On the principles of morality

By principles of morality we understand all those things from which it comes about that act be good, or evil, or indifferent. The Author assigns three here q. 18, a. 2, 3 et 4, namely object, circumstances and end. For although the end is also a circumstance, since nevertheless it influences action most greatly, therefore the Holy Doctor treats specially of it, and with him commonly theologians. But those things which are wont to be disputed concerning these three principles of morality we shall weigh in this article through several paragraphs. Whence be

§ I. — Whether the first and specific goodness or malice of human act is from the object ?

By object we understand here not whatsoever is objected to the will, for thus the very circumstances would also be its object; but that which is first and per se attained by the will.

I say 1° : The first and essential goodness, or malice of human act, is drawn from the object morally considered¹. ¹ Here q. 18, a. 2, c.

It is proved. As in naturals first and essential goodness is taken from form which gives species, as in man from rational form, and the first evil from defect of form which gives species, as if generated thing does not attain specific form, suppose man be not generated but something in place of man ; so in morals first and essential goodness is regarded from form giving species to human act, and first malice from defect of this form. But form giving species to human act is the object. Therefore. — The minor is proved. Human act is motion and tending toward object as toward term. But motion and tending regards term as proper form; for it is compared to it as potency to act, perfectible and determinable to perfective and determinative. Therefore.

I said : « From object morally considered, » because around same object physically considered acts specifically diverse can turn, good and evil: as around same thing alien, act of injustice, taking away, act of justice, restoring; around same wife adultery and conjugal act; around same man love and hatred.

Object must therefore be taken morally, and as it stands to directing reason, and is conformable or disconformable to it.

You will say. Human act draws first and specific morality from what it first regards. But it regards the end, as St. Thomas teaches here a. 6, c., and above q. 1, a. 3, c. And it is clear because object is willed on account of end. Therefore end is prior willed.

I answer. I distinguish the minor. Human act first regards end of work, I concede; end of worker, I deny. End of work, which also is called intrinsic, coincides with object; end of worker comes to it from extrinsic and accidentally, so that without it the same act could stand.

Whether and how human act takes goodness or malice from circumstances and from end ?

TO BE NOTED BEFOREHAND

1° Circumstance is « an accident of human act, morally affecting it already constituted in moral being ¹ ». ¹ Here q. 7, a. 1, c.

It is explained ². It is called accident, because circumstance is said metaphorically from place. Therefore as in local things that is said to stand around something which is indeed extrinsic to it, yet attains it or approaches it; so in morals circumstance is said to be that which is outside substance of act, yet attaining it somehow. But what is outside substance of thing, as being such that without it the thing can be and be conceived, pertains nevertheless to itself, is called its accident. So is, e.g., circumstance of sacred place respecting theft. ² Ibid.

It is said, « affecting human act already constituted in moral being, » because, if it gave first and essential moral species, it would no longer be circumstance, but would pass into condition of object and essential difference.

It is said, « morally affecting it, » that is, modifying it in ordine to rules of morals; because, if it affect physically, it will indeed be circumstance of act qua physical, not qua moral, as that one give alms in gold or silver, morning or evening, with right or left hand; of which there is not question here.

2° Seven circumstances of human acts are commonly assigned, comprehended in this verse: Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando¹. For in acts must be considered, who did it, with what aids or instruments he did it, what he did, where he did it, why he did it, how he did it, and when he did it. ¹ Ibid., a. 3, c. — These circumstances were enumerated by Aristotle in III Ethic., c. 2 vel 3, and by Cicero in his Rhetorica.

Note, these things which we recounted, in order that they be circumstances, are not to be taken insofar as substance of act depends upon them, but insofar as they affect it accidentally. Whence

Quis, signifies not substance of agent, but its quality, e.g., that he be priest, religious or layman, unmarried or married, rich or poor, superior or subject.

Quid, denotes likewise not substance of effect, but some accident joined to it, suppose quality or quantity : e.g., in theft, it denotes not that stolen thing be alien, for that pertains to substance of theft, but that it be sacred or profane, that it be of great or small quantity; in homicide, that slain one be parent or cleric; in lust, that partner be kinswoman or wedded one, etc.

