Article III: On the End

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 6-9; q. 19, a. 7 and 10; q. 20, a. 1, 3 and 6; Contra Gentiles III, 26; De Malo, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 and 11, and a. 3; II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 4.

Let the notions concerning ends handed down above, nn. 9 and 10, be recalled.

155. Principle I. Human acts have species of goodness or malice from the end.

It is proved: a human act has species from the object. But a human act is twofold: the interior act of the will, whose proper object is good or the end, and the exterior act, whose object is that about which it is concerned. Those two acts, because they express order to one thing, are one moral act, in which the interior act is the formal element because the will determines the exterior members to acting, and because the exterior act is not voluntary and human except dependently upon the will; hence it is the material element. Therefore they have one and the same goodness or malice, and therefore:

1. the interior act has its principal species and morality from the end and participates in the morality of the exterior object;

2. on the contrary, the exterior act has species and morality from its own object and participates in the morality of the end;

3. the completed act is considered chiefly and formally according to the intended end, materially and secondarily according to the object of the exterior act; hence one who steals in order to commit adultery is more an adulterer than a thief.

Therefore 1) one physical act a) can have, according to moral being, two or more species of goodness or malice, or be multiple in species according to moral being, if it has an object and an end, or even ends of diverse species subordinated to one another, as if someone steals in order to fornicate and this in order to extort a secret; on the contrary, b) if the end is of the same species as the object, goodness or malice is only increased in the same species, as if someone steals one person's key in order to steal another person's gold.

Indeed 2) one physical act, as it seems, can be multiple in number according to moral being: a) if it is done for several ends, not indeed subordinated but equally principal, disparate and independent, for example, alms for mercy and in order to please a friend, a gift for vainglory and for fornication. For there are as many acts distinct in number as there are independent ends, because an act having several total objects is virtually and according to moral being multiple; in other words, there are morally as many acts as there are objects distinct or total according to moral being. Also b) it can be good and evil under a diverse respect, not only successively through a change of the moral object, as the eating of meat begun before Friday and continued after it, but also simultaneously, if someone acts for a good and an evil end that are disparate and equally principal, because then the evil end does not affect the good, nor conversely. Thus, for example, alms given to relieve misery and at the same time for vainglory.

1. Let this not be thought impossible, on the ground that if there are several objects, the acts also will be physically several. For by one physical act the will can will diverse things not only subordinately, but also things independent of one another or merely coordinate; indeed it can simultaneously will good or the ordination of reason in one thing and evil or the violation of order in another thing, as if someone wills to extinguish a fire in order to save a child and in order to steal. Then, namely, he intends several things on account of one thing, namely, good in common or happiness in the abstract, and thus tends to something physically one, and so by one physical movement of tendency he can tend simultaneously to several morally diverse objects. This seems to follow from the principles of St. Thomas, a. 4, ad 3, and II Sent. d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4; but it is a rare case to which the holy Doctor did not explicitly attend. - Others say that in the case there are two physical acts of the will, and among the ends one is always more principally intended; whence one act of the will intends the principal end to which the external act is ordered, while another act of the will intending the secondary end merely accompanies the execution of the work.

156. Practical rules follow from this:

1. An act good from the object, referred to a good end, has a double goodness if both are intended, as if someone wills to relieve a poor man and does this for penance; if the goodness of the object is not intended, it has only the goodness of the end, because then the object is considered as only a means to the end, for example, if someone abstains from wine, not on account of the good of abstinence, about which he does not care at all, but solely in order to preserve continence more easily.

1. Hence care must be taken concerning intention, so that moral perfection may be increased.

2. An act evil from the object, referred to an evil end, has a double malice of object and end, for example, theft for fornication.

3. An act otherwise good according to itself and from the object, referred to an evil end which is the total and adequate reason why it is chosen, is good from no part but wholly evil, for example, if someone gives alms solely for fornication or in order to turn a poor man away from religion.

It is proved: a) from the Scriptures, Mt. VI, 2, 5, 22-23; Prov. XXI, 27; b) from the general principle: Goodness is not contracted unless it is intended and the agent is moved by it (n. 146). But in the present case the object is intended not as good in itself but as a means to an evil end: for it is not apprehended except as something evil, and consequently insofar as it is the object of this act it is not good but evil. Namely, the object communicates no goodness to the act, but only the intended end passes over into the notion of object. - In other words: to will good under the notion of evil is not good but evil; but he who acts solely on account of an evil end does not will goodness except under the notion of evil; therefore the act is totally evil.

