Appendix. For Priests of the Society of Jesus

378. I. A priest of the Society can accept a stipend neither for himself nor for another for the Masses which he says. The same is to be observed also concerning any other sacred ministries. This is established throughout the Institute of the Society. See especially the Epitome, new ed., p. 185. - Lacroix, bk. 4, p. 136.

II. If money is offered for Masses to a priest of the Society or to a Community, it can be admitted through the Superior, not indeed with an obligation, but with a promise of saying, under the title of gratitude, some Masses, or even one or another in individual years. Thus Castropalao. Burghaber, cent. 3, case 25, testifies that Mutius Vitelleschi, the General, so declared. - Lacroix, bk. 6, part 2, no. 146.

III. Likewise, money liberally offered can be accepted, and in turn Masses can be liberally promised, yet in such a way that the latter promise is not as though a compensation or reciprocal payment, as if for stipends, but the money is admitted under the title of alms alone, so that the offerer plainly understands that it cannot be accepted under another title and gives it himself under this same title of alms. - Lacroix, bk. 6, part 2, no. 146.

379. Hence you will resolve. - 1. A priest of the Society to whom money is offered for Masses to be said can tell the offerer that he will say the Masses gratuitously according to his intention, and in turn ask him to will liberally to apply the money offered to this or that pious cause. Thus the offerer will have a twofold fruit: namely, the ordinary fruit of the Mass, and then the fruit of cooperation in that pious cause. - Thus expressly Lacroix, ibid.

2. Titius, a priest of the Society, can say Masses according to the intention of Sempronius, a secular priest who accepted stipends for Masses to be said, when the latter can neither restore them, as having been consumed, nor satisfy for all the Masses; because in these circumstances Titius is judged to celebrate the Masses gratuitously from pure charity, as Lacroix, bk. 4, no. 138, gathers from a declaration of Claudius Aquaviva.

3. If Titius, a priest of the Society, does not indeed receive a stipend, but nevertheless disposes concerning it, for example, if he says to Caius: Give the stipend to this poor man, and I will say Mass according to your intention; or if he says to Sempronius: You accept the stipend, and I will say Mass in your place; he acts unlawfully, because while he thus disposes concerning the stipend through a contract facio ut des, he virtually accepts the stipend and gives it again to another. Each of these is contrary to the vow of poverty ¹. - Pellizzarius. - Lacroix, bk. 4, no. 138. - Sanchez, etc.

¹ Understand the first case in this way: that Titius imposes a strict obligation upon Caius by that agreement; for if he merely asks that Caius do this from liberality, we fall back upon what was defined in the first Resolution and is defined again in Resolution 5. But with regard to the second case, according to the opinion of Michael Vasquez, John Salas, and Castropalao against Sanchez (see Lacroix, bk. 4, no. 139), the reason for the unlawful disposition readily ceases when Titius, having been asked by Sempronius to celebrate some Mass, does this liberally, caring nothing and asking nothing about whether Sempronius has accepted stipends for those Masses or whether he retains them for himself, etc. Some are moved rather by this: by what title Sempronius retains stipends perhaps accepted. But this difficulty also, which otherwise does not at all touch the cause of Titius celebrating Masses gratuitously, has an easy solution. For the one giving the stipends requires this one thing from Sempronius: that he assume the burden of the Masses to be celebrated. But whether he satisfies either by himself or through another, and whether this other celebrates either after exacting a stipend or gratuitously, he does not care, unless perhaps he chose Sempronius to celebrate the Masses because, as the cited Lacroix says, he is believed to say them more devoutly.

4. If Paul, a man of the Society, supplies for a Chaplain bound by a foundation in singing Mass, he sins in no way, although the Chaplain receives his revenues, because Paul disposes concerning nothing. The same is to be said if he preaches, or otherwise exercises an office for someone who receives the customary honoraria from it. - Lacroix, bk. 4, no. 139.

