Point I. On Scandal

234. • DEFINITION. Scandal is a saying or deed less right, furnishing someone an occasion of spiritual ruin.

DIVISION. Scandal is distinguished as direct or indirect, according as the evil action of another either is intended, or although it is not intended, nevertheless is foreseen at least in the confused way.

Direct scandal is also called diabolical when the spiritual ruin of the neighbor is properly intended. But if the spiritual ruin of another is not intended, but only the satisfaction of one's own will, it is called simply direct ¹.

¹ More briefly Suarez (De Char. Disp. 10. Sect. 2. n. 1.): It can be understood in three ways that one leads someone to sinning. First with this direct intention, that he may spiritually die, as the devil does. Second also directly by inducing to the work, not that he may fall, but on account of some utility or pleasure of mine. Third only indirectly, by doing something whence he is stirred up to sinning. The first with Cardinal de Lugo (De Poenit. Disp. 16. n. 157.) can be called direct and formal scandal; the second simply direct; the third indirect.

Theologians commonly distinguish active and passive scandal. Active scandal is that to which the given definition applies. Passive scandal is the spiritual ruin of the neighbor itself, and is improperly called scandal, since it ought better to be called the effect of scandal ².

² It must be noted, says Suarez (De Char. Disp. 10. Sect. 1. n. 1.), that commonly this passive scandal is wont to be thought and called not so much the spiritual ruin which consists in sin, as a sort of astonishment and rumor which is stirred up in neighbors from the sin of another; but that never has the proper reason of scandal, unless it includes some malice which in some way draws its origin from him who gave scandal, as is gathered from Jerome..., and St. Thomas.

But scandal can be active or given, without being passive or received; because an action apt per se for scandal can be placed without the effect following. And vice versa it can be received without being given; but then the scandal is not properly to be attributed to the action of the neighbor, but rather to the ignorance, imagination, or even malice of him who suffers the scandal, or admits it without foundation. But this is called scandal of the little ones, if it is taken up from weakness or ignorance of the neighbor; but it is called pharisaical if it comes from the mere malice of the subject. - St. Lig. n. 43.

235. Principles. - I. Scandal, even indirect, is not only a grave sin from its genus, but a sin of specific malice ³, most great and horrible, since it thrusts down into Gehenna souls redeemed by Christ. For this reason Christ the Lord exclaims, Matt. 18.7: Woe to the world from scandals... Woe to that man through whom scandal comes ⁴.

³ The specific reason of this sin is that it is against charity, and, as St. Thomas says (2. 2. q. 43. art. 3.), it is directly opposed to fraternal correction, in which the removal of a special harm is intended. But there are those who think that St. Thomas held this only concerning direct scandal, and indeed that by which the sin of another is intended as his spiritual evil. Thus Suarez (De Charit. disp. 10. sect. 2. n. 4.), who alleges others of the older authors for the same opinion. But those words of St. Thomas: When someone... intends to draw another to sinning, do not necessarily signify the intention of drawing to sin insofar as it is the spiritual evil of another. Otherwise, indeed, Suarez himself (ibid. n. 3.) cites the same Holy Doctor for himself, where he attributes the proper malice of scandal to any direct scandal.

But that this malice is present also in indirect scandal is the common doctrine against some older authors (apud Suar. l. c. n. 5.), and is easily proved. For it is clear that a sin is aggravated, even by a new species, from harm foreseen with the obligation of avoiding it, even if it is not intended per se: and this is plainly evident, because in morals the direct and indirect voluntary belong to the same species.

⁴ Yet do not infer that the sin of scandal is always mortal. For one can sin venially in this not only on account of the imperfection of the act, but also on account of smallness of matter, namely if you induce another only to a light fault, for example, to lying. Thus St. Thomas (2. 2. q. 43. art. 4.): But if he intends to induce the neighbor to sin venially..., it is a venial sin. And this indeed, as St. Thomas has (l. c.), has force not only with regard to indirect scandal, but also with regard to direct; and it is to be understood of the act insofar as it induces the spiritual ruin of another. For if the act by which scandal is begotten is considered in itself, certainly (as Sanchez well notes, Moral. Lib. I. cap. 6. n. 11.) it can happen that a work otherwise mortal per se is nevertheless light with regard to the reason of scandal, and vice versa grave by reason of scandal, although per se it is either light or even in no way evil, but only has the appearance of evil; whence that saying of Paul (1. Cor. VIII. 13.): If food scandalizes my brother, I will not eat flesh forever.

