Morals of the Church
Library › Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology › Volume I › Book I. On the General Principles of the Christian Life › Treatise II. On Motion in Order to the Final End, or on the Human Act, Considered according to Moral Being › Dissertation II. On Human Acts Considered according to Moral Being › Part I. On Morality in General › Section II. On the Sources of Morality

Chapter — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Chapter III. On the End

¶1.

The principal one among the circumstances of an act is the end, concerning which we must deal especially.

The End

70.

I. Notion. What the end is, and how manyfold it is distinguished, was explained in nn. 1 and 2.

The End

71.

II. Morality from the end. That an act takes some morality from the end follows from what has been said about morality taken from circumstances, since the end, as we have noted, is the principal circumstance of an act. Take these things especially:

  1. An act good from its object:

a) Referred to a good end, distinct from the intended end of the work, receives a new species of goodness; indeed, it obtains as many species of goodness as the good ends appointed for it. Thus, for example, fasting in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary and in satisfaction for sins has a threefold goodness: of temperance from the object, of religion and penance from the ends (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, aa. 4, 6, and 7; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXVIII).

b) Referred to an evil end:

a) It becomes simply evil if the evil end, whether gravely or lightly evil, is the only end, as if someone gives alms to a poor woman solely in order to seduce her, or solely to seek vain glory. The reason is that in this hypothesis the object is not intended insofar as it is honorable, but only insofar as it is useful for obtaining the evil end. "The will," says St. Thomas, "cannot be called good if an evil intention is the cause of willing. For one who wills to give alms for the sake of obtaining vain glory wills that which of itself is good under the account of evil; and therefore, insofar as it is willed by him, it is evil; hence his will is evil" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 7, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, V, XXXVIII).

b) It is partly evil, partly good, if the end is venially evil, as if someone prays also from vain glory. The reason is that a venially evil end does not prevent the object, insofar as it is honorable, from being intended, and thus the honesty of the object from being contracted. Added to this is that, as we noted in n. 68, if this doctrine is rejected, even among devout persons a good act would be found with greater difficulty, since a lightly evil end is easily mixed into the work (St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4; cf. I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3).

c) It is disputed if the evil end is not indeed the only end, but nevertheless is gravely evil. But even such an end does not seem to prevent the act from being able to be partly good, partly evil; partly good, I say, because the agent can, as it seems, even in this hypothesis intend the object insofar as it is honorable, and thus contract its honesty (n. 68). Yet most authors hold acts of this sort as simply evil. Therefore, according to our opinion, one who gives alms to a poor woman in order to seduce her, though not solely for that reason, can contract the goodness which inheres in the object.

We spoke above of an act partly good and partly evil. But it should be noted that, in the cases adduced, strictly speaking a multiple elicited act of the will should rather be admitted, of which one is good, the other evil; or that by appearance rather than in the reality itself there is had one elicited act of the will which is partly good and partly evil (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 20, a. 6). Apply these things also to what has been said about circumstance (n. 68).

  1. An act evil from its object:

a) Referred to an evil end, receives a new species of malice; indeed, it obtains as many species of malice as the evil ends appointed for it. Thus, for example, theft committed in order to make oneself drunk has a twofold malice: of injustice from the object, of intemperance from the end.

b) Referred to a good end, remains evil and contracts no goodness: not from the object, since this is not changed by intention and therefore retains its malice; nor from the end, because the end, as it is intended in the concrete, that is, as to be obtained through an evil means, is evil. Hence, for example, a lie committed in order to save the life of a neighbor is good under no heading. Nevertheless, ignorance or good faith rather often excuses from grave fault, or even from every fault.

  1. An act indifferent from its object:

a) Referred to a good end, is good.

b) Referred to an evil end, is evil.

c) Concerning an act referred to an indifferent end, or placed on account of a pleasurable good, something will be said later.

The End