The End

THE Christian faith teaches that the end of human life is to know, love, and serve God. If a man fulfils this obligation faithfully till death, it further gives him the assured hope of eternal happiness with God in heaven. All our actions should be directed towards the end for which the whole man exists; if an action is such that it conduces to that end, it is a good, moral action; if, on the contrary, it does not conduce to that end, it is a bad, immoral action.

Not all man’s actions, however, are capable of being invested with this moral quality. There are many actions of man which have no more moral quality than the growth of a tree in the garden or the running of a dog in the street. Good or bad digestion is an operation to a great extent removed from man’s control; he is in general no more responsible for it than for the condition in which he was born. Or, if some immoral picture is suddenly thrust under his eyes, he cannot help seeing it. Such acts are neither moral nor immoral; they are neither capable of conducing to the end of moral human action, nor of diverting the agent from it: they merit neither praise nor blame.

In order to provide a general rule of conduct in such circumstances, divines have formulated what is known as the principle of a double effect. That principle may be enunciated as follows: It is lawful to perform an action which produces two effects, one good, the other bad, provided that (1) the action, viewed in itself, is good, or at least indifferent; (2) the agent does not intend the evil effect, but only the good; (3) the good effect is produced as immediately as—that is, not by means of— the bad; and (4) there is a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect.

This rule will furnish us with a guide in case of doubt whether we are bound to abstain from any given action because of some evil effect which will follow from it. We shall be at liberty to perform the action in question provided that four conditions are realized. In the first place, the action itself, apart from the evil effect, must not be bad. If it is bad in itself, there can be no question about its lawfulness. Further, the agent must not intend the evil effect, though he foresees that it will follow. If he intends it, the evil effect becomes voluntary in itself and imputable to the agent. Then, the good effect must not be the result of the bad, for we must not do evil that good may come; the end does not justify the means.1 Lastly, there must be such a proportion between the good and bad effects that right reason tells me that I am not forbidden to forego the good effect of the action on account of the bad being inextricably bound up with it.

The question as to whether a general is justified in ordering his army to take a stronghold by assault in war will serve to illustrate the principle and its use. In the first place, the assault must be justified by itself, apart from the cost in human life. The assault will be justified in itself if the war is just and the stronghold belongs to the enemy; it will not be justified if the war is one of unjust aggression, or if the general has been expressly ordered by his Government not to take the place. Moreover, the general must not directly intend the necessary loss of life among the innocent non-belligerents.

He foresees and deplores it; he is said in the technical language of theology to permit the evil effect, not to intend it. The slaughter of innocent non-belligerents must not be the means chosen to capture the stronghold; evil may not be done that good may come. Finally, the capture of the place must be a matter of sufficient importance in the war to warrant the shedding of innocent blood in the bombardment, and the other evils necessarily entailed in an assault. The question as to when the good result is sufficient to outweigh the evil is largely a matter of sound judgement after a careful examination of all the circumstances. If the successful storming of the place would only add to the personal reputation of the general without bringing the end of the war any the nearer, the assault would be a crime; if it would compel the enemy to sue for peace, it would usually be justified. This principle is of great importance in Moral Theology; it has in its support the common consent of divines, and is expressly used by St Thomas.”

By the end is here understood the reason or motive which induces the agent to act.

The end of all human life is called the last end; other motives for action are intermediate ends. An end is primary if it holds the first place among several, and would be sufficient by itself to induce action; otherwise it is secondary.

It is obvious that the end or motive which induces the agent to act holds a very prominent place among the sources of the morality of an action.

For it is the object to which the will tends, the prospect of gaining which moves the agent to act; but, as we saw in the last point, the motion of the will takes its moral quality from the object; a will, then, which tends to a good end will so far be good; a will which tends to a bad end will be bad. But the morality of an action resides chiefly in the will, so that a good or bad will, derived from the motive of an action, must necessarily contribute to the goodness or badness of that action. It is the end or motive which sets the will in motion and gives its own moral quality to the action which follows. One, then, who steals money in order to be able to commit adultery commits a sin against justice, induced thereto by a desire to sin against chastity, and as St Thomas, following Aristotle, says, he is more of an adulterer than a thief.¹

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 18, a. 6.

The end which the agent has in view may coincide with the natural scope of the action, as when a man eats to support life. The extrinsic end is then said to correspond with the intrinsic end of the object. Or it may be different, as when a man eats merely for the sake of pleasure; and a man may be moved to action by a variety of subordinate ends, as when he eats to keep up his strength, to be able to work, to obtain the money wherewith to be able to support his family, and so fulfil his duty.

If the object of the action be good, and the extrinsic end of the agent be good also, the action will have a twofold merit. And so there is a twofold merit in giving an alms to relieve distress for the love of God. On the other hand, a grievously sinful motive corrupts and makes an otherwise good action grievously wrong. It turns the agent altogether away from God, his last end. And so it would be a mortal sin to give an alms to a poor woman in order to seduce her.

Even a venially sinful motive, if it be the whole or the primary motive for the action, corrupts the whole act and makes it venially sinful; for then a bad object is sought by good means indeed, but the means are infected with the purpose to which they are prostituted. And so one who preaches merely out of vanity commits a venial sin.

If, however, an end be only venially sinful, and be not the whole or primary motive of the agent, the resulting action will be partly good and partly evil. We suppose that the object is good, a partial motive or motives are also good; in this case a partial and secondary bad motive, which is only venially sinful, cannot corrupt the whole action. One who preaches principally out of obedience, but more willingly because his vanity is flattered, performs an action which is substantially good, but which is infected with a slight defect.

A good motive gives its own moral quality to an indifferent action and makes it good. And so I do an act of charity by depriving a man of a knife with which he was threatening to commit suicide, while the same action done with a view to making the knife my own would be theft.

There is a controversy among theologians as to whether the purpose or intention with which an action is performed can make an action unjust, which, apart from that intention, is not so.

Would a man, for example, be guilty of an act of injustice towards his enemy, and bound to make restitution to him, if he committed a crime, foreseeing and intending that it should be imputed to his enemy, who would be punished for it? Of course he is guilty of a grave sin by giving way to such an act of hatred, and if by any means he procures the false accusation of his enemy he is also guilty of injustice by causing his undeserved punishment. But supposing the false accusation, though foreseen, was in no way procured by him, but was brought about by other causes, would his intention make him guilty of injustice towards his enemy and bound to make restitution to him ? Many theologians affirm that it would,¹ but seeing that the false accusation is indeed occasioned by the crime, but not caused by it, it would seem that the bad intention of the man who committed the crime was incapable of supplying the . causal connection between the crime and the false accusation. The intention alone cannot change the nature of the external action. But if this be so, he is not the effective cause of the injury done to his enemy, and he is not bound to make restitution to him, A good intention certainly cannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to tell a lie even to save another’s life, according to the teaching of Innocent III. Evil must not be done that good may come of it. This is the teaching of Holy Scripture and of the Catholic Church, nor have Jesuits any other doctrine different from that of the Church. Father Dasbach promised to give anyone two thousand florins who would prove in open court that the Jesuits had ever taught that the end justifies the means, Count Paul von Hoensbroech undertook to do so, but he failed in his suit when it was tried at Cologne in the spring of 1905.² Here we must touch upon a question which has raised a good deal of controversy among divines, and which still divides them. Some, following the great St Augustine, hold that it is a venial sin to eat and to perform other operations of our animal nature for the sake of the pleasure which they give us. Others, on the contrary, hold that the sensible pleasure which accompanies the satisfaction of our animal appetites is good, inasmuch as it is natural and intended by the Author of nature, and so to perform actions which are not wrong in themselves from the motive of pleasure cannot be sinful. If it were not for the sake of the pleasure afforded by eating and by other animal functions many men would abstain from them altogether through disgust. The imperious Stimulus of our fleshly appetites and their satisfaction is required for the preservation and increase of the human race. These satisfactions of our animal nature must indeed be ruled and moderated by right reason, the norm of human conduct. If they are thus moderated, they are conformable to man’s nature, they are in right order and morally good. This seems to be the teaching of St Thomas;³ it is the commoner opinion among modern theologians, nor is it involved in the condemnation of the eighth and ninth propositions condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679.⁴

¹ Lugo, De Justitia, disp. 8, n. 75.

² Civilta Cattolica, Oct. 7, 1905, p. 3.

³ Cont. Gent. 3, c. 9, n. 1; Summa, 2-2, q. 141, a. I, ad I.

⁴ V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 2, n. 505.

Craniotomy, or any other similar operation which has for its immediate and direct effect the destruction of the life of the foetus, is a direct killing of the innocent, and is never allowed. If the child is already dead, there is of course no difficulty in permitting craniotomy or embryotomy, but if it is still alive it is not lawful to kill it, even if otherwise both child and mother were certain to die. Evil must not be done that good may come of it. The end does not justify the means. Some medical men consider the foetus, until it is born, as a portion of the mother which may be destroyed to save her life. This view is not in keeping with Christian principles, according to which the child has a soul of its own, and has its own independent right to live.

Some theologians used to think that such operations were lawful if the mother’s life could not otherwise be saved, because the child might be considered a materially unjust assailant of its mother’s life, and so be lawfully killed; or because when there is a conflict of rights the stronger right should prevail. However, in no sense can it be allowed that the child is an unjust assailant of its mother’s life; it is where nature placed it, through no fault of its own, and it has a right to be there and to be born. If either is an unjust assailant of the other’s life, it is the mother, who voluntarily undertook the obligations of motherhood. In the same way, when the stronger of two conflicting rights prevails, this is due to the fault of the other party, and such fault is out of the question in this case. This doctrine is now theologically certain after the repeated declarations of the Holy See that no operation which tends directly to the destruction of the life of the foetus is lawful.

When the child cannot be born in the natural way, and the life of both mother and child is in danger, Caesarian section or some similar operation may be, and should be, performed, by which the lives of both may very probably be saved. The operation which takes its name from Dr. Porro, and which consists in removing the uterus together with the foetus, requires some special reason to make it lawful, for such mutilation of the mother is only allowed when it is necessary in order to save life.

In all operations which involve danger to the life of the child, Catholic parents should be careful to have the living foetus baptized, which may be done by the doctor or nurse while it is still in the womb. But according to Canon 746 this should not be done as long as there is any hope of the child being born alive.

I. Notion of end. An end is said to be: that for the sake of which something is done, or that for the sake of which an agent operates, or that which, by exciting the appetite of the one about to operate, draws him to acting. Now the appetite is drawn only by an apprehended good. Hence good and end, although they differ in formal concept, materially fall into the same thing. That is, one and the same thing is called a good insofar as it is fitting to the appetite; it is called an end insofar as, through that fittingness, it draws to acting.

Good, by reason of appetibility, is distinguished as threefold: honorable, delectable, and useful. The honorable is that which is conformable to the rules of morals; the delectable, that which is apt to satisfy the appetite; the useful, that which is apt for attaining some other good. Now since an end is that which by its goodness moves one to acting, a useful good as such does not have the character of an end but only of a means (St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 6, ad 2); for that which is chosen by reason of another is called a means. Thus, for example, victory is the end of those fighting, while the fight is the means.

II. Division of end. End is distinguished:

1. Into the end of the work and the end of the worker. The end of the work, or the intrinsic end, is the end to which the work by its nature is ordered. The end of the worker is the end which the worker intends in acting, whether it is the end of the work itself or some other end. Thus in almsgiving the end of the work is the relief of the poor person; the end of the worker can be the relief of the poor person, or vainglory, or something else (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 1).

2. Into the end which, the end for whom, and the end by which. The end which is the very good that is intended; the end for whom is the person for whom the good is desired; the end by which is the very possession or acquisition of the intended good. Thus health is the end which, the sick person is the end for whom, and the acquisition of health is the end by which intended by the physician.¹

3. Into the primary end and the secondary end. The primary or principal end is the one intended by the worker in such a way that, if it were lacking, he would not act, and for its sake he would act even if other ends were lacking. The secondary end is the one intended in such a way that without it the action would nevertheless be placed.

4. Into the final end and the intermediate end. The final end is the one intended only by reason of itself, and therefore not referred to another end. An intermediate end is said to be one which is indeed intended by reason of itself, but with a relation or subordination to a further end.

5. Into a natural end and a supernatural end, according as it can be attained by natural means or - as with the beatific vision - only by a supernatural means.

¹ The end which and the end by which, for example health and its acquisition, likewise the end which and the end for whom, for example health and the sick person for whom health is desired, should not be taken as simply several ends, but rather as two quasi-parts of one total end (Billuart, same place, article 1).

I. The final end for whom of man - as also of every creature - is God, or the divine goodness. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "For whom are all things, and through whom are all things"; "The Lord has made all things for himself, the wicked also for the evil day."¹

It is proved 2. by reason. He who is the first cause and therefore the absolute Lord of all things is necessarily the end to which all things are subordinated. But God is the first cause and therefore the absolute Lord of all things.

¹ Heb. 2:10; Prov. 16:4.

III. Besides the absolutely final end, which man has in common with every creature and which consists in the external glory of God, there is also another final end proper to man. "In the parts of the universe," says St. Thomas, "each creature is for the sake of its own proper act and perfection" (I, q. 65, a. 2). Now the final end proper to man is beatitude. For that is rightly called the proper end of man toward which he himself tends by a natural appetite, and therefore by one implanted by the author of nature. But man tends by a natural appetite toward beatitude.

Corollary. Beatitude, although rightly called the final end proper to man, is nevertheless subordinated to the glory of God, which is the absolutely final end. For from the fact that God is the final end for whom of man, it follows that all things which pertain to man or regard him, and therefore also the beatitude itself of man, are ordered to the good of God, that is, to his external glory. Besides, the beatitude of man and the external glory of God are so connected with each other that they are constituted by the same acts. Lessius explains this in these words: "The highest glory of God is our highest good, and our highest good cannot be anything except his highest glory. The reason is that his highest external glory is that he be perfectly known, loved, and tasted by us. Hence it consists in three vital acts; and in the same acts our highest good formally consists.... For our highest good and formal beatitude is to see, love, taste God, or, what can be said in one word as the same thing, to enjoy God. And so in the highest glory of God our highest good is formally and intrinsically included, so that it cannot be conceived without it; and by this very fact, that God intends and seeks that glory, he intends and seeks our highest good and advantage."¹

¹ Lessius, De perfectionibus divinis, book 14, chapter 3.

I. Man, when he acts deliberately, always acts for the sake of some end. For always, when he acts deliberately, he intends some effect or some good. But that effect is truly an end: for an end is that for the sake of which something is done (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1).

II. Man, when he acts deliberately, always acts for the sake of some final end. For man, whose rational appetite regards the good as its object and is satisfied only by a good apprehended as perfect, man, I say, whatever he deliberately desires, desires either as a perfect good or as tending toward a perfect good. But in either case he acts for the sake of the final end: in the former case, because the perfect good has the character of the final end; in the latter case, because one desiring something as tending toward the perfect good desires it in order to the perfect good or to the final end (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 6).

III. The final ends for which man can in fact act are distinguished as three, namely God, the creature, and beatitude in common. Of these, God and the creature are final ends in the concrete, as regarding a concrete object, and are called material ends. Beatitude is the final end in the abstract, as regarding the indeterminate perfect good, or whatever that may be; and it is usually called the formal end. Now that God and the creature can be intended as the final end is plain and admitted by all. The same seems to be said of beatitude in common. For by the consent of all, there are acts that are venially evil. But acts of this kind are neither referred to God as to the final end, nor to the creature as to the final end, because then they would be mortal sins. It remains, therefore, that they are referred to beatitude in common. Moreover, there are good acts placed without charity. But acts of this kind do not seem to be referred to God as to the final end (n. 243); nor are they referred to the creature as to the final end, because then they would be gravely evil. Hence it seems necessary to admit that they are referred to beatitude in common. Others, however, teach otherwise, and judge that acts that are venially evil and good acts placed without charity are referred to God positively, to the creature negatively, or - as others say - to God efficaciously, to the creature inefficaciously.¹

¹ Cf. Billuart, De ultimo fine, dissertation I, articles 4 and 5.

IV. Man cannot act at the same time for several final ends. For someone desires as the final end that which he desires as the perfect good. Hence the final end so fills the appetite of man that nothing outside it remains to be desired by man. Given this, neither can he desire anything outside it (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 5). Hence a deliberate act is referred either to God alone, or to the creature alone, or to beatitude in common alone, as to the final end. If to God, the act is good; if to the creature, it is gravely evil; if to beatitude in common, it is good or venially evil, according as it is or is not referable to God (n. 243). Others, however, think otherwise according to what was said under III.

The principal one among the circumstances of an act is the end, concerning which we must deal especially.

I. Notion. What the end is, and how manyfold it is distinguished, was explained in nn. 1 and 2.

II. Morality from the end. That an act takes some morality from the end follows from what has been said about morality taken from circumstances, since the end, as we have noted, is the principal circumstance of an act. Take these things especially:

1. An act good from its object:

a) Referred to a good end, distinct from the intended end of the work, receives a new species of goodness; indeed, it obtains as many species of goodness as the good ends appointed for it. Thus, for example, fasting in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary and in satisfaction for sins has a threefold goodness: of temperance from the object, of religion and penance from the ends (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, aa. 4, 6, and 7; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXVIII).

b) Referred to an evil end:

a) It becomes simply evil if the evil end, whether gravely or lightly evil, is the only end, as if someone gives alms to a poor woman solely in order to seduce her, or solely to seek vain glory. The reason is that in this hypothesis the object is not intended insofar as it is honorable, but only insofar as it is useful for obtaining the evil end. "The will," says St. Thomas, "cannot be called good if an evil intention is the cause of willing. For one who wills to give alms for the sake of obtaining vain glory wills that which of itself is good under the account of evil; and therefore, insofar as it is willed by him, it is evil; hence his will is evil" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 7, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXVIII).

b) It is partly evil, partly good, if the end is venially evil, as if someone prays also from vain glory. The reason is that a venially evil end does not prevent the object, insofar as it is honorable, from being intended, and thus the honesty of the object from being contracted. Added to this is that, as we noted in n. 68, if this doctrine is rejected, even among devout persons a good act would be found with greater difficulty, since a lightly evil end is easily mixed into the work (St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4; cf. I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3).

c) It is disputed if the evil end is not indeed the only end, but nevertheless is gravely evil. But even such an end does not seem to prevent the act from being able to be partly good, partly evil; partly good, I say, because the agent can, as it seems, even in this hypothesis intend the object insofar as it is honorable, and thus contract its honesty (n. 68). Yet most authors hold acts of this sort as simply evil. Therefore, according to our opinion, one who gives alms to a poor woman in order to seduce her, though not solely for that reason, can contract the goodness which inheres in the object.

We spoke above of an act partly good and partly evil. But it should be noted that, in the cases adduced, strictly speaking a multiple elicited act of the will should rather be admitted, of which one is good, the other evil; or that by appearance rather than in the reality itself there is had one elicited act of the will which is partly good and partly evil (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 20, a. 6). Apply these things also to what has been said about circumstance (n. 68).

2. An act evil from its object:

a) Referred to an evil end, receives a new species of malice; indeed, it obtains as many species of malice as the evil ends appointed for it. Thus, for example, theft committed in order to make oneself drunk has a twofold malice: of injustice from the object, of intemperance from the end.

b) Referred to a good end, remains evil and contracts no goodness: not from the object, since this is not changed by intention and therefore retains its malice; nor from the end, because the end, as it is intended in the concrete, that is, as to be obtained through an evil means, is evil. Hence, for example, a lie committed in order to save the life of a neighbor is good under no heading. Nevertheless, ignorance or good faith rather often excuses from grave fault, or even from every fault.

3. An act indifferent from its object:

a) Referred to a good end, is good.

b) Referred to an evil end, is evil.

c) Concerning an act referred to an indifferent end, or placed on account of a pleasurable good, something will be said later.

