Section — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
§ II. On Celibacy
- All clerics receiving sacred Orders contract by that very fact the obligation of celibacy. This is clear from various Decrees of Canon Law, but especially from ch. 1, dist. 28, where St. Gregory prescribed thus: “Let Bishops presume to make no one a subdeacon unless he has promised that he will live chastely, because no one ought to approach the ministry of the Altar unless his chastity has been proved before the ministry has been received.” Likewise from the Council of Trent, sess. 24, ch. 9, where it is defined thus: “If anyone shall say that clerics constituted in sacred Orders, or Regulars solemnly professed in chastity, can contract matrimony, and that the contract is valid, notwithstanding ecclesiastical law or vow, let him be anathema.”
- Questions. - QUESTION 1º. Is the obligation of celibacy of divine law?
Resp. No, with the common opinion against some; but it is from merely ecclesiastical institution, namely from the force of a precept of the Church, or also from the vow annexed to sacred Orders. The reason is that celibacy was introduced only from the precept of the Church or of the Apostles. It is further plain from the Council of Trent reported above, where it is said: “Notwithstanding ecclesiastical law.” Therefore, etc. - Thus commonly the theologians. St. Ligorius, On Order, Bk. 6, n. 807. Therefore the Church can dispense from that obligation. But she never dispenses with those constituted in sacred Orders so that they may be bound by the bond of matrimony, unless under this law, that they be altogether excluded from clerical offices. Thus Pius VII convalidated the sacrilegious marriages of some Priests who had entered into nuptials during the French disturbance.
- QUESTION 2º. Does the obligation of celibacy proceed immediately from a precept of the Church, or mediately, namely from the vow which is emitted in the ordination itself 1?
1 The controversy is more aptly and clearly proposed by asking whether this obligation of chastity arises from the mere precept of the Church, or also from a vow annexed to sacred Orders. To this question an easy answer offers itself, that the Church wills both that clerics keep chastity and that they profess chastity from a vow. Wherefore ecclesiastical law commands clerics both chastity and at the same time the manner of professing chastity, namely from a vow.
Resp. Certain ones have thought it probable that the obligation is from ecclesiastical law alone; yet this opinion seems to have its origin from the doctrine of certain older authors understood wrongly. But the more common and to-be-held opinion says that this obligation arises from a vow. And indeed unless you derive it from a vow, it would be probable that a cleric is not guilty of sacrilege in internal sins against chastity, which is against the opinion of all 2.
2 When you establish that clerics are probably obliged to keep chastity only by force of ecclesiastical law, another perhaps will subsume that human laws do not reach acts merely internal, as the opinion has it which is at least extrinsically probable from authority. And if indeed ecclesiastical law does not extend itself to these acts, therefore through them a cleric will certainly sin against natural law, but not against ecclesiastical law, from which alone the guilt of sacrilege could be deduced for those acts. Therefore acts merely internal will not be infected with the malice of sacrilege; whence it will also follow that the circumstance of Sacred Order in the confession of these sins is not necessarily to be expressed.
But since a consequence of this sort openly conflicts with the doctrine which doctors most commonly have as certain, namely that a cleric constituted in sacred Orders by sins even merely internal against chastity also incurs the guilt of sacrilege, necessarily to be expressed in confession (see Tamburini, On the Sacraments, bk. 7, ch. 3, § 3, n. 7; Verricelli, tr. 4, Quaest. Mor. 5, n. 2; St. Alphonsus, Bk. 3, n. 454), therefore one must conclude that, if not in both, at least in one of those premises from which that consequence flows spontaneously and legitimately, a defect lies hidden, and probability is wrongly attributed to it. For the probability of the premises would make the consequence probable; but probability of that consequence cannot cohere with the certainty of its contradictory.
