§ 1. On scandal

605. Notion. Scandal, derived from the Greek word skandalon, signifies according to etymology any obstacle at which someone strikes his foot, totters, or falls. Scandal is one thing active, of which we treat directly here and which consists in an occasion of the ruin of neighbor being given; another thing passive, which is the ruin itself or the very sin of neighbor caused from such an occasion. Active scandal (anstossige Handlung) is defined by St. Thomas:¹⁰⁶ "a saying or deed less right, furnishing to another an occasion of ruin" (spiritual).

It is said 1: a saying or deed, by which words there is comprehended also the omission of a due saying or deed, which furnishes to another an occasion of ruin.

It is said 2: less right, i.e. either evil in itself, or having the appearance of evil; for no one takes an occasion of sinning from a work which either is good in itself or at least appears good. In pharisaic scandal and in the scandal of the little ones (concerning which below), the work from which it arises is indeed good in itself, but appears evil from the malice or from the imperfection of him who takes scandal.

It is said 3: furnishing to another an occasion of ruin, i.e. scandal is apt for inducing another to moral evil. Certainly nothing can sufficiently and necessarily induce man to evil, since man always remains free; but scandal entices him (although not always efficaciously) to sinning.

¹⁰⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 1.

606. Divisions. Scandal is divided in many ways. Besides the division into active and passive scandal, of which mention has already been made, the following subdivisions are to be noted:

1. Active scandal is subdivided into direct scandal and indirect scandal. The former is had if the intention of the agent is borne toward the sin of another, e.g. by command, counsel, seduction, etc. The latter is had when the sin of another is not indeed intended, but is foreseen, and notwithstanding the foresight, the act which furnishes the cause of another's sin is not omitted; e.g. if someone publicly commits a sin, foreseeing that others will thereby be induced to some evil. Therefore indirect scandal is like an indirectly voluntary evil or even like the voluntary in a qualified sense, concerning which see above n. 53 sq.

Direct scandal is again subdivided into direct formal or diabolical scandal and into direct scandal simply. The former is when someone from hatred of God or neighbor by his action principally intends the perversion of neighbor. It is deservedly called diabolical, because such a man truly acts like the devil, "who as a roaring lion goes about, seeking whom he may devour."¹⁰⁷ The latter is when a man by his action does not indeed directly intend the formal sin of another, but something else with which sin is joined, e.g. his own pleasure, vengeance, etc. But since he cannot attain that end without the sin of another, he also indirectly intends this sin.¹⁰⁸

2. Passive scandal is subdivided into scandal given and into scandal accepted or taken. The former is that which is produced from the truly evil action of another, e.g. a girl is seduced from wanton speeches which someone publicly utters. The latter is that which does not arise from the evil action of another, but from an action right and good in itself, which nevertheless is taken by another, either from ignorance and weakness or from malice, as an occasion of sinning. If passive scandal arises from ignorance or imperfection, it is called scandal of the little ones, e.g. if someone should take scandal on seeing a priest on a two-wheeled machine (commonly Velociped), thinking this to be prohibited to priests of itself. But if passive scandal is taken from malice, it is called pharisaic, because the Pharisees, seeing the best works of Christ and His miracles, nevertheless were scandalized from their own malice and ill will.

From the explanations given it follows that sometimes active and passive scandal are simultaneous, e.g. if someone commits sin precisely because another has given a true occasion. In this case there is had on one side active scandal and on the other side passive scandal given. But sometimes there is active scandal on one side, namely, when someone does a work inductive to the sin of another; but on the other side there is no passive scandal, because that man strongly resists the temptation arising. Finally, sometimes there is passive scandal without active scandal, namely, if someone from his own weakness or malice takes an occasion of sinning on account of a truly good work apprehended. In this case passive scandal accepted is had.¹⁰⁹

In order that the divisions of scandal may more easily be furnished at one glance, we place the following schema:

1. active
   direct (per se)
      formally direct or diabolical
      materially or simply direct
   indirect (per accidens)

2. passive
   given
   accepted
      of the little ones
      pharisaic

Malice of scandal.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. 1 Petr. 5, 8.