4. An act good of itself or from the object, which is referred to an evil but partial end, so that this is not the only reason for acting, is evil from the end but good from the object, even if the end is mortally evil, for example, if someone intended to give alms for mercy and also to honor an idol; in practice, however, it almost never happens that a mortally evil act has a good end sufficiently disparate.

It is proved: an act is good from the object if goodness is intended in itself and on account of itself, and that intention is not vitiated. But in the case the goodness of the object is intended in itself and on account of itself, for the act is not done solely on account of the evil end; and on the other side that intention is not vitiated, because the good end is not sought on account of the evil end, to which it is not subordinated, nor is the evil intended on account of the good end. Therefore the act is good from the object. In other words: two independent and equally principal ends are intended, the intrinsic end of the object and the extrinsic end of the one acting, and therefore one physically single act is a twofold moral act.

5. An act evil from the object or circumstance, referred to a good end, remains evil, because an evil means is not proportioned to a good end, and the goodness of the end does not prevent there being a defect in the object and the means being evil, and the will appetizing evil; hence St. Paul, concerning those who slanderously charge us with the contrary, says: "And not (as we are slandered, and as some affirm that we say), let us do evil that there may come good: whose damnation is just" (Rom. III, 8; cf. Eccli. XXXIV, 23-24).

Nevertheless: a) It is less evil, 1) than an evil act ordered to an evil end, and indeed so much less as the good end is better, because the affection toward malice is so much less; also 2) than a good act exercised solely on account of an evil end, because then the goodness of the act is corrupted; but to corrupt good is worse than to order evil to good.

b) The very intention of the good end is good, if this is intended absolutely and on account of itself, to be obtained indeterminately by some means; and therefore at times it was rewarded by God (Exod. I, 20, 21). But it is evil if the end is intended not absolutely but precisely as moving to an evil means, or as to be obtained by an evil and no other means, because then the end is intended not as good in itself but as a cause moving to evil.

6. An act indifferent from the object and circumstances becomes good or evil from the end, which then passes over into the notion of object, which gives the first morality: thus to sing for the praise of God or for lust.

157. Observation.

A partial end can be related to an action in three ways:

a) it can merely precede it, so that it does not influence the action afterward to be placed, but rather is its occasion, as if someone from human respect approaches the sacred rite, which afterward he attends with due intention: this occasional end does not vitiate the action;

b) it can accompany it, so that together with another good end it is the cause of the action, as if someone plays the organ to praise God and for vainglory: this vitiates the action in part;

c) it can follow, if, after the action has already been begun from a good end, an evil end enters in, as if someone begins to sing for the praise of God and afterward something of ostentation also creeps in: this end likewise vitiates the action in part, supposing that it truly becomes the end of the action which is then continued on account of the good and evil end together; otherwise, during the good action, another evil act is placed, for example, of ostentation or vainglory, because this is not a circumstance of the prior action but merely accompanies it (n. 154; q. 19, a. 7, ad 2).

158. Principle II. In order that an act be not evil but good, it is required that it be done for a due honorable end.

It is proved: man acting deliberately, in his human acts, ought to act as man, that is, according to the requirement and dignity of his nature as a rational being insofar as he is distinguished from brutes. But man differs from brutes a) in this, that he positively acts for an end as an end; and indeed b) for the end proper to himself, that is, for the good fitting to his nature, or the honorable. Therefore in all human acts he ought positively to intend an end, and indeed an honorable end. Hence:

1. Idle acts are evil (Mt. XII, 36), which are not so called because they have an evil end, but because they do not have a due end: for an idle person is one who does useless things which he ought not to do while he could, or even ought to, do other useful things. Acts placed solely because it pleases (or does not please) to act in this way are idle, as are acts omitted because they are not commanded; for they lack a good end. They are not idle but good if they are done for a good end, for example, for relief or moderate recreation.

2. Acts which are done solely on account of a useful good, resting in it, are evil, because it is not an end, since it is not appetible on account of itself but only on account of another; hence it is illicit to seek money or honor for its own sake.