Moreover the Author rightly detects a defect of this sort in the probability which, through mere equivocation, was attributed to the proposition deriving the obligation of chastity with regard to clerics immediately from mere ecclesiastical law. I said “through mere equivocation”; for if you diligently inquire, not with another’s eyes but with your own, into the opinion of those authors whom, as patrons of that opinion, you have enumerated in a long train apud Sanchez (On Matrimony, bk. 7, disp. 27, n. 9), and after Sanchez apud Aversa (On Order, q. 4, sect. 7, § Praeferendus), you will find that most of them are wrongly alleged, since they are treating a wholly different question. And indeed several of them by no means ask whence is the obligation of perfect chastity with regard to clerics, whether from a vow or from a mere precept of the Church, but whence is the force of diriment impediment or of rendering invalid the matrimony which a cleric perhaps contracts after receiving Sacred Order; namely, whether this is to be derived from the nature of Sacred Order, or by force of a vow, or only from ecclesiastical law. But they establish that this does not flow from the nature of Sacred Order, both because the custom tolerated in the Greek Church contradicts it, and because the Supreme Pontiff can dispense; likewise not by force of a vow, both because the matrimony even of that cleric who perhaps did not wish to vow, at least by internal will, is held invalid, and because not even the solemn vow of a monk of itself, but through a statute of the Church, has this force. Wherefore they rightly conclude that the invalidity of a matrimony of this sort can be deduced from ecclesiastical law alone; and this conclusion is wrongly confused with the opinion which derives every obligation of chastity, which can be present even apart from the force of diriment impediment, from the law of the Church alone. But lest these things seem to be tossed out wrongly, it will not be burdensome for the reader to have inspected here with his own eyes the genuine senses of these doctors who are objected to as contrary.
Therefore the conclusion of Scotus is this (In 4, dist. 37, single q.): “The Church makes such a person simply illegitimate, namely for nuptials.” Say the same about Innocent III and Henry of Ghent, of whom the former (In C. Placet 12, De Convers. Coniug.) merely says that it is from the constitution of the Church that a presbyter, after the death of his first wife, cannot take another; but the latter (Quodl. 5, q. 38), that the Church indeed exacts continence from a cleric, but nevertheless does not dissolve matrimony contracted before Orders were received. To these add Bellamera, who (In C. De illo 5, dist. 32, n. 4) establishes this one thing, that the Pope can dispense with a subdeacon, because the prohibition about not contracting matrimony is not of natural or divine law, but ecclesiastical. But Durandus (In 4, dist. 37, q. 1, ad 1) also merely concludes: “When they receive Sacred Order, from then they are unfit and illegitimate simply for contracting matrimony by statute of the Church.” And from Durandus Turrecremata transcribed (In C. Placuit 13, dist. 32, art. 1, n. 6, ad 5), saying: “Sacred order impedes matrimony to be contracted and dissolves one contracted, not by reason of order absolutely, nor by reason of the annexed vow, but it impedes completively by statute of the Church making the persons illegitimate for contracting,” etc. Nor otherwise Paludanus (In 4, dist. 37, q. 1, concl. 2), where he writes: “Each sacred order dissolves a contracted matrimony, not by reason of the annexed vow, but by statute of the Church.” But the hallucination of those who understood these things as if the annexed vow were denied is plain from q. 2, concl. 2, where Paludanus expressly even asserts this vow: “A solemn vow,” he says, “which dissolves, is only either that of Sacred Order, or of approved Religion, as the new Decretal says, namely of Boniface VIII, in the single chapter De Voto in VI.” You see this same thing apud Henry (In C. Ex litterarum, tit. Qui clerici vel voventes, n. 2), who has these things: “They, clerics, retain the character which is imprinted on the soul, nor can it be removed by deposition; whence a deposed cleric must live clerically, and the vow of continence is annexed to the character.”