¹⁰⁸ This is the common division of scandal given by moderns, e.g. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I 628; Noldin, De praec. n. 103; Gopfert, Schindler. Another is the division given by St. Thomas (S. theol. l. c. a. 1 ad 4), namely, active scandal is subdivided into scandal per se and scandal per accidens. Scandal per se is present "when someone by his evil word or deed intends to induce another to sin, or even if he does not intend this, the deed itself is such that of its own nature it has that it is inductive to sinning." If the agent intends the sin of neighbor precisely as it is sin (namely, led by hatred of God or neighbor), it is called diabolical scandal; but if he intends only the action of another, with which sin is necessarily connected, it is scandal simply direct. To this scandal per se there corresponds, in him who falls into sin on account of scandal, scandal given. - Scandal per accidens is a word or deed which, beyond the intention of the one operating and beyond the condition of the work itself, is an occasion of sin for another on account of his weakness or malice. Passive scandal arising from scandal per accidens is either pharisaic or of the little ones.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 1 ad 4.

607. Principle 1. Direct scandal is a mortal sin from its genus, and indeed both against charity and against that virtue to the violation of which neighbor is induced.

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture. Christ says: "But he who shall scandalize one of these little ones who believe in Me, it is expedient for him that an ass's millstone be hung on his neck, and that he be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals! For it is necessary that scandals come; nevertheless, woe to that man through whom scandal comes."¹¹⁰ From these entirely grave words it is manifestly established that scandal from its genus is a mortal sin.

Proof 2. Scandal is against charity, which gravely prohibits injuring the spiritual good of neighbor. Hence St. Thomas teaches: "Active scandal is always sin in him who scandalizes: because either the very work which he does is sin; or even if it has the appearance of sin, it is always to be laid aside on account of charity toward neighbor, by which each one is bound to provide for the salvation of neighbor; and thus he who does not lay it aside acts against charity."¹¹¹ But since all sins which are directly against charity are mortal sins from their genus, hence the sin of direct scandal is mortal from its genus. - Not only charity, however, but also that virtue is injured which the scandalizing person or the scandalized person violates. Hence active direct scandal commonly includes three sins; e.g. he who acts immodestly before a girl in order to seduce her commits three grave sins, namely, a double sin against chastity (namely his own sin and the girl's sin, which is also imputed to him), and a sin against charity, insofar as he harms the girl.¹¹² - Direct scandal, although from its genus it is a mortal sin, nevertheless can become a venial sin; and indeed not only from imperfection of the act, insofar as the one scandalizing acted with half-full advertence or imperfect consent, but also from smallness of matter.

The gravity of scandal depends on many circumstances. It is always a mortal sin if the one scandalizing by his action, which perhaps from its object is not gravely sinful, intends the grave sin of neighbor. For such a depraved intention gravely injures charity, although perhaps the neighbor in reality did not consent to the seduction furnished to him.

The following general rules can be had for judging the gravity of scandal:

The guilt of scandal is the graver, according as a) the sin of neighbor is more willed; b) the action more influences the sin of neighbor; c) the sin committed by neighbor is graver.

The guilt of scandal is the lighter, according as a) the defect of sufficient deliberation is greater; b) the action itself influences neighbor more lightly; c) the sinful matter to which neighbor is induced is lighter, e.g. if someone is induced to a small officious lie.

Note. The malice of scandal becomes greater if the scandalized neighbor truly falls into sin. But even if the one scandalizing (directly) foresees that his solicitation will probably be fruitless, nevertheless he commits the sin of scandal. Wherefore prostitutes soliciting men to sin cause scandal as often as they solicit, although often they foresee that they themselves will suffer rejection.

¹¹⁰ Matth. 18, 6 sq.

¹¹¹ S. theol. l. c. a. 4.

¹¹² Cf. nevertheless below n. 611 concerning a girl freely consenting to fornication.

608. Principle 2. Indirect scandal is indeed a sin against charity, but not against that virtue which is injured by the scandalized person.

