Article I. On Contrition

441. Contrition is distinguished as twofold: 1. Perfect contrition, which is the detestation of sin from the special motive of perfect charity, or of the goodness of God supremely loved for His own sake ¹.

¹ Some have thought (see St. Alphonsus, bk. 6, no. 436, and Scavini, tr. 1, disp. 1, ch. 2, art. 1, sec. 1, q. 1) that for perfect contrition it is more probably not sufficient that it be elicited from the motive merely of some one divine attribute, but that it is required to proceed from the motive of the offense against the divine goodness, insofar as this goodness embraces all the perfections of God. They attribute this opinion to Cardinal de Lugo, Suarez, Vasquez, etc.

But the authority from which the entire strength of this opinion arises is altogether wanting. For the cited Doctors do not dispute whether the motive of contrition ought to be taken from the aggregate of the divine perfections rather than from some particular perfection of God, but whether the motive of another virtue besides charity suffices for perfect contrition; for example, if the sorrow is (as Suarez says, De Poenitentia, disp. 2, sect. 3, no. 4, and disp. 4, sect. 2, no. 15) from the motive of obedience, religion, penance, gratitude, etc.; because, as Lugo says (De Poenitentia, disp. 5, no. 3), the sin is against the precept of Him whom we are bound to obey, or against His worship, etc. The formal motive of these virtues, as is plain, is different from the motive of charity.

Moreover, since the formal object of charity is the supreme excellence and infinite perfection of God, on account of which He is to be loved above all things with an appreciative love, and since this infinite perfection and excellence of the supreme good shines forth in each of the attributes, Ripalda (De Virtutibus Theologicis, disp. 35, sect. 1) therefore rightly establishes, from the common opinion of the Theologians whom he cites (ibid., no. 4), this thesis: The formal object of charity is the divine goodness insofar as it is common and proper to the nature of God and to the attributes. St. Thomas expressed this more briefly (De Virtutibus, q. 2, art. 4, ad 5), saying that an object of this kind is the divine good.

Nor should it be passed over here that the objects of the other virtues which we have mentioned, namely, obedience, gratitude, religion, etc., if not a motive of perfect contrition, are certainly a most apt motive of imperfect contrition; indeed, by this path penitents can easily be drawn to the motive of perfect charity. For if, together with the motive of obedience, religion, justice, etc., there is added a consideration of the infinite excellence of God, to whom an injury was either inflicted, or obedience denied, or worship withheld, one will very easily arrive at the perfection of charity. These things ought to be ready at hand for the confessor, so that there may readily be available to him a means of advancing penitents to more perfect things at the opportune time.

** The VV. have written twenty-five columns to attack this Note (pp. 399-411). Nevertheless, they have scarcely, if at all, touched the hinge of the question. St. Alphonsus had written (bk. 6, no. 432): It is asked from what motive the act of perfect contrition ought to be elicited? And he replies: The first opinion, which several hold, says that it can be elicited from the motive of any offended divine attribute, of justice, wisdom, mercy, etc. And Suarez and Lugo rightly judge this probable. The reason is that he who loves the divine justice or mercy for God's sake already loves God ...; therefore, he who grieves over sin because of God's offended mercy or justice ... already grieves for God's sake.... But the second opinion, common and more probable, which Suarez, Vasquez (who calls the opposite erroneous), and Croix with Arriaga, Dicastillo, and others generally hold, teaches that contrition must altogether proceed from the sole motive of charity, namely, of the divine goodness offended, insofar as this embraces all the perfections of God.

Now, as regards the first opinion, it is false that either Suarez, Lugo, or Vasquez, in the cited places, discusses an act by which either justice or mercy, etc., is loved for God's sake; rather, they treat of sorrow elicited, not from any motive of charity, but from the motive of another virtue, not theological but moral, such as religion, justice, obedience, etc.; and they ask whether this sorrow is that perfect contrition which has the power of justifying.

Thus Vasquez (q. 85, art. 2, no. 45, which is the place cited by St. Alphonsus): I would judge erroneous the opinion of the more recent authors, who teach that the act of contrition ... is not the love of God, nor necessarily proceeds from the love of God, and NEVERTHELESS JUSTIFIES.... But concerning sorrow which is not the love of God and does not proceed from the love of God, he had premised (loc. cit., no. 35): Insofar as it is against the justice of God, it is hatred from THE SPECIAL VIRTUE OF PENANCE, and thus the hatred (of sin) under this aspect is a compensation for the offense from justice, such as ours can be found before God. Concerning this matter he adds below (ibid., no. 38): Nor does there appear to be another manner of justice on our part toward God than toward His precept, which OBEDIENCE supplies, ... or finally RELIGION in rendering, nevertheless, the worship due to God, which also is constituted by the Scholastics as a part of potential justice. Therefore, no trace is found here of the love of God from the motive of some attribute, of which St. Alphonsus speaks.

The holy Doctor then cites Lugo, De Poenitentia, disp. 5, no. 3. But neither does Lugo have a single word about that love of God from the motive of one attribute. Behold his words: Some Theologians teach that, for contrition, it suffices that the sorrow be either from the motive of charity (and this Lugo also admits with all the Doctors), or from the motive of obedience, or religion, or penance: namely, because sin displeases God, whom we love (and this is the motive of charity), or because it is against His precept, whom we ought to obey, or against His worship, or finally because it is against the right of God, which we are bound to observe, which they say is the motive of penance.... Father Suarez says that this opinion is probable, and that it once pleased him ..., although Father Suarez speaks only of sorrow arising from the motive of justice.... But to this sorrow from the motive either of obedience, religion, penance, or justice, in which Lugo finds nothing of that love on account of some divine attribute of which St. Alphonsus speaks, and which he indeed presents as moral virtues (no. 6), Lugo himself opposes the motive of charity, without, however, adding anything about a motive from all the perfections of God. Thus he says (no. 3): Yet other Theologians commonly teach that sorrow from the motive of the love of God is altogether required. And again (ibid., no. 10): It must altogether be said, with the common opinion, that contrition sufficient for justification must arise from the particular motive of charity, namely, of God loved above all things.