II. In order that an act be morally good, these things are required:

1. The object must be good or at least indifferent (n. 66). If it is indifferent, the act becomes good if it is referred to a good end; in which case the end assumes the character of object.¹

2. The act must be referred to a good end; for "since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the character of evil" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 9).²

3. Goodness must be intended in itself; otherwise it is not contracted subjectively. "In order that the will be good, it is required that it be good under the aspect of good; that is, that it will the good, and on account of the good" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 7, ad 3). But goodness is intended in itself when someone wills the good affected by its goodness, even if he does not reflexively think that he wills the good because it is good.

¹ On circumstances, see n. 69.

² Note, however, that an act good from its object is at least not deprived of goodness by just any bad end (n. 71).

III. Of the conditions assigned, the second must be developed more fully; in other words, it must be explained what kind of end is good, or to what end in the concrete an act must be referred. Now:

1. Every human act must be referred to an honorable end. Nevertheless any honorable end suffices, and it is enough that the honorable end be intended virtually. I said:

a) Every human act must be referred to an honorable end. The proposition is established against the Scotists, who teach that those acts which of themselves are ordered only to some comfort or relief of nature, such as walking, smelling flowers, stroking the beard, those acts, I say, can without sin be directly referred to the lower end alone, namely to comfort or pleasure, provided the ultimate end is not positively excluded.¹ According to the stated authors, one who directly rests in such an end neither sins, because to act for the end of the work alone is not evil, nor acts morally well, because he does not refer the act to an honorable end. Therefore he places an indifferent act. But the contrary opinion is deduced from the fact that every human or deliberated act must be done for that end alone which befits rational nature. But it befits rational nature to act for an honorable end, and not for another (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 4, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XLIV).

Objection. He who acts for the end of the work alone cannot sin. But the works about which there is controversy are, by their nature, ordered to pleasure alone.

Response. The argument proposed by us proves precisely that he sins who acts for the end of the work alone, if there is question of a work which by its nature is ordered to pleasure alone.

Corollary I. It is illicit to act for pleasure alone, so that an act placed for that end alone not only is destitute of goodness, but is also evil. It is, however, only venially evil, if there is question of a thing licit in itself or venially evil, because the disordered relation of an act licit in itself or slightly evil does not import grave disorder. Except the case in which pleasure would be intended as the ultimate end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 912).

Corollary II. It seems illicit to act, even, for pleasure, by resting, even, in it as such, because pleasure as such is not an honorable end. Yet to someone this will seem licit, insofar as the honorable act and its delectability constitute one thing.

Corollary III. It is licit to act for pleasure insofar as, from the intention of the Author of nature, it attracts to an act ordered in itself, for instance to conjugal intercourse; likewise insofar as it conduces to the well-being and operation of the body or soul. The reason is that pleasure, considered as such, has the character of an honorable end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 912; cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 34, a. 1; II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 2; II-II, q. 168, a. 2; Contra Gentiles, bk. 3, c. 9, n. 1).

b) Nevertheless any honorable end suffices, whether the end of the work or another intended by the agent, whether conceived in species or in a vague way. The very end of the work, at least to this extent, does not fall under precept, insofar as there is no obligation of intending it, although there can be an obligation of not impeding it. This being posited, the agent is free to set before himself another honorable end (St. Alphonsus, VI, 927; cf. 882 and 883). Nevertheless several think, as we shall soon note, that the end of the work itself, by the very fact that it is not positively excluded, is at least implicitly intended.

c) It is enough that the honorable end be intended virtually, or that the act be virtually referred to an honorable end, or that the act be placed by force of an honorable intention previously had. For it suffices that the act truly be referred to an honorable end; but it is truly referred to an honorable end if it is placed by force of an honorable intention previously had. There is added that the obligation of an actual relation "would be an unbearable weight and a matter entangled with six hundred scruples" (St. Alphonsus, V, XLIV).

d) It is disputed whether one who places an act ordered by its nature to an honorable end, and does not positively exclude that end, by that very fact intends the honorable end, at least implicitly. Most more recent authors affirm this; but it seems it must be denied. For that on account of which an act is distinguished is not implicitly intended by the very fact that the act is performed. But the end of the act is distinguished from the act itself, for example the procreation of offspring from intercourse, as effect from cause; hence in order that it be intended, a new act of the will is required. But the controversy is less practical, because one who places, in the due mode and order, an act ordered by its nature to an honorable end, and does not positively exclude this end, commonly positively includes that end, although only confusedly and weakly.

2. It is disputed whether every human act must, in order to be good, be referred to God, or whether it suffices that it be referable to God.

Some teach that every act must be referred to God, because the dignity of the true ultimate end requires that all acts be referred to him. They add, however, that an implicit relation suffices, and that this is had by the very fact that the act is placed for an honorable end; because every honorable act by its nature is referred to God, the first and fontal honorableness of every particular honorableness.

Others deny that every act must be referred to God, and teach that, for a good act, it suffices that it be referable to God. They think this because acts cannot in any way be referred to God except through charity. But charity is certainly not required in order that a good act be placed; and this is already deduced from the 25th Baian proposition: "All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices."² According to the latter opinion, a good act not referred to God is referred to beatitude in common as to the ultimate end (nn. 12 and 13).

3. A human act, in order to be good, does not have to be elicited from the motive of charity, nor from another supernaturally known motive; this again is already deduced from the 25th Baian proposition just cited.

4. Although a human act, in order to be good, does not have to be elicited from the motive of charity, nevertheless to this extent there is an obligation of referring one's acts through an act of charity to God as to the ultimate end, insofar as it is prescribed to elicit an act of charity at certain times. Another precept besides that which is identified with the precept of charity cannot be proved. Hence St. Thomas says: "If it is asked when one must refer an act to the ultimate end, this is nothing other than to ask when the habit of charity must go out into act, because whenever the habit of charity goes out into act, the ordering of the whole man to the ultimate end takes place, and consequently of all those things which are ordered to him as goods for him" (In II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 6).

Nor does St. Alphonsus contradict these things when he teaches that acts should be offered to God several times in the day, at least in the morning (V, XLIV). For, as is clear from the context, he does not speak about the relation of acts to God as to the ultimate end, but about the care of referring all one's acts, even those which from the object are indifferent, to a good or honorable end. In order that this be done certainly, a good intention should be repeated more often.

5. Those who think that, for the goodness of an act, it is not required that it be referred to God as to the ultimate end, since according to their opinion this cannot be done without charity, ask what kind of influence must proceed from charity in order that an act be referred to God.³ Now:

Some require only habitual charity, without its influencing the act, since honorable acts are referred to God as if by their own weight.

Others likewise require only habitual charity; but according to them honorable acts which are placed in that state are always placed under the influence of the intention of God as ultimate end. For every agent, they say, acts from the intention of the ultimate end; but this, in one who is ordered to God, that is, in a just person, is God himself.

Others, besides habitual charity, require an act of perfect charity, by force of which good acts are referred to God. Of these, some say that in itself one act suffices for referring all future good acts to God, with the things that must be posited of course having been posited, namely that one not lose charity in the meantime. I said "in itself," because from another source there is the precept of eliciting an act of charity at certain times. Others think that the act of charity must be repeated at least from time to time. Here, however, it is further disputed whether the act of charity, in order to refer human acts to God, must be their causing principle, or whether it suffices that it be an ordering principle.⁴

Van Roey, who embraces the latter opinion, describes the stated ordering thus: "But if you ask how that virtual ordering of works is conceived, which is not virtual causality, we respond that it is a certain determination left behind from the first intention, some dictate arising from the first dictate, by force of which works are exercised in loving service of God and are determined and specified as friendly offerings made to God. This determination, this dictate, must be perceived as something truly persevering in the will, although here and now it does not occur to thought; the sign, indication, and argument of its real persistence is if someone, self-possessed and acting morally, is in such a disposition of mind that, seriously reflecting upon himself or asked why he does this or that work, finally and ultimately, after perhaps giving other particular motives, he answers that he acts on account of God, to please God, or something similar including explicitly or implicitly the motive of charity.

"If the matter is understood thus, it cannot be denied that the ordering of works is virtual; that is, the preceding intention, when it vanishes from the mind as an explicit intention, leaves behind some power, some determination, some disposition, which suffices so that the works, if they are done, are directed to God."

¹ Therefore they do not apply the doctrine to those acts to which the Author of nature has appointed the certain end of some honorable necessity or utility; such are, for example, eating, conjugal intercourse, etc. Besides, Innocent XI condemned proposition 8: "To eat and drink to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts"; and proposition 9: "The act of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from all fault and venial defect" (Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1158 and 1159).

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1025.

³ Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 26 sq.; Ernst, Ueber die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. dogm., VIII, n. 639.

⁴ Van Roey, De virtute caritatis, p. 232 sq.

There are three acts of the will that are directed to the end the will has in view, viz., wish, intention and fruition. Wish is the love or inclination of the will towards the end without any reference to the means by which it is to be obtained: this is the first act of the will. Intention is the direction of the will to the gaining of the end through certain means. Fruition is the enjoyment of the end after it has been gained: this is the last act of the will.

Having considered human acts and the passions, we now pass to a consideration of the principles from which acts proceed proximately. These principles are, first, the faculties, powers or forces of the soul (such as the intellect, will, sense, appetite, and vegetative powers); and, secondly, the habits which permanently modify the faculties. For some faculties may be turned in various directions, either favorably or unfavorably, as regards their ends, and it is the stable bent given to a faculty that is called a habit. Thus, the intellect may be directed towards its end, which is truth, by the habit of knowledge; or away from that end by the habit of ignorance. Likewise, the will may be directed towards or away from its end, which is good, by virtue or vice. The faculties are treated in Psychology, but the habits, since they turn the faculties towards good or evil, must be considered in Moral Theology, as well as in philosophy.

Whether morality, or moral goodness or malice, is found only in the interior act of the will, or also in the exterior act? - Morality formally is only in the interior, free act of the will; materially, however, it is only also in the exterior act. For a twofold moral goodness or malice can be distinguished in the exterior act. First, the objective moral goodness or malice of the exterior act can be considered, which that act has of itself, namely from its proper object and circumstances, by which it is objectively affected, according to the right order of reason. Goodness or malice of this kind, which the exterior act has in itself because of due or undue matter and due or undue circumstances, is derived from reason, according as that object and those circumstances exhibit the rectitude of reason or a deviation from the right order of reason. This objective goodness or malice of the exterior act is prior to the goodness or malice of the act of the will. And thus the exterior act is the object of the will, insofar as it is proposed to the will by reason as a certain good apprehended and ordered by reason, or as departing from this order; and it causes moral goodness or malice in the will.

Second, moral goodness or malice can be considered in the exterior act in order to the end, according as this exterior act stands under the interior act of the will. For the end is the proper object of the will. And thus the notion of good or evil which the exterior act has from order to the end is found first in the act of the will, and is derived from it to the exterior act. Moreover, insofar as the exterior act consists in the execution of the work, it is an effect of the will and follows the will. The will is then compared to the exterior act as an efficient cause; hence the moral goodness or malice of the act of the will is the form of the exterior act, as existing in the acting cause, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 1. Therefore "the goodness of the end redounds from the will into the exterior act, and the goodness of the matter and circumstances redounds into the act of the will," S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 3.

Now the exterior act and the interior act of the will, as they are considered in the genus of morals, are one human act, ib. If the human act is considered adequately in this way, the formal moral goodness or malice of the human act is intrinsically only in the interior act of the will, but in the exterior act only by extrinsic denomination. For the morality of a human act, formally considered, is found only in a free act, and freedom formally is only in the will. Likewise formal moral goodness is from order to the end, which is the proper object of the will, q. 20. a. 1. Hence it is clear that in the exterior act moral goodness of this kind, which is according to order to the end, depends wholly on the will, ib. a. 2.

But that "goodness of the exterior act which it has from matter and circumstances is other than the goodness which is from the end; it is not, however, other than the goodness of the will which it has from the very act willed, but is compared to it as its reason and cause," q. 20. a. 4 ad 2. This is confirmed, "for however much the exterior act may seem good in itself and conformable to reason, nevertheless if it is commanded by an evil internal act or depraved intention and election, it is not good insofar as it is a human act. Therefore this is a sign that in the notion of a human act it is good only by denomination from the interior act. A similar argument is this: because the exterior act precisely and taken in itself does not add formal moral goodness to a man, nor render him more virtuous. For if we understand someone who, thinking that he can execute the exterior act of virtue, has an efficacious will to exercise such an act, he is upright and virtuous, whether he can really execute it or not, because virtue does not depend on a faculty which can be lacking to us unwillingly, but on the will, supposing that the will is equal.... This doctrine concerning external acts proceeds in the same way in acts of the intellect and of the sensitive appetite." Suarez tr. 3. d. 10, s. 1. n. 6. 11. "What is clearer than that the will is reputed as the deed, where necessity excludes the deed?" S. Bernard Ep. 77; Gen. 22:16; Matt. 5:28. The will, namely a will efficacious of itself. E. M. 6. 71. 72.

Does the external act add morality in some way to the internal act? "It must be said first, that the exterior act of itself does not bear an increase of goodness or malice, if the other things are equal, in the interior act. Thus D. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 4.... because the exterior act does not have a goodness distinct from the interior, and necessarily follows from it if it is in our power; but if it is not in our power, it does not diminish the goodness of the will.... Second, it must be said that external action is sometimes necessary for the goodness of the will, or for such goodness.... For when it is in man's power to execute an external action, he cannot have a perfect interior will unless he executes the exterior action, because the exterior act is the term and end of the interior, and because an absolutely perfect will is one that acts when it can.... Third, it must be said that accidentally the exterior act can increase goodness or malice simply.... For 1. because of the exterior act a man often endures and perseveres more in the interior act; indeed he often multiplies interior acts, and in this way it is morally worse to kill. 2. Because the exterior action itself both kindles the affection, and thus contributes to the interior act, in the way in which vocal prayer is accustomed to contribute to interior devotion. 3. External actions are useful for moderating the passions and habituating the body, so that it may more easily serve justice.... It must also be added that good external acts are useful for the effect of satisfaction for temporal punishment due for sin, because satisfaction is taken not only from goodness, but especially from the penal character of the act; but the exterior act of itself brings its own pain and sorrow. Finally it must be added that exterior acts are necessary for certain effects of grace, which are conferred either ex opere operato, or from a special privilege; such as are the effects of the sacraments and the effects of martyrdom, and any others that are similar, because, since these effects do not depend on the mind alone of the one acting, they have been promised to one exercising such a work not only in affection, but also in effect; and in the same way on the contrary, evil external acts, or even their effects, are necessary for incurring certain punishments or censures, which are not incurred by the internal act alone." Suarez tr. 3. d. 10. s. 2. n. 2. 3. 4. 6; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1; L. 1. 2. n. 42; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5 ad 1, q. 20. a. 5, 2. D. 40. a. 3; E. M. 71. 72.

Is it necessary for the moral goodness of human acts to direct all actions to the glory of God; and do human acts, insofar as they are good or evil, have the notion of merit or demerit before God? - R. To the 1st: The more common and truer opinion affirms it. The reason is most clearly evident from what has been said; since every moral action, in order that it be good, must tend to the ultimate end and be ordered to it by reason. But if a human action tends and is ordered to the ultimate end, it is already directed to the glory of God. Therefore it is as necessary to direct all actions to the glory of God as it is necessary for them to be morally good. "The goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end: but the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, which is God. Therefore it is required for the goodness of the human will that it be ordered to the highest good." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 9. "The whole that man is, and what he can and has, must be ordered to God." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. a. 4 ad 3. - 1 Cor. 10:31.

Hence it is enough to direct them to God virtually on the part of the work, or by the very act exercised, namely by acting for the end of some virtue, or for what is honorable and consonant with rational nature; for such an act tends to the glory of God from its intrinsic nature. To the point S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3 ad 2: "Whenever someone wills those things which are for the end, he wills the end by the same act; but not conversely." And q. 21. a. 4: "He who does an evil act not referable to God does not preserve the honor of God which is due to the ultimate end." Cajetan on the same q. 8. a. 3: "one who always seeks what is for the end seeks the end, not habitually, but actually, as actually extends itself to virtually. For virtually to use something is within the breadth of actual use; otherwise that precept would never be fulfilled: Do all things for the glory of God; for to do imports to operate actually."

Much more, moreover, is it enough to direct all actions to God virtually on the part of the one operating himself, who by an act of charity has ordered his whole life to God and remains in habitual charity. Cajetan says this on 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3: "Between the movement of the will toward something habitually and actually, there is the middle movement of the will toward it virtually.... For when one having charity sins venially, he indeed habitually loves God, but not actually, as is clear, nor virtually, because sin is not directable to God. But when one having charity walks or preaches, and whatever else he does not do evilly, although he does not actually think of God, nevertheless that act is not only an act of such virtue, but of charity, and the will then is borne virtually toward God, and not only habitually, which belongs to one sleeping and to one sinning venially." S. Th. 2. D. 10. q. 1, a. 5; E. M.

R. To the 2nd: A human act has the notion of laudable or blameworthy, or of fault, from the fact that it is from the power of free will: "For to be praised or blamed is nothing other than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his act." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 21. a. 2. It has the notion of good or evil from the fact that it is suitable or unsuitable to right reason. It has the notion of rectitude from the fact that it has order to the end. It has the notion of honorable or of sin from the fact that it is conformable or deformable to law. Finally it has the notion of merit or demerit according to the retribution of justice toward another, from the fact that it is performed in service of another. Retribution is made to someone from the fact that he acts for the advancement or harm of another. By giving something from those things which are in our dominion, we acquire for ourselves a certain right to receive something from another's. S. Th. De Verit. q. 29. a. 6. Therefore from the fact that a human act is referred to God as to the ultimate end, and consequently promotes his honor and glory, and God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, to whom it belongs to make retribution for those things which are done well or badly in it, human acts have before God the notion of natural merit or demerit. For a human act considered precisely according to its moral goodness, in the present order of divine providence, is not formally meritorious of grace and eternal life; for grace is necessary for supernatural merit, by which it is elevated to a supernatural condition. Materially, however, such an act is capable of becoming meritorious of supernatural reward, presupposing divine ordination and grace being added. For if these are removed, there is had only natural merit toward a merely natural reward, from the fact that good works yield to God's service. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 5. a. 7, q. 21. a. 2. 3. 4, q. 114. a. 1. 2; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 3; E. M. 75. 89.

What is an end, and how manyfold is it? - By end here is properly understood that which the agent further intends through such or such an act, as the reason on account of which he acts. This is that end which is called the end of the one acting, and it is an end extrinsic to the act. "It must be said," says S. Th. 2. D. 36. q. un. a. 5 ad 5, "that some act has a twofold end, namely the proximate end, which is its object, and the remote end, which the agent intends." But if the agent does not intend another end diverse from the intrinsic end itself of the action which he does, then the end of the one acting coincides with the end of the work, as appears in one who wishes to steal in order to steal, that is, in order to become rich from another's goods. The intrinsic end of the work cannot be wholly excluded by the one acting if he knows the nature of the work, for that end is intrinsic to the work. And thus if someone blasphemes the divine Name, he cannot exclude the injury inflicted on God. Hence what the uneducated say is of no force, namely that they blasphemed God not to inflict injury on God and to sin, but for mere relief; that they fornicated not in order to sin, but to experience natural pleasure. Yet sometimes the one acting can by his intention exclude the very moral exterior action, when it depends on this, for example, if someone goes to church not to hear Mass, but so that he can commit theft.