Ubi, signifies not bare place, certain it is that act done somewhere is done somewhere, but quality of place: as that it be public, sacred, etc.; for if fornication take place in public place, scandal arises, if in sacred place, it is sacrilege.

Quibus auxiliis, signifies accidental instruments or means which the agent used; as if he used help of devil or witchcraft, if he killed by poison or sword, etc.

Cur, denotes end, not intrinsic and of work, for that pertains to substance of act, but extrinsic and of working : as if someone steal to get himself drunk.

Quomodo, signifies accidental mode whereby act is done, e.g., intensely or remissly, from contempt or levity, from ignorance or fear, from malice or passion.

Quando, signifies accidental condition of time, namely either quality, as if work be done on feast day, or day of communion; or quantity, as if act endure long or little.

Question is resolved.

I say 1° : Human act draws some goodness or malice from circumstances¹. ¹ Here q. 18, a. 3, c.

It is proved 1°. Concerning goodness or malice of human acts judgment must be made in same mode, at least analogically, as concerning goodness and malice of natural things. But in natural things whole goodness and perfection is not taken from sole form giving species, but also from accidents: thus, e.g., whole goodness and perfection of man is not taken from his sole substantial form, but from various accidents, as from color, figure, due proportion of members, etc. Therefore whole goodness of human act is not taken from sole object giving species, but also from circumstances which are its accidents.

2° Therefore human act draws goodness or malice from object, because it says habit of convenience or disconvenience toward right reason. But circumstances also can import habit of convenience or disconvenience toward right reason: thus, e.g., not only is it disconvenient to reason to steal, but also to steal in sacred place.

I say 2° : Human act sometimes draws from circumstances species of good or evil, sometimes only aggravation or diminution of goodness or malice within same species ; or, as commonly is said : Certain circumstances are changing species, certain only aggravating within same species¹. ¹ Here q. 18, a. 10 et 11, c.

Changing-species circumstance is that which of itself adds onto human act special and distinct goodness or malice; only aggravating, that which increases only presupposed goodness or malice and modifies it within same species.

Among aggravating circumstances, some aggravate notably, others lightly. It is held notably aggravating in quantitative matter, or which consists in number, weight and measure, when separately taken and separated from act it would suffice unto mortal sin : as he who stole beyond twenty-five aurei would sin mortally: as he who beyond twenty-five asses, which I suppose suffice unto mortal sin, stole another twenty-five. In other matters however it is held notably aggravating, when it notably exceeds ordinary measure of sinning in suchlike matters: as if anyone spend whole night in impurities with woman, if anyone persevere through months and years in fraternal hatred, if anyone killed enemy cutting him limb from limb, etc.

If neither of these occur, it is held lightly aggravating : suppose thief filched thirty asses; that after quarrel someone angry remained in hatred for some small time.

Species-changing circumstances certainly must be accused in confession. That notably aggravating circumstances also must be accused holds the more common and safer opinion², of which in treatise on Penance. ² The contrary is now common, because it seems more probable. This question will be resolved in its place.

I say 3° : Human act draws goodness or malice from end³. ³ Here q. 18, a. 4, c.

Clear from what was said, because end, like other circumstances, can say order of conformity or disformity toward reason. So conformable to reason is it, not only to give alms, but also to give in satisfaction for sins; just as repugnant to reason is it, not only to steal, but also to steal to get oneself drunk.

§ III. — Certain little questions concerning preceding paragraphs briefly resolved.

You will ask 1° from what act good from object, commanded unto good end, draws specific and essential goodness.

I answer. Commanded act taken in itself and specifically draws its specific and essential goodness from object, accidental from end: 1° Because what comes upon act constituted in its species is accidental to it. But command and ordering of act good of itself unto extrinsic end comes upon it already constituted in its species. Therefore. 2° Act takes essential species from what it primarily and immediately regards. But commanded act, considered in itself and specifically, primarily and immediately regards object: thus e.g., volition of giving alms, commanded by penance, primarily and immediately regards honesty of mercy, only secondarily and mediately honesty of penance. Therefore.

But if commanded act be taken formally and reduplicatively as commanded, it has essential species from end; because, as such, it is reckoned one and same with commanding act, and regards same object.

