Article I. On the Force of Obligation

100. Principles. I. Any law whatever induces true obligation, at least to penalty; for in this law differs from counsel, that the subject cannot put it aside with impunity according to his own pleasure. - Thus all.

II. Any human law whatever can of itself oblige in conscience before God ¹. The reason is that Superiors are constituted by God with the power of commanding. Hence the Apostle, Rom. 13. 12: He who resists the power resists the ordination of God. But they who resist acquire damnation for themselves. - Thus all.

¹ It is said, can oblige, not however, obliges; the reason is that law does not oblige beyond the mind of the legislator; therefore if he intends to oblige under penalty alone, the law per se will not oblige to fault. And indeed the Doctors commonly hand down that this is valid both concerning civil laws and concerning canonical laws. See Reiffenstuel, Canon Law, book I, title 2, no. 199 and following; Laymann, book I, tr. 4, ch. 15, no. 1, etc.

** But whether some law must be considered merely penal, or whether violation of it also brings guilt of conscience, this the Doctors commonly establish must be defined from the mind of the legislator, which is argued both from the matter and words of the law, and from other adjuncts. But what the Salmanticenses (On Laws, ch. 2, no. 45), and after them St. Alphonsus (book 1, no. 147), have as to be held in place of a norm, whether a precept is joined beyond the penalty, must be taken, as Suarez adds with others (On Laws, book 3, ch. 3, no. 6), unless the mind of the legislator is clear from elsewhere, which, as the same Suarez adds (ibid., ch. 4, no. 8), can also be gathered from custom, which is the best interpreter of laws. Much less can it be admitted as a certain rule that laws are merely penal if they display no commanding words; concerning which see Suarez, cited ch. 4, no. 10.

III. Law obliges under grave or under light fault according to the gravity of the matter or circumstances, or of the end specially intended by the Superior. But an affirmative law obliges always, but not for always: a negative law, however, obliges both always and for always, that is, for each individual moment. - All consent.

IV. Positive divine law, and human law, do not generally oblige with very grave inconvenience, or with grave harm which is per accidens joined to the observation of the law. It is clear from natural and canon law, from the practice of the Church, and from the consent of all.

101. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether a legislator can command under light fault in grave matter, and vice versa?

I answer to the first affirmatively, at least more probably, because obligation depends on his will, just as the law itself does. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig., no. 143.

I answer to the second negatively, because proportion is lacking between grave obligation and light matter. Except if the matter is not light in every respect, but grave from the end, etc. - St. Lig. ibid. and others commonly ².

² ** St. Alphonsus (book 1, no. 141), after he reported the most common doctrine, namely: when the matter is light, the one transgressing does not sin mortally, even if the superior commanded under mortal sin, adds as an exception from the Salmanticenses (tr. 15, ch. 6, from no. 86), that a regular prelate can command under grave obligation that which is commanded by the rule only under light obligation, if it is feared that the rule otherwise will not be observed. But that these things may be rightly understood, it must be observed that the Salmanticenses and the Authors alleged by them dispute concerning rules which indeed by force of the Constitutions of that Order oblige only under light fault, or only under penalty, but at the same time have that matter which is capable of grave obligation, for example, abstinence from flesh meat.

QUESTION 2. What matter of law must be considered grave or light?

I answer. This must be gathered 1. from the words of the law itself; 2. from its object, end, and circumstances; 3. from the gravity of the penalty inflicted; 4. from the interpretation of custom. - But in general matter is grave when the end of the law is altogether of great moment, and the law conduces much to this end, or if it greatly harms it, even if of itself it is something light; otherwise, the matter will be considered light. Thus it is grave for one celebrating Mass if he omits to pour a few little drops of water into the Chalice. But it will not be grave if on a fast day you eat an ounce of bread outside the meal. - St. Lig., no. 144. - Lacroix, no. 663, and others commonly.

QUESTION 3. Whether human law can sometimes impede an obligation, otherwise valid, from being contracted?

I answer affirmatively. The reason is that sometimes the common good requires this; nor does natural law prohibit that, when the common good requires it, conditions be added by which acts otherwise valid are invalidated ³.

³ Thus the Tridentine Synod invalidates clandestine marriages, otherwise valid from merely natural law: so also civil laws invalidate testaments destitute of the prescribed solemnities.

QUESTION 4. Whether a violation of law in a light matter from contempt is grave?

I answer 1. Affirmatively, if the contempt directly affects the legislator formally as such, because the authority itself from which laws obtain force is contemned.

I answer 2. No, if the contempt regards only the matter as light in itself, or if the one sinning transgresses the law from carelessness, anger, or another cause of this kind. The reason is that then the authority itself does not seem to be contemned. - St. Lig., no. 142.

102. • QUESTION 5. Whether the application of law or a sentence which is founded on a false presumption of fact obliges in conscience?

I answer 1. No, if the application of the law is founded only on the presumption of a particular fact, of fault, of fraud, or of damage; the reason is that if the fact is lacking, by that very fact the whole foundation of the obligation is lacking. Hence if you are condemned to pay money for damages which are falsely thought to have been inflicted by your donkey, you are not obligated to pay, except per accidens, for example by reason of scandal; but then you can compensate yourself even after the sentence has been passed. - St. Lig., nos. 100, 150. - Suarez, Roncaglia, and others commonly.

I answer 2. If the law is founded on the presumption of universal danger, fault, frauds, etc., its application always obliges in conscience, even every fault being excluded; because the common good requires that all be stably obligated; otherwise evils would not be impeded effectively; and the law otherwise intends to prevent the danger of hallucination, and to render men more cautious. Hence you are held to pay the fine to which you are condemned for damage truly inflicted by your animal, even if that damage happened without theological fault on your part. - St. Lig., no. 100. - See the things to be said in the Treatise on Restitution, where it treats of the unjust damager.