Thus St. Thomas and very many of his Commentators,¹¹³ such as Cajetan, Banez, Ioannes a S. Thoma.¹¹⁴ The same opinion is held by several modern authors, such as Ballerini,¹¹⁵ Lehmkuhl,¹¹⁶ Noldin.¹¹⁷ The mind of St. Thomas, concerning which authors dispute much, nevertheless seems to be sufficiently clear; for the Angelic Doctor writes: "Active scandal can be taken in two ways: namely per se and per accidens; per accidens indeed, when it is beyond the intention of the agent; as when someone by his deed or disordered word does not intend to give to another an occasion of ruin, but only to satisfy his own will: and thus also active scandal is not a special sin; because that which is per accidens does not constitute a species."¹¹⁸ - St. Alphonsus holds the opposite opinion, saying: "He who directly or indirectly induces neighbor to sin, sins in two ways, namely, both against charity and against the virtue to the violation of which he induces neighbor."¹¹⁹ The holy Doctor cites for this opinion of his many authors, some of whom nevertheless are not rightly alleged. - The first opinion seems to be better, because in indirect scandal there is not properly a willing and approval of another's sin, but rather its permission, which is not necessarily imputed to the one giving indirect scandal. Besides, in practice there is not such great difference between the two opinions, as Concina himself,¹²⁰ patron of the second opinion, admits. - The following things are to be attended to in practice:

¹¹³ On S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 1-4.

¹¹⁴ On 1, 2, q. 18, disp. 10, a. 1.

¹¹⁵ In notes to Gury, Comp. Theol. mor. I, n. 236.

¹¹⁶ Theol. mor. I 789.

¹¹⁷ De praecept. n. 104.

¹¹⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 3. The same Angelic Doctor teaches the same still more explicitly, 4, dist. 38, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 2. The mind of St. Thomas is explained excellently by Cajetan in the Commentaries on S. theol. l. c. a. 1.

¹¹⁹ Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 45. - G. J. Waffelaert discusses this controversy at great length and breadth in "L'espece morale du scandale." His general conclusion is: "1. Every scandal contains a species against charity. 2. Indirect scandal is not, generally speaking, a sin of the same nature as that to which it gives occasion" (p. 145).

¹²⁰ Lib. 1 in Decal., diss. de scand. c. 2.

609. Resolves: 1. He who without sufficient cause gives indirect scandal through an action good or indifferent in itself sins against charity only. Hence scandal of the little ones or pharisaic scandal foreseen and culpably not impeded is a sin against charity in him who was the voluntary occasion of those scandals. Wherefore, e.g., a priest legitimately dispensed from the law of fasting and eating meat before laymen, foreseeing that they will be scandalized and perhaps by his example be induced to eating meat on forbidden days, indeed sins against charity, but not against temperance. In confession he is bound to say: Legitimately dispensed, I ate meat before laymen, foreseeing that they would take scandal from it, and I neither warned them concerning my dispensation nor had any sufficient reason for so acting.

2. He who gives indirect scandal through an evil action performed before others commits a double sin to be declared in confession, namely, one through the evil action considered in itself, the other through injury to charity, because he was an occasion of spiritual harm for neighbor; but he does not sin against the virtue which neighbor perhaps violated on account of indirect scandal. Hence, e.g., he who committed theft before others, foreseeing, but in no way intending, that a neighbor, having seen this evil example, would also commit theft, indeed sinned against charity by publicly perpetrating theft, and he is bound to declare this in confession, but he did not sin against justice from the fact that the neighbor also committed theft; and a fortiori he is not bound to restitution on account of the theft committed by neighbor.

Or St. Alphonsus himself¹²¹ and several other authors, thinking that in this case there is a double sin against justice, do not oblige him who gave indirect scandal to restitution. But other favorers of the second opinion, speaking more logically, oblige to restitution in this case. Therefore Billuart,¹²² a favorer of the second opinion, says: "If [someone] by his example efficaciously moves another to damage, he sins equally against justice with respect to the one damaged, as if he moved him by counsel or persuasion." But he who efficaciously counsels unjust damage, beyond all doubt, is bound to restitution. And in truth, as will be taught below in the treatise on unjust damage, with all theologians agreeing, an unjust damager is bound to restitution if his action was truly, formally, and efficaciously unjust. But according to the second opinion the action of him who by his example causes the damage of another is truly, formally, and efficaciously unjust. Hence logically it would have to be inferred that from such indirect scandal there arises an obligation of restitution. This, however, very few authors teach and require in practice. Hence the first opinion, also on account of this reason, namely, because it proceeds more logically, is to be preferred in theory and besides is safe in practice.

