Article — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
Article I. On the Matter of the Eucharist
I. On Remote Matter
- Principles. - I. Bread and wine are the remote matter of the Sacrament of the Eucharist. This is clear: 1. from the institution itself of this Sacrament; for Christ at the last supper took bread and wine and consecrated them into his Body and Blood; 2. from the definition of the Church in the Lateran Council, ch. Firmiter; in the Council of Florence, in the Decree of Union; and in Trent, sess. 13, in almost all the chapters. - To all these is added the unanimous tradition of each Church, Latin and Greek.
II. Only wheaten bread and only wine from the vine are valid matter of the Sacrament of the Eucharist. This is clear from the Council of Florence in the Decree cited above, where it is said: The third is the Sacrament of the Eucharist, whose matter is WHEATEN BREAD and WINE FROM THE VINE. The perpetual tradition and practice of each Church, Latin and Greek, also agree.
- III. A very little water must be mixed with the wine, and this not by necessity of the Sacrament, but of ecclesiastical precept.
The first reason is drawn: 1. from the perpetual practice of the Church and the universal tradition of the Fathers; 2. from the Declaration of the Councils, and especially of Florence, which declares that the matter of the chalice is wine from the vine, to which a very little water must be mixed; and from the Council of Trent, sess. 22, ch. 7.
The second reason is drawn from the fact that Christ, in the institution of this Sacrament, designated only wine, and the Councils, in making mention of this mixture, speak only of precept, as Trent in the place cited; there is added the doctrine of the Catechism of the same Council, which, after it taught that this mixture cannot be omitted without mortal sin, adds: Yet if it (water) is lacking, the Sacrament can stand.
- Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether bread made from rye or secale is valid matter?
Resp. It is controverted. Some affirm, because rye, they say, seems to be of the same species as wheat, although it is of a different quality. - But others, much more commonly and more probably, deny; because rye bread is of a different species, nor is it commonly accustomed to be used by the rich. Therefore in practice this matter is prohibited under grave obligation. - See St. Ligorius, n. 200.
QUESTION 2. Whether bread made from far or spelt is valid matter?
Resp. It is likewise controverted, as concerning rye. Hence that matter also is to be held as doubtful, and therefore as gravely illicit. - St. Ligorius, ibid., and others commonly. - Nevertheless it must be observed that in various regions there are given different species of true grain, which come under the name of spelt. Hence it seems that attention must be paid to the common estimation of men.
- QUESTION 3. Whether both unleavened and leavened bread are valid and licit matter of the Eucharist?
Resp. 1. As to validity, affirmatively. The reason is that each is true bread, and is also simply called bread in Scripture; and each is made from wheaten flour and natural water. This is also clear from the definition of the Church. For thus the Council of Florence in the Decree of Union: We define that in unleavened, or in leavened wheaten bread, the body of Christ is confected.
Resp. 2. As to liceity, Latins are bound under grave obligation to consecrate in unleavened bread, and Greeks in leavened bread, each according to the rite of his Church. This is clear: 1. from the practice of each Church; 2. from the Council of Florence in the cited Decree, where it is added: And priests ought to confect the very body of the Lord in either, namely each according to the custom of his Church, whether Western or Eastern.
QUESTION 4. Whether a Priest consecrating in souring wine sins gravely?
Resp. The answer is affirmative, although that wine is still valid matter of the Sacrament. Indeed a mortal sin is committed not only if the wine is near vinegar, but also if it certainly begins to sour and to be corrupted, because even thus grave irreverence seems to be inflicted on the Sacrament. - Thus commonly with St. Ligorius, n. 207. - This is also clear from the Rubric, tit. 4, n. 2, where it is said thus: If the wine has begun to sour or to be corrupted, or has been somewhat sharp..., the Sacrament is confected, but the one confecting sins gravely.
