§ I. On the Interpretation of Law

112. • DEFINITION. Interpretation of law is its genuine explanation according to the mind of the legislator.

Division. It is 1. authentic, doctrinal, and usual, according as it is made by the Superior himself, or by learned men, or from custom.

2. Strict, or broad, according as it is made strictly according to the natural property of the words, or broadly according to the more benign sense.

3. Simple, or extensive, when the words are accepted either as they sound, or beyond their natural sense ¹.

¹ Declarations which the Author calls simple, the Doctors are accustomed to call comprehensive, when namely the sense declared does not recede from the proper and received-by-use signification of the words; but extensive when they concede, prohibit, dispense, etc., something beyond that which the words, accepted properly and according to the common sense, denote.

But between these there also intervenes this distinction: if they are authentic, comprehensive ones indeed do not need promulgation; but extensive ones have no force unless they are legitimately promulgated; since by the very fact that they are not contained in the words of the law, they are already certain new laws, and therefore must be promulgated in the manner of laws.

Rules of interpretation:

I. The words of the law are to be accepted according to their proper and received-by-use signification, unless something absurd or unjust would follow from it.

II. In doubt concerning the true sense, attention must be given to the mind of the legislator, to the end of the law, and to the circumstances either antecedent or consequent.

III. Penal and odious law in doubt is to be interpreted strictly; but favorable law demands an ample interpretation. Hence the axiom: Favors are to be enlarged, and odious things restricted. - St. Lig., no. 200, and all others.

QUESTION. Whether a law ought to be extended from case to case because of identity of reason?

I answer affirmatively, whenever otherwise the legislator could be accused of injustice or imprudence. But this is had in the following: 1. in correlatives, for example, between bridegroom and bride; hence if a bride is freed from the obligation of betrothal because of the long absence of the bridegroom, the bridegroom likewise is freed because of the absence of the bride; 2. in equivalent things, such as election and presentation to a benefice; likewise eggs and milk foods as to the law of abstinence; 3. in connected things, such as Deacon and Subdeacon. Likewise in things contained: wherefore he who can make a testament can also make legacies. - St. Lig., no. 200.