Article II. On the Free

11. • DEFINITION. That is called free which proceeds from the will determining itself with the power of not acting. But liberty is the faculty of acting or not acting, or the faculty of choosing one thing before another. Hence every free thing is voluntary, but not vice versa.

Although the free and the voluntary are distinguished in themselves, as is clear from the definition of each, nevertheless in the acts by which man as wayfarer tends to his end, they are not distinguished in reality; for as often as some act is voluntary, it is also free, and vice versa. The reason is that man as wayfarer, master of himself, in those things which are toward the end, never acts necessarily ¹.

¹ Excellently, after his manner, St. Thomas (2, Dist. 25, q. 1, art. 2, o): If some good is proposed to the will which has the completed notion of good, as the last end, on account of which all things are desired, the will cannot not will this: whence no one cannot not wish to be happy, or wish to be wretched. But in those things which are ordered to the last end, nothing is found so evil that it does not have some good mixed in; nor anything so good that it suffices in all respects: whence however much good or evil is shown, it can always adhere to and do the contrary by reason of another thing which is in it, from which it is taken, if it is evil simply, as an apparent good, and if it is good simply, as an apparent evil; and hence it is that in all things which fall under election, the will remains free, having determination in this alone, that it naturally desires happiness, and not determinately in this or that. This doctrine, indeed, no less consonant with right reason than with the Catholic faith, manifestly shows in what place one must hold a certain recent philosophy, which under the pretext of the limits of human liberty vainly brings in innumerable acts to which man as wayfarer, otherwise master of himself, is necessarily borne.

DIVISION. A manifold species of liberty is distinguished.

1. Liberty from necessity, or liberty of indifference, or of election, which is immunity from every antecedent intrinsic necessity; and this is liberty properly and strictly so called.

2. Liberty from coercion, or liberty of spontaneity, which is immunity from every violence inflicted extrinsically.

3. Liberty of contradiction, which is the faculty of bearing oneself toward contradictories, for example, of studying or not studying.

4. Liberty of contrariety, through which someone can choose one thing, or the contrary of this, for example, to love, or to hold in hatred.

5. Liberty of specification, which is the faculty of bearing oneself toward diverse things, for example, to walk, to play, etc.

These things having been set forth, the chief foundations of Catholic doctrine are to be submitted in a few words.

12. • Man in the state of fallen nature is free from every intrinsic necessity.

It is clear 1. from sacred Scripture. For thus Eccli. 31. 10: Eternal glory shall be to him who could transgress, and has not transgressed; to do evil things, and he has not done them. And Eccli. 15. 14: God from the beginning constituted man, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commandments and precepts: if thou wilt keep the commandments, they shall preserve thee... Before man are life and death, good and evil; that which shall please him shall be given to him. The same doctrine is confirmed from six hundred other places of sacred Scripture.

2. From reason. Man, by the consent of all, can merit and demerit, or elicit meritorious and demeritorious acts; but for this liberty from necessity is required: and indeed unless man were free for positing or not positing an act, he would not be master of his own act; therefore that act could not be imputed to him either unto merit or unto punishment. Besides, to what purpose would precepts be imposed on man? To what purpose would exhortations profit? To what purpose rewards, threats, and punishments, unless man possessed liberty? Finally, this is clear from intimate sense, since man senses himself to be free, and besides, intimate sense cannot deceive. Therefore...

3. From the definition of the Church. For thus it was sanctioned in the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 5: If anyone shall say that the free will of man after the sin of Adam has been lost and extinguished, or that it is a thing of title alone..., let him be anathema.

It is confirmed from the condemnation of the following proposition of Jansenius made by Innocent X: For meriting or demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required, but liberty from coercion suffices ².

² Observe besides that the liberty of Adam sinning does not suffice so that the actions of fallen man become moral and demeritorious. We have this defined in the proscription of this thesis of Christian Lupus, which is the first among the 31 condemned by Alexander VIII: In the state of fallen nature, for formal sin and demerit, that liberty suffices by which it was voluntary and free in its cause, original sin and the liberty of Adam sinning.

Man as wayfarer is not only free with liberty of contradiction, but also with liberty of contrariety, by which he can be borne toward evil.

It is clear from all the arguments and testimonies just related, for example, from those words: He could transgress..., do evil things, etc.

Moreover, the whole essence of free will is found in liberty of contradiction; for it consists in this, that it is the faculty of acting, or not acting: but liberty of contradiction supplies this, as is clear. Therefore... Hence the power of sinning is not of the notion of free will. - See more on liberty in Dogmatic Theology.