II. Scandal of the little ones or of the weak is to be avoided as often as this can be done without grave inconvenience, both by omission of an indifferent work, and even by omission of a good work not commanded; the reason is that from Charity we are bound to impede the ruin of the little ones when we easily can, for example, by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by deferring it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc. ⁵.

⁵ Since truly in this way too the occasion of spiritual ruin is furnished to the neighbor, so that in some proper sense this ruin is said to be caused; for this reason it has pleased others to call this scandal of the little ones not merely received, but also given. Thus Bonac. (De Pecc. Disp. 2. q. 4. p. 2. n. 2. 3.), Sanchez (Moral. Lib. I. cap. 6. n. 1.), and others.

III. Pharisaical, or malicious, scandal, at least ordinarily ⁶, is not necessarily to be avoided either by omission of a good work, or by omission even of an indifferent work, not having the appearance of evil: the reason is that such scandal arises from the malice alone of him who receives the scandal, and for that reason it is in no way given, but purely received.

⁶ Thus Suarez (De Charit. Disp. 10. Sect. 3. n. 9.): When it is said that the scandal of the Pharisees is not to be avoided by omitting spiritual goods, it must be understood either regularly, or certainly that it is never to be omitted in fact; nevertheless it is necessary sometimes to omit an external good work. But he gives the reason (ibid. n. 8.): If care for the good of the neighbor can oblige one to doing good, why not also sometimes to interrupting it? especially since a man is deprived of no spiritual good on account of this: both because that omission is chiefly necessary in an exterior act, but in interior desire he can retain the fruit and merit; and also because this very thing, that he deprives himself of the merit of that work on account of the good of the neighbor, will be a greater merit than the good work itself. Hence in works of counsel the matter is clear.

236. Questions. - Q. 1º Are precepts sometimes to be omitted on account of scandal of the little ones?

Resp. 1º Neg., with regard to negative precepts of natural right, because these oblige always and for always, and works contrary to them are intrinsically evil. But affirmative precepts which do not oblige for always can sometimes lawfully, indeed must ⁷, be omitted, for example, the precept of correcting sinners, if graver ruin is to be feared from it; but it must rather be said that then the law itself ceases. - St. Lig. n. 51.

⁷ This rule is general; but, as Suarez notes (De Char. Disp. 10. Sect. 3. n. 9.), then one must prudently judge in the individual case what outweighs more, whether the ruin of the neighbor to be avoided, or that work to be omitted. It must also be considered how grave that precept is, how great its necessity or utility, and after all things have been considered judgment must be given, as must be done whenever things occur looking to diverse precepts, which nevertheless cannot be done at the same time. And indeed these things must also be considered when it is a matter of positive precepts.

Resp. 2º With regard to positive human precepts, it is controverted. The 1st probable opinion affirms, when grave inconvenience has been excluded, because the precept of avoiding scandal of the neighbor, as natural, is to be preferred to positive precepts. Hence a woman knowing that she will be shamefully desired by someone if she goes to the prescribed Mass is bound to omit it once or again, if hope is present that afterward the scandal will cease: nevertheless not more often, on account of the grave inconvenience which would follow from this. - St. Lig. ibid. - Suarez. - Laymann, etc. - Yet others deny no less probably ⁸. - See St. Lig. ibid.

⁸ They deny, namely, that a woman is bound to omit Mass, although they grant that she can omit it. This latter point indeed seems difficult, unless they grant it on account of whatever probability of the opposite opinion. For if the necessity of avoiding scandal is absent, it does not appear why she would not be bound to be present at Mass. Meanwhile note three things: 1º this question is made concerning scandal which someone in particular can suffer, but not when fear generally arises lest perhaps someone be scandalized; 2º an obligation of this kind of avoiding scandal rarely occurs, as Suarez notes (De Char. Disp. 10. Sect. 3. n. 10.); 3º in this variety of opinions the Confessor can indeed furnish counsels, but cannot urge obligations.