The end of the one acting can be considered in two ways: 1. with respect to the intention of the will, that is, with respect to the act of the will intending it; 2. with respect to the act itself which is commanded as a means to that end. Under the first consideration, the end is properly the object of the will, indeed the chief object, since the end is that which moves the will to the means. Under the second consideration, the end is a mere circumstance of the commanded act, and thus it is usually numbered among the circumstances. He who steals, for example, in order to commit adultery, chiefly wills adultery; this he intends and efficaciously procures. And from this adultery comes the principal malice of the will. But the act commanded for that reason by the will of adultery, namely theft, for example, has the substantial malice proper to itself from its proper object, that is, from taking another's property against the owner's will; but that it is referred extrinsically by the one acting to such or such an end is altogether accidental to it, not from its own nature, but from the choice of the one acting.

Therefore the end which is a circumstance of the act is not the end of the work itself, which gives species to the act, but some joined end; just as that the brave man acts bravely on account of the good of fortitude is not a circumstance; but if he acts bravely for the liberation of the city, or for Christ, or something of this sort. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3 ad 3, q. 18. a. 6 ad 2. The intrinsic end is always the proximate end, as is clear; but the extrinsic end can be proximate and remote and ultimate. The proximate is what is immediately intended, the remote what is intended mediately, the ultimate that in which one rests.

Is there one sole end of a human action? - "The same act numerically, according as it proceeds once from the agent, is not ordered except to one proximate end, from which it has its species; but it can be ordered to several remote ends, of which one is the end of another." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 3. According as it proceeds once from the agent: for there can be several ends of the act according as it is continued and repeated; for example, to take another's property so that someone may grow rich from another's; to retain another's property, or to take it again, so that it may be preserved for the owner. To one proximate end, that is, of the act or work itself. Cf. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 4 ad 2. From which it has species: for there can be several ends, even proximate ends, of the work, of one and the same act, but one is the primary end of the work, from which there is, as it were, the substantial species of the act; the others are accidental and rather take on the nature of circumstances. Thus, for example, if someone undertakes a pilgrimage in order to celebrate Mass in the Sanctuary of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, the sacrifice of the Mass is the proximate end of the work, from which the celebration of Mass itself intrinsically takes its species; but to celebrate in that Sanctuary in honor of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus is also the proximate end of the work of the celebration itself, but as a certain extrinsic circumstance, not giving species to the act, namely the first species, or substantial species of the act. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2, a. 7 ad 1.

Therefore it is possible "that one act according to the species of nature be ordered to diverse ends of the will. Just as this very thing, to kill a man, which is the same according to the species of nature, can be ordered as to an end to the preservation of justice and to satisfying anger (either by the same person in diverse acts, or by diverse persons). And from this there will be diverse acts according to the species of morals, because in one way it will be an act of virtue, in another way an act of vice. But moral ends are accidental to a natural thing; and conversely the notion of a natural end is accidental to the moral; and therefore nothing prevents acts which are the same according to the species of nature from being diverse according to the species of morals, and conversely." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 3.

The end, whether proximate or remote, of the one acting, to which the act of the will is ordered, can itself give a moral species to the act. And if it is the ultimate end in some series, it is that which most especially gives species to the act, because it is prior in intention, and all other ends depend upon it, since all those others are subordinated. And thus he who commits adultery in order to steal, and steals in order to commit homicide, is rather a homicide than an adulterer and a thief: because homicide is the formal and motive reason of the other acts. "When many acts differing in species are ordered to one end, there is indeed diversity of species on the part of the exterior acts, but unity of species on the part of the interior act." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6. The end, whether proximate or remote, of the one acting can be multiple, and indeed primary; for example, if someone goes to the house of an enemy in order to kill him and at the same time steal his goods, and is determined to go even though he can accomplish only one or the other in act. Primary is that which moves and determines to the act. It is therefore distinguished from the secondary, which only impels to the act and by itself alone does not suffice to move efficaciously to acting.

Does a human action take goodness and species from the end; and does this differ from the goodness and species which is taken from the object? - R. To the 1st: "The end is the most principal cause of the act, insofar as it moves the agent to acting; hence also the moral act has species especially from the end." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 4, q. 1. a. 2. 3; Matt. 6:1. 2. 22.

To the 2nd: "The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Hence, as regards the act of the will, the goodness which is from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, as it does in acts of the other powers; unless perhaps accidentally according as the end depends on the end and the will on the will"; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 2 ad 1, namely when several ends per se subordinated and willed are present together, as when someone wills curative medicine for the sake of entering military service, for the sake of victory: the formal goodness of the object, say, to be healthy, differs from the goodness of another end, say, of military service; and when the will of one end, say adultery, depends on the will of another end, say theft, as when someone wills to commit adultery in order to steal, the malice also of the object, say adultery, differs from the malice of the end, say theft. But both are accidental; for it is accidental to the end that it be subordinated to another, and it is also accidental to the will that it depend on another, otherwise this would belong to every end and every volition. Cajetan on this place.

Moreover, a human act is human insofar as it is voluntary. But in a voluntary act a twofold act is found: the interior act of the will and the exterior act. And each of these has its own proper object. "But the end is properly the object of the will. That about which the exterior action is concerned is its object. Therefore, just as the exterior act receives species from the object about which it is concerned, so the interior act of the will receives species from the end as from its proper object. But that which is on the part of the will is related as formal to that which is on the part of the exterior act, because the will uses the members for acting as instruments; nor do exterior acts have the notion of morality except insofar as they are voluntary. And therefore the species of a human act is considered formally according to the end, but materially according to the object of the exterior act. Hence the Philosopher says that he who steals in order to commit adultery is, speaking per se, more an adulterer than a thief." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6. For adultery is first intended and more voluntary than theft, which is chosen only as a means to it. Yet the primary species of the work is theft rather than adultery, for that is taken from the object. And thus also he who gives alms in order to satisfy God for his sins is rather penitent and just than merciful; but that action of distributing alms is rather a work of mercy than of penance and justice. S. Th. 2. D. 38. q. 1. a. 4 ad 4; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1; E. M.

Can the intention of an extrinsic end intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work? - R. Negatively. The reason is: 1. Because the intrinsic nature of things cannot be changed. 2. Because the intention of the one acting adds nothing to the work; indeed it does not even touch it, since it is wholly extrinsic to it. - Therefore our good intention cannot render an evil work good, nor can our evil intention render evil what is good, nor intrinsically transfer what is evil into another species of malice.

But this does not prevent, as is clear, that where the question concerns an object indifferent of itself, the extrinsic end of the one acting can confer moral goodness or malice. For this is not to change the intrinsic nature of the exterior work itself, but to determine its intrinsic indifference, insofar as it is a human work; and in morals this determination is only from intention. And thus, although the depraved intention of a judge to harm the accused cannot intrinsically change the nature of a just sentence and constitute it an unjust damaging, nevertheless the intention of taking another's property determines the very taking, according as someone takes another's property in order to preserve it for its owner, or in order to take it for himself and steal. - L. 1. 3. n. 584. 636.

Is an act good if it has a twofold end, one good, the other evil? - R. Affirmatively, if the evil end relates itself merely antecedently or consequently, that is, merely precedes the whole act or accedes to an act already preexisting, or even if it relates itself merely concomitantly, that is, contributes nothing to the being of the act itself, but is only joined to it. The reason is that then it is wholly extrinsic to the act constituted in its whole being. For it is not the reason on account of which the act itself is done, but is only the reason of another act, for example, of a certain simple complacency which precedes, accompanies, or follows the deliberate act. But this simple complacency can exercise its own influence even without infecting the act, so that someone may be moved more easily to a good act, for example, if almsgiving were proposed to someone as contributing to eternal life, and to this were joined a simple complacency in the esteem to be had thereby among men. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7.

R. Negatively, if the evil end relates itself truly causatively, and influences the substance of the act. The reason is that then someone wills the good at least inadequately under the notion of evil, which is to will evil. "For the will to be good, it is required that it be of good under the notion of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good." S. Th. l. c. ad 3. Except unless the end is only lightly evil, and is not the primary end, and not even inadequately the end moving and determining. The reason is that then the only lightly evil and secondary end, merely impelling, does not influence the substantial being itself of the act, but the extrinsic accidental being of the act; and therefore the whole substance of the act remains good. And thus almsgiving will be good, even if a light ostentation has extrinsically crept into that act and truly influenced it, so that someone gave it more promptly and easily, in such a way that there is a multiple act in the genus of morals, although one in the genus of nature. This, as is clear, falls back into the preceding case. Nevertheless there are not lacking those who hold that one and the same act can be at once substantially good and lightly evil. Yet this appears difficult; for then there could be an act not only morally good as to its substance, but even supernatural, which nevertheless would be lightly evil and displeasing to God. Cf. 73. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4 ad 3; Suarez d. 8. s. 1. n. 14 seq.

Does he sin who acts for the sake of delight? - R. Affirmatively, if he acts for the sake of delight alone, namely by positively excluding the further honorable end of the work; and this sin, speaking per se, does not exceed venial sin. Negatively, if he simply acts for the sake of delight. The reason of the first is that delight is for the sake of operation, not conversely, namely so that man may be enticed to the operations necessary or useful to human life. Therefore delight is not the end of action, "but a means for exercising the action more constantly, more easily, better." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 4. a. 2. Confirmed from prop. 8, condemned by Innoc. IX. The reason of the second is that since delight is not evil of itself, but good, unless someone constitutes his ultimate end in it, which without doubt would be grave, there is no grave disorder in human action. The reason of the third is that delight is not evil of itself, but good, and it is consonant with the very order of nature that man be enticed by delight to operating. S. Th. C. G. l. 3. c. 26. n. 6. 7. Therefore if someone, although he expressly thinks nothing about a further honorable end, is moved by delight to an action which he apprehends as consonant with nature, or in which he finds nothing contrary to the order of reason, for example, to taking food, playing, etc., he does not sin at all.

S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141. a. 1 ad 1; E. M. Although he expressly thinks nothing about a further honorable end, for example, about the preservation of his own life by eating and drinking. For to act honorably it suffices that someone apprehend the act as licit, or, what is the same, that he not apprehend it as illicit. For by willing an act consonant with reason he implicitly wills all those things on account of which that act is suitable to reason, although he does not expressly think about them, indeed even if he is ignorant of them.

Whether injury can be inflicted by an anterior act alone? - Although injury can be inflicted on another through a merely internal act, nevertheless an internal act of itself cannot cause an external act to become unjust. The first part is proved, because sometimes by an internal act alone the strict right of another can be injured. This is clear from the example of rash judgment, by which, according to the common opinion, justice toward neighbor is violated, since each person has a strict right to the good estimation of himself among individuals. The second part is proved, because an internal act cannot change the nature of an external act. Hence he who refuses out of hatred to help another does not sin against justice, unless he is held by office; nor does a judge, condemning a murderer from hatred to the death he deserves; nor a merchant, selling his goods at the lowest price so as to deprive other merchants of profits. Of itself; for an external action inchoatively indifferent is determined only by the interior intention, so that it is the beginning of a completed unjust external action rather than a just one. And thus one who accepts a thing from the hands of a thief does not sin against justice if he does it to restore it to the owner, but he does if he does it to retain it. Lugo d. 22, n. 156; La-Croix l. 3, p. 2, n. 635, 636; C. A. 1305.

What if an external work is posited indeed from an evil intention, but, although damage can occur, it is not truly probable that it will follow? There is controversy among the gravest theologians. But the state of the question will be clearer from the following examples, namely: 1. Someone places poison or a snare in a place through which his enemy passes very rarely, but with the intention that he be killed if by chance he passes. 2. A physician employs all the diligence to which he is bound, but does not wish to employ greater diligence out of hatred, so that the death of the sick man may follow. It is asked: whether these are the cause of an unjust death which perhaps will follow, if in fact it follows? There is a twofold opinion. The first, more common opinion denies. The reason is that on one side the external act is not unjust, since the mere possibility of another's damage must not be attended to in human affairs; on the other side, the external act is not made injurious by reason of the intention, since intention does not influence the efficacy of the cause, or the danger of damage. For then it must be called a merely accidental cause, and the depraved intention does not change its nature. Hence neither is he unjust in fact who digs a well on his own land so that the neighbor's well may dry up. Who certainly would say that the director of a railroad is bound to restitution because he does not send scouts before individual carriages to see whether some person is in the middle of the way and perhaps is to be killed by the passage of the carriages, although he omits this from the depraved will of killing all if perhaps they are there? But the second opinion affirms. The reason is that in the aforesaid cases homicide is certainly against justice and is not excused except insofar as involuntary. But the intention renders it voluntary. For the reason why, excluding the intention, it is not voluntary is that the one placing the cause is not judged to will the effect efficaciously, since the effect is not probably connected with the cause; but the intention supplies that connection and causes the one acting to be its true cause. For the intention of the one acting contributes much to the character of a cause. Therefore. But mere foresight of the possibility of damage in the aforesaid cases would not suffice for the character of injury; rather, the intention of procuring it is also required. - Lessius l. 2, c. 9, n. 133; Lugo d. 8, n. 75; L. 584; C. A. 1305, 1311.

Whether you are bound to restitution if from an evil intention, e.g., from hatred, yet with means of themselves unjust excluded, you turn another away from the attainment of a good to which he does not have a strict right? Resp. Negatively, more probably. The reason is that no injury is inflicted on the neighbor. For evil intention does not suffice for injury, but an external action is required which is the true and efficacious cause of unjust damage. - L. 584, 585; Elbel 108.

1. Caius, an ingenuous youth, indeed confesses rather often, because he knows that this is very pleasing to his directors. Likewise he is accustomed to hear Mass daily, moved by the example of his companions, lest he seem less devout than they. Moreover, he not rarely distributes among the poor money received from his father, but almost always experiences in himself a desire for vain glory. Hence, after spiritual exercises have been completed, he greatly fears lest his confessions were invalid and sacrilegious, and lest he acquired no merit from his pious works, but, on the contrary, incurred demerit and sin.

Q. 1. Do human actions take their species from the end? 2. Has Caius received the sacrament of penance invalidly, and has he lost all merit of pious works?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 79. To the second: the confessions of Caius were neither sacrilegious nor invalid. For for the validity of confession there is required, and there suffices, sincere sorrow and purpose. But Caius could well have sincere sorrow and purpose, even if he approached confession because he knew that this was pleasing to his directors. Nor indeed, since Caius is an ingenuous youth, can it be supposed that he principally intended this end, or that he confessed without due sorrow and purpose. Therefore the confessions of Caius were neither invalid nor sacrilegious, but substantially good and meritorious, although perhaps he was moved in some way by the impulse of vain glory; because such an impulse does not intrinsically affect the very substance of confession, but is related to it merely concomitantly and extrinsically. Therefore granted that such an impulse was venially evil, confession nevertheless, as having been made from a good intrinsic end, namely of reconciling himself to God and obtaining grace remissive of sins, could well remain morally good and sufficient for validity and for merit. And thus also it remains substantially good and sufficient for validity, although in confession perhaps you lie lightly, or without cause lightly defame your neighbor. For although such a lie and such defamation are morally evil, nevertheless, because they are related accidentally in order to confession, and since venial sins from elsewhere do not obstruct divine grace and reconciliation, they leave confession good in itself, and sufficient for validity and for merit. Hence the same must be said of Masses heard and of alms bestowed. - Elbel 78, 79; G. 33, 34; I. M. 77, 78, 81.

2. Sebastianus, being scrupulous, in order to abstract himself from every creature, resolved to deprive himself of every pleasure not necessary for the sustaining of life. He thought that pleasure not necessary to life could be sought only from the satisfaction of natural inclination, since pleasure is not referred to the glory of God. But in order that he might live wholly for God and seek the glory of God in all things, he resolved actually to offer all his actions to God before he did anything. Hence in a short time it happened that, gravely ill in the head, he died in an asylum of the insane.

Q. 1. Is it licit to act for the sake of pleasure? 2. Must all actions be referred to God? 3. What as to the case?

R. To the first and to the second, cf. I. M. 75, 82. To the third: Sebastianus is deceived, with grave detriment to his body and soul. In order that one may live wholly for God and seek the glory of God in all things, he does not therefore necessarily have to be deprived of every honest pleasure, not altogether necessary for the sustaining of life. Pleasure also, even only useful for restoring the bodily powers by moderate delight and recreation, is honest, and by its own nature is implicitly and mediately ordered also to the ultimate end, or to God. Hence it is altogether licit to act for the sake of pleasure and delight, and to intend it, provided that another honest end, to which by its very nature it is referred, is not excluded, namely that man may act better and may be able to persevere longer in honest operation; by which intermediate end as mediator, it is referred to God himself. Therefore, whenever one does not exclude that honest end, the pleasure or delight sought is virtually referred to God, nor is it necessary that one actually offer it to God, since a virtual offering suffices.

Indeed, honest recreations and amusements have been created by God himself for the use of men. Therefore they are naturally good in themselves and honest. Therefore, as one who intends another honest thing acts honestly, and the action is virtually referred to God without his explicitly and actually offering that action to God, so also someone acts honestly by accepting an honest recreation of mind and an honest amusement, without actually and formally offering it to God. Hence the same must consequently be said of pain and inconvenience, to be avoided and repelled by honest means. Whence it is also clear that, in order that an action be honest and be referred to the glory of God, it is not necessary actually and explicitly to offer it to God. It suffices that one intend an honest action and act honestly. It suffices that each day in the morning one offer to God all his actions to be done during the course of the day. "In this way every act, even one indifferent in species, becomes good and virtuous in the individual." L. tr. De Act. hum. XLIV. - G. 29, 30, 35, 36.

1. By end here is properly understood that which the agent further intends through such and such an act, as the reason on account of which he operates. This is that end which is called the end of the one operating. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas, 2 Dist. 36. q. un. a. 5 ad 5, “that some act has a twofold end, namely the proximate end, which is its object, and the remote end, which the agent intends.” But if the agent does not intend another end diverse from the very intrinsic end of the action which he does, then the end of the one operating coincides with the end of the work, as appears in him who wishes to steal so that he may steal, i.e. so that he may become rich from another’s property. The end of the work cannot in any way be excluded by the one operating, if he himself knows the nature of the work; for that end is intrinsic to the work. Now the end of the one operating can be considered in two ways: 1.º with respect to the intention of the will, that is, with respect to the act of the will intending it; 2.º with respect to the act itself which is commanded, as a means to that end. Under the first consideration, the end is properly the object of the will, indeed its principal object, since the end is what moves the will to the means. Under the second consideration, the end is a mere circumstance of the commanded act, and thus is usually numbered among the circumstances. He who steals, for example, so that he may commit adultery, principally wills adultery; he intends this and efficaciously procures it. And from this adultery comes the principal malice of the will. But the act commanded for this reason by the will of adultery, namely theft, for example, has its own substantial malice from its proper object, that is, from the taking of another’s thing against the will of the owner; but that it is referred extrinsically by the one operating to such and such an end is altogether accidental to it, not from its own nature, but from the judgment of the one operating. Therefore the end which is a circumstance of the act is not the end itself of the work, which gives species to the act, but some adjoined end: just as the fact that a brave man acts bravely on account of the good of fortitude is not a circumstance; but it is a circumstance if he acts bravely for the liberation of the city, or for Christ, or something of this sort. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3 ad 3; q. 18. a. 6 ad 2.

2. The end of the one operating can be one thing as primary, another as secondary. The primary end is that which someone first proposes to himself, and is the cause simply of the action. The secondary end is that which is added to the primary, and is not the cause simply of the action, but only, with the primary end, impels that it be done better, that is, more eagerly, more easily, more pleasantly, etc.

3. Human acts take moral goodness or malice from the end. For the end can be considered as a circumstance and as the object of a human act. If the end is considered as a circumstance, it can, not otherwise than the other circumstances, state an order of conformity or deformity to reason. Thus it is conformable to reason not only to give alms, but also to give them in satisfaction for sins; just as it is repugnant to reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to become drunk. Therefore, as circumstances give goodness or moral malice to a human act, so also does the end. And as circumstances of themselves give only accidental goodness and malice, so also does the end. But if the end is considered as object, then human acts take species from the end as from an object, and therefore from it they take not only moral goodness or malice, but also from it they take essential moral goodness or malice.