3. He who culpably gives indirect scandal before many probably commits as many sins against charity as there are persons truly scandalized. The reason is that charity is injured toward each scandalized person, inasmuch as each scandalized person is a total object. Hence, e.g., he who has uttered filthy words before twenty persons gathered together ought (insofar as he morally can) to declare in confession the number of persons scandalized. But since in practice it is often impossible to indicate the exact number of persons scandalized, and since indirect scandal frequently is not a mortal sin, whether on account of smallness of matter or on account of imperfection of the act, it is often enough to declare in confession in a general way that such a sin was committed before many. - According to the first opinion reviewed above in Principle 2, it is not necessary to confess the special condition of the persons scandalized through indirect scandal. Hence, e.g., it is not necessary to confess that filthy words were uttered before a nun, or a blood relative, or a married person. But sometimes the condition of the one scandalizing is to be explained, as if a superior, father of a family, parish priest, etc. scandalized subjects, because these are bound not only from charity but from office to guard against the ruin of their subjects.¹²³

4. An action gravely sinful from its nature, perpetrated before others, is not scandal if it exercises no causality at all upon the neighbor seeing or hearing; e.g. if those before whom such an evil action is committed are so stable in good that they are in no way moved; or conversely, if they are imbued with such lost morals that they are no longer induced to sin from the evil action of another, but have been accustomed to sin from their own malice or passion.¹²⁴ Thus in theory; but in practice the circumstance that a gravely sinful action was done before others is generally to be accused, because this circumstance not only aggravates the sinful action, but also often produces true scandal, since it is almost impossible to establish whether an action of this kind exercised absolutely no harmful causality upon neighbor or not. Hence, e.g., he who would commit fornication, others even of the most lost morals being present, would have to confess this circumstance of the sin committed. For it is almost impossible that so great a foulness seen should move nothing toward lust. Authors commonly teach that it is a true sin of scandal if someone directly induces another to a thing evil in itself, even if that other had already before been prepared for sin. The reason is that a new actual ruin is caused to the other. Wherefore that man acted illicitly who, doubting whether a woman living in his house was a prostitute, disguised, sought fornication from her in order to expel the doubt. When the woman immediately consented to sin, she was cast out by the man.¹²⁵

¹²¹ L. c.

¹²² De carit. diss. 7, a. 6, § 3.

¹²³ Cf. Billuart, De carit. diss. 7, a. 6, § 3.

¹²⁴ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 45.

¹²⁵ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 47.

610. Obligation of avoiding scandal.

1. Pharisaic scandal is not necessarily to be avoided if there is some reasonable cause for acting.

The reason is that such scandal arises from the malice alone of him who takes scandal. This indeed is confirmed by the example of Christ, who answered the disciples saying: "Do you know that the Pharisees, having heard this word [concerning foods], have been scandalized? - Let them alone; they are blind and leaders of the blind."¹²⁶ Sometimes, however, charity requires that even this scandal be avoided; e.g. a cleric is bound from charity, if he easily can, not to pass through a street where wicked men, seeing him, would break forth into blasphemies against religion.

2. The scandal of the little ones is to be avoided as often as this can be done without grave inconvenience.¹²⁷

The reason is that charity obliges us to prevent the evils of neighbor when it can be done easily. But if a notable inconvenience arises for the agent, then scandal of the little ones can be permitted; and this inconvenience ought to be the graver in proportion as the sin feared is graver, as it is more certainly foreseen as going to happen, and as there are more persons going to suffer scandal. Hence indifferent works, or works which are only of counsel, are sometimes to be omitted in order to avoid scandal of the little ones; e.g. a girl who knows that she is being foully desired by a young man is bound sometimes, but not for a long time, to omit hearing Mass on weekdays; indeed, according to several theologians, even once or twice on days of precept.¹²⁸ Likewise entrance into Religion ought to be deferred somewhat if otherwise parents would take grave scandal, and there exists hope that they will shortly give consent. On the contrary, no one is bound to pay more to some workman, even if he foresees that the man, notwithstanding the just price received, will blaspheme. The reason is that such a workman by a greater payment would be rendered still more insolent and worse another time. A parish priest who is not fasting could, indeed would be bound to, celebrate Mass if otherwise a great scandal would arise among the people. The reason is that the positive law of the Eucharistic fast ought to yield to the natural law of avoiding scandal. But never (as, moreover, is self-evident) is it licit to do something intrinsically evil in order to avoid scandal; e.g. it is not licit to deny the faith in order to avoid the blasphemies of heretics.

