Article I. On the Promulgation of Law

Promulgation is the publication of a law, made by legitimate authority for inducing obligation upon subjects.

96. Principles. - I. Public promulgation of a law is necessary so that it may oblige, nor does private knowledge of it suffice, because thus the precept has not been sufficiently proposed and manifested to the community. - St. Lig., no. 95.

II. Promulgation suffices without knowledge of the law for obliging in the external forum, because knowledge of a duly promulgated law is generally presumed. But in the internal forum, knowledge of the law is required besides, because no one can sin without cognition of the obligation, according to what was said in the Treatise on Human Acts, no. 4 and following.

III. From the nature of the thing it suffices that the law be promulgated in some principal city, or in such a place whence it can come to the knowledge of the community, and it obliges immediately when it has been promulgated. Attend nevertheless to received custom, or to the particular statutes of various places.

97. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether a doubtfully promulgated law obliges?

I answer. No, because it is not sufficiently manifested and intimated, and therefore is doubtful; but a doubtful law does not oblige. - St. Lig., no. 97.

QUESTION 2. Whether pontifical laws oblige as soon as they are promulgated?

I answer affirmatively. For a promulgated law by that very fact immediately has force, and obliges even, as they say, in second act, all those who know it.

QUESTION 3. Whether it suffices that episcopal laws be promulgated in the episcopal city, and papal laws at Rome?

I answer affirmatively, because this suffices so that they can be manifested to the Christian people. Besides, the mode of promulgation is in the power of the legislator. - Moreover in practice Bishops wish to oblige through promulgation made in the episcopal city, and Pontiffs through that which is made at Rome ¹.

¹ The opinion which for pontifical laws requires promulgation in the individual provinces and the lapse of two months before they have force of obliging rests only on a certain confused heap of false allegations, which can be seen heaped up in Reiffenstuel (book 1, title 2, § 5, no. 125) and Suarez (On Laws, book 4, ch. 15, no. 1), and which others then borrowed and attributed some extrinsic probability to this opinion. And indeed very many, almost all, who are usually alleged, both the old Canonists and later Theologians, attributed force of obliging to pontifical Constitutions in such a way that immediately from the promulgation made in the Roman curia, all who knew it were held to observe it; but the dispute concerning promulgation, or better, concerning publication in the provinces, and also concerning the lapse of a certain time, looked only to this, that it might be defined when violators of the law could allege probable ignorance of the law in judgments in order to avoid punishment.

** Against the last little part of this note, which is referred to the preceding Question 2, VV. object the text brought by St. Alphonsus from ch. 1, On the Concession of Prebends, in VI: Law or Constitution and mandate bind no one, unless after they have come to the knowledge of the same persons, or unless after the time within which they ought by no means to have been ignorant. And hence they wish to conclude that laws do not oblige even in conscience except after two months from promulgation.

But the text brought forward, just as it refutes the conclusion of VV., so it confirms the doctrine of the Author. For a twofold limitation or exception is seen in it. The first is generally of those to whose knowledge the law has come. But this would badly be affirmed if the law obligated only after two months, since it can easily come to the knowledge of many before two months have elapsed. The other exception is of those who violate the law after those two months, and therefore are not excused. Moreover this also would be falsely affirmed generally concerning guilt in conscience; since even after two months some can inculpably be ignorant of the law.

As to the Council of Trent, it is certain that its decrees pertaining to faith and morals oblige even in those places where they have not been specially promulgated; likewise that the decree concerning clandestine marriages does not oblige except in parishes where promulgation preceded. As to the other decrees which regard reform, the sentence asserting that they oblige everywhere is to be preferred, since they have been duly promulgated at Rome. - Scavini and Analecta Iuris Pontificii, series II, col. 2308. - And Cases, no. 89 and following.