Nevertheless Gobat, Sporer, and Lacroix probably say that, if other wine is lacking, it is permitted without scruple, as good men are accustomed, to use wine slightly souring, or not notably acid 1. - St. Ligorius, ibid. - Hence the Rubric does not seem to be taken with so much rigor that it comprehends even all the first degrees of sharpness, but only those which proximately begin to constitute souring wine. - St. Ligorius, Homo apostolicus, appendix 3, exam. ordinand., n. 98.
1 The preceding things will scarcely seem in reality to cohere with these. For if it is probably permitted to use wine slightly souring, how is whoever uses wine which begins to sour guilty of grave fault?
- QUESTION 5. Whether frozen wine is valid matter?
Resp. It is controverted. The answer is affirmative, more probably. The reason is: 1. because it remains substantially wine, since it retains the same color, taste, and smell; 2. because from the Rubric of the Missal the species of wine frozen after consecration must be liquefied by applying heated cloths, and then consumed, since it is the true Sacrament (rubr. de defect., section 10, n. 11). Therefore it supposes that the species of frozen wine retains the Blood of Christ; therefore the sacred species are not substantially changed through freezing after consecration; therefore neither before. - Thus St. Ligorius, n. 207, where he says that it is the truer opinion because of the reason drawn from the cited Rubric.
QUESTION 6. What quantity of water is to be mixed in the chalice?
Resp. A very small quantity of water suffices, as the Council of Florence says above, n. 277. Probably water can be poured up to an eighth part of the wine, indeed up to a fifth part according to Lugo, disp. 4, n. 58. Busembaum adds that it suffices that the water not exceed a third part. But in practice this last opinion is not to be admitted, although a third part does not corrupt the wine if it is generous. Generally, it must be counseled that the Priest not exceed eight or ten little drops. But if by chance he has poured in too great a quantity of water, some quantity of wine can again be added. - St. Ligorius, n. 210.
II. On Proximate Matter, or on the Use of the Matter Required in the Consecration Itself
- Principles. - I. For valid consecration, besides suitable matter, it is required: 1. that the matter to be consecrated be physically present, because the demonstrative pronouns of the form, hoc, hic, necessarily require this; otherwise the form would be false, because that would be demonstrated as present which was not present; 2. that it be determined in the individual through the intention of the Minister, because just as the Minister does not consecrate unless he intends to consecrate, so also he does not consecrate this matter unless he determinately intends to consecrate it. Nevertheless actual determination is not required, but virtual determination suffices. - St. Ligorius, n. 211-214.
II. For licit consecration it is required: 1. that the Priest in no way depart from the use of the Church, especially as determined by the Rubrics of the Roman Missal; hence especially it is necessary that the matter to be consecrated be becoming and clean, because of the reverence due to so great a Sacrament;
- that it be placed on the altar and on the corporal, indeed also on the sacred stone, according to Benedict XIV, On the Sacrifice of the Mass, sect. 2, n. 139; 3. that the ciborium or chalice to be consecrated be uncovered; 4. that it be done at the time of the canon prescribed by the Rubric. - See St. Ligorius, n. 218 and 219.
- Resolves. - 1. Hosts hidden under others, or otherwise covered, are validly consecrated. Likewise wine is validly consecrated in a chalice covered with a veil, pall, or in any way whatever, because for the true presence of the matter it suffices that it can be demonstrated by the pronouns hoc or hic. - St. Ligorius, n. 212, etc., and others very commonly 2.
2 Here the question is usually added: what must be done if unconsecrated particles are mixed with consecrated ones? Busembaum, cited by St. Alphonsus (lib. 6, n. 216), intimates a twofold opinion, namely either the whole heap must be brought to the altar, so that the priest may intend to consecrate the unconsecrated ones, or rather he should consecrate the whole heap under condition, if they are not consecrated.
And St. Alphonsus follows the latter opinion, adding: And this is rather to be done, because in consecrating unconsecrated hosts the true determination of the matter is lacking, nor can the word hoc be verified, whence all the hosts must be consecrated under condition, that they may be validly consecrated. Thus Lugo, disp. 4, n. 136, the Salmanticenses, chap. 4, n. 129, with Laymann, Dicastillus, Aversa, Leander, Diana, etc.