Nor do the things which he adduces from Suarez serve the purpose of St. Alphonsus any better. Speaking (De Poenitentia, disp. 4, sect. 2, no. 13) of the detestation of sin which is from the proper motive of justice, Suarez writes: It has seemed probable to some that this act, of itself and without formal love, suffices for the nature of contrition. And this opinion is indeed probable, and at one time simply pleased me. But now, the matter having been better considered, it seems that the contrary opinion is to be chosen. St. Alphonsus, as is evident from his words cited above, here understands the motive of justice as the divine attribute of justice which is the object of love. But nothing is more foreign to the opinion of Suarez; for he here understands justice as the virtue by which the sinner wishes to compensate God for the injury inflicted. Hence he writes (disp. 2, sect. 3, no. 4): Since this virtue of penance is a certain justice toward God, its object will be the divine right.

Dicastillo, whom St. Alphonsus nevertheless adduces for his purpose, presents the state of the question in no different manner. For Dicastillo says (De Poenitentia, tr. 8, disp. 2, no. 106): We now ask whether, in order that penance be perfect and sufficient (for the remission of sins), an act of love of God is required; and some deny this, thinking that perfect penance can exist without that love. For they think it sufficient that it be FROM THE MOTIVE OF OTHER VIRTUES; Suarez confesses that he at one time inclined to this opinion.... But he speaks of the motive according to which he thinks an act of the special virtue of penance is constituted. And other more recent authors think the same concerning other motives, especially according to the various opinions for establishing the motive of the special virtue of penance. Then, against these, he establishes this thesis (ibid., no. 112): It must altogether be asserted that penance is never contrition sufficient for the remission of sins outside the Sacrament without a formal act of love of God, and that this act belongs to the intrinsic nature of perfect contrition, which is distinguished from attrition. Therefore, it is not true, as St. Alphonsus supposes, that Dicastillo disputes whether merely some one divine attribute or rather the aggregate of all the perfections is the formal object of charity and therefore of perfect contrition, and that he defends the second opinion against the first.

Moreover, if it is asked by what means St. Alphonsus, with no one preceding him, gave a new face to the question ordinarily treated here, and attributed to the cited Doctors opinions about which they themselves had said nothing, and indeed had not even thought, one perhaps will not wander altogether from the truth who thinks that this happened to the holy Doctor merely because of a less skillful interpretation of the words of Croix, from whom he also borrowed the citations. For Croix had written (bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 722): This contrition (sufficient for justification without the Sacrament) must proceed from the motive of the goodness of God, and therefore be a hatred of sin because it is evil to God. St. Thomas, Arriaga, Dicastillo, and others most commonly teach this against a few who have said that this contrition can proceed from the motive of religion alone, or justice, or another virtue regarding God, apart from every punishment or reward, and therefore that it suffices to detest sin, for example, because it is against the worship of God, against the right of God, etc.; Suarez calls this opinion probable, and Aversa and Lugo defend it as probable; on the contrary, Arriaga says that it is not intrinsically probable, ... Vasquez calls it erroneous.

That St. Alphonsus took both the core of the question and the citations from this source is gathered not obscurely, not only from his words copied above, but also from the edition of the year 1748, where he writes (bk. 6, tr. 4, ch. 1, dub. 2, note A):

Question II. From what motive can contrition proceed? Some think that it can proceed from any offended divine attribute; but most commonly, says Croix, bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 722, with St. Thomas, Dicastillo, and others, contrition must proceed from the motive of the offended Goodness of God. Accordingly, the contrition which Croix had said, according to the opinion of a few, proceeds from the motive of religion, justice, or another virtue regarding God, the holy Doctor interpreted as contrition which proceeds from any offended divine attribute. He afterwards explained this more fully in the edition of the year 1757, saying that it is contrition which proceeds from the motive of any offended divine attribute, of justice, wisdom, mercy; and he gave the reason, as we saw above, because he who loves divine justice ... for God's sake already loves God; hence, he who grieves over sin on account of offended justice already grieves for God's sake. Everyone sees for himself how foreign these things are to the sense in which Croix, after Suarez, Lugo, Vasquez, Dicastillo, etc., spoke of contrition from the motive of justice or religion.

Lugo (loc. cit., no. 9) certainly indicates more aptly how contrition from the motive of other virtues can in some way be drawn to the motive of love of God, insofar as, he says, to love is said to be to will good to someone; for since through religion we will the worship of God, through penance we will not to offend Him, through obedience we will to fulfill His will, etc., all these things appear to contain love of God. He then rejects these things and establishes the contrary thesis (ibid., no. 10), which we related above. For these acts pertain not to theological but to moral virtues, and they furnish a motive not of perfect contrition but of attrition, no differently from sorrow from the motive of ingratitude toward the most beneficent God.

These things having been premised, the reply to the twenty-five columns of the VV. is easy. For: 1. what they heap together concerning the formal object of charity considered either adequately or inadequately has nothing to do with the argument of the Note which they undertake to attack; 2. from what has been said, it is sufficiently plain whether the citations of Vasquez, Suarez, and Lugo, whom St. Alphonsus cited, are pertinent.

2. Imperfect contrition, or attrition, which is the detestation of sin arising from another motive, for example, from consideration of the turpitude of sin, or from fear of hell, or from love of eternal beatitude. - Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 4.

Three things are to be explained here: 1. the necessity; 2. the qualities; 3. the efficacy of contrition.