4. “The same act numerically, according as it once goes forth from the agent, is not ordered except to one proximate end from which it has species, but it can be ordered to several remote ends, of which one is the end of another.” It is said according as it once goes forth from the agent, for there can be several ends of his act according as this is continued and repeated; for example, to take another’s property, so that one may become rich from another’s property; to retain another’s property, or again to take it, so that it may be preserved for the owner. It is said from which it has species, for there can be several ends, even proximate ends, of the work of one and the same act, but one is the primary end of the work from which comes the species, as it were, substantial to the act; the others are accidental and rather take on the nature of circumstances. Thus, for example, if someone undertakes a pilgrimage so that he may celebrate Mass in the Sanctuary of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, the sacrifice of the Mass is the proximate end of the work, from which the very celebration of Mass intrinsically takes its species; but to celebrate in that Sanctuary in honor of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus is also the proximate end of the work of that celebration, but as a certain extrinsic circumstance not giving species to the act. But the remote end of the one operating, to which the act is ordered, can itself also give species to the act; indeed, if it is the ultimate end in that series, it itself is what gives species to the act most of all, because it is what is prior in intention and on which all the other ends depend, since all those are subordinated. And thus he who commits adultery so that he may steal, and steals so that he may commit homicide, is rather a murderer than an adulterer and thief, because homicide is the formal and motive reason of the other acts. “When many acts differing in species are ordered to one end, there is indeed diversity of species on the part of the exterior acts, but unity of species on the part of the interior act.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6. “Nevertheless it is possible that one act according to the species of nature be ordered to diverse ends of the will. Thus this very thing which is to kill a man, which is the same according to the species of nature, can be ordered as to an end to the preservation of justice and to satisfying anger. From this there will be diverse acts according to the species of morals, because in one way it will be an act of virtue, in another way an act of vice.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 2.

5. “The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Whence as to the act of the will, the goodness which is from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, as in the acts of the other powers, except perhaps accidentally, according as an end depends on an end and a will on a will;” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 2 ad 1; namely when several ends subordinated of themselves and willed are together, as when someone wills healing medicine on account of going into military service, on account of victory, the formal goodness of the object, for example being healthy, differs from the goodness of another end, for example military service; and when the will of one end, for example adultery, depends on the will of another end, for example theft, as when someone wishes to commit adultery so that he may steal, the malice also of the object, for example adultery, differs from the malice of the end, for example theft. But each is accidental; for it happens to an end that it is subordinated to another, and it also happens to the will that it depends on another; otherwise this would belong to every end and every volition. Cajetan, in the cited place. Moreover a human act is human insofar as it is voluntary. But in a voluntary act a twofold act is found: the interior act of the will and the exterior act. Each of these has its proper object. “But the end is properly the object of the will. But that about which the exterior action is concerned is its object. Therefore, just as the exterior act receives species from the object about which it is concerned, so the interior act of the will receives species from the end as from its proper object. But that which is on the part of the will stands as formal to that which is on the part of the exterior act, because the will uses the members for acting as instruments, nor do exterior acts have the character of morality except insofar as they are voluntary. And therefore the species of a human act is considered formally according to the end, but materially according to the object of the exterior act. Whence the Philosopher says that he who steals in order to commit adultery is, speaking of himself, more adulterer than thief.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6.

6. Now a commanded act can be considered according to itself and taken specificatively, and it can be considered formally and reduplicatively as commanded. If it is considered in the first way, it takes its essential and specific goodness or malice from the object, and accidental goodness or malice from the end. The extrinsic end of the one operating comes to the act already constituted in its species from its proper object. And it is altogether accidental to such an act, considered according to itself, that it be ordered to such an end. Thus the volition of giving alms, commanded by penance, primarily and immediately regards the honorableness of almsgiving or mercy, but only secondarily and mediately the honorableness of penance. If the commanded act is taken in the other way, i.e. formally and reduplicatively as commanded, it has its essential species from the end, because the commanding act and the commanded act are considered one act, whose principal object is then the end which each regards.

7. Therefore human acts take moral goodness or malice from the end because, insofar as they are acts, they receive species from the end as from an object. And this can also be shown otherwise. For human acts can be considered after the manner of actions and after the manner of passions, because through them man moves himself and is moved by himself. But action obtains species from the principle of acting, while passion obtains species from the term of motion. And thus heating as action is nothing other than a certain motion proceeding from heat; heating as passion is nothing other than motion toward heat; and a definition manifests the account of species. For indeed each thing obtains species according to act, and not according to potency; and therefore motion, which is distinguished through action and passion, insofar as it is action, takes species from the act which is the principle of acting; but insofar as it is passion, it takes species from the act which is the term of motion. Moreover “acts are called human insofar as they proceed from a deliberate will, but the object of the will is good and end. And therefore it is manifest that the principle of human acts, insofar as they are human, is the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3. For the end is not only an end, but also the object of the will, and through this is in the place of form, which is the principle of acting. But the end is the object of the will, and is the reason of acting for it, precisely insofar as it is end; for it is that which is sought of itself; and thus the end is good, and “good has the character of end.” St. Thomas, ibid. a. 4 ad 1. “The motive and object of the will is the end... the end, although it is not of the substance of the act (namely of the commanded act), is nevertheless the most principal cause of the act (aforesaid), insofar as it moves the agent to act. Whence also the moral act most of all has species from the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 4, body and ad 2. “The end is first in the intention of reason, according to which the species of moral acts are taken.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 7 ad 2. “The end, according as it is prior in intention, according to this pertains to the will. And in this way it gives species to the human or moral act.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 2. “And similarly (the end) is the term of the same (acts). For that at which the human act is terminated is that which the will intends as an end.” Namely, the human act is from the end, and is to the end: from the end as action; to the end as passion; from the end as object, the intrinsic form of the act, the principle of the act by which the will acts; to the end as the term of the act, for the sake of which it acts. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3.

8. Therefore human acts, besides the absolute and intrinsic goodness or malice which they have from their proper object, have goodness or malice from the end on which they depend. “For the disposition of things in goodness and in being is the same. For there are certain things whose being does not depend on another. And in these it suffices to consider their being itself absolutely. But there are certain things whose being depends on another, whence it is necessary that they be considered by consideration toward the cause on which they depend. But just as the being of a thing depends on the agent and the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4; q. 72. a. 3.

And hence this is understood: good and end are convertible, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 2 ad 2. For whatever the will wills and does, it wills and does as good and for the sake of good.

9. Whether the intention of an extrinsic end can intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work? — R. Some affirm it; others deny it. The opinion of the latter seems to us alone true. The reason is: 1.º because nature cannot be changed; 2.º because the intention of the one operating adds nothing to the work, indeed it does not even touch it, since it is entirely extrinsic to it. Therefore our good intention cannot make an evil work good, nor can our evil intention make what is good evil, nor transfer what is evil intrinsically into another species of malice. But this does not prevent, as is clear, that where the question concerns an object indifferent of itself, the extrinsic end of the one operating can give moral goodness or malice. For this is not to change the intrinsic nature of the exterior work itself, but to determine its intrinsic indifference insofar as it is a human work; and this determination in morals is only from intention. And thus, although the depraved intention of a judge to harm the guilty person cannot intrinsically change the nature of a just sentence and constitute it an unjust causing of damage, nevertheless the intention of taking another’s property determines the taking itself, according as someone takes another’s thing so that he may preserve it for the owner, or so that he may take it for himself and steal it. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 584, 636. — Therefore if someone without force and fraud, but from hatred, or even so that he may harm another, impedes him from the attainment of a good to which he has no right, for example if someone impedes a testator from leaving an inheritance to someone who has no right to it, he is by no means bound to restitution. For he sins either only against charity, or even against justice, but affectively only, not effectively. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 584.

10. Whether an act is good if it has a twofold end, one good and the other evil? — R. 1.º In the affirmative, if the evil end has itself merely antecedently or consequently, that is, merely precedes the whole act or is added to the act already preexisting, or even if it has itself merely concomitantly, that is, influences nothing in the being of the act itself but is only joined to it. The reason is that then it is wholly extrinsic to the act constituted in its whole being. For it is not the reason on account of which of the act itself, but is only the reason, for example, of a certain simple complacency which precedes, accompanies, or follows the deliberate act. But this simple complacency can exercise its influence without infecting the act, so that someone may be moved more easily to a good act, for example if alms were proposed to someone as contributing to eternal life, and to this were joined a simple complacency over the esteem to be had thence among men. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. Sometimes, in carrying out a good work, a certain sense and imperfect affection touches someone’s soul, although in no way is it the end which he proposes to himself. Whatever of fault is found in this, the goodness of the work which someone does does not perish on that account. — 2.º In the negative, if the evil end has itself truly causatively and influences the substance of the act. The reason is that then someone wills the good at least inadequately under the aspect of evil, which is to will evil. “In order that the will be good, it is required that it be of the good under the aspect of good, i.e. that it will the good and on account of the good.” St. Thomas, q. 19. a. 7 ad 3. — Except unless the end is only lightly evil. The reason is that then the only lightly evil end influences not the substantial being itself of the act, but only the accidental being of the act, and therefore the whole substance of the act remains good. And thus almsgiving will be good, even if a slight ostentation has crept into that act and has truly influenced it. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4 ad 3; De Malo, q. 2. a. 4 ad 2; Suarez, D. 8, S. 1, n. XIV ff. The question concerns, as is clear, an exterior act which is one in the genus of nature and multiple in the genus of morals. “If one act is taken as it is in the genus of morals, it is impossible that it be good and evil by moral goodness and malice; yet if it is one by unity of nature and not by unity of morals, it can be good and evil.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 6.

11. Whether he sins who acts for the sake of pleasure? — R. In the affirmative, if he acts for the sake of pleasure alone, namely by positively excluding the further honorable end of the work; and this sin, speaking of itself, does not exceed venial. In the negative, if he acts simply for the sake of pleasure. The reason for the first is that pleasure is for the sake of operation, not conversely, namely so that man may be enticed to the operations necessary or useful for human life. Therefore pleasure is not the end of action, “but the means to exercising the action more constantly, more easily, and better.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 4. a. 2. It is confirmed from proposition 8, condemned by Innocent XI: “To eat and drink even to satiety for the sake of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its acts.” The reason for the second is that since pleasure of itself is not evil, but good, unless someone establishes his ultimate end in it, which without doubt would be grave, there is not had a grave disorder in the human action. The reason for the third is that pleasure of itself is not evil, but good, and it is consonant with the very order of nature that man be enticed by pleasure to operating. St. Thomas, C. G. l. 3, c. 26, nn. 6, 7; 1. 2. q. 4. a. 2 ad 2. Otherwise, it would have to be said that he also sins who would be moved to acting honorably from heavenly pleasure. Moreover nature indeed more principally intends the operation itself, to which pleasure is joined. But secondarily the same nature intends that man, from the appetite of pleasure, seek the operation. Therefore pleasure can be intended as an end, provided it is not intended as the ultimate or principal end. Therefore if someone, although he expressly thinks nothing of a further honorable end, is moved by pleasure to an action which he apprehends as consonant with nature, or in which he finds nothing contrary to the order of reason, for example to taking food, playing, etc., he does not sin at all. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 141. a. 1 ad 1.

"9. He truly sins who hates sin merely because of its turpitude and incongruity with nature, without any regard for God offended. - 10. The intention by which someone detests evil and pursues good merely in order to obtain heavenly glory is not right or pleasing to God. - 11. Everything that is not from supernatural Christian faith, which works through love, is sin. - 13. Whoever also serves God with a view to eternal reward, if he should lack charity, is not free from fault whenever he acts, even with a view to beatitude. - 14. Fear of hell is not supernatural. - 15. Attrition, which is conceived from fear of hell and of punishments, without the love of benevolence for God on account of Himself, is not a good and supernatural movement." Propositions condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"60. If fear of punishment alone animates penance, the more violent this penance is, the more it leads to despair. - 61. Fear restrains only the hand; but the heart is devoted to sin as long as it is not led by the love of justice. - 62. He who abstains from evil only through fear of punishment commits it in his heart and is also guilty before God." Condemned propositions of Pasquier Quesnel, condemned by Clement XI.

28. • An end in general is that for the sake of which something is done.

It is twofold, namely the end of the work, that is, the end intrinsic to the work itself and toward which the work tends per se; and the end of the worker, that is, extrinsic to the work, and toward which the agent directs his intention at will, or which the agent has set before himself ¹. We must speak only about this latter end, since it alone is properly called the end.

¹ These two ends sometimes fall into the same thing, sometimes one is added to the other, sometimes, with the intrinsic end of the work set aside, one alone directs the act extrinsically.

Now that end is 1. intermediate or ultimate, according as it is referred to another end, or the will rests in it; - 2. positively ultimate, or negatively ultimate, according as it is intended or not intended with the exclusion of another end; - 3. primary or secondary, according as it is the totally motive cause of the act, or only partially impulsive. Again the ultimate end can be explicitly or implicitly intended, according as the agent is moved expressly or only virtually by an end of this kind.

I say 1. A human act takes true morality from the end. The reason is that the end can express an order of conformity and deformity to right reason. Thus it is conformable to right reason not only to give alms, but also to give it unto the remission of sins; just as likewise it is repugnant to right reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to make oneself drunk.

I say 2. He sins who acts for the sake of delight alone ². The reason is that he acts inordinately, perverting the order of things instituted by the author of nature. For according to the order instituted by the author of nature, delight is on account of operation, and not vice versa: namely, delight is like salt and a certain condiment, which serves to entice to actions of life necessary or useful. Therefore delight is only a means for carrying out actions more easily, better, and more constantly, but not the ultimate end of the action. For thus St. Thomas: The divine intellect, which is the institutor of nature, appended delights for the sake of operations. I-II, q. 4, art. 2.

² It is one thing to act for the sake of delight, another to act for the sake of delight alone. This latter positively excludes a further end of the work; but this exclusion of an end is inordinate, and indeed not only in desiring delight, but also in an act of any virtue whatever; because even an act of virtue, if it is exercised in such a way, or so stopped in itself, that the higher or ultimate end is positively excluded, by that very fact will already become vicious.

But that first thing involves no inordination of this kind. For first, delight, as St. Thomas says (Against the Gentiles, book 3, ch. 26, no. 6), is good and to be desired if it follows a good operation; and it is proper to the virtue of temperance to moderate the use of delightful things, and indeed to draw back from those things which are against reason, but not from those which are convenient according to reason (see St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, art. 1, ad 1). But then the further end is not excluded, except perhaps negatively only. But a negative exclusion of the end does not vitiate the act; for it is not necessary for the honesty of an action to think about the further end, or even about the intrinsic end of the work. Therefore, that someone may honestly take delight from play, or food, or rest, it is in no way necessary that he think about the end, whether intrinsic or further, of play, or food, or rest; but it is sufficient that he apprehend the action as consonant with right reason, or also that he find nothing in it contrary to the order of reason; since, as St. Thomas has it (Supplement, q. 49, art. 4), from the same thing some act has that it is not evil in the genus of morals, and that it is good, because no act is indifferent.

From this the reason plainly comes forth why propositions VIII and IX concerning the work of marriage or the act of eating on account of pleasure alone were deservedly proscribed by Innocent XI. For they labor under an intrinsic vice on account of the predicate alone, which positively excludes any other ends, unto which actions of this kind are ordered. For otherwise, that someone is enticed and moved to the work by an appetite for delight, just as also to labor by hope of reward or wages, is consonant with the order of nature, as St. Thomas has it in the cited place. Compare the Salmanticenses (On Marriage, ch. 3, no. 33), Viva (On Proposition VIII of Innocent XI, no. 6), Duarte (Exposition of Condemned Propositions, no. 162), Roncaglia (On Marriage, q. II, ch. 1, q. 2, resp. 2), Pontius (On Marriage, book X, ch. 8, no. 6), Azor (part I, book 2, ch. 5, q. 4), etc.

It is confirmed from proposition 8 condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: To eat and drink unto satiety on account of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its own acts. - Nevertheless this disorder is not grave per se, and therefore does not exceed venial sin; because ordinarily the ultimate end ³ is not excluded, not even implicitly, unless there is question of those of whom the Apostle says, Phil. 3. 19: Whose God is their belly.

³ The Author understands the ultimate end of human life, not the intrinsic end of those works about which the discussion is held. Moreover, that ultimate end is excluded through any grave sin, which the Author deservedly supposes in those whose God, as the Apostle says, is the belly.

31. • YOU WILL ASK 2. Whether all actions, that they may be morally good, ought to be informed by the motive of charity?

I answer. No. For acts elicited from the motive of other virtues are good per se, as are acts of Faith, Hope, etc. This is also clear from the Council of Trent, session 14, ch. 4, where it is declared that attrition is a gift of God and disposes the penitent to justification. Likewise session 6, canon 31, where it is said: If anyone shall say that the justified man sins while he works well with a view to eternal recompense, let him be anathema.

YOU WILL ASK 3. Whether all our actions, that they may be honest, ought to be referred to God from a supernatural motive, or one apprehended through Faith?

I answer. No. For otherwise all the works of unbelievers would be sins, which doctrine has been condemned by the Church.

YOU WILL ASK 4. Whether all our actions ought to be referred to God, according to the words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 10. 31: Do all things unto the glory of God?

I answer. Concerning the obligation, which is drawn from the cited text, of referring actions to God, the obscure and often entangled opinions of certain more recent authors being set aside, the common doctrine of the ancients is altogether to be preferred, which is contained in these headings.

And first indeed, the words of Paul, from the common opinion of the Doctors, pertain to the virtue of charity, and, no otherwise than the precept of charity, can be taken both in a negative and in an affirmative sense.

If they are taken in a negative sense, they signify: Do nothing against God ⁵; and thus, according to the opinion of all, indeed from the very nature of the matter, they contain a precept, namely of not sinning. Nevertheless this precept does not give species to sin, because sins take their species not from a general virtue or law, but from special precepts, for example, not killing, not blaspheming.

⁵ See St. Thomas, 2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 7, and St. Bonaventure, 2, Dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 1.

But if the words of Paul are understood in an affirmative sense, the Doctors dissent somewhat among themselves, and they neither explain them in the same way nor attribute the same force to them.

For some, with St. Bonaventure, judged that through those words Paul insinuates that individual actions, or at least individual series of actions subordinated among themselves, be referred to God actually, or by an actual relation. Nevertheless at the same time they contended that Paul there had handed down no precept, but a mere counsel. - See St. Bonaventure, 2, dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 1 and ad 6.

But others, more commonly with St. Thomas, teach that a precept is in reality contained in the words of the Apostle. But lest someone be carried from this into absurdities ⁶, it is plainly necessary to retain the integral doctrine of St. Thomas on this matter.

⁶ Notable was the fraud of the Jansenists, that they contended the words of Paul to be preceptive, alleging these things from St. Thomas (lecture 3 on Colossians, ch. 3): Some say that this is counsel; but this is not true; but they did not explain the Pauline sentence with St. Thomas, but with St. Bonaventure, where he says (2, Dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 1): The Apostle admonishes... that we refer any work of ours to God: and concerning any work dividedly we can do this. From this, however, they concluded that sin is committed as often as any work is not actually referred to God. And since to refer works to God pertains to charity, among other things they inferred this also, that unbelievers and sinners, as being those who do not have charity, sin in every work.