Q. 2º Are you bound to let go temporal goods in order to avoid scandal?

Resp. Neg., ordinarily speaking, because Charity toward the neighbor does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Hence you are not bound to pay more than is fair to a workman or coachman, although you foresee that otherwise he is going to blaspheme: for that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur more often, and thus easily becomes grave; indeed more, this could often be an incitement to blaspheming ⁹. - St. Lig. n. 52.

⁹ Thus neither is a pastor bound to let go those things which are owed to him by right of stole, in order, namely, to forestall slanders; for a grave inconvenience would arise from this not only to himself, but also to his successors; but with the poor it will be more expedient that he later help by alms those from whom he exacts his own right.

Q. 3º In scandal is there not only a sin against Charity, but also against the virtue to the violation of which the neighbor is induced?

Resp. 1º Affirm., with regard to direct scandal. For any virtue especially forbids not only that it be violated, but also that someone directly induce another to violate it. - Thus almost all.

Resp. 2º Some affirm also with regard to indirect scandal. Yet others better deny with Lugo, de Poenit. D. 16. n. 159. For otherwise he who by his example moves another to stealing would be bound to restitution, which the Doctors very commonly deny ¹⁰.

¹⁰ Therefore it suffices in confession to express generally the sin of scandal, nor is it necessary to indicate the species of sin to which others were indirectly induced. Much less is there need that circumstances be expressed which perhaps add a species to the sins of others, for example, whether those who could have been induced to lust by shameful speech or picture are married or bound by vow, etc. Add that neither is it necessary, where several have been scandalized by the same act, to express their number, according to those things which were disputed in the Treatise on Sins.

** VV. (in the Note at Pag. 915.) object that what is said here, namely that it is not necessary to indicate the species of sin to which others were indirectly induced, does not cohere with the things contained in the Note at n. 235, namely that the proper malice of scandal is present both in direct and indirect scandal, because in morals the direct and indirect voluntary belong to the same species. - Resp. The proper malice of scandal is that which is opposed to charity; and this is found also in indirect scandal, because, as Suarez says (De Char. Disp. 10. Sect. 2. n. 9.), I can be bound to avoiding a work, lest the neighbor be induced to sinning, from the obligation of charity. But the same Suarez (ibid.) indicates the distinction between indirect and direct scandal with regard to guilt against another virtue thus: In that case (of indirect scandal) he is judged to be the moral cause of the ruin of the neighbor, insofar as it is against charity, but not insofar as it is against other virtues. Nor is it similar concerning him who directly induces by counsel: for this is openly against the obligation of any virtue. Lugo himself (De Poenit. Disp. 16. n. 161.) expressed this thus: Therefore neither do you sin against justice, if, foreseeing, outside your intention, that another will be induced from your intemperance to stealing, you do not impede it; because justice indeed obliges you not to procure that others steal, but not that you impede their thefts and abstain from intemperance for this end. Since Lugo has these things, and explains and defends them at length, it does not appear how St. Alphonsus (Lib. 2. n. 45.) alleges him for the opposite opinion, which he holds, as also Tamburini, who (Conf. Lib. 2. c. 1. n. 105.) teaches the same as Lugo, and moreover Collet (Tom. 3. p. 327.), who indeed establishes that one also sins against the virtue to the violation of which one induces by scandal; but he has this in the thesis concerning direct scandal.

237. • Q. 4º Must one sinning with an accomplice declare in confession the circumstance of solicitation?

Resp. More probably neg., because, with the consent of the other acceding, solicitation is only a merely aggravating circumstance; nor less does the accomplice by consent become guilty of scandal; therefore the sin of scandal is sufficiently accused by confessing the sin committed with others. - St. Lig. n. 46. - Lugo. - Yet the Salmanticenses and others probably affirm, who say that the action of inducing to sinning is a distinct and special sin ¹¹.