It is displeasing that the St. Doctor, after the Salmanticenses, numbers Laymann and Aversa among the patrons of this opinion, who manifestly stand for the opposite. For thus Laymann (lib. 5, tr. 4, chap. 2, n. 12): The whole heap can and must be brought to the altar, so that the priest may intend to consecrate only those which have not received consecration. And Aversa (De Eucharistia, q. 2, sect. 2): If some unconsecrated hosts are mixed with other consecrated ones..., and the priest determines to consecrate that which is not consecrated, Lugo judges that it does not avail and does not suffice.... Yet it seems to avail and to suffice.
To these Marcus Struggl acceded (tr. 10, q. 1, art. 2, n. 52), saying: In such a case that whole heap of hosts is to be consecrated in another Mass with this intention: I will to consecrate this whole thing, according as it is consecrable. Thus Laymann, Tamburini, and several others. And indeed Tamburini has it thus (Method of Celebrating Mass, lib. 2, c. 1, section 3, n. 10): If through someone's carelessness it happens that consecrated particles are mixed with unconsecrated ones, let the whole heap be consecrated with the intention of consecrating those which have not been consecrated. Nor otherwise Kresslinger (appendix to Anacl., tr. 14, dist. 4, q. 4, add. 4): I answer that such a heap can still be consecrated in such a way that the intention of consecrating is borne toward the unconsecrated ones. Then he alleges five others, among whom also is Felix Potestas. From these it is sufficiently gathered that whoever embraces either of these opinions relies on sufficiently grave authority.
Yet this can seem singular: that Lugo, who can be held as the author of the opinion more approved by St. Alphonsus with the Salmanticenses, then doubts whether it is done licitly. But whether, he says, n. 139, one could licitly consecrate all under condition, so that that other unconsecrated one might not remain mixed in, I do not see a sufficient necessity for repeating the form under condition over all those consecrated hosts... Otherwise it would also be permitted to consecrate again under condition the chalice into which after consecration a drop of unconsecrated wine had by chance been poured; yet no one will admit this.
St. Alphonsus (l.c.), after the Salmanticenses, merely responds that this can be done licitly, as the Salmanticenses, Laymann, Dicastillus, Diana, and Leander say; nor do the Salmanticenses add anything else. But indeed, Laymann being omitted, whom we have said is cited to no purpose as thinking the contrary, Dicastillus certainly does not solve the difficulty. For Lugo (l.c.), to avoid the inconvenience and the difficulty of repeated consecration, although conditional, over particles which certainly are established to be consecrated, proposes that two of those particles be given to each person in Communion; for thus it would be certain that each person receives some consecrated host. But Dicastillus (De Eucharistia, disp. 4, n. 139) merely replies that this way indicated by Lugo is subject to several and grave inconveniences; and therefore that inconvenience is rather to be tolerated, namely of consecrating conditionally even particles certainly consecrated. But this response, as is clear, does not prove against Lugo that a consecration of this sort is not illicit. Hence there is nothing wonderful that others judged the different opinion of Laymann to be preferable, and did not defer much to the reason which Lugo had objected to this opinion. If the priest, says Lugo (l.c., n. 139), directed the words only to that host which was not consecrated, and wished to speak of that alone, then he would not have a conditional intention of consecrating, but an absolute one, which we have said is probably impossible, because the host of which the priest wishes to speak could not be designated in any way. But those who have followed the opinion of Laymann do not see that probable impossibility of designating the host. This indeed will appear much more easily if it is observed that the formula of consecration is not merely indicative, but effecting transubstantiation, so that the particles hoc or hic serve rather for determining than for indicating the matter to which the intention of the consecrating priest is borne; and this determination of matter in the case seems in reality to present no difficulty.