Moreover not a few among the more recent, although they abhor this condemned error, nevertheless while they themselves also mingle the disparate interpretations of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure of the Pauline text into one thing, fall into another inconvenience. For on the one hand they call back the words of Paul with St. Thomas to a precept; but on the other hand they place the reason of this precept in that which St. Bonaventure required merely for the account of merit, namely that individual actions, or at least individual series of actions, be actually referred to God; and thus, while they establish that this actual relation of all works is obligatory, they bring the matter to this, that scarcely anyone can be found who, on account of this omitted relation of works to God, does not daily and everywhere stain himself with manifold guilt, as Gazzaniga in reality concluded (and indeed coherently) (On Human Acts, diss. 2, ch. 4, no. 87); and Collet adds (On Human Acts, ch. 6, art. 1, sect. 2) that there is not given invincible ignorance which perhaps excuses from this sin. Nor indeed do they sufficiently remedy this inconvenience by so restricting that obligation that it suffices daily, or several times in the day, as Collet says (in the cited place), or at least in the morning, to have referred works to God. For 1. this does not effect that individual actions or individual series of actions subordinated among themselves are actually referred to God according to the mind of St. Bonaventure, and thus that manifold guilt of omissions is absent; 2. since this actual relation is not distinguished from an act of perfect charity, they now infer an obligation hitherto unheard of in the schools, namely of eliciting an act of charity several times in the day or at least once in the morning daily. And from these things it is sufficiently clear that no reason for avoiding these inconveniences is at hand, unless either we deny with St. Bonaventure that a positive precept is contained in the words of Paul, or, if indeed we contend better with St. Thomas that a precept is uttered in them, we take also the explanation of the precept, as it is expounded in the text of the Author, from the same holy Doctor.

**And indeed it were to be wished that St. Alphonsus, who excellently wrote (Treatise on Human Acts, at the beginning): I think one must not depart from the sound doctrine of the Angelic Doctor where it can be had; for with him as guide in theological matters one walks with unoffending foot; it were to be wished, I say, that the holy Doctor in this question also had followed the Angelic Doctor rather than Collet, the continuator of Tournely. For, insisting on his footsteps, he writes (ibid., no. XLIV): Hence for practice we gather: It is necessary several times in the day, at least in the morning, generally to offer to God all one's acts, so that thus the precept of the Apostle may be fulfilled, at least with the virtual intention of doing all things unto the glory of God. The most manifest sense of these words is, namely, that to fulfill the precept of the Apostle it is necessary that several times in the day, at least in the morning, all actions be actually offered to God, so that thus all daily actions and words may thereafter be referred to the glory of God at least by virtual intention. Whence he adds: For the actual relation of all words or works into an honest good is not required, which would be an unbearable burden, and a thing entangled with six hundred scruples, but the virtual suffices, as we have said.

In the preceding edition of this Compendium, care was taken to soften this opinion of the holy Doctor in some way. But VV., both in St. A. (pages 114, 115) and in V. (pages 127-134), took this as an insult cast upon the holy Doctor. They object against it 1. that the Doctors who stand for the obligation of a daily relation of acts are in no way to be counted among those who demand an actual relation of all actions, and 2. that they in no way affirm that an act of charity must be elicited daily: all of which are beside the matter, because the question here is not what other Doctors have said; and besides they rest on a false supposition, as though the alleged Doctors (if you except Collet) defend the obligation of a daily relation. That would be to the point which VV. then added, namely that St. Alphonsus wished to signify not that to which we are held, but merely what is expedient and congruous, to have wished to signify. But this is very difficult, and too alien from likelihood. For 1. when he says: Hence for practice it is concluded, etc., he surely wishes to draw a consequence from those things which he had set forth, namely that the words of the Apostle contain a precept, not however a mere counsel. Therefore the consequence necessarily regards the thing commanded, not the thing of counsel; otherwise he would have said nothing at all about that which it most interests us to know and which the connection of the discourse demanded, namely to what we are held by force of that precept. 2. Granted, the word it is necessary is sometimes taken for that which is merely useful and congruous. Thus, for example, we say that for leading life in a Christian manner it is necessary that a suitable time be granted to pious meditation, examination of conscience, etc. But not so in the present matter. For here the discussion is expressly about fulfilling a precept, that is, about the obligation which the precept necessarily imposes, and which it is necessary to furnish in order that satisfaction be made to the precept. Therefore the word it is necessary here necessarily signifies the necessity which obligation imposes. Nor is it strange that this word, according to the diverse matter of the question, has a diverse sense. Thus if you say that it is necessary that Mass be heard daily, and the Holy Eucharist be received every eight days or at least every month, this will have been said very well if the discussion is about fostering piety, etc.; but badly if this is about fulfilling the precepts of the Church, which command both that Mass be heard on feast days and that the Holy Eucharist be received at paschal time.

Therefore we shall certainly say that the industrious zeal of VV. for protecting the doctrine of the holy Doctor is commendable. But perhaps zeal of this kind will not be most acceptable to the holy Doctor whenever it departs from the boundaries of truth.

Therefore St. Thomas, having made a distinction between actual relation, namely that by which a work is actually directed to God, and virtual relation, namely when the force of the first ordering or relation remains in the actions that follow, establishes:

1. That the actual relation, by which individual actions, even taken distributively, are actually ordered to God, is not of precept, but of counsel ⁷.

⁷ Thus St. Thomas in the same text which the Jansenists fraudulently truncated (lecture 3 on Colossians, ch. 3): Some say that this is counsel; but this is not true. But it must be said that it is not necessary that all things be referred to God actually. And elsewhere (2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 7): If (the sentence of Paul) is understood affirmatively... in such a way that actual ordering to God is actually joined to each of our actions, it can be understood in two ways, either distributively or collectively. If distributively, this is the sense: whatever action you do, it is better if you actually order it to God; and thus it is counsel. But if it is taken collectively, this is the sense: so do all your works that there be none of them which you do not actually order to God; and this is neither precept nor counsel, but the end of the precept, to which one arrives through the fulfillment of the precept: for thus the Saints in the fatherland refer their acts to God.

2. That the virtual relation of all works is of precept ⁸. For this, however, two things are required and suffice: first indeed on the part of the work, that it be morally honest, or infected by no stain of mortal or venial sin. The other on the part of the agent, that he at some time has elicited, and has not retracted by grave fault, an act of charity by which man orders himself and all his things to God as ultimate end ⁹.

⁸ Thus St. Thomas (I-II, q. 100, art. 10, ad 2): It is contained under the precept of charity that God be loved from the whole heart; to which it pertains that all things be referred to God; and therefore man cannot fulfill the precept of charity unless all things also are referred to God. And again (Disputed Questions On Virtues, q. 2, art. 11, ad 2): That all things be referred to God virtually pertains to the perfection of charity, to which all are held. And ibid., ad 3: To refer all things virtually to God falls under the precept of charity, since this is nothing else than to have God as ultimate end.

⁹ Thus St. Thomas (2, Dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 6): Nor yet is it necessary that an actual intention ordering to the ultimate end be always joined to any action which is directed to some proximate end; but it suffices that at some time all those ends be actually referred to the ultimate end; as happens when someone thinks of directing himself wholly to the love of God: for then whatever he orders to himself will be ordered to God.

3. As to the time of eliciting this act of charity, by which man orders himself and all his things to God, nothing is specially commanded beyond that which is commonly accustomed to be handed down in the schools concerning the precept of eliciting an act of charity at some time ¹⁰, where the precept of charity is treated.

¹⁰ St. Thomas (in the cited place): And if it is asked when it is necessary to refer an act to the ultimate end, this is nothing else than to ask when it is necessary for the habit of charity to go forth into act: because whenever the habit of charity goes forth into act, there is made an ordering of the whole man to the ultimate end, and consequently of all those things which are ordered to him as goods to himself.

Moreover, this doctrine will borrow light from the following questions, which, these principles of St. Thomas having been set down beforehand, are easily solved.

147. Notion. (A) The end concerning which we are treating is not the end of the work, which is not distinguished from the object formally taken, but the end of the one operating, or the intention, the motive on account of which the agent operates (above n. 4). Thus, if someone gives alms, the end of the work is the relief of the poor man, but the end of the one operating can be love of neighbor for his own sake, love of God or of Christ, the intention of redeeming sins, or vainglory, etc. Indeed one and the same act by the same agent, and at the same instant, can be performed on account of a manifold intention; thus someone can bestow alms in order to relieve the poor man, because he is loved on account of Christ and God, and at the same time in order to obtain remission of sins, etc. - Hence the end of the work is sometimes the same as the end of the one operating, namely when the agent intends the very goodness intrinsically inhering in the act, for example the relief of the poor man in the case of alms. - The intention itself is necessarily good or evil: for since it is deliberate, if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason and is good; otherwise, it is evil.¹

¹ Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 9: "For since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to the due end, from this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the nature of evil; but if it is ordered to the due end, it agrees with the order of reason, whence it has the nature of good. But it is necessary that it either be ordered or not be ordered to the due end." Cf. Didiot, op. cit., n. 440-454.

(B) With the end is connected the means, or that through which the agent wills to attain the end. A means, insofar as it is a means,² is not desirable or good of itself, because the will does not rest in it; but it is perceived as something useful for attaining the end, and therefore it is intended not on account of itself, but on account of the end. From this arose the axiom: he who wills the end, by that very fact wills the means; and he who wills the means, as it is a means, by that very fact wills the end. For the end cannot be obtained without the means, and consequently no one sincerely wills the end without by that very fact willing the means necessary for attaining the end. Likewise the means, as it is a means, is not intended except insofar as it conduces to the end; therefore no one sincerely wills the means as such unless at the same time he wills to attain the end. Thus he who wills to kill Peter, by that very fact wills the means necessary for perpetrating this homicide; likewise he who knowingly wills to apply, or in reality applies, means of themselves apt for killing Peter, by that very fact wills to kill Peter.

² It is said insofar as it is a means; for if it is considered not in order to the end, but in itself, insofar as it is an independent act, it has its own morality from the object, its proper end, and the circumstances.

Therefore the end and the means, by reason of morality, are indivisibly connected and are subjected to the same rules.

II. THE END. —By the end of an action (obiectum formale) is meant the reason or motive which induces the agent to perform that action, or, to employ a more familiar term, the intention with which he acts.⁵ i. An intention may be actual, virtual, or habitual. It is actual if it is elicited immediately before the act is performed and with direct reference to the same. It is virtual if its force is borrowed from a previous act of the will, which is accounted as continuing in effect. It is habitual if it once existed and has never been retracted.

⁵ Cfr. Matth. VI, 1-8. —St. Augustine, De Serm. Dom. in Monte, II, c. 13, n. 45: "Therefore we must consider not what each person does, but with what intention he does it. For this is the light within us, because this is manifest to us: that we do what we do with a good intention." (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 1289). —St. Bernard, De Baptismo, c. 2, n.

To be morally good an act must be inspired by an actual, or at least a virtual, good intention. A merely habitual intention is not sufficient for this purpose because it may exist in an unconscious subject, and is strictly speaking non-existent while the action is being performed.

The Catholic Church exhorts her children to make a good intention frequently, at least every day, in order to sanctify all their actions by referring them directly to God.⁶ There is no nobler motto than, "All for the greater honor and glory of God." ⁷ The end of an action may be primary or secondary, ultimate or intermediate, natural or supernatural.

⁶ (P. L., CLXXXII, 1035).

⁶ 1 Cor. X, 31; 1 Pet. IV, 11; Col. III, 17; cfr. John XV, 8; Phil. I, 10 sq. —St. Ignatius of Antioch, Epist. ad Polycarp., c. 5: Πάντα εἰς τιμὴν Θεοῦ γινέσθω. (Funk, Patres Apost., I, 2nd ed., 292, 8). —St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 34, s. 2, n. 16: "Who endures praising God all day? I suggest a remedy by which you may praise God all day, if you wish. Whatever you do, do it well, and you have praised God." (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 341).—On the good intention as a requisite of supernatural merit see Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, pp. 413 sqq.

⁷ Cfr. H. Lammens, "L'Antiquité de la Formule 'Omnia ad Maiorem Dei Gloriam,' " in the Revue de l'Orient Chrétien, VIII (Paris 1903), pp. 477 sqq.

2. As regards the influence of the intention on the morality of an act, note the following considerations: a) An act that is morally indifferent, so far as its object is concerned, becomes good or bad by the intention of the agent. Thus the act of eating, which is in itself indifferent, becomes good if done for the purpose of sustaining life and strength, bad if done exclusively for pleasure.⁸ b) An act that is objectively good (e. g., prayer, almsgiving) becomes bad if done for a wicked purpose. Conversely, an objectively good act derives an increase of moral value from a good intention.⁹ c) A materially bad act (e. g., a lie) is never rendered good by a good intention. The reason is that a good end cannot be attained by evil means.¹⁰ No advantage that could possibly be gained by sin is large enough to outweigh the injury inflicted on the moral law. Christ Himself said: "What doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his own soul? Or what exchange shall a man give for his soul?”¹¹ It is never allowed to do evil that good may come, which is but another way of saying that the end never justifies the means.¹² "This," says Father Slater, S.J., "is the teaching of Holy Scripture and of the Catholic Church, nor have the Jesuits any other doctrine different from that of the Church. Father Dasbach promised to give anyone two thousand florins who would prove in open court that the Jesuits had ever taught that the end justifies the means. Count Paul von Hoensbroech undertook to do so, but he failed in his suit when it was tried at Cologne, in the spring of 1905." ¹³

⁸ Eccles. X, 17.

⁹ Cfr. Matth. V, 16; VI, 1 sqq.; XXIII, 5, 15.

¹⁰ Cfr. Job XIII, 7; Rom. III, 8; VI, 1.—St. Augustine, De Mendacio, c. 21, n. 42: “No one is to be led to eternal salvation with a lie lending assistance.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 516).

¹¹ Matth. XVI, 26.

¹² Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Mendacium, c. 7, n. 18: “It matters very greatly from what cause, for what end, and with what intention something is done; but things which are known to be sins must not be done under the pretext of a good cause, for any supposedly good end, or with any apparently good intention.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 528).

¹³ Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 49.—P. Roh, S.J., Das alte Lied: “Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel,” 3rd ed., Freiburg 1894; M. Reichmann, S.J., Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel, Freiburg 1903; Fr. Gerard, S.J., Does the End Justify the Means? C. T. S. pamphlet.—B. Duhr, S.J., Jesuitenfabeln, 4th ed., pp. 542 sqq.; J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, pp. 92 sqq.; Pilatus (Dr. V. Naumann, a Protestant), Der Jesuitismus, Ratisbon 1905, pp. 280 sqq.; F. Heiner, Der Jesuitismus, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1902, pp. 81 sqq.; IDEM, Die Jesuiten und ihre Gegner, Munich 1906, pp. 73 sqq.; Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. III, p. 87; Vol. XIV, pp. 104 sq.; Brou, S.J., Les Jésuites de la Légende, Paris 1906; Concerning Jesuits, London 1902; Maynard, The Studies and Teaching of the Society of Jesus, London 1855.

However, while the sinfulness of an act is never neutralized, it may be diminished by the intention of the agent, if the choice of means results from imperfect knowledge or is made for the sake of a good purpose. To choose a bad means for the attainment of a good end manifestly indicates less malice than to choose a bad means for its own sake.¹⁴ An apparently good purpose may, on the other hand, augment the wickedness of an act because of the intrinsic contradiction contained in the attempt to employ a bad means for the attainment of a good end, e. g., if one meant to honor God by committing murder or fornication.

¹⁴ Cfr. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 18, n. 6: "It seems to me that every lie is indeed a sin, but it makes a great difference with what intention and about what matters each person lies. For he who lies with the intention of advising does not sin in the same way as he who lies with the intention of harming; nor indeed does the person who by lying sends a traveler onto a different road do as much harm as the one who corrupts the way of life by a deceiving lie." (Migne, P. L., XL, 240).—IDEM, Contra Mendac., c. 8, n. 19: "Someone will say: then is every thief to be equated with the thief who steals from a will of mercy? Who would say this? Yet neither of these two is good merely because one is worse. For he who steals from covetousness is worse than he who steals from pity; but if every theft is a sin, every theft must be abstained from." (P. L., XL, 529).—St. Bernard, De Praec. et Dispens., c. 7, n. 13: "It certainly matters from what cause, with what disposition, with what intention, by whose command, and in regard to what precept this evil is committed. Indeed, I say that no disobedience at all is to be regarded lightly, yet not every disobedience is to be judged of equal danger. For God's command is: You shall not kill [Ex. 20, 13]. Suppose, then, two murderers, one of whom committed the crime from a desire to plunder and the other from the necessity of defending himself. Does not the cause here quite evidently distinguish leprosy from leprosy, making the guilt of one and the same transgression very unequal? What if sudden anger drove the one, but calculated malice or an old hatred drove the other, to the same crime? Must that which is known to have been done with such dissimilar dispositions be weighed by a similar judgment? Further, nothing is more incestuous or obscene than those daughters of Lot having usurped intercourse with their father [Gen. 19, 32-36]; yet who does not see how greatly the piety of their intention and their intention of piety removed or diminished the guilt of that shameful and unspeakable crime?" (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 868).—The legend that St. Crispin stole leather to make shoes for the poor, is based upon a misunderstanding. Cfr. V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 286.

Notion and divisions. First the end is presented to the will; for it is that on account of which something is done. But to have the reason for acting is proper to a rational being. Wherefore the end is called first in intention; nothing is more voluntary, and therefore nothing is more moral.

The end is distinguished as the end of the work, or internal, intrinsic, toward which the work per se, or by its own nature in moral estimation, tends; as for example the relief of need is the internal end of almsgiving; and the end of the worker, or external, extrinsic, which the one acting sets before himself, whether the same or diverse, as if he offers alms as suffrage for the souls in purgatory.

The proximate end is that which is intended immediately, or with no other mediating; the remote end, that which is intended through another end as mediating. A workman lives more sparingly so that, with money saved, he may gradually have the means of acquiring a house: the saving of money is his proximate end; the procuring of the house is his remote end.

An intermediate end is that which, whether proximate or remote, nevertheless is intended on account of a further end. Thus, in the example given, if the workman wants that house in order that he may marry honorably, the saving of money and the purchase of the house are intermediate ends.

The ultimate end, on the contrary, is that which is not referred to another; the simply ultimate end is that which, neither in the same nor in another series of actions, is ordered to another end; the ultimate end according to something is that which concludes some series, yet keeps the notion of a means for another end. Thus knowledge terminates many studies: if it is sought for its own sake, it is called the simply ultimate end; if it is sought for annexed rewards or honors, it will be the ultimate end according to something. Finally, the positively ultimate end excludes a further end; the negatively ultimate end indeed is not referred to a further end, yet does not exclude one. Thus in a just man, the good sought by venial sin is the simply but negatively ultimate end of that disordered act. Satisfaction mortally evil is the simply and positively ultimate end of the sinner.

A total end moves by itself to acting; a partial end concurs together with another: whether both ends move equally and are called equally principal; or one is primary, which has the first part and alone suffices for the act, and the other secondary, which dependently upon the first moves to the action, so that this may be done more easily, more promptly, more perfectly: this is called impelling or the impulsive cause. Thus for a pious priest the stipend will be only a secondary end of celebration; for a less pious, yet honorable priest, who would not celebrate without the stipend, it becomes the primary end, yet not the only end, since both priests wish at the same time to exercise an act of religion.

The end itself can be of the honorable good, or good; or of the pleasurable good: either of delight joined with an evil operation, and then it is evil; or of delight joined with a good operation, and then it is good, if at the same time the operation as honorable is intended. But if explicitly nothing is thought of except delight, then it is disputed whether this end should be called indifferent or evil. Omitting the dispute here, this is our brief conclusion.

On an action done on account of delight. 1. Delight is described as enjoyment of the appetite from a possessed good; and especially sensible enjoyment, while the delight which follows reason is rather addressed by the name of joy.

2. For the solution of the question it must be noted beforehand that a twofold good will is to be admitted in man: the will of not transgressing the order of reason or the law of God, and the will positively zealous for that order or law. This will is better; nevertheless the former is already good, because it loves the object as such a thing to which reason or God does not contradict, or because it contains a voluntary repudiation of moral evil. But voluntary omission is equated with an act; and the voluntary omission of evil is as it were an act containing approval of the moral order.

