Article — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
Article II. On Just Price
- It is twofold: 1. legal, which is determined by law; 2. natural or common, which corresponds to the value of the thing according to the common estimation of men.
But the natural price is 1. the highest, above which the thing is not customarily estimated; 2. the lowest, below which the thing is generally not estimated; 3. the middle, which is placed between the two.
- Principles. - I. The legal price, or the price constituted by civil authority, must be held as adequate to the value of the thing, and therefore must be observed under the burden of restitution. The reason is that it belongs to the civil authority to establish whatever pertains to public commerce, since it can make laws for the common good. - Thus all.
Yet sometimes it is lawful to exceed the legal price, namely 1. if it is not observed by the greater part of men, while the Prince is silent; 2. if, circumstances being changed, the rate becomes unjust; 3. if the goods are notably more precious than usual, or worse.
II. When the legal price is lacking, only that is to be held as just which is determined as such by common estimation, if there is question of merchandise which has valuation among the multitude; because the adequate price of things of this kind is deduced from their utility for common uses. Moreover, the valuation of such utility cannot be had better than by common estimation. - Thus all.
But if the things do not have a common estimation, as are gems, precious little pictures, etc., more probably they are to be estimated according to the judgment of experts in that matter, with the circumstances attended to, and with regard had to the novelty, antiquity, rarity, etc., of the thing. The reason is that in matters of this kind they are reputed suitable judges, just as the common people are in common matters. Yet the opposite opinion appears as probable, because in that case the just price seems to be that concerning which the contracting parties agree. Thus with respect to each opinion St. Lig. n. 807. - In practice those are not to be disturbed who in good faith and freely, according to their own judgment, agree in such things. - Thus Salmant. - Gousset, n. 842. A fortiori that price is to be reputed just concerning which each party agrees, if the price is wholly unknown, because each is then exposed to danger. - St. Lig. n. 802 at the end.
- Questions. - Q. 1. Whether the seller can sell a thing more dearly on account of the special affection which he experiences toward it, or the advantage which he derives from it?
Resp. to the 1st. Affirmatively. The reason is that the affection of an owner toward his own thing is truly appreciable by a price, since the deprivation of the thing is greater for him. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig. n. 807.
Resp. to the 2nd. Affirmatively, even a fortiori; since the deprivation of a special advantage renders the thing much more precious to the seller, and it is equitable that the price increase by reason of the greater loss which he suffers. - St. Thomas, II-II, q. 77, art. 1 and following, and others very commonly.
- Q. 2. Whether the seller can sell a thing more dearly on account of the affection or special utility of the buyer?
Resp. Theologians commonly deny it, because the greater utility or affection is not the seller's, and therefore cannot be sold by him; otherwise he would sell what is not his. - Thus St. Thomas, q. 77, art. 1: If someone is helped much by another's thing which he has received, but the one who sold is not harmed by lacking that thing, he ought not to over-sell it; because the utility which accrues to the other is not from the seller, but from the condition of the buyer; and no one ought to sell what is not his. - St. Lig. n. 806 and Carriere, n. 692, are in agreement.
Yet some affirm it, on the ground that the seller procures that advantage for the buyer; but this reason seems altogether weak, as is clearly plain from the doctrine of St. Thomas.
- Q. 3. Whether it is lawful to buy more cheaply in favor of a seller seeking a buyer?
Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is that unsolicited things become cheap, and the price of a thing decreases when the thing is of little use to the buyer and he buys in favor of the seller. - Thus commonly with St. Lig. n. 802.
Q. 4. Whether it is also lawful to buy more cheaply where goods are sold because of poverty?
Resp. Affirmatively, probably. The reason is that an unsolicited thing decreases in price according to common estimation. But the need of the seller does not bring it about that the common estimation is changed. Yet others probably deny it.
- Q. 5. Whether it is lawful to sell more dearly because of delay of payment of the price, or to buy more cheaply because of anticipated payment?