- Consecration is valid if the Priest thinks that only one or two hosts to be consecrated are present, when there are several, whether placed by himself or by another; the reason is that the Priest is always presumed to will to consecrate whatever is becomingly consecrable. Hence if after consecration the celebrant notices that two hosts are joined together, let him consume each as consecrated according to the Rubric of the Missal. But if before consecration, after he has offered, he notices this, let him set the other aside, and after Mass let him himself or another consume it as blessed bread. - St. Ligorius, n. 216, and all others.
- The same must be said if someone has brought several hosts to the altar to be consecrated, or before the Sacrifice has been admonished concerning hosts to be consecrated already placed on the altar, or has observed them being brought by another that they may be consecrated, even if while he consecrates he does not so expressly remember them, or even did not uncover them at the oblation, provided that they are present on the corporal; because the preceding intention virtually perseveres. - St. Ligorius, n. 216.
- Hosts would not be consecrated if, the Priest being unaware, they were placed even on the corporal 3, because the Priest, being wholly unaware, did not have the intention of consecrating them.
3 There will nevertheless be those who desire the coherence of this resolution with the principles on which the preceding second resolution rests.
- If small hosts for communicating the people are brought to the Priest a little after the oblation has been made, he will be able licitly to consecrate them, the oblation being supplied mentally. - St. Ligorius, ibid.
- Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether a ciborium left outside the corporal through forgetfulness is to be judged consecrated?
Resp. It is controverted. The first probable opinion affirms. The reason is that the positive will of consecrating that ciborium in the beginning of the Mass, nor was that will retracted; therefore it persevered virtually at the time of consecration.
The second opinion denies. The reason is that that intention of consecrating outside the corporal would have been a grave sin, and therefore the Priest is not presumed to have had it 4.
4 That reason supposes this general principle: that an intention of consecrating cannot be presumed in a priest whenever some circumstance, although unknown to the same priest, intervenes, which, if it were known by him, would deter him from consecrating, lest namely he act illicitly. But I think that no one has ever admitted, or ever will admit, a principle of this sort. And indeed it is illicit, and according to the opinion of the Doctors gravely illicit, to celebrate Mass in an unconsecrated chalice or on an unblessed corporal, or to consecrate matter which is valid indeed but illicit, for example leavened bread in the Latin Church. Now who would contend that, if such a chalice or corporal, or such matter, were presented to a priest who did not notice it, it cannot be presumed that he had the intention of celebrating illicitly, and therefore that he did not consecrate validly? I would add that certain persons undeservedly hand down the second opinion as common. See St. Alphonsus, lib. 5, n. 217. For easily not fewer Doctors could be alleged for the first opinion also.
** Against this brief Note the VV. wrote fifteen columns (pp. 379-386). Led by Roncaglia, however, they rest in the examples which are brought forward in the Note, of an unconsecrated chalice, or an unblessed corporal, or leavened bread, in which, as they reason, if indeed intention were lacking, there would follow a most grave and altogether to-be-avoided inconvenience of a sacrifice either altogether void or mutilated. In these circumstances, therefore, they say, the intention of completing the sacrifice always prevails. But this inconvenience is absent if it is only a question of particles which the consecration does not reach; with regard to these, therefore, the intention of avoiding a defect against the rubrics, which otherwise must always be presumed in the priest, must prevail over the intention of consecrating. Therefore particles placed outside the corporal are not to be held as consecrated.
Resp. That argumentation of Roncaglia shows itself to be too weak, since, although it could perhaps have some force by resting in those examples, nevertheless it loses all force if the examples are changed. And indeed suppose with Elbel (De Sacram., conf. 12, n. 49) that the priest did not uncover the pyx, or that the pyx was not consecrated, or that the pyx remained outside the corporal. Indeed, as Elbel observes in the cited place, in these circumstances the particles would per se be consecrated illicitly. But in the first two hypotheses the pyx was lying upon the altar or corporal; and in the third hypothesis the base of the pyx, by chance, while the priest wishes to move it nearer, remains under the corporal and therefore outside it. Meanwhile, however, the priest either is ignorant of those circumstances which per se would render the consecration illicit, or in no way notices them; and otherwise he renews the intention of consecrating the particles even within the canon; indeed in the third case he consecrates the particles with actual intention and with the pyx uncovered. I ask: shall we conclude, in that threefold hypothesis, that the particles are not to be held as consecrated, on this reason, namely, that apart from the absolute intention necessarily to be posited for completing the sacrifice, an intention of consecrating can never otherwise be presumed whenever some circumstance, however much unknown, would make the consecration illicit?