3. It is not a sin of scandal, from a just cause, to permit an occasion of sin or even to place it by some honorable action.

Thus St. Alphonsus¹²⁹ and theologians commonly. St. Thomas agrees, saying: "To induce someone to sin is licit in no way; nevertheless to use the sin of another for good is licit; because even God uses all sins for some good; for from any evil whatever He draws out some good";¹³⁰ and: "Sometimes a man, having his wife suspected of adultery, lays snares for her, so that he may be able to discover her with witnesses in the crime of fornication; and thus he can proceed to accusation."¹³¹ Hence Judith, for a most grave reason, offered Holofernes an occasion of sinning. The reason, however, is that to permit sin is not something evil in itself, since God also permits many sins. But for discerning in practice when it is licit to permit sin, those rules are to be applied which were given above, where there was treatment of the indirectly voluntary (n. 57 sqq.), namely when it is licit to place a cause from which there follows a double effect, one good, the other evil. E.g. it is licit for a master not to remove the occasion of stealing from sons and servants, so that, having been detected, they may be suitably punished and corrected; guards of gardens, orchards, and vineyards can hide themselves so that those doing damage may be apprehended; it is licit to borrow money from a usurer from a just cause, even if he is going to commit the sin of usury.

Certain questions are usually proposed and solved here by theologians, namely:

¹²⁶ Matth. 15, 12-14.

¹²⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 7 et 8.

¹²⁸ S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 51.

¹²⁹ Ib. n. 58.

¹³⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 78, a. 4.

¹³¹ Suppl. q. 62, a. 3 ad 4.

611.

1. Whether it is licit from a reasonable cause to ask from another that which he himself will not furnish without sin? R. Affirmatively, if the sin proceeds from the malice alone of the other; negatively, if the work asked is intrinsically evil. Hence it is licit from a reasonable cause to ask sacraments from an unworthy priest; an oath from one who is going to perjure himself; the conjugal debt from a spouse who is going to perpetrate onanism. On the contrary, it is not licit to buy stolen things from a thief, or to ask sacramental absolution from a priest who lacks jurisdiction.

2. Whether it is licit to counsel someone to a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater? R. Negatively, unless that lesser evil is virtually included in the other greater evil already determinately willed. Yet there are many and great authors, among whom are St. Alphonsus,¹³² Dominic Soto,¹³³ and Cajetan,¹³⁴ teaching that it is more probably licit to counsel a lesser evil, if the other has already been determined to carry out the greater, as Lot is read to have done (Gen. 19, 8), when, the Sodomites wishing to abuse two men, he counseled fornication with his two daughters. Nevertheless the first opinion, namely the negative one, seems to be better and truer. For he who by counsel induces another to a lesser evil not virtually included, but disparate, really causes a new sin and does not prevent the first greater sin (according to its malice). E.g. if someone determinately wishes to commit adultery, I cannot counsel him to simple fornication. For if he consents to my counsel, he is guilty before God not only of the adultery willed, but also of the fornication counseled by me, and I am really the cause of this fornication done. On the contrary, if someone wishes to steal 100 francs from Peter, I can counsel him to take only 10 francs, because then this second sin is virtually included in the first.¹³⁵

3. Whether in sins which cannot be committed without an accomplice the circumstance of induction is necessarily to be declared in confession? R. All indeed teach that he who induced another to sin sinned more gravely than if the sin had been done without induction; but several grave theologians, among whom are Lugo, the Salmanticenses, St. Alphonsus,¹³⁶ and many moderns, rightly affirm that this circumstance of induction is only an aggravating circumstance and not one changing the species, unless, however, the induction had been made by threats, coercion, or fraud. Hence he who committed fornication is not strictly bound to say that he induced the woman to this sin, if she gave consent freely, without preceding threats, fraud, or coercion. The reason is that no special injury was inflicted upon one consenting.

¹³² Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 57.

¹³³ De iur. et iust. l. 6, q. 1, a. 5.

¹³⁴ Summula v. Tyrannis.

¹³⁵ Cf. below II, n. 103.

¹³⁶ Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 46.