Resp. Affirmatively, at least probably, provided the legal rate for a mutuum, or the reason of some title, is not exceeded. The reason is clear from what was said above concerning usury, n. 863 and following 1.
1 Namely, the lack of the price during the time in which payment is deferred is a burden appreciable by price. But the words of mutuum or of the thing or money lent are employed abusively according to those things which were said at length above. For the contract from which profit is sought from these things is to be judged to be of a different nature.
Q. 6. Whether notes and credits also can be bought more cheaply because of anticipated payment?
Resp. 1. Affirmatively altogether, if they are uncertain or of difficult payment, because then they become notably cheap.
Resp. 2. Affirmatively probably, even if they are certain and of easy payment. The reason is 1. because money is not bought, but an action to it, and therefore that price is judged just which is commonly paid for such notes. - Thus St. Lig. n. 829, etc.; 2. because they are equivalent to money lent; therefore, from the same reason as in a mutuum, it is lawful to receive a moderate profit according to the legal rate. - Thus now the common practice.
- Q. 7. Whether someone can buy for much less credits of payment very difficult in themselves, if because of a circumstance special to himself they become easy of payment?
Resp. Affirmatively, more probably. The reason is that the facility of obtaining payment does not depend on the thing which is sold, but on the buyer himself; moreover the value of any thing is determined by common estimation, not by the particular circumstance of the buyer. - St. Lig. n. 829.
Q. 8. Whether you can sell at the current price a thing which you know will soon be worth less?
Resp. Affirmatively, more probably and more truly. The reason is that the present price is just and has not yet been changed, provided, however, that this knowledge is private; for if it were common, the price would already be changed. Yet sometimes you could sin against charity. - St. Thomas. - St. Lig. n. 824. - Hom. apost. n. 188.
- Q. 9. Whether you can sell at the current price a thing mixed with another cheaper thing?
Resp. A distinction must be made, namely 1. if the mixture is harmful or renders the thing notably worse or less useful, you sin against justice, as is clear; 2. if your thing is of extraordinary goodness, you can probably sell it, mixed with the cheaper thing, at the common price; 3. if by skill you so mix the cheaper matter with the better that it is better tempered, you can sell it at the customary price. But in practice this should not easily be permitted because of the danger of hallucination. - St. Lig. n. 820-823.
- Q. 10. Whether merchants are bound to restitution who by fraud or a lie induce buyers to buy their goods at a higher price than they would have bought them, although they do not exceed the highest price?
Resp. 1. As to fraud, affirmatively. The reason is that fraud is an efficacious and unjust cause of the damage which the buyer suffers; moreover, everyone has a strict right not to be induced by fraud or deceit to suffer some damage. Therefore...
Resp. 2. As to a lie, per se the same would have to be said, since it also is of itself an unjust cause of damage. Nevertheless, ordinarily lies or even perjuries by which merchants affirm that goods cost them so much, or that such a price was offered to them, are not to be held as frauds really causing damage; the reason is that these things are so frequent among them that almost no one gives them faith. Yet an exception must be made if, at any time, because of special trust in the seller, the lie must be judged the cause of the contract. - St. Lig. n. 805. - Lacroix, n. 956. - Reuter, n. 223.
- Q. 11. Whether or how merchants sin who, when asked concerning the price of goods, notably exaggerate it?
Resp. 1. If they truly intend to sell at this price, they sin against justice by unjustly coveting another's property; and they are bound to restitution if in fact that price is paid to them.
Resp. 2. But if they intend only to give the buyer a place for offering his own price, so that thus they may come to the just price, they are excused, because it is known and customary for merchants to speak thus, so that they may lead buyers to the just price.
Q. 12. Whether they sin against justice who, before delivery, diminish or adulterate a thing sold at the lowest price?
Resp. Affirmatively, because they act against the pact entered into with the buyer. For although it is lawful to sell at the highest price, nevertheless it is not lawful for a merchant who sells at the lowest or middle price secretly to procure for himself the middle or highest price by diminishing the quality of the merchandise, or by subtracting from the measure or from the weight; otherwise agreements would be altogether useless.
