paragraph — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
§ 2. On Scandal
102. Definition. Scandal is defined by St. Thomas as: a word or deed less right furnishing to another an occasion of spiritual ruin.1
a. From scandal properly and strictly such, which the given definition presents, scandal taken in a broader and improper sense must be distinguished; by this is frequently signified astonishment or rumor stirred up among the people because of an unusual action, though no one is incited to sin.
b. Word or deed: by these words not only a positive external action, but also an external omission must be understood, since even the omission of a precept can be an occasion of sinning for others. Less right, namely what is evil or at least has the appearance of evil, as when on a prohibited day one who has been dispensed eats meat before others. If an action in itself good or indifferent, which does not have the appearance of evil, is to another an occasion of sinning, the action is not the occasion of sin, but rather the evil disposition of the sinner, namely frailty or malice.
c. Furnishing to another an occasion, namely that by its presence, without exercising a positive influence upon his will, it furnishes to the neighbor an occasion of determining himself to sin: the sin itself is wholly from the will of another freely determining itself to the sinful act. Therefore of the nature of scandal it is that to the neighbor whose will is not yet determined to sin, by its existence, it furnishes an occasion of sinning.
d. Of spiritual ruin: for true scandal it is not required that the sin of the neighbor actually follow, but it is sufficient that from the action placed, the circumstances considered, it can follow and perhaps is foreseen as going to follow. But it makes no difference whether the neighbor is induced to the same sin or to a wholly different sin. A sin committed before others has the character of scandal if those before whom the sin is committed are foreseen to be drawn from it to sin, which otherwise they would not have committed; but it does not have the character of scandal if those before whom the sin is committed are either already determined to sin, or are so confirmed in probity that sin is not to be feared. One who by his example gives others an occasion of omitting a thing indeed good but not prescribed, for example prayer before or after table, likewise does not commit the sin of scandal, because he does not entice to sinning.
1 Summa, II-II, q. 43, a. 1.
103. Division of scandal. 1. Scandal is divided into active and passive; active is called the action which furnishes to the neighbor an occasion of sinning, and passive is called the very sin to be committed for which the occasion is furnished to the neighbor.
a. The definition placed at the beginning fits only active scandal. Passive scandal is customarily called occasioned sin.
b. Active and passive scandal are not always connected with each other; for active scandal can be had without passive scandal following, which was thought going to follow; and passive scandal can be had without active scandal preceding, which is clear from the definition of pharisaical scandal.
Active scandal is divided into direct and indirect, according as the sin of another is intended or not intended, but only foreseen; direct scandal is again divided into diabolical, when the sin of another is intended because it is an offense of God or the spiritual ruin of the neighbor, and simply direct, when the sin of the neighbor is intended on account of another end, for example because it brings utility or pleasure to the one scandalizing.
Passive scandal is twofold: given, when it arises from an action which by its nature can furnish the neighbor an occasion of sinning; taken, when the sin indeed arises on the occasion of another's action, which nevertheless furnishes an occasion of sinning not by its nature, but only because of the evil disposition of the one scandalized. But if this occurs only from ignorance or weakness of the one scandalized, it is called scandal of the little ones, as if a young man from the honorable adornment of a woman takes an occasion of sinning; but if it occurs from the mere malice of another, it is called pharisaical scandal, as if a father from the exercises of piety of his daughter takes an occasion of blaspheming.
Since this division is not taken in the same way by all, attention must be paid to the sense which individual authors put under these terms.
104. Malice of scandal. 1. Active scandal is a sin from its genus grave against the precept of charity. Therefore Christ the Lord says: He who shall scandalize one of these little ones who believe in Me, it is expedient for him, etc. Woe to that man through whom scandal comes.1 And indeed, if charity obliges us to correct the neighbor and to prevent him from falling, much more does it oblige us not to incite him to sin by bad example.
a. The sin of scandal will ordinarily be grave or light according as it furnishes an occasion of sinning gravely or lightly; therefore the gravity of scandal must ordinarily be taken from the gravity of the sin to which another is incited, not from the gravity of the action by which another is incited to sin. Wherefore it can happen that someone furnishes only light scandal through mortal sin, and conversely grave scandal through venial sin, indeed even through an act indifferent in itself. One who excels in dignity and esteem, for example, easily furnishes grave scandal, as if a priest keeps in his house a maid suspected by the people. Ordinarily, because passive scandal which arises almost from malice or excessive weakness must be excepted.
b. Therefore both parents and superiors, and also clerics, priests, and religious, ought carefully to guard themselves from any less right action: the former because children and subjects are always inclined to follow the bad examples of parents and superiors, the latter because they easily furnish occasion that in others the love of virtue and piety be diminished, that others judge and speak badly of clerics and religious, and that they despise religion and its exercises.
c. One who furnishes to a man very prone to committing grave sins only a light occasion of sinning mortally does not sin by grave scandal, because his grave sin arises more from his malice and bad custom than from the light occasion. Therefore children who know that parents from any light acts of disobedience take an occasion of gravely blaspheming and cursing do not sin gravely; nor do girls who by their vain levities furnish to young men an occasion of sinning gravely.2
- Direct scandal is a special sin also against that virtue to the injury of which the neighbor is incited: for every virtue prohibits both that we ourselves violate it and that we will it to be violated by others; but through indirect scandal one sins only against charity.
a. With regard to indirect scandal St. Alphonsus (n. 45) affirms that a twofold sin is committed, against charity and against that virtue which is injured by passive scandal; but others with de Lugo deny this, saying that in this case sin is indeed committed against charity, but not also against that virtue to the violation of which another is indirectly incited: for every virtue indeed demands that it not be violated and that another not be directly stirred up to violating it, but it does not demand that its violation be prevented, which belongs to charity.3 Therefore one who by his example induces others to stealing indeed sins against charity, but not against justice, provided he neither intended the sin of others nor used exhortation, counsel, or command.
b. Wherefore it is not necessary in confession to declare the species of the sin which another committed because of indirect scandal, but it is sufficient to say: I was to another (or to others) an occasion of sinning, or I was scandal to another (or to others) by bad example. But one who committed direct scandal does not satisfy in confession if he says that he gave scandal or incited another to sin, but he must also declare the species of sin to which he drew another.
c. Diabolical scandal furthermore has a special malice against charity of God.