612. Reparation of scandal.

There exists a true obligation of repairing scandal, because through scandal the charity of neighbor has been wounded, and not rarely also the public good. Wherefore he who has given grave scandal cannot be admitted to the sacraments unless he has repaired the grave scandal given, or, if there is question of sacramental absolution, unless he has at least seriously promised the reparation of that scandal. This obligation arises from the virtue of charity, or even from the virtue of legal justice, but not from the virtue of commutative justice, unless neighbor had been seduced by means truly unjust, e.g. by threats, coercion, fraud, etc.

1. Public scandal must also be repaired publicly. The reason is obvious, namely because otherwise its evil influence is not eliminated. It is to be noted that this obligation of public reparation exists even if from the active scandal given no ruin of neighbor in fact followed. For the public good requires that the individual members of human society lead a morally ordered life. But if they have publicly neglected this obligation, they ought also publicly to return to good conduct. This return is sometimes had sufficiently if he who gave scandal now gives good example; e.g. if a notorious adulteress publicly receives the sacraments, devoutly assists at the exercises of religion, and diligently fulfills the duties of her state. Sometimes, however, good example publicly given is not sufficient for the due reparation of scandal, but besides this an express retraction is required. Thus, e.g., he who spread false doctrines ought publicly to revoke them; he who publicly gave his name to the Masonic sect is bound expressly and notoriously to retract his adherence, etc. It belongs to a prudent confessor, or parish priest, to determine the mode of reparation of public scandal. In graver cases recourse must be had to the Ordinary or to the Holy See.

2. Secret scandal must be repaired before those persons who have borne some damage from it. Hence, e.g., a seducer is bound in the best way he can to see that the seduced neighbor recover his former salvation. If from secret scandal no true damage has befallen the neighbor, then it suffices that he who gave scandal show thereafter, by his good example, the amendment made.

Scandal in Certain Particular Cases.

The whole world indeed is set in evil,¹³⁷ and there are very many things which cause scandal. But there are certain things which more frequently entice to sin, and concerning these it is usual to treat specially in the treatise on scandal. Now these things are: 1. the adornment of women, 2. obscene images and statues, 3. dances and spectacles, 4. bad books and evil newspapers.

¹³⁷ Cf. 1 Jo. 5, 19.

613. 1. The adornment of women. It is licit for women to adorn themselves, provided, however, that this is done in a right manner and for an honorable end. Hence St. Paul says: "I wish therefore ... likewise also women in adorned apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, and not with braided hair or gold or pearls, or costly clothing, but what befits women."¹³⁸ First of all attention must be given to the end or intention by which a woman adorns herself. This intention can be either a) honorable, e.g. that she may please her husband, that she may find a spouse, that she may conceal natural defects; or b) less honorable, e.g. that she may present her beauty for the admiration of all; or c) finally directly sinful, e.g. that she may provoke the concupiscence and impure love of men. It is self-evident that in the third case every adornment of women is gravely sinful. But in the first and second case adornment is licit, or only lightly evil, provided however that it is not immodest adornment. Therefore women can assume modest adornment from an honorable end, even if perhaps someone takes an occasion of sinning.

But notably immodest adornment is a grave sin, because it is grave scandal furnishing to many a cause of spiritual ruin. But for discerning what adornment of women is immodest, attention must first of all be given to the customs of the country in which the women live, e.g. in hot regions. That adornment or dress is censured by deserved right as immodest which, the circumstances of place and time being considered, incites to lust. Cf. Instruction of the S. C. of the Council to diocesan ordinaries, "On the dishonorable manner of dress of women," Jan. 12, 1930. Act. Ap. Sed. XXII 26 sqq.

When theologians speak of the immodest dress of women, they chiefly have before their eyes the uncovering of the breast. But what uncovering of the breast is gravely dishonorable depends much upon custom. For things to which people are accustomed entice less. Hence it can happen that a woman furnishes grave scandal on one occasion and not on another, although she appears adorned in the same manner. It will easily be a mortal sin of scandal if women publicly in the streets present themselves to the sight of all with a transparent garment about the breast, or with some, although not so immoderate, denudation of the breast; on the contrary, it is not so easily a mortal sin if in some private society, e.g. on the occasion of a more solemn dinner, dancing, or another festivity, they appear in such dress - with moderate denudation, however, and not down to the middle of the breasts. The reason is that there is an almost universal custom that women in those circumstances somewhat bare the breast or wear transparent garments about the upper part of the breast. Hence it would be a grave inconvenience if some woman had to refuse obedience to that custom.