Namely, that one may judge suitably about these things, it is necessary that the different hypotheses be distinguished, which certainly permit or even require a different judgment. Indeed no one would deny that it can happen that, for example, a Priest admonished in the sacristy concerning particles to be consecrated then set his intention; nevertheless the particles must be judged not doubtfully but certainly unconsecrated if, for example, the cleric serving the Mass left the particles brought by himself in the epistle corner, enclosed in a wooden or paper box. And certainly the reason here will be given that that single aforesaid intention of the priest in no way extended itself to a consecration of this sort in those circumstances. But must it therefore be concluded that, if anything even slight from those things which are prescribed in the rubrics by chance and inadvertently falls away, there is always to be presumed in the priest an absence of intention, however much the same priest, acting in good faith, even has actual intention while consecrating, because, as they say, a more general intention is presumed in him never to consecrate in those circumstances in which someone conscious of the matter would not consecrate without some fault? If the matter stands thus, it would have to be said, as Reuter well observes (part 4, n. 155), that intention would be lacking in the one acting whenever he acts against a law invincibly unknown or not known here and now. For example, he adds, in one baptizing, ordaining, or contracting matrimony, intention would be lacking when the subject receiving the Sacrament did not have the disposition required for the fruit of the Sacrament, invincibly unknown to the one conferring it. But these things can in no way be admitted; and Reuter himself adds the reason, ibid., because grave inconveniences would follow from it, and therefore, from the will of Christ, the intention must nevertheless be present.
And indeed Reuter, l.c., says that these grave inconveniences do not follow from an intention of not consecrating hosts placed outside the corporal; and we shall think this most truly said if we suppose that a defect of this sort does not remain hidden, but is noticed at once. But suppose, I ask, that neither the priest nor others noticed the defect, and consequently that those particles are adored, placed in the tabernacle, and distributed to the faithful asking for Eucharistic bread, indeed even carried to the sick as Viaticum. Would less grave inconveniences occur? Therefore that most grave reason by which Reuter proved the falsity of that principle taken generally, namely that intention is lacking in the one acting whenever he acts against a law invincibly unknown, this reason, I say, manifestly retains all its force in our case also.
Rather, it seems that one must inquire whether and how the opinions of Doctors apparently dissenting in this question can be reconciled. Now it can contribute much to this if it is inspected whether the Authors dispute about the same hypothesis or about a different one. For who does not see that, even concerning a pyx situated outside the corporal, multiple hypotheses can be imagined? And indeed we can think of two from among these, extremely opposed, concerning which hardly, or not even hardly, does dissent seem possible. One is about a pyx which the priest does not notice to be situated outside the corporal, and which he at the same time consecrates with actual intention. For who could deny or doubt that the particles were validly consecrated? The other is about particles brought by the cleric, but then left by him through forgetfulness in the epistle corner, enclosed in a box, however much in the sacristy mention had been made with the priest about their being consecrated. For neither does anyone seem able to judge these consecrated.
Therefore doubt remains concerning the case when the priest is supposed to have had only virtual intention while consecrating, and nevertheless the particles have not been placed in a position so distant or less becoming that the conjecture about intention concerning them is plainly improbable. The solution of this question does not seem to be sought elsewhere than from the preceding actual intention of the priest being weighed, namely how far that intention is to be thought to have extended itself, and therefore how far the virtual intention also extended itself; for the virtual cannot extend more than the preceding actual intention; wherefore in reality the validity or invalidity of the consecration must be said to depend on this. But once that norm of measuring intention has been rejected, which is taken from the will of not doing whatever would per se be in any way illicit, it already seems to remain that we say that this virtual intention suffices for consecrating those particles concerning which the priest, not then noticing the improper position of the particles, could have had actual intention. Therefore if the particles have been placed there where the priest, not noticing that they are outside the corporal, nevertheless could think them sufficiently present, and therefore could have an actual intention of consecrating them, we shall say that the intention of consecrating them was not lacking; but otherwise, if the particles lie in such a place that the priest could not have judged them sufficiently present, and therefore could not have had actual intention of consecrating them.