380. 5. If Sempronius, a parish priest who has already accepted a stipend, asks Titius, a priest of the Society, to supply for him in saying Mass, Titius will lawfully supply, provided that he disposes concerning nothing of the stipend. - Lacroix, bk. 4, no. 139. - Vasquez. - Salas. - Castropalao, against Sanchez. The reason is that the stipend is not even virtually received by Titius, since he disposes concerning nothing of it, and it is altogether indifferent to the one who gave the stipend by whomsoever the Mass is said. This is confirmed: if Titius, being about to go to Paris, were gratuitously to carry letters in favor of Sempronius, for the carrying of which Sempronius had been hired for a wage, Titius certainly would not act against poverty, nor would he be judged to acquire the wage for himself and donate it to Sempronius. Therefore, it is similar in our case. - Lacroix, ibid.

You will say: Sempronius has no right or title to retain those stipends except by means of the Masses of Titius; therefore, Titius, by saying the Masses, confers upon him the right and title to retain the stipends, and consequently it is the same as if he accepted the stipends and gave them to Sempronius.

Reply. I deny the antecedent; for Sempronius has the right and title to retain them by force of the innominate contract do ut facias, by which he is bound to have the Masses said either by himself or through another. But he is relieved of this burden by Titius, who merely supplies the Masses as a condition without which Sempronius could not enjoy that right and title of retaining the stipends. - Lacroix, ibid.

You will say again: At least Decree VIII of Congregation XII stands in the way, prohibiting the General himself from applying the Masses which are celebrated according to his intention... by priests of the Society, according to the intention of any other person who could derive gain from it.

Reply. I deny the antecedent; for in positive matters an inference from the greater or from an equal does not hold. But reasons are present why these things are prohibited to the General but not to others, for example, the necessities of the Society, etc. Therefore, that Decree has no bearing with regard to others. - Lacroix, ibid.

QUESTION. What obligation exists in the Society with regard to Masses or prayers customarily enjoined?

Reply 1. Religious of the Society who do not discharge the prayers and Masses enjoined do not sin, speaking per se, because no precept is strictly imposed, nor is there any obligation other than from the Rule, which of itself does not bind under sin. - Suarez and others commonly. Nevertheless, Superiors will sin if through negligence they do not take care that persons be designated to celebrate Masses or pray, especially for benefactors and founders. Thus it was answered at Rome in the year 1604. But those who have the Masses which they themselves are to say said by others do not satisfy the Rule, because it is a personal burden. - Thus it was answered to the Province of the Rhine in the year 1634 ². Nevertheless, one satisfies by asking another to celebrate in his place today or this week, while he himself is to compensate on another day or in another week. Likewise, those satisfy who, foreseeing a difficulty for the following week, anticipate the Masses in the preceding week. - Lacroix, bk. 6, part 2, no. 168.

² The law in force in the Society is that responses of the Superior General to the requests of a certain Province, unless they are duly promulgated or communicated elsewhere, have force only for that Province to which they were given.

Reply 2. Masses enjoined for deceased members of the Society do not bind under mortal sin, whether they are determined by the general Constitutions of the Order, by particular Rules, or by the prescription of Superiors. The reason is that these have only the character of a simple command, unless a precept of obedience is added. - Thus according to the judgment of all, as Pellizzarius testifies, vol. 1, tr. 5, ch. 9, no. 12. - Lacroix, ibid., no. 169 ³.

³ The Author transcribed these words literally from Lacroix, and Lacroix from Pellizzarius; but he presented the latter's text in a mutilated form. For Pellizzarius in that place gives this reason: Because the prescription of these suffrages commonly does not exceed the obligation of a simple Rule or of obedience, and consequently has the character of a simple ordinance. Then he adds that these things are gathered from Suarez (De Religione, tr. 10, bk. 8, ch. 2, no. 5), who therefore infers that these obligations do not bind under sin. Therefore, even an express obligation under venial sin is excluded, and only the obligation of the Rule remains, which of itself does not bind under sin.

Reply 3. Masses affixed to a time, for example, those which ought to be said every week or every month, if they could not be celebrated at that time because of an impediment or illness, do not necessarily have to be supplied afterward, but can be omitted. Thus it was answered to the Province of the Rhine in the year 1585. On the contrary, if they were omitted through negligence, they ought afterward to be supplied. - Thus it was answered to the Province of Toulouse in the year 1629. - Lacroix, ibid., no. 171.

Reply 4. If Masses or prayers are enjoined without a definite time, it is sufficient to say them within two or three months. - Thus it was answered to the Province of Naples in the year 1603. - Lacroix, ibid., no. 172.