3. Now indeed, reason detects this disposition of divine Providence by which He has joined delights with useful operations so that men may be enticed to them. Hence it perceives that it is not against the order of reason to yield to that invitation, provided one holds the mode of temperance.

It observes, besides, that it is positively good for man in the present life to be moderately delighted, indeed that this is sometimes necessary so that the mind may be recreated and may be able for nobler pursuits, even of virtues (1).

4. Hence now in a conscious manner a man can act on account of delight in three ways:

a) By loving and seeking delight as a useful and almost necessary aid of virtuous action: then the will is positively zealous for honesty itself; it does not act merely on account of delight; and by all it is called good or honorable.

b) By seeking and embracing the delight which he first apprehended as licit, simply as a delight not evil. Then he rests in delight as in an end negatively ultimate, not indeed of the subject, but of such an action. Then he acts on account of delight alone, insofar as delight alone moves him; yet it does not move him as pure delight but as delight not evil, or to which reason or God does not contradict. And this will is positively good, insofar as it contains repudiation of an evil object and of intemperance, or excess in the mode.

c) By resting in delight as in an end simply and positively ultimate, with virtual contempt of the divine order: "whether it is forbidden or not, I want this delight." This manner of acting on account of delight alone is the only sinful one.

d) If, in acting, there is no attention to the agreement of delight with the order of reason, then indeed the intrinsic end will be able to be called indifferent; but rather it must be said that the action, from this part, is not human and free.

This reasoning cannot be opposed to our conclusion: that God made delight for the sake of operation, and therefore delight is to be sought by us for the sake of operation. For nothing obliges us to act with the same intention as the legislator: the end of the law does not fall under the law.

In vain also would the two propositions condemned by Innocent XI, n. 8 and 9, be alleged: "To eat and drink even to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not injure health, because one can licitly enjoy the natural appetite in its acts." "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely without fault and venial defect." In vain, I say, would they be alleged, both because those propositions were condemned as they lie "at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice," and judgments so put forward, by which pursuits needing restraint lest we exceed due measure are fostered, are importune and in practice must lead to sinning; and because it can be denied that he acts for pleasure alone who embraces pleasure as not evil.

Concerning this argument cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theol., tom. I, n. 101 and III, n. 323; De la Barre, La morale d'apres S. Thomas, p. 53, 54; and Noldin, Princ., n. 88-91.

That in the present life mortification rather than delight is to be preached, we by no means deny. Yet imprudently would every delight sought for its own sake be accused of venial sin. For concerning actions which men are accustomed to perform with a quiet and simple mind, scruples are not to be injected. For a fearful manner of acting, which weakens the mind, is to be avoided by good men.

Efficacy of the end. 1. An action cannot be morally better than its total end. For beyond the intention to which the means are referred it is not loved by the will, does not terminate the affection of the will, and therefore cannot have moral goodness: the will by willing good becomes good. Therefore, if the whole action is done on account of a solely lightly evil end, the whole will be morally evil. Nor does it matter that its object is good, for example the relief of need, since the will does not will that good except as a means to an evil end, and therefore wills nothing except evil.

2. Intermediate ends, as such, add nothing to final goodness. For as such they are loved only as means.

3. Simultaneous and coordinated ends, that is, those of which neither exists or is intended on account of the other, make an action virtually multiple, which participates in the morality of each end. For since we can simultaneously will the observance of the order of reason in one thing, and its violation in another thing, it is not absurd that two actions, as it were parallel, one morally good, the other morally evil, should exist at the same time. Someone wishes to extinguish flames in order to save a child and at the same time in order to steal. The extinguishing of the fire will be morally honorable insofar as it is ordered to the safety of the child; morally evil insofar as it is directed to theft ¹. Nor is the matter morally changed by the fact that each end, equally principal, had to concur in order that the action be done: as if, in the proposed case, neither the desire of theft alone nor the hope of saving the child alone would have persuaded the agent to the action ².

Take care not to transfer to merit what we have said here about an action reduplicatively as moral. Cf. the things to be said below.

4. Of two ends, of which one is primary and the other secondary, the primary gives the principal morality, the other an accessory morality, or morality according to something. Wherefore a secondary end of the temporal order, for example of gain, does not corrupt an act good from another end.

¹ Cf. the principle enunciated by St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 18, art. 4, ad 3; and Suarez, De bonitate et malitia actuum humanorum, d. 8, r. 1, n. 7, 14, 15, 16.

² Cf. Pesch, De Deo creante, n. 639-641, and Frins, De act. hum., II, 436 and following.

Corollaries. By comparing these assertions about the end with the rule handed down above about the object, these corollaries become manifest:

1. An act good from the object, commanded toward a good end (for example, almsgiving from a motive of religion), besides the specific goodness of the object, acquires a new goodness from the end.

2. An act evil from the object, directed to an evil end, is stained with a twofold malice: think of theft perpetrated on account of fornication.

3. An act which from the object is evil, directed to a good end, does not thereby become good, as will be said below, n. 123.

4. An act draws its more powerful moral species from the end rather than from the object, because the end is more loved per se and therefore more voluntary. Wherefore alms given on account of the worship of God is more an act of religion than of mercy; theft on account of fornication is to be placed more in the species of lust than of injustice.

5. An act indifferent from the object will become good or evil from the end.

Preliminary Note. Already above, n. 15 sqq., we have sufficiently treated of the notion and divisions of the end. The end which is here counted as the third principle of morality is not the intrinsic end of any work, since this coincides with the moral object,⁵³ concerning which there was discussion above, n. 111 sqq.; but it is the extrinsic end or the end of the worker. For example, the act of praying has for the end of the work and at the same time for its moral object the veneration of God, from which therefore it takes its primary morality, indeed also its moral specification. But the same act of praying can be produced from a motive of penance and mortification. Then an accidental extrinsic end, or the end of the worker, accedes, which adds a new morality to the act of praying.⁵⁴

⁵³ Cf. 2, dist. 36, a. 5 ad 5.

⁵⁴ The intrinsic end is also called the proximate end, the specifying end, the extrinsic form of the act; but the extrinsic end is also called the remote end, the end not specifying, but only moving. These locutions indeed are not so clear and therefore are better avoided.

121. Principle 1. The extrinsic end or the end of the worker is also a source of morality.

Proof 1. The extrinsic end or the end of the worker is a moral circumstance, which is expressed by the word "why." But moral circumstances are sources of morality, as was proved above, n. 116 sqq. Therefore.

Proof 2. The extrinsic end or the end of the worker is the motive, indeed sometimes the sole motive, inducing one to act. But the motive of an action either agrees or disagrees with right reason and the eternal law, and therefore has a special morality. Therefore the extrinsic end gives some morality to the act.

Proof 3. Christ warns:⁵⁵ "Take heed that you do not your justice before men, to be seen by them; otherwise you shall not have a reward of your Father." - From these words it is clear that the extrinsic end of vainglory disfigures works of justice and therefore gives them a new morality.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Matt. 6:1.

⁵⁶ St. Thomas distinguishes a fourfold goodness in a human act: 1. physical goodness; for every act is some being; 2. specific goodness, which arises from the moral object of the act; 3. accidental goodness, which arises from moral circumstances; 4. goodness of the end, which arises from a good extrinsic end (S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 4).

122. Principle 2. The extrinsic end or the end of the worker can a) render an action indifferent from the object good or evil; b) render an action good from the object more or less good, indeed even evil; c) render an action evil from the object more or less evil, but never good.

Each part is proved and explained.

To a) Walking is an action indifferent from the object; nevertheless it is rendered morally good if, for example, it is exercised from religious obedience or because of reasonable care of health. The same action is rendered evil if it is done because of an evil end, for example, because of vanity, because of culpable curiosity, etc. But the reason is that those ends are intended insofar as they agree or disagree with the norm of morality, and therefore cause (and indeed primarily) either the goodness or the malice of an objectively indifferent action.

To b) An action good from the object is almsgiving; he who does this action from a vow performs a work more good. For besides an act of the virtue of mercy and charity, he also performs an act of the virtue of religion. Therefore that action has at the same time two goodnesses, one essential, the other accidental.⁵⁷ Thus the common doctrine of theologians, which Vasquez alone contradicts.⁵⁸ - But a difficulty exists in explaining the influence of an evil end upon a work good from the object. A distinction is needed: an evil end can be the total, sole, and adequate cause why a work good from the object is chosen, for example, to give alms to a poor man solely in order to turn him away from the faith or to induce him into sin; or it can be a partial cause, so that the good work is chosen also because of its own honesty, for example, someone sincerely wishes to relieve the misery of a poor man, but at the same time intends vainglory from the giving of alms. The difference between each influence of an evil end is this: in the first case the good work is a pure means and instrument for obtaining an evil end; but in the other case the good work is not a pure means, but truly a partial and intermediate end.⁵⁹ With this distinction premised, I say:

⁵⁷ Cf. Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 3, § 4.

⁵⁸ Comm. in I-II, disp. 51, c. 3.

⁵⁹ The Angelic Doctor seems to call this diverse influence of the end preceding and concomitant (consequent) intention. "Intention can stand in two ways toward the will: in one way as preceding; in another way as concomitant. Intention precedes the will causally when we will something because of the intention of some end; and then the order to the end is considered as a certain reason for the goodness of the very thing willed, for example, when someone wills to fast because of God; for fasting has the character of good from the very fact that it is done because of God.... But intention follows the will when it accedes to a pre-existing will; for example, if someone wills to do something and afterward refers that to God; and then the goodness of the first will does not depend on the following intention except insofar as the act of the will is reiterated with the following intention" (S. theol. I-II, q. 19, a. 7 according to the Leonine edition).

123. The moral goodness of an action good from the object is totally destroyed by an end which is the adequate and sole cause of the action, but not by an end alone which is the non-adequate and non-total cause of the action. This is also expressed thus by some theologians: an evil extrinsic end, if it is primary and adequate, destroys the objective goodness of the action; but if it is a secondary end and an inadequate motive of acting, it makes an action otherwise good from the object not totally evil.

The first part of this proposition is admitted by almost all. In this sense also St. Paul says:⁶⁰ "A little leaven corrupts the whole lump." For by the leaven can be understood a depraved intention which is the total cause of a human action. - But the intrinsic reason of this doctrine is obvious. For a man choosing a work good from the object solely for obtaining an evil end in no way seeks the honesty of that work, but uses it as the sole means and instrument for obtaining his depraved end; this certainly is against the right norm of morality, and therefore is intrinsically evil.

The other part of the proposition⁶¹ today is most commonly admitted by almost all theologians; nevertheless there were theologians of great name who taught that even an inadequate depraved end destroys the whole objective goodness of the action, for example, the Salmanticenses,⁶² John of St. Thomas,⁶³ Gonet,⁶⁴ and others. Although these authors cite St. Thomas⁶⁵ for their opinion, nevertheless the proposition defended above seems more conformable to the mind of the Angelic Doctor. Here are the words of St. Thomas:⁶⁶ "Nothing prevents an action having one of the aforesaid goodnesses from lacking another. And according to this it happens that an action which is good according to its species or according to circumstances is ordered to an evil end, and conversely. Yet an action is not good simply unless all goodnesses concur, because any singular defect causes evil; but good is caused from an integral cause." The Angelic Doctor speaks still more explicitly in another place:⁶⁷ "When someone wills to give alms because of empty glory (behold the total and adequate cause!), here there is one act of the will; and this whole act is evil, although not everything in it has malice; for one particular defect suffices for something to be called evil simply. But it is true that if he were to will this, namely, to give alms, as a certain thing not in order to such an end (behold the inadequate and secondary cause!), that act of the will would be good, and it would be another act of the will from that by which he wills empty glory." From these words of St. Thomas the intrinsic reason of the proposed doctrine is also clear. For alms in this case are not chosen as a means for obtaining empty glory, but are truly intended as something honorable in itself. Therefore they retain their objective goodness, although through another act the intention of empty glory is extrinsically joined to them.

The proposed opinion is confirmed from the inconveniences which would otherwise arise: if a light disorder of the end destroyed the whole goodness of an action otherwise good, scarcely any good action would be performed even by holy men. For "there are very few works even among holy men watching attentively to which in this life either some due circumstance is not lacking, or into which some evil things are not mixed, for example, of empty glory, self-love, excessive complacency.... Thus there are very few penitents whose penance some excess or defect does not accompany; very few superiors who in corrections do not suffer some excess of zeal or anger; very few preachers who, although led by zeal for the glory of God, are not moved amid the applause of hearers by the tickling of some complacency." Thus rightly Billuart,⁶⁸ who treats this question very well, clearly, and succinctly before many authors who hand down this certainly difficult matter both diffusely and confusedly. Therefore it is established that one action can be virtually multiple and therefore at the same time be good and evil under a diverse head, namely, good from the object, evil from a circumstance or end, provided, however, that the evil end is not the adequate and total cause of the action.

Some authors, such as Lehmkuhl,⁶⁹ Noldin,⁷⁰ Marc-Raus,⁷¹ Schindler,⁷² think that the whole work is vitiated if the partial end is gravely evil; for it would be impossible that an action by which man is totally turned away from God should be pleasing. But these things seem to be said illogically and are not sufficiently proved. For even if the partial end is lightly evil, that part of the action which proceeds from this end is not pleasing to God. For example, empty glory joined with the giving of alms is certainly not pleasing to God; and yet these authors teach that this giving of alms has a twofold morality: one good from the object, the other evil from empty glory. Wherefore it seems more probable that absolutely no partial end, provided that it is truly partial and inadequate, destroys the objective goodness of an action.^72a For example, if someone sincerely and principally wishes to assist at the sacrifice of the Mass, but at the same time secondarily during Mass to lust shamefully after a woman seen, he does indeed commit a mortal sin against chastity because of the depraved secondary desire, but his assistance at Mass itself has not been made totally evil. - Nor should anyone say that by such assistance a man merits nothing except hell; for merit is one thing, moral goodness another; and however devoutly a man existing in mortal sin assists at Mass, he merits no eternal reward before God. But it has been condemned in Baius and Jansenius to assert that sinful man is unable to do morally good works.⁷³

⁶⁰ 1 Cor. 5:6.

⁶¹ Cajetan, Comm. in I-II, q. 18, a. 8, and Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 4, hold it.

⁶² Curs. theologicus tract. XI, De bonitate et malitia, disp. 6, dub. 1.

⁶³ Q. 21, disp. 9, a. 4. This author treats the matter clearly and profoundly.

⁶⁴ Clypeus: De act. hum. tr. 3, disp. 4, a. 1.

⁶⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 5.

⁶⁶ Ibid. a. 4 ad 3.

⁶⁷ 2, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4 ad 4. The Parma and Vives editions have a somewhat different but not so good reading. Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 12, a. 4.

⁶⁸ De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 4, § 2.

⁶⁹ Theol. mor. I, 100.

⁷⁰ De principiis n. 77.

⁷¹ Inst. mor. I, 306.

⁷² Lehrbuch der Moraltheol. I, 2. Abschn., § 3.

^72a Thus also Vermeersch, Theol. mor. I, n. 118.

⁷³ Cf. Billuart, l. c. obj. 4.

124. To c) An action evil from the object becomes more evil when an evil end accedes. Hence he who commits theft in order to have money for making himself drunk commits a greater sin than if he had committed theft alone. The reason is that here there is a twofold malice: one from the object, the other from the subjective end.

An action evil from the object, when a good end accedes, can indeed become less evil, but never totally good. Hence he who commits theft in order to give alms does indeed perpetrate a lesser sin, but a true sin. It is plain that this sin is lesser from the fact that there is a lesser affection toward evil, since the will does not seek it for its own sake, but from love of some true moral good. Wherefore St. Augustine⁷⁴ says: "He is worse who steals from coveting than he who steals from pity," and St. Thomas:⁷⁵ "The better the good intended is, the more the fault of the lie is diminished." But although sin is diminished from a good end, nevertheless it remains true sin, and indeed grave sin if grave fault stains the object. Wherefore the adage holds: A good end can never justify evil means. And therefore St. Paul⁷⁶ teaches: "And not (as we are slandered, and as some say that we say) let us do evil that good may come; whose damnation is just." St. Thomas says: "No evil done with a good intention is excused."⁷⁷ The scholastics, calling the appetite of the means election and the appetite of the end intention, are accustomed to express the proposed doctrine in this way: a good intention is vitiated by evil election; and an evil election is not made honorable by a good intention. Thus all Catholic authors teach. Cassian alone⁷⁸ seems to have asserted the contrary, whom a few others joined, teaching the liceity of an officious lie in a case of necessity.⁷⁹ Only with the greatest injury is the calumny brought against the Jesuits, as if they defended in doctrine and in practice the adage: "The end justifies the means." On the contrary, several non-Catholic authors expressly admit this principle; indeed all those who defend false doctrines concerning the supreme norm of morality must admit it. For if, for example, the supreme norm of morality is individual or social utility, then it can easily happen that a morally evil act, for example, an officious lie, serves utility more than the omission of this act.⁸⁰ But the intrinsic reason why it is never licit to choose an evil means for obtaining a good end is that otherwise man would approve and assume moral evil, which is certainly illicit.

Against this doctrine are objected both the words of Sacred Scripture and certain examples of the Saints. Sacred Scripture says: "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome; but if thy eye be evil, thy whole body shall be darksome."⁸¹ Under the figure of the eye interpreters are accustomed to understand a good intention, so that the sense would be: If you have in your acts a depraved intention, all your acts are dark and morally evil; on the contrary, if you have a good intention, whatever you do is lightsome and morally good. It is answered that under the name of eye, intention cannot be understood in so unlimited a sense. The holy Fathers by the eye are accustomed to understand the heart; if it has been clean and free from desire of earthly things, the whole body of the remaining affections will be lightsome and immaculate. - Abraham, Jacob, Judith, and the midwives of Egypt are objected, who are reported to have employed lies for obtaining a good end; Moses is objected, who by his own authority killed the Egyptian; Samson, who committed suicide; St. Apollonia, who cast herself into the fire, etc. To these and similar deeds it is answered: either they must be explained so that they are no longer intrinsically evil; for example, the enumerated lies are not true lies, but mental restrictions; or, if this cannot be done, those men otherwise most worthy truly sinned by so acting, at least materially. For no man, however holy, is impeccable on this earth.⁸²

⁷⁴ Contra mendacium c. 8 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 529).

⁷⁵ S. theol. II-II, q. 110, a. 2.

⁷⁶ Rom. 3:8.

⁷⁷ Opusc. 4 (3), Expositio in duo praecepta caritatis et in decem legis praecepta, c. 6.

⁷⁸ Coll. 17 (Migne, Patr. lat. 49, 1062).

⁷⁹ Cf. below in the treatise on lying, II, n. 169.

⁸⁰ Cf. on this matter Cathrein, Moralphilosophie I 4, 326 sqq., where on p. 329 Jhering, Sigwart, Paulsen, Ziegler, and Gallwitz are cited for this false adage. - G. Ulrich writes in his work Verdienst und Gnade: "The necessary lie, the social and conventional lie, appear, when used with understanding, wholly unobjectionable; for always it is the end alone which hallows a means or makes it into injustice." Matthew Prior: "The end must justify the means, He only sins who ill intends" (The works of the English poets [London 1810] X, 155; cf. Tanquerey, Synops. theol. mor. de act. hum. 152).

⁸¹ Matt. 6:22-23.

⁸² Cf. Billuart, De act. hum. obj. 4, where other objections also are clearly solved.

125. Principle 3. Man is bound to set before himself in all his actions an honorable end, which at least implicitly is referred to God; but it is not licit to act for pleasure alone.

The stated principle responds to the question: what intention is necessary in the agent so that his works may be good? But the proposed doctrine holds a middle place between two other extremes.