Decency of dress is especially to be observed in assisting at sacred functions. Wherefore many bishops have issued special statutes concerning decency of dress in these circumstances. - Whether it is licit for women to paint their face with rouge? St. Thomas answers that this is licit if it is done to hide some blemish or deformity; but that it is a light sin if it is done from vanity, yet without an evil end.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ 1 Tim. 2, 9 sq.

¹³⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 169, a. 2 ad 2.

614. 2. Obscene images and statues. Images and statues are called obscene which are accustomed to excite to venereal lust. This indeed can happen either on account of the scene which they exhibit, or on account of the nudity of the persons whom they represent. Wherefore those are obscene which represent acts truly foul, and ordinarily also those which represent adult persons entirely nude; on the contrary, those which represent nude infants cannot be called obscene. Likewise anatomical figures are not obscene (although they cannot licitly be looked at by all). Likewise so-called "artistic studies" (Aktstudien) upon a nude human model, provided they are made from a just cause. Likewise if nude persons are represented in a manner so artistic or idealistic that those looking are moved chiefly by the art or by the idea represented. Hence, e.g., the very celebrated Laocoon in the Vatican Museum cannot be called obscene; likewise several representations made in the Catacombs or in the first times of the Middle Ages are not obscene, whose piety we admire, and which also are sometimes had in Catholic churches. Furthermore it certainly cannot be said that the Catholic Church, and especially the Church in the Catacombs, to which holy martyrs and confessors gathered, admitted obscene images.

Nevertheless even those artistic or idealistic representations, if they represent nude adult persons, today are no longer to be placed before the eyes of all, especially of the young, because several are not able to discern art so well, but rather are moved from the thing itself represented. - Those who make obscene images or statues, or place them before the eyes of all in public streets or gardens, commit a grave sin of scandal. But entrance into public museums and other public exhibitions, where several nude statues and images are set forth, is not to be permitted (without a reasonable cause) to young persons not yet having mature judgment.

615. 3. Dances and spectacles, although in themselves they are something indifferent, are nevertheless very frequently accustomed to produce grave scandals and to be proximate occasions of sinning gravely. Certainly it is never licit to institute dances in which, by reason of nudity, gestures, etc., something notably dishonorable is externally done; but if these things do not occur, although the sins of many to be committed on the occasion of dances are feared, those who institute them from a reasonable cause, or who are present at them, cannot in themselves be said to be liable to grave sin. A cause is required that is the graver in proportion as the occasion of sinning is more proximate. In our times it is often most difficult to turn the faithful away from instituting and frequenting all dances. Therefore let the parish priest and confessor strive according to their powers that young persons be present at dances more rarely, that nothing dishonorable be perpetrated there, and that a proximate occasion of sinning be absent. - Almost the same thing ought to be said of spectacles and cinematographic exhibitions. But in our times not a few spectacles are wicked, both on account of things represented against religion or good morals, and on account of the immodest dress of those representing. Since in ordinary cases someone can more easily exempt himself from the obligation of assisting at these spectacles than from the moral compulsion of assisting at dances, it seems that a stricter practice with respect to spectacles than with respect to dances should ordinarily be observed.

616. 4. Bad books and evil newspapers in our times constitute a most abundant fountain of scandals, because they pervert very many men with respect to morals and with respect to religion. Hence authors and editors of bad books, journals, and other writings furnish very grave scandal. Likewise booksellers gravely sin who sell books and writings of this kind to anyone at all, or furnish them to be read. But on account of great inconveniences that would otherwise arise, booksellers can sometimes sell such books to men having mature judgment, who incur no danger of perversion from the reading, provided, however, that those books are not obscene by profession. Concerning this matter the Code of Canon Law establishes c. 1404: "Sellers of books are not to sell, lend, or retain books treating of obscene matters by profession; they are not to have the other prohibited books for sale, unless they have obtained the due permission from the Apostolic See, nor are they to sell them to anyone unless they can prudently judge that they are legitimately sought by the buyer." Workers also, who proximately cooperate in the printing and distribution of these writings, sin gravely of themselves.