Article — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Article I. On Scandal
I. Notion. Scandal is a work which gives one's neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin, and is placed without sufficient cause. It is said:
A work (or omission of a work), whether evil, as drunkenness; or bearing before itself the appearance of evil, as if, having been dispensed, you eat meat on a day of abstinence before those who are ignorant of the dispensation; or altogether right, as if you pray before impious persons who for that reason are about to break forth into blasphemies.1
Which gives occasion. Hence it is not required that the work influence the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor in the manner of a cause; but it suffices that someone without sufficient cause place or omit an act, from which, once placed or omitted, the neighbor will take an occasion of sinning.
Of spiritual ruin, that is, of formal sin. And so it is not enough that the work placed gives an occasion only of material sin, of just indignation, of astonishment, or even of defamation of the one scandalizing; yet these often bring sins with them, for example of unjust anger, detraction, calumny, etc. Nor is scandal properly so called had - although one can sin against charity - when someone draws his neighbor back from a more perfect act or from a good not prescribed.
And is placed without sufficient cause; this must be added because for a proportionate cause it is lawful to place a work which will give an occasion of the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor: in which case the work placed is not called scandal; these things will be explained more fully in n. 550.
1 Cf. Waffelaert, Dissertations morales, 1st series, L'espece morale du scandale.
II. Division. Scandal is distinguished:1
By reason of intention, into direct and indirect, according as the sin of one's neighbor is intended or (without sufficient cause) merely permitted. Direct scandal is subdivided into diabolical and simply intended, according as the sin of one's neighbor is intended formally as sin - or insofar as it is the evil of one's neighbor or an offense of God - or under another aspect, that is, insofar as it serves the advantage or pleasure of the one scandalizing.
By reason of efficacy, into causal and occasional. It is causal when the one scandalizing (morally) causes the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor, for example by persuading, by commanding sin. It is occasional when the one scandalizing merely gives the neighbor an opportunity of sinning; this can happen both by a positive act, as by blaspheming, and by omission of an act, as by neglecting the precepts of the Church (n. 551).
It is disputed whether example should be reckoned with causal or occasional scandal. Now example of itself is not a (moral) cause of the sin of one's neighbor, because of itself it does not involve the character of counsel (St. Alphonsus, II, 44, 40); by accident, namely with the circumstances considered, it can take on a character of this kind; as if you know that others are waiting to see what you are going to do, with the intention that they may follow your example.
Note. A work which gives an occasion of the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor is customarily called active scandal; but the spiritual ruin itself, or the sin of the neighbor, is passive scandal. The latter is called scandal of the weak, if it follows from active scandal on account of the ignorance or frailty of the neighbor; if it follows on account of mere malice, it is called pharisaical.
1 Some distinguish scandal otherwise, or at least take the distinct species in a different sense. Other divisions seem superfluous and to entangle the matter uselessly.
III. Morality; concerning this, the quality and quantity, or gravity, of the malice which is present in scandal must be explained.
- The quality of the malice. a) Every scandal, that is, both causal and occasional, is opposed to charity. For charity forbids that I become for my neighbor the cause or (without sufficient reason) the occasion of evil, a fortiori of such an evil as spiritual ruin is (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 43, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, II, 45).
b) Scandal besides is opposed to the virtue for the violation of which it gives an occasion, as follows:
a) This must be affirmed of causal scandal; for it is clear that he who (morally) causes another's evil act is guilty of the malice of the act.
b) The same seems, against many, to have to be said of occasional scandal; for one who cooperates in an evil act, in whatever way this happens, seems of himself guilty of the malice in which he cooperates. But occasional scandal involves some cooperation in another's evil act, insofar, namely, as it gives an occasion to it (St. Alphonsus, II, 45). If the intention of seducing another is added, all affirm it.
c) The sin of occasional scandal, opposed to the virtue violated by one's neighbor, seems to differ in species from the sin of the neighbor himself. For it is one thing to violate a virtue indirectly, another directly; but occasional scandal is indirectly opposed to the obligation of the virtue, while the sin of the neighbor is directly opposed to it. Yet they are of the same higher species or of the same genus. But causal scandal does not differ in species from the sin of the neighbor, because both are directly opposed to the obligation of the virtue.