3. Acts which are done principally on account of delectable good are evil. For God attached the chief delights as an effect to certain necessary or useful operations, on account of those operations themselves, lest man abstain from operating, but rather so that he would be enticed to operating; and other secondary delights as a better means for the understanding of things, the relief of weariness of the mind, and refreshment and recreation in rational life. Hence delights are intrinsically ordered to the placing of a work. Therefore it is not licit to intend delight as the principal end, but as secondary and subordinated, namely, on account of the honorable good either of the operation or of recreation: not indeed as a mere means for obtaining it, but as its effect on account of the cause, or as a help for placing the work more securely, pleasantly, and easily. In other words, to seek an operation for the sake of delight is to invert the due order of things. Hence theologians after St. Augustine say: it is not licit to enjoy what is to be used or to use what is to be enjoyed.

1. Contra Gentiles III, c. 26, n. 7.

4. A fortiori, acts which are done solely on account of delight, resting in it, are evil, both because delectable good ought to be appetized on account of the honorable end, as was said under 3), and because animals act for delight alone, resting in it: but man in all things ought to follow the rule of reason, and therefore seek delight insofar as reason dictates that it is proportioned and fitting to his nature, and thus it already becomes an honorable good. Therefore to seek delight for its own sake is to pervert the order.

Whence propositions 8 and 9 were condemned by Innocent XI:

1. "To eat and drink even to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health; because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts."

2. "The conjugal act exercised for pleasure alone altogether lacks every fault and venial defect."

Hence:

a) Acts which are done on account of any delight whatever are evil, if another end is excluded.

b) Acts which procure sensible delight are of themselves indifferent, and therefore are evil if they are not referred at least implicitly to honorable good; otherwise, namely, the lower powers, because from their nature they do not tend to honorable good but to delight alone, do not serve the higher powers, but on the contrary reason and will serve lower delight, which is an inversion of order.

c) On the contrary, they are good if from the circumstances or from the custom of acting the honorable end of necessity or utility is sufficiently known, and this is at least implicitly intended: thus one who, without explicitly thinking, at the ordinary hour goes to the place of recreation.

d) A fortiori, acts which procure spiritual delight from an honorable good are good: for this by its nature is connected with honorable good, which therefore is implicitly intended.

The aforesaid evil acts, by which the due end is excluded only in affection or affectively, of themselves are only lightly evil, because the disordered use of a thing not illicit is not a grave disorder. If, however, someone also effectively wished to impede the due end, it could be grave.

159. Principle III. The due intermediate end or ultimate end in a certain respect is any honorable good whatever, because this is conformed to rational nature; but the due simply ultimate end is the supreme Good or God. Hence:

1. In order that an act be good, we cannot positively exclude God, whether explicitly, or implicitly by loving a creature above all things or preferring it to God.

2. But we ought not in every act tend expressly to God; it suffices implicitly, insofar as every participated honorable good from its nature is ordered and tends to the supreme good (cf. propositions 16 and 38 of Baius condemned).

3. Sometimes, however, there is a precept of explicitly tending (or converting oneself) to God through charity; but he who loves God above all things by that very fact refers implicitly to God all things which can be referred to him.

1. Cf. I-II, q. 19, a. 9 and 10; q. 21, a. 4; q. 100, a. 10, ad 2.

But if a sinner omits this, he sins by omission at the moment when the precept urges; yet other works which are done at this moment or afterward will not therefore be sinful, because the omission is not a true circumstance influencing and affecting those works themselves, but only merely accompanies them, unless nevertheless they were its occasion. Otherwise it would have to be said that all the works of infidels are sins; likewise works performed with a view to eternal reward or done from fear of hell would be evil, which has been condemned by the Church.

Prop. 16 of Hus; prop. 22, 35, 38, 40 of Baius; prop. 15 condemned by Alexander VIII; prop. 45 and 59 of Quesnel; prop. 23 of Pistoia; Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 31; sess. 14, c. 4.

4. There is no other precept of explicitly referring all works, or even each single work, to God. But the words of the Apostle (I Cor. X, 31) can be understood either of counsel; or negatively, of the obligation of doing nothing against the glory of God, and of doing nothing which is not referable to God; in other words, of doing nothing except honorable works which are implicitly referred to God; or positively, of an act of charity which implicitly orders the whole following life to God as to the ultimate end.