Nevertheless, because it happens to that act, considered in itself, that it be commanded, and command and ordering unto extrinsic end supervenes upon it already constituted in its species, simply speaking, comparison made between those species, it must be said that that which it has from object is essential, and that which it has from end accidental.

You will ask 2° how goodness or malice both of object and of circumstances ought to be intended that act be good or evil.

I answer. That act be morally evil, it suffices that malice be indirectly virtually or implicitly willed in another to which it is annexed; that however it be good, there is required that goodness be formally and directly in itself willed, at least in exercised act.

Our Doctor expresses this whole response in these words here q. 19, a. 7, ad 3 : « Evil happens out of singular defects, good truly out of whole and integral cause. Wherefore, whether will be of that which is of itself evil and under reason of good, or be of good under reason of evil, always will will be evil. But unto this that it be good will, it is required that it be of good under reason of good, that is that it will good, and on account of good. »

Reason moreover of first part is: 1° because otherwise malice cannot be intended; for no one intending evil operates, as I said above and philosophers commonly teach; and if anyone be so wicked that he seem to covet malice in his act, he covets it not except by reason of some goodness which he apprehends in it. 2° Because malice not only is not to be coveted, but is to be avoided. It is not avoided however, by this very fact that indirectly and implicitly it is intended. Suffices therefore that one covet in a thing delectability, to which he sees malice annexed.

Reason of second part is, because honesty is per se and on account of itself appetible, and thus right reason says it to be appetend.

I said : « At least in exercised act ; » because it is not necessary that agent say in signed act, e.g.: « I will give alms because honest, » but suffices that he will alms under that reason whereby it is honest, namely because it relieves misery of neighbor.

You will ask 3° whether good intention makes honest evil election, or is vitiated from evil election.

I answer. Good intention, as moving unto evil election, is vitiated from it, and evil election is not made honest by good intention ; its malice nevertheless is diminished secundum quid.

First part is proved and explained in case. Titius steals to give alms, or lies to save life of neighbor. Intention of saving life of neighbor or relieving his need formally, as moving unto theft or lie, is vitiated and becomes evil : 1° Because thus it is cause of evil, namely theft or lie. But cause of evil does not say good, but defect. Therefore. 2° Intention, as moving unto election, contains it virtually; for intention and volition of end is not anyhow, but as to-be-attained through means. Therefore by this very fact that he wills to acquire through evil medium, it is inordinate and evil.

I said : « Formally as moving, unto evil election, » because in itself and from object it is good; good indeed is willing to succor needy neighbor. Of which art. seq.

Second part is proved, wherein is against Cassianus, Collat. 17. Malice from object, while object remains unchanged, is immutable and unchangeable; whence neither would good intention itself be vitiated from perverse election, unless because, as moving, it includes virtually in its object the very evil election, as was said, and thus its object is changed. But object of evil election, e.g., theft, is not changed by good intention. Therefore. Whence Apostle, Rom., II, 8, condemns those who say : Let us do evil, that good may come. And Alexander III, c. 4 super eo, de usuris, says: « Sacred Scripture forbids to lie for life of another. »

Third part is proved. Malice or gravity of sin is regarded from voluntary affection toward sin, or toward that which in sin is wont to please, namely delectable good. But, in case, although malice of theft or lie sought from object be not diminished, voluntary affection toward sin, or toward delectable good which in sin is wont to please, is nevertheless diminished ; because he covets evil or sin only from love of honest good, and as clothed with reason of useful good, for attaining that honest good. Therefore.

intended is better, so much more is fault of lie diminished. »

You will ask 4° whether evil intention vitiates good election, or conversely is made honest from good election.

I answer. Good election, as election, is sullied by evil intention, and evil intention is not rectified by good election.

It is proved. In good election, precisely as election, honesty of medium is not loved, but medium is loved precisely as useful unto evil end : e.g., who gives alms solely on account of vain glory cares not for honesty of alms, but only intends vain glory, so that, if alms were not of itself honest and conduced unto vain glory, he would assume it. Intention itself moreover of vain glory thence becomes worse, because it orders that which of itself is good unto evil. For perversion it is that good serve evil, and nobler be ordered unto less noble, as unto end, resting there. This whole reason will appear more clearly from art. seq.