And from these things it is now clear what must be said about all those Authors whom the VV. (pp. 380-384) collected with immense labor, that they might confirm that the opinion of St. Doctor Alphonsus can be called common. Namely it must be inspected about what hypothesis they speak. For if they treat those circumstances in which all must confess that the intention of the priest cannot be presumed, it is manifest that they are improperly objected against us. But if anyone further contends that the opinion which the Authors gave about a particular hypothesis must be transferred, as some general principle, to any other hypothesis whatever, let him have this paralogism for himself.
In practice that ciborium will have to be consecrated again under condition in another Mass. Those particles can also be consumed after both Communions, but before the purification. - St. Ligorius, n. 217.
QUESTION 2. Whether a ciborium placed indeed on the corporal, but which through forgetfulness remained closed at the time of consecration, is judged consecrated?
Resp. The answer is affirmative. The reason is: 1. because hosts in a closed ciborium certainly can be validly consecrated, as was said above; 2. because the Priest is always judged to have the absolute intention of consecrating whatever, with his knowledge, is upon the corporal, is becomingly consecrable, and is had by way of a continuous thing. - Thus Reuter, etc.
You will object: From the things said in the preceding question, a ciborium left outside the corporal probably is not consecrated, because the Priest is not judged to will to sin; by parity, in the present case for the same reason.
Resp. I deny the parity. For although the Church wills the ciborium to be opened for greater reverence, nevertheless since this irreverence does not seem notable, and this can happen more frequently, this precept does not urge so much as the precept of not consecrating outside the corporal. Reuter asserts that this is the common opinion of the Doctors.
- QUESTION 3. Whether drops of wine adhering to the chalice, either exteriorly or interiorly, are judged consecrated?
Resp. 1. Drops adhering exteriorly are never judged consecrated. The reason is that the intention of the Priest is deservedly presumed to be to consecrate that one thing which is licitly consecrable; but those little drops would be consecrated illicitly and irreverently and without any utility. Therefore... - Thus all. - St. Ligorius, n. 215.
Resp. 2. More probably neither are the drops adhering interiorly and altogether separated from the greater quantity judged consecrated. The reason is that it does not seem to be the intention of the Church, and therefore neither of the Priest, to consecrate anything except the wine which is potable by way of one thing and is found gathered together in the chalice. - Thus more commonly with Suarez, Laymann, etc., against others. - See St. Ligorius, ibid.
QUESTION 4. What sort of sin is it to consecrate a broken or stained host?
Resp. Scandal being excluded, it is only venial 5, unless the stain or fracture is enormous. If, however, some fracture or stain, even notable, is discovered in the host after the oblation, such a host will licitly be consecrated 6, because already through the oblation it has been somewhat dedicated and sanctified to God. - St. Ligorius, n. 204, and others commonly 7.
5 St. Alphonsus (cited n. 204) says that it is venial if it is done without reasonable cause.
6 St. Alphonsus limits: unless scandal of the people is feared.
7 Here the question is usually added: whether the consecration of one species without the other is valid. And St. Alphonsus (lib. 6, n. 196, dub. 3) distinguishes a twofold case: the first, if this happens by chance; the other, if the priest has a positive intention of consecrating only one species without the other. As to the first, however, he responds: No one doubts that it is valid if this happens by chance. But as to the other he responds: Lugo denies, De Eucharistia, disp. 19, n. 103, whom Renzi follows.... Others commonly affirm.