Yet it should be noted that not all things can be referred to God even by one who has charity: namely, acts which are not proportioned to the glory of God, such as venial sins, and many indifferent acts, for example, walking, eating, etc.; these of themselves are not proportioned to the end of God's glory and of themselves conduce nothing to God's honor, and therefore, that they may be done on account of God, they must first be referred to an honorable end proportioned to them, for example, to health, to sustenance, etc.

160. Are there indifferent acts? - From the aforesaid it follows that no indifferent acts are given, if acts are considered not in the abstract, on the part of the object only and according to species alone, but in the concrete or in the individual, that is, on the part of the thing with all circumstances. For man acting deliberately either acts in due circumstances for a due honorable end indicated by reason and fitting to nature, and then the act is good; or he does not act in due circumstances, or at least does not act for a due honorable end indicated by reason, and then the act is evil. To act for an indifferent end would be an idle act; but neither is an indifferent end given in the concrete, because an end is a good, and this is either a true good, or only according to appearance, and then it is evil.

It is said: man acting deliberately. For many acts are placed from imagination alone, such as rubbing the beard, moving the foot or the hand, etc.; and such acts are not properly human, good or evil, but are indifferent and exist outside the genus of morality.

161. Corollaries.

From the aforesaid it is understood that one should not admit:

1. The opinion of the Scotists, who say that it is illicit to act on account of delight alone when the act from itself, by its intrinsic end, is ordered to something other than pleasure, such as eating, drinking, the conjugal act; but that it is not illicit when delight is the end which the act by its nature intends, for example, the recreation of the ears in music, of the eyes in the vision of beauty, of the nostrils in the smell of a flower: these acts, namely, according to them, are indifferent in the individual. But we have seen that there are no indifferent acts in the individual.

2. Nor the opinion of Ballerini, whom several Jesuits follow (Genicot, Noldin, Vermeersch), saying that acts exercised on account of the end of delight are morally good even if the will does not intend another honorable end, provided it does not positively exclude the end, nor is there anything disordered in the action itself. But this opinion is too benign. For that man may act as man, it is not enough for him to avoid evil, but it is also required that he will and do the good fitting to his nature, namely, the honorable, which is impossible unless he positively intend it. For a) on one side, good is not contracted unless it is positively intended for its own sake; but the sensitive appetite of itself does not tend to honorable good but to the delectable good alone; therefore the delight of the sensitive appetite will not be good unless it is positively intended on account of honorable good. Otherwise in the concrete it will be evil, as sought without a due end. b) On the other side, to avoid evil is not a positively honorable end, because between the objectively evil and the objectively good there stands the objectively indifferent; therefore it is not enough to will to avoid objective evil in order that the act be objectively good, but a positively honorable end must be intended. Otherwise the act in the concrete will be idle and evil, as lacking the due circumstance of a right end. c) Innocent XI condemned eating or the conjugal action as illicit when done for pleasure alone. And if the Scotists can explain the condemnation of the propositions by Innocent XI by saying that eating, drinking, the conjugal act are not ordered by an intrinsic end to pleasure, Ballerini cannot explain it except by turning the words away from their obvious sense and saying that the positive exclusion of an honorable end is prohibited, not negative exclusion.

Therefore, in order that an act exercised on account of sensible delight be good, it is not enough that it not be disordered in itself, nor that in fact it be fitting to rational nature; it is also required that as such it be known in some way by the agent, and at least implicitly intended as such.

3. On the contrary, some have spoken excessively, saying that a good act requires that someone will the good formally as honorable, or even act from a general intention of living rightly and always acting according to reason. For it suffices that someone in some way intend the good which is honorable and is known as such, without willing it precisely and expressly because it is honorable; and thus he already implicitly tends to the ultimate end.

4. A fortiori the Jansenists and Augustinians erred, such as Noris and Berti, requiring that a good act be referred explicitly to God, the ultimate end.

Practically the opinion of St. Thomas does not differ much from the more recent opinion of Ballerini and his followers, for when someone, in seeking delight, wills to act moderately and admits nothing disordered, ordinarily he not only does not positively exclude the honorable end, but could scarcely fail to include it implicitly. Indeed this opinion is more benign than Scotus's opinion, for the acts which the Scotists consider indifferent, according to us, very easily become good, since in them agreement with rational nature, namely, a good disposition of mind, is easily perceived.