¹¹ That reason does not contradict the first opinion; for this does not deny that a special sin of scandal intervenes; but it affirms that this is common to each one sinning, and therefore is sufficiently expressed in confession when complicity with another is expressed, for example, the sin of fornication.

Q. 5º Is it lawful to persuade a lesser evil to someone determined upon a greater?

Resp. Affirm. more probably with St. Lig. n. 57. Yet some limit this, if the lesser evil is contained in some way in the greater, as striking in homicide, etc.; which limitation, however, does not seem necessary to St. Alph. ¹².

¹² Others except, if to one wishing to inflict a greater damage on one person, you persuade that a lesser damage is to be inflicted on another. Thus Sporer (T. 4. Cap. 3. n. 27.) after Lugo (de Iust. et Iur. Disp. 19. n. 47.), to whom St. Alph. adheres (Lib. 3. n. 565.). But Sanchez (De Matr. Lib. 7. Disp. 11. n. 24.), Turrianus (De Fide, etc. Disp. 95. dub. 6.), and Vasquez (Opusc. De Scandalo art. 1. dub. 2. n. 14.) affirm more probably that this is lawful. The reason is (says Vasquez), because this kind of counsel formally tends to this, that a greater sin not be committed, from which it happens that he from whom the robber steals that which is less is not reasonably unwilling concerning him who furnished the counsel. Nor does Lugo's reason on the opposite side seem very efficacious, because namely while you propose this theft to one who was thinking nothing about it, it is the same as if you opened the door for him to steal. For it still remains to be proved that in those circumstances it is illicit to open the door in that way.

Q. 6º Is it lawful to permit an occasion of sinning, so that the guilty person may be corrected?

Resp. Affirm., because to permit is not to induce, and there is sufficient reason for permitting the sin. Hence they are excused from sin per se: 1º parents and masters who allow children or servants to sin, so that they may find an opportune place of correcting them; - 2º guards of fields, vineyards, etc., who hide themselves so that those doing damage may be caught, and they may exact punishment from them. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig. n. 58. - Laymann, etc.

238. • Q. 7º Is it lawful even to place an occasion of sin?

Resp. It is controverted. Affirm. more probably, because the one sinning is not induced into sin, just as the usurer from whom a loan is requested is not induced: for an indifferent act is placed with sufficient reason. Hence probably a master does not sin who deliberately leaves the key of the chest in which money is stored placed there, in order to test the doubtful fidelity of a servant. - St. Lig. n. 28. - Laymann, Collet, against certain persons who deny for this reason, as if this were the same as positively concur with the sin, expressly creating its danger and inducing to it.

Q. 8º What about the communication of the faithful with Jews?

Resp. Both for protecting the dignity of the Christian Religion and for avoiding any danger whatever of perversion, it has been established by the Church: 1º that Christians not dwell with Jews; 2º that they not be present at their banquets; 3º that they not serve them; 4º that they not eat their unleavened bread; 5º that Christian women not nurse the infants of Jews, whether in the homes of the latter or in their own home (C. Nullus, C. Omnes, C. Iudaei, and St. Lig. n. 18. Pius IV Constit. Cum enim, and S. Congr. Inquisit. on the day 15 March 1612).

Nevertheless, with any danger of perversion excluded, probably it is not deadly, indeed there is no fault, if this is done from a reasonable cause. - St. Lig. l. 2. n. 18. - See Cases, n. 226 et seq.

1º Around lust; 2º around depraved books; 3º around dances; 4º around spectacles.

239. • It is a most grave scandal to do, represent, or display those things which notably provoke to lust; because no subtler poison can be offered to the soul.

Hence those are guilty of most grave scandal: - 1º who represent shameful things in comedies or other gatherings; - 2º who compose or sing shameful ditties or songs; - 3º who make or expose obscene statues or images; - 4º who seduce pupils entrusted to them by depraved examples. - St. Lig. n. 56.

Questions. - Q. 1º Does a woman walking with uncovered breast sin gravely?

Resp. Affirm., if the uncovering is immoderate, or very notable, notwithstanding any contrary custom whatever. But if it is not so immoderate, custom will easily excuse from grave sin. For custom notably diminishes the force of concupiscence, since accustomed things excite the imagination less. - St. Lig. n. 55. ¹³.