But what is more remarkable, even those are alleged for the opinion denying the vow who, openly asserting the vow itself, then dispute whether that vow is annexed to order by divine or human law, or whether that vow dissolves matrimony by its own force, or only by ecclesiastical statute. Thus the Archdeacon, namely Guido de Baysio, while he refutes those who asserted that a vow is annexed to Order by its own nature, and on the contrary refers this to the constitution of the Church, grants the vow itself thus (In C. Cum in praeterito 3, dist. 84): “There is an argument that he who has accepted order by that very fact makes a vow of continence, even if it is not expressed: for since some things are annexed to it, he who accepts one, since it cannot be without the other, seems to accept the other.” Thus also the Provost, namely Ioannes Antonius de S. Georgio (In Rubr. Qui Clerici vel voventes, n. 6): “You have, therefore, that continence, even if someone is bound to it by a solemn vow, is not included by divine law, but by the positive law of the Church, and therefore a solemn vow dissolves matrimony rather by constitution of the Church than by divine law. For by divine law the Priests of the Synagogue could contract matrimony, and even the Eastern Church has it that Priests contract matrimony, that is, retain a wife previously taken.” But Valentia (Controv., single bk., De Caelibat., ch. 2) institutes the question thus: “Whether the solemn vow of continence is annexed to sacred Orders not only by ecclesiastical law, but also by divine law.” He repeats this in the Theological Commentaries (tom. 4, disp. 9, q. 5, punct. 5, § 1), establishing that the law of celibacy with regard to all those things which it includes is only of ecclesiastical law, not divine; and therefore that the vow of continence is annexed to Sacred Orders only by ecclesiastical law. And John Gutiérrez (Quaest. Canonic., bk. 2, ch. 7, n. 2): “Although clerics do not emit an explicit vow of chastity, nor is the debt of continence essentially annexed to Sacred Order, but by statute of the Church, implicit, namely hidden in the very reception of Order; therefore by constitution of the Church they are bound to observe it. For by that very fact that someone is promoted to Sacred Order, he is tacitly understood to vow continence, even if no mention is made of a vow of continence.”
Nor less beside the point are Aegidius de Coninck and Palaus alleged for that opinion, since they derive the obligation of clerical continence both from a vow and immediately from ecclesiastical law. Thus the former (On the Sacraments, disp. 20, dub. 13, n. 130): “Although the second opinion reported in n. 126, namely the one which deduces the obligation immediately from the vow alone, is probable because of the authority of very many doctors, nevertheless I believe it more probable that those receiving sacred Orders, besides the obligation of the vow there explained, are also immediately obliged to continence from ecclesiastical law.” And Palaus (tr. 27, single disp., punct. 17, n. 5): “I judge it truer with Aegidius de Coninck that those initiated in sacred orders are bound to keeping chastity not only from a vow, but from a special law.” These authors were moved, namely, by this: that if someone through ignorance or malice in receiving Sacred Order did not vow, this one would in no way be bound to chastity, contrary to what all the doctors teach. And this reason indeed moved some even of the older authors, about whom we spoke above, so that they said that the invalidity of matrimony contracted by a cleric flowed not from a vow but from an ecclesiastical statute; namely lest, if someone did not emit the vow, which must be emitted by each one’s will, his marriage would have to be held valid.
Therefore, for the opinion which attributes the obligation of clerical chastity solely to ecclesiastical law, only some jurists remain, whom Zabarella also hints at (in Clement. Ad nostrum De haereticis). While these men were asking of what crime, adultery or incest, etc., a fornicating presbyter was guilty, and of what penalty he was worthy, they advanced so far that, against the common opinion of all theologians, they ascribed to him no other guilt except that of simple fornication, led of course by empty little reasons, both because in ch. Presbyter, 5, dist. 82, this offense is called fornication, “A presbyter, if he has committed fornication,” and because clerics do not solemnly vow, although, as Decius adds in ch. At si clerici, De Iudiciis, n. 227, they promise chastity.