Note. Although he is guilty of injustice who is only an occasion - not a cause - for another of stealing, nevertheless he is not bound to restitution, because an onerous obligation, such as restitution is, does not arise except from the fact that I have been the cause of injustice, or at least, as many admit, have given the occasion with that intention that another inflict harm on one's neighbor; these things will be explained more fully in the treatise on justice.
- The gravity of the malice. a) Scandal, insofar as it is opposed to charity, is a grave sin from its genus. This is clear from Sacred Scripture: "Woe to that man through whom scandal comes."1 Likewise from what has been said about the violation of charity in general (n. 282). It is only a light sin: 1. if the act placed influences the sin of one's neighbor only lightly; 2. if an occasion of light sin is given; and this holds even if the light ruin of the neighbor is intended (St. Alphonsus, II, 44, 20). Yet if the light sin is intended precisely as an offense of God, there is an affection toward God that is gravely evil.
b) Scandal, insofar as it is opposed to the virtue for the violation of which it gives an occasion, is generally grave or light according as the act of the one scandalized is gravely or lightly evil. I have said generally, because a light influence of itself involves only a light sin.
Corollary I. An act can contain light or no malice from its nature and grave malice by reason of scandal; as if a priest were to walk about manifestly half-drunk. Likewise an act grave in itself can contain only a light malice of scandal, as if someone were to sin before those who are moved only lightly thereby.
Corollary II. He seems guilty of grave scandal who gives an occasion of grave sin: 1. to him who is already actually prepared for such a sin, as if someone consents to one seducing him;2 2. to him who is habitually prepared for such a sin or for any sin of the same species, as if someone seeks intercourse from a prostitute or divination from a diviner. The reason is that he gives an occasion for an increase of grave malice, which seems grave; namely, "through the external work something of malice is added; because then the malice of the will itself is increased. For which reason, although, speaking speculatively, the opinion of the Thomists is more probable, in practice we nevertheless say that, from things commonly occurring, the malice of the will is always increased through the external act, on account of its greater complacency, effort, duration, etc." (St. Alphonsus, II, 47). There is added, with respect to him who is habitually prepared to sin, that here and now he again sins actually and commits another sin numerically. Thus St. Alphonsus and others, against others who judge that in the cases posited the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor is not notably increased.
Corollary III. One who induces his neighbor to sin is not bound to confess the circumstance of induction, since it is only an aggravating circumstance within the same species; in other words, both the one inducing and - according to what has been said under Corollary II - more probably even the one consenting are guilty of grave scandal; yet the scandal of the one inducing is graver (St. Alphonsus, II, 46).
1 Matthew 18:7.
2 The sin of the one consenting is rather referred to cooperation (n. 545).
IV. Causes excusing from scandal, or rather causes for giving occasion to passive scandal, that is, to the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor.
- An occasion cannot be given to passive scandal without cause; but it can be given for a proportionate cause. It is said:
a) An occasion cannot be given to passive scandal without cause. For charity of itself requires that I hinder my neighbor's evil, much less does it permit that I give him an occasion of it.
b) But it can be given for a proportionate cause, because charity does not oblige with a proportionate inconvenience. Now a graver cause is required:
The more the action has the appearance of evil; likewise it is more easily lawful to place an act altogether right than one which is evil in appearance or in reality.
The graver the sin is which will follow.
The more certainly it will follow.
The more numerous those are who will suffer scandal (St. Alphonsus, II, 49).
If the act to be placed has only the appearance of evil, or gives an occasion of sin on account of the neighbor's ignorance alone, the appearance of evil or the ignorance, if it can conveniently be done, should be removed, for example by admonishing the neighbor about the lawfulness of the act. If afterwards he is nevertheless scandalized, the scandal for the most part can be regarded as pharisaical.
- Sometimes an occasion must be given to passive scandal, namely if someone, in order to avoid scandal, would have to omit what is necessary by necessity of means, or do what is intrinsically evil, or omit what, all things considered, urges more gravely (St. Alphonsus, II, 51).
V. General resolutions. 1. Works prescribed by positive law must not be omitted or deferred on account of pharisaical scandal.