¹³ Although it is the most common opinion of the Doctors, as St. Alphonsus testifies (Lib. 2. n. 55.), that a moderate uncovering of the breast is not to be condemned as mortal sin where such a custom flourishes; yet for the most part they perhaps do not say what kind of uncovering is moderate or immoderate, because the custom can be varied for various places. Concerning this matter Cajetan says thus (Sum. V. Ornatus): The (inordinate) quality of adornment commonly induces venial sin, if it is indecent and less chaste, as the adornment of women showing half the breasts. Nevertheless, where the custom is already accustomed, it seems to be without sin.

Whatever be the case, St. Alphonsus has two things (l. c.) most worthy of note. The first is, that those women who introduce this custom somewhere sin gravely. But the other is a general warning, which St. Antoninus hands down in these words: It seems that it must be said, that where in ornaments of this kind the Confessor finds what is clearly and undoubtedly mortal, he should not absolve such a one, unless she proposes to abstain from such a crime. But if he cannot clearly perceive whether it is mortal, then the sentence does not seem to be hastened (as William the Speculator says in a certain similar case), namely so that he would deny absolution on this account, or make for her a conscience concerning mortal sin; because by afterward acting against that, even if that were not mortal, it will be mortal for her, because everything which is against conscience builds unto gehenna... And since laws are more ready to loose than to bind... and it is better to render an account to the Lord concerning too much mercy than concerning too much severity, as Chrysostom says... it seems rather that she is to be absolved and left to the divine examination. Yet I confess that both preachers in preaching, and Confessors in the hearing of confessions, ought to detest such things, and persuade that they be put away, since they are excessive and immoderate, yet not so indiscriminately to assert that they are mortal.

Q. 2º Does a woman sin gravely who wears superfluous adornment, or paints her face with cosmetics?

Resp. to the 1st. Neg. per se, because adornment does not of its nature gravely provoke to lust; indeed it is often required for the becomingness of one's state ¹⁴. Resp. to the 2nd. Neg. likewise: for of itself this by no means exceeds a venial stain, if it is done to catch a little vain glory; but it will be free of all sin if a just cause intervenes, for example a natural defect to be covered, etc.

¹⁴ Let St. Thomas be consulted (2. 2. q. 169. art. 1.), where he shows that both virtue and vice can be present in adornment. Virtue indeed is present if the person conducts himself moderately in all things according to the custom of the country, and according to his own condition and dignity; but vice is present both by excess and by defect.

But specifically concerning the adornment and paints of women, the doctrine of St. Thomas is reduced to these heads (from 2. 2. q. 169. art. 2., and Comm. in Isai. cap. 4.): 1º They sin mortally if they adorn themselves with the mind of provoking to lust; 2º They sin venially if they employ ornaments merely from vanity, levity, ostentation; 3º It is a venial fault from its kind that adornment is superfluous, or beyond the condition of one's state, whether this is done by excess or by defect; 4º There is no sin per se if the custom of the country and the condition of the state is observed; 5º Women licitly add something of ornament, that they may please husbands either whom they have or whom they ought to take; 6º Paintings will be mortal if they are applied for lasciviousness; venial if merely for feigning beauty; but none if for concealing some defect; 7º Those are excused from sin who go about with hair not veiled, if they do this not from vanity, but from custom, which otherwise is not praiseworthy.

But to the question whether a woman is bound to put away adornment for avoiding the scandal of others, Suarez thus answers from the common opinion (De Charit. Disp. 10. Sect. 3. n. 10.): If the adornment is moderate and becoming, per se she is not bound (to put it away) for avoiding scandal; because of itself the act is not evil, nor does it have per se the character of active scandal more than natural beauty, and because it would be grave to oblige to this. And indeed, for avoiding the dangers of others, no one has yet obliged women to disfigure their own face.

Q. 3º Does a woman sin gravely who puts on men's clothing?

Resp. Neg. per se: for if this is done for a just cause, it can be free from every fault; if from levity or jest, it does not exceed venial sin, scandal or danger of lust being set aside, however. - St. Lig. n. 52.

