do not intend the sin of my neighbor, but only foresee it and permit it, I am guilty of indirect scandal, which is a sin only against charity. For every virtue lays an obligation onus, not only that we ourselves do not violate it, but also that we do not desire that it shall be violated by others.

Bearing these few preliminary remarks in mind, it will easy to form a just judgment of Claudia's conduct.

1. In the first place Claudia is guilty of indirect scandal. It is not Claudia's purpose, by her manner of dress, to lead others into sin. If such were her purpose she would be guilty of scandalum directum. But as her purpose is only the indulgence of her own vanity and self-complacency, she becomes guilty of indirect scandal, inasmuch as her conduct is not altogether right, and is calculated to induce or incite others to sin. Indirect scandal, as has been said above, is a sin against charity, but not against the particular virtue against which our neighbor is led to sin. In the present instance, therefore, Claudia sins, at least materially, against charity, but not against purity; that is, her conduct, in as far as it is scandalous, is only against charity.

But what kind of a sin does Claudia commit, mortal or venial? We are inclined to think that she commits a venial sin. Immodesty in dress, at least off the stage or outside of masked balls, will hardly ever amount to more than a venial sin. The custom of the country must be considered. Physical charm is more alluring than dress, and yet no one is obliged to destroy their beauty because others take scandal at it. Of course a pious woman would not be guilty even of a slight immodesty in her dress, if she thought it might lead others into even venial sin. But Claudia evidently is not pious, nor much concerned about her neighbor's spiritual welfare. If some persons unknown to her take grave scandal by her conduct, such scandal is rather scandalum sumptum et non datum. On the contrary, if it is not a question of some indetermined persons taking scandal, but of a particular and known person, then the obligation to avoid giving scandal becomes more urgent.

2. Claudia ought to be advised and exhorted to be more modest and careful in her dress, but she could scarcely be obliged, under pain of mortal sin, to change her style of dress, since it is rather her personal beauty than her dress that is the cause of the scandal. Especially since there is danger that Claudia might give up the frequentation of the Sacraments, it would be prudent not to urge a reformation in dress too vehemently.

158. Thesis IX. We are obliged to refrain from giving scandal.

Explanation. Our duty towards the will of our fellow-man amounts to this: that, in charity, we ought to aid him in the attainment of his highest good, and, in justice as well as in charity, we must never deter him therefrom. We may so deter him, and thus become accessory to another's wrongdoing, in various ways, and especially by bad example, all of which we include under the general term, scandal. For scandal may be given by any word or deed not entirely right, which is an occasion of wrongdoing on the part of others.

Proof. We are obliged to will that others should attain their last end (Thesis VII.). But to give scandal is to will the contrary, because it tends to lead men away from their last end. Therefore, we are obliged to refrain from giving scandal.