- Q. 13. Whether European merchants sin against justice who sell among the Indians, at the maximum price, knives, mirrors, and other things of this kind, which among us are held to be of a cheaper price?
Resp. Negatively, because although these things are cheaper in our regions, nevertheless they are commonly esteemed highly by Indians or Chinese, etc.; moreover the common price is determined from the common estimation of the men of the region. Therefore... - Carriere, n. 699.
- Q. 14. Whether they sin against justice who buy precious things at a cheap price when they are exposed for sale among dealers in old things?
Resp. Negatively, because those things are judged to have lost their old price and to receive another by custom, or by the agreement of the contracting parties. Whence things of this kind receive the greatest latitude by reason of price. - St. Lig. n. 807. - Thus sometimes books are bought for a few coins which could have been sold for five or ten francs. The same must be said concerning the purchase of old furniture, which are called in French de rencontre, because these are commonly held to be of lesser value. - Carriere, n. 695, 699.
- Resolves. - 1. Merchants who sell in small quantities can sometimes sell more dearly than those who sell in great quantity; because they must spend greater labors and expenses, and greater time, in preserving them and distributing them to buyers. Thus innkeepers, stable-keepers, etc., who sell oats, hay, straw, and other things more dearly, are excused from injustice. - St. Lig. n. 809.
- It can also be sold more dearly if the price must be handed over by the buyer at the time when the thing will be worth more. Thus likewise it can be bought more cheaply if the thing must be delivered at the time when it will be worth less.
- If the seller and buyer are ignorant of the price of the thing and contract for a certain price, the contract is valid, provided each proceeds according to equity and good faith; because if each is ignorant of the just price, each exposes himself to equal danger of damage and voluntarily yields concerning his own right.
- A thing cannot be sold beyond the just price for this reason, that the seller, from his own ignorance or imprudence or even from a fortuitous event, bought it at a higher price, or underwent greater expenses than others commonly pay or undergo. The reason is that the prices of things do not increase or decrease from this, that it happens to one or another, but from that which commonly happens. Nor from the fact that some private merchant suffered theft or shipwreck is the price of things customarily increased in the estimation of the people; just as the price of grain is not customarily increased because one or another farmer lost the fruits of his fields by fatal hail. - But it would have to be said otherwise if many merchants had lost their goods in shipwreck, because the goods, having been made rarer, would by that very fact increase in price. - Elbel, n. 587.
- The practice of merchants or craftsmen is not to be approved who, in order to attract more persons to their shop, are accustomed to give gifts to maidservants, servants, sons of families, etc.; but afterwards they try tacitly to compensate expenses of this kind by increasing the price of things beyond justice. For thus they secretly compel the masters themselves unjustly to refund those donations. - Elbel, n. 583. - But it is otherwise if they preserve the just price with them.
- Likewise the practice of those merchants is to be reproved who expose their goods for sale at the very cheapest price, so that they may attract buyers to themselves; but afterwards they corrupt the weight or measure, etc. The reason is that thus buyers are deceived unjustly. - Elbel, n. 523. - Lugo, D. 26, sect. 8, etc.
- A fortiori the practice of those is to be reproved who refuse to restore to the owner appearing things belonging to another which were bought in good faith, unless he first refunds the price spent for them. - Elbel, n. 691. Except, however, with respect to France, unless the thing was bought in a public market or from a merchant selling such things (Art. 2280). - See above n. 644.
- Generally, in making restitution because of injury to the just price, these things are to be held: 1. if there is question of the seller, the unjust excess must be computed from the highest price, because he could have sold at this price; whence the buyer was not injured except in that which surpasses the highest price; 2. but if there is question of the buyer, the defect of the price must be computed from the lowest price, because he could have bought at such a price; whence the seller was injured only in that which is below this price. I said generally; because if profit was obtained by fraud, it would have to be restored, even if the highest price was not exceeded, or the lowest was reached, according to what was said above n. 897. - See Cases, from n. 900 to n. 944.