The first extreme doctrine requires that all human acts be referred actually or at least virtually to God. Baius, Jansenius, and their followers, thinking that human nature was thoroughly corrupted through original sin, taught that man must always actually refer his actions to God; otherwise he follows his vitiated nature and therefore sins. For according to these authors there is nothing intermediate between heavenly charity and vitiated cupidity. From this false doctrine it follows that all works of infidels and the impious, since they do not refer their actions to God, are sins. This indeed St. Pius V condemned: "All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices."⁸³ St. Alphonsus seems to have taught that a virtual relation to God is necessary in our acts.⁸⁴ Nevertheless there are those who explain the mind of the holy Doctor otherwise.⁸⁵

The other extreme opinion teaches that for the honesty of an act it suffices that it be done according to the prescriptions of reason and be apprehended and sought as such. Therefore the act remains good, even if the will intends not an honorable good or a motive of virtue, but delectation (not evil in itself) or convenience, without thinking of a further end. Thus Noldin,⁸⁶ who for this opinion of his cites Ballerini, Genicot, Pesch, and others; indeed he calls this opinion today common among authors.

In practice this controversy does not seem to be of great moment, and therefore the faithful are not to be disturbed concerning the morality of their acts, provided that they follow the dictate of their own conscience; but theoretically speaking, the opinion requiring an actual relation of acts to the ultimate end is too rigid and today obsolete. Indeed even a virtual relation of our acts is not to be urged in this sense, as if it were a true sin if a man did not elicit an explicit resolve, for example, every morning, of doing all things for the glory of God. For such an obligation is not established. But the last opinion does not seem to be sufficiently safe unless it is explained in a sound sense.

It is proved. 1. From propositions condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679: "It is licit to eat and drink to satiety without necessity for pleasure alone, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its acts" (prop. 8). - "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free of every fault and venial defect" (prop. 9).⁸⁷ Therefore, even in objectively licit acts, it is necessary to intend something other than pleasure; or the end of the will cannot be pleasure alone, although that pleasure does not directly conflict with reason. For it cannot be said that to eat for pleasure alone without detriment to health directly conflicts with natural reason, if one abstracts from the ordination of the Creator.

2. From Sacred Scripture. For the Lord says:⁸⁸ "But I say unto you, that every idle word that men shall speak, they shall render an account for it in the day of judgment." But if an idle word is evil, a fortiori an idle work is evil; and therefore St. Jerome⁸⁹ exclaims: "If an account is rendered for idle words, how much more for works!" - But a word and work are called idle not because they have an evil end, for then they would no longer be idle, but evil, but because they are not ordered to their connatural end. Hence even boys are called idle, not because they do nothing or something evil, but because they do not do those things which they ought, for example, by playing uselessly. Moreover, an ultimate end has been appointed for man by the Creator, toward which he must tend by all his acts.⁹⁰ Therefore whatever man does, he must refer to that end; not indeed actually and explicitly, but implicitly, insofar as he perceives every act as fitting right reason and the eternal law. Certainly the Creator joined some special delectation to certain actions, for example, to actions of eating, drinking, generating, etc., with this intention, that men would perform more fervently and more perfectly these actions so necessary for individual and social life; but this delectation is not the end, but only a means to the end. Therefore he who seeks pleasure as the end and not as a means acts against the intention of the Creator and therefore sins. Hence it follows that man cannot positively intend and seek delectation in such a way that the proper motive and reason for willing the action is the convenience itself or the delectation itself, without it being necessary to think of a further honorable end.

3. By the authority of doctors. The proposed opinion is by far the more common among doctors, and indeed not only among Thomists, but also among other theologians. Thus, besides St. Thomas,⁹¹ Cajetan,⁹² Billuart,⁹³ Sylvius,⁹⁴ Haine,⁹⁵ Marc-Raus,⁹⁶ Aertnys-Damen,⁹⁷ Tanquerey,⁹⁸ and many others hold it. - John Sanchez⁹⁹ seems to have been the first who explicitly taught the contrary, writing: "If harm is absent, to eat and drink without necessity solely for seeking delectation, namely, because of the coolness of drink or the pleasantness of food, will by no means be against reason; but such eating or drinking is done freely so that the natural appetite may enjoy its acts. But to will that the appetite be delighted in its operations, which are not against reason, is in no way sin.... Therefore neither will it be right to condemn the sense of taste because it seeks food solely because of its delectation." It is deservedly doubted whether St. Bonaventure¹⁰⁰ and certain Scotists¹⁰¹ are rightly alleged as patrons of the opinion of John Sanchez.

4. From reason. St. Thomas¹⁰² rightly teaches: "Delectation is because of operation, and not conversely." For delectation is as it were a certain salt and condiment which serves for the appetibility and better digestion of food. But just as it is unfitting to eat solely because of salt or condiment, so also it is a disorder to act because of pleasure alone. Wherefore it is indeed licit to act with delectation or even to intend delectation as an intermediate end with subordination to some further end; but it is never licit to act because of pleasure alone. For this reason St. Augustine says briefly but most truly: "It is not licit to use things to be enjoyed or to enjoy things to be used."¹⁰³ Concerning delectation sought in foods St. Alphonsus notes:¹⁰⁴ "Although someone approaching the table does not think about the conservation of life, but only about the delectation of food, he does not therefore sin, because he wills such delectation, at least virtually, because of the conservation of life; and thus he does not seek it inordinately."

⁸³ Prop. 25 of Baius (Denz. n. 1025).

⁸⁴ Here are the words of the holy Doctor: "Man is bound to refer all his acts to God when he acts with deliberation and because of some end. For the apostle says in 1 Cor. 10:31: Whether ... you eat, or drink, or whatever else you do: do all things for the glory of God. Therefore, if he refers it to God at least through virtual intention, the act will be good; if he does not refer it, it will be evil: therefore no act is indifferent.... Hence for practice we gather: one must often in the day, at least in the morning, generally offer to God all his acts, so that thus the precept of the apostle may be fulfilled, at least by the virtual intention of doing all things for the glory of God" (l. 5, tract. praeamb., n. 44).

⁸⁵ Aertnys-Damen, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 35, note; Vindiciae Alphonsianae P. 2, q. 1, t. 1, pp. 149-157, ed. 2.

⁸⁶ Princ. Theol. mor. n. 88 sqq.

⁸⁷ Denz. n. 1158 and 1159.

⁸⁸ Matt. 12:36.

⁸⁹ It is found among the apocryphal works of St. Jerome: Breviarium in Psalmos, Ps. 16 (Migne, Patr. lat. 26, 910).

⁹⁰ Cf. above n. 20.

⁹¹ Contra gent. 3, c. 26; Suppl. q. 49, a. 6.

⁹² Comm. in I-II, q. 1, a. 6.

⁹³ De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 6, and De ultimo fine diss. 1, a. 5.

⁹⁴ Comm. in I-II, q. 100, a. 10.

⁹⁵ Theol. mor. De act. hum. q. 59.

⁹⁶ Inst. mor. I, n. 307.

⁹⁷ Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 35.

⁹⁸ De act. hum. 8, n. 203.

⁹⁹ Select. disp. 2, n. 14; this work was placed on the Index on Dec. 6, 1642.

¹⁰⁰ Comm. in 2, dist. 41, a. 1, q. 3.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theol. I, n. 170.

¹⁰² Contra gent. 3, c. 26.

¹⁰³ What use and fruition are was said above, n. 34.

¹⁰⁴ Theol. mor. l. 5, tract. praeamb., n. 44.

126. From what has been said it seems sufficiently proved that man in all his acts must tend toward an honorable end and mediately toward the ultimate end, that is, toward God. Hence the apostle warns: "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do: do all things for the glory of God."¹⁰⁵ By these words, authors commonly teach with St. Thomas^105a and St. Alphonsus that not mere counsel, but a true precept is contained. And this precept is not hard; for it is not required that man explicitly refer all and each of his actions to God, but an implicit relation suffices, which is abundantly had if a man at due times elicits an act of faith and charity, which acts indeed are necessary for all men by necessity of means, as will be said below in the treatise on the theological virtues. In practice the faithful are indeed to be exhorted to elicit often the intention of doing all things for the glory of God, but they are not to be accused of having committed sin if they have not elicited this explicit intention. Hence inappropriately in some so-called "mirrors of conscience" or outlines of examination of conscience there is found the question: "Have you often elicited a good intention?" For it is not a sin if the faithful have not explicitly elicited a good intention of doing all things for God.

¹⁰⁵ 1 Cor. 10:31.

^105a II Sent. Dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5 ad 7.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 6-9; q. 19, a. 7 and 10; q. 20, a. 1, 3 and 6; Contra Gentiles III, 26; De Malo, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 and 11, and a. 3; II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 4.

Let the notions concerning ends handed down above, nn. 9 and 10, be recalled.

155. Principle I. Human acts have species of goodness or malice from the end.

It is proved: a human act has species from the object. But a human act is twofold: the interior act of the will, whose proper object is good or the end, and the exterior act, whose object is that about which it is concerned. Those two acts, because they express order to one thing, are one moral act, in which the interior act is the formal element because the will determines the exterior members to acting, and because the exterior act is not voluntary and human except dependently upon the will; hence it is the material element. Therefore they have one and the same goodness or malice, and therefore:

1. the interior act has its principal species and morality from the end and participates in the morality of the exterior object;

2. on the contrary, the exterior act has species and morality from its own object and participates in the morality of the end;

3. the completed act is considered chiefly and formally according to the intended end, materially and secondarily according to the object of the exterior act; hence one who steals in order to commit adultery is more an adulterer than a thief.

Therefore 1) one physical act a) can have, according to moral being, two or more species of goodness or malice, or be multiple in species according to moral being, if it has an object and an end, or even ends of diverse species subordinated to one another, as if someone steals in order to fornicate and this in order to extort a secret; on the contrary, b) if the end is of the same species as the object, goodness or malice is only increased in the same species, as if someone steals one person's key in order to steal another person's gold.

Indeed 2) one physical act, as it seems, can be multiple in number according to moral being: a) if it is done for several ends, not indeed subordinated but equally principal, disparate and independent, for example, alms for mercy and in order to please a friend, a gift for vainglory and for fornication. For there are as many acts distinct in number as there are independent ends, because an act having several total objects is virtually and according to moral being multiple; in other words, there are morally as many acts as there are objects distinct or total according to moral being. Also b) it can be good and evil under a diverse respect, not only successively through a change of the moral object, as the eating of meat begun before Friday and continued after it, but also simultaneously, if someone acts for a good and an evil end that are disparate and equally principal, because then the evil end does not affect the good, nor conversely. Thus, for example, alms given to relieve misery and at the same time for vainglory.

1. Let this not be thought impossible, on the ground that if there are several objects, the acts also will be physically several. For by one physical act the will can will diverse things not only subordinately, but also things independent of one another or merely coordinate; indeed it can simultaneously will good or the ordination of reason in one thing and evil or the violation of order in another thing, as if someone wills to extinguish a fire in order to save a child and in order to steal. Then, namely, he intends several things on account of one thing, namely, good in common or happiness in the abstract, and thus tends to something physically one, and so by one physical movement of tendency he can tend simultaneously to several morally diverse objects. This seems to follow from the principles of St. Thomas, a. 4, ad 3, and II Sent. d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4; but it is a rare case to which the holy Doctor did not explicitly attend. - Others say that in the case there are two physical acts of the will, and among the ends one is always more principally intended; whence one act of the will intends the principal end to which the external act is ordered, while another act of the will intending the secondary end merely accompanies the execution of the work.

161. Corollaries.

From the aforesaid it is understood that one should not admit:

1. The opinion of the Scotists, who say that it is illicit to act on account of delight alone when the act from itself, by its intrinsic end, is ordered to something other than pleasure, such as eating, drinking, the conjugal act; but that it is not illicit when delight is the end which the act by its nature intends, for example, the recreation of the ears in music, of the eyes in the vision of beauty, of the nostrils in the smell of a flower: these acts, namely, according to them, are indifferent in the individual. But we have seen that there are no indifferent acts in the individual.

2. Nor the opinion of Ballerini, whom several Jesuits follow (Genicot, Noldin, Vermeersch), saying that acts exercised on account of the end of delight are morally good even if the will does not intend another honorable end, provided it does not positively exclude the end, nor is there anything disordered in the action itself. But this opinion is too benign. For that man may act as man, it is not enough for him to avoid evil, but it is also required that he will and do the good fitting to his nature, namely, the honorable, which is impossible unless he positively intend it. For a) on one side, good is not contracted unless it is positively intended for its own sake; but the sensitive appetite of itself does not tend to honorable good but to the delectable good alone; therefore the delight of the sensitive appetite will not be good unless it is positively intended on account of honorable good. Otherwise in the concrete it will be evil, as sought without a due end. b) On the other side, to avoid evil is not a positively honorable end, because between the objectively evil and the objectively good there stands the objectively indifferent; therefore it is not enough to will to avoid objective evil in order that the act be objectively good, but a positively honorable end must be intended. Otherwise the act in the concrete will be idle and evil, as lacking the due circumstance of a right end. c) Innocent XI condemned eating or the conjugal action as illicit when done for pleasure alone. And if the Scotists can explain the condemnation of the propositions by Innocent XI by saying that eating, drinking, the conjugal act are not ordered by an intrinsic end to pleasure, Ballerini cannot explain it except by turning the words away from their obvious sense and saying that the positive exclusion of an honorable end is prohibited, not negative exclusion.

Therefore, in order that an act exercised on account of sensible delight be good, it is not enough that it not be disordered in itself, nor that in fact it be fitting to rational nature; it is also required that as such it be known in some way by the agent, and at least implicitly intended as such.

3. On the contrary, some have spoken excessively, saying that a good act requires that someone will the good formally as honorable, or even act from a general intention of living rightly and always acting according to reason. For it suffices that someone in some way intend the good which is honorable and is known as such, without willing it precisely and expressly because it is honorable; and thus he already implicitly tends to the ultimate end.

4. A fortiori the Jansenists and Augustinians erred, such as Noris and Berti, requiring that a good act be referred explicitly to God, the ultimate end.

Practically the opinion of St. Thomas does not differ much from the more recent opinion of Ballerini and his followers, for when someone, in seeking delight, wills to act moderately and admits nothing disordered, ordinarily he not only does not positively exclude the honorable end, but could scarcely fail to include it implicitly. Indeed this opinion is more benign than Scotus's opinion, for the acts which the Scotists consider indifferent, according to us, very easily become good, since in them agreement with rational nature, namely, a good disposition of mind, is easily perceived.

An end in general is that for the sake of which something is done; but it is distinguished as twofold, namely the end of the work, that is, the end intrinsic to the work itself and to which the work tends through itself; and the end of the one working, that is, the end to which the agent directs his intention at will, or which the agent has set before himself, whether it is the same as the end of the work, or is diverse from it and extrinsic to the work. Concerning this latter end only must we speak, since it alone is properly called the end.

But that end is: 1st, intermediate or ultimate, according as it is referred to another end, or the will rests in it; 2nd, positively or negatively ultimate, or, what is the same thing, simply and as to all things, or in a certain respect and in only some series ultimate, according as it is or is not intended with the exclusion of any other ultimate end whatsoever; 3rd, primary or secondary, according as it is intended first and through itself, or only consequently and with subordination to the primary. Again, the ultimate end can be intended explicitly or implicitly, according as the agent is moved by an end of this sort expressly or only virtually.

I say, 1st. A human act takes true morality from the end. The reason is that the freely intended end ultimately orders the act to this, that it be or not be conformable to right reason. But this ordering is diverse from that which the object and the other circumstances besides the end bestow upon the act. Thus it is conformable to right reason not only to give alms, but also to give them unto the remission of sins; just as likewise it is repugnant to right reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to make oneself drunk.

I say, 2nd. He sins who acts on account of delight alone, which he does not refer even implicitly or virtually to a further end. The reason is that delight is only a means for carrying out actions more easily, better, and more constantly, but not the ultimate end of an action. Therefore he who acts on account of delight alone perverts the order of things instituted by the author of nature. The same is clear from proposition 8, condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: "To eat and drink even to satiety on account of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its acts." Moreover this proposition, as Father Viva observes, was condemned both on account of the clause even to satiety, and on account of the word alone. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 4, art. 2. - Viva, on the cited proposition, nn. 5 and 6.

Yet it must be noted, 1st, that this disordering through itself is not grave, and therefore does not exceed venial sin; for he who behaves thus seeks, on the one hand, not a bad thing, but rather a good thing in an undue order, since, as St. Thomas says, Contra Gentiles, lib. 3, cap. 26, n. 6, "delight is good, and to be sought, if it follows a good operation"; and on the other hand he does not ordinarily place the ultimate end of his life in this undue mode of seeking, unless he is of the number of those concerning whom the Apostle says, Philipp. iii, 19: "whose God is the belly." Cf. St. Alphonsus, tract. on sins, n. 73; and tract. on matrimony, n. 912.

It must be noted, 2nd, that this disordering then only has place when someone so acts on account of delight alone that he positively excludes a further honest end. For he does not sin, not even venially, who expressly seeks the delight of food, for example, or of games, even if he does not actually think about a further end, provided only that in some way he virtually intends this further end; for instance, because he wills generally in all these things to behave honestly, and to admit nothing against the prescription of right reason, or because he is accustomed to assume them on account of some utility of soul or body, etc. For such a one must perhaps be said to act on account of delight, but not on account of delight alone. Cf. Viva, on prop. 8, condemned by Innocent XI, n. 6. - Salmantic., de matr., cap. 3, n. 33. - Baller., note (a), p. 26.

Question 1. Does any bad end corrupt the whole goodness of an act?

Response. An end gravely bad always wholly infects an act, however good the object may be in itself. For that act can be good from no part, since the agent, by sinning mortally, totally recedes from God. But an end lightly bad also corrupts the whole act if it is the total end, or at least the primary end, of the agent. For if it is total, it embraces the whole object, and therefore infects the whole, because, as St. Thomas says, "the agent with a bad end wills the good under the aspect of evil, and therefore, insofar as it is willed by him, it is evil." But if a double end is had, and the bad end is primary, it must be resolved in the same way, because that act is still chosen so that it may be an instrument for evil, and therefore it is substantially vitiated. Finally, if an end lightly bad is merely secondary, more probably it does not corrupt the whole act, and therefore this act will be partly good, partly bad. The reason is that that act retains its goodness from the object; but the bad end behaves only concomitantly, and does not flow into the very substance of the action. If it were otherwise, fewer good acts would be found. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 19, art. 7. - Billuart, dissert. 4, art. 4.

Question 2. Are all our actions commanded to be referred to God by the words of the Apostle, I Cor. x, 31: "Do all things unto the glory of God"?

Response. Negatively, if there is question of an obligation of actually and explicitly referring all and each of our actions to the glory of God. The reason is not only that the aforesaid words can be taken, and in reality are taken by many Doctors, in a negative sense, insofar as they would mean: do nothing against God; but also because, if they are understood in an affirmative sense and at the same time concerning the actual reference of all our actions to God, they report a mere counsel and not a precept, which would be altogether impossible.

But if there is question of another reference besides actual and explicit reference, at times a sharp controversy has existed among theologians. Those who were called Augustinians, especially from among the Louvain theologians, said that an intention of this kind was necessary, which they called virtually explicit, and that it was commanded by the words of St. Paul, I Cor. x, 31, and Coloss. iii, 17. But indeed, while they thought thus, it could scarcely happen that they would not fall under the condemnation of proposition 25 of Michael Baius: "All the works of unbelievers are sins"; indeed they were to be accused of notable temerity, because, against the sense of the Church, they would condemn of sin very many works of innumerable faithful who operate without such an intention. For that reason their opinion was vehemently attacked by nearly all the other theologians. But these established: 1st, that through an act of charity elicited at due times, the obligation of directing all works universally to God as the ultimate end is sufficiently fulfilled; 2nd, that no law can be brought forth by which we are obliged to refer the same works to God in a more particular mode; 3rd, that, besides, a work honest from its object and vitiated by no depraved end and no bad circumstance, from itself, and therefore in the implicit intention of the one working, is referred by a certain necessary order to God, who is the source, rule, and end of the good and the honest.