Since therefore no solid reason favors this opinion, and the authority on account of which some attributed to it some probability is finally resolved into the support of certain jurists who by vain reasonings declined to opinions opposed to the common doctrine of theologians; and since to the authority of Boniface VIII, in the single chapter De Voto in VI, there accedes the Constitution of Benedict XIV Inter praeteritos, 3 Dec. 1749, in which (§ 41) it is expressly said that a vow is solemnly emitted in the reception of Sacred Order; one must conclude that that opinion is wrongly called probable. And each one will admit this conclusion the more willingly, the more certainly it is established among all that to the sins against chastity of clerics initiated in sacred Orders, even if merely internal, the malice of sacrilege accedes.
** Nothing about St. Alphonsus, as is plain to the reader, had been said in this note. But because St. Alphonsus also held as probable the opinion which derives the obligation of keeping chastity, with regard to clerics, from ecclesiastical law alone, behold, the Vindicators (p. 327, note 1) judged that this note too must be attacked.
And indeed, 1º in order to weaken the argument which is taken from the very common opinion of the doctors, namely that clerics become guilty of sacrilege through acts even merely internal, which nevertheless human law, according to an opinion at least extrinsically probable, does not reach, they object that internal acts can be commanded by the Church at least indirectly, if they are connected with external acts as effects and cause.
Resp. Let the antecedent pass, and I deny the consequence. For it is very well known that even grave sins against chastity can be committed through acts merely internal, which are in no way connected with external acts as cause and effect. And nevertheless, by the unanimous consent of the doctors, these sins in those initiated in Sacred Order contract the malice of sacrilege. Therefore in that opinion one cannot avoid an absurdity of this sort, which of itself suffices to take away every probability from it.
2º The Vindicators add that the extrinsic value, namely the extrinsic probability of the opinion which is rejected in the note, is derived by St. Alphonsus chiefly not from certain old jurists, but from the very words of the Holy Council of Trent.
Resp. Someone perhaps would rightly prefer that certain jurists had been alleged by St. Alphonsus, rather than the theologians Scotus, Palaus, Valentia, etc. For the former, although less effectively, nevertheless seem in some way to pertain to the matter, because they touch this question; not so the latter.
But as to Canon 9, sess. 22, of the Holy Synod of Trent, this is brought forward much less to the matter. For even if you suppose what must be denied, that this canon does not stand in the way of saying that clerics in sacred Orders are kept from nuptials by ecclesiastical law alone, and that nuptials are contracted invalidly by them, can a law of this sort, keeping them from nuptials and establishing them as invalid, be confused with a law which makes clerics themselves guilty of sacrilege for any sin whatsoever committed by them against chastity? But I said that that hypothesis must be denied. For, as was indicated in the note, after the declarations both of Boniface VIII and Benedict XIV, it is not lawful to deny that clerics constituted in sacred Orders are bound by a solemn vow of chastity.
- QUESTION 3º. Is the obligation of celibacy universal in the Church?
Resp. Some exception is given from the tolerance of the Church among Easterners. For in the Eastern Church priests indeed can never enter matrimony after sacerdotal ordination, or even after the diaconate; but those married before the diaconate can be advanced to further Orders, and nevertheless live with their wives. Bishops are excepted, who all must constantly keep perfect chastity. But apud the Greeks the subdiaconate is not numbered among Sacred Orders. Hence the precept of chastity is imposed on unmarried clerics in the ordination of the diaconate.
QUESTION 4º. Would one be bound to chastity who expressly did not wish to vow chastity?
Resp. This one nevertheless would be bound to chastity, if not from a vow, since no one can be bound unwillingly by a vow, then certainly from a precept of the Church, which from the motive of Religion would bind him to chastity when the vow was lacking 3. - Thus commonly with St. Ligorius, Bk. 6, n. 809. Others hold that he is bound to emit a vow of chastity; and no one will deny that the Church can oblige him to this.
3 “What certain ones have said, that if such a one sinned against chastity he would not commit sacrilege, this does not seem sufficiently probable, and is against the common opinion, because chastity would be commanded from the motive of the virtue of religion.” - St. Alphonsus, Bk. 6, n. 809, q. 2.