Q. 4º Do those sin gravely who go about masked or in disguise?

Resp. Neg. per se, provided, that is, they do not go to those gatherings in which for the most part a proximate occasion of sinning occurs.

240. • Q. 5º Is it lawful to serve prostitutes or those keeping concubines?

Resp. to the 1st. Neg., both because of scandal, and also because of the very great danger of falling. But if perhaps any cases are to be excepted, these will have to be judged from the circumstances of the persons, or from the degree of necessity.

Resp. to the 2nd. It can indeed be permitted, if a concubine is not kept at home. But otherwise with difficulty, on account of the grave danger of seduction, unless nevertheless grave reasons are present for serving a master of this kind, or unless the male and female servants are judged more advanced in piety or in years. In few words: the solution of this question can scarcely be handed down, but must be sought from the various circumstances of things. - Thus commonly, against Concina, who admits no exception.

Q. 6º Is it lawful for a girl to accept small gifts from him by whom she is sought and loved apart from the end of marriage?

Resp. Neg. ordinarily ¹⁵, because gifts especially excite and foster mutual love; and almost always loves of this kind are not without either a depraved end or certainly danger. Hence, so far as can be done, the girl must be ordered either to return small gifts of this kind, or to distribute them to the poor, or to hand them over to the flames to be burned. - St. Lig. n. 76. - Lacroix, l. 2. n. 264.

¹⁵ It is said ordinarily, because honorable friendship also, or benevolence which the gifts of the person excite, is sometimes accustomed to impel persons to destine small gifts of this kind both to girls and to men, apart from those dangers.

From every kind of scandals none is more execrable than that which is produced from impious and obscene books. This is a diabolical invention, the most efficacious of all for thrusting souls in crowds into the abyss of gehenna. This is the most dread and monstrous plague of all, which infects not only one region or age, but is spread to all places and times, and fills all things with innumerable slaughters. But who could say the horrendous evils which have arisen for Religion and morals from evil books as from a lethal fountain, and indeed are to be propagated and multiplied even to the end of the world?

Therefore let the ministers of God, namely preachers and Confessors, strive and exert their soul, that with all their strength they may oppose themselves to this torrent of iniquity, and snatch perishing souls from the jaws of the infernal abyss.

Therefore the reading, printing, and divulging of books wholly opposed to Faith and morals must never be permitted.

241. Questions. - Q. 1º Can books be committed to type which are partly good, partly evil?

Resp. Neg. speaking generally, unless they have been accurately expurgated; otherwise, however, if the danger to be feared from them is not so grave, and this seems to be compensated by great utility to be received from them. But printers should diligently inquire from learned and experienced men, especially ecclesiastical Superiors, what is to be done in doubts.

Q. 2º Can evil books sometimes be sold?

Resp. They can in no way be sold indiscriminately, namely to any buyer whatever, as is clear. Nevertheless sometimes they can be sold to prudent and learned men, who can usefully read books of this kind, for example in order to refute them, etc. Except books entirely obscene, which are to be extirpated by the root.

Q. 3º What concerning the donation or leasing of evil books?

Resp. Generally the same must be said, with proportion preserved, as concerning their sale, because all these things are full of corruptions. - Gousset, l. 1. n. 392.

Q. 4º Can books of this kind be returned to their owner?

Resp. Neg., unless a prudent fear of some grave inconvenience otherwise advises. This flows of its own accord from the principles which we have handed down. But it is to be judged a grave inconvenience if you fear grave quarrels, blasphemies, hatreds, and other things of this sort from the owner. Slight sadness, or even fear of dissolving a friendship, would certainly not be judged a reason, at least for the most part, for returning evil books to a friend ¹⁶.

¹⁶ These things deservedly can seem somewhat harsher, as is easily clear from those things which will be said below concerning cooperation with evil. Nor is the parity valid with the case of returning a sword to him who is about to kill another; for his own sword is not entirely nor perpetually taken away from him, and moreover a most grave damage to a third party is present, which is wholly to be impeded.

We shall speak concerning the prohibition of books in the Treatise on Censures.