1 Matt. 18:6-7. Cf. 1 Cor. 8:9 ff.
2 Berardi, Praxis confessariorum, Faenza: Novelli, 1898, I, n. 271 ff.; Genicot, I, n. 232.
3 Cf. Lugo, De poenitentia, disp. 16, n. 157 ff.
105. Principles concerning permission of passive scandal. 1. Although an action good or indifferent, which does not even have the appearance of evil, is not properly scandal given, nevertheless from charity we ought to omit it where it can be done without inconvenience, so that the sin of the neighbor may be prevented; yet from any cause, even not grave, it is licit to place it.
a. Therefore even scandal of the little ones must be avoided if it can easily be done. Pharisaical scandal ordinarily indeed is not to be cared for; nevertheless without any cause it is not licit to place an action because of which another, even from mere malice, is foreseen as going to sin, because charity demands that without any cause we not offer to the neighbor an occasion of sinning.
b. It must be noted that the scandal of others can be avoided by omitting the action, or by deferring it to another time, or by hiding it, and, if the action presents some appearance of evil, by admonishing the neighbor concerning the rectitude of the action (that, for example, an excusing cause or dispensation is present); but if, after admonition has been made, scandal nevertheless continues, that scandal must be judged pharisaical.
- That it is sometimes licit to place an action, although the sin of the neighbor is foreseen as going to follow from it, is established from the known principle: where from an action good or indifferent a twofold effect follows, one good (the advantage of the one scandalizing) and the other evil (the sin of the neighbor), the latter can be permitted from a just cause of necessity or utility.
106. Rules concerning the permission of scandal.1 In order that these principles be applied more safely, the following rules must be noted, in which, however, pharisaical scandal is not considered.
- Works prescribed by negative natural law, indeed also affirmative works in those circumstances in which the law truly urges, may never be omitted because of scandal.
The reason is that these can never be omitted without sin; therefore it is never licit to lie or perjure oneself to avoid scandal; nor is it licit to omit profession of faith where it is prescribed in order to prevent the sin of a tyrant, or the reception of baptism because of the scandal of parents.
- Works prescribed by positive law, whether divine or human, can be omitted because of scandal, but they ought not to be omitted except perhaps once or twice.
a. The reason for the first is that, when two precepts concur which cannot both be observed at the same time, the natural precept of avoiding scandal prevails. Hence a parish priest can celebrate on a feast day when not fasting in order to avoid the scandal of the people, which cannot otherwise be avoided.
b. With regard to the second it must be noted: once or twice, that is, if the danger of scandal is foreseen as soon going to be removed, most authors affirm that these precepts must be omitted, because the natural precept is to be preferred to the positive, and because the omission does not bring great inconvenience. But all deny that this must be done rather often or for a long time, because this would be too grave. Therefore they say that a virgin who knows that a young man is scandalized by the sight of her ought, once or twice, to remain at home omitting Mass; and in like manner a wife ought to omit Mass or fasting if she knows that her husband takes an occasion of blaspheming from the observance of the precepts. But certainly they are not bound to omit these precepts for a long time, because this would be too burdensome for them. But since the opinion obliging them for a brief time is not certain, practically they cannot be obliged to omit a prescribed thing.
c. It must be noted that this alone holds if someone knows that a determinate person takes scandal from his action; for from fear lest the action be a scandal to some indeterminate person, it ought not to be omitted, because the obligation of preventing even this danger would be too grave and troublesome.
- Works not prescribed, whether good or indifferent, we are bound to omit in order to avoid scandal, if it can be done without grave inconvenience; but with grave inconvenience we are not bound.
Therefore if a woman knew that she was an occasion of sinning to a determinate man, she would be bound to flee his sight if she easily could, for example by walking by another road, by not approaching the window; but she would not be bound to do this for a long time, because it would be too hard for her to be deprived of her liberty for a long time. She is not bound to abstain from a public walk in order to prevent scandal, because it is judged too burdensome.
- Temporal goods must be given up in order to avoid scandal if they are of lighter moment; but if they are of greater moment, they need not necessarily be given up. The reason is that the spiritual good of others not only can be preferred to one's own temporal good, but where it can easily be done, it must also be preferred; but charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience.
Hence no one is bound to pay more to a worker whom he foresees will blaspheme: for this inconvenience, although light in itself, nevertheless becomes grave because it can occur often, and because impious men would thereby become more audacious. Parish priests are not bound, indeed cannot omit, those things which are necessary for preserving ecclesiastical goods, for example lawsuits and exactions of stole fees, in order to avoid scandals arising from them; but they are bound to prevent scandal by suitable admonition, for example by explaining the reason for the exaction.
1 Cf. Reuter, Theologia moralis, II, tr. 1, n. 137; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 635.