- QUESTION 5º. Whether or when can a married man, while his wife is living, receive Sacred Orders?
Resp. A married man can licitly be promoted to Sacred Orders with the express and altogether spontaneous permission of his wife, provided that she herself also vows chastity. But then the wife is not bound to enter Religion according to the more probable opinion 4, against Sanchez, etc. Nevertheless exception must be made unless the husband becomes a Bishop or a Religious, and the wife is young 5. - Thus St. Ligorius, Bk. 6, n. 812. Others say that then the wife indeed is bound to enter a Monastery, but not to profess; others finally exempt her from every obligation except the vow of chastity 6.
4 But now by received custom alone a man is not admitted to Sacred Orders unless the wife, if she is young, enters religion and professes, and if she is old, vows continence. Thus Pontius, On Matrimony, bk. 7, ch. 25, n. 7.
5 This limitation, “if the wife is young,” is to be understood only of the case of a husband professing religion, but not of one promoted to the Episcopate. For the wife of him who is chosen as Bishop must altogether pass to a monastery, even if she is old. For thus in ch. Sane 6, De Convers. Coniug., Alexander III established: “By Apostolic authority we prohibit you from presuming to ordain a married man as Bishop, unless the wife first, having professed continence, puts on the sacred veil for herself and assumes religious dress.”
6 But these authors seem to have been ignorant of what has been sanctioned in law (ch. Cum sis 4, De Convers. Coniug.). For thus Alexander III: “You ought not be ignorant that it is contrary to the constitution of the holy Fathers that a husband, with his wife not assuming the habit of religion, or a wife, with her husband not assuming it, should pass to religion. Hence it is that by apostolic authority we prohibit you from permitting a husband or wife in your episcopate to pass to religion, unless each shall have migrated to religion. But if the wife is so old and sterile that she can remain in the world without suspicion, you will be able to dissemble, so that with her remaining in the world and promising chastity, her husband may pass to religion.”
- QUESTION 6º. Can a wife who vowed chastity outside Religion after the ordination of her husband, when he has died, validly contract matrimony?
Resp. There is a twofold probable opinion.
The 1st OPINION denies, and rests on Canon Law, ch. Quia sunt, 10, dist. 28, where it is said of such a matrimony: “Let those who are badly joined be separated.” But the reason of this decision is that the Church, because of reverence for the Order assumed by the first husband, renders the wife incapable of a subsequent marriage. St. Ligorius, n. 812, calls this opinion the more common and very probable. The 2nd OPINION affirms. The reason is that it is not established that such a matrimony is invalid. For 1º it is not invalid by reason of the simple vow of chastity emitted by such a wife; 2º nor is it invalid from a special law of the Church; for from the fact that the spouses are ordered to be separated, it does not follow that their matrimony is invalid; for separation can be ordered as a penalty of a second matrimony contracted against the vow and prohibition. The same St. Ligorius, ibid., says this is sufficiently probable 7.
7 For this opinion St. Alphonsus had no one whom he could allege except Soto and Pontius. The former of these (On Justice and Law, bk. 7, q. 5, art. 3) writes scarcely a few words about this matter in passing, where he also supposes that a priest, unlike a religious, is not simply incapable of matrimony; but the latter (On Matrimony, bk. 7, ch. 25, n. 10) rests on this argument, that the Canons sometimes order spouses to be separated, although the matrimony is valid; but the Toledan canon grants the sacrament at the end of life to one sinning. But it would further have to be proved that separation of this sort and the interdict of the sacrament until the end of life were then imposed by the canons on delinquents only when the matrimony had existed validly, but by no means when, although invalidly, it had nevertheless been attempted. Since this cannot be proved, the argument of Pontius falls back into a mere sophism. Otherwise, St. Alphonsus does not deny that the former opinion is received by the common support of theologians and canonists, so much so that he scarcely, or not even scarcely, makes mention of the contrary opinion. See Schmalzgrueber, bk. 4, tit. 6, nn. 40-42.