242. • Dances or saltations, as they are commonly made, are full of danger and scandal, and entangle innumerable souls in the snares of the devil; and the holy Fathers unanimously inveigh against this kind of play. Yet not all dances equally carry the same evil or danger.

Principles. - I. Dances per se, even among persons of different sex, are not illicit, if they are done in an honorable manner, that is, with every impure touch, gesture, or act removed. The reason is, because dances per se are indifferent, nor are they prohibited by any law. - Thus commonly ¹⁷. - St. Lig. l. 3. n. 429.

¹⁷ Compare the doctrine of St. Thomas, which we brought forward above in the notes to n. 32. Q. 7.

II. Dances which are dishonorable by reason of nudities, the manner of dancing, words, gestures, songs, can be gravely illicit, as is clear. But among these many count the more recent dances, which in French are called la Walse, la Polka, le Galop, and others similar to these. But it will belong to the Confessor to judge concerning particular cases from the manner, circumstances, gravity of motive, etc.

III. In practice, generally any dances whatever among persons of different sex are to be impeded as much as can be done, because as they are usually held they are for the most part dangerous. Hence Pastors and Confessors ought to turn subjects and penitents away from them as much as can be done. - Thus commonly the Doctors of our age, and directors of souls.

243. Resolves. - 1º Those who are so infirm that they incur grave danger of sinning in dances ought to abstain from them under mortal sin; unless perhaps sometimes a certain necessity urges, and at least probably the danger of consent is absent.

2º To dance modestly or to be present at honorable dances from a certain necessity, or from the decency of one's state, without probable danger of sinning, is no sin; because there is given a sufficient reason for permitting the sins of others, if any there are. Hence girls destined for marriage are excused from sin by dancing becomingly, who cannot be absent from dances held in the paternal home, or among neighbors or relatives, or cannot refuse dancing, without being derided, or displeasing parents or suitors requiring them.

3º Indeed to be present at honorable dances, even without necessity, danger and notable scandal nevertheless being excluded, and in them to dance becomingly, is not only not mortal, but can also easily be free from every sin. For sometimes men, and not rarely women, are found to whom even in dances among persons of different sex, no danger or a very remote danger threatens. But these, although they are to be dissuaded from dances, nevertheless a promise of avoiding dances would imprudently be exacted from them under denial of absolution ¹⁸. - Bouvier.

¹⁸ In circumstances of this kind, not only imprudently, but also unjustly and therefore not without grave sin would absolution be denied; for absolution, when the penitent is present rightly disposed, is not an act of liberality, which the Confessor may either grant or refuse according to his whim.

244. Questions. - Q. 1º Can dances with masks be regarded as lawful?

Resp. Neg., speaking generally. For experience establishes that games of this kind are enticements to lust, and an efficacious cause of unchastity ¹⁹. Attend nevertheless to various circumstances, and to the reason of greater or lesser danger which can be found in them.

¹⁹ Masks, to be sure, sometimes furnish a fire for unbridled license, which otherwise modesty would prohibit.

Q. 2º Can those be absolved who do not wish to promise that they will leave off dances?

Resp. 1º Neg., if for them they are a proximate occasion of sinning, and they wish indiscriminately to be present also at dishonorable dances. For it is generally impossible for anyone often to be engaged in those companies of the most frivolous and most corrupt youth of either sex and not to be infected by impure contagion. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2º Affirm. generally, if they are present only at honorable dances, for example if at some time they are celebrated by public authority, or at the weddings of relatives or friends, or even on the feast day of the Patron of the place; in cases of this kind, which cannot be impeded, the Confessor will prudently dissemble; for penitents are not to be removed from the Sacraments on this account. - Thus Bouvier, de VI praecept. c. 4. art. 3. and others.

Q. 3º Can those easily be absolved who sometimes lead dances among relatives and friends?

Resp. Affirm., at least speaking generally, if the dances are done while pious parents are present, or others who are conspicuous in age and morals. For such games do not seem per se gravely dangerous; and on the other hand they scarcely, or not even scarcely, can be impeded, especially since they bear before themselves no appearance of evil. Except, unless even there a proximate occasion of sinning is present for someone.