"Who endures to praise all day? I suggest a remedy, from which you may praise God all day, if you wish. Whatever you do, do it well, and you have praised God. When you sing a hymn, you praise God: what does your tongue do, unless your conscience also praises? Have you ceased from singing a hymn, and do you go away to refresh yourself? Do not become drunk, and you have praised God. Do you go away to sleep? Do not rise to do evil, and you have praised God. Are you doing business? Do not commit fraud, and you have praised God. Do you cultivate a field? Do not stir up a lawsuit, and you have praised God. In the innocence of your works prepare yourself for praising God all day." St. Augustine, Enarratio in Ps. 34, serm. 11 (M. 36, c. 340). - Cf. St. Thomas, 2 dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5; 2 de Carit., art. 11, ad 2; and 2-2, q. 44, art. 4. - Perrone, de Caritate, cap. 5, art. 1, prop. 4. - Theol. Wirceb., de Act. hum., cap. 3, art. 3.

Question 3. Whether, just as there is not given an act in the individual indifferent in relation to natural honesty, so it can be said that no act is posited by a just man which is indifferent in relation to eternal life?

Response. Negatively. For in order that some act be meritorious of eternal life, it is required that it be supernatural; but it cannot be supernatural unless, besides the honesty of the work and the state of grace of the principle operating, there is also present some supernatural motive. This third condition being lacking, and no one will deny that it can be lacking, that work will be neither meritorious nor demeritorious. Besides, if some act were to be called meritorious of eternal life insofar as it proceeds from a just man, it would follow that every act which proceeds from a sinner is demeritorious, which can in no way be said. And this is the doctrine which is constantly and certainly handed down by St. Thomas in several places. Cf. Suarez, de Merito, lib. 12, cap. 7, nn. 2 and seq., and cap. 10, n. 15. - Mazzella, de Virt. Inf., prop. 55, nn. 1345 and seq.

I say 3° : Human act draws goodness or malice from end³. ³ Here q. 18, a. 4, c.

Clear from what was said, because end, like other circumstances, can say order of conformity or disformity toward reason. So conformable to reason is it, not only to give alms, but also to give in satisfaction for sins; just as repugnant to reason is it, not only to steal, but also to steal to get oneself drunk.

1. The morality of any given action is determined by three elements, the end in view, the means taken, and the circumstances that accompany the taking of the said means. Whoever knows this principle, does not thereby know the right and wrong of every action, but he knows how to go about the enquiry. It is a rule of diagnosis.

2. In order to know whether what a man does befits him as a man to do, the first thing to examine is that which he mainly desires and wills in his action. Now the end is more willed and desired than the means. He who steals to commit adultery, says Aristotle, is more of an adulterer than a thief. The end in view is what lies nearest to a man's heart as he acts. On that his mind is chiefly bent; on that his main purpose is fixed. Though the end is last in the order of execution, it is first and foremost in the order of intention. Therefore the end in view enters into morality more deeply than any other element of the action. It is not, however, the most obvious determinant, because it is the last point to be gained; and because, while the means are taken openly, the end is often a secret locked up in the heart of the doer, the same means leading to many ends, as the road to a city leads to many homes and resting-places. Conversely, one end may be prosecuted by many means, as there are many roads converging upon one goal.

3. If morality were determined by the end in view, and by that alone, the doctrine would hold that the end justifies the means. That doctrine is false, because the moral character of a human act depends on the thing willed, or object of volition, according as it is or is not a fit object. Now the object of volition is not only the end in view, but likewise the means chosen. Besides the end, the means are likewise willed. Indeed, the means are willed more immediately even than the end, as they have to be taken first.

4. A good action, like any other good thing, must possess a certain requisite fulness of being, proper to itself. As it is not enough for the physical excellence of a man to have the bare essentials, a body with a soul animating it, but there is needed a certain grace of form, colour, agility, and many accidental qualities besides; so for a good act it is not enough that proper means be taken to a proper end, but they must be taken by a proper person, at a proper place and time, in a proper manner, and with manifold other circumstances of propriety.

5. The end in view may be either single, as when you forgive an injury solely for the love of Christ: or multiple co-ordinate, as when you forgive both for the love of Christ and for the mediation of a friend, and are disposed to forgive on either ground separately; or multiple subordinate, as when you would not have forgiven on the latter ground alone, but forgive the more easily for its addition, having been ready, however, to forgive on the former alone; or cumulative, as when you forgive on a number of grounds collectively, on no one of which would you have forgiven apart from the rest.

6. Where there is no outward action, but only an internal act, and the object of that act is some good that is willed for its own sake, there can be no question of means taken, as the end in view is immediately attained.

We need not go beyond the words of Our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. vi. 22; vii. 17), for a proof of the important bearing of our intention | on the morality of our actions. In the sight of God the aim, the intention, with which we perform our actions, is of more importance than what we do. This is a commonplace of theology and of asceticism, and it is admitted by all who profess to guide their conduct by the maxims of the Gospel. But though it be admitted on all hands that the intention is the principal part of our deliberate actions, there is considerable difference of opinion among theologians on several points in the general doctrine of intention. Theologians do not usually discuss these points together, but it may be worth while to consider them together as forming a portion of one body of doctrine, every part of which throws light on every other part. I propose, then, to take St. Thomas principally for my guide, and bring together for the purposes of comparison and mutual illustration a few points in the doctrine of intention.

Intention is nothing more than an efficacious wish or desire of an object; it is a movement of the will towards an end, with reference to the means which must be taken in order to attain that end.

The ends of our intentions are manifold and various as are human nature and human actions, but there is one which is common to all men, and in regard to which we are not free. Man necessarily desires happiness, and if happiness be taken in the abstract, it forms the object of all our endeavors. The will is attracted only by what seems good; it is moved only by what seems likely to contribute to our well-being; in every action, then, we seek for happiness, and cannot do otherwise. If we found ourselves in presence of an object which was wholly good, we could not but love and desire it; and so when the blessed find themselves face to face with God, the infinite source of all goodness and beauty, they are necessarily ravished with love of Him; they cannot but love Him.

However, as no other object but God is wholly good, and as in this world we cannot see Him face to face, and the attainment of the possession of God is accompanied by labor and difficulty, so while we live on earth, though we necessarily seek happiness, yet we do not seek it necessarily in any one object; in other words, we are free to determine the end of our intentions according to our choice.

If we accept the teaching of St. Thomas, we are under a moral obligation to direct all our actions to the honor and glory of God.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Sum. I.-II., q. 100, a. 10 ad 2.

In this sense he interprets the words of St. Paul.² However, this must not be understood as imposing on us an obligation to form ‘an actual intention of doing our every action for God. This would be requiring more than man’s weakness can bear. It will be sufficient if we refer every action to God virtually. St. Thomas explains his mind very fully and clearly on this point in various places of his works. Thus in De Caritate, a. 11, ad 2, he says:

² I Cor. x. 31.

To the second it must be said that it is not possible in this life actually to refer all things to God, just as it is not possible always to think about God, for this belongs to the perfection of the heavenly homeland; but that all things be referred virtually to God belongs to the perfection of charity to which all are bound. To make this evident, it must be considered that, just as in efficient causes the power of the first cause remains in all subsequent causes, so also the intention of the principal end remains virtually in all secondary ends. Hence whoever actually intends some secondary end virtually intends the principal end; thus, while a physician actually gathers herbs, he intends to prepare a potion, perhaps thinking nothing about health; nevertheless he virtually intends the health for which he gives the potion. Thus, therefore, when someone orders himself to God as to his end, in all the things which he does for his own sake there remains virtually the intention of the last end, which is God; hence he can merit in all things, if he has charity. Therefore it is in this way that the Apostle commands all things to be referred to the glory of God.

In the next paragraph St. Thomas distinguishes a virtual from an habitual intention of pleasing God:

To the third it must be said that it is one thing habitually to refer to God and another virtually. For even one who does nothing and actually intends nothing, such as one sleeping, habitually refers to God; but virtually to refer something to God belongs to an agent acting for an end ordered to God. Hence habitually to refer to God does not fall under a precept; but virtually to refer all things to God falls under the precept of charity, since this is nothing other than to have God as the last end.

It is then necessary and sufficient, according to St. Thomas, to refer all our actions to God virtually. What he means by virtually is clear enough from the passages just quoted, but he explains his meaning more fully and more clearly in other places, especially in his commentary on the Second Book of the Sentences, Dist. xl., q. 1, a. 5. There we read the following passages:

To the sixth it must be said that a wholly habitual ordering of an act to God does not suffice, because no one merits from what is in habit, but from what he actually does. Yet it is not necessary that the actual intention ordering to the last end always be joined to every action which is directed to some proximate end; rather, it suffices that at some time all those ends be actually referred to the last end, as happens when someone resolves to direct his whole self to the love of God: for then whatever he orders to himself will be ordered to God. And if it is asked when it is necessary to refer an act to the last end, this is nothing other than to ask when it is necessary for the habit of charity to go forth into act; because whenever the habit of charity goes forth into act, the whole man is ordered to the last end, and consequently all those things which are ordered to him as goods for him.

To the third it must be said that not only an act of charity is meritorious, but also acts of the other virtues insofar as they are informed by grace; although they cannot be meritorious except insofar as they are brought back to the end of charity. It is not necessary, however, that acts always be brought back to that end; rather, for the efficacy of meriting it suffices that they be actually brought back to the ends of the other virtues. For one who intends to preserve chastity, even if he thinks nothing about charity, certainly merits if he has grace. Now every act tending to some good, unless it tends to it inordinately, has as its end the good of some virtue, because the virtues sufficiently perfect a person concerning all things which can be human goods.

It is clear, then, that St. Thomas teaches that it is of obligation to refer all our actions to God, our last end. However, this obligation is sufficiently fulfilled by one who acts from any motive that is not bad; for in thus acting he intends something which he sees to be good, as every human act is either good or bad, according to St. Thomas. But in directing his intention to something that is good, he is necessarily, though only virtually, not actually, directing his intention to God, his last end; for the very notion of moral goodness implies conformity to man’s last end.

St. Thomas further teaches that in him who is in the grace of God, in him who fulfils all the obligations which bind him under pain of grave sin, every act that is ethically good is also meritorious of life eternal. For among our other obligations there is the positive precept of charity, by which we are bound at times to think of God, and elicit an act of love towards Him. By this act of charity we have referred ourselves and all our actions to God, and so unless it be recalled by one that is contrary to it, or by mortal sin, which destroys the bond of friendship between God and the soul, it continues to exert its influence on our subsequent actions, and informs them with the spirit of charity. It thus makes them supernatural and meritorious of a crown of glory in heaven.

The precept of charity obliges us to love God with all our heart, mind, and strength, but our condition here on earth does not permit us to be always engaged in actually thinking of God and forming acts of love towards Him. The limitations of our nature and the necessities of life, as a rule, only permit us to observe this greatest of all commandments by never doing anything directly contrary to it, and by fulfilling it virtually, that is, by virtually directing our every action towards God in the sense explained by St. Thomas. However we are bound at all events occasionally to think of God explicitly, and to give Him the service of our explicit love and affection. This St. Thomas teaches, as we have already seen, and it is certain doctrine, approved and enforced by the Church. Nevertheless, it seems impossible to say when and how often we are bound under pain of sin to form explicit acts of the love of God. St. Thomas³ teaches that at least when a man begins to have the use of reason he then begins to think about his last end, and that he is then bound under pain of mortal sin to refer his whole being and all his actions to God. If he do this, he thereby obtains the sanctifying grace of God if he was still in original sin; if he fail to do it he commits his first sin, so that one who is still in original sin cannot commit venial sin before he has committed mortal sin.

³ Sum. I.-II., q. 89, a. 6.

Although this opinion of St. Thomas has always had its supporters, especially among his followers, yet it does not seem ever to have won the common assent of theologians. The opinion seems not sufficiently grounded in revelation, reason, or experience. At some time, indeed, after coming to the use of reason, and after learning his obligations towards God, his Creator and Lord, every man is bound to give himself to the service of God by an act of love; but other theologians think that the particular time when this obligation must be fulfilled under pain of grave sin cannot be so exactly determined as St. Thomas lays down. All are agreed that we must frequently during our lives form explicit acts of the love of God, but it seems impossible to determine more accurately at what intervals this obligation must be fulfilled under pain of sin.

Intimately connected with the obligation of referring our actions to our last end is the question concerning the influence of our intention on the moral quality of our actions. Some early Christian writers misled by a false interpretation of the words of Our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount, taught that the intention with which we perform our actions is everything, the actions themselves are of no moral quality. Thus the unknown author of the Opus imperfectum on St. Matthew, generally published with the works of St. Chrysostom, says:

Therefore a servant of God cannot do evil; and if it sometimes seems to you that he has acted badly, consider carefully his evil itself, and you will find him inwardly good. For from a good purpose even what seems evil is good, because a good purpose excuses an evil deed; but an evil deed does not condemn a good purpose.

Cassian, too, in his Collationes writes:

For God is not only the examiner and judge of our words and deeds, but also the examiner of our purpose and determination.

4 Hom. xix.

If He sees anything done or promised by anyone for the sake of eternal salvation and with a view to divine contemplation, although it may seem harsh and unjust to men, nevertheless He, looking into the inward piety of the heart, judges not the sound of words but the resolve of the will, because the end of the deed and the disposition of the doer must be considered; by reason of this some, as was said above, could even be justified through a lie, and others through an assertion of truth could incur the sin of eternal death.

Peter Lombard had perhaps these and other authors in mind when he wrote in the Second Book of the Sentences:

But it is asked whether all the works of a man are good or bad from their effect and end. Some think that they are, who say that all acts are indifferent, so that they are neither good nor bad in themselves; but every act is good from a good intention and bad from a bad one.

As it is clear from these extracts, the doctrine that the end justifies the means had its supporters in very early times among Christian writers; it was indignantly and triumphantly refuted by the great St. Augustine, whom St. Thomas and orthodox teachers in the Church have always followed on this point.

In order to have a clear notion of what influence the intention has on the morality of an action, it may be worth while briefly to summarize St. Thomas’s doctrine on the point.

He first of all examines the human act in its totality,’ and teaches that it derives its moral quality from the object, the end, and the circumstances. The object is that about which the human faculty is engaged when the action is produced, or it is that which the faculty produces or does; it is the substance of the action considered in the abstract, and apart from its circumstances. Thus, in the act of theft, the object is the taking away of something which belongs to another, and if this be considered in relation to right reason, it is obvious that it is an act which is contrary to it; or theft is morally wrong because the object of the action is against right reason, which is the rule of human actions.

5 Collat. xvii., c. 17.

6 Dist. xl.

7 Sum. I-IL, q. 18.

The end, on which the morality of an action also depends, is the motive of the action, the reason why it is done. It is obvious from what has been said above that the moral quality of an act depends on its motive or on the intention with which it is done; it is bad to steal, it is worse to steal in order to be able to commit adultery, according to the well-worn illustration.

Finally, the circumstances which accompany an action give it its moral quality, as well as the object and the end. It is wrong to steal, but to steal the Church plate, or the pittance on which a poor man depends for the support of himself and his family is worse.’ To play in the field at the proper time is right, to play in church is wrong. After laying down these principles about the morality of human acts in general, St. Thomas considers in detail the morality of the two chief component parts of a complete and consummated act, the interior act of the will and the exterior act. When a theft is committed, the thief first of all determines to commit the crime, and then sets about its execution. The crime morally considered is one completed human action, but physically it is composed of many, both interior and exterior acts. The will determines upon the theft, and then sets the external faculties in action to accomplish it. We are chiefly concerned with the interior act of the will.

The will is set in motion by some object or end which it wishes to attain. Thus one may come to know of a case of distress, and natural good feeling prompts the desire to relieve it. The relieving of distress in the case is the object towards which the will tends, and which causes the will to form the intention of giving relief. This object, therefore, is the cause of the action of the will, it is the term from which the action starts, and it is the goal towards which the action is directed. And as all motion is specified by the term to which it is directed, so the motion of the will, which we call intention, receives its moral quality from the object or aim to which it tends. So the intention to relieve distress is an act of virtue, and an intention to do an injury is vicious. In other words, the morality of the intention depends upon the object or end in view.

When the will has formed the intention of relieving the case of distress, the next step is to discover the means. If the means are not at hand, it is necessary to work to obtain them, the work undertaken for so charitable a purpose will be colored by the object for which it is undertaken, and itself become an act of charity. The means are desired for the sake of the end, they become the object of the will because of their connection with the end, they therefore put on the moral quality of the end. In the same way, if the end be bad, means, though good in themselves, taken with a view to attain such an end, become corrupted and bad. And so to work in order to obtain money to indulge in debauchery is itself wrong and wicked.

And here we touch upon the celebrated question whether a good end justifies wrongful means. In the sphere of politics there is too much reason to suppose that the view that the end does justify the means is largely acted upon by statesmen of all parties and nationalities. Machiavelli, who has given his name to the theory, lays down the principle with the utmost candor:

A prince, therefore, is not obliged to have all the forementioned good qualities in reality, but it is necessary he have them in appearance; nay, I will be bold to affirm, that having them actually, and employing them upon all occasions, they are extremely prejudicial, whereas having them only in appearance, they turn to better account; it is honorable to seem mild, and merciful, and courteous, and religious, and sincere, and indeed to be so, provided your mind be so rectified and prepared that you can act quite contrary upon occasion. And this must be premised, that a prince, especially if he come but lately to the throne, cannot observe all those things exactly which make men be esteemed virtuous, being oftentimes necessitated for the preservation of his State to do things inhumane, uncharitable, and irreligious; and therefore it is convenient his mind be at his command, and flexible to all the puffs and variations of his fortune: Not forbearing to be good, whilst it is in his choice, but knowing how to be evil when there is a necessity. . . . Let a prince therefore do what he can to preserve his life, and continue his supremacy, the means which he uses shall be thought honorable, and be commended by everybody, because the people are always taken with the appearance, and event of things, and the greatest part of the world consists of the people: those few who are wise, taking place when the multitude has nothing else to rely upon.⁸

⁸ The Prince, c. 18.

More briefly, but perhaps still more to the point, he says in his Discourses on Livy:

And this ought to be considered and observed by every man whose office it is to advise for the good of his country; for where the safety of that is in question no other consideration ought to be coincident, as whether the way be just or unjust, merciful or cruel, honorable or dishonorable, but postponing all other respects, you are to do that which shall procure the safety of your country, and preservation of its liberty.⁹

⁹ Book III., c. 41.

It is by no means an uncommon thing to meet with an almost equally explicit approval of the doctrine that the end justifies the means in the daily press and in modern periodical literature. Such approvals are specially frequent in more or less appreciative accounts of the careers of such men as Bismarck and Rhodes. But Machiavellianism is not confined to politicians, nor of course did unscrupulousness first appear in the days of the crafty Florentine. As we have already seen there are traces of the doctrine that the end justifies the means in several writers of the early ages of the Church.

However, with a few obscure exceptions, theologians have constantly rejected the view. They point out with St. Thomas that an action is not morally good merely because the end or intention is good; it must be good in all particulars; Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu, was the axiom applied in the case. And so if a man steals in order to relieve a case of distress, he does wrong though his intention be never so praiseworthy. It is wrong to steal, and it remains wrong though the theft be committed with a good intention, and the otherwise good action of relieving distress is vitiated by the wrongful means employed to do it, for the will to relieve distress by robbery is a vicious will. As the Society of Jesus is constantly being attacked on this point, it may not be out of place to quote the words in which Vasquez, one of its greatest divines, sums up the doctrine which it has always taught: