§ 2. On the End

Notion and divisions. First the end is presented to the will; for it is that on account of which something is done. But to have the reason for acting is proper to a rational being. Wherefore the end is called first in intention; nothing is more voluntary, and therefore nothing is more moral.

The end is distinguished as the end of the work, or internal, intrinsic, toward which the work per se, or by its own nature in moral estimation, tends; as for example the relief of need is the internal end of almsgiving; and the end of the worker, or external, extrinsic, which the one acting sets before himself, whether the same or diverse, as if he offers alms as suffrage for the souls in purgatory.

The proximate end is that which is intended immediately, or with no other mediating; the remote end, that which is intended through another end as mediating. A workman lives more sparingly so that, with money saved, he may gradually have the means of acquiring a house: the saving of money is his proximate end; the procuring of the house is his remote end.

An intermediate end is that which, whether proximate or remote, nevertheless is intended on account of a further end. Thus, in the example given, if the workman wants that house in order that he may marry honorably, the saving of money and the purchase of the house are intermediate ends.

The ultimate end, on the contrary, is that which is not referred to another; the simply ultimate end is that which, neither in the same nor in another series of actions, is ordered to another end; the ultimate end according to something is that which concludes some series, yet keeps the notion of a means for another end. Thus knowledge terminates many studies: if it is sought for its own sake, it is called the simply ultimate end; if it is sought for annexed rewards or honors, it will be the ultimate end according to something. Finally, the positively ultimate end excludes a further end; the negatively ultimate end indeed is not referred to a further end, yet does not exclude one. Thus in a just man, the good sought by venial sin is the simply but negatively ultimate end of that disordered act. Satisfaction mortally evil is the simply and positively ultimate end of the sinner.

A total end moves by itself to acting; a partial end concurs together with another: whether both ends move equally and are called equally principal; or one is primary, which has the first part and alone suffices for the act, and the other secondary, which dependently upon the first moves to the action, so that this may be done more easily, more promptly, more perfectly: this is called impelling or the impulsive cause. Thus for a pious priest the stipend will be only a secondary end of celebration; for a less pious, yet honorable priest, who would not celebrate without the stipend, it becomes the primary end, yet not the only end, since both priests wish at the same time to exercise an act of religion.

The end itself can be of the honorable good, or good; or of the pleasurable good: either of delight joined with an evil operation, and then it is evil; or of delight joined with a good operation, and then it is good, if at the same time the operation as honorable is intended. But if explicitly nothing is thought of except delight, then it is disputed whether this end should be called indifferent or evil. Omitting the dispute here, this is our brief conclusion.

On an action done on account of delight. 1. Delight is described as enjoyment of the appetite from a possessed good; and especially sensible enjoyment, while the delight which follows reason is rather addressed by the name of joy.

2. For the solution of the question it must be noted beforehand that a twofold good will is to be admitted in man: the will of not transgressing the order of reason or the law of God, and the will positively zealous for that order or law. This will is better; nevertheless the former is already good, because it loves the object as such a thing to which reason or God does not contradict, or because it contains a voluntary repudiation of moral evil. But voluntary omission is equated with an act; and the voluntary omission of evil is as it were an act containing approval of the moral order.

3. Now indeed, reason detects this disposition of divine Providence by which He has joined delights with useful operations so that men may be enticed to them. Hence it perceives that it is not against the order of reason to yield to that invitation, provided one holds the mode of temperance.

It observes, besides, that it is positively good for man in the present life to be moderately delighted, indeed that this is sometimes necessary so that the mind may be recreated and may be able for nobler pursuits, even of virtues (1).

4. Hence now in a conscious manner a man can act on account of delight in three ways:

a) By loving and seeking delight as a useful and almost necessary aid of virtuous action: then the will is positively zealous for honesty itself; it does not act merely on account of delight; and by all it is called good or honorable.

b) By seeking and embracing the delight which he first apprehended as licit, simply as a delight not evil. Then he rests in delight as in an end negatively ultimate, not indeed of the subject, but of such an action. Then he acts on account of delight alone, insofar as delight alone moves him; yet it does not move him as pure delight but as delight not evil, or to which reason or God does not contradict. And this will is positively good, insofar as it contains repudiation of an evil object and of intemperance, or excess in the mode.

c) By resting in delight as in an end simply and positively ultimate, with virtual contempt of the divine order: "whether it is forbidden or not, I want this delight." This manner of acting on account of delight alone is the only sinful one.

d) If, in acting, there is no attention to the agreement of delight with the order of reason, then indeed the intrinsic end will be able to be called indifferent; but rather it must be said that the action, from this part, is not human and free.