Q. 4º Whether, or what fault it is, to grasp the hand of a woman in dances?

Resp. If it is grasped lightly according to custom in honorable dances, there is no fault per se, or at most it is venial, because in this generally no or slight danger of lust is present. - Thus St. Lig. with others, l. 4. n. 429.

But if with a depraved affection the hand of a woman were grasped or squeezed, the fault would be light or grave according to the depravity of the affection, or also according to the lesser or greater danger of consent in sin.

245. • Q. 5º Is it expedient publicly in preaching to reprehend dances?

Resp. Neg. generally in those places where they are in use, and are reputed something indifferent; because the preacher would profit nothing, and would turn those dancing away both from sermons and from the Sacraments. Therefore it is expedient that preachers, especially Pastors, act only indirectly against dances, and directly against the sins which are accustomed to be committed in them. But let them beware lest imprudently they affix marks of infamy both to those dancing and to others gathering for dances, nor let them threaten that such persons will not be admitted to the sacred table at Paschal time. - V. Casus, n. 223. et seq.

246. • Concerning spectacles, or plays, which are customarily represented through mimes or through actors, almost the same thing will have to be said as concerning dances. Therefore it may suffice to add these few things.

Principles. - I. Spectacles per se are not evil, and consequently not illicit; for they are opposed to no law, neither natural, nor positive, whether divine or human. Hence if shameful things were not represented in them, and if otherwise circumstances furnishing an incentive to lust were absent, they would in no way be to be reproved. - Thus commonly. - St. Thom. 2. 2. qu. 168. art. 3. ²⁰.

²⁰ Thus St. Thomas (l. c. ad 3.) concerning the thing itself, and concerning those who serve it: It must be said that play is necessary for the intercourse of human life. But to all things which are useful for the intercourse of human life, certain lawful offices can be deputed: and therefore also the office of actors, which is ordered to furnishing solace to men, is not according to itself illicit, nor are they in a state of sin, provided they use play moderately, that is, by not using any illicit words or deeds for play, and by not applying play to undue business and times. And although in human affairs they do not use another office by comparison to other men, nevertheless by comparison to themselves and to God they have other serious and virtuous operations (for instance, when they pray, and compose their passions and operations, and sometimes also give alms to the poor). Hence those who moderately assist them do not sin, but act justly, by giving them the payment of their ministry. But if any superfluously spend their goods on such persons, or also sustain those actors who use illicit plays, they sin, as fostering them in sin.

II. Spectacles in which notably shameful things are represented, or in which persons of different sex appear in notably indecent dress, speaking generally, are gravely illicit, because they are harmful both to actors and to spectators.

Yet since generally it is not illicit, when a just and proportionate cause exists, for someone to expose himself to danger, especially if, as is fitting, he fortifies himself with salutary safeguards, therefore there can be excused both soldiers who are bound to be present in order to watch, and servants who would suffer the grave indignation of their masters if they refused to be present, etc. - Scavini.

247. Resolves. - 1º He who, scandal being set aside, is present at a comedy not gravely shameful does not sin mortally, unless perhaps by experience he knows that he is vehemently moved to lust by plays of this kind, with proximate danger of consent, so that the spectacle is for him a proximate occasion of sinning. - St. Lig. de VI praec. n. 472.

2º If in comedies notably shameful things were represented, or represented in a shameful manner, it would indeed be mortal to watch them on account of the delight arising from the shameful things themselves; but venial on account only of curiosity or on account of vain solace, provided nevertheless there is excluded the danger of consent in shameful delight (St. Lig. ibid.), which will easily be present in adolescents, or in others of little timorous conscience, and unless scandal is present; which plainly would be present if Clerics and Religious were present at shameful comedies, as Benedict XIV warns. - St. Lig. Hom. apost. Tract. 9. n. 10.

3º Deservedly Holzmann and Lacroix, because of the scandal of others, condemn as mortal both those who by money or applause cooperate with notably shameful comedies; and also those who are bound to impede them, and when they conveniently can, do not impede them; but a fortiori those who represent them. - St. Lig. ibid. in the great work.