But this absurd opinion is attributed to John Lugo altogether undeservedly, for he writes most expressly, ibid., n. 104: All priests consecrating, whether by error or deliberately, one species without the other, validly consecrate. Now he who deliberately consecrates one species without the other certainly has the positive intention, as St. Alphonsus has it, of consecrating only one species without the other.
Certainly Lugo, after he had written, ibid., n. 102, that the opinion of those who said that the consecration of one species would be invalid is rejected by all, because it asserts this without any foundation against the truth of the words - since the consecration of either species is absolute, it immediately has its effect before the consecration of the other species - then adds concerning that opinion of theirs, ibid., n. 103: Besides, this opinion, if it is explained in the due manner, as perhaps it was understood by its Authors, is not absurd, but true. But he does not affirm this about the hypothesis of St. Alphonsus, namely if the priest has the positive intention of consecrating only one species without the other; rather, he affirms it about an altogether different hypothesis, namely of a priest consecrating, and indeed consecrating not one species only but both species, yet with the intention of offering sacrifice wholly and efficaciously excluded.
Namely Lugo explains how one must reason about the sacrifice of the Mass no otherwise than we are accustomed to speak about the sacrament of matrimony, namely that the sacrament of matrimony was so instituted by Christ the Lord that for the baptized the character of sacrament can in no way be separated from the character of matrimony; and by parity the character of sacrament in the Eucharist is so constituted that from the institution of Christ the Lord it has at the same time the character of sacrifice. Therefore, just as no matrimony can exist among Christians which is not a sacrament, so in no way can it happen that a consecration of the Eucharist is confected and at the same time does not have the character of sacrifice. From this, indeed, the consequence is that, just as the matrimony of one who would indeed wish to contract it, but at the same time would absolutely and efficaciously be unwilling to receive the sacrament, would be void and invalid, so also the consecration of each species would be invalid if the priest, pronouncing the form, should will absolutely and efficaciously to exclude the sacrifice by his intention.
Thus Lugo: I suppose that which our Theologians commonly suppose and teach, namely that Christ so instituted this Sacrament that he at the same time instituted it in the character of sacrifice, and did not will sacrifice to be made without Sacrament, nor Sacrament without sacrifice...; so that priests could neither consecrate outside sacrifice, nor offer sacrifice without consecration, as Suarez proves....
He applies this doctrine to the hypothesis of one consecrating one species in this way, l.c., n. 104: It is consequent that he who wishes to consecrate the host alone,
and not to offer sacrifice, but by excluding the oblation of sacrifice, would do nothing, because he does not have power for consecrating except by way of sacrifice. Yet in fact all priests consecrating one species without the other, whether by error or deliberately, validly consecrate: because they do not altogether efficaciously exclude the intention of sacrificing, but will to consecrate in the better way in which they can, and therefore will at least implicitly, through the consecration of the host, for example, to begin the sacrifice in such a way that, as far as lies in them, it can be completed through the consecration of the chalice, if it is applied; whence then they already have some intention of offering partially in the consecration of the host. Besides, if a Priest... foreseeing that sacrifice cannot be offered without the consecration of each species, and foreseeing that both cannot be consecrated, should will to consecrate one, altogether excluding the intention of offering even partially, or of beginning the sacrifice through that consecration, by an altogether efficacious will in the manner explained, then we say that he would not consecrate, because the will of consecrating must be at least an implicit will of offering partially, or of beginning the oblation of the sacrifice; and in this sense the aforesaid opinion would be true.
Therefore Lugo does not say that the consecration of one species is invalid when someone only has the positive intention of consecrating one species without the other; for he affirms that it is valid, although he deliberately consecrates one species without the other. But he pronounces it invalid when in this very consecration of one species someone efficaciously excludes any will whatever, even partially, of beginning the sacrifice, or of offering partially, no otherwise than if someone efficaciously excluded the will of receiving the sacrament while he intends to contract matrimony. This efficacious will of the sacrament is judged excluded when someone is of such a mind that, if he knew that true matrimony could not be celebrated unless at the same time the sacrament is received, he then would be unwilling even to have the contract of matrimony itself.