On account of scandal of the weak there certainly is no obligation if someone or some persons are foreseen only in confusion as going to suffer scandal. If a determinate person is foreseen as going to be scandalized, likewise the obligation is lacking if, in order that scandal be prevented, the precept would have to be neglected frequently, or if in a particular case a special reason occurs for fulfilling the precept. If the precept would neither have to be neglected more frequently, nor would a special reason for fulfilling it here and now be present, the matter is disputed; but St. Alphonsus holds as sufficiently probable that not even then is there an obligation, although in that case neglect of the precept is advised (II, 51). Yet if the precept, for example the hearing of Mass, can equally conveniently be deferred or fulfilled elsewhere, this - namely the deferral of hearing Mass or the hearing of Mass elsewhere - must be done, but only under light obligation, if there is question of pharisaical scandal.
- Works of mere counsel must not be omitted on account of pharisaical scandal; more easily, but under light obligation only, they should sometimes be deferred.
On account of scandal of the weak there is not - as we have said about precepts - an obligation of omitting or deferring them, if the scandal is foreseen only in confusion; if the scandal of a determinate person is foreseen, likewise there is no obligation if, for preventing scandal, the counsel would have to be neglected or deferred more frequently, or if a special reason for fulfilling the counsel here and now, for example for receiving Communion, were at hand. Outside these cases there is an obligation (St. Alphonsus, II, 50).
Indifferent works which do not contain the appearance of evil, of themselves must be omitted or deferred somewhat more often than good works, if however there is question of the scandal of a determinate person. Some apply almost the same to acts only venially evil, for example to women's adornment that is not notably dishonorable; but such things by reason of scandal must of themselves simply be omitted under light obligation: moreover those who would introduce such a custom would easily sin gravely (n. 550).
Temporal goods must not be given up on account of pharisaical scandal (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 43, a. 8; St. Alphonsus, II, 52). Hence someone is not bound to pay more than is fair to a workman who is going to blaspheme; nor should a parish priest remit stole fees on account of detractions that will follow.
For avoiding scandal of the weak, likewise there is no obligation of undergoing a grave loss of goods; the opposite must be said of a light loss (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).
VI. Particular resolutions. The following are guilty of grave scandal:
Those who have a custom of blaspheming.
Those who speak very filthy things, especially if this happens before younger persons or persons of a different sex. A milder judgment must be made about immodest jokes among married persons and ruder persons (St. Alphonsus, III, 426).
Those who compose, print, circulate, or sing truly filthy songs.
Those who compose, print, etc., notably filthy or impious plays; likewise actors and actresses and others who cooperate in such plays (St. Alphonsus, III, 428); likewise dancers of scenic dances in which, on account of the dancers' dress, obscene manners of dancing, or lascivious gestures, the greatest turpitude appears.
Those who sculpt, paint, or represent by photograph very filthy statues or images; likewise those who represent obscene things by the help of a lifelike instrument, such as a stereoscope, cinematograph, or bioscope; likewise those who expose things of this kind in gardens, a workshop, a house, to the sight of all (St. Alphonsus, II, 56; Hom. Ap., tr. 4, n. 8); likewise makers and sellers of women's clothing or adornment who publicly expose models adorned in such a way that they are gravely offensive.
Those who compose, publish, print, circulate books, newspapers, or other writings notably opposed to religion or good morals; likewise booksellers, or any others, who sell books or newspapers of this kind to anyone, or procure them to be read, and thus spread the poison of souls; likewise those who in libraries erected for lending books expose poisonous works for the use of all; likewise those who introduce into schools a pernicious method of teaching or dangerous little books; likewise those who hand over to children books which, although not evil in themselves, treat of matter whose knowledge for them, on account of their natural innocence and sensitivity, is thought to be gravely offensive.1
Husbands who retain at home a maidservant suspected by the wife not without reason; likewise wives who, by admitting their pretty lovers to familiar conversations, are an offense to their husbands and to others, as experience teaches; likewise clerics who, by visiting or not dismissing a person suspected by the people, give an occasion of sins of detraction, calumny, and contempt of the clerical state, at least if the suspicion of the people is founded on the morals of the person retained or on known excessive familiarity.2
Parents and other superiors who blaspheme before their children or commit other grave sins, or neglect grave duties of a Christian person; likewise those who, without grave cause and without precautions having been applied, send them to dangerous schools or permit them other occasions and dangers, such as solitary conversations with lovers and betrothed persons.