This reasoning cannot be opposed to our conclusion: that God made delight for the sake of operation, and therefore delight is to be sought by us for the sake of operation. For nothing obliges us to act with the same intention as the legislator: the end of the law does not fall under the law.

In vain also would the two propositions condemned by Innocent XI, n. 8 and 9, be alleged: "To eat and drink even to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not injure health, because one can licitly enjoy the natural appetite in its acts." "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely without fault and venial defect." In vain, I say, would they be alleged, both because those propositions were condemned as they lie "at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice," and judgments so put forward, by which pursuits needing restraint lest we exceed due measure are fostered, are importune and in practice must lead to sinning; and because it can be denied that he acts for pleasure alone who embraces pleasure as not evil.

Concerning this argument cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theol., tom. I, n. 101 and III, n. 323; De la Barre, La morale d'apres S. Thomas, p. 53, 54; and Noldin, Princ., n. 88-91.

That in the present life mortification rather than delight is to be preached, we by no means deny. Yet imprudently would every delight sought for its own sake be accused of venial sin. For concerning actions which men are accustomed to perform with a quiet and simple mind, scruples are not to be injected. For a fearful manner of acting, which weakens the mind, is to be avoided by good men.

Efficacy of the end. 1. An action cannot be morally better than its total end. For beyond the intention to which the means are referred it is not loved by the will, does not terminate the affection of the will, and therefore cannot have moral goodness: the will by willing good becomes good. Therefore, if the whole action is done on account of a solely lightly evil end, the whole will be morally evil. Nor does it matter that its object is good, for example the relief of need, since the will does not will that good except as a means to an evil end, and therefore wills nothing except evil.

2. Intermediate ends, as such, add nothing to final goodness. For as such they are loved only as means.

3. Simultaneous and coordinated ends, that is, those of which neither exists or is intended on account of the other, make an action virtually multiple, which participates in the morality of each end. For since we can simultaneously will the observance of the order of reason in one thing, and its violation in another thing, it is not absurd that two actions, as it were parallel, one morally good, the other morally evil, should exist at the same time. Someone wishes to extinguish flames in order to save a child and at the same time in order to steal. The extinguishing of the fire will be morally honorable insofar as it is ordered to the safety of the child; morally evil insofar as it is directed to theft ¹. Nor is the matter morally changed by the fact that each end, equally principal, had to concur in order that the action be done: as if, in the proposed case, neither the desire of theft alone nor the hope of saving the child alone would have persuaded the agent to the action ².

Take care not to transfer to merit what we have said here about an action reduplicatively as moral. Cf. the things to be said below.

4. Of two ends, of which one is primary and the other secondary, the primary gives the principal morality, the other an accessory morality, or morality according to something. Wherefore a secondary end of the temporal order, for example of gain, does not corrupt an act good from another end.

¹ Cf. the principle enunciated by St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 18, art. 4, ad 3; and Suarez, De bonitate et malitia actuum humanorum, d. 8, r. 1, n. 7, 14, 15, 16.

² Cf. Pesch, De Deo creante, n. 639-641, and Frins, De act. hum., II, 436 and following.

Corollaries. By comparing these assertions about the end with the rule handed down above about the object, these corollaries become manifest:

1. An act good from the object, commanded toward a good end (for example, almsgiving from a motive of religion), besides the specific goodness of the object, acquires a new goodness from the end.

2. An act evil from the object, directed to an evil end, is stained with a twofold malice: think of theft perpetrated on account of fornication.

3. An act which from the object is evil, directed to a good end, does not thereby become good, as will be said below, n. 123.

4. An act draws its more powerful moral species from the end rather than from the object, because the end is more loved per se and therefore more voluntary. Wherefore alms given on account of the worship of God is more an act of religion than of mercy; theft on account of fornication is to be placed more in the species of lust than of injustice.

5. An act indifferent from the object will become good or evil from the end.