Daughters and maidservants of tavern-keepers who behave rather loosely before everyone, commonly permitting kisses and embraces.
Women and girls who use truly dishonorable dress. But this - since indeed the question is very current - let us explain more fully. Now:
a) Dress, with our matter considered, can be distinguished as threefold: honorable, indecent, and dishonorable or lascivious.
Honorable dress is that which, with the circumstances of places considered, in no way or scarcely excites to lust; as if nothing or only a small part of the breast is bared, and the garments are lowered at least below the knees.
Indecent dress is that which, with the circumstances of places considered, lightly or moderately excites to lust; as if the whole upper part of the breast, or a notable part of it, is bared, or the garments reach only to the knees.
Dishonorable dress is that which, with the circumstances of places considered, gravely provokes to lust; as if the breasts are wholly or partly bared, or are covered only with a transparent covering, or the garments do not even reach to the knees,3 or are fitted to the body in such a way that almost the entire form of the body is displayed.
b) Not only those who use dishonorable dress, but also those who introduce indecent dress, are guilty of grave scandal, if from a custom of this kind introduced the spiritual ruin of many is imminent.
c) Women, in church or outside church, while they assist at sacred rites, should be with the head covered and modestly dressed, especially when they approach the Lord's table (can. 1262, § 2); these things should be extended to Catholic gatherings, whether religious or social.
d) Dress not only dishonorable, but even indecent, must be earnestly restrained and uprooted by preachers and confessors, as far as this can be done. This also holds with respect to boys and girls, who thus lose natural modesty; and this must be urged all the more because indecent and dishonorable dress is today promoted by deliberate effort.
Corollary I. It is lawful for women and girls, provided propriety or honorableness is preserved, to dress themselves and adorn themselves in an elegant manner, whether so that they may please their husband more, or, if there is question of girls of marriageable age, so that they may arrive at an honorable marriage, or so that they may present themselves fittingly according to their condition. If they act thus from vanity, they sin lightly; if with that intention that they provoke men or young men to lust, they sin gravely (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, II, 54, 55; III, 425).
Corollary II. If someone uses the clothing of the other sex, "of itself it is not a grave sin... and sometimes none, if a just cause is present, for example for hiding oneself. But it could be grave from the circumstances of danger of lust or scandal" (St. Alphonsus, II, 52; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 2, ad 3). These things you may also apply to the use of masks.
- Finally, those introducing a manner of acting, for example women's adornment, as has already been noted, or amusements, which although they are not truly dishonorable, are nevertheless going to become for many an occasion of grave sins, are guilty of grave scandal (St. Alphonsus, II, 55).
1 Konings, Theol. Mor., n. 295.
2 Konings, loc. cit.
3 I do not speak of girls of lesser age, although this custom too cannot be approved.
VII. Special resolutions. 1. It is lawful for a just cause and for a good end deliberately to permit or not remove, indeed even by an indifferent act deliberately to place, an occasion of sinning; since it is right for a just cause to permit an evil effect (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 62, a. 3, ad 4; St. Alphonsus, II, 58). Hence, for example, "it is lawful for a master not to remove from sons or servants an occasion of stealing, when nevertheless he knows them to be inclined and prepared to steal, so that, having thus been detected, they may be punished and come to their senses" (St. Alphonsus, II, 58). Yet it is not lawful to intend the sin of one's neighbor; hence it is illicit to give an occasion of sinning for this sole or primary end, that the delinquent be punished; it is lawful for this end, that the one punished be amended, or that a test of the subject's probity be taken, for example by exposing money or leaving a key in a chest.
It is lawful, on account of a cause of necessity or notable utility, to seek something from someone who can provide it without sin, although it is foreseen that he will provide it with sin, for example a loan from a usurer, an oath from one about to swear falsely (if you suppose that a private person can have a grave cause for seeking it), a sacrament from a sinful priest. The reason is that in the hypothesis posited, the sin follows upon your petition for a lawful thing from the malice of the neighbor alone, so that it is not caused by you, but only an occasion is given to him; this is right to do for a proportionate cause. Now this is more easily lawful the more either the other is prepared for such a sin, or you have a right to the work sought (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 78, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, II, 47, 49, 77, 79, 80). If someone is prepared for any such sin whatsoever, according to many any reasonable cause suffices that I seek from another an action which he can provide without sin, although he is not going to provide it without sin. But since in this case there seems to be question of grave scandal (n. 548), the aforesaid opinion seems to have to be rejected (St. Alphonsus, II, 47).
It is more probable that it is lawful to persuade one determined to a graver sin to a lesser evil, or that he commit a lesser rather than a greater sin; for example, that he merely mutilate someone rather than kill him, steal less rather than more, steal from a rich man rather than from a poor man. And this holds even if the lesser evil is not a sin of the same genus, and is included in the greater neither formally nor virtually. Hence it is lawful, for example, to persuade someone determined to homicide that he rather commit adultery. The reason is that in this case, strictly speaking, not evil but the lessening of evil - which is good - is being advised (St. Alphonsus, II, 57).
Yet it is disputed whether it is lawful to persuade someone that he violate the strict right of a determinate third party, rather than commit another graver sin; for example, that he steal rather from Peter the rich man than from another poor man, that he rather violate the maidservant than the wife of Paul, etc. Now with St. Alphonsus (III, 565) and others,1 it seems this must be denied. For it is not lawful for me to violate the right of one person in order to avert harm from another. But he who persuades someone to violate the right of a third party, himself also violates the right of the third party. Make an exception with St. Alphonsus (loc. cit.) if the former would be cast by the loss into extreme necessity: in which case, by persuading someone that he steal rather, for example, from Peter the rich man, I would not violate this man's right.
It is asked whether it ought to be clear from words or circumstances that the lesser evil is being advised as lesser, or as impeding the greater. It seems this must be affirmed, because otherwise the persuader, although he intends the lessening of evil, nevertheless in reality advises, not that the other lessen the sin, but that he sin.
1 Lugo, De iust., disp. 19, n. 54; Sanchez, De Matr., l. 7, disp. 11, n. 24 sq.; Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., n. 799; Sweens, Inst. theol. de virt. card. iust., n. 325.
VIII. Reparation of scandal. 1. There is an obligation of repairing scandal, or: 1. of destroying the further influence of the scandal given, if this is feared; 2. of procuring the amendment of the one scandalized. This obligation indeed is greater in the one scandalizing, that is, in the author of the harm, than in others who have not given an occasion of spiritual ruin.
The obligation of repairing scandal is an obligation of charity if someone by example alone or persuasion gave an occasion of sin; if he did this by fear or fraud, an obligation of justice is added (St. Alphonsus, III, 662).
The mode by which scandal can and must be repaired will depend on the character of the scandal given, on the mode in which it was given, whether publicly or privately, and finally on the qualities of the one scandalizing and the one scandalized. Moreover, scandal given publicly must be repaired publicly. Hence:
a) One who gave scandal to others through wicked counsels still effective must, as far as he can, render them ineffective by diligent revocation, to be made known to the same persons either by himself or through another.
b) A father of a family who scandalized the household is ordinarily bound, in order to repair the scandal, if it is still judged effective, to manifest to the same household his displeasure over his evil example, and to exhort them paternally not to follow it in the future.
c) One who by false doctrine seduced others in matters of faith or morals is bound to revoke the error, even if the one seduced did not sin formally; because he still inflicted a grave injury, to which great harm is not rarely attached.
d) An evil author who has corrupted many by heretical, impious, or obscene books is bound by a public writing and other opportune means, insofar as he morally can, to retract his depraved writings and to impede their further diffusion.
e) A public concubinarian, after first abandoning his filthy commerce, should publicly approach the sacraments.
f) Ordinary scandals for the most part are sufficiently removed by that general reparation which is contained in the very cessation from scandal, in the offering of good example, in prayer for the one scandalized, and similar things.2
1 Aertnys-Damen, Theol. Mor., I, n. 344.
2 Konings